Malware Analysis and Adversary Infrastructure Mapping: the One-Two Punch

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#DTWEBINAR



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- 15+ years in infosec
- Passionate about fighting bad guys...
- ...and about other stuff too ©



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- Digital Forensics/Incident Response Consultant
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Punch One: Malware Hunting and Analysis




Detection of Infected Host



• All detected items Items that were detected on your PC. Detected item Alert level Date Trojan:Win32/Malex.gen!E Severe 6/14/2016 Category: Trojan **Description:** This program is dangerous and executes commands from an attacker. Recommended action: Remove this software immediately. Items: file:C:\Users\possiblyothers\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe file:C:\Users\POSSIB~1\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe

Detection of Infected Host





Trojan:Win32/Malex.gen!E is a generic detection for certain malicious files that attempt to copy itself in certain folders without the user's consent or knowledge.





Physical Memory Acquisition



Autoruns Collection



Windows OS Artifacts



Network Traffic Capture





Process List

Name 💽	PID ▼	PPID ▼	Sess ▼	Wow64 Start
svchost.exe	656	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:07
svchost.exe	708	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:07
svchost.exe	856	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:10
svchost.exe	904	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:10
svchost.exe	1020	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:13
svchost.exe	8	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:13
svchost.exe	828	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:15
svchost.exe	884	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:18
svchost.exe	360	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:18
svchost.exe	1512	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:25
svchost.exe	1184	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:53:39
svchost.exe	2436	556	0	0 2016-06-12 15:54:48
svchost.exe	720	556	0	0 2016-06-12 17:50:16
sychost exe	3524	556	1	0 2016-06-13 11-41-09
svchost.exe	4616	2044	1	2016-06-13 11:56:00



0 20

SVCHOST Process Details

0xffffe001a9a16780:svchost.exe 4616 2044

UTC+0000

audit: \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\POSSIB~1\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe

cmd: C:\Users\POSSIB~1\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe
path: C:\Users\POSSIB~1\AppData\Local\Temp\svchost.exe

Anomalous Path

Wrong Parent

Late Creation Time



Extracted SVCHOST Binary Strings

```
0123456789ABCDEF
.locky
\_Locky_recover_instructions.txt
\ Locky recover instructions.bmp
Open
sychost.exe
:Zone.Identifier
vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet
Locky
cmd.exe /C del /Q /F "
_Locky_recover_instructions.bmp
_Locky_recover_instructions.txt
Winnt
Application Data
```



Extracted SVCHOST Binary



SHA256: 787cea08c6a10fdc2558b0b8d31ec6aa66afb150e08996c1be1dda39cdd640d5

File name: executable.4616.exe

Detection ratio: 25 / 48

Analysis date: 2016-06-15 03:44:39 UTC (1 minute ago)

Analysis

♠ File detail

Additional information

Comments

√ Votes

	Antivirus	Result	Update
ı	Ad-Aware	Gen:Variant.Graftor.272655	20160615
ı	AhnLab-V3	Trojan/Win32.Locky	20160614
	Antiy-AVL	Trojan[Ransom]/Win32.Locky.genb	20160615



Network Connections

В	C	D	E
Proto	LocalAddr	ForeignAddr	State
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50257	208.100.26.234:80	CLOSE_WAIT
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50302	13.107.4.50:80	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50235	63.146.14.9:443	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50293	64.4.54.18:443	ESTABLISHED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50268	23.218.204.183:443	ESTABLISHED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50205	204.79.197.200:443	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50260	86.104.134.144:80	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50244	208.100.26.234:80	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50204	204.79.197.200:443	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50258	86.104.134.144:80	SYN_SENT
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50233	63.146.14.9:443	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50100	65.52.108.225:443	ESTABLISHED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50231	63.146.14.9:443	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50297	13.107.4.50:80	ESTABLISHED
В	C	D	F

В	C	D	E
Proto ▼	LocalAddr -	Foreign Addr	StateF
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50257	208.100.26.234:80	CLOSE_WAIT
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50244	208.100.26.234:80	CLOSED
TCPv4	172.16.7.54:50247	208.100.26.234:80	CLOSED


Memory Analysis of Infected Host

Packet Carving from Memory

Source	Destination	Protocel	Length	Info		
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS	72	Standard	query	0x787c A ssl.bing.com
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS	72	Standard	query	0x787c A ssl.bing.com
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS	148	Standard	query	response 0x787c CNAME ssl-bing-com.
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x787c CNAME ssl-bing-com.
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x893c A vdijrsjcnnxftd.de
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x893c A vdijrsjcnnxftd.de
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x893c No such name
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x777d A npkjhnfbnlgmf.in
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x893c No such name
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x777d A npkjhnfbnlgmf.in
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x777d No such name
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x2257 A enerf.nl
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS			-	response 0x777d No such name
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x2257 A enerf.nl
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x2257 No such name
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x14ad A rdbbnojt.fr
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x14ad A rdbbnojt.fr
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x14ad No such name
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0xc9ec A jstfqmo.it
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0xc9ec A jstfqmo.it
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x14ad No such name
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x2257 No such name
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0xc9ec No such name
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS			-	0x2162 A wfdrdiolrq.pw
172.16.7.54	172.16.0.1	DNS				0x2162 A wfdrdiolrq.pw
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x2162 A 208.100.26.234
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS				response 0x2162 A 208.100.26.234
172.16.0.1	172.16.7.54	DNS	125	Standard	query	response 0xc9ec No such name

ODOMAINTOOLS

Memory Analysis of Infected Host



Punch Two: Mapping and Blocking Malicious Infrastructure





...Between malware analysis and infrastructure mapping

Malware has to do "stuff" that involves the Internet

- Phone home to C2 for instructions
- Exfiltrate data
- Get encryption key (ransomware)
- etc...

And the most effective way for it to find the hosts it needs to talk to is via *domain names*.





To (over)simplify:

- Start with a domain name (malware infra in this case)
 - Block it
- Find what it's connected to
 - Block those
- Determine if it's been active previously
 - Search logs

A Typical Hunt Sequence



HOW DO THE STEPS PLAY OUT?

An indicator is seen

IOC Sources:

- Phish domain
- Firewall/IPS alert
- Malware Analysis

Form Hypothes(es)

This indicator could be

- · Part of a campaign
- Targeting my industry
- Targeting my org

Gather Data

Enrich indicators

- Cross-indexed Whois/DNS data
- Other domain profile info



Evaluate data

- Connected domains?
- Thematic consistency?
- High risk scores?
- Other red flags?

Test Hypotheses part 2

Look for more evidence

- Search alerts for domains/IPs
- Search archived logs
- Search SIEM/feeds

Act!


- Block domains/IPs in network/host defenses
- Monitor observed actors
- Block future infrastructure



FLAGSHIP DOMAIN/DNS INVESTIGATION PLATFORM


Easy mining of DomainTools databases for cyber investigations and related research activities

- Whois, DNS, MX, and more—all cross-referenced
- Historical Whois and DNS data
- Based on research into real-world investigative workflows





Scientific Method for Investigations



DEMO TIME!

The Proof is in the Data



OUR DATA

300 Million Current domain names

100+ Million ccTLD domains 10+ Billion

Current Hostnames

10+ Million Continually mapped IPv4 address range delegations and sub-delegations

15+ Million DNS data points on changes among domain names, IP addresses, name servers and Registrants 10+ Billion Historical domain profile records on over nearly 500 million current and previously registered domain names

5,000,000

Nearly 5 Million new domain profiles captured daily

1,000,000

Over 1 Million new website screenshots taken daily

20,000,000

Nearly 20 Million new domain-IP resolutions

Current Product and Solution Suite





DomainTools Iris – unified domain and DNS research tool



Enterprise-grade APIs

- Integration with third-party products
- Partnerships with threat intelligence platforms
- Large-scale enrichment, expansion & automation



Monitoring products for brands, IPs, NSs & registrants



Domain Reputation Engine



Investigative tools for domains, IPs, NSs & registrants



QUESTIONS?

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@timhelming