

THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL

**HOW TO SURVIVE AND THRIVE DURING
THE COLLAPSE OF THE WELFARE STATE**

**JAMES DALE DAVIDSON &
LORD WILLIAM REES-MOGG**

Authors of THE GREAT RECKONING

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
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The Sovereign Individual
君主个人

by James Dale Davidson & Lord William Rees-Mogg
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CHAPTER 1 THE TRANSITION IN THE YEAR 2000
第 1 章 2000 年的转型

"It feels like something big is about to happen: graphs show us the yearly growth of populations, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, Web addresses, and Mbytes per dollar. They all soar up to an asymptote just beyond the turn of the century: The Singularity. The end of everything we know. The beginning of something we may never understand"¹ -Danny Hillis PREMONITIONS

在眼前即将发生的大事情:图表向我们展示了人口、二氧化碳大气浓度、网址和每美元兆字节数的年增长情况。它们都飙升到进入这个世纪之后的渐近线:奇点。一切我们所知道的的终结。我们可能永远无法理解的新的开端。-丹尼·希利斯《预兆》

The coming of the year 2000 has haunted the Western imagination for the past thousand years. Ever since the world failed to end at the turn of the first millennium after Christ, theologians, evangelists, poets, and seers have looked to the end of this decade with an expectation that it would bring something momentous. No less an authority than Isaac Newton speculated that the world would end with the year 2000. Michel de Nostradamus, whose prophecies have been read by every generation since they were first 1 Danny Hillis, "The Millennium Clock," Wired, Special Edition, Fall 1995, p.48.

2000 年的到来在过去千年里一直困扰着西方人的想象力。自从第一个千禧年末世并未到来以来,神学家、传道者、诗人和先知们都期望这个十年的结束会带来某些重大事件。连牛顿这样的大权威都猜测世界会在 2000 年结束。米兰·诺斯特拉达姆斯的预言从它们首次被发表起就已经被每一代人研读,预言称...

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published in 1568, forecast the coming of the Third Antichrist in July [1999.2](#) Swiss psychologist Carl Jung, connoisseur of the "collective unconscious," envisioned the birth of a New Age in 1997. Such forecasts may easily be ridiculed, but there is no denying that they excite a morbid fascination at a time when many are not entirely sure what to believe.

1568 年出版的著作预测了第三个反基督将于 1999 年 7 月到来。瑞士心理学家卡尔·荣格,对"集体无意识"有深入了解,预见了新纪元的到来

将在 1997 年。这类预言很容易被嘲笑,但不可否认它们引起了人们对当下究竟应当相信什么的病态迷恋。

A sense of disquiet about the future has begun to color the optimism so characteristic of Western societies for the past 250 years. People everywhere are hesitant and worried. You see it in their faces. Hear it in their conversation. See it reflected in polls and registered in the ballot box. Just as an invisible, physical change of ions in the atmosphere signals that a thunderstorm is imminent even before the clouds darken and lightning strikes, so now, in the twilight of the millennium, premonitions of change are in the air. One person after another, each in his own way, senses that time is running out on a dying way of life. As the decade expires, a murderous century expires with it, and also a glorious millennium of human accomplishment. All draw to a close with the year 2000.

对未来的不安感开始渗透到过去 250 年里西方社会所特有的乐观主义之中。每个人都变得犹豫不决和担忧。你可以从他们的面孔看出这种情绪。你可以从他们的交谈中听出这种情绪。你可以从民意调查和选票反映中看到这种情绪。就像大气中微不可察的静电变化预示着即将到来的暴风雨,即便乌云还没有聚集也没有闪电劈下,在这个千年的黄昏时刻,前兆正在空气中传播。一个接一个的人,每个人以自己的方式感觉到,一种濒临消亡的生活方式正在失去时间。随着这个十年的结束,一个充满杀戮的世纪也将随之结束,人类成就辉煌的一个千年也将走向终结。所有这一切都将在 2000 年画下句号。

We believe that the modern phase of Western civilization will end with it. This book tells why. Like many earlier works, it is an attempt to see into a glass darkly, to sketch out the vague shapes and dimensions of a future that is still to be. In that sense, we mean our work to be apocalyptic in the original meaning of the word. Apokalypsis means "unveiling" in Greek. We believe that a new stage in history-the age of the Sovereign Individual is about to be "unveiled."

我们相信现代西方文明阶段将以此告终。这本书讲述了原因。与许多早期著作一样,这是一次尝试,去窥探一个仍有待形成的未来。在这个意义上,我们的工作旨在以原意上的启示录式的方式呈现。启示录在希腊

语中意味着"揭示"。我们相信历史的新阶段即将到来 - 主权个体的时代将要"揭示"。

"Violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy borders." ISAIAH 60:18

"你地上不再听见强暴的事,你境内不再听见荒废毁坏的事。" 以赛亚书 60:18

THE FOURTH STAGE OF HUMAN SOCIETY

人类社会的第四阶段

The theme of this book is the new revolution of power which is liberating individuals at the expense of the twentieth century nationstate. Innovations that alter the logic of violence in unprecedented ways are transforming the boundaries within which the future must lie. If our deductions are correct, you stand at the threshold of the most sweeping revolution in history. Faster than all but a few now imagine, microprocessing will subvert and destroy the nationstate, creating new forms of social organization in the process. This will be far from an easy transformation.

这本书的主题是新的权力革命,它正在以牺牲二十世纪民族国家为代价来解放个人。创新正在以前所未有的方式改变暴力的逻辑,从而改变未来必须存在的边界。如果我们的推论是正确的,你站在历史上最广泛的革命的门槛上。比大多数人所设想的更快,微处理器将颠覆和摧毁民族国家,在此过程中创造出新的社会组织形式。这绝非易事。

The challenge it will pose will be all the greater because it will happen with incredible speed compared with anything seen in the past. Through all of human history from its earliest beginnings until now, there have been only three basic stages of economic life. (1) hunting-and-gathering societies; (2) agricultural societies; and (3) industrial societies. Now, looming over the horizon, is something entirely new, the fourth stage of social organization: information societies.

这种挑战将大得多,因为它的发生速度将比过去任何时候都快。从人类历史的最早开始到现在,经济生活只有三个基本阶段:(1)狩猎采集社会;(2)农业社会;(3)工业社会。现在,在地平线上浮现出一些全新的东西,即社会组织的第四个阶段:信息社会。

Each of the previous stages of society has corresponded with distinctly different phases in the evolution and control of violence. As we explain in detail, information societies promise to dramatically reduce the returns to violence, in part because they transcend locality. If the new millennium, the advantage of controlling violence on a 2 Ericka Cheetham, *The Final Prophecies of Nostradamus* (New York: Putnam, 1989), p. 424.

社会的每一个阶段都与暴力的演变和控制存在着截然不同的阶段。正如我们详细解释的那样,信息社会承诺会大幅降低暴力的回报,部分原因是它们超越了地域性。如果新千年,控制暴力的优势。

2

large scale will be far lower than it has been at any time since before the French Revolution. This will have profound consequences. One of these will be rising crime.

与法国大革命前相比,规模将大幅下降。这将产生深远的后果。其中之一就是犯罪率上升。

When the payoff for organizing violence at a large scale tumbles, the payoff from violence at a smaller scale is likely to jump. Violence will become more random and localized. Organized crime will grow in scope. We explain why.

当组织大规模暴力的回报下降时,小规模暴力的回报可能会跳涨。暴力将变得更加随机和局部化。有组织犯罪的范围将会扩大。我们解释原因。

Another logical implication of falling returns to violence is the eclipse of politics. There is much evidence that adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth century nationstate is rapidly eroding. The death of Communism is merely the most striking example. As we explore in detail, the collapse of morality and growing corruption among leaders of Western governments is not a random development. It is evidence that the potential of the nationstate is exhausted. Even many of its leaders no longer believe the platitudes they mouth. Nor are they believed by others.

暴力收益下降的另一个逻辑推论是政治的没落。有很多证据表明,对二十世纪民族国家公民神话的坚持正在迅速消退。共产主义的崩溃仅仅

是最引人注目的例子。正如我们详细探讨的那样,西方政府领导人中道德的崩溃和腐败的加剧并非偶然现象。这表明民族国家的潜力已经枯竭。即使是许多领导人也不再相信他们口中的空话。他人也不再相信他们。

History Repeats Itself 历史重演

This is a situation with striking parallels in the past. Whenever technological change has divorced the old forms from the new moving forces of the economy, moral standards shift, and people begin to treat those in command of the old institutions with growing disdain. This widespread revulsion often comes into evidence well before people develop a new coherent ideology of change. So it was in the late fifteenth century, when the medieval Church was the predominant institution of feudalism.

这是一种与过去存在惊人相似之处的情况。每当技术变革将旧有形式与经济新动力分离时,道德标准就会发生转移,人们开始以越来越蔑视的态度对待掌管旧制度的人。在人们形成新的一致性变革意识形态之前,这种普遍不满通常就已经显露出来。这正是十五世纪末,中世纪教会作为封建主义主导机构时的情况。

Notwithstanding popular belief in "the sacredness of the sacerdotal office," both the higher and lower ranks of clergy were held in the utmost contempt-not unlike the popular attitude toward politicians and bureaucrats today. 3 尽管人们普遍相信"祭司职位的神圣性",但上下级僧侣都受到极大的蔑视,这与人们今天对政客和官僚的态度并无不同。

We believe that much can be learned by analogy between the situation at the end of the fifteenth century, when life had become thoroughly saturated by organized religion, and the situation today, when the world has become saturated with politics.

我们认为,通过类比十五世纪末生活被有组织的宗教彻底饱和的情况和如今世界被政治彻底饱和的情况,我们可以学到很多东西。

The costs of supporting institutionalized religion at the end of the fifteenth century had reached a historic extreme, much as the costs of supporting

government have reached a senile extreme today.

支持机构化宗教的成本在十五世纪末达到了历史极端,就像今天支持政府的成本已经达到了衰老的极端。

We know what happened to organized religion in the wake of the Gunpowder Revolution. Technological developments created strong incentives to downsize religious institutions and lower their costs. A similar technological revolution is destined to downsize radically the nationstate early in the new millennium.

我们知道,在火药革命之后,有组织的宗教遭受了什么。技术发展创造了缩小宗教机构和降低其成本的强大动力。类似的技术革命注定要在新千年初期彻底缩小国家。

The Information Revolution 信息革命

As the breakdown of large systems accelerates, systematic compulsion will recede as a factor shaping economic life and the distribution of income. Efficiency will rapidly become more important than the dictates of power in the organization of social institutions. An entirely new realm of economic activity that is not hostage to physical violence will emerge in cyberspace. The most obvious benefits will flow to the "cognitive elite," who will increasingly operate outside political boundaries. They are 3

大型系统的崩溃正在加速,系统性强制将不再是塑造经济生活和收入分配的主导因素。在社会制度的组织中,效率将迅速比权力的命令更加重要。一个全新的经济活动领域将在网络空间中出现,它不会受到实体暴力的限制。最明显的受益者将是"认知精英",他们将越来越多地在政治边界之外运作。他们是

already equally home in Frankfurt, London, New York, Buenos Aires, Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Incomes will become more unequal within jurisdictions and more equal between them.

已经在法兰克福、伦敦、纽约、布宜诺斯艾利斯、洛杉矶、东京和香港同样家的。管辖区内收入差距将变大,但管辖区之间的收入差距将变小。

The Sovereign Individual explores the social and financial consequences of this revolutionary change. Our desire is to help you to take advantage of the opportunities of the new age and avoid being destroyed by its impact. If only half of what we expect to see happens, you face change of a magnitude with few precedents in history.

主权个人探讨了这一革命性变革的社会和财务影响。我们的愿望是帮助您利用新时代的机遇,避免被其影响毁灭。如果我们所期望看到的只是部分发生,您面临的变革规模将是历史上少有的。

The transformation of the year 2000 will not only revolutionize the character of the world economy, it will do so more rapidly than any previous phase change. Unlike the Agricultural Revolution, the Information Revolution will not take millennia to do its work. Unlike the Industrial Revolution, its impact will not be spread over centuries.

2000 年的转型不仅会彻底改变世界经济的面貌,而且其速度将比任何以前的阶段转变都更快。与农业革命不同,信息革命不需要数千年来完成其工作。与工业革命不同,其影响不会遍布整个世纪。

The Information Revolution will happen within a lifetime.
信息革命将在有生之年发生。

What is more, it will happen almost everywhere at once. Technical and economic innovations will no longer be confined to small portions of the globe. The transformation will be all but universal. And it will involve a break with the past so profound that it will almost bring to life the magical domain of the gods as imagined by the early agricultural peoples like the ancient Greeks. To a greater degree than most would now be willing to concede, it will prove difficult or impossible to preserve many contemporary institutions in the new millennium. When information societies take shape they will be as different from industrial societies as the Greece of Aeschylus was from the world of the cave dwellers.

此外,这将几乎同时在各地发生。技术和经济创新将不再局限于全球的小部分地区。这种转型将几乎是全方位的。它将与过去产生如此深刻的断裂,几乎会使早期农业民族(如古希腊人)想象中神圣领域重新展现。比大多数人现在愿意承认的更大程度上,在新的千年中保存许多当

代机构将证明是困难或不可能的。当信息社会成型时,它们将与工业社会有如阿伊斯库罗斯时代的希腊与洞穴居民世界一样的差异。

PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: THE RISE OF THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL

被解放的普罗米修斯:主权个人的崛起

The coming transformation is both good news and bad. The good news is that the Information Revolution will liberate individuals as never before. For the first time, those who can educate themselves will be almost entirely free to invent their own work and realize the full benefits of their own productivity. Genius will be unleashed, freed from both the oppression of government and the drags of racial and ethnic prejudice. In the Information Society, no one who is truly able will be detained by the ill-formed opinions of others. It will not matter what most of the people on earth might think of your race, your looks, your age, your sexual proclivities, or the way you wear your hair.

即将到来的转型既是好消息也是坏消息。好消息是信息革命前所未有地解放个人。第一次,那些可以自己受教育的人将几乎完全自由地发明自己的工作,并获得自己生产力的全部收益。天才将被释放,摆脱政府的压迫和种族和族裔偏见的拖累。在信息社会,不管地球上大多数人怎么看你的种族、相貌、年龄、性取向或发型,真正有能力的人都不会受到阻碍。

In the cybereconomy, they will never see you. The ugly, the fat, the old, the disabled will vie with the young and beautiful on equal terms in utterly color-blind anonymity on the new frontiers of cyberspace.

在网络经济中,他们将永远看不到你。丑陋的、肥胖的、老年人和残疾人将与年轻漂亮的人在网络空间这片新疆域上平等竞争,完全没有肤色的差异。

Ideas Become Wealth
想法成为财富

Merit, wherever it arises, will be rewarded as never before. In an environment where the greatest source of wealth will be the ideas you have

in your head rather than physical capital alone, anyone who thinks clearly will potentially be rich. The Information Age will be the age of upward mobility. It will afford far more equal opportunity for the billions of humans in parts of the world that never shared fully in the 4

在您头脑中的想法而非单纯的实物资本成为财富的最大来源的时代,任何思维清晰的人都有可能变得富有。信息时代将是向上流动的时代。它将为世界各地数十亿人提供更加平等的机会,这些人过去从未充分分享过第四次工业革命的成果。

prosperity of industrial society. The brightest, most successful and ambitious of these will emerge as truly Sovereign Individuals.

工业社会的繁荣。其中最聪明、最成功和最有抱负的人将成为真正的主权个人。

At the highest plateau of productivity, these Sovereign Individuals will compete and interact on terms that echo the relations among the gods in Greek myth. The elusive Mount Olympus of the next millennium will be in cyberspace—a realm without physical existence that will nonetheless develop what promises to be the world's largest economy by the second decade of the new millennium. By 2025, the cybereconomy will have many millions of participants. Some of them will be as rich as Bill Gates, worth over \$10 billion each. The cyberpoor may be those with an income of less than \$200,000 a year. There will be no cyberwelfare. No cybertaxes and no cybergovernment. The cybereconomy, rather than China, could well be the greatest economic phenomenon of the next thirty years.

在最高的生产力高原上,这些主权个体将以反映希腊神话中诸神之间关系的方式进行竞争和互动。下个千年的遥不可及的奥林帕斯山将位于网络空间——这个没有实体存在的领域,但将在新千年的第二个十年内发展成为世界上最大的经济体。到 2025 年,网络经济将拥有数百万参与者。其中一些人的财富将与比尔·盖茨一样,每人超过 100 亿美元。网络贫困者可能是那些年收入不到 20 万美元的人。不会有网络福利,也没有网络税收和网络政府。网络经济,而不是中国,可能是未来 30 年最大的经济现象。

The good news is that politicians will no more be able to dominate, suppress, and regulate the greater part of commerce in this new realm than

the legislators of the ancient Greek city-states could have trimmed the beard of Zeus. The liberation of a large part of the global economy from political control will oblige all remaining forms of government to operate on more nearly market terms. They will ultimately have little choice but to treat populations in territories they serve more like customers, and less in the way that organized criminals treat the victims of a shakedown racket.

政治家将无法再主导、压制和控制这个新领域中绝大部分的商业活动,就像古希腊城邦的立法者无法修剪宙斯的胡子一样。全球经济的大部分从政治控制中解放出来将迫使所有剩余的政府形式在更接近市场条件下运营。他们最终将别无选择,只能把他们管辖区内的人群像对待客户一样,而不是像有组织犯罪分子对待勒索受害人一样。

Beyond Politics

超越政治

What mythology described as the province of the gods will become a viable option for the individual—a life outside the reach of kings and councils. First in scores, then in hundreds, and ultimately in the millions, individuals will escape the shackles of politics. As they do, they will transform the character of governments, shrinking the realm of compulsion and widening the scope of private control over resources.

神话中描述为神域的区域将成为个人可行的选择-脱离君主和议会的生活。首先是几十人,然后是几百人,最终是数百万人,个人将逃离政治的束缚。当他们这样做时,他们将改变政府的性质,缩小强制的领域,扩大个人对资源的控制范围。

The emergence of the sovereign individual will demonstrate yet again the strange prophetic power of myth. Conceiving little of the laws of nature, the early agricultural peoples imagined that "powers we should call supernatural" were widely distributed.

主权个人的出现将再次证明神话的奇特预言力量。早期农业民族几乎不了解自然法则,他们想象"我们应称之为超自然的力量"广泛存在。

These powers were sometimes employed by men, sometimes by "incarnate human gods"

这些力量有时被人类使用,有时被"化身人神"使用

who looked like men and interacted with them in what Sir James George Frazer described in *The Golden Bough* as "a great democracy" 4

看起来像人,并与他们互动的人,詹姆斯·乔治·弗雷泽爵士在《金枝》中描述为"一个伟大的民主"

When the ancients imagined the children of Zeus living among them they were inspired by a deep belief in magic. They shared with other primitive agricultural peoples an awe of nature, and a superstitious conviction that nature's works were set in motion by individual volition, by magic. In that sense, there was nothing self-consciously prophetic about their view of nature and their gods. They were far from anticipating microtechnology. They could not have imagined its impact in altering the marginal productivity of individuals thousands of years later. They certainly could not have foreseen how it would shift the balance between power and efficiency and thus revolutionize the way that assets are created and protected. Yet what they imagined as they spun their myths has a strange resonance with the world you are likely to see.

当古人想象宙斯的子女与他们生活在一起时,他们受到了对魔法的深深信仰的启发。他们与其他原始农业民族一样,惊叹于自然,以及对自然作品由个人意志、由魔法推动的迷信信念。从这个意义上说,他们对自然和神的观点并没有什么自觉的预言性。他们远未预见到微观技术。他们无法想象它在改变个人边际生产率方面的影响,数千年后。他们当然也无法预见它将如何改变权力和效率之间的平衡,从而彻底改变资产创造和保护的方式。然而,他们在编织神话时想象的内容,与你可能看到的世界却有一种奇怪的共鸣。

5

Alt.Abracadabra

无

The "abracadabra" of the magic invocation, for example, bears a curious similarity to the password employed to access a computer. In some respects, high-speed computation has already made it possible to mimic the magic of the genie. Early generations of "digital servants" already obey the commands of those who control the computers in which they are sealed

much as genies were sealed in magic lamps. The virtual reality of information technology will widen the realm of human wishes to make almost anything that can be imagined seem real. Telepresence will give living individuals the same capacity to span distance at supernatural speed and monitor events from afar that the Greeks supposed was enjoyed by Hermes and Apollo. The Sovereign Individuals of the Information Age, like the gods of ancient and primitive myths, will in due course enjoy a kind of "diplomatic immunity" from most of the political woes that have beset mortal human beings in most times and places.

神奇咒语中的"abracadabra"与用于访问计算机的密码有着一些好奇的相似之处。在某些方面,高速计算已经使模仿精灵魔法成为可能。"数字仆从"的早期版本已经服从于控制他们所在计算机的人的命令,就像精灵被封在魔灯里一样。信息技术的虚拟现实将扩大人类愿望的领域,让几乎可以想象的任何事物都显得真实。远程存在将给生者以跨越距离的超自然速度和远程监控事件的能力,这正是古希腊人认为赫耳墨斯和阿波罗所拥有的。信息时代的"主权个人"就像古老和原始神话中的诸神,最终将享有某种"外交豁免权",免于绝大多数困扰凡人的政治烦恼。

The new Sovereign Individual will operate like the gods of myth in the same physical environment as the ordinary, subject citizen, but in a separate realm politically.

新的主权个人将像神话中的神明一样运作,在与普通臣民相同的物理环境中,但在政治上拥有独立领域。

Commanding vastly greater resources and beyond the reach of many forms of compulsion, the Sovereign Individual will redesign governments and reconfigure economies in the new millennium. The full implications of this change are all but unimaginable.

主权个人将在新千年重新设计政府,重新构建经济,因为他们拥有更强大的资源,并且超越了许多形式的强制力。这种变革的全部含义几乎难以想象。

Genius and Nemesis

天才与宿命

For anyone who loves human aspiration and success, the Information Age will provide a bounty. That is surely the best news in many generations. But it is bad news as well. The new organization of society implied by the triumph of individual autonomy and the true equalization of opportunity based upon merit will lead to very great rewards for merit and great individual autonomy. This will leave individuals far more responsible for themselves than they have been accustomed to being during the industrial period. It will also reduce the unearned advantage in living standards that has been enjoyed by residents of advanced industrial societies throughout the twentieth century. As we write, the top 15 percent of the world's population have an average per-capita income of \$21,000 annually. The remaining 85 percent of the world have an average income of just \$1,000. That huge, hoarded advantage from the past is bound to dissipate under the new conditions of the Information Age.

对于热衷于人类抱负和成就的人来说,信息时代将带来丰厚的收获。这无疑是很多年来最好的消息。但也会带来坏消息。个人自主权和基于才能的真正机会均等的胜利所意味着的新社会组织方式,将为才能获得丰厚的回报,并增加个人自主权。这将使个人比工业时代更多地为自己负责。这也将减少 20 世纪先进工业社会居民一直享有的无偿的生活水平优势。我们在写作时,世界人口的前 15% 平均人均年收入为 21,000 美元,其余 85% 的人平均收入仅为 1,000 美元。这巨大的积累优势必将在信息时代的新条件下逐渐消失。

As it does, the capacity of nationstates to redistribute income on a large scale will collapse. Information technology facilitates dramatically increased competition between jurisdictions. When technology is mobile, and transactions occur in cyberspace, as they increasingly will do, governments will no longer be able to charge more for their services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. Anyone with a portable computer and a satellite link will be able to conduct almost any information business 6

随着这种情况的发生,国家国家进行大规模收入再分配的能力将会崩溃。信息技术极大地促进了不同管辖区之间的竞争。当技术变得移动化,交易发生在网络空间中,正如它们越来越频繁地这样做,政府将再也无法向人们收取比它们提供的服务更多的费用。任何拥有便携式电脑和卫星链接的人都将能够进行几乎任何信息业务。

anywhere, and that includes almost the whole of the world's multitrillion-dollar financial transactions.

在任何地方,这包括了世界几乎全部的数万亿美元的金融交易。

This means that you will no longer be obliged to live in a high-tax jurisdiction in order to earn high income. In the future, when most wealth can be earned anywhere, and even spent anywhere, governments that attempt to charge too much as the price of domicile will merely drive away their best customers. If our reasoning is correct, and we believe it is, the nationstate as we know it will not survive in anything like its present form. 这意味着你不再需要居住在高税收管辖区来获得高收入。未来当大部分财富可以在任何地方赚取,甚至可以在任何地方消费时,企图收取过高居民费用的政府只会驱逐他们最优质的客户。如果我们的推理是正确的,我们相信这是正确的,我们所知的国家国体将不会以其现有的形式存续。

THE END OF NATIONS

国家的终结

Changes that diminish the power of predominant institutions are both unsettling and dangerous. Just as monarchs, lords, popes, and potentates fought ruthlessly to preserve their accustomed privileges in the early stages of the modern period, so today's governments will employ violence, often of a covert and arbitrary kind, in the attempt to hold back the clock. Weakened by the challenge from technology, the state will treat increasingly autonomous individuals, its former citizens, with the same range of ruthlessness and diplomacy it has heretofore displayed in its dealing with other governments. Increasingly harsh techniques of exaction will be a logical corollary of the emergence of a new type of bargaining between governments and individuals.

削弱主导机构权力的变革既令人不安又危险。正如君主、领主、教皇和强人在现代早期阶段不遗余力地维护其习惯特权,如今各国政府也将采取暴力手段,通常是秘密和任意的方式,以阻止时钟倒转。受到技术挑战的影响,国家将以惯常对待其他政府的那种残酷和外交手段对待日益自主的个人,这些曾经是它的公民。对个人进行日益严酷的剥削必将成为政府与个人之间新型讨价还价的必然结果。

Technology will make individuals more nearly sovereign than ever before. And they will be treated that way. Sometimes violently, as enemies, sometimes as equal parties in negotiation, sometimes as allies. But however ruthlessly governments behave, particularly in the transition period, wedding the IRS with the CIA will avail them little.

技术将使个人比以往任何时候都更加具有主权。他们将被这样对待。有时是以敌人的方式,暴力地;有时是平等的谈判方式;有时是盟友的方式。但是无论政府行为多么无情,特别是在过渡期间,将国税局与中央情报局联合起来,对他们几乎没有什么帮助。

They will be increasingly required by the press of necessity to bargain with autonomous individuals whose resources will no longer be so easily controlled.

他们将不得不与自主个人进行更多谈判,这些个人的资源将不再容易控制。

The changes implied by the Information Revolution will not only create a fiscal crisis for governments, they will tend to disintegrate all large structures. Fourteen empires have disappeared already in the twentieth century. The breakdown of empires is part of a process that will dissolve the nationstate itself. Government will have to adapt to the growing autonomy of the individual. Taxing capacity will plunge by 50~70

信息革命所带来的变革不仅会为政府带来财政危机,还会导致所有大型结构的瓦解。20 世纪已有 14 个帝国消失。帝国的崩溃是一个过程的一部分,这个过程将溶解国家本身。政府将不得不适应个人自主性的增长。税收能力将下降 50%至 70%。

percent. This will tend to make smaller jurisdictions more successful. The challenge of setting competitive terms to attract able individuals and their capital will be more easily undertaken in enclaves than across continents. 百分之。这将倾向于使较小的管辖区更加成功。吸引有能力的个人及其资本的竞争性条件的挑战,在小封闭区域内比在跨大陆更容易实现。

We believe that as the modern nationstate decomposes, latter-day barbarians will increasingly come to exercise power behind the scenes. Groups like the Russian mafiya, which picks the bones of the former Soviet Union, other ethnic criminal gangs, nomenklaturas*, drug lords, and renegade covert agencies will be laws unto themselves.

我们相信,随着现代民族国家的瓦解,后现代的野蛮人将日益掌握幕后的力量。俄罗斯黑帮、其他种族犯罪团伙、党政官僚、毒品集团以及背信弃义的秘密情报机构将成为自己的法律。

They already are. Far more than is widely understood, the modern barbarians have already infiltrated the forms of the nationstate without greatly changing its appearances.

他们已经在这样做了。比人们广泛认知的更多,现代野蛮人已经渗透进了民族国家的形式,但并未大幅改变它的面貌。

They are microparasites feeding on a dying system. As violent and unscrupulous as a state at war, these groups employ the techniques of the state on a smaller scale. Their growing influence and power are part of the downsizing of politics. Microprocessing reduces the size that groups must attain in order to be effective in the use and control of 7

他们是寄生在一个濒临死亡的体系上的微小寄生虫。与处于战争状态的国家一样残暴和无所顾忌,这些群体在较小的范围内采用国家的技术。它们日益增长的影响力和权力是政治缩小的一部分。微处理减少了群体必须达到的规模,才能有效利用和控制 7

violence. As this technological revolution unfolds, predatory violence will be organized more and more outside of central control. Efforts to contain violence will also devolve in ways that depend more upon efficiency than magnitude of power.

暴力。随着这场技术革命的展开,掠夺性暴力将越来越多地组织在中央控制之外。遏制暴力的努力也将以效率而非权力规模的方式分散。

* Nomenklaturas are the entrenched elites that ruled the former Soviet Union and other state-run economies.

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History in Reverse

历史倒转

The process by which the nationstate grew over the past five centuries will be put into reverse by the new logic of the Information Age. Local centers of power will reassert themselves as the state devolves into fragmented, overlapping sovereignties.⁵

国家在过去五个世纪中的发展过程将会被信息时代的新逻辑逆转。地方权力中心将会重新崛起,而国家则会转化为碎片化的、重叠的主权。

The growing power of organized crime is merely one reflection of this tendency.

有组织犯罪势力的不断壮大只是这一趋势的一个反映。

Multinational companies are already having to subcontract all but essential work. Some conglomerates, such as AT&T, Unisys, and ITT, have split themselves into several firms in order to function more profitably. The nationstate will devolve like an unwieldy conglomerate.

跨国公司已经不得不将除基本工作之外的所有工作进行外包。一些大型企业集团,如美国电话电报公司、优尼系统公司和国际电话电报公司,已将自身拆分成多家公司,以更有利可图地运营。像臃肿的企业集团一样,国家也将逐步瓦解。

Not only is power in the world changing, but the work of the world is changing as well. Microprocessing has created entirely new horizons of economic activity that transcend territorial boundaries. This transcendence of frontiers and territories is perhaps the most revolutionary development since Adam and Eve straggled out of paradise under the sentence of their Maker: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread. "As technology revolutionizes the tools we use, it also antiquates our laws, reshapes our morals, and alters our perceptions. This book explains how.

世界权力不仅在变化,世界的工作也在变化。微处理器创造了跨越领土边界的全新经济活动视野。这种跨越边界和领土的现象可能是自亚当和夏娃在造物主的判决下离开伊甸园以来最具革命性的发展:"你必汗流浹背才能得到食物。"随着技术革命改变了我们使用的工具,它也让我们法律过时,重塑我们的道德,并改变我们的认知。本书解释了这一切。

Microprocessing and rapidly improving communications already make it possible for the individual to choose where to work. Transactions on the Internet or the World Wide Web can be encrypted and will soon be almost impossible for tax collectors to capture. Tax-free money already compounds far faster offshore than onshore funds still subject to the high tax burden imposed by the twentiethcentury nationstate. After the turn of the millennium, much of the world's commerce will migrate into the new realm of cyberspace, a region where governments will have no more dominion than they exercise over the bottom of the sea or the outer planets. In cyberspace, the threats of physical violence that have been the alpha and omega of politics since time immemorial will vanish. In cyberspace, the meek and the mighty will meet on equal terms. Cyberspace is the ultimate

offshore jurisdiction. An economy with no taxes. Bermuda in the sky with diamonds.

微处理和迅速改善的通信已经使个人能够选择工作的地点。在互联网或万维网上进行的交易可以被加密,很快就很难逃避税收。离岸资金的增长速度远远超过国内资金,后者仍受二十世纪民族国家强加的高税收负担。在新千年之后,世界上大部分的商业将转移到网络空间这个新领域,这是一个政府将没有主宰权力的区域,就像它们无法主宰海底或外星球一样。在网络空间里,自古以来一直是政治的本质和终点的物理暴力的威胁将消失。在网络空间里,软弱和强大的人将在平等的条件下相遇。网络空间是最终的离岸管辖区,没有税收的经济,天上的百慕大,充满钻石。

When this greatest tax haven of them all is fully open for business, all funds will essentially be offshore funds at the discretion of their owner. This will have cascading consequences. The state has grown used to treating its taxpayers as a farmer treats his cows, keeping them in a field to be milked. Soon, the cows will have wings.

当这个最大的避税天堂完全开放营业时,所有资金实质上都将成为由其所有者自行决定的离岸资金。这将会产生连锁反应。政府已习惯于将纳税人视为农民对待奶牛的方式,让他们呆在牧场里供人挤奶。很快,奶牛就会长出翅膀。

The Revenge of Nations 国家的复仇

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Like an angry farmer, the state will no doubt take desperate measures at first to tether and hobble its escaping herd. It will employ covert and even violent means to restrict access to liberating technologies. Such expedients will work only temporarily, if at all. The twentieth century nationstate, with all its pretensions, will starve to death as its tax revenues decline.

像生气的农民一样,国家无疑会首先采取绝望的措施来束缚和限制其逃逸的群众。它将采用隐蔽甚至暴力的手段来限制获取解放技术。如果

有的话,这种权宜之计只能暂时有效。20 世纪民族国家,连同它的所有虚荣,将在税收下降的情况下而殆尽。

When the state finds itself unable to meet its committed expenditure by raising tax revenues, it will resort to other, more desperate measures. Among them is printing money. Governments have grown used to enjoying a monopoly over currency that they could depreciate at will. This arbitrary inflation has been a prominent feature of the monetary policy of all twentieth-century states. Even the best national currency of the postwar period, the German mark, lost 71 percent of its value from January 1, 1949, through the end of June 1995. In the same period, the U.S. dollar lost 84 percent of its value.⁶ This inflation had the same effect as a tax on all who hold the currency. As we explore later, inflation as revenue option will be largely foreclosed by the emergence of cybermoney. New technologies will allow the holders of wealth to bypass the national monopolies that have issued and regulated money in the modern period. The state will continue to control the industrial-era printing presses, but their importance for controlling the world's wealth will be transcended by mathematical algorithms that have no physical existence. In the new millennium, cybermoney controlled by private markets will supersede fiat money issued by governments. Only the poor will be victims of inflation.

当政府无法通过增加税收来满足其承担的开支时,它将求助于其他更为绝望的措施。其中之一就是印刷货币。各国政府习惯于拥有货币发行的垄断权,可以随意贬值。这种任意性的通胀一直是二十世纪各国货币政策的显著特征。即使是战后最好的国家货币德国马克,从 1949 年 1 月 1 日到 1995 年 6 月底,其价值也下跌了 71%。在同一时期,美元也贬值了 84%。这种通胀就相当于对持有该货币的所有人征税。正如我们稍后探讨的,随着网络货币的出现,通胀作为一种收入选择将基本被取缔。新技术将使财富持有者能够绕开在现代社会发行和监管货币的国家垄断。政府将继续控制工业时代的印刷机,但它们在控制全球财富方面的重要性将被没有实体存在的数学算法所超越。在新千年,由私人市场控制的网络货币将取代由政府发行的法定货币。只有穷人会成为通胀的受害者。

Lacking their accustomed scope to tax and inflate, governments, even in traditionally civil countries, will turn nasty. As income tax becomes

uncollectable, older and more arbitrary methods of exaction will resurface. The ultimate form of withholding tax--de facto or even overt hostage-taking will be introduced by governments desperate to prevent wealth from escaping beyond their reach. Unlucky individuals will find themselves singled out and held to ransom in an almost medieval fashion. Businesses that offer services that facilitate the realization of autonomy by individuals will be subject to infiltration, sabotage, and disruption. Arbitrary forfeiture of property, already commonplace in the United States, where it occurs five thousand times a week, will become even more pervasive. Governments will violate human rights, censor the free flow of information, sabotage useful technologies, and worse. For the same reasons that the late, departed Soviet Union tried in vain to suppress access to personal computers and Xerox machines, western governments will seek to suppress the cybereconomy by totalitarian means.

缺乏通常的征税和通胀空间,即使在传统上民主的国家,政府也将变得恶劣。由于无法征收所得税,更加武断的盘取方式将重新出现。政府为了防止财富逃离其掌控,将采取最终形式的扣缴税款——事实上甚至公开的人质劫持。不幸的个人将发现自己成为目标,并以几乎中世纪的方式遭到勒索。为个人实现自主权提供服务的企业将面临渗透、破坏和干扰。美国已经普遍存在的任意没收财产,每周发生 5000 次,将变得更加普遍。政府将侵犯人权,审查信息自由流通,破坏有用的技术,甚至更糟。正如前苏联最终无法抑制个人电脑和复印机的使用,西方政府也将采取极权主义手段来压制网络经济。

RETURN OF THE LUDDITES

新卢德主义者的回归

Such methods may prove popular among some population segments. The good news about individual liberation and autonomy will seem to be bad news to many who are not among the cognitive elite. The greatest resentment is likely to be centered among those of middle talent in currently rich countries. They particularly may come to feel that information technology poses a threat to their way of life. The beneficiaries of organized compulsion, including millions receiving income redistributed by governments, may

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这些方法可能会在一些人群中受欢迎。个人解放和自主权的好消息对于不属于认知精英阶层的许多人来说可能是坏消息。最大的不满情绪很可能集中在目前富裕国家的中等才能阶层。他们可能特别会感觉到信息技术对他们的生活方式构成了威胁。包括数百万通过政府再分配收入的人在内的组织强制的受益者也许会

resent the new freedom realized by Sovereign Individuals. Their upset will illustrate the truism that "where you stand is determined by where you sit." 仇视新获得的自由的主权个体。他们的不满将说明这个真理:"您的立场取决于您的处境。"

It would be misleading, however, to attribute all the bad feelings that will be generated in the coming transition crisis to the bald desire to live at someone else's expense. More will be involved. The very character of human society suggests that there is bound to be a misguided moral dimension to the coming Luddite reaction. Think of it as a bald desire fitted with a moral toupee. We explore the moral and moralistic dimensions of the transition crisis. Self-interested grasping of a conscious kind has far less power to motivate actions than does self-righteous fury. While adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth century is rapidly falling away, they are not without their true believers. Everyone who came of age in the twentieth century has been inculcated in the duties and obligations of the twentiethcentury citizen. The residual moral imperatives from industrial

society will stimulate at least some neo-Luddite attacks on information technologies.

在即将到来的过渡危机中,并非所有不良情绪都源于想要寄生于他人的卑鄙欲望。其中还会涉及更多因素。人类社会的特性表明,即将来临的柔达运动必然会具有某种偏差的道德层面。这可以理解为戴了一顶道德假发的光头欲望。我们将探讨过渡危机的道德和道德主义层面。有意识的自利行为远不如自我骄傲的愤怒来得有力。尽管对 20 世纪公民神话的信仰正在迅速消失,但仍有真正的信徒存在。每个在 20 世纪成长的人都被灌输了 20 世纪公民的职责和义务。工业社会遗留下来的道德命令将刺激至少一些新柔达运动者对信息技术的攻击。

In this sense, this violence to come will be at least partially an expression of what we call "moral anachronism," the application of moral strictures drawn from one stage of economic life to the circumstances of another. Every stage of society requires its own moral rules to help individuals overcome incentive traps peculiar to the choices they face in that particular way of life. Just as a farming society could not live by the moral rules of a migratory Eskimo band, so the Information Society cannot satisfy moral imperatives that emerged to facilitate the success of a militant twentiethcentury industrial state. We explain why.

从这个意义上说,这种即将到来的暴力至少部分上是对我们所谓的"道德时代错位"的表达,即将从一个经济生活阶段提取的道德规范应用于另一个阶段的情况。每一个社会阶段都需要自己的道德规则来帮助个人克服他们在那种特定生活方式中面临的激励机制陷阱。就像农业社会不可能遵循游牧爱斯基摩部落的道德规则一样,信息社会也无法满足为促进 20 世纪军事工业国家成功而出现的道德命令。我们将解释原因。

In the next few years, moral anachronism will be in evidence at the core countries of the West in much the way that it has been witnessed at the periphery over the past five centuries. Western colonists and military expeditions stimulated such crises when they encountered indigenous hunting-and-gathering bands, as well as peoples whose societies were still organized for farming. The introduction of new technologies into anachronistic settings caused confusion and moral crises. The success of

Christian missionaries in converting millions of indigenous peoples can be laid in large measure to the local crises caused by the sudden introduction of new power arrangements from the outside. Such encounters recurred over and over, from the sixteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century. We expect similar clashes early in the new millennium as Information Societies supplant those organized along industrial lines.

在未来几年里,道德时代错误将在西方核心国家显现,就像过去五个世纪里它在边缘地区所显现的那样。西方殖民者和军事远征激发了这种危机,当他们遇到原住民的狩猎-采集部落以及仍然以农业为基础的社会时。新技术的引入导致了这些时代错误环境中的困惑和道德危机。基督教宣教士成功地将数百万原住民改信,很大程度上是因为突然引入了外来的新权力安排所造成的当地危机。从 16 世纪到 20 世纪初,这种遭遇一次次重复发生。我们预计在新千年初,信息社会取代工业化社会的过程中,将出现类似的冲突。

The Nostalgia for Compulsion 恋旧之欲

The rise of the Sovereign Individual will not be wholly welcomed as promising new phase of history, even among those who benefit from it most. Everyone will feel some misgivings. And many will despise innovations that undermine the territorial nationstate. It is a fact of human nature that radical change of any kind is almost always seen as a dramatic turn for the worse. Five hundred years ago, the courtiers gathered around the duke of Burgundy would have said that unfolding innovations that undermined feudalism were evil. They thought the world was rapidly spiraling downhill 10

主权个人的崛起不会被完全视为历史上一个令人期待的新阶段,即使是那些从中获益最多的人也是如此。每个人都会有一些顾虑。许多人也会鄙视那些破坏领土国家的创新。这是人性的一个事实,任何类型的根本性变革几乎总是被视为走向更坏的戏剧性转折。500 年前,围绕布根地公爵的亲信们会说,破坏封建制度的不断涌现的创新是恶劣的。他们认为这个世界正在迅速走向衰落。

at the very time that later historians saw an explosion of human potential in the Renaissance. Likewise, what may someday be seen as a new

Renaissance from the perspective of the next millennium will look frightening to tired twentieth century eyes.

在后来的历史学家看到文艺复兴中人类潜力的爆发时。同样地,从下一个千年的角度来看,有可能被视为新的文艺复兴的东西,在疲惫的 20 世纪眼中看起来会让人恐惧。

There is a high probability that some who are offended by the new ways as well as many who are disadvantaged by them, will react unpleasantly. Their nostalgia for compulsion will probably turn violent. Encounters with these new "Luddites" will make the transition to radical new forms of social organization at least a measure of bad news for everyone.

有很大可能性,一些被新方式冒犯的人以及很多受其不利影响的人会做出不愉快的反应。他们对强制的怀旧情绪可能会变得暴力。与这些新"机器破坏者"的遭遇会使向更为激进的社会组织形式的过渡,至少给所有人带来一些坏消息。

Get ready to duck

准备好躲避吧

With the speed of change outracing the moral and economic capacity of many in living generations to adapt, you can expect to see a fierce and indignant resistance to the Information Revolution, notwithstanding its great promise to liberate the future.

面对变革速度超越许多现代人适应道德和经济能力的现状,尽管信息革命拥有巨大的改变未来的前景,你可以预计会看到一种激烈且愤怒的抵制。

You must understand and prepare for such unpleasantness. A transition crisis lies ahead. The new information and communication technologies are more subversive of the modern state than any political threat to its predominance since Columbus sailed. This is important because those in power have seldom reacted peacefully to developments that undermined their authority. They are not likely to now.

您必须了解并做好准备应对这种不愉快的情况。过渡危机正在眼前。新信息和通信技术比哥伦布航行以来对现代国家权威地位的任何政治

威胁更具颠覆性。这很重要,因为掌权者很少会对削弱他们权威的发展做出和平反应。他们现在也不太可能如此。

The clash between the new and the old will shape the early years of the new millennium. We expect it to be a time of great danger and great reward and a time of much diminished civility in some realms and unprecedented scope in others.

新旧冲突将塑造新千年的初期阶段。我们预计这将是一个危机和机遇并存的时期,在某些领域会出现公民道德的大幅下降,而在其他领域则会出现前所未有的广度。

Increasingly autonomous individuals and bankrupt, desperate governments will confront one another across a new divide. We expect to see a radical restructuring of the nature of sovereignty and the virtual death of politics before the transition is over instead of state domination and control of resources, you are destined to see the privatization of almost all services governments now provide. For inescapable reasons that we explore at length in this book, information technology will, destroy the capacity of the state to charge more for its services than they are worth to the people who pay for them.

越来越自主的个人和破产、绝望的政府将在一个新的鸿沟上互相对峙。在这个过渡期结束之前,我们预计会看到主权性质的彻底重塑,以及政治的虚拟死亡,而不是国家对资源的主导和控制。您注定会看到几乎所有政府现在提供的服务都实现了私有化。由于我们在本书中深入探讨的不可避免的原因,信息技术将摧毁国家对其服务向人们收取高于其价值的费用的能力。

Sovereignty Through Markets 主权通过市场

To an extent that few would have imagined only a decade ago, individuals will achieve increasing autonomy over territorial nationstates through market mechanisms.

与十年前很难想象的程度相比,个人通过市场机制将在越来越大程度上获得对领土国家的自主权。

All nationstates face bankruptcy and the rapid erosion of their authority. Mighty as they are, the power they retain is the power to obliterate, not to command. Their intercontinental missiles and aircraft carriers are already artifacts, as imposing and useless as the last warhorse of feudalism.

所有国家都面临着破产和权威迅速崩溃的风险。尽管他们强大如斯,但他们所保留的力量只是毁灭的力量,而非命令的力量。他们的洲际导弹和航空母舰已经成为文物,就像封建主义时代的战马一样,令人敬畏却无用。

Information technology makes possible a dramatic extension of markets by altering the way that assets are created and protected. This is revolutionary indeed, it promises to be more revolutionary for industrial society than the advent of gunpowder proved to be for feudal agriculture. The transformation of the year 2000 implies the 11

信息技术使得通过改变资产的创造和保护方式来极大地扩展市场成为可能。这确实是一场革命性的变革,它对工业社会的影响可能会比火药对封建农业的影响更大。2000 年的转型意味着

commercialization of sovereignty and the death of politics, no less than guns implied the demise of oath-based feudalism. Citizenship will go the way of chivalry.

主权商业化和政治死亡,远不止意味着宣誓制封建制的消亡。公民身份将走向骑士精神的命运。

We believe that the age of individual economic sovereignty is coming. Just as steel mills, telephone companies, mines, and railways that were once "nationalized" have been rapidly privatized throughout the world, you will soon see the ultimate form of privatization--the sweeping denationalization of the individual. The Sovereign Individual of the new millennium will no longer be an asset of the state, a de facto item on the treasury's balance sheet. After the transition of the year 2000, denationalized citizens will no longer be citizens at all, but customers.

我们相信个人经济主权时代即将来临。就像曾经"国有化"的钢铁厂、电话公司、矿山和铁路,已经在全球范围内快速私有化,你很快就会看到最终形式的私有化——一个人的彻底非国有化。新千年的主权个人不再

是国家的资产,也不再是国库资产负债表上的事项。2000 年过渡后,非国有化的公民将不再是公民,而是客户。

The commercialization of sovereignty will make the terms and conditions of citizenship in the nationstate as dated as chivalric oaths seemed after the collapse of feudalism. Instead of relating to a powerful state as citizens to be taxed, the Sovereign Individuals of the twenty-first century will be customers of governments. These governments will be organized along different principles than those which the world has come to expect over the past several centuries.

主权商业化将使国民国家公民身份的条款和条件像骑士誓言在封建制解体后一样过时。21 世纪的主权个人不再是被征税的公民,而是政府的客户。这些政府将按与过去数个世纪不同的原则组织运营。

A new moral vocabulary will be required to describe the relations of Sovereign Individuals with one another and what remains of government. We suspect that as the terms of these new relations come into focus, they will offend many people who came of age as "citizens" of twentiethcentury nationstates. The end of nations and the "denationalization of the individual" will deflate some warmly held notions, such as "equal protection under the law" that presuppose power relations that are soon to be obsolete.

全新的道德词汇将被要求用于描述主权个人之间的关系以及政府剩余的职能。我们怀疑,随着这些新关系的形式逐渐清晰,这将触犯许多在二十世纪民族国家"公民"时代成长起来的人的内心。国家的终结和"个人的去国家化"会挫伤一些温存的概念,比如"法律下的平等保护"等,这些概念都假定了即将被淘汰的权力关系。

Just as attempts to preserve the power of knights in armor were doomed to fail in the face of gunpowder weapons, so the modern notions of nationalism and citizenship are destined to be short-circuited by microtechnology. Indeed, they will eventually become comic in much the way that the sacred principles of fifteenth-century feudalism fell to ridicule in the sixteenth century. The cherished civic notions of the twentieth century will be comic anachronisms to new generations after the transformation of the year 2000.

就像武装骑士的力量最终难以抵挡火药武器的到来,民族主义和公民身份这些现代概念也注定会被微型技术所削弱。事实上,这些概念最终会变得与 15 世纪封建主义的庄严原则在 16 世纪遭受嘲笑一样可笑。20 世纪受珍视的公民理念在 2000 年变革之后将成为新一代人眼中的可笑时代遗物。

The Don Quixote of the twenty-first century will not be a knight-errant struggling to revive the glories of feudalism but a bureaucrat in a brown suit, a tax collector yearning for a citizen to audit.

二十一世纪的《don quixote》不会是一个骑士 errant 努力复兴封建主义的荣耀,而是一个穿着棕色西装的官僚,一个渴望审计公民的税收员。

REVIVING LAWS OF THE MARCH

复活 3 月法律

We seldom think of governments as competitive entities, except in the broadest sense, so the modern intuition about the range and possibilities of sovereignty has atrophied. In the past, when the power equation made more difficult for groups to assert a stable monopoly of coercion, power was frequently fragmented, jurisdictions overlapped, and entities of many different kinds exercised one or more of the attributes of sovereignty. Not infrequently, the nominal overlord actually enjoyed scant power on the ground. Governments weaker than the nationstates are now faced with sustained competition in their ability to impose a monopoly of coercion over a local territory. This 12

我们很少将政府视为竞争性实体,除了在最广泛的意义上,因此对主权范围和可能性的现代直觉已经萎缩。在过去,当权力方程使群体难以声称稳定的胁迫垄断时,权力往往是碎片化的,管辖权重叠,各种不同类型的实体行使一项或多项主权属性。有时名义上的最高统治者实际上在地面上享有很少的权力。比国家更弱的政府现在面临着在其对某一地区实施胁迫垄断的能力方面的持续竞争。这 12

competition gave rise to adaptations in controlling violence and attracting allegiance that will soon be new again.

竞争催生了在控制暴力和吸引忠诚度方面的新适应,这些适应很快就会重新出现。

When the reach of lords and kings was weak, and the claims of one or more groups overlapped at a frontier, it frequently happened that neither could decisively dominate the other. In the Middle Ages, there were numerous frontier or "march"

当领主和国王的权力薄弱,一个或多个群体在边界地区发生重叠时,他们中没有一方能够彻底主导对方。在中世纪,存在许多边境或"边疆"地区。

regions where sovereignties blended together. These violent frontiers persisted for decades or even centuries in the border areas of Europe. There were marches between areas of Celtic and English control in Ireland; between Wales and England, Scotland and England, Italy and France, France and Spain, Germany and the Slav frontiers of Central Europe and between the Christian kingdoms of Spain and the Islamic kingdom of Granada. Such march regions developed distinct institutional and legal forms of a kind that we are likely to see again in the next millennium. Because of the competitive position of the two authorities, residents of march region seldom paid tax. What is more, they usually had a choice in deciding who's laws they were to obey, a choice that was exercised through such legal concepts as "avowal" and "distrain" that have now all but vanished. We expect such concepts to become a prominent feature of the law of Information Societies.

主权相互交织的地区。这些猛烈的边界地区在欧洲的边界地带持续了数十年甚至数世纪。爱尔兰凯尔特人和英格兰人的控制区域之间、威尔士和英格兰之间、苏格兰和英格兰之间、意大利和法国之间、法国和西班牙之间、德国和中欧斯拉夫边境之间,以及西班牙基督教王国和格拉纳达伊斯兰王国之间都存在这种边界地区。这种边界地区发展出了独特的制度和法律形式,我们很可能在下一个千年再次看到。由于两个当局的竞争地位,边界地区的居民很少缴纳税款。此外,他们通常可以选择遵守谁的法律,这种选择是通过"宣誓"和"扣押"等法律概念来行使的,这些概念如今已经几乎消失了。我们期望这些概念将成为信息社会法律的一个重要特征。

Transcending Nationality

跨越国籍

Before the nationstate, it was difficult to enumerate precisely the number of sovereignties that existed in the world because they overlapped in complex ways and many varied forms of organization exercised power. They will do so again. The dividing lines between territories tended to become clearly demarcated and fixed as borders in the nationstate system. They will become hazy again in the Information Age. In the new millennium, sovereignty will be fragmented once more. New entities will emerge exercising some but not all of the characteristics we have come to associate

with governments.

在国家出现之前,准确统计世界上存在的主权数量是很困难的,因为它们以复杂的方式重叠,而且许多不同形式的组织都在行使权力。这种情况将再次出现。在国家体系中,领土之间的分界线倾向于变得明确和固定。在信息时代,这些分界线将再次变得模糊。在新的千年里,主权将再次碎片化。新的实体将出现,行使一些但不是全部我们习惯与政府联系的特点。

Some of these new entities, like the Knights Templar and other religious military orders of the Middle Ages, may control considerable wealth and military power without controlling any fixed territory. They will be organized on principles that bear no relation to nationality at all. Members and leaders of religious corporations that exercised sovereign authority in parts of Europe in the Middle Ages in no sense derived their authority from national identity. They were of all ethnic backgrounds and professed to owe their allegiance to God, and not to any affinities that members of a nationality are supposed to share in common.

这些新实体中,像圣殿骑士团和其他中世纪的宗教军事秩序,可能在没有控制任何固定领土的情况下拥有相当大的财富和军事力量。它们将按照与国籍无关的原则进行组织。在中世纪欧洲的某些地区行使主权利力的宗教公司的成员和领导者,他们的权威根本不源自于国家认同。他们来自各种族背景,声称效忠于上帝,而非任何被认为国籍成员应共享的亲合力。

Merchant Republics of Cyberspace

网络空间的商业共和国

You will also see the reemergence of associations of merchants and wealthy individuals with semisovereign powers, like the Hanse (confederation of merchants) in the Middle Ages. The Hanse that operated in the French and Flemish fairs grew to encompass the merchants of sixty cities.⁷ The "Hanseatic League," as it is redundantly

你也将看到商人和富人与半主权利量的联合会的复兴,就像中世纪的商人同盟(汉萨)。在法国和弗兰德斯集市上运营的汉萨联盟扩展到包括 60 个城市的商人。⁷ 这种"汉萨同盟",既是冗余的¹³

known in English (the literal translation is "Leaguely League"), was an organization of Germanic merchant guilds that provided protection to members and negotiated trade treaties. It came to exercise semisovereign powers in a number of Northern European and Baltic cities. Such entities will reemerge in place of the dying nationstate in the new millennium, providing protection and helping to enforce contracts in an unsafe world. 商业同盟联盟（在英语中被称为“公会联盟”，字面意思是“会者如一”），是一个由日耳曼裔商人公会组成的组织，它为成员提供保护并谈判贸易条约。它最终在一些北欧和波罗的海沿岸城市拥有半主权权力。在新千年里，这些实体将取代垂死的民族国家重新出现，在一个不安全的世界中提供保护并帮助执行合同。

In short, the future is likely to confound the expectations of those who have absorbed the civic myths of twentiethcentury industrial society. Among them are the illusions of social democracy that once thrilled and motivated the most gifted minds.

总之，未来很可能会打击那些已吸收 20 世纪工业社会公民神话的人的期望。其中包括曾经激动和激励最有天赋头脑的社会民主的幻梦。

They presuppose that societies evolve in whatever way governments wish them to; preferably in response to opinion polls and scrupulously counted votes. This was never as true as it seemed fifty years ago. Now it is an anachronism, as much an artifact of industrialism as a rusting smokestack. The civic myths reflect not only a mindset that sees society's problems as susceptible to engineering solutions; they also reflect a false confidence that resources and individuals will remain as vulnerable to political compulsion in the future as they have been in the twentieth century. We doubt it. Market forces, not political majorities, will compel societies to reconfigure themselves in ways that public opinion will neither comprehend nor welcome. As they do, the naive view that history is what people wish it to be will prove wildly misleading.

他们假设，社会以政府希望的任何方式进化，最好是根据民意调查和认真统计的选票作出回应。这从未像 50 年前那样真实。现在它已经是一种腐朽的工业遗物。公民神话反映的不仅是一种认知方式，即将社会问题视为可以通过工程解决方案解决；它们也反映了一种虚假的信心，即资源和个人在未来将像 20 世纪一样容易受到政治强制。我们有所怀疑。不

是政治多数,而是市场力量将迫使社会重新配置自己,这种方式公众意见既无法理解,也无法欢迎。当他们这样做时,历史是人们所希望的这种天真的看法将被彻底误导。

It will therefore be crucial that you see the world anew. That means looking from the outside in to reanalyze much that you have probably taken for granted. This will enable you to come to a new understanding. If you fail to transcend conventional thinking at a time when conventional thinking is losing touch with reality, then you will be more likely to fall prey to an epidemic of disorientation that lies ahead. Disorientation breeds mistakes that could threaten your business, your investments, and your way of life. 因此,重要的是你要以全新的视角看待这个世界。这意味着从外部审视并重新分析你可能已视为理所当然的许多事物。这将使你达成新的理解。如果你未能跳脱常规思维,而常规思维正在与现实脱节,那么你很可能会陷入即将到来的茫然困扰之中。茫然无助导致错误,这可能危及你的事业、投资和生活方式。

"The universe rewards us for understanding it and punishes us for not understanding it. When we understand the universe, our plans work and we feel good. Conversely, if we try to fly by jumping off a cliff and flapping our arms, the universe will kill us." -JACK COHEN AND IAN

宇宙会奖励我们理解它,也会惩罚我们不理解它。当我们了解宇宙时,我们的计划会奏效,我们会感到良好。相反,如果我们试图通过从悬崖跳下并挥舞双臂来飞行,宇宙会杀死我们。 - JACK COHEN AND IAN

STEWART

斯图亚特

Seeing Anew
见新景

To prepare yourself for the world that is coming you must understand why it will be different from what most experts tell you. That involves looking closely at the hidden causes of change. We have attempted to do this with an unorthodox analysis we call the study of megapolitics. In two previous volumes, *Blood in the Streets* and *The Great Reckoning*, we argued that the most important causes of change are not to be found in political manifestos or in the pronouncements of dead economists, but in the hidden factors that alter the boundaries where power is exercised. Often, subtle changes in climate, topography, microbes, and technology alter the logic of violence. They transform the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves.

为了准备迎接即将到来的世界,您必须了解它为何会有别于大多数专家告诉您的。这需要仔细研究隐藏的变革原因。我们曾尝试通过一种非正统的分析,即研究大政治学,来做到这一点。在前两本著作中,即《街头的鲜血》和《大清算》中,我们论证了,导致变革的最重要原因,并非出现在政治宣言或已故经济学家的声明之中,而是存在于改变权力行使边界的隐藏因素之中。气候、地理、微生物和技术的微妙变化,往往会改变暴力的逻辑,并重塑人们组织生计和自我防卫的方式。

Notice that our approach to understanding how the world changes is very different from that of most forecasters. We are not experts in anything, in the sense that we 14

我们对世界变化的理解方式与大多数预测者大不相同。我们在任何领域都不是专家。

pretend to know a great deal more about certain "subjects" than those who have spent their entire careers cultivating highly specialized knowledge. To the contrary, we look from the outside in. We are knowledgeable around the

subjects about which we make forecasts. Most of all, this involves seeing where the boundaries of necessity are drawn.

假装对某些"主题"有比终生钻研高度专门知识的人更多的了解。相反,我们是从外部观察的。我们对我们预测的主题有较深的了解。最重要的是,这涉及确定必要性的边界。

When they change, society necessarily changes, no matter what people may wish to the contrary.

当他们发生变化时,不管人们怎么想,社会必然也会发生变化。

In our view, the key to understanding how societies evolve is to understand factors that determine the costs and rewards of employing violence. Every human society, from the hunting band to the empire, has been informed by the interactions of megapolitical factors that set the prevailing version of the "laws of nature." Life is always and everywhere complex. The lamb and the lion keep a delicate balance, interacting at the margin. If lions were suddenly more swift, they would catch prey that now escape. If lambs suddenly grew wings, lions would starve. The capacity to utilize and defend against violence is the crucial variable that alters life at the margin.

在我们看来,理解社会如何演化的关键在于理解决定使用暴力的成本和回报的因素。从狩猎部落到帝国,每一个人类社会都受到"自然法则"主导版本所决定的大政治因素的影响。生活总是复杂的。羔羊与狮子保持着微妙的平衡,在边际地进行互动。如果狮子突然更敏捷,它们就能捕捉到现在逃脱的猎物。如果羔羊突然长出翅膀,狮子们就会挨饿。利用和抵御暴力的能力是改变边际生活的关键变量。

We put violence at the center of our theory of megapolitics for good reason. The control of violence is the most important dilemma every society faces. As we wrote in *The Great Reckoning*:

我们将暴力置于我们的超级政治理论的核心,这是有充分理由的。暴力的控制是每个社会都面临的最重要的困境。正如我们在《大清算》中所写的:

The reason that people resort to violence is that it often pays. In some ways, the simplest thing a man can do if he wants money is to take it. That is no less true for an army of men seizing an oil field than it is for a single thug

taking a wallet. Power, as William Playfair wrote, "has always sought the readiest road to wealth, by attacking those who were in possession of it."

暴力通常可以带来收益,这就是人们会选择使用暴力的原因。如果一个人想获得金钱,最简单的办法就是去抢夺。这一点对于一支军队占领石油田,与单独一个流氓抢劫钱包来说是一样的。正如威廉·普莱费尔所写,"权力一直在寻求最快速的获取财富的道路,那就是攻击那些拥有财富的人"。

The challenge to prosperity is precisely that predatory violence does pay well in some circumstances. War does change things. It changes the rules. 繁荣的挑战恰恰在于掠夺性暴力在某些情况下确实有回报。战争确实改变事物。它改变了规则。

It changes the distribution of assets and income. It even determines who lives and who dies. It is precisely the fact that violence does pay that makes it hard to control. 9

它改变了资产和收入的分配。它甚至决定谁生谁死。正是因为暴力是有回报的,这使得它难以控制。

Thinking in these terms has helped us foresee a number of developments that better-informed experts insisted could never happen. For example, *Blood in the Streets*, published in early 1987, was our attempt to survey the first stages of the great megapolitical revolution now under way. We argued then that technological change was destabilizing the power equation in the world. Among our principal points: • We said that American predominance was in decline, which would lead to economic imbalances and distress, including another 1929-style stock market crash. Experts were all but unanimous in denying that such a thing could happen. Yet within six months, in October 1987, world markets were convulsed by the most violent sell-off of the century.

从这种角度考虑有助于我们预见一些专家坚持认为永远不会发生的发展。例如,1987年初出版的《血洒街头》是我们试图调查正在进行的大型地缘政治革命的初期阶段。我们当时认为,技术变革正在破坏世界权力方程。我们的主要观点包括:我们表示,美国的主导地位正在下降,这将导致经济失衡和困境,包括1929年式的股市崩溃。专家们几乎一致

否认这种情况会发生。然而,在六个月后的 1987 年 10 月,市场却遭受了本世纪最严重的抛售。

- We told readers to expect the collapse of Communism. Again, experts laughed.

我们告诉读者,要预计共产主义的崩溃。再次,专家们嗤之以鼻。

Yet 1989 brought the events that "no one could have predicted." The Berlin Wall fell, as revolutions swept away Communist regimes from the Baltic to Bucharest.

然而 1989 年出现了"没人能预料到"的事件。柏林墙倒塌了,革命席卷了从波罗的海到布加勒斯特的共产主义政权。

- We explained why the multiethnic empire that the Bolshevik nomenklatura inherited from the tsars would "inevitably crack apart." At the end of December 1991, the 15

我们解释了为什么波尔什维克党的代表继承自沙皇的多民族帝国"必将破裂"。1991 年 12 月末,15 个苏联加盟共和国退出了苏联联邦。

hammer-and-sickle banner was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time as the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

锤子和自行车旗帜在克里姆林宫上最后一次降下,苏联不复存在。

- During the height of the Reagan arms buildup, we argued that the world stood at the threshold of sweeping disarmament. This, too, was considered unlikely, if not preposterous. Yet the following seven years brought the most sweeping disarmament since the close of World War I.

在里根军备扩张高峰期,我们论证了世界正站在全面裁军的门槛上。这也被认为是不太可能发生的,甚至是荒谬的。然而,接下来的七年里,发生了自第一次世界大战结束以来最为广泛的裁军。

- At a time when experts in North America and Europe were pointing to Japan for support of the view that governments can successfully rig markets, we said otherwise. We forecast that the Japanese financial assets boom would end in a bust.

在北美和欧洲的专家指出政府可以成功操纵市场的观点时,我们持不同观点。我们预测日本金融资产的繁荣最终将以崩盘告终。

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Japanese stock market crashed, losing almost half its value. We continue to believe that its ultimate low could match or exceed the 89 percent loss that Wall Street suffered at the bottom after 1929.

柏林墙倒塌后不久,日本股市也遭遇崩盘,损失了近一半的价值。我们仍然认为,它最终的低点可能与 1929 年华尔街底部损失 89%的情况相匹配或超过。

- At a point when almost everyone, from the middle-class family to the world's largest real estate investors, appeared to believe that property markets could only rise and not fall, we warned that a real estate bust was in the offing. Within four years, real estate investors throughout the world lost more than \$1 trillion as property values dropped.

当几乎所有人,从中产阶级家庭到世界最大的房地产投资者,似乎都相信房地产市场只能上涨而不会下跌时,我们警告过房地产泡沫即将破裂。在短短 4 年内,全球房地产投资者损失超过 1 万亿美元,因为房地产价值大幅下跌。

- Long before it was obvious to the experts, we explained in *Blood in the Streets* that the income of blue-collar workers had decreased and was destined to continue falling on a long-term basis. As we write today, almost a decade later, it has at last begun to dawn on a sleepy world that this is true. Average hourly wages in the United States have fallen below those achieved in the second Eisenhower administration. In 1993, average annualized hourly wages in constant dollars were \$18,808. In 1957, when Eisenhower was sworn in for his second term, U.S., annualized average hourly wages were \$18,903.

工人工资在很长一段时间内一直在下降,尽管专家当时还没有意识到这一点。早在很多年前,我们就在《街头血战》一书中就预测了这一趋势。如今十年过去了,这一事实终于被一个昏昏欲睡的世界认识到。美国平均时薪已经低于艾森豪威尔第二任期时的水平。1993 年,美国实际平均时薪为 18,808 美元,而 1957 年,也就是艾森豪威尔第二次就职时,美国平均时薪为 18,903 美元。

While the main themes of *Blood in the Streets* have proven remarkably accurate with the benefit of hindsight, only a few years ago they were considered rank nonsense by the guardians of conventional thinking. A reviewer in *Newsweek* in 1987 reflected the closed mental climate of late industrial society when he dismissed our analysis as "an unthinking attack on reason."

尽管《街头血腥》的主要主题在事后看来异常准确,但就在几年前,它们还被主流思维的守护者视为纯属胡言乱语。1987年,《新闻周刊》上的一位评论者反映了后工业社会封闭的思维环境,他将我们的分析贬低为"对理性的无谓攻击"。

You might imagine that *Newsweek* and similar publications would have recognized with the passage of time that our line of analysis had revealed something useful about the way the world was changing. Not a bit. The first edition of *The Great Reckoning* was greeted with the same sniggering hostility that welcomed *Blood in the Streets*. No less an authority than the *Wall Street Journal* categorically dismissed our analysis as the nattering of "your dopey aunt."

你可能会想象,《新闻周刊》和类似出版物随着时间的推移会意识到,我们的分析路线已经揭示了关于世界变化方式的有价值的信息。完全不是这样,《大清算》的首版遭到了与《大街上的血》相同的嘲笑和敌意。正如《华尔街日报》所说,我们的分析被斥为"你这个蠢妈妈的碎碎念"。

This chuckling aside, the themes of *The Great Reckoning* proved less ludicrous than the guardians of orthodoxy pretended.

这番哄笑之外,《大清算》的主题要比正统派保卫者所宣称的更加可信。

- We extended our forecast of the death of the Soviet Union, exploring why Russia and the other former Soviet republics faced a future of growing civil disorder⁴

我们扩展了我们对苏联覆亡的预测,探讨了为什么俄罗斯和其他前苏联共和国面临着日益加剧的内乱的未来

hyperinflation, and falling living standards.
恶性通胀和生活水平下降。

- We explained why the 1990s would be a decade of downsizing, including for the first time a worldwide downsizing of governments as well as business entities.

我们解释了为什么 1990 年代将是一个精简规模的十年,包括政府和企业实体首次进行全球范围的精简工作。

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- We also forecast that there would be a major redefinition of terms of income redistribution, with sharp cutbacks in the level of benefits. Hints of fiscal crisis appeared from Canada to Sweden, and American politicians began to talk of "ending welfare as we know it."

我们还预测,收入再分配的条款将会有有一个重大重新定义,福利水平将会大幅削减。从加拿大到瑞典,出现了财政危机的迹象,美国政治家开始谈论"结束我们所知的福利"。

- We anticipated and explained why the "new world order" would prove to be a "new world disorder." Well before the atrocities in Bosnia engrossed the headlines, we warned that Yugoslavia would collapse into civil war.

我们预料并解释了为什么"新世界秩序"将证明是"新世界混乱"。在波斯尼亚的暴行引起头条新闻之前,我们就警告过南斯拉夫将陷入内战。

- Before Somalia slid into anarchy, we explained why the pending collapse of governments in Africa would lead some countries there to be effectively placed into receivership.

索马里陷入无政府状态之前,我们解释了为什么非洲政府的即将崩溃会导致某些国家被实际置于托管状态。

- We forecast and explained why militant Islam would displace Marxism as the principal ideology of confrontation with the West. Years before the Oklahoma bombing and the attempt to blow up the World Trade Center, we explained why the United States faced an upsurge in terrorism.

我们预测和解释了为什么激进的伊斯兰教将取代马克思主义成为与西

方对抗的主要意识形态。在俄克拉荷马城爆炸案和世贸中心遭袭事件发生多年前,我们就解释了为什么美国面临恐怖主义的上升势头。

- Before the headlines that told of the rioting that swept Los Angeles, Toronto, and other cities, we explained why the emergence of criminal subcultures among urban minorities was setting the stage for widespread criminal violence.

在报道洛杉矶、多伦多和其他城市骚乱的新闻出现之前,我们解释了为什么城市少数群体中犯罪亚文化的出现正在为广泛的犯罪暴力奠定舞台。

The Great Reckoning also spelled out a number of controversial theses that have not yet been confirmed, or have not reached the level of development that we forecast: • We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall Street's path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit collapse and depression. Although unemployment rates in Spain, Finland, and a few other countries exceeded those of the 1930s, and a number of countries, including Japan, did experience local depressions, there has not yet been a systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies worldwide in the 1930s.

大清算也列出了一些尚未得到证实或尚未达到我们预测水平的有争议论点:•我们说,日本股市将在 1929 年后走向华尔街的道路,这将导致信贷崩溃和经济衰退。虽然西班牙、芬兰和少数其他国家的失业率超过了 1930 年代,一些国家包括日本也经历了局部经济衰退,但目前还没有出现 1930 年代那种全球性的系统性信贷崩溃。

- We argued that the breakdown of the command-and-control system in the former Soviet Union would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of ministates, terrorists, and criminal gangs. To the world's good fortune, this has not come to pass, at least not to the degree that we feared. Press reports indicate that Iran purchased several tactical nuclear weapons on the black market, and German authorities foiled several attempts to sell nuclear materials. But there has been no announced deployment or use of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the former Soviet Union.

我们认为,前苏联指挥控制系统的崩溃将导致核武器扩散到小国、恐怖分子和犯罪团伙手中。幸运的是,这种情况并未真正发生,至少没有达到

我们担心的程度。有报道称伊朗在黑市购买了几枚战术核武器,德国当局也阻挠了几起出售核材料的企图。但前苏联核武库中没有任何公开的部署或使用核武器的情况。

- We explained why the "War on Drugs" was a recipe for subverting the police and judicial systems of countries where drug use is widespread, particularly the United States. With tens of billions of dollars in hidden monopoly profits piling up each year, drug dealers have the means as well as the incentive to corrupt even apparently stable countries. While the world media have carried occasional stories hinting at high-level penetration of the U.S. political system by drug money, the full story has not yet been told. 我们解释了为什么"反毒战争"是一个破坏吸毒广泛国家尤其是美国警察和司法体系的配方。每年累积数十亿美元的隐藏垄断利润,毒品交易商不仅有手段,而且还有动机去腐蚀即使是表面稳定的国家。尽管世界媒体偶尔报道了毒品资金渗透美国政治体系的暗示,但真实的故事还未完全讲述。

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Looking Where Others Don't
找其他人没发现的地方

Notwithstanding the points where our forecasts were mistaken or seem mistaken in light of what is now known, the record stands to scrutiny. Much of what is likely to figure in future economic histories of the 1990s was forecast or anticipated and explained in *The Great Reckoning*. Many of our forecasts were not simple extrapolations or extensions of trends, but forecasts of major departures from what has been considered normal since World War II. We warned that the 1990s would be dramatically different from the previous five decades. Reading the news of 1991 through 1995, we see that the themes of *The Great Reckoning* were borne out almost daily.

尽管我们的预测在某些点上存在错误或似乎与现有信息不符,但整体来说我们的记录经得起审查。1990年代的许多经济史料很可能都已在《大清算》中预测或预期并加以阐述。我们的许多预测并非简单地延续趋势,而是对自二战以来被视为正常的局面发生重大转变的预测。我

们警示 1990 年代将与前五十年出现戏剧性的不同。翻阅 1991 年至 1995 年的新闻,我们发现《大清算》中的主题几乎日复一日地得到印证。

We see these developments not as examples of isolated difficulties, trouble here, trouble there, but as shocks and tremors that run along the same fault line. The old order is being toppled by a megapolitical earthquake that will revolutionize institutions and alter the way thinking people see the world. 我们看到这些发展并非是孤立困难的例子,这里有麻烦,那里有麻烦,而是沿着同一断层线发生的冲击和震颤。旧秩序正被一场庞大的政治地震所推翻,这将革新各种制度,改变思考者看待世界的方式。

In spite of the central role of violence in determining the way the world works, it attracts surprisingly little serious attention. Most political analysts and economists write as if violence were a minor irritant, like a fly buzzing around a cake, and not the chef who baked it.

尽管暴力在决定世界运行方式中起着中心作用,但它却引起了令人惊讶的很少的认真关注。大多数政治分析师和经济学家的著述,就好像暴力只是一个微不足道的烦扰,像蜂拥在蛋糕周围的苍蝇,而不是烘制它的厨师。

Another Megapolitical Pioneer 另一位兆政治先驱

In fact, there has been so little clear thinking about the role of violence in history that a bibliography of megapolitical analysis could be written on a single sheet of paper.

事实上,对历史中暴力作用的清晰思考太少,一张纸就可以列出所有的大政治分析书目。

In *The Great Reckoning*, we drew upon and elaborated arguments of an almost entirely forgotten classic of megapolitical analysis, William Playfair's *An Enquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations*, published in 1805. Were one of our departure points is the work of Frederic C. Lane. Lane was a medieval historian who wrote several penetrating essays on the role of violence in

history during the 1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these was "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," which appeared in the Journal of Economic History in 1958. Few people other than professional economists and historians have read it, and most of them seem not to have recognized its significance. Like Playfair, Lane wrote for an audience that did not yet exist.

在《大清算》中,我们借鉴并发展了一部几乎被遗忘的重大政治分析经典作品,那就是威廉·普雷费尔于 1805 年出版的《强大富裕国家衰落的永久性原因探究》。我们出发点之一是弗雷德里克·C·莱恩的作品。莱恩是一位中世纪史学家,20 世纪 40 年代和 50 年代写了几篇有深度的论文,探讨历史上暴力的角色。其中最全面的一篇是 1958 年在《经济史杂志》上发表的《有组织暴力的经济后果》。除了专业经济学家和历史学家,很少有人读过这篇文章,而且大多数人似乎并没有意识到它的重要性。就像普雷费尔一样,莱恩的作品面向的读者尚未真正出现。

Insights for the Information Age 信息时代的见解

Lane published his work on violence and the economic meaning of war well before the advent of the Information Age. He certainly was not writing in anticipation of microprocessing or the other technological revolutions now unfolding. Yet his insights into violence established a framework for understanding how society will be reconfigured in the Information Revolution.

莱恩在信息时代到来之前就发表了关于暴力和战争经济意义的著作。他当然并非是在预期微处理器或当前展开的其他技术革命时在撰写。然而,他对暴力的洞见为理解信息革命如何重塑社会奠定了基础。

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The window Lane opened into the future was one through which he peered into the past. He was a medieval historian, and particularly a historian of a trading City, Venice, whose fortunes surged and sagged in a violent world. In thinking about how Venice rose and fell, his attention was attracted to issues that can help you understand the future. He saw the fact that how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining "what

uses are made of scarce resources.

拉纳打开的未来窗户是他窥视过去的一扇窗户。他是一名中世纪历史学家,尤其是一座贸易城市威尼斯的历史学家,其命运在动荡的世界中起伏。在思考威尼斯的兴衰时,他的注意力被一些能帮助你理解未来的问题所吸引。他认识到暴力的组织和控制在决定 "稀缺资源的利用"方面发挥着重大作用。

We believe that Lane's analyses of the competitive uses of violence has much to tell us about how life is likely to change in the Information Age. But don't expect most people to notice, much less follow, so unfashionably abstract an argument. While the attention of the world is riveted on dishonest debates and wayward personalities, the meanderings of megapolitics continue almost unnoted. The average North American has probably lavished one hundred times more attention on O. J. Simpson than he has on the new microtechnologies that are poised to antiquate his job and subvert the political system he depends on for unemployment compensation.

我们相信,兰恩关于暴力竞争用途的分析,可以告诉我们信息时代生活很可能发生的变化。但不要期望大多数人能注意到,更不要指望他们会跟上这种过于抽象的论点。当全世界都被不诚实的辩论和偏离轨道的人物所吸引时,巨型政治的迷漫几乎没有受到关注。普通北美人可能会在奥伊·辛普森身上花费的注意力,是他们关注即将取代自己工作和削弱其失业补偿依赖的新型微技术的一百倍。

THE VANITY OF WISHES

虚荣的愿望

The tendency to overlook what is fundamentally important is not confined solely to the couch dweller watching television. Conventional thinkers of all shapes and sizes observe one of the pretenses of the nationstate-that the views people hold determine the way the world changes. Apparently sophisticated analysts lapse into explanations and forecasts that interpret major historical developments as if they were determined in a wishful way. A striking example of this type of reasoning appeared on the editorial page of the New York Times just as we were writing "Goodbye, NationState, Hello.

忽视基本重要性的趋势并不仅仅局限于看电视的懒人。各种各样的传统思想家都注意到了国家的一个假设,即人们持有的观点决定了世界的变化方式。表面上很复杂的分析师陷入这种解释和预测,好像主要的历史发展是以一种期望的方式确定的。在我们写 "再见,国家,你好"时,纽约时报的社论页面出现了一个很好的例子说明了这种类型的推理。

..What?," by Nicholas Colchester.¹¹ Not only was the topic, the death of the nationstate, the very topic we are addressing, but its author presents himself as an excellent marker to illustrate how far removed our way of thinking is from the norm. Colehester is no simpleton. He wrote as editorial director of the Economist Intelligence Unit. If anyone should form a realistic view of the world it should be he. Yet his article clearly indicates in several places that "the coming of international government "is" now logically unstoppable."

什么?

Why? Because the nationstate is faltering and can no longer control economic forces.

为什么?因为民族国家正在式微,无法再控制经济力量。

In our view, this assumption verges on the absurd. To suppose that some specific new form of governance will emerge simply because another has failed is a fallacy. By that reasoning, Haiti and Zaire would long ago have

had better government simply because what they had was so luminously inadequate.

在我们看来,这种假设几乎是荒谬的。认为因为另一种形式的治理失败,就会出现某种特定的新形式的治理,这是一个谬误。基于这种推理,海地和扎伊尔早就应该有更好的政府,因为他们当时的政府显然是极其不力的。

Colchester's point of view; widely shared among the few who think about such things in North America and Europe, utterly fails to take into account the larger megapolitical forces that determine what types of political systems are actually viable.

科尔切斯特的观点;在北美和欧洲那些关注这些问题的少数人中广为流传,完全没有考虑到决定哪种政治体系实际上可行的更大的大政治力量。

That is the focus of this book. When the technologies that are shaping the new millennium are considered, it is far more likely that we will see not one world government, but microgovernment, or even conditions approaching anarchy.

这是本书的重点。当我们考虑塑造新千年的技术时,我们更有可能看到不是一个世界政府,而是微型政府,甚至接近无政府状态的情况。

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For every serious analysis of the role of violence in determining the rules by which everyone operates, dozens of books have been written about the intricacies of wheat subsidies, and hundreds more about arcane aspects of monetary policy. Much of this shortfall in thinking about the crucial issues that actually determine the course of history probably reflects the relative stability of the power configuration over the past several centuries. The bird that falls asleep on the back of a hippopotamus does not think about losing its perch until the hippo actually moves. Dreams, myths, and fantasies play a much larger role in informing the supposed social sciences than we commonly think.

对于每一个关于暴力在决定所有人运营规则中作用的深入分析,都有数十本关于小麦补贴复杂性的著作,还有成百上千篇关于货币政策晦涩细

节的文章。这种对决定历史进程关键问题的思考缺失,很可能反映了过去几个世纪权力配置相对稳定的状况。睡在河马背上的鸟,直到河马真的移动,才会想到可能失去栖身之所。梦想、神话和幻想在影响所谓的社会科学中,所起的作用要比我们通常认为的更为广泛。

This is particularly evident in the abundant literature of economic justice. 这在丰富的经济正义文献中尤为明显。

Millions of words have been uttered and written about economic justice and injustice for each page devoted to careful analysis of how violence shapes society, and thus sets the boundaries within which economies must function. Yet formulations of economic justice in the modern context presuppose that society is dominated by an instrument of compulsion so powerful that it can take away and redistribute life's good things. Such power has existed for only a few generations of the modern period. Now it is fading away.

经济公平与不公平已经产生了数以百万计的字句。但是我们很少深入剖析暴力如何塑造社会,并制定经济活动的边界。现代社会正在经历一个强大统治工具的衰落,这种工具曾经能够剥夺并重新分配生活的美好事物。

Big Brother on Social Security
社会保障上的"大哥哥"

Industrial technology gave governments greater instruments of control in the twentieth century than ever before. For a time, it seemed inevitable that governments would become so effective at monopolizing violence as to leave little room for individual autonomy. Nobody at midcentury was looking forward to the triumph of the Sovereign Individual.

工业技术在 20 世纪给予政府前所未有的控制手段。有一段时间,人们认为政府对暴力的垄断会变得如此有效,以至于个人自主权所剩无几。在 20 世纪中叶,没有人期待"主权个人"的胜利。

Some of the shrewdest observers of the mid-twentieth century became convinced on the evidence of the day that the tendency of the nationstate to centralize power would lead to totalitarian domination over all aspects of

life. In George Orwell's 1984 (1949), Big Brother was watching the individual vainly struggle to maintain a margin of autonomy and self-respect. It appeared to be a losing cause. Friedrich von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) took a more scholarly view in arguing that freedom was being lost to a new form of economic control that left the state as the master of everything.

20 世纪中期一些最敏锐的观察者,根据当时的证据,确信国家倾向集中权力会导致对生活的各个方面的极权主义统治。在乔治·奥威尔的《一九八四》(1949 年)中,大哥哥在无谓地监视着个人维护自主权和尊严的努力。这似乎是一场注定失败的事业。弗里德里希·冯·哈耶克的《通往阶隶社会之路》(1944 年)则从更学术的角度论证,自由正被一种新形式的经济控制所失去,政府成为一切的主宰。

These works were written before the advent of microprocessing, which has incubated a whole range of technologies that enhance the capacity of small groups and even individuals to function independently of central authority. 这些作品是在微处理器出现之前撰写的,微处理器催生了一系列技术,增强了小群体甚至个人独立于中央权威运作的的能力。

As shrewd as observers like Hayek and Orwell were, they were unduly pessimistic. History has unfolded its surprises. Totalitarian Communism barely outlasted the year 1984. A new form of serfdom may yet emerge in the next millennium if governments succeed in suppressing the liberating aspects of microtechnology. But it is far more likely that we will see unprecedented opportunity and autonomy for the individual. What our parents worried about may prove to be no problem at all. What they took for granted as fixed and permanent features of social life now seem destined to disappear. Wherever necessity sets boundaries to human choice, we adjust, and reorganize our lives accordingly.

正如哈耶克和奥威尔这样敏锐的观察者,他们过于悲观了。历史呈现了它的惊喜。极权主义共产主义几乎没有在 1984 年之后存活下来。如果政府成功压制微型技术的自由化方面,在下一个千年中可能出现一种新的农奴制。但我们更有可能看到个人前所未有的机会和自主权。我们父母所担心的事情可能根本不成问题。他们认为理所当然的社会生活

的固定和永久特征现在似乎注定要消失。无论生存必须对人类选择设置边界,我们都会做出调整,并相应地重组我们的生活。

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The Hazards of Forecasting 预测的风险

No doubt we put our small measure of dignity at risk in attempting to foresee and explain profound changes in the organization of life and the culture that binds it together.

毫无疑问,在试图预见和解释生活组织和维系它的文化的深刻变化时,我们会冒犯我们细微的尊严。

Most forecasts are doomed to make silly reading in the fullness of time. And the more dramatic the change they envision, the more embarrassingly wrong they tend to be. The world doesn't end. The ozone doesn't vanish. The coming Ice Age dissolves into global warming. Notwithstanding all the alarms to the contrary, there is still oil in the tank. Mr.

大多数预测在时间的推移下会变得荒唐可笑。而且,他们所设想的变化越剧烈,他们往往会越错得令人尴尬。世界并没有结束。臭氧层没有消失。即将到来的冰河时代已转变为全球变暖。尽管存在大量警告,但油箱里仍然有油。

Antrobus, the everyman of *The Skin of Our Teeth*, avoids freezing, survives wars and threatened economic calamities, and grows old ignoring the studied alarms of experts.

《我们的皮肤》中的平凡人安特罗巴斯避免了冻结,生存了战争和经济灾难的威胁,并在忽视专家警告的情况下变老。

Most attempts to "unveil" the future soon turn out to be comic. Even where self-interest provides a strong incentive to clear thinking, forward vision is often myopic. In 1903, the Mercedes company said that "there would never be as many as 1 million automobiles worldwide. The reason was that it was implausible that as many as 1

大多数试图"揭开"未来的尝试最终都被证明是滑稽可笑的。即使自身

利益提供了清晰思考的强烈动力,远见也往往是近视的。1903 年,梅赛德斯公司表示,"全球汽车数量永远不会超过 100 万辆"。原因是认为这样的数量是不大可能实现的。

million artisans worldwide would be trainable as chauffeurs." 12
将全球数百万手工艺人培训为司机。

Recognizing this should stop our mouths. It doesn't. We are not afraid to stand in line for a due share of ridicule. If we mistake matters greatly, future generations may laugh as heartily as they please, presuming anyone remembers what we said. To dare a thought is to risk being wrong. We are hardly so stiff and useless that we are afraid to err. Far from it. We would rather venture thoughts that might prove useful to you than suppress them out of apprehension that they might prove overblown or embarrassing in retrospect.

我们应该明白,这不应该阻止我们的言论。但事实并非如此。我们并不畏惧接受应得的嘲笑。即使我们严重误解了某些问题,未来的世代也可以自由地大笑,如果还有人记得我们所说的话。我们敢于去想,也随时承担可能错误的风险。我们远非那种僵硬和无用的人,害怕犯错。相反,我们更愿意提出可能有用的想法,也不会因为它们可能事后被证明是夸张或令人尴尬而压抑它们。

As Arthur C. Clarke shrewdly noted, the two overriding reasons why attempts to anticipate the future usually fall flat are "Failure of Nerve and Failure of Imagination." "

亚瑟·C·克拉克敏锐地指出,预测未来往往失败的两个主要原因是"意志力的缺失和想象力的缺乏"。

Of the two, he wrote, "Failure of Nerve seems to be the more common; it occurs when even given all of the relevant facts the would-be prophet cannot see that they point to an inescapable conclusion, Some of these failures are so ludicrous as to be almost unbelievable."

在两者之中,他写道:"神经失常似乎更为普遍;即使拥有所有相关事实,欲成为先知者也无法看到它们指向不可逃避的结论,其中一些失败荒谬至几乎难以置信。"

Where our exploration of the Information Revolution falls short, as it inevitably will, the cause will be due more to a lack of imagination than to a lack of nerve.

我们对信息革命的探索虽然注定会有不足之处,但这更多是由于缺乏想象力而非缺乏勇气所致。

Forecasting the future has always been a bold enterprise, one which properly excites skepticism. Perhaps time will prove that our deductions are wildly off the mark. Unlike Nostradamus, we do not pretend to be prophetic personalities. We do not foretell the future by stirring a wand in a bowl of water or by casting horoscopes. Nor do we write in cryptic verse. Our purpose is to provide you with a sober, detached analysis of issues that could prove to be of great importance to you.

预测未来一直是一种大胆的事业,这恰恰会引起怀疑。也许时间会证明我们的推论完全脱离事实。与诺斯特拉达姆斯不同,我们并不自称是预言家。我们不会通过在水中搅动魔杖或投掷星相图来预测未来。我们也不会用隐晦的诗句写作。我们的目的是为您提供一个冷静、客观的分析,这些分析可能对您非常重要。

We feel an obligation to set out our views, even where they seem heretical, precisely because they may not otherwise be heard. In the closed mental atmosphere of late industrial society, ideas do not traffic as freely as they should through the established media.

我们觉得有责任表达我们的观点,即使它们可能有争议,正是因为它们可能不会被其他人表达。在后工业社会闭塞的思想气氛中,想法无法像应该那样自由地在既有的媒体中传播。

This book is written in a constructive spirit. It is the third we have written together, analyzing various stages of the great change now under way. Like *Blood in the 21*

这本书用了建设性的语气。这是我们共同撰写的第三本著作,分析了这场大变革的不同阶段。像《21 世纪的血》一样。

Streets and The Great Reckoning, it is a thought exercise. It explores the death of industrial society and its reconfiguration in new forms. We expect to see amazing paradoxes in the years to come. On the one hand, you will

witness the realization of a new form of freedom, with the emergence of the Sovereign Individual. You can expect to see almost the complete liberation of productivity. At the same time, we expect to see the death of the modern nationstate. Many of the assurances of equality that Western people have grown to take for granted in the twentieth century are destined to die with it. 街道和大清算,这是一个思想实验。它探讨了工业社会的死亡及其在新形式中的重新配置。我们预计未来几年会出现令人惊奇的悖论。一方面,你将见证主权个人的出现,并实现新形式的自由。你可以期待生产率几乎完全被解放。与此同时,我们预计现代民族国家的死亡。20 世纪西方人日益习以为常的许多平等保证都注定要与之一起消亡。

We expect that representative democracy as it is now known will fade away, to be replaced by the new democracy of choice in the cybermarketplace. If our deductions are correct, the politics of the next century will be much more varied and less important than that to which we have become accustomed.

我们预计,现有形式的代议制民主将逐渐消失,被网络市场新兴的选择型民主所取代。如果我们的推论正确,下一个世纪的政治将更加多样化,但也相对不太重要,与我们习惯的政治形式不同。

We are confident that our argument will be easy to follow, notwithstanding the fact that it leads through some territory that is the intellectual equivalent of the backwoods and bad neighborhoods. If our meaning is not entirely intelligible in places, that is not because we are being cute, or using the time-honored equivocation of those who pretend to foretell the future by making cryptic pronouncements. We are not equivocators. If our arguments are unclear, it is because we have failed the task of writing in a way that makes compelling ideas accessible. Unlike many forecasters, we want you to understand and even duplicate our line of thinking. It is based not upon psychic reveries or the gyrations of planets, but upon old-fashioned, ugly logic. For quite logical reasons, we believe that microprocessing will inevitably subvert and destroy the nationstate, creating new forms of social organization in the process. It is both necessary and possible for you to foresee at least some details of the new way of life that may be here sooner than you think.

我们相信,尽管我们的论点需要进入一些知识等同于荒野和贫困地区的

领域,但仍会很容易理解。如果我们的意思在某些地方并不完全清晰,那不是因为在装可爱,或使用那些假装预知未来的人常用的晦涩暧昧的措辞。我们不是说一些含糊其辞的话。如果我们的论点不太清楚,那是因为我们未能以一种使引人注目的思想易于理解的方式进行写作。与许多预测者不同,我们希望您能理解并甚至复制我们的思路。这种思路并非源于心灵幻想或行星的运动,而是源于老派而枯燥的逻辑。由于完全合乎逻辑的原因,我们认为微处理器将不可避免地颠覆和破坏民族国家,在此过程中创造出新的社会组织形式。您预见到新的生活方式至少某些细节的出现是必要和可能的,这可能发生得比您想象的更快。

Ironies of a Future Foretold 预见未来的讽刺

For centuries, the end of this millennium has been seen as a pregnant moment in history. More than 850 years ago, St. Malachy fixed 2000 as the date of the Last Judgment. American psychic Edgar Cayce said in 1934 that the earth would shift on its axis in the year 2000, causing California to split in two and inundating New York City and Japan. A Japanese rocket scientist, Hideo Itokawa, announced in 1980 that the alignment of the planets in a "Grand Cross" on August 18, 1999, would cause widespread environmental devastation, leading to the end of human life on earth.' 15 这个千年的结束数个世纪以来一直被视为历史上的一个关键时刻。800多年前圣玛拉基将 2000 年定为最后的审判日。美国灵媒爱德格·凯西在 1934 年预言,地球轴将于 2000 年移动,导致加州分裂,纽约和日本被淹。日本火箭科学家伊藤秀男在 1980 年宣布,1999 年 8 月 18 日 planets 的"大十字星"排列将导致广泛的环境灾难,最终导致地球上人类的灭亡。

Such visions of apocalypse make a plump target for ridicule, After all, the year 2000, while an imposing round number, is only an arbitrary artifact of the Christian calendar as adopted in the West. Other calendars and dating systems calculate centuries and millennia from different starting points. By the reckoning of the Islamic calendar, for example, A.D. 2000 will be the year 1378. As ordinary-sounding as a year can be. 这种末日的幻想成了嘲笑的目标。毕竟,2000 年只是西方基督教日历的

一个任意的圆整数字。其他历法和日期系统是从不同的起点计算世纪和千年。以伊斯兰历来说,公元 2000 年将是 1378 年。这听起来也很普通。

According to the Chinese calendar, which repeats itself every sixty years, A.D. 2000 is just another year of the dragon. It is part of a continuous cycle that extends millennia into the past.

根据中国历法,每六十年重复一次,2000 年就是龙年。这是延续了数千年的持续循环的一部分。

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Professor Itokawa notwithstanding, premonitions about the new millennium seem closely tied to the Christian faith, and the predominant Western imagination of time.

虽然伊藤川教授并不认同,但对新千年的预感似乎与基督教信仰和主导西方的时间观念有着密切联系。

They are prophecies, not astrophysics. Most are dreams, reveries, and visions, or numerical interpretations of visions, like Newton's gloss on the prophecies of Daniel.

它们是预言,而非天体物理学。大多数是梦境、沉思和异象,或异象的数值解释,就像牛顿对丹尼尔预言的注解。

These intuitive leaps begin with a perspective that takes the birth of Christ to be the central fact of history. They are compounded by the psychological power of large round numbers, which every trader will recognize as having an arresting quality. The two thousandth year of our epoch cannot help but become a focus for the imagination of intuitive people.

这些直觉飞跃始于一个观点,即认为基督诞生是历史的中心事实。它们又被大的整数所具有的心理力量所加强,这是每个交易员都能认识到的一种吸引力。我们纪元的两千年不能不成为直觉人群想象力的焦点。

A critic could easily make these premonitions seem silly, without even addressing the ambiguous and debatable theological notions of the Apocalypse and the Last Judgment that give these visions so much of their

power Even within the Christian framework, the year 2000 can only seem the likely inflection point for the next stage of history if one overlooks errors of arithmetic. In strict logic, the next millennium will not begin until 2001. The year 2000 will be only the two thousandth year since Christ's birth. Or it would be had Christ been born in the first year of the Christian era. He was not. In 533, when Christ's birth replaced the founding date of Rome as the basis for calculating years according to the Western calendar, the monks who introduced the new convention miscalculated Christ's birth. It is now accepted that he was born in 4 B.C.

一位批评者可以轻松地说这些预感看起来愚蠢,而无需处理启示录和最后审判的模糊和有争议的神学概念,这些概念赋予这些视野如此多的力量。即使在基督教框架内,2000 年也只能被视为历史下一阶段的可能转折点,如果忽略算术错误的话。在严格的逻辑中,下一个千年纪元不会在 2000 年开始,而是要到 2001 年。2000 年只是自基督诞生以来的两千年。或者它本应是,如果基督诞生于基督教纪元的第一年。事实上并非如此。在 533 年,当基督诞生替代罗马建城纪年成为西方日历计算的基础时,引入这一新惯例的修士误算了基督的诞生年份。现在被公认他是在公元前 4 年出生的。

On that basis, a full two thousand years since his birth will be completed sometime in 1997. Hence Carl Jung's apparently odd launch date for the start of a New Age.

基于此,自他出生至今将在 1997 年左右全面完成两千年。因此卡尔·荣格在新纪元开始的奇特启动日期。

Giggle if you will, but we do not despise or dismiss intuitive understandings of history. Although our argument is grounded in logic, not in revenues, we are awed by the prophetic power of human consciousness. Time after time, it redeems the visions of madmen, psychics, and saints. So it may be with the transformation of the year 2000.

即使你会发笑,我们也不贬低或忽视对历史的直观理解。虽然我们的论点建立在逻辑之上,而非收益,但我们敬畏人类意识的预言能力。一次又一次,它拯救了疯子、灵媒和圣徒的幻景。2000 年的变革也可能如此。

The date that has long been fixed in the imagination of the West looks to be the inflection point that at least half confirms that history has a destiny. We

cannot explain why this should be, but nonetheless we are convinced that it is so.

久久固定在西方想象力中的日期似乎是至少有一半确认历史有命运的拐点。我们无法解释为什么会这样,但我们仍然坚信这是如此。

Our intuition is that history has a destiny, and that free will and determinism are two versions of the same phenomenon. The human interactions that form history behave as though they were informed by a kind of destiny. Just as an electron plasma, a dense gas of electrons, behaves as a complex system, so do human beings. The freedom of individual movement by the electrons turns out to be compatible with highly organized collective behavior. As David Ohm said of an electron plasma, human history is "a highly organized system which behaves as a whole."

我们的直觉是,历史有一种命运,而自由意志和决定论是同一现象的两种表述。形成历史的人类互动行为仿佛受到某种命运的指引。正如电子等离子体,这种由密集电子组成的气体,能表现出复杂的系统行为,人类社会也是如此。电子个体的自由运动与高度组织化的集体行为是兼容的。正如大卫·欧姆所说的电子等离子体,"人类历史是一个高度有组织的系统,表现为一个整体"。

Understanding the way the world works means developing a realistic intuition of the way that human society obeys the mathematics of natural processes. Reality is nonlinear But most people's expectations are not. To understand the dynamics of change, you have to recognize that human society, like other complex systems in nature, is characterized by cycles and discontinuities. That means certain features of history have a tendency to repeat themselves, and the most important changes, when they occur, may be abrupt rather than gradual.

了解世界运转的方式意味着要发展一种切合实际的直觉,即人类社会遵循自然过程的数学规律。现实是非线性的,但大多数人的期望却不是。要理解变化的动态,就必须认识到人类社会与自然中其他复杂系统一样,都具有循环和不连续的特点。这意味着历史上的某些特征有重复出现的倾向,而最重要的变化往往是突然发生,而非渐进式的。

Among the cycles that permeate human life, a mysterious five-hundred-year cycle appears to mark major turning points in the history of Western

civilization. As the year 23
2023 年。

2000 approaches, we are haunted by the strange fact that the final decade of each century divisible by five has marked a profound transition in Western civilization, a pattern of death and rebirth that marks new phases of social organization in much the way that death and birth delineate the cycle of human generations. This has been true since at least 500 B.C., when Greek democracy emerged with the constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C. The following five centuries were a period of growth and intensification of the ancient economy, culminating in the birth of Christ in 4 B.C. This was also the time of the greatest prosperity of the ancient economy, when interest rates reached their lowest level prior to the modern period.

当 2000 年即将到来时,我们被这样一个奇怪的事实所困扰:每个能被 5 整除的世纪的最后一个十年都标志着西方文明的一次深刻转型,这种死亡和重生的模式标志着社会组织的新阶段,就像人类世代的循环一样。这种模式至少从公元前 500 年开始就一直存在,那时希腊民主在公元前 508 年克雷斯梯尼的宪政改革中崛起。接下来的五个世纪是古代经济增长和发展的时期,culminating 于公元前 4 年基督的诞生。这也是古代经济最繁荣的时期,利率达到了现代时期之前的最低水平。

The next five centuries saw a gradual winding down of prosperity, leading to the collapse of the Roman Empire late in the fifth century A.D. William Playfair's summary is worth repeating: "When Rome was at its highest pitch of greatness. ... will be seen to be at the birth of Christ, that is, during the reign of Augustus, and by the same means it will be found declining gradually till the year 490." 16 It was then that the last legions dissolved, and the Western world sank into the Dark Ages.

接下来的五个世纪里,繁荣逐渐衰落,导致了公元五世纪末罗马帝国的崩溃。威廉·普雷费尔的总结值得重复:"当罗马达到顶峰时,.....将被看作是在基督降生期间,即在奥古斯都统治期间,同样的方法也可以发现它逐渐衰落直到 490 年。"16 那时,最后的军团解散了,西方世界陷入了黑暗时代。

During the following five centuries, the economy withered, long-distance trade ground to a halt, cities were depopulated, money vanished from circulation, and art and literacy almost disappeared. The disappearance of effective law with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West led to the emergence of more primitive arrangements for settling disputes. The blood feud began to be significant at the end of the fifth century.

在接下来的五个世纪里,经济萎缩,远距离贸易陷入停顿,城市人口流失,货币从流通中消失,艺术和文字几乎消失殆尽。随着西罗马帝国的崩溃,有效法律的消失导致了更原始的纠纷解决方式的出现。血仇在第五世纪末变得愈加重要。

The first recorded incident of trial by ordeal occurred precisely in the year 500.

500 年开始有正式记录的审讯逼供事件。

Once again, a thousand years ago, the final decade of the tenth century witnessed another "tremendous upheaval in social and economic systems." Perhaps the least known of these transitions, the feudal revolution, began at a time of utter economic and political turmoil. In *The Transformation of the Year One Thousand*, Guy Bois, a professor of medieval history at the University of Paris, claims that this rupture at the end of the tenth century involved the complete collapse of the remnants of ancient institutions, and the emergence of something new out of the anarchy feudalism.¹⁷ In the words of Raoul Glaber, "It was said that the whole world, with one accord, shook off the tatters of antiquity." "The new system that suddenly emerged accommodated the slow revival of economic growth. The five centuries now known as the Middle Ages saw a rebirth of money and international trade, along with the rediscovery of arithmetic, literacy and time awareness. 一千年前,十世纪最后十年见证了另一次"社会和经济体系的巨大动荡"。也许最不为人知的这些过渡之一,分封革命,始于一个完全经济和政治动荡的时期。在《千年转型》一书中,巴黎大学中世纪历史教授 Guy Bois 声称,这次十世纪末的断裂导致古老制度的残余完全崩溃,并从混乱的分封制度中诞生了新事物。正如 Raoul Glaber 所言,"人们说,整个世界都一致地摆脱了古老的破碎。"这种突然出现的新体系奠定了经济增长缓慢复苏的基础。现在被称为中世纪的五个世纪见证了货币和国际贸易的重生,以及算术、识字和时间意识的重新发现。

Then, in the final decade of the fifteenth century, there was yet another turning point. It was then that Europe emerged from the demographic deficit caused by the Black Death and almost immediately began to assert dominion over the rest of the globe.

然后,在十五世纪末的最后一个十年,又出现了另一个转折点。那时,欧洲摆脱了黑死病造成的人口亏损,几乎立即开始主宰全球其他地区。

The "Gunpowder Revolution," the "Renaissance," and the "Reformation" are names given to different aspects of this transition that ushered in the Modern Age. It was announced with a bang when Charles VIII invaded Italy with new bronze cannon. It involved an opening to the world, epitomized by Columbus sailing to America in 1492.

火药革命"、"文艺复兴"和"宗教改革"是用来描述这个揭开现代时代序幕的过渡时期的不同方面的名称。当查尔斯八世领导新型青铜大炮入侵意大利时,这个转变就以轰轰烈烈的方式宣告到来。这个转变还包括了通向全球的开放,这由 1492 年哥伦布航行至美洲所象征。

This opening to the New World launched a push toward the most dramatic economic growth in the experience of humanity. It involved a transformation of physics and astronomy that led to the creation of modern science. And its ideas were disseminated widely with the new technology of the printing press.

这一通向新世界的开端推动了人类历史上最为剧烈的经济增长。这涉及物理学和天文学的转变,催生了现代科学的诞生。这些思想通过新兴的印刷术广泛传播。

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Now we sit at the threshold of another millennial transformation. We expect it to utterly transform the world, in ways that this book is meant to explain. You would be perfectly within your rights to doubt this, since no cycle that repeats itself only twice in a millennium has demonstrated enough iterations to be statistically significant. Indeed, even much shorter cycles have been viewed skeptically by economists demanding more statistically satisfying proof. "Professor Dennis Robertson once wrote that we had better wait a few centuries before being sure" about the existence of four-year and the

eight-to ten-year trade cycles.' 19 By that standard, Professor Robertson would have to suspend judgment for about thirty thousand years to be sure that the five-hundred-year cycle is not a statistical fluke. We are less dogmatic, or more willing to recognize that the patterns of reality are more complex than the static-and linear-equilibrium models of most economists. 现在我们正处于另一个千年转型的门槛上。我们期望这种转型将彻底改变世界,这正是本书旨在解释的。你有充分的理由对此表示怀疑,因为在一个千年内只重复出现两次的周期还不足以在统计上显得显著。事实上,即使是更短的周期也被经济学家们怀疑,他们要求更多统计上令人信服的证据。"丹尼斯·罗伯逊教授曾经写道,我们最好等待几个世纪,才能确定四年和八到十年的贸易周期的存在。"根据这一标准,罗伯逊教授将不得不暂缓判断三万年,以确定五百年周期不是一个统计上的偶然。我们没有如此教条主义,或者更愿意承认现实的模式比大多数经济学家的静态和线性平衡模型更复杂。

We believe that the coming of the year 2000 marks more than another convenient division along an endless continuum of time. We believe it will be an inflection point between, the Old World and a New World to come. The Industrial Age is rapidly passing. Its technology of mass production has been eclipsed by a new technology of miniaturization. With the new information technology has come a new science of nonlinear dynamics, one whose startling conclusions are mere strands that have yet to be woven together into a comprehensive worldview. We live in the time of the computer, but our dreams are still spun on the loom. We continue to live by the metaphors and thoughts of industrialism. Our politics still straddles the industrial divide between right and left, as mapped by thinkers like Adam Smith and Karl Marx, who died before almost everyone now living was born.* The industrial worldview, incorporating the operating principles of industrial science, is still the "commonsense" intuition of educated opinion. 我们认为 2000 年的到来标志着不仅仅是时间连续统上的另一个方便划分。我们相信它将成为旧世界与即将到来的新世界之间的转折点。工业时代正在急剧退去。它的大批量生产技术已被微型化技术所取代。随着新信息技术的出现,出现了一门关于非线性动力学的新科学,它的一些令人震惊的结论只是尚待编织成一个全面的世界观的线索。我们生活在计算机时代,但我们的梦想仍在织机上编织。我们继续用工业主义

的隐喻和思想来生活。我们的政治仍处于像亚当·斯密和卡尔·马克思等思想家描绘的工业分裂线之间,而这些思想家在当下几乎所有人出生之前就已经去世了。工业世界观,包括工业科学的操作原则,仍然是受过教育的人群的"常识"直觉。

It is our thesis that the "common sense" of the Industrial Age will no longer apply to many areas as the world is transformed.

我们认为,随着世界的转型,工业时代的"常识"将不再适用于许多领域。

More than eighty-five years after the day in 1911 when Oswald Spengler was seized with an intuition of a coming world war and "the decline of the West," we, too, see "a historical change of phase occurring. ... at the point preordained for it hundreds of years ago."²⁰ Like Spengler, we see the impending death of Western civilization, and with it the collapse of the world order that has predominated these past five centuries, ever since Columbus sailed west to open contact with the New World. Yet unlike Spengler we see the birth of a new stage in Western civilization in the coming millennium.

在 1911 年斯宾格勒预感到即将到来的世界大战和"西方的衰落"之后的八十五年以上,我们也看到"一个历史转折点正在到来。...这是在几百年前就已经注定的。"与斯宾格勒一样,我们也看到了西方文明即将走向灭亡,以及过去五个世纪里一直主导的世界秩序即将崩溃,这个世界秩序始于哥伦布西渡开启对新世界的接触。不同的是,我们看到了在即将到来的千年里,西方文明将迎来新的纪元。

* Adam Smith died in 1790, Karl Marx in 1883.

亚当·斯密于 1790 年去世,卡尔·马克思于 1883 年去世。

CHAPTER 2

第二章

METAPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN

后现代政治转型

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

历史视角

"In history as in nature, birth and death are equally balanced"
在历史和自然中,出生和死亡是完全平衡的

-JOHAN HUIZING [A3](#)

约翰·赫伊宁 g A3

THE WANING OF THE MODERN WORLD

现代世界的衰落

In our view, you are witnessing nothing less than the waning of the Modern Age.

你正目睹现代时代的衰落。

It is a development driven by a ruthless but hidden logic. More than we commonly understand, more than CNN and the newspapers tell us, the next millennium will no longer be "modern." We say this not to imply that you face a savage or backward future, although that is possible, but to emphasize that the stage of history now opening will be qualitatively different from that into which you were born.

这是一种由无情但隐藏的逻辑驱动的发展。超过我们通常所理解的,超过 CNN 和报纸告诉我们的,下一个千年将不再"现代"。我们这样说不是暗示你面临着残酷或落后的未来,尽管这种可能性存在,而是要强调,现在开启的历史阶段将与你出生时的历史阶段在质上不同。

Something new is coming. Just as farming societies differed in kind from hunting-and-gathering bands, and industrial societies differed radically from feudal or yeoman agricultural systems, so the New World to come will mark a radical departure from anything seen before.

新的事物正在来临。正如农业社会与狩猎采集部落有本质区别,工业社会与封建或自耕农农业体系有根本差异,即将到来的新世界也将与以往任何情况都截然不同。

In the new millennium, economic and political life will no longer be organized on a gigantic scale under the domination of the nationstate as it was during the modern centuries. The civilization that brought you world war, the assembly line, social security, income tax, deodorant, and the toaster oven is dying. Deodorant and the toaster oven may survive. The others won't. Like an ancient and once mighty man, the nationstate has a future numbered in years and days, and no longer in centuries and decades. 在新千年中,经济和政治生活将不再像现代几个世纪那样被国家规模主导。曾给你带来世界大战、装配线、社会保障、所得税、制汗剂和烤面包机的文明正在走向衰亡。制汗剂和烤面包机可能会存活下来。其他的不会。就像一个昔日强大的人,国家-国家有着几年和几天的未来,而非几个世纪和几十年。

Governments have already lost much of their power to regulate and compel. The collapse of Communism marked the end of a long cycle of five centuries during which magnitude of power overwhelmed efficiency in the organization of government. It was a time when the returns to violence were high and rising. They no longer are. A phase transition of world-historic dimensions has already begun. Indeed, the future Gibbon who chronicles the decline and fall of the once-Modern Age in the next millennium may declare that it had already ended by the time you read this book. Looking back, he may say, as we do, that it ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Or with the death of the Soviet Union in 1991. Either date could come to stand as a defining event in the evolution of civilization, the end of what we now know as the Modern Age.

政府已经失去了大部分调控和强制的权力。共产主义的崩溃标志着持续五个世纪的一个漫长周期的结束,在此期间,政府组织中权力的规模压倒效率。那是一个暴力收益率高且不断上升的时期。如今,情况已经不再如此。一场世界历史级别的阶段性转变已经开始。事实上,在下一个千年里,记述一旦现代时代的衰落和崩溃的未来吉本,可能会宣布这一时代早在你读到本书时就已结束了。回顾过去,他可能会说,正如我们所言,这一时代终结于 1989 年柏林墙的倾塌。或者是 1991 年苏联的崩溃。无论哪个日期,可能都会成为文明演化进程中的一个决定性事件,标志着我们所知的现代时代的终结。

The fourth stage of human development is coming, and perhaps its least predictable feature is the new name under which it will be known. Call it "PostModern."

人类发展的第四阶段正在到来,也许它最不可预测的特点就是它将以新的名字出现。可以称之为"后现代"。

Call it the "Cyber Society" or the "Information Age." Or make up your own name. No one knows what conceptual glue will stick a nickname to the next phase of history.

称之为"网络社会"或"信息时代"。又或自创新名称。无人知晓何种概念性粘合剂会为历史下一个阶段粘上昵称。

3 Huizinga, op. cit., p.7.

华因加, 同上, 第7页。

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We do not even know that the five-hundred-year stretch of history just ending will continue to be thought of as "modern." If future historians know anything about word derivations, it will not be. A more descriptive title might be "The Age of the State" or "The Age of Violence." But such a name would fall outside the temporal spectrum that currently defines the epochs of history. "Modern," according to the Oxford English Dictionary means pertaining to the present and recent times, as distinguished from the remote past.... In historical use commonly applied (in contradiction to ancient and medieval) to the time subsequent to the MIDDLE AGES.⁴

我们甚至不知道刚刚结束的五百年历史会继续被认为是"现代"。如果未来的历史学家了解词源,这就不会是这样。一个更加描述性的标题可能是"国家时代"或"暴力时代"。但是这种名称会超出当前定义历史纪元的时间范围。"现代"这个词,根据《牛津英语词典》的定义,指的是与现在和最近时期有关,与遥远的过去有所区别.....在历史使用中,通常用来指定时期,与古代和中世纪相对应的时间。

Western people consciously thought of themselves as "modern" only when they came to understand that the medieval period was over. Before 1500, no one had ever thought of the feudal centuries as a middle" period in Western

civilization. The reason is obvious upon reflection: before an age can reasonably be seen as sandwiched in the "middle" of two other historic epochs, it must have already come to an end. Those living during the feudal centuries could not have imagined themselves as living in a halfway house between antiquity and modern civilization until it dawned on them not just that the medieval period was over, but also that medieval civilization differed dramatically from that of the Dark Ages or antiquity.⁵

西方人只有意识到中世纪时期已经结束,才会自觉地认为自己是"现代"的。在 1500 年之前,没有人曾将封建时代视为西方文明中的一个"中间"时期。原因很明显:要将某一时代合理地视为两个其他历史时期之间的"中间"时期,必须首先认识到该时代已经结束。在封建时代生活的人无法想象自己生活在古代和现代文明之间的过渡时期,直到他们意识到不仅中世纪时期已经结束,而且中世纪文明与黑暗时代或古代文明存在戏剧性的不同。

Human cultures have blind spots. We have no vocabulary to describe paradigm changes in the largest boundaries of life, especially those happening around us.

人类文化存在盲点。我们没有词汇来描述生活最广泛边界中的范式转变,特别是那些正在我们周围发生的变化。

Notwithstanding the many dramatic changes that have unfolded since the time of Moses, only a few heretics have bothered to think about how the transitions from one phase of civilization to another actually unfold, How are they triggered? What do they have in common? What patterns can help you tell when they begin and know when they are over? When will Great Britain or the United States come to an end? These are questions for which you would be hard-pressed to find conventional answers.

尽管自摩西时代以来发生了许多戏剧性的变化,但只有少数异教徒费心思考从一个文明阶段转向另一个阶段的实际过程。它们是如何被触发的?它们有什么共同之处?什么样的模式可以帮助你识别它们何时开始和结束?英国或美国何时会走向终结?这些问题很难找到传统的答案。

The Taboo on Foresight

以下是原文的简体中文翻译: 对预见性的禁忌

To see "outside" an existing system is like being a stagehand trying to force a dialogue with a character in a play. It breaches a convention that helps keep the system functioning. Every social order incorporates among its key taboos the notion that people living in it should not think about how it will end and what rules may prevail in the new system that takes its place. Implicitly, whatever system exists is the last or the only system that will ever exist. Not that this is so baldly stated. Few who have ever read a history book would find such an assumption realistic if it was articulated. Nonetheless, that is the convention that rules the world. Every social system, however strongly or weakly it clings to power, pretends that its rules will never be superseded. They are the last word. Or perhaps the only word. Primitives assume that theirs is the only possible way of organizing life. More economically complicated systems that incorporate a sense of history usually place themselves at its apex. Whether they are Chinese mandarins in the court of the emperor, the Marxist nomenklatura in Stalin's Kremlin, or members of 4 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 1

要"看透"一个现有的系统,就像一个场务想要与舞台上的角色对话一样。这违背了一种有助于维持系统运转的惯例。每一种社会秩序都将人们不应思考它如何终结,以及取而代之的新系统可能会遵循何种规则,这个观点列为其一项关键禁忌。隐含着,无论什么样的系统存在,都是最后或唯一的系统。并非如此明白地陈述。如果这种假设被明确表达,即使是读过历史书的人也会觉得不太现实。尽管如此,这仍是统治这个世界的惯例。不管一个社会体系对权力的依恋有多强或多弱,它都假装自己的规则将永不过时。它们就是最后的或唯一的话语。又或者原始社会假设,它们的组织生活方式是唯一可能的。那些涵盖历史意识的更复杂的经济体系,通常将自己置于历史发展的顶点。无论是在皇帝的朝廷中的中国官僚,还是在斯大林克里姆林宫的马克思主义领导层,亦或是牛津大英百科词典的编纂者,他们都认为自己处于历史的高峰。

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 1828.

牛津：牛津大学出版社，1971年，第1828页。

5 Michael Hicks, *Bastard Feudalism* (London: Longmans, 1995), p.1.

5 迈克尔·希克斯,《野种封建主义》(伦敦:朗文出版社,1995年),第1

页。

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the House of Representatives in Washington, the powers-that-be either imagine no history at all or place themselves at the pinnacle of history, in a superior position compared to everyone who came before, and the vanguard of anything to come.

华盛顿众议院,权力者要么根本不认知历史,要么将自己置于历史顶点,认为自己高于前人,并是未来的先驱。

This is true for almost unavoidable reasons. The more apparent it is that a system is nearing an end, the more reluctant people will be to adhere to its laws. Any social organization will therefore tend to discourage or play down analyses that anticipate its demise. This alone helps ensure that history's great transitions are seldom spotted as they happen. If you know nothing else about the future, you can rest assured that dramatic changes will be neither welcomed nor advertised by conventional thinkers.

这对几乎不可避免的原因来说是真的。一个系统即将终结越明显,人们就越不愿意遵循它的法律。因此,任何社会组织都会倾向于阻碍或弱化预示其终结的分析。这一点就有助于确保历史上的重大转变鲜少被及时发现。如果你对未来一无所知,你可以确信,传统思想者是不会欢迎或宣传剧烈变革的。

You cannot depend upon conventional information sources to give you an objective and timely warning about how the world is changing and why. If you wish to understand the great transition now under way, you have little choice but to figure it out for yourself.

您不能依赖常规信息来源给您一个客观和及时的警告关于世界正在如何变化以及原因。如果您希望了解正在进行的大转型,您除了自己摸索之外,别无选择。

Beyond the Obvious

不言而喻的

This means looking beyond the obvious. The record shows that even transitions that are undeniably real in retrospect may not be acknowledged for decades or even centuries after they happen. Consider the fall of Rome. It was probably the most important historic development in the first millennium of the Christian era. Yet long after Rome's demise, the fiction that it survived was held out to public view, like Lenin's embalmed corpse. No one who depended upon the pretenses of officials for his understanding of the "news" would have learned that Rome had fallen until long after that information ceased to matter.

这意味着超越表面看到的東西。历史记录显示,即使在事后是不可否认的现实变迁,也可能需要数十年或甚至数世纪后才被承认。以罗马帝国的衰落为例。这可能是公元第一千年最重要的历史事件。然而,在罗马帝国灭亡很久之后,人们依然被告知它仍然存在,就像列宁的防腐尸体一样。任何依赖官方宣传了解"新闻"的人,都要到这一信息失去意义很长时间之后,才会知道罗马已经覆亡。

The reason was not merely the inadequacy of communications in the ancient world. The outcome would have been much the same had CNN miraculously been in business, running its videotape in September 476. That is when the last Roman emperor in the West, Romulus Augustulus, was captured in Ravenna and forcibly retired to a villa in Campania on a pension. Even if Wolfe Blitzer had been there with minicams recording the news in 476, it is unlikely that he or anyone else would have dared to characterize those events as marking the end of the Roman Empire. That, of course, is exactly what latter historians said happened. CNN editors probably would not have approved a headline story saying "Rome fell this evening." The powers-that-be denied that Rome had fallen. Peddlers of "news" seldom are partisans of controversy in ways that would undermine their own profits. They may be partisan. They may even be outrageously so. But they seldom report conclusions that would convince subscribers to cancel their subscriptions and head for the hills. Which is why few would have reported the fall of Rome even if it had been technologically possible. Experts would have come forth to say that it was ridiculous to speak of Rome falling. To have said otherwise would have been bad for business and, perhaps, bad for the health of those doing the reporting. The powers in late-fifth-century Rome were barbarians, and they denied that Rome had

fallen.

原因并不仅仅在于古代世界通讯的不足。即使 CNN 在 476 年 9 月的时候奇迹般地开始运营,并播放视频录像,结果也可能大致相同。那正是西罗马帝国最后一位皇帝罗慕路·奥古斯图路斯在拉韦纳被俘获并被迫退休到坎帕尼亚一座别墅的时候。即使沃尔夫·布利茨当时带着摄像机在现场报道这一新闻,也不太可能有人敢宣称这标志着罗马帝国的终结。当然,这正是后来历史学家所说发生的事。CNN 的编辑可能也不会批准一个标题为"罗马今晚覆亡"的新闻报道。当权者否认罗马覆亡。新闻从业者很少会以会损害自身利润的方式成为争议的支持者。他们可能有倾向性,甚至十分明目张胆,但很少会报道那些会让订阅者取消订阅并逃往山丘的结论。这就是即使在技术上可能,也鲜有人会报道罗马的覆亡。专家会出来说,谈论罗马覆亡是荒谬的。否则会对从业者的业务和健康造成不利影响。五世纪末的罗马掌权者是野蛮人,他们否认罗马已经覆亡。

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But it was not merely a case of authorities' saying, "Don't report this or we will kill you." Part of the problem was that Rome was already so degenerate by the later decades of the fifth century that its "fall" genuinely eluded the notice of most people who lived through it. In fact, it was a generation later before Count Marcellinus first suggested that "The Western Roman Empire perished with this Augustulus."[6](#) Many more decades passed, perhaps centuries, before there was a common acknowledgment that the Roman Empire in the West no longer existed. Certainly Charlemagne believed that he was a legitimate Roman emperor in the year 800.

但这并非仅仅是当局说"不要报告这件事,否则我们会杀了你"的问题。部分问题在于,到了 5 世纪后期,罗马已经沦为如此堕落,以至于它的"陨落"确实逃过了大多数人的注意。事实上,直到一代人之后,马塞利努斯伯爵才首次提出"西罗马帝国在这个奥古斯图勒斯时期灭亡"。⁶ 在普遍承认西罗马帝国不复存在之前,或许还过了数十年,甚至数世纪。无疑,在 800 年,查理曼认为自己是合法的罗马皇帝。

The point is not that Charlemagne and all who thought in conventional terms about the Roman Empire after 476 were fools. To the contrary. The

characterization of social developments is frequently ambiguous. When the power of predominant institutions is brought into the bargain to reinforce a convenient conclusion, even one based largely on pretense, only someone of strong character and strong opinions would dare contradict it. If you try to put yourself in the position of a Roman of the late fifth century, it is easy to imagine how tempting it would have been to conclude that nothing had changed. That certainty was the optimistic conclusion. To have thought otherwise might have been frightening. And why come to a frightening conclusion when a reassuring one was at hand?

查理曼和所有在 476 年后以常规方式思考罗马帝国的人都不是愚蠢的。相反,社会发展的特征通常是模棱两可的。当主导机构的权力被利用来强化一个便利的结论时,即使这个结论主要建立在预设上,也只有性格坚强和观点强烈的人才敢于反驳。如果您设身处地去想一个五世纪晚期的罗马人的处境,很容易想象,得出什么都没有变的结论是多么诱人。这种确定性是一个乐观的结论。如果想到别的可能会很可怕。为什么要得出可怕的结论,当有一个令人安慰的结论就在手边呢?

After all, a case could have been made that business would continue as usual. It had in the past. The Roman army, and particularly the frontier garrisons, had been barbarized for centuries.⁷ By the third century, it had become regular practice for the army to proclaim a new emperor. By the fourth century, even officers were Germanized and frequently illiterate.⁸ There had been many violent overthrows of emperors before Romulus Augustulus was removed from the throne. His departure might have seemed no different to his contemporaries than many other upheavals in a chaotic time. And he was sent packing with a pension. The very fact that he received a pension, even for a brief period before he was murdered, was a reassurance that the system survived. To an optimist, Odoacer, who deposed Romulus Augustulus, reunified rather than destroyed the empire. A son of Attila's sidekick Edecon, Odoacer was a clever man. He did not proclaim himself emperor. Instead, he convened the Senate and prevailed upon its too-suggestible members that they offer the emperorship and thus sovereignty over the whole empire to Zeno, the Eastern emperor in faraway Byzantium. Odoacer was merely to be Zeno's patricius to govern Italy. 毕竟,有人可能会认为业务照常进行。过去一直如此。数世纪以来,罗马军队,特别是边境防卫部队,已被野蛮化。到第三世纪,军队宣布新皇帝

成为常规做法。到第四世纪,即使是军官也被日耳曼化,经常文盲。在罗穆卢斯·奥古斯图勒斯被废黜之前,已经发生过多次数暴力推翻皇帝的事件。他的离开对于他的同时代人来说,可能与其他动荡时期的许多其他变化并无不同。而且他被遣送离开时获得了一份养老金。他即使在被谋杀之前短暂地获得养老金,也说明了这一体系得以延续。对于乐观主义者而言,罢免罗穆卢斯·奥古斯图勒斯的奥多阿克并非摧毁帝国,而是重新统一了帝国。奥多阿克是阿提拉的副手埃德孔的儿子,是一个聪明的人。他没有自称为皇帝。相反,他召集了元老院,说服其过于从众的成员提供皇帝宝座和整个帝国的主权给遥远拜占庭的东方皇帝祖诺。奥多阿克只是要当祖诺的帕特里齐乌斯来治理意大利。

As Will Durant wrote in *The Story of Civilization*, these changes did not appear to be the "fall of Rome" but merely "negligible shifts on the surface of the national scene."⁷

正如威尔·杜兰特在《文明史》中写的那样,这些变化似乎并非"罗马的衰落",而只是"在国家舞台上的微不足道的变化"。

When Rome fell, Odoacer said that Rome endured. He, along with almost everyone else, was keen to pretend that nothing had changed. They knew that "the glory that was Rome" was far better than the barbarism that was taking its place. Even the barbarians thought so. As C. W. Previte-Orton wrote in *The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History*, 6 *Ibid.*, p. 102.

当罗马陷落时,奥多阿克说罗马经得起考验。他和其他几乎所有人一样,都急于假装什么都没有改变。他们知道"罗马的辉煌"远胜于取而代之的野蛮。连野蛮人自己也是这么认为的。正如 C. W. 普雷维特-奥尔顿在《剑桥中世纪简史》中所写的。

⁷ See S. A. Cook et al., eds., *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol.12
见 S. A. Cook 等编,《剑桥古代史》,第 12 卷。

(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 208-22.
(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,1971 年),第 208-222 页。

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 209-20.

《*Ibid.*》,第 209-220 页。

the end of the fifth century, when "the Emperors had been replaced by barbaric German kings," was a time of "persistent make-believe."

五世纪末,当"皇帝被野蛮的德国国王所取代"时,那是一个"持续的自我欺骗"的时期。

"Persistent make-believe"

"持续的假想"

This "make-believe" involved the preservation of the facade of the old system, even as its essence was "deformed by barbarism."⁹ The old forms of government remained the same when the last emperor was replaced by a barbarian "lieutenant." The Senate still met. "The praetorian prefecture and other high offices continued, and were held by eminent Romans." Consuls were still nominated for a year "The Roman civil administration survived intact." Indeed, in some ways it remained intact until the birth of feudalism at the end of the tenth century. On public occasions, the old imperial insignia was still employed. Christianity was still the state religion. The barbarians still pretended to owe fealty to the Eastern emperor in Constantinople, and to the traditions of Roman law. In fact, in Durant's words, "in the West the great Empire was no more."

这种"假作真"包括维持旧体系的外表,即使它的本质"被野蛮所畸变"。⁹ 当最后一位皇帝被一位野蛮的"副官"所取代时,政府的旧形式依旧存在。参议院仍在开会。"禁卫军署理职务和其他高级职务继续存在,并由杰出的罗马人担任。"正式任命的执政官每年仍如此。"罗马文明行政保持完整。"事实上,它一直保持完整,直到 10 世纪末封建制度的出现。在公共场合,仍然使用旧的帝国徽章。基督教仍是国教。野蛮人仍然假装效忠于君士坦丁堡的东罗马帝国,并保持着罗马法的传统。事实上,正如杜兰特所言,"在西方,伟大的帝国不复存在。"

So What?

那又怎样?

The faraway example of the fall of Rome is relevant for a number of reasons as you contemplate conditions in the world today. Most books

about the future are really books about the present. We have sought to remedy that defect by making this book about the future first of all a book about the past. We think that you are likely to draw a better perspective about what the future has in store if we illustrate important megapolitical points about the logic of violence with real examples from the past.

远古罗马的衰落是一个很好的例子,当思考当今世界状况时,它的相关性是有很多原因的。大多数关于未来的书其实都是关于现在的书。我们试图通过使这本书首先成为一本关于过去的书来矫正这一缺陷。我们认为,如果我们用过去的真实案例来说明关于暴力逻辑的重要大政治观点,你就更有可能获得一个更好的对未来的展望。

History is an amazing teacher The stories it has to tell are more interesting than any we could make up. And many of the more interesting relate to the fall of Rome. They document important lessons that could be relevant to your future in the Information Age.

历史是一位出色的老师。它讲述的故事比我们编造的任何故事都更有意思。其中许多更有趣的故事与罗马帝国的衰亡有关。它们记录了重要的教训,这些教训可能与你在信息时代的未来有关。

First of all, the fall of Rome is one of history's more vivid examples of what happened in a major transition when the scale of government was collapsing. The transitions of the year 1000 also involved the collapse of central authority, and did so in a way that increased the complexity and scope of economic activity. The Gunpowder Revolution at the end of the fifteenth century involved major changes in institutions that tended to raise rather than shrink the scale of governance. Today, for the first time in a thousand years, megapolitical conditions in the West are undermining and destroying governments and many other institutions that operate on a large scale.

罗马的崩溃是历史上政府规模崩溃时发生的鲜明事例之一。公元一千年前的过渡时期也涉及中央权力的崩溃,并以增加经济活动的复杂性和范围的方式进行。十五世纪末的火药革命涉及了倾向于提高而不是缩小管治规模的重大制度变革。如今,在西方,一千年来第一次,大政治条件正在破坏和摧毁政府和其他许多大规模运作的机构。

Of course, the collapse in the scale of governance at the end of the Roman Empire had very different causes from those existing at the advent of the Information Age. Part of the reason that Rome fell is simply that it had expanded beyond the scale at which the economies of violence could be maintained. The cost of garrisoning the empire's far-flung borders exceeded the economic advantages that an ancient agricultural economy could support. The burden of taxation and regulation required to finance the military effort rose to exceed the carrying capacity of the economy. Corruption became endemic.

当然,罗马帝国末期治理规模的崩溃与信息时代开启时的原因大不相同。罗马帝国崩溃的部分原因在于,它已经扩张到了无法维持暴力经济的规模。维护帝国边远边境的成本超过了古老的农业经济所能支撑的经济优势。维持军事开支所需的税收和管制负担超出了经济的承受能力。腐败也变得普遍存在。

A large part of the effort of military commanders, as historian Ramsay MacMullen has

军事指挥官的很大一部分努力,正如历史学家拉姆塞·麦克马伦所说,30

documented, was devoted to pursuit of "illicit profits of their command." '~ This they pursued by shaking down the population, what the fourth-century observer Synesius described as "the peace-time war, one almost worse than the barbarian war and arising from the military's indiscipline and the officers' greed." 14

有文件记载,他们致力于追求"他们指挥权下非法利润"。他们通过勒索民众来实现这一目标,正如 4 世纪观察家西内修斯所描述的"和平时期的战争,几乎比野蛮战争更加严重,源于军人的纪律松弛和军官的贪婪"。

Another important contributing factor to Rome's collapse was a demographic deficit caused by the Antonine plagues. The coil apse of the Roman population in many areas obviously contributed to economic and military weakness. Nothing of that kind has happened today, at least not yet. Taking a longer view, perhaps. the scourge of new "plagues" will compound the challenges of technological devolution in the new millennium. The unprecedented bulge in human population in the twentieth century creates a

tempting target for rapidly mutating microparasites. Fears about the Ebola virus, or something like it, invading metropolitan populations may be well founded. But this is not the place to consider the coevolution of humans and diseases. As interesting a topic as that is, our argument at this juncture is not about why Rome fell, or even about whether the world today is vulnerable to some of the same influences that contributed to Roman decline. It is about something different-namely, the way that history's great transformations are perceived, or rather, misperceived as they happen.

另一个对罗马帝国崩溃有重大贡献的因素是安东尼家族时期的瘟疫导致的人口赤字。许多地区罗马人口的衰落显然加剧了经济和军事上的弱点。到目前为止,还没有发生过这种情况。从长远来看,也许新的"瘟疫"的侵袭将加剧新千年技术衰退的挑战。20 世纪人口的前所未有的激增为快速变异的微小寄生虫提供了诱人的目标。人们对埃博拉病毒或类似病毒侵袭大都市人群的担忧可能是正当的。但这不是考虑人类与疾病共同进化的场合。尽管这是一个很有趣的话题,但我们在这里要讨论的不是为什么罗马帝国衰落,也不是当今世界是否容易受到导致罗马衰落的同样影响,而是历史上重大变革是如何被感知的,或者说是被误解的。

People are always and everywhere to some degree conservative, with a small "C."

人们在某种程度上总是保守的。

That implies a reluctance to think in terms of dissolving venerable social conventions, overturning the accepted institutions, and defying the laws and values from which they drew their bearings. Few are inclined to imagine that apparently minor changes in climate or technology or some other variable can somehow be responsible for severing connections to the world of their fathers. The Romans were reluctant to acknowledge the changes unfolding around them. So are we.

这意味着不愿意从解散久负盛名的社会习俗、推翻公认的机构以及违背他们依赖的法律和价值观的角度考虑问题。很少有人愿意想象,气候或技术或其他变量的微小变化,可能会导致与父辈世界的联系被切断。罗马人不愿承认正在发生的变化。而我们也是如此。

Yet recognize it or not, we are living through a change of historical season, a transformation in the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves that is so profound that it will inevitably transform the whole of society. The change will be so profound, in fact, that to understand it will require taking almost nothing for granted.

不论我们是否意识到,我们正经历历史季节的变迁,人类组织生活和自我维护的方式正在发生如此深远的变革,这必将改变整个社会。这种变革如此深远,以至于要真正理解它,几乎没有什么可以被视为理所当然的。

You will be invited at almost every turn to believe that the coming Information Societies will be very like the industrial society you grew tip in. We doubt it. Microprocessing will dissolve the mortar in the bricks. It will so profoundly alter the logic of violence that it will dramatically change the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves, Yet the tendency will be to downplay the inevitability of these changes, or to argue about their desirability as if it were within the fiat of industrial institutions to determine how history evolves.

你几乎每每都会被邀请相信,即将到来的信息社会将与你成长的工业社会非常相似。我们对此表示怀疑。微处理器将溶解砖块中的黏结剂。它将如此深刻地改变暴力的逻辑,以至于它将大大改变人们组织生计和自我防守的方式。然而,人们往往会忽视这些变化的必然性,或者争论它们的可取性,就好像工业机构可以决定历史的演变。

The Grand Illusion 伟大的幻觉

Authors who are in many ways better informed than we are will nevertheless lead you astray in thinking about the future because they are far too superficial in examining how societies work. For example, David Kline and Daniel Burstein have written a well-researched volume entitled Road Warriors: Dreams and Nightmares Along the Information highway It is full of admirable detail, but much of this detail is marshaled in 31

在很多方面比我们掌握更多信息的作者,在思考未来时却会误导你,因为他们在研究社会如何运作时过于肤浅。例如,大卫·克莱恩和丹尼尔·伯斯坦撰写了一本题为《路上的战士:信息高速公路上的梦想与噩梦》的

研究著作。这本书充满了可敬的细节,但其中大部分细节都被编排成了 31 条

arguing an illusion, the idea "that citizens can act together, consciously, to shape the spontaneous economic and natural processes going on around them." Although it may not be obvious, this is equivalent to saying that feudalism might have survived if everyone had rededicated himself to chivalry. No one in a court of the late fifteenth century would have objected to such a sentiment. Indeed, it would have been heresy to do so. But it also would have been entirely misleading, an example of the snake trying to fit the future into its old skin.

争论是一种幻觉,即"公民可以有意识地共同行动,塑造周围的自发经济和自然过程"的想法。虽然这可能不太明显,但这等同于说,如果每个人都重新致力于骑士精神,封建制度可能会生存下来。在 15 世纪末的任何一个法庭上,没有人会反对这种观点。事实上,这么做会被视为异端邪说。但这也完全是误导性的,就像蛇试图把未来塞进它的旧皮囊一样。

The most profound causes of change are precisely those that are not subject to conscious control. They are the factors that alter the conditions under which violence pays. Indeed, they are so remote from any obvious means of manipulation that they are not even subjects of political maneuvering in a world saturated with politics. No one ever marched in a demonstration shouting, "Increase scale economies in the production process." No banner has ever demanded, "Invent a weapons system that increases the importance of the infantry." No candidate ever promised to "alter the balance between efficiency and magnitude in protection against violence." Such slogans would be ridiculous, precisely because their goals are beyond the capacity of anyone to consciously affect. Yet as we will explore, these variables determine how the world works to a far greater degree than any political platform.

变革最深层的原因正是那些不受人控制的。他们是改变暴力有利条件的因素。实际上,它们远离任何明显的操控手段,以至于即便在政治众多的世界中,也从未成为政治运作的对象。从未有人在示威中高呼"提高生产过程的规模经济"。从未有过诉求"发明一种武器系统,提高步兵的重要性"。从未有候选人承诺"改变防范暴力行为中效率和规模之间的平衡"。这样的口号听起来可笑,正是因为它们的目标超出了任何人

的有意识控制能力。然而,正如我们将探讨的,这些变量实际上在决定这个世界的工作方式,比任何政治纲领都有更大的影响力。

If you think about it carefully, it should be obvious that important transitions in history seldom are driven primarily by human wishes. They do not happen because people get fed up with one way of life and suddenly prefer another. A moment's reflection suggests why. If what people think and desire were the only determinants of what happens, then all the abrupt changes in history would have to be explained by wild mood swings unconnected to any change in the actual conditions of life. In fact, this never happens. Only in cases of medical problems affecting a few people do we see arbitrary fluctuations in mood that appear entirely divorced from any objective cause.

如果仔细思考,很明显,历史上重要的转变往往不是由人类愿望主要推动的。它们不是因为人们厌倦了一种生活方式而突然偏好另一种。仔细考虑一下就可以明白原因。如果人们的思想和欲望是发生事情的唯一决定因素,那么历史上所有急剧的变化都必须用与生活实际条件变化无关的情绪起伏来解释。事实上,这种情况从未发生过。只有在少数人出现医疗问题的情况下,我们才会看到完全与任何客观原因无关的情绪波动。

As a rule, large numbers of people do not suddenly and all at once decide to abandon their way of life simply because they find it amusing to do so. No forager ever said, "I am tired of living in prehistoric times, I would prefer the life of a peasant in a farming village." Any decisive swing in patterns of behavior and values is invariably a response to an actual change in the conditions of life. In this sense, at least, people are always realistic. If their views do change abruptly, it probably indicates that they have been confronted by some departure from familiar conditions: an invasion, a plague, a sudden climatic shift, or a technological revolution that alters their livelihoods or their ability to defend themselves.

大多数人都不会突然放弃他们的生活方式,只是因为他们觉得这很有趣。从未有任何一个采集者说过:"我厌倦了原始时代的生活,我更愿意过农村里农民的生活。"行为和价值观模式上的任何重大转变,都是对生活条件实际变化的回应。至少在这个意义上,人们总是现实的。如果他们的观点发生了急剧变化,这可能表明他们已经面临着某些熟悉条件

的变化:侵略、瘟疫、气候的突然变化,或者改变他们谋生或自我保卫能力的技术革命。

Far from being the product of human desire, decisive historic changes more often than not confound the wish of most people for stability. When change occurs, it typically causes widespread disorientation, especially among those who lose income or social status. You will look in vain at public opinion polls or other measures of mood for an understanding of how the coming megapolitical transition is likely to unfold.

远非人类欲望的产物,决定性的历史变革通常不会顺应大多数人对稳定的愿望。当变革发生时,它通常会导致广泛的失落感,尤其是对于那些失去收入或社会地位的人。您将无法从公众舆论调查或其他情绪测量中找到对即将到来的重大政治转型可能展开的了解。

LIFE WITHOUT FORESIGHT

没有远见的生活

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If we fail to perceive the great transition going on around us, it is partly because we do not desire to see. Our foraging forebears may have been just as obdurate, but they had a better excuse. No one ten thousand years ago could have foreseen the consequences of the Agricultural Revolution. Indeed, no one could have foreseen much of anything beyond where to find the next meal. When farming began, there was no record of past events from which to draw perspective on the future. There was not even a Western sense of time divided into orderly units, like seconds, minutes, hours, days, and so on, to measure out the years. Foragers lived in the "eternal present," without calendars, and indeed, without written records at all. They had no science, and no other intellectual apparatus for understanding cause and effect beyond their own intuitions.

如果我们无法感知周围正在发生的巨大转变,这部分是因为我们不想看到。我们的采食祖先可能也一样顽固,但他们有更好的借口。10,000年前的任何人都无法预见到农业革命的后果。事实上,任何人都无法预见到超越下一餐在哪里的东西。当农业开始时,没有过去事件的记录可以为未来提供视角。甚至连西方把时间划分成有序单位的概念,如秒、

分、时、日等,来衡量年份都没有。采食者生活在"永恒的现在"中,没有日历,实际上也没有任何书面记录。他们没有科学,也没有其他知识性的工具来理解因果关系,超越自己的直觉。

When it came to looking ahead, our primeval ancestors were blind. To cite the biblical metaphor, they had not yet eaten of the fruit of knowledge.

我们远古祖先对未来视而不见。用圣经的比喻来说,他们还没有尝到知识的果实。

Learning from the Past

从过去中学习

Luckily, we have a better vantage point. The past five hundred generations have given us analytic capabilities that our forebears lacked. Science and mathematics have helped unlock many of nature's secrets, giving us an understanding of cause and effect that approaches the magical when compared to that of the early foragers. Computational algorithms developed as a result of high-speed computers have shed new insights on the workings of complex, dynamic systems like the human economy. The painstaking development of political economy itself{ although it falls well short of perfection, has honed understanding of the factors informing human action. Important among these is the recognition that people at all times and places tend to respond to incentives. Not always as mechanically as economists imagine, but they do respond. Costs and rewards matter. Changes in external conditions that raise the rewards or lower the costs of certain behavior will lead to more of that behavior, other things being equal.

幸运的是,我们有更好的优势。过去五百代人给予我们祖先所缺乏的分析能力。科学和数学帮助我们解开大自然的许多秘密,使我们对因果关系的理解接近于与早期采集者相比的魔法般。高速计算机开发的计算算法为复杂动态系统(如人类经济)的运作提供了新的见解。政治经济学自身的艰苦发展,虽然还远未臻于完善,但已经深化了对影响人类行为因素的理解。其中一个重要认知是,在各个时间和地点,人们往往都会对激励作出反应。反应的方式并非如经济学家想象的那么机械化,但他们确实作出了回应。成本和回报是重要影响因素。外部条件的变化会提

高某种行为的回报或降低其成本,从而在其他条件不变的情况下会出现更多这种行为。

Incentives Matter 鼓励措施很重要

The fact that people tend to respond to costs and rewards is an essential element of forecasting. You can say with a high degree of confidence that if you drop a hundred-dollar bill on the street, someone will soon pick it up, whether you are in New York, Mexico City, or Moscow. This is not as trivial as it seems. It shows why the clever people who say that forecasting is impossible are wrong. Any forecast that accurately anticipates the impact of incentives on behavior is likely to be broadly correct. And the greater the anticipated change in costs and rewards, the less trivial the implied forecast is likely to be.

人们倾向于对成本和回报做出反应这一事实是预测的一个基本要素。不管您身在纽约、墨西哥城还是莫斯科,只要您在街上掉落一张 100 美元钞票,都很快就会有别人捡起来。这并非如此微不足道。这表明那些声称预测是不可能的聪明人是错误的。任何能准确预测激励因素对行为影响的预测都很可能是正确的。而且,预期的成本和回报变化越大,所隐含的预测就越不微不足道。

The most far-reaching forecasts of all are likely to arise from recognizing the implications of shifting megapolitical variables. Violence is the ultimate boundary force on behavior; thus, if you can understand how the logic of violence will change, you can usefully predict where people will be dropping or picking up the equivalent of one-hundred-dollar bills in the future.

最广泛的预测很可能源于认识到移动大政治变量的含义。暴力是行为的最终边界力量;因此,如果你能够理解暴力逻辑的变化,你就可以有用地预测未来人们会在何处放下或拾起等同于一百美元的钞票。

We do not mean by this that you can know the unknowable. We cannot tell you how to forecast winning lottery numbers or any truly random event. We

have no way of knowing when or whether a terrorist will detonate an atomic blast in Manhattan. Or if an asteroid will strike Saudi Arabia. We cannot predict the coming of a new Ice Age, a sudden volcanic eruption, or the emergence of a new disease. The number of unknowable events that could alter the course of history is large. But knowing the unknowable is very different from drawing out the implications of what is already known. If you see a flash of lightning far away, you can forecast with a high degree of confidence that a thunderclap is due. Forecasting the consequences of megapolitical transitions involves much longer time frames, and less certain connections, but it is a similar kind of exercise.

我们并不是说你能知道无法知道的事物。我们无法告诉你如何预测中奖号码或任何真正随机的事件。我们无法知道恐怖分子何时或是否在曼哈顿引爆原子弹。或者一颗小行星是否会撞击沙特阿拉伯。我们无法预测新冰河时代的来临、突发的火山喷发或新疾病的出现。可能改变历史进程的未知事件数量众多。但是,知道无法知道的事物与推导出已知事物的含义是完全不同的。如果你远处看到一道闪电,你可以相当确定随之而来的会是雷声。预测重大政治转变的后果需要很长的时间框架,连接性也没那么确定,但这类似于一种练习。

Megapolitical catalysts for change usually appear well before their consequences manifest themselves. It took five thousand years for the full implications of the Agricultural Revolution to come to the surface. The transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society based on manufacturing and chemical power unfolded more quickly. It took centuries. The transition to the Information Society will happen more rapidly still, probably within a lifetime. Yet even allowing for the foreshortening of history, you can expect decades to pass before the full megapolitical impact of existing information technology is realized.

大政治变革的推动因素通常在其结果显现之前就已出现。农业革命的全面影响用了五千年才浮现出来。从农业社会过渡到以制造业和化学能为基础的工业社会则进行得更快,用了几个世纪。而向信息社会的转型将更快,可能在一个人的有生之年就会完成。但即便考虑到历史的压缩,现有信息技术的大政治影响也需要数十年的时间才能完全显现出来。

Major and Minor Megapolitical Transitions 主要和次要的大政治转型

This chapter analyzes some of the common features of megapolitical transitions.

这一章分析了大政治转型的一些常见特征。

In following chapters we look more closely at the Agricultural Revolution, and the transition from farm to factory, the second of the previous great phase changes. Within the agricultural stage of civilization there were many minor megapolitical transitions such as the fall of Rome and the feudal revolution of the year 1000~ These marked the waxing and waning of the power equation as governments rose and fell and the spoils of farming passed from one set of hands to another. The owners of sprawling estates under the Roman Empire, yeoman farmers in the European Dark Ages, and the lords and serfs of the feudal period all ate grain from the same fields. They lived under very different governments because of the cumulative impact of different technologies, fluctuations in climate, and the disruptive influences of disease.

以下是上述文本的简体中文翻译: 在后续章节中,我们将更仔细地研究农业革命,以及从农场到工厂的过渡,这是前一个重大阶段变迁的第二个部分。在农业文明阶段,还有许多小型的大政治过渡,比如罗马帝国的崩溃和公元 1000 年的封建革命。这些标志着权力方程式的升降,因为政府的兴衰以及农业收益从一方手中转移到另一方。在罗马帝国时期的广大庄园主、欧洲黑暗时代的自耕农以及封建时期的领主和农奴,都从同一块田地里获取了粮食。他们生活在截然不同的政府下,这是由于不同技术的累积影响、气候的波动以及疾病的干扰所致。

Our purpose is not to thoroughly explain all of these changes. We do not pretend to do so, although we have sketched out some illustrations of the way that changing megapolitical variables have altered the way that power was exercised in the past.

我们的目的不是全面解释这些变化。我们并不打算这样做,尽管我们已经描述了一些说明,说明主要政治变量的变化如何改变了过去权力的行使方式。

Governments have grown and shrunk as megapolitical fluctuations have lowered and raised the costs of projecting power.

政府的规模随着大政治格局的变化而扩大和收缩,从而降低和提高了行使权力的成本。

Here are some summary points that you should keep in mind as you seek to understand the Information Revolution:

以下是您在努力理解信息革命时应记住的一些摘要要点：

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1.

A shift in the megapolitical foundations of power normally unfolds far in advance of the actual revolutions in the use of power.

权力的大政治基础的转变通常在实际权力变革之前很长时间就开始发生。

2.

Incomes are usually falling when a major transition begins, often because a society has rendered itself crisis-prone by marginalizing resources due to population pressures.

当一个重大转型开始时,收入通常会下降,这往往是因为一个社会因人口压力而边缘化资源,从而使自己易陷入危机。

3.

Seeing "outside" of a system is usually taboo. People are frequently blind to the logic of violence in the existing society; therefore, they are almost always blind to changes in that logic, latent or overt. Megapolitical transitions are seldom recognized before they happen.

看到一个系统的"外部"通常是被禁忌的。人们通常对现有社会暴力的逻辑视而不见;因此,他们几乎总是看不到那种逻辑的变化,无论是潜在的还是公开的。大政治转型通常都是在发生之前没有被认识到的。

4.

Major transitions always involve a cultural revolution, and usually entail clashes between adherents of the old and new values.

重大转型通常伴随着文化革命,通常涉及旧价值观与新价值观支持者之间的冲突。

5.

Megapolitical transitions are never popular, because they antique painstakingly acquired intellectual capital and confound established moral imperatives. They are not undertaken by popular demand, but in response to changes in the external conditions that alter the logic of violence in the local setting.

大都会政治转型从来都不受欢迎,因为它使辛辛苦苦积累的知识资本变得过时,并且令既有的道德命令陷入困惑。它们并非出于民众的要求,而是为了应对外部条件的变化,从而改变当地暴力冲突的逻辑。

6.

Transitions to new ways of organizing livelihoods or new types of government are initially confined to those areas where the megapolitical catalysts are at work.

生计组织方式或新型政府的转型最初仅限于大政治动因发挥作用的地区。

7.

With the possible exception of the early stages of farming, past transitions have always involved periods of social chaos and heightened violence due to disorientation and breakdown of the old system.

除了农业早期阶段可能的例外情况外,过去的转型过程一直伴有社会秩序混乱和暴力升高的时期,这是由于旧体系的失衡和瓦解所致。

8.

Corruption, moral decline, and inefficiency appear to be signal features of the final stages of a system.

腐败、道德下降和效率低下似乎是一个系统最后阶段的标志性特征。

9.

The growing importance of technology in shaping the logic of violence has led to an acceleration of history, leaving each successive transition with less adaptive time than ever before.

技术在塑造暴力逻辑中的越来越重要性,导致了历史的加速,使得每次连续的转变都比以往更缺乏适应时间。

History Speeds Up

历史加速

With events unfolding many times faster than during previous transformations, early understanding of how the world will change could turn out to be far more useful to you than it would have been to your ancestors at an equivalent juncture in the past. Even if the first farmers had miraculously understood the full megapolitical implications of tilling the earth, this information would have been practically useless because thousands of years were to pass before the transition to the new phase of society was complete.

随着事件的发展速度远远超过以往的变革,对世界将如何变化的早期理解,可能会比你的祖先在过去等同时期更有用。即使第一批农民奇迹般地理解了耕作大地的全面政治影响,这种信息在数千年过渡到新的社会阶段之前仍将是毫无用处的。

Not so today. History has sped up. Forecasts that correctly anticipate the megapolitical implications of new technology are likely to be far more useful today. If we can develop the implications of the current transition to the Information Society to the same extent that someone with current knowledge could have grasped the implications of past transitions to farm and factory, that information should be many times more valuable now. Put simply, the action horizon for megapolitical forecasts has shrunk to its most useful range, within the span of a single lifetime.

这种情况今天已不复存在。历史已加速前进。能够正确预测新技术的宏观政治影响的预测,可能今天更加有用。如果我们能够推演当前向信息社会的转型所带来的影响,就像以前有人掌握了从农业到工厂时代转型所带来的影响一样,那么这些信息现在应该更有价值。简而言之,对于

宏观政治预测,可行的时间范围已经缩短到一个人生命跨度之内最有用的范畴。

"Looking back over the centuries, or even f looking only at the present, we can clearly observe that many men have made their living, Often a very good living, from their special skill in 35

说重话生

applying weapons of violence, and that their activities have had a very large part in determining what uses were made of scarce resources." FREDERIC C. LANE

"运用暴力武器,而且他们的活动在决定稀缺资源的用途方面发挥了非常重要的作用。" 弗雷德里克·C·兰

Our study of megapolitics is an attempt to do just that-to draw out the implications of the changing factors that alter the boundaries where violence is exercised.

我们对宏观政治学的研究就是试图做到这一点 - 阐述改变了暴力行使边界的不断变化的因素的影响。

These megapolitical factors largely determine when and where violence pays. They also help inform the market distribution of income. As economic historian Frederic Lane so clearly put it, how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining "what uses are made of scarce resources.

这些大政治因素在很大程度上决定了暴力何时以及在何处有效。它们还有助于了解收入的市场分配。正如经济史学家弗雷德里克·雷恩所清楚地指出的那样,暴力的组织和控制方式在决定"稀缺资源的用途"方面起着重要作用。

A CRASH COURSE IN MEGAPOLITICS

巨观政治速成课程

The concept of megapolitics is a powerful one. It helps illuminate some of the major mysteries of history: how governments rise and fall and what types of institutions they become; the timing and outcome of wars; patterns of economic prosperity and decline. By raising or lowering the costs and rewards of projecting power, megapolitics governs the ability of people to impose their will on others. This has been true from the earliest human societies onward. It still is. We explored many of the important hidden megapolitical factors that determine the evolution of history in *Blood in the Streets* and *The Great Reckoning*. The key to unlocking the implications of megapolitical change is understanding the factors that precipitate revolutions in the use of violence. These variables can be somewhat arbitrarily grouped into four categories: topography, climate, microbes, and technology.

兆政治概念是一个强大的概念。它有助于阐明历史的一些主要奥秘:政府如何兴衰及其所形成的机构类型;战争的时机和结果;经济繁荣和衰落的模式。通过提高或降低投射权力的成本和回报,兆政治决定人们强加自己意志于他人的能力。这从最早的人类社会开始就一直如此。这仍然如此。我们在《街头之血》和《大清算》中探讨了许多决定历史演变的重要隐藏的兆政治因素。解开兆政治变革含义的关键是理解导致暴力使用革命的因素。这些变量可以任意划分为四个类别:地形、气候、微生物和技术。

1. Topography is a crucial factor, as evidenced by the fact that control of violence on the open seas has never been monopolized as it has on land. No government's laws have ever exclusively applied there. This is a matter of the utmost importance in understanding how the organization of violence and protection will evolve as the economy migrates into cyberspace.

地形是一个关键因素,正如事实所示,暴力在公海上从未像在陆地上那样被垄断。任何政府的法律在那里都没有得到过独家适用。这对于理解暴力和保护的组织如何随着经济向网络空间迁移而发展至关重要。

Topography, in conjunction with climate, had a major role to play in early history.

地形加上气候在早期历史中扮演了重要角色。

The first states emerged on floodplains, surrounded by desert, such as in Mesopotamia and Egypt, where water for irrigation was plentiful but surrounding regions were too dry to support yeoman farming. Under such conditions, individual farmers faced a very high cost for failing to cooperate in maintaining the political structure. Without irrigation, which could be provided only on a large scale, crops would not grow. No crops meant starvation. The conditions that placed those who controlled the water in a desert in a position of strength made for despotic and rich government.

最早的国家兴起于洪泛平原,周围为沙漠,如美索不达米亚和埃及,那里灌溉用水充足,但周边地区太干燥无法维持自耕农种植。在这种条件下,个体农民坚持不配合维护政治结构的代价非常高。没有灌溉(只能大规模提供),庄稼就无法生长。无庄稼意味着饥饿。控制沙漠中水源的人因此处于优势地位,导致了专制和富裕的政府。

As we analyzed in *The Great Reckoning*, topographic conditions also played a major role in the prosperity of yeoman farmers in ancient Greece, enabling that region to become the cradle of Western democracy. Given the primitive transportation conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean region three thousand years ago, it was all but impossible for persons living more than a few miles from the sea to compete in the production of high-value crops of the ancient world, olives and grapes. If the oil and the wine had to be transported any distance overland, the portage costs were so great that they could not be

正如我们在《大清算》中分析的那样,地形条件也在很大程度上促进了古希腊自耕农的繁荣,使该地区成为西方民主的摇篮。考虑到三千年前地中海地区原始的交通条件,距海不足几英里的人要生产当时高价值的作物如橄榄和葡萄,是几乎不可能的。如果要將油和酒运输一定距离,陆路运输费用如此之高,以至于无法盈利。

sold at a profit. The elaborate shoreline of the Greek littoral meant that most areas of Greece were no more than twenty miles from the sea. This gave a decisive advantage to Greek farmers over their potential competitors in

landlocked areas.

以利润销售。希腊沿海线的精心设计意味着希腊的大多数地区距离海洋不超过 20 英里。这给希腊农民相比内陆地区的竞争对手带来了决定性的优势。

Because of this advantage in trading high-value products, Greek farmers earned high incomes from control of only small parcels of land. These high incomes enabled them to purchase costly armor. The famous hoplites of ancient Greece were farmers or landlords who armed themselves at their own expense. Both well armed and well motivated, the Greek hoplites were militarily formidable and could not be ignored.

由于这种高价值产品交易上的优势,希腊农民凭借少量土地的控制获得了高收入。这些高收入使他们能够购买昂贵的盔甲。古希腊著名的重装步兵部队由农民或地主组成,他们自费装备武器。希腊重装步兵武装精良,士气高涨,军事实力强大,不容忽视。

Topographic conditions were the foundation of Greek democracy, just as those of a different kind gave rise to the Oriental despotisms of Egypt and elsewhere.

地形条件是希腊民主制度的基础,就像不同类型的地形导致了埃及和其他地方的东方独裁主义的产生。

2.

Climate also helps set the boundaries within which brute force can be exercised.

气候也有助于设定暴力行使的边界。

A climatic change was the catalyst for the first major transition from foraging to farming.

气候变化是从采集到农业的首次重大转变的催化剂。

The end of the last Ice Age, about thirteen thousand years ago, led to a radical alteration in vegetation. Beginning in the Near East, where the Ice Age retreated first, a gradual rise in temperature and rainfall spread forests into areas that had previously been grasslands. In particular, the rapid

spread of beech forests seriously curtailed the human diet. As Susan Alling Gregg put it in *Foragers and Farmers*: The establishment of beech forests must have had serious consequences for local human, plant and animal populations. The canopy of an oak forest is relatively open and allows large amounts of sunlight to reach the forest floor. An exuberant undergrowth of mixed shrubs, forbs, and grasses develops, and the diversity of plants supports a variety of wildlife. In contrast, the canopy of a beech forest is closed and the forest floor is heavily shaded. Other than a flush of spring annuals prior to the emergence of the leaves, only shade-tolerant sedges, ferns, and a few grasses are found."

上一个冰河时代的结束,大约在一万三千年前,导致了植被的根本性变化。从冰河时代最早撤退的近东地区开始,温度和降雨的逐渐上升使森林扩展到了原先为草地的地区。特别是山毛榉林的迅速蔓延严重地限制了人类的饮食。正如苏珊·艾林·格雷格在《采集者和农民》中所说:"山毛榉林的建立肯定对当地人类、植物和动物种群产生了严重的影响。橡树林的树冠相对开阔,允许大量阳光照射到林地。繁茂的灌木、杂草和草本植物形成了下层植被,植物的多样性也支撑了各种野生动物。相比之下,山毛榉林的树冠闭合,林地阴暗潮湿。除了春季叶芽展开前的一些一年生植物,只有耐荫的莎草、蕨类和少量草本植物生长其中。"

Over time, dense forests encroached on the open plains, spreading throughout Europe into the Eastern steppes. The forests reduced the grazing area available to support large animals, making it increasingly difficult for the population of human foragers to support themselves.

随着时间推移,密集的森林侵占了开放的平原,蔓延到整个欧洲直至东部大草原。森林减少了大型动物觅食的区域,使人类狩猎采集者的生存变得越来越困难。

The population of hunter-gatherers had swollen too greatly during the Ice Age prosperity to support itself on the dwindling herds of large mammals, many species of which were hunted to extinction. The transition to agriculture was not a choice of preference, but an improvisation adopted under duress to make up for shortfalls in the diet. Foraging continued to predominate in those areas farther north, where the warming trend had not adversely affected the habitats of large mammals, and in tropical

rainforests, where the global warming trend did not have the perverse effect of reducing food supplies. Since the advent of farming, it has been far more common for changes to be precipitated by the cooling rather than the warming of the climate.

猎人-采集者人口在冰河时代繁荣时期急剧膨胀,无法依靠日益枯竭的大型哺乳动物种群维持自己,导致许多物种濒临灭绝。向农业过渡并非偏好的选择,而是在窘迫情况下采取的应急措施,弥补饮食上的不足。在气候变暖对大型哺乳动物栖息地影响不大的更北地区,以及全球变暖趋势并未降低食物供给的热带雨林地区,采集仍然占主导地位。自农业出现以来,导致变革的更为常见的是气候变冷,而非变暖。

A modest understanding of the dynamics of climatic change in past societies could well prove useful in the event that climates continue to fluctuate. If you know that a drop of one degree Centigrade on average reduces the growing season by three to four weeks and shaves five hundred feet off the maximum elevation at which crops can be grown, then you know something about the boundary conditions that will confine people's action in the future. You can use this knowledge to forecast changes in 37 一个过往社会气候变化动力学的适度了解对于气候继续波动的情况下可能会很有用。如果你知道平均气温下降一摄氏度会使生长季减少三到四周,并且使作物可种植的最高海拔降低 500 英尺,那么你就知道未来人们行动受限的边界条件。你可以利用这种知识来预测 37

everything from grain prices to land values. You may even be able to draw informed conclusions about the likely impact of falling temperatures on real incomes and political stability. In the past, governments have been overthrown when crop failures extending over several years raised food prices and shrank disposable incomes.

从谷物价格到土地价值的一切。你甚至可以对温度下降对实际收入和政治稳定的可能影响做出有根据的结论。过去,当连续数年的作物失收导致食品价格上涨和可支配收入缩小时,政府已经被推翻。

For example, it is no coincidence that the seventeenth century, the coldest in the modern period, was also a period of revolution worldwide. A hidden megapolitical cause of this unhappiness was sharply colder weather. It was so cold, in fact, that wine froze on the "Sun King's" table at Versailles.

Shortened growing seasons produced crop failures and undermined real income. Because of the colder weather, prosperity began to wind down into a long global depression that began around 1620. It proved drastically destabilizing. The economic crisis of the seventeenth century led to the world being overwhelmed by rebellions, many clustering in 1648, exactly two hundred years before another and more famous cycle of rebellions. Between 1640 and 1650, there were rebellions in Ireland, Scotland, England, Portugal, Catalonia, France, Moscow, Naples, Sicily, Brazil, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Turkey. 以 17 世纪这个在现代时期最冷的时期也恰好是全球革命爆发的时期为例,这并非巧合。导致这一不满情绪的潜在宏观政治原因是天气急剧变冷。事实上,天气变得如此寒冷,以至于在凡尔赛的"太阳王"餐桌上的葡萄酒都结冰了。种植季节缩短导致了作物歉收,进而损害了实际收入。由于气温下降,从 1620 年前后开始出现了长期的全球性经济衰退。这被证明是极度不稳定的。17 世纪的经济危机导致全世界被叛乱所吞噬,其中许多集中在 1648 年,正好是另一个更为著名的叛乱周期的 200 年前。在 1640 年至 1650 年之间,发生了爱尔兰、苏格兰、英格兰、葡萄牙、加泰罗尼亚、法国、莫斯科、那不勒斯、西西里、巴西、波希米亚、乌克兰、奥地利、波兰、瑞典、荷兰和土耳其的叛乱。

Even China and Japan were swept with unrest.
即使中国和日本也被动乱所席卷。

It may also be no coincidence that mercantilism predominated in the seventeenth century during a period of shrinking trade. Economic closure was perhaps most pronounced at the end of the century, "when a terrible famine occurred." By the eighteenth century, especially after 1750, warmer temperatures and higher crop yields had begun to raise real incomes in Western Europe sufficiently to expand demand for manufactured goods. More free-market policies were adopted. This led to a self-reinforcing burst of economic growth as industry expanded to a larger scale in what is commonly described as the Industrial Revolution. The growing importance of technology and manufactured output reduced the impact of the weather on economic cycles.

商业主义在 17 世纪贸易萎缩期间占据主导地位,这并非偶然。当时末期"发生了一次可怕的饥荒",经济封闭可能达到高潮。到了 18 世纪,

特别是 1750 年之后,西欧的气温升高和作物产量提高,足以提高实际收入并扩大对制成品的需求。采用了更多的自由市场政策。这导致了一个自我增强的经济增长爆发,工业规模扩大,通常被称为工业革命。技术和制造产出的日益重要性降低了天气对经济周期的影响。

Even today, however, you should not underestimate the impact of suddenly colder weather in lowering real incomes-even in wealthy regions such as North America. There is a strong tendency for societies to render themselves crisis-prone when the existing configuration of institutions has exhausted its potential. In the past, this tendency has often been manifested by population increases that stretched the carrying capacity of land to the limit. This happened both before the transition of the year 1000 and again at the end of the fifteenth century. The plunge in real income caused by crop failures and lower yields played a significant role in both instances in destroying the predominant institutions. Today the marginalization is manifested in the consumer credit markets. If sharply colder weather reduced crop yields and lowered disposable incomes, this would lead to debt default as well as tax rebellions. If the past is a guide, both economic closure and political instability could result.

即使在今天,您也不应该低估严寒天气突然降临对降低实际收入的影响,即使在北美这样的富裕地区也是如此。当现有的制度配置已经耗尽其潜力时,社会倾向于使自己易受危机影响。在过去,这种倾向通常表现为人口增加,将土地的承载能力推到极限。这种情况在 1000 年前后以及 15 世纪末都曾出现。由于作物歉收和产量降低造成的实际收入暴跌在这两种情况中都起到了重要作用,从而摧毁了主导性的制度。如今,这种边缘化表现在消费信贷市场。如果严寒天气严重减低了作物产量,降低了可支配收入,这将导致债务违约和税收叛乱。如果过去是一个指南,经济封闭和政治不稳定都可能是结果。

3.

Microbes convey power to harm or immunity from harm in ways that have often determined how power was exercised. This was certainly the case in the European conquest of the New World, as we explored in The Great Reckoning. European settlers, arriving from settled agricultural societies riddled with disease, brought with them relative immunity from childhood

infections like measles. The Indians they encountered lived largely in thinly populated foraging bands. They possessed no such immunity and 38 微生物可以赋予伤害或免受伤害的力量,这往往决定了权力的行使方式。这在欧洲对新世界的征服中确实如此,正如我们在《大清算》中探讨的那样。来自有病患的定居农业社会的欧洲移民带来了针对儿童传染病如麻疹的相对免疫力。他们遇到的印第安人主要生活在稀疏的狩猎采集部落中。他们没有这种免疫力,因此

were decimated. Often, the greatest mortality occurred before white people even arrived, as Indians who first encountered Europeans on the coasts traveled inland with infections.

被严重削减。通常在白人到达之前,最大的死亡率就已经发生,因为最先遇到欧洲人的沿海印第安人带着感染进入内陆。

There are also microbiological barriers to the exercise of power. In *Blood in the Streets*, we discussed the role that potent strains of malaria served in making tropical Africa impervious to invasion by white men for many centuries. Before the discovery of quinine in the mid-nineteenth century, white armies could not survive in malarial regions, however superior their weapons might have been.

此外,还有微生物障碍阻碍权力的行使。在《街头血腥》中,我们讨论了猛烈的疟疾菌株如何使热带非洲对白人的入侵保持了数个世纪的不可侵犯性。在 19 世纪中叶发现奎宁之前,白人军队无法在疟疾流行区生存下去,不管他们的武器有多强大。

The interaction between humans and microbes has also produced important demographic effects that altered the costs and rewards of violence. When fluctuations in mortality are high due to epidemic disease, famine, or other causes, the relative risk of mortality in warfare falls. The declining frequency of eruptions in death rates from the sixteenth century onward helps explain smaller family size and, ultimately, the far lower tolerance of sudden death in war today as compared to the past. This has had the effect of lowering the tolerance for imperialism and raising the costs of projecting power in societies with low birthrates.

人类与微生物之间的相互作用也产生了重要的人口效应,改变了暴力的成本和回报。当由于流行病、饥荒或其他原因导致死亡波动较大时,战

争中死亡的相对风险降低。自 16 世纪以来,死亡率爆发频率的下降有助于解释家庭规模较小,最终今天相较过去对战争中突然死亡的容忍度大幅降低。这降低了对帝国主义的容忍度,增加了出生率较低的社会投射力量的成本。

Contemporary societies, comprising small families, tend to find even small numbers of battle deaths intolerable. By contrast, early modern societies were much more tolerant of the mortality costs associated with imperialism. Before this century, most parents gave birth to many children, some of whom were expected to die randomly and suddenly from disease. In an era when early death was commonplace, would-be soldiers and their families faced the dangers of the battlefield with less resistance.

当代社会以小家庭为主,即使战争死亡人数不多,也难以接受。相比之下,早期现代社会对帝国主义相关的死亡率更加容忍。在上个世纪之前,大多数父母生育多个子女,其中一些预计会因病随机而突然死亡。在早期死亡普遍的时代,准军人及其家人面对战场危险时抱有更少的抵抗情绪。

4.

Technology has played by far the largest role in determining the costs and rewards of projecting power during the modern centuries. The argument of this book presumes it will continue to do so. Technology has several crucial dimensions: A.

技术在决定现代世纪投射实力的成本和回报中起到了最重要的作用。本书的论点认为它将继续起到这种作用。技术有几个关键维度:A。

Balance between offense and defense. The balance between the offense and the defense implied by prevailing weapons technology helps determine the scale of political organization. When offensive capabilities are rising, the ability to project power at a distance predominates, jurisdictions tend to consolidate, and governments form on a larger scale. At other times, like now, defensive capabilities are rising. This makes it more costly to project power outside of core areas. Jurisdictions tend to devolve, and big governments break down into smaller ones.

进攻和防守之间的平衡。流行武器技术所暗示的进攻和防守之间的平

衡有助于决定政治组织的规模。当进攻能力上升时,远程投射实力占主导地位,管辖区倾向于整合,政府规模也会扩大。而在其他时期,如现在,防御能力正在上升。这使得在核心区域以外投射实力的成本更高。管辖区倾向于分散,大政府也会分裂为更小的政府。

B.

Equality and the predominance of the infantry. A key feature determining the degree of equality among citizens is the nature of weapons technology. Weapons that are relatively cheap, can be employed by nonprofessionals, and enhance the military importance of infantry tend to equalize power. When Thomas Jefferson wrote that "all men are created equal," he was saying something that was much more true than a similar statement would have seemed centuries earlier. A farmer with his hunting rifle was not only as well armed as the typical British soldier with his Brown Bess, he was better armed. The farmer with the rifle could shoot at the soldier from a greater distance, and with greater accuracy than the soldier could return fire. This was a distinctly different circumstance from the Middle Ages, when a farmer with a pitchfork-he could not have afforded more-could 39
平等和步兵的优势。决定公民平等程度的一个关键特征是武器技术的性质。相对较便宜、可由非专业人士使用并增强步兵重要性的武器倾向于平等化权力。当托马斯·杰斐逊写道"所有人生而平等"时,他所说的话要比几个世纪前更加真实。一个拥有猎枪的农民不仅和典型的英国士兵手持的布朗贝斯一样武装,还能更好地武装自己。拥有步枪的农民可以从更远的距离射击士兵,精度也比士兵反击更高。这与中世纪的情况截然不同,当时一个只能负担得起干草叉的农民无法与更强大的武器抗衡。

scarcely have hoped to stand against a heavily armed knight on horseback. No one was writing in 1276 that "all men are created equal." At that time, in the most manifestly important sense, men were not equal. A single knight exercised far more brute force than dozens of peasants put together. 很难指望能抵挡一名重装备骑士。1276 年没人写过"所有人生而平等"。当时,在最重要的意义上,人们并不平等。一个骑士拥有远超数十个农民的蛮力。

C.

Advantages and disadvantages of scale in violence. Another variable that helps determine whether there are a few large governments or many small ones is the scale of organization required to deploy the prevailing weapons. When there are increasing returns to violence, it is more rewarding to operate governments at a large scale, and they tend to get bigger. When a small group can command effective means of resisting an assault by a large group, which was the case during the Middle Ages, sovereignty tends to fragment. Small, independent authorities exercise many of the functions of government. As we explore in a latter chapter, we believe that the Information Age will bring the dawn of cybersoldiers, who will be heralds of devolution. Cybersoldiers could be deployed not merely by nationstates but by very small organizations, and even by individuals. Wars of the next millennium will include some almost bloodless battles fought with computers.

规模在暴力中的优缺点。另一个变量是部署主导武器所需的组织规模,这有助于确定是存在少数大政府还是许多小政府。当暴力有报酬递增时,以较大规模运营政府会更有利可图,它们也倾向于变得更大。当一小群人可以有效抵御大群人的攻击时(就像在中世纪),主权倾向于分裂。小型独立当局行使许多政府职能。正如我们在后一章所探讨的,我们相信信息时代将带来网络士兵的曙光,他们将成为分权的先导。网络士兵不仅可以由国家部署,也可以由非常小的组织甚至个人部署。下一个千年的战争将包括一些几乎无血代价的电脑战斗。

D.

Economies of scale in production. Another important factor that weighs in the balance in determining whether ultimate power is exercised locally or from a distance is the scale of the predominant enterprises in which people gain their livelihoods. When crucial enterprises can function optimally only when they are organized on a large scale in an encompassing trading area, governments that expand to provide such a setting for enterprises under their protection may rake off enough additional wealth to pay the costs of maintaining a large political system. Under such conditions, the entire world economy usually functions more effectively where one supreme

world power dominates all others, as the British Empire did in the nineteenth century. But sometimes megapolitical variables combine to produce falling economies of scale. If the economic benefits of maintaining a large trading area dwindle, larger governments that previously prospered from exploiting the benefits of larger trading areas may begin to break apart-even if the balance of weaponry between offense and defense otherwise remains much as it had been.

生产规模经济。另一个重要因素是人们谋生的主导企业的规模。当关键企业只有在大范围的贸易区中才能最佳运作时,为这些受保护企业提供这种环境的政府可以额外获得足够的财富来支付维持大型政治体系的成本。在这种情况下,如同 19 世纪的大英帝国一样,一个统治其他国家的最高世界强国通常能使整个世界经济更有效地运作。但有时,巨观政治变量可能导致规模经济下降。如果维持大型贸易区的经济利益减少,之前靠开发这些利益而兴盛的大型政府可能开始瓦解,即使进攻与防御之间的武力均衡基本保持不变。

E.

Dispersal of technology. Still another factor that contributes to the power equation is the degree of dispersal of key technologies. When weapons or tools of production can be effectively hoarded or monopolized, they tend to centralize power. Even technologies that are essentially defensive in character, like the machine gun, proved to be potent offensive weapons, that contributed to a rising scale of governance during the period when they were not widely dispersed.

技术的分散化。另一个影响力量方程的因素是关键技术的分散程度。当武器或生产工具可以有效地囤积或垄断时,它们倾向于集中权力。即使本质上具有防御性质的技术,如机关枪,也被证明是强大的进攻性武器,在它们尚未广泛传播的时期,促进了治理规模的提高。

When the European powers enjoyed a monopoly on machine guns late in the nineteenth century, they were able to use those weapons against peoples at the periphery to dramatically expand colonial empires. Later, in the twentieth century, when machine guns became widely available, especially in the wake of World War II, they were deployed to help destroy the power of empires. Other things being equal, the more widely dispersed key

technologies are, the more 40

当欧洲列强在 19 世纪后期垄断机枪时,他们能够使用这些武器针对边缘地带的民众,大大扩张殖民帝国。后来,在 20 世纪,机枪广泛普及,尤其是在第二次世界大战之后,它们被用来帮助摧毁帝国的势力。其他条件相同的情况下,关键技术分布越广,对抗帝国的力量就越大。

widely dispersed power will tend to be, and the smaller the optimum scale of government.

广泛散布的权力趋于较小,政府的最佳规模也会较小。

THE SPEED OF MEGAPOLITICAL CHANGE

超大政治变革的速度

While technology is by far the most important factor today, and apparently growing more so, all four major megapolitical factors have played a role in determining the scale at which power could be exercised in the past.

尽管技术无疑是当今最重要的因素,而且还在不断增强,但过去决定权力行使规模的四大主要大政治因素都发挥了作用。

Together, these factors determine whether the returns to violence continue to rise as violence is employed on a larger scale. This determines the importance of magnitude of firepower versus efficiency in employing resources. It also strongly influences the market distribution of income. The question is, What role will they command in the future? A key to estimating an answer lies in recognizing that these megapolitical variables mutate at dramatically different speeds.

这些因素共同决定着暴力行为带来的回报是否继续上升,随着暴力行为在更大范围内的应用。这决定了火力规模与资源运用效率的重要性。它也极大地影响着收入的市场分配。问题在于,它们在未来将发挥何种作用?估算答案的关键在于认识到这些大政治变量的突变速度差异巨大。

Topography has been almost fixed through the whole of recorded history. Except for minor local effects involving the silting of harbors, landfills, or erosion, the topography of the earth is almost the same today as it was when Adam and Eve straggled out of Eden. And it is likely to remain so until another Ice Age recarves the landscapes of continents or some other drastic event disturbs the surface of the earth. At a more profound scale, geological ages seem to shift, perhaps in response to large meteorite strikes, over a period of 10 to 40 million years. Someday, there may again be geological upheavals that will alter significantly the topography of our planet. If that happens, you can safely assume that both the baseball and cricket seasons will be canceled.

地形在整个历史记录中基本保持不变。除了涉及港口淤积、填海或侵

蚀的一些小规模局部影响外,地球的地形与亚当和夏娃离开伊甸园时基本相同。除非再次出现冰河时代重塑大陆地貌或其他重大事件扰乱地球表面,否则这种状况很可能持续下去。在更深层次上,地质纪元似乎会发生变化,可能是由于大型陨石撞击,持续时间为 1000 万年至 4000 万年。总有一天,地质大变动再次发生,将显著改变我们星球的地貌。如果真的发生这种情况,你可以确定棒球和板球赛季将被取消。

Climate fluctuates much more actively than topography. In the last million years, climatic change has been responsible for most of the known variation in the features of the earth's surface. During Ice Ages, glaciers gouged new valleys, altered the course of rivers, severed islands from continents or joined them together by lowering the sea level.

气候波动比地形变化更为活跃。在过去一百万年里,气候变化是造成地球表面特征众多变化的主要原因。在冰河时代,冰川开凿了新的山谷,改变了河流的走向,并且通过海平面下降将岛屿与大陆相连或分离。

Fluctuations in climate have played a significant role in history, first in precipitating the Agricultural Revolution after the close of the last Ice Age, and later in destabilizing regimes during periods of colder temperatures and drought.

气候波动在历史上扮演了重要角色,首先是在上一个冰河时代结束后促进了农业革命的发生,后来又在寒冷气温和干旱时期扰乱了政权的稳定。

Lately, there have been concerns over the possible impact of "global warming."

近来,人们对"全球变暖"的潜在影响感到担忧。

These concerns cannot be dismissed out of hand. Yet, taking a longer perspective, the more likely risk appears to be a shift toward a colder, not a warmer climate. Study of temperature fluctuations based upon analysis of oxygen isotopes in core samples taken from the ocean floor show that the current period is the second warmest in more than 2

这些担忧不能被轻易否决。然而,从更长远的角度来看,更可能的风险似乎是转向一个更冷的气候,而不是更温暖的气候。根据对海底岩芯样品中氧同位素分析得出的温度波动研究显示,当前时期是 2

million years.²² If temperatures were to turn colder, as they did in the seventeenth century, that might prove megapolitically destabilizing. Current alarms about global warming may in that sense be reassuring. To the extent that they are true, that assures that temperatures will continue to fluctuate within the abnormally warm and relatively benign range experienced for the past three centuries.

二十二个世纪。如果温度降低,与十七世纪一样,那可能会造成严重的地缘政治不稳定。目前关于全球变暖的警报在某种程度上可能是令人安心的。它们为真的话,就能保证温度将继续在过去三个世纪里经历过的异常温暖和相对温和的范围内波动。

The rate of change in the influence of microbes on the exercise of power is more of a puzzle. Microbes can mutate very rapidly. This is especially true of viruses. The 22

新冠病毒在很大程度上改变了权力的行使。病毒可以快速变异,尤其是病毒。

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common cold, for example, mutates in an almost kaleidoscopic way. Yet although these mutations proceed apace, their impact in shifting the boundaries where power is exercised have been far less abrupt than technological change. Why? Part of the reason is that the normal balance of nature tends to make it beneficial for microbes to infect but not destroy host populations. Virulent infections that kill their hosts too readily tend to eradicate themselves in the process. The survival of microparasites depends upon their not being too rapidly or uniformly fatal to the hosts they invade. 普通感冒在某种程度上以万花筒式的方式变异。然而,尽管这些变异在继续进行,但它们在改变权力边界方面的影响远没有技术变革那么急剧。为什么?部分原因是自然界的正常平衡倾向于使微生物感染但不破坏宿主群体。过于猖獗的感染会杀死宿主,从而往往也会自我消灭。微寄生虫的生存依赖于它们对侵染的宿主不会过于迅速或完全致命。

That is not to say, of course, that there cannot be deadly eruptions of disease that alter the balance of power. Such episodes have figured prominently in history. The Black Death wiped out large fractions of the population of

Eurasia and dealt a crushing blow to the fourteenth-century version of the international economy.

这并不是说不会出现改变权力平衡的致命疾病爆发。这种事件在历史上一直十分突出。黑死病抹杀了欧亚大陆大部分人口,并严重打击了 14 世纪的国际经济。

What Might Have Been
什么本可能存在

History can be understood in terms of what might have been as well as what was.

历史可以从"本该如此"和"实际发生"两个角度去理解。

We know of no reason that microparasites could not have continued to play havoc with human society during the modern period. For example, it is possible that microbiological barriers to the exercise of power, equivalent to malaria but more virulent, could have halted the Western invasion of the periphery in its tracks. The first intrepid Portuguese adventurers who sailed into African waters could have contracted a deadly retrovirus, a more communicable version of AIDS, that would have stopped the opening of the new trade route to Asia before it even began. Columbus, too, and the first waves of settlers in the New World might have encountered diseases that decimated them in the same way that indigenous local populations were affected by measles and other Western childhood diseases. Yet nothing of the kind happened, a coincidence that underlines the intuition that history has a destiny.

我们无法解释微小寄生虫为何没有在现代社会中持续肆虐。例如,可能存在更加猖狂的微生物学障碍,类似于疟疾,阻碍了西方对外围地区的入侵。最早勇敢的葡萄牙航海家进入非洲水域时,可能感染了一种致命的逆转录病毒,即一种更具传染性的艾滋病毒,这将在亚洲贸易航线开放之前就阻止了它的开启。或者,哥伦布及其在新大陆的首批定居者也可能遭遇到与当地土著人因麻疹等西方童年疾病而受影响相同的疾病,被彻底消灭。但什么都没有发生,这正重申了历史具有必然性的直觉。

Microbes did far less to impede the consolidation of power in the 'modern period than to facilitate it. Western troops and colonists at the periphery

often found that the technological advantages that allowed them to project power were underscored by microbiological ones. Westerners were armed with unseen biological weapons, their relative immunity to childhood diseases that frequently devastated native peoples. This gave voyagers from the West a distinct advantage that their antagonists from less densely settled regions lacked. As events unfolded, the disease transfer was almost entirely in one direction—from Europe outward. There was no equivalent transfer of disease in the other direction, from the periphery to the core.

微生物在现代时期促进权力集中的作用,要大于阻碍的作用。西方军队和殖民者在边缘地区发现,他们投射权力的技术优势,也得益于微生物学优势。西方人拥有隐形的生物武器,他们相对于频繁严重伤害当地人的儿童疾病具有免疫力。这给来自西方的探险家以显著优势,而他们的对手来自人口稀少的地区却缺乏此优势。随着事态的发展,疾病传播几乎是单向的——从欧洲向外扩散。从边缘地区到核心区域则没有同等的疾病传播。

As a possible counterexample, some have claimed that Western explorers imported syphilis from the New World to Europe. This is arguable. If true, however, it did not prove to be a significant barrier to the exercise of power. The major impact of syphilis was to shift sexual mores in the West.

作为一个可能的反例,一些人声称西方探险家将梅毒从新世界传到欧洲。这是可争议的。但是,如果属实,它并未成为行使权力的重大障碍。梅毒的主要影响是改变了西方的性道德。

From the end of the fifteenth century to the last quarter of the twentieth, the impact of microbes on industrial society was ever more benign.

Notwithstanding the personal tragedies and unhappiness caused by outbreaks of tuberculosis, polio, and flu, no new diseases emerged in the modern period that even approached the megapolitical impact of the Antonine plagues or the Black Death. Improving public health, and the 42 从十五世纪末到二十世纪最后一个季度,微生物对工业社会的影响越来越温和。尽管肺结核、小儿麻痹症和流感的爆发造成了个人悲剧和不幸,但在现代时期没有出现新的疾病能够接近安东尼瘟疫或黑死病的政治影响。公共卫生的改善以及

advent of vaccinations and antidotes, generally reduced the importance of infectious microbes during the modern period, thereby increasing the relative importance of technology in setting the boundaries where power was exercised.

新冠疫苗和解毒剂的出现,降低了现代时期传染性微生物的重要性,从而提高了技术在制定权力边界中的相对重要性。

The recent emergence of AIDS and alarms over the potential spread of exotic viruses are hints that the role of microbes may not be altogether as megapolitically benign in the future as it has been over the past five hundred years. But when or whether a new plague will infect the world is unknowable. An eruption of microparasites, such as a viral pandemic, rather than drastic changes in climate or topography, would more likely disrupt the megapolitical predominance of technology.

艾滋病的近期出现和对神秘病毒可能蔓延的警报表明,微生物在未来五百年内可能不再像过去那样对大政治无伤大雅。但是,新的瘟疫何时会和是否会感染全世界都无法预知。与气候或地形的剧烈变化相比,微寄生虫的暴发,如病毒大流行,更可能扰乱技术的主导地位。

We have no way of monitoring or anticipating drastic departures from the nature of life on earth as we have known it. We cross our fingers and assume that the major megapolitical variables in the next millennium will be technological rather than microbiological. If luck continues to side with humanity, technology will continue to grow in prominence as the leading megapolitical variable. It was not always such, however, as a review of the first great megapolitical transformation, the Agricultural Revolution, clearly shows.

我们没有办法监测或预测与我们所了解的地球生命性质的剧烈变化。我们只能交叉双指,假定下个千年的主要大政治变量将是技术性的,而不是微生物学的。如果幸运继续倾斜于人类,技术将继续成为主导的大政治变量。然而,这并非一直如此,对第一次伟大的大政治转型 - 农业革命的回顾,就能清楚地显示出这一点。

CHAPTER 3

第 3 章

EAST OF EDEN

伊甸园东

The Agricultural Revolution and the Sophistication of Violence 'And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel, thy brother? And he said, I know not: Am I my brothers' keeper? And he said, What hast thou done? the voice of thy brothers' blood crieth unto me from the ground.'" GENESIS 4:9-10

农业革命和暴力的复杂性"主对该隐说:'你弟弟亚伯在哪里?'他说:'我不知道。我岂是看守我弟弟的吗?'主说:'你作了什么事?你弟弟的血声从地里向我哀告。'"创世记 4:9-10

Five hundred generations ago, the first phase change in the organization of human society began.[1](#) Our ancestors in several regions reluctantly picked up crude implements, sharpened stakes and makeshift hoes, and went to work. As they sowed the first crops, they also laid a new foundation for power in the world. The Agricultural Revolution was the first great economic and social revolution. It started with the expulsion from Eden and moved so slowly that farming had not completely displaced hunting and gathering in all suitable areas of the globe when the twentieth century opened. Experts believe that even in the Near East, where farming first emerged, it was introduced in "a long incremental process" that "may have taken five thousand years or more."[2](#)

五百代之前,人类社会组织的第一次转变开始了。我们的祖先在几个地区勉强拿起粗糙的工具、尖桩和临时的锄头,开始了工作。当他们种植第一批庄稼时,他们也为世界上的力量奠定了新的基础。农业革命是第一次伟大的经济和社会革命。它始于从伊甸园的逐出,发展缓慢,以至于在 20 世纪开始时,农业还没有完全取代所有合适地区的狩猎采集。专家认为,即使在农业最早出现的近东地区,它也是通过"一个漫长的渐进过程"引入的,"可能需要五千年或更长时间"。

It may seem an exaggeration to describe a process that stretched out over millennia as a "revolution." Yet that is precisely what the advent of farming was, a slow-motion revolution that transformed human life by altering the logic of violence.

虽然将持续数千年的过程描述为"革命"似乎有些夸张,但农业的出现确实是一场缓慢的革命,彻底改变了人类生活,并改变了暴力的逻辑。

Wherever farming took root, violence emerged as a more important feature of social life.

农业一旦落地,暴力就成为社会生活中更重要的特征。

Hierarchies adept at manipulating or controlling violence came to dominate society.

善于操纵或控制暴力的等级制度逐渐统治了社会。

Understanding the Agricultural Revolution is a first step toward understanding the Information Revolution. The introduction of tilling and harvesting provides a paradigm example of how an apparently simple shift in the character of work can radically alter the organization of society. Put this past revolution into perspective and you are in a far stronger position to forecast how history may unfold in response to the new logic of violence introduced with microprocessors.

了解农业革命是理解信息革命的第一步。犁地和收割的引入为一种看似简单的工作性质变化如何彻底改变社会组织提供了范例。将这一过去的革命置于视角中,您将能更好地预测历史可能如何在微处理器引入的新暴力逻辑的影响下展开。

To appreciate the revolutionary character of agriculture, you first need a picture of how the primeval society functioned before farming. We surveyed this in The Great Reckoning and offer a further sketch below. Hunting-and gathering societies were the only forms of social organization through a long, prehistoric slumber when human life changed little or not at all from generation to generation. Anthropologists claim that humans have been hunters and gatherers for 99 percent of the time since we appeared on earth. Crucial to the long success and ultimate failure of hunting-and-gathering bands is the fact that they had to operate on a very small scale over a very wide area.

要欣赏农业的革命性质,你首先需要了解在农业出现之前原始社会是如何运作的。我们在《大清算》中已经概述了这一点,并在下面提供了一个简要的描述。狩猎采集社会是在很长的史前阶段唯一存在的社会形式,在这个时期,人类的生活方式几乎没有发生任何变化。人类学家称,从出现在地球上至今,人类有 99%的时间是作为狩猎采集者生存的。对狩猎采集群体们长期成功以及最终失败至关重要,他们必须在一个非常广阔的地区里小规模运作。

1 Boyden, op. cit., p.4.

博耶登,前引书,第4页。

2 Gregg, op. cit., xv.

2 格雷格,同上,第15页。

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Foragers could survive only where population densities were light. To see why, think of the problems that larger groups would have posed. For one thing, a thousand hunters parading together across a landscape would have raised such a ruckus as to scare away the game they sought to trap. And even worse, had a small army of hunters occasionally managed to corner a huge herd of game, the food they harvested, including fruits and edible plants found in the wild, could not have remained plentiful for long. A large group of foragers would have laid waste to the countryside through overharvesting like a starving army in the Thirty Years War. Therefore, to minimize overkill, hunting bands had to be small. As Stephen Boyden writes in *Western Civilization in Biological Perspective*, "Most commonly, hunter-gatherer groups number between twenty-five and fifty individuals." 采集者只能在人口密度较低的地区生存下来。原因如下:首先,成群的猎人在景中游行会引起很大动静,从而惊走他们试图捕捉的猎物。此外,即使猎人们偶尔设法捕获了一大群猎物,从野外采集的水果和可食用植物也很快会变得稀缺。大型采集群会像三十年战争期间的饥饿军队一样,对乡村造成毁灭性的过度开采。因此,为了减少过度开采,猎人小组必须保持较小的规模。正如斯蒂芬·博伊登在《从生物学角度看西方文明》中所写的,"通常,狩猎采集者群体的人数在 25 到 50 人之间。"

To live on ten thousand acres in a temperate climate today is a luxury allowed only to the very rich. A family of hunter-gatherers could scarcely have survived on less.

今天在一个温和气候下拥有一万英亩的土地,这样的奢侈只有最富有的人才能享受得起。狩猎采集的家庭几乎难以在这么小的范围内生存下去。

They generally required thousands of acres per person, even in areas that were most fertile for foraging. This suggests why the growth of human populations during periods particularly favorable to farming may have created the basis for population crises.

他们通常每人需要数千英亩的土地,即使在最适宜采集的地区。这可以解释为什么在对农业特别有利的时期,人口增长可能导致人口危机的基础。

Because so much land was required to support a single person, the population densities of hunting-and-gathering societies had to be incredibly sparse. Before farming, humans were about as densely settled as bears. 因为一个人所需的土地面积如此之大,狩猎采集社会的人口密度不得不非常稀疏。在农业出现之前,人类的居住密度和熊差不多。

With minor differences, the human diet resembled that of bears. Foraging societies depended upon food gathered from the open countryside or from nearby bodies of water. Although some gatherers were fishers, most were hunters who depended for a third to a fifth of their food upon protein from large mammals. Other than a few simple tools and objects carried around with them, hunter-gatherers had almost no technology at their disposal. They usually had no way to effectively store quantities of meat or other foods for later use. Most food had to be consumed soon after it was gathered or left to spoil. That is not say, of course, that some hunter-gatherers did not eat spoiled food.

人类的饮食与熊类相似,只有微小差异。采集社会依赖从野外或附近水域收集的食物。虽然有些采集者也进行捕鱼,但大多数是依赖从大型哺乳动物获取三分之一到五分之一的蛋白质的狩猎者。除了少量的简单工具和携带的物品,狩猎采集者几乎没有可使用的技术。他们通常无法有效储存肉类或其他食物供之后使用。大部分食物必须在采集后不久

立即食用,否则会变质腐烂。当然,这并不意味着一些狩猎采集者就不会食用变质的食物。

Eskimos, as Boyden reports, "are said to have a particular liking for decomposed food."⁴

埃斯基摩人据报道"对腐烂的食物有特别喜好"。

He repeats the observations of experts that Eskimos "bury fish heads and allow them to decay until the bones become of the same consistency as the flesh. They then knead the reeking mass into a paste and eat it"; they also enjoy the 'fat maggoty larvae of the caribou fly served raw. . deer droppings, munched like berries ... and marrow more than a year old, swarming with maggots' ⁵

埃斯基摩人将鱼头埋起来,让它们腐烂直到肉和骨头的质地相同。然后他们将这种恶臭的化为糊状并食用。他们还享用生吃的"驯鹿蝇的肥肥的蛆虫,鹿粪当野果吃,以及长满蛆虫的年迈骨髓"。

Other than such delicacies, foragers developed little surplus food. As anthropologist Gregg notes, "mobile populations generally do not store foodstuffs against seasonal or unexpected lows in resource availability." Consequently, foragers had little to steal. A division of labor that included specialization to employ violence was insupportable in settings where surplus food could not be stored. The logic of the hunt also dictated that violence among hunting-and-foraging bands could never rise above a small scale because the groups themselves had to remain tiny.

除了这些美味之外,采集者也没有积累太多剩余食物。正如人类学家格雷格所指出的,"流动人口通常不会储存食物以应对季节性或意外的资源匮乏。"因此,采集者没有什么可被偷的。在无法储存剩余食物的环境中,所谓以暴力为手段的劳动分工是无法维系的。狩猎的逻辑也决定了,狩猎采集部落之间的暴力永远不会超出小规模,因为部落本身必须保持微小。

The small scale of foraging bands was advantageous in another way. Members of such small groups would have known one another intimately, a factor that made them more effective in working together. Decision-making becomes more difficult as numbers ⁵ Ibid.

觅食者小型群体的规模优势在于另一个方面。这种小型群体的成员彼此亲密无间,这一因素使他们在合作方面更加高效。随着人数的增加,决策过程变得更加困难。

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rise, because incentive traps proliferate. You need only think how hard it is to get a dozen people organized to go out to dinner. Imagine how hopeless would have been the task of organizing hundreds or thousands of persons to traipse around on a moveable feast. Lacking any sustained and separate political organization or bureaucracy required by specialization for war, hunting-and-gathering bands had to depend on persuasion and consensus-principles that work best among small groups with relatively easygoing attitudes.

崛起,因为激励陷阱正在泛滥。你只需要想一想组织十几个人外出吃晚餐有多难。想象一下组织数百或数千人在可移动的盛宴上来来往往的任务有多么无望。缺乏任何持续和独立的政治组织或战争所需的专门化机构,狩猎采集部落不得不依靠说服和共识原则,这些原则在小群体中效果最佳,态度也相对轻松。

Whether hunting-and-gathering bands were easygoing is open to debate. Sir Henry Maine refers to "the universal belligerency of primitive man." In his words, "It is not peace which is natural and primitive but war." ⁶ His view has been underlined by the work of evolutionary biologists. R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong comment: "[T]here are strong indications that many of the injuries apparent in remains of *Australopithecus*, *Homo erectus*, and *Homo sapiens* of the European fourth and pre-fourth glacial periods resulted from combat." ⁷ But others doubt this. Experts like Stephen Boyden argue that primitive groups were usually not warlike or prone to violence. Social conventions developed to reduce internal tensions and facilitate the sharing of the hunt. Especially in areas where humans preyed on larger game, which was difficult for a single hunter to fell, religious and social doctrines emerged to facilitate the redistribution of any game that was taken with the whole group. The first priority of sharing of caloric resources was with other hunters. Necessity, rather than sentiment, was the spur. The first claim on the resources was exercised by the most economically competent and

militarily strong, not by the sick and the weak. Undoubtedly, a major influence informing this priority was the fact that hunters in the prime of life were also militarily the most potent members of the small band. By assuring them a first claim on the hunt, the group minimized potentially lethal internal squabbling.

狩猎采集部落是否生活轻松,这个问题很有争议。亨利·梅因爵士提到"原始人的普遍好战性"。正如他所说,"不是和平是自然且原始的,而是战争。"进化生物学家的研究也支持这一观点。R. Paul Shaw 和 Yuwa Wong 评论说:"有强烈迹象表明,australopithecus、直立人和欧洲第四纪及四纪前期智人遗骸中出现的许多伤痕是由战斗造成的。"但也有人对此表示怀疑。斯蒂芬·博登等专家认为,原始群体通常并不好战或倾向于暴力。他们发展了社会习俗来减少内部紧张局势,并促进狩猎的分享。特别是在人类捕猎大型猎物的地区,这对单个猎人来说很困难,宗教和社会教义出现是为了促进任何被捕获的猎物在整个群体中的重新分配。分享热量资源的首要对象是其他猎人。这不是出于情感,而是出于必要。资源的首要权利属于最具经济竞争力和军事实力的人,而不是病弱者。毫无疑问,这一优先次序的一个重要影响因素是,在小型部落中,处于壮年的猎人也是最强大的军事力量。通过确保他们首先获得狩猎所得,群体最大程度地减少了可能造成不可逆转的内部纷争。

So long as population densities remained low, the foragers' gods were not militant gods but embodiments of natural forces or the animals they hunted. The scantiness of capital and open frontiers made war in most cases unnecessary. There were few neighbors outside one's own small family or clan to pose threats. Because foragers tended to roam in search of food, personal possessions beyond a bare minimum became an encumbrance. Those with few possessions necessarily experienced little property crime. When conflicts arose, the contending parties were often content to walk away because they had little invested in any given locale. Escape was an easy solution to personal feuds or exorbitant demands of other kinds. This does not mean that early humans were peaceful. They may have been violent and unpleasant to a degree we can scarcely imagine. But if they employed violence, it was mostly for personal reasons or, what may be worse, for sport.

只要人口密度保持较低,采集狩猎者的神祇不是好战的神祇,而是自然力

量或他们所狩猎的动物的化身。资本稀缺和开放的边疆使大部分情况下战争是不必要的。除了自己的小家庭或氏族之外,很少有外来的邻居构成威胁。由于采集狩猎者倾向于四处游荡寻找食物,除了最低限度的个人财物之外,其他财物反而成为负担。拥有少量财物的人自然经历很少财产犯罪。当发生冲突时,争执双方通常会选择离开,因为他们任何特定地点都没有大量投资。逃避是化解个人恩怨或其他过度要求的简单解决方案。这并不意味着早期人类是和平的。他们可能曾经暴力和令人不快,程度是我们难以想象的。但如果他们使用暴力,主要是出于个人原因,或者更糟糕的是,出于娱乐的目的。

The livelihoods of hunter-gatherers depended upon their functioning in small bands that allowed little or no scope for a division of labor other than along gender lines.

狩猎采集者的生计依赖于他们在小型部落中的运作,这些部落几乎没有劳动分工,除了性别划分。

They had no organized government, usually no permanent settlements, and no possibility for accumulating wealth. Even such basic building blocks of civilization as a written language were unknown in the primeval economy. Without a written language there could be no formal records and no history. 他们没有组织的政府,通常没有永久性的定居点,也没有积累财富的可能性。即使是文明的基本要素,如书面语言,在原始经济中也是未知的。没有书面语言,就不可能有正式记录和历史。

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Overkill 过度杀伤

The dynamic of foraging created very different incentives to work than those to which we have become accustomed since the advent of farming. The capital requirements for life as a forager were minimal. A few primitive tools and weapons sufficed. There was no outlet for investment, not even private property in land, except occasionally in quarries where flint or soapstone was mined. 8 As anthropologist Susan Alling Gregg wrote in *Foragers and Farmers*, "Ownership of and access to resources was "held in

common by the group." 9 With rare exceptions, such as fishers living on the shores of lakes, foragers usually had no fixed place of abode. Having no permanent homes, they had little need to work hard to acquire property or maintain it. They had no mortgage or taxes to pay, no furniture to buy. Their few consumer goods were animal skins, and personal adornments made by members of the group themselves. There was little incentive to acquire or accumulate anything that might have passed for money because there was little to buy. Under such conditions, savings for the foragers could have been no more than a rudimentary concept.

狩猎采集创造了与我们自从农业兴起以来习惯的工作激励完全不同的激励。作为狩猎采集者的生活资本需求很小。几件原始工具和武器就够了。除了偶尔在燧石或肥皂石矿区之外,根本没有投资的出口,甚至也没有土地私有财产。人类学家苏珊·阿灵·格雷格在《狩猎采集者与农民》中写道:"资源的所有权和获取是由群体共同持有的。"除了生活在湖边的渔民外,狩猎采集者通常没有固定的居所。由于没有永久的房屋,他们没有太大的需要通过努力工作来获得财产或维护财产。他们没有抵押贷款或税收需要支付,也没有家具需要购买。他们的少量消费品就是动物皮毛和群体成员自制的个人装饰品。由于几乎没有什么可以购买,所以积累任何可能被视为货币的东西都没有太大的激励。在这种情况下,狩猎采集者的储蓄可能只是一个基本概念。

With no reason to earn and almost no division of labor, the concept of hard work as a virtue must have been foreign to hunting-and-gathering groups. Except during periods of unusual hardship, when protracted effort was required to find something to eat, little work was done because little was needed. There was literally nothing to be gained by working beyond the bare minimum required for survival. For the members of the typical hunting-and-gathering band, that meant working only about eight to fifteen hours a week. Because a hunter's labor did not augment the food supply but could only reduce it, one who heroically labored overtime to kill more animals or pick more fruit than could be eaten before it spoiled contributed nothing to prosperity. To the contrary, overkill reduced the prospects of finding food in the future, and thus had a detrimental impact on the wellbeing of the group. That is why some foragers, such as Eskimos, punished or ostracized members of the band who engaged in overkill. 没有赚钱的理由,且几乎没有劳动分工,将勤劳视为美德的概念对于狩猎

采集群体来说可能是陌生的。除了在需要长期努力寻找食物的特殊困难时期外,很少有人工作,因为需求很少。除了维持生存所需的最低限度,再多的工作就没有任何收益。对于典型的狩猎采集部落成员而言,每周工作只有八到十五个小时。因为猎人的劳动不会增加食物供应,只会减少它,所以那些为了杀死更多动物或采摘更多水果而加班工作的人,并没有给群体带来任何繁荣。相反,过度捕猎会减少将来找到食物的希望,从而对群体福祉产生不利影响。这就是为什么一些采集民族,如爱斯基摩人,会惩罚或排斥那些过度捕猎的成员。

The example of the Eskimos punishing overkill is particularly telling, because they, far more than others, might well have been able to store meat by freezing it.

例如埃斯基摩人惩治过度猎杀,这尤其有说服力,因为他们比其他任何人都更可能通过冷冻方式储存肉类。

Further, it would have been feasible to provide at least some storage for oils rendered from large marine animals. The fact that foragers generally chose not to do so reflects their far more passive interactions with nature. It may also indicate the degree to which cognition and mental processes are biased by culture. Constraints on learning and behavior in complex environments make adoption of some strategies far more difficult than would otherwise appear. As R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong have written, "Because niches differ in many respects, so, too, do biases in learning."

此外,为大型海洋动物提供部分储存油脂是可行的。采集者通常选择不这样做反映了他们与自然的更被动的互动。这也可能表明,认知和心理过程在多大程度上受到文化的偏见影响。在复杂环境中的学习和行为受限,使得某些策略的采用比其他情况下更加困难。正如 R. Paul Shaw 和 Yuwa Wong 所写的:"因为生态位在许多方面都有所不同,所以学习的偏见也有所不同。"

Seen in this perspective, the advent of agriculture entailed more than a change in diet; it also launched a great revolution in the organization of economic life and culture as well as a transformation of the logic of violence. Farming created large-scale capital assets in land and sometimes in irrigation systems. The crops and domesticated animals farmers raised

were valuable assets. They could be stored, hoarded, and stolen. Because crops had to be tended over the entire growing season, from planting through harvest, 47

从这个角度来看,农业的出现不仅仅意味着饮食的改变,还引发了经济生活和文化组织方式的巨大革命,以及暴力逻辑的转变。农业创造了大规模的土地和灌溉系统等资本资产。农民种植的作物和饲养的家畜都是有价值的资产,可以被储存、囤积和盗窃。由于作物需要从播种到收获整个生长季节都要照料,因此

migration away from threats became less attractive, especially in arid regions where opportunities to grow crops were confined to the small areas of the land with dependable water supplies. As escape became more difficult, opportunities for organized shakedowns and plunder increased. Farmers were subject to raids at harvest time, which gradually raised the scale of warfare.

远离威胁的迁徙变得不太有吸引力,特别是在干旱地区,适合种植作物的地方仅限于有可靠水源的小区域。随着逃逸变得更加困难,有组织的敲诈和抢劫的机会增加了。农民在收获季节遭受袭击,逐步升高了战争规模。

This tended to increase the size of societies because contests of violence more often than not were won by the larger group. As competition over land and control of its output became more intense, societies became more stationary. A division of labor became more apparent. Employment and slavery arose for the first time. Farmers and herders specialized in producing food. Potters produced containers in which food was stored. Priests prayed for rain and bountiful harvests.

这往往会增加社会的规模,因为暴力的竞争通常都由人数较多的群体获胜。随着对土地和产出的控制竞争变得更加激烈,社会变得更加固定。分工变得更加明显。雇佣和奴隶制首次出现。农民和牧民专门从事食品生产。陶工生产用于储存食物的容器。祭司祈祷雨水和丰收。

Specialists in violence, the forefathers of government, increasingly devoted themselves to plunder and protection from plunder. Along with the priests, they became the first wealthy persons in history. In the early stages of agricultural societies, these warriors came to control a portion of the annual

crop as a price of protection. In places where threats were minimal, yeoman farmers were sometimes able to retain a relatively large degree of autonomy. But as population densities rose, and competition over food intensified, especially in regions around deserts where productive land was at a premium, the warrior group could take a large fraction of total output. These warriors founded the first states with the proceeds of this rake-off, which reached as high as 25 percent of the grain crop and one-half the increase in herds of domesticated animals. Farming, therefore, dramatically increased the importance of coercion. The surge in resources capable of being plundered led to a large surge in plunder.

暴力专家，政府的始祖，越来越专注于掠夺和免受掠夺的保护。与神职人员一起，他们成为历史上第一批富有的人。在农业社会的早期阶段，这些战士开始控制一部分年度作物作为保护的代价。在威胁最小的地方，自立农民有时能保持相当大程度的自主权。但随着人口密度的上升，食物竞争加剧，特别是在沙漠周围生产性土地丰富的地区，武士团就可以占据总产量的很大一部分。这些武士建立了第一个国家，从这种剥削中获得收益，其比例高达粮食作物的 25% 和家养动物数量增加的一半。因此，农业大大增加了强制力的重要性。可被掠夺的资源的激增导致了大规模的掠夺行为。

It took millennia for the full logic of the Agricultural Revolution to play itself out.

农业革命的全部逻辑花费了数千年才完全实现。

For a long while, sparse populations of farmers in temperate regions may have lived much as their foraging forebears had done. Where land and rainfall were ample, farmers harvested crops on a small scale without much violent interference. But as populations rose over a period of several thousand years, farmers even in thinly settled regions became subject to erratic plunder that sometimes must have left them with insufficient seed to replant the next year's crop. Competitive plundering, or anarchy, was a possibility at one extreme, as well as unprotected communities living without any specialized organization to monopolize violence.

在很长一段时间里，温带地区稀疏的农民人口可能过着与他们的采集祖先非常相似的生活方式。在土地和降雨充足的地方，农民以小规模的方式收获农作物，很少受到严重的干扰。但随着几千年来人口的不断上升，

即使在人口稀疏的地区,农民也可能遭受到不确定的掠夺,有时甚至连第二年种植所需的种子都无法保留。极端情况下,恶性竞争性掠夺或无政府状态是可能发生的,而没有任何专门的组织来垄断暴力的社区也是如此。

As time passed, the logic of violence inherent in agriculture imposed itself over an ever-wider terrain. The regions where farming and herding could continue without the predations of government receded to a few truly remote areas. The Kafir regions of Afghanistan, to cite an extreme example, resisted the imposition of government until the last decade of the nineteenth century. But in so doing, they were transformed centuries earlier into a quite militant society, organized along kinship lines. Such arrangements were not capable of mustering force on a large scale. Until the British brought modern weapons to the region, the Kafirs remained independent in their remote Bashgal and Waigal valleys because their redoubts were protected by features topography, high mountains, and deserts that stood between them and conquerors from the outside.²

随着时间的推移,农业内在的暴力逻辑占据了越来越广阔的地域。可以在没有政府掠夺的情况下继续农牧的地区已经缩小到了少数真正偏远的地区。以阿富汗的卡菲尔地区为极端例子,直到 19 世纪最后一个十年,它们才屈服于政府的统治。但这样做的结果是,他们在几个世纪前就已经转变成了一个相当好战的社会,沿血缘关系组织。这种安排无法动员大规模的力量。直到英国人将现代武器引入该地区,卡菲尔人才保持在巴什格尔和瓦伊格尔山谷的独立地位,因为他们的据点受到山高谷深、沙漠的地理特征的保护,远离外来征服者。

Over time, the basic logic of the Agricultural Revolution impressed itself on the societies where farming took hold. Farming sharply raised the scope at which human 48
生产力得以提高。

communities could form. Beginning about ten thousand years ago, cities began to emerge. Although tiny by today's standards, they were the centers of the first 'civilizations,' a word derived from civit which means "citizenship" or "inhabitants of a city" in Latin. Because farming created assets to plunder and to protect, it also created a requirem for inventory

accounting. You cannot tax unless you can compile records and issue receipts. The symbols employed in the accountant's ledger became the rudiments of written language, an innovation that had never existed among hunters and gatherers.

大约从一万年开始,城市开始出现。尽管与如今的标准相比非常微小,但它们是第一个"文明"的中心,这个词源于拉丁语中的"公民"或"城市居民"的意思。因为农业创造了可掠夺和保护的资产,它也创造了对库存核算的需求。除非你能编制记录并发出收据,否则你无法征税。会计账本中使用的符号成为了书面语言的基础,这是狩猎采集者从未拥有过的创新。

Farming also extended the horizon over which humans had to solve problems.

农业也扩大了人类需要解决问题的范围。

Hunting bands lived within an immediate time horizon. They seldom undertook projects that lasted more than a few days. But planting and harvesting a crop took months.

狩猎部落生活在即时时间范围内。他们很少从事持续时间超过几天的项目。但种植和收获作物需要数月时间。

Pursuing projects of a longer time frame farmers to train their attentions on the stars.

农民要将注意力集中在长期项目上。

Detailed astronomical observations were a precondition for drawing up almanacs and calendars to serve as guides on when to best plant and reap. With the advent of farming, hunters horizons expanded.

详细的天文观测是编制 almanacs 和日历的先决条件,以作为何时最佳种植和收获的指南。随着农业的出现,猎人的视野得到了扩展。

PROPERTY

财产

The move to a settled agricultural society resulted in the emergence private property. Obviously, no one would be content to toil through whole growing season to produce a crop just to see someone else war along and harvest what he produced. The idea of property emerged a' inevitable consequence of farming. But the clarity of private property concept was attenuated by the logic of violence that also accompanied introduction of farming. The emergence of property was confused by fact that the megapolitical power of individuals was no longer as equal had been in foraging societies, where every healthy adult male was a hunter as well armed as anyone else. Farming gave rise to specialization in violence. Precisely because it created something to steal, farming made investment in better weaponry profitable. The result was theft, much of it highly organized.

向定居农业社会的转变导致了私有财产的出现。显然,没有人愿意努力整个种植季节来生产一种作物,只为看到别人抢走他生产的东西。财产的概念是农业不可避免的结果。但是,财产权利的清晰性受到了伴随农业引入的暴力逻辑的削弱。财产的出现被那个事实所混淆,即个人的大政治力量不再像狩猎社会那样平等,在那里每个健康的成年男子都是一名猎人,拥有与其他人一样的武器。农业促进了暴力的专业化。正是因为它创造了可被盗取的东西,农业使得投资更好的武器变得有利可图。其结果就是盗窃,其中很多都是高度组织的。

The powerful were now able to organize a new form of predation: a monopoly of violence, or government. This sharply differentiated societies, creating quite different circumstances for those who benefited from plunder, and the mass of poor who tilled the fields. The few who controlled military power could now become rich, along with others who found favor with them. The god-kings and their allies, the various lesser, local potentates who ruled the first Near Eastern states, enjoyed much more nearly modern forms of property than the great mass who toiled beneath them.

掌权者现在能够组织一种新的掠夺形式:暴力垄断,也就是政府。这明显区分了社会,为那些从掠夺中获益的人以及为之耕种田地的贫穷群众创

造了完全不同的环境。那些掌控军事力量的少数人,连同那些获得他们青睐的其他人,现在都变得富有了。统治早期中东国家的神王和他们的盟友,即各种统治当地的小型势力,拥有的财产形式比广大底层劳动者要现代得多。

Of course, it is anachronistic to think of a distinction between private and public wealth in the early agricultural societies. The ruling god-king had the full resources of the state at his disposal in a way that could hardly be distinguished from ownership of a sprawling estate. Much as in the feudal period of European history, all property was subject to the overlordship of higher potentates. Those down the chain of hierarchy found their property subject to attenuation at the whim of the ruler.

当然,在早期农业社会中,将私人财富和公共财富划分是一种时代错位的思维方式。统治的神王掌握了国家的全部资源,这种掌控方式几乎无法与拥有一处规模宏大的领地区分。就像在欧洲封建时期,所有的财产都受制于更高层统治者的至高无上的所有权。社会等级链条上的下属发现,他们的财产随时都可能因统治者的意愿而受到削弱。

Yet to say that the potentate was not restrained by law does not mean that he could afford to seize anything he pleased. Costs and rewards impinged upon the freedom 49

君主并非完全不受法律约束,但并不意味着他可以妄为任意。成本和回报会影响到他的自由。

of the pharaoh as much as they do today upon the prime minister of Canada. And the pharaoh was much more constrained than contemporary leaders by the difficulties of transport and communication. Simply hauling loot from one spot to the next, especially when loot was measured mainly in the form of agricultural produce, involved a lot of loss from spoilage and theft. The proliferation of officials to check on one another reduced the loss due to pilfering but increased the total overhead costs the pharaoh had to bear.

与现代加拿大首相一样,古埃及法老也受到了严格的约束。法老比现代领导人更加受限于交通和通信的局限性。从一处到另一处运送战利品,特别是以农产品为主要形式的战利品,都会导致大量的损坏和盗窃。增

加的官员数量能够降低盗窃带来的损失,但同时也增加了法老需要承担的总开销。

Decentralized authority, which optimized output under some circumstances, also gave rise to stronger local powers who sometimes blossomed into full-fledged challengers for dynastic control. Even Oriental despots were by no means free to do as they pleased.

分散的权力,在某些情况下优化了产出,也给予了更强大的地方势力,有时它们会蓬勃发展成为挑战王朝控制的强大对手。即使是东方专制君主,也绝非可以为所欲为的自由之身。

They had no choice but to recognize the balance of raw power as they found it.

他们别无选择,只能承认他们所面临的原始力量的平衡。

Although everyone, including the rich, was subject to arbitrary expropriation, some were able to accumulate property of their own. Then as now, the state devoted much of its income to public works. Projects such irrigation systems, religious monuments, and crypts for the kings provided opportunities for architects and artisans to earn income. Some well-situated individuals were able to accumulate considerable private property. In fact, a large portion of the surviving cuneiform tablets from Sumer, an early Mesopotamian civilization, record various acts of trade, most of which involve the transfer of property titles.

尽管每个人,包括富人,都面临着任意充公的风险,但有些人还是能够积累自己的财产。从那时到现在,国家将大部分收入用于公共工程。灌溉系统、宗教纪念碑和国王的地宫等项目为建筑师和工匠提供了赚钱的机会。一些地位较高的个人能够积累相当多的私人财产。事实上,从苏美尔这一早期美索不达米亚文明留存下来的大量楔形文字泥板记录了各种贸易活动,其中大部分涉及财产所有权的转让。

There was private property in the early agricultural societies, but seldom at the bottom of the social pyramid. The overwhelming majority of the population were peasants who were too poor to accumulate much wealth. In fact, with a few exceptions, most peasants, up until modern times, were so poor that they stood in constant danger of perishing from starvation any

time that a drought or a flood or an infestation reduced crop yields. Hence the peasants were obliged to organize their affairs in a way that minimized the downside risks in bad years. Across the broad and impoverished stratum of society, a more primitive organization of property obtained. It increased the chance of survival at the expense of foreclosing the greater part of the opportunity to accumulate capital and rise in the economic system.

在早期的农业社会中存在私人财产,但很少位于社会金字塔的底层。绝大多数人口都是贫困的农民,无法积累太多财富。事实上,除了少数例外,直到现代时期,大多数农民都如此贫穷,以至于在干旱、洪灾或虫灾减产时随时面临饿死的危险。因此,农民被迫以一种最大程度减小在恶劣年景中风险的方式组织生活。在整个贫困阶层中,出现了一种更加原始的财产组织形式。这增加了生存机会,但同时也放弃了在经济体系中上升的绝大部分机会。

Peasant Insurance

农民保险

The form that this bargain took was the adoption of what anthropologists and social historians describe as the "closed village." Almost every peasant society in premodern times had, as its main form of economic organization, the "closed village."

这种交易形式表现为采用人类学家和社会历史学家所描述的"封闭型村庄"。在现代时期之前,几乎所有的农民社会都以"封闭型村庄"作为其主要的经济组织形式。

Unlike more modern forms of economic organization, in which individuals tend to deal with many buyers and sellers in an open market, the households of the closed village joined together to operate like an informal corporation, or a large family, not in an open marketplace but in a closed system where all the economic transactions of the village tended to be struck with a single monopolist-the local landlord, or his agents among the village chiefs. The village as a whole would contract with the landlord, usually for payment in kind, for a high proportion of the crop, rather than a fixed rent. The proportional rent meant that the landlord absorbed part of the downside risk of a bad harvest. Of course, the landlord also took the greater part of the potential profit.

与现代更加开放的经济组织形式不同,在封闭的村庄里,各家庭相互结合,就像一个非正式的公司或大家庭,而不是在开放的市场上交易,而是在一个封闭的系统中,所有的经济交易都倾向于与一个单一的垄断者——当地地主或他在村长中的代理人进行。整个村庄通常会与地主订约,以支付实物形式而不是固定租金,支付整个收成的很大比例。这种比例租金意味着地主吸收了部分糟糕收成的风险。当然,地主也获得了更大部分的潜在利润。

Landlords also typically provided seed.
房东通常也提供种子。

50

This convention also minimized the danger of starvation. It required that the landlord, rather than the peasant, save a disproportionate share of his part of the harvest.

这个公约还最小化了饥饿的危险。它要求地主而不是农民储存了他们收成的过多份额。

Because agricultural yields were appallingly low in many areas in the past, as many as two seeds had to be planted for every three harvested. Under such conditions, a bad harvest would mean mass starvation. The peasants rationally preferred an arrangement which would require the landlord to invest in their survival. At the cost of buying at monopolized prices, selling cheaply, and providing the landlord with in-kind labor, the peasants increased their chances of survival. A similar impulse led the typical peasant in a closed village economy to forgo the security of freehold property ownership. By putting themselves at the mercy of the village headman, a peasant family improved its chances of benefiting from the regular redistribution of fields. Not infrequently, the headman would take the best fields for himself and his favorites. But that was a risk that peasants had to tolerate in order to enjoy the survival insurance that confused village ownership of fields provided. At times when crop yields were miserably low, a difference in growing conditions of fields a hundred yards apart could make the difference between starvation and survival. Peasants frequently opted for the arrangement that lowered the downside risk, even

at the cost of forgoing any hope of increased prosperity.

由于过去许多地区农业产量惊人地低,每三次收获需要种植两次种子。在这种情况下,歉收意味着大规模饥荒。农民有理有据地偏好一种安排,即要求地主投资于他们的生存。通过以高价购买、低价出售和无偿为地主提供劳动力,农民增加了生存的可能性。类似的冲动促使典型的封闭村落经济中的农民放弃自由所有制的安全性。通过将自己置于村长的恩慈之下,农民家庭提高了从定期重新分配土地中获益的机会。村长并非不时将最好的土地占为己有,并赠予他的亲友。但这是农民不得不容忍的风险,以换取封闭村落土地所有制提供的生存保险。当作物产量惨淡低落时,相邻的 100 码土地之间的种植条件差异可能决定生死存亡。农民经常选择降低下行风险的安排,即使这意味着放弃任何增加繁荣的希望。

In general, risk-averse behavior has been common among all groups that operated along the margins of survival. The sheer challenge of survival in premodern societies always constrained the behavior of the poor. An interesting feature of this risk aversion, explored in *The Great Reckoning*, is that it reduced the range of peaceful economic behavior that individuals were socially permitted to adopt. Taboos and social constraints limited experimentation and innovative behavior, even at the obvious cost of forgoing potentially advantageous improvements in settled ways of doing things.³ This was a rational reflection of the fact that experimentation increases the variability of results.

在一般情况下,对风险规避行为在生存边缘运营的所有群体中都很常见。在前现代社会中,生存的巨大挑战总是限制着贫困者的行为。在《大清算》中探讨的这种风险规避的一个有趣特点是,它减少了个人在社会上被允许采取的和平经济行为的范围。禁忌和社会约束限制了实验和创新行为,即使这样做明显会放弃可能有利的改进已定下来的做事方式。这反映了一个事实,即实验会增加结果的变异性。

Greater variability means not only potentially greater gains but more ominously for those at the very margin of survival-potentially ruinous losses. A great part of the cultural energy of poor farming societies has always been devoted to suppressing experimentation. This repression, in effect, was their substitute for insurance policies. If they had insurance, or

sufficient savings to self-insure their experiments, such strong social taboos would not be needed to help ensure survival.

更大的可变性意味着不仅可能获得更大的收益,而且对于处于生存边缘的人来说,更具有毁灭性的损失。穷困的农业社会一直把大部分文化精力用于抑制实验。这种压制,实际上是他们的保险政策替代品。如果他们有保险,或有足够的储蓄自我保险他们的实验,就不需要如此严格的社会禁忌来帮助确保生存。

Cultures are not matters of taste but systems of adaptation to specific circumstances that may prove irrelevant or even counterproductive in other settings.

文化并非仅仅是品味问题,而是适应特定环境的系统,在其他环境中可能会显得无关或甚至适得其反。

Humans live in a wide variety of habitats. The wide number of potential niches in which we live require variations in behavior that are too complex to be informed by instinct.

人类生活在各种各样的栖息地中。我们生活的潜在分生境种类繁多,这需要复杂的行为变化,而不仅仅靠本能就能获得。

Therefore, behavior is culturally programmed. For the vast majority in many agricultural societies, culture programmed them for survival, but little more than survival in an environment where the luxury of participating in open markets was reserved to others.

因此,行为是由文化编程的。对于许多农业社会中的绝大多数人来说,文化让他们编程以求生存,但除此之外,在只有少数人享受参与开放市场的奢侈品的环境中,别无其他。

Personal ability and personal choice-individual "pursuit of happiness," in the modern sense-were suppressed by taboos and social restrictions that have always been most emphatic among the poor. Such restrictions were superseded only with great difficulty in societies with limited productivity. When and where agricultural productivity was higher, such as in ancient Greece, minor megapolitical revolutions 51

个人能力和个人选择-现代意义上的个人"追求幸福"-受到禁忌和社会限制的压制,这些限制在穷人群体中最为严格。只有在生产力有限的社会

中,才能很难超越这些限制。当且仅当农业生产力较高时,如在古希腊,才会出现一些次要的大政治革命。

occurred. Property took more modern forms. "Allod," or freehold property, emerged.

财产采取了更加现代的形式。"自由土地"(Allod)出现了。

Lands tended to rent for a fixed fee, and the tenant absorbed the economic risk as well as a higher portion of the profit if the crop was good. Higher savings allow self-insurance of riskier behavior. Under such conditions, yeoman farmers could rise above the rank of peasantry and sometimes even accumulate independent wealth.

土地租金通常固定,租户承担经济风险,并分享丰收的较高利润。较高的储蓄允许对更高风险行为进行自我保险。在这种情况下,小农可以超越农民的地位,有时甚至积累独立财富。

The tendency for more market-like property rights and relationships to develop near the top of an economic hierarchy or, in rarer cases, across the whole economy, as societies emerged from poverty, is an important characteristic of social organization. It is equally important to note that the most common organization of agricultural society historically has been essentially feudal, with market relations at the top and the closed village system at the bottom. The great mass of peasants were tied to the land in almost all premodern agricultural societies. So long as agricultural productivity remained low, or higher productivity was dependent upon access to centralized hydraulic systems, the freedom and property rights of individual farmers at the bottom remained minimal. In such conditions, feudal forms of property prevailed. Land was held by tenure rather than through freehold title. Typically, rights of sale, gift, and inheritance were restricted.

在一个经济体系的顶层或者在整个经济中,市场化的产权和关系会逐渐发展,这是社会从贫困中崛起的一个重要特征。同样值得注意的是,历史上农业社会最常见的组织形式是封建制,有着顶层的市场关系和底层的封闭式村庄体系。在大多数前现代农业社会中,绝大多数农民被束缚在土地上。只要农业生产率依然较低,或者需要依赖集中的水利系统来提高生产率,底层农民的自由和产权就会非常有限。在这样的条件下,封建

形式的财产权利将会占主导地位。土地不是自由所有,而是按照封建领主的意愿而占有。典型的,诸如出售、赠予和继承等权利都受到了限制。

Feudalism in its various forms was not only a response to ever-present risks of predatory violence. It also was a reaction to appallingly low rates of productivity. The two have tended to go hand in hand in farming societies. Each frequently contributed to the other. When public authority collapsed, property rights and prosperity tended to recede accordingly. Collapsing productivity also tended to undermine authority. While not every drought or adverse climatic change resulted in the breakdown of public authority, many did.

封建制度的各种形式不仅是针对无处不在的掠食性暴力的应对。它也是对生产率极低的反应。这两个在农业社会中往往是相辅相成的。它们经常相互促进。公共权威的崩溃,财产权和繁荣往往会相应地后退。生产率的下降也往往会削弱权威。虽然并非每次干旱或不利的气候变化都导致了公共权威的崩溃,但许多情况下确实如此。

THE FEUDAL REVOLUTION OF THE YEAR 1000

公元 1000 年的封建革命

Such was the case with the transformation of the year 1000, which launched the feudal revolution.¹⁴ At that time, megapolitical and economic conditions differed in important ways from those we have come to think of as characterizing the Middle Ages.

公元 1000 年的变革引发了封建革命。当时的大政治和经济状况在许多重要方面都与我们认为代表中世纪的特征有所不同。

In the first few centuries after the fall of Rome, the economy of Western Europe withered. The Germanic kingdoms that took root in the territories of the former Roman Empire had assumed many functions of the Roman state, but at a much less ambitious level. Infrastructure more or less went untended. As the centuries passed, bridges and aqueducts fell into disrepair and became unusable. Roman coinage was still employed, but it practically disappeared from circulation. Land markets, which had thrived in Roman times, more or less dried up. Towns, which had been centers of Roman

administration, virtually vanished along with the taxing power of the state. And so did almost every other accoutrement of civilization.

在罗马帝国衰落后的前几个世纪里,西欧经济衰落了。在原罗马帝国领土上崛起的日耳曼王国承担了许多罗马国家的职能,但规模要小得多。基础设施基本上被忽视了。随着世纪的流逝,桥梁和渠道陷入了衰败,不再可用。罗马铸币仍在使用,但实际上已从流通中消失。在罗马时代蓬勃发展的土地市场也基本上干涸了。作为罗马行政中心的城镇几乎消失,连同国家的税收能力也一起消失。几乎所有文明的外衣都消失了。

The "Dark Ages" were so named for a reason. Literacy became so rare that anyone who possessed the ability to read and write could expect immunity from prosecution for almost any crime, including murder. Artistic, scientific, and engineering skills that had been highly developed in Roman times disappeared. From road building to the grafting of vines and fruit trees, Western Europe ceased employing many techniques that had once been well known and practiced to a high standard. Even so 52

中古时期这一称谓正有所指。识字的人寥寥无几,只要会读写就几乎可以逃脱几乎任何犯罪的指控,包括谋杀在内。在罗马时期高度发展的艺术、科学和工程技能都消失殆尽。从修路到嫁接葡萄和果树,西欧都放弃了许多曾经众所周知并执行到高水平的技术。即便如此

ancient a device as the potter's wheel disappeared in many places. Mining operations contracted. Metallurgy receded. Irrigation works in the Mediterranean region disintegrated through neglect.' 15 As historian Georges Duby observed, "At the end of the sixth century, Europe was a profoundly uncivilized place." 16 Although there was a brief renaissance of central authority under the rule of Charlemagne around the year 800, everything soon devolved again after his death.

古老的像陶器轮这样的设备在许多地方消失了。采矿业萎缩。冶金业后退。地中海地区的灌溉工程由于疏于维护而崩溃。"正如历史学家乔治·杜比所观察到的,"到第六世纪末,欧洲是一个深度未开化的地方。"虽然在 800 年左右查理曼统治期间曾出现中央权威的短暂复兴,但在他去世后一切都很快再次陷入了混乱。

A surprising corollary to this dreary landscape was the fact that the collapse of the Roman state probably raised the living standards of small farmers for

several centuries.

这片阴郁景象的一个令人惊讶的推论是,罗马国家的崩溃可能让小农民的生活水平在几个世纪内有所提高。

The Germanic kingdoms that dominated Western Europe during the Dark Ages incorporated some of the relatively easygoing social features common to their ancestral tribes, such as the legal equality of freeholders. As a consequence, small farmers in the Dark Ages were far freer than they were to be in the feudal centuries. By that we can also infer that they were more prosperous. As we analyzed above in exploring the logic of property forms under different conditions of productivity, freehold property has historically gone hand in hand with the relative prosperity of small farmers. The closed-village and feudal forms of property tended to emerge where the capacity of small farmers to make a living was more doubtful.

日耳曼王国在中世纪主导了西欧,其社会特征保留了先祖部落的一些相对宽松的特点,比如自由农民的法律平等。因此,中世纪的小农要比封建时代的自由更大。这也可以推断出,他们的生活更加繁荣。如我们前面分析的,在不同生产条件下,自由产权与小农相对繁荣是并驾齐驱的。而村落闭塞、封建形式的产权倾向于出现在小农维持生计更加存疑的地方。

To be sure, the virtual collapse of commerce during the Dark Ages cost small farmers the benefits of trade and advantages of wider markets. The demise of the towns undermined the cash economy, but it also meant the rural population was no longer called upon to support the crushing burden of bureaucracy. As Guy Bois has written, the Roman town was a parasitic community, not a center of production: "In the Roman period, the dominant function of a city was of a political order. It lived primarily from the revenues draining into it from its surroundings by the agency of the land tax.... The town, in effect, produced little or nothing for the benefit of the surrounding countryside."

在昏暗时代,商业几乎崩溃,小农失去了贸易带来的利益和更大市场的优势。城镇的衰落也摧毁了货币经济,但也意味着农村人口无需再支撑繁重的官僚负担。正如 Guy Bois 所写,罗马城市是一个寄生型社区,而非生产中心:"在罗马时期,城市的主导功能是政治性的。它主要依靠从周

边地区流入的地税收入维持生计.....城市实际上对周围乡村几乎没有任何产出。"

17 The collapse of Roman authority largely freed farmers in the countryside from taxes, which had sucked away "between one quarter to one third of the gross product of the land, without counting the various exactions suffered by small and middling landowners."

罗马政权的崩溃使乡村农民从缴纳税赋中解放出来,这些税收曾"吞噬了土地总产值的四分之一到三分之一,不包括小户和中等农场主承受的各种额外索取。"

18 The taxes were so onerous, sometimes enforced by execution, that desertion of property by owners was widespread. The barbarians mercifully allowed these taxes to lapse.

税赋如此沉重,有时甚至以处决的方式实施,以致财产所有者大量逃离。野蛮人慈悲地让这些税赋免除。

Agri Deserti 农业沙漠

The burdens of government were so greatly reduced by the barbarian conquests that an opening was created for the poor to obtain freehold property and keep it. Some of the agri deserti, or deserted farms abandoned by owners fleeing predatory taxation in the final years of the Roman Empire, were brought back into production. Notwithstanding the rude circumstances of the time and the fact that crop yields were ridiculously low by modern standards, the Dark Ages were a period of relative prosperity for Europe's smallholders. In fact, they were in a stronger position than they would be again until the modern era. For one thing, fewer hands were available to till the fertile land, large tracts of which had gone out of cultivation. Plagues, wars, and abandonment by owners 53

政府的负担由于野蛮征服而大大减轻,为贫困人民获得自有财产和保留下来创造了机会。一些被所有者抛弃的荒芜农场,是因在罗马帝国末年逃避掠夺性赋税,后来又重新投入生产。尽管当时环境粗糙,而且农作物的收成远低于现代标准,但黑暗时代对于欧洲小农而言,却是一个相对繁荣的时期。事实上,他们的地位要强于直到现代才恢复的水平。原因之

一是可以耕种肥沃土地的劳动力减少,大片土地已不再种植。瘟疫、战争和土地所有者的弃地造成这种情况。

escaping the collapsing Roman Empire had significantly depopulated areas previously under cultivation. Another advantage enjoyed by small farmers in the Dark Ages arose from the adoption in the sixth century of new farming technology: the heavy plow, often mounted on wheels. Used in tandem with an improved harness that allowed peasants to employ multiple oxen, the new technology made it much easier to clear forested land in Northern Europe.' 19

逃离崩溃的罗马帝国显著减少了之前处于耕种之下的地区。在黑暗时代,小农场主还从 6 世纪采用新的农业技术中获益:重型犁,通常安装在轮子上。与改良后的马具一起使用,允许农民雇佣多头牛,这项新技术使在北欧清理林地变得容易得多。

Under such conditions, the market for land contracted almost to the vanishing point. New land for farming could be had merely by clearing it and sharing part of each new parcel with the appropriate local authorities. This process, known as assarting, gave a comfortable outlet for population growth for centuries after Rome fell. Assarting became particularly attractive in thinly populated northern regions after warmer temperatures in the eighth century made farming more productive.

在这种情况下,土地市场几乎完全萎缩。新的农业用地只需要通过开垦并与当地相关部门分享每个新地块的一部分即可获得。这种被称为"扩张"的过程,在罗马陷落后的几个世纪里为人口增长提供了舒适的出口。在八世纪温度升高使农业更加高产之后,这种扩张在人口稀疏的北方地区变得特别有吸引力。

The leaders of the Germanic tribes who conquered former Roman territories had established themselves as large landholders. Most of the rest of the population farmed small plots-but under conditions very different from those that came later under feudalism. Wealthier landowners, or masters represented about 7-10 percent of the population. It appears that before the year 1000, two-thirds of the villagers in a typical area of France were freehold landowners.²¹ They owned about half of all the land in cultivation.² There were few serfs. Coloni, or tenant farmers, amounted to

no more than 5 percent of the population. Slavery persisted, but on a much smaller scale than in Roman times.

日耳曼部落的领导人占领了前罗马领土,已经建立了自己作为大地主的地位。大多数其余人口在小块土地上种植-但条件与后来的封建制下截然不同。较富裕的地主或主人约占总人口的 7-10%。在公元 1000 年之前,法国典型地区的村民有三分之二是自有土地的地主。他们拥有一半以上的耕地面积。农奴很少。租佃农户约占人口的 5%以下。奴隶制仍然存在,但规模远远小于罗马时期。

The Germanic successor kingdoms to Rome were defended militarily by all free men who assembled to bear arms on the call of the king's local representative, the count.

罗马帝国日耳曼语系的继任王国由所有自由男子军事防卫,他们在国王当地代表伯爵的呼召下集合起来携带武器。

Even "small and middling proprietors" were expected to club together and send one of their number to fight with the infantry. 22 In the Edict of Pitres, Charles the Bald ordered all those who could afford to do so to muster for battle on horseback. Pope Gregory II; had attempted to advance this military imperative a century earlier by banning the human consumption of horsemeat in 732. 23 But there was as yet little distinction in status or law between the infantry of freeholders and the cavalry. All free men participated in local judicial assemblies and could petition for dispute settlement to the count, an office that had existed since late Roman times. There was no nobility as such.

即使"小型和中型所有者"也被期望聚在一起并派遣其中一人与步兵作战。22 在皮特雷斯法令中,秃鹫查理命令所有有能力的人都要乘马出战。教皇格列高利二世曾在 732 年试图推进这一军事要求,禁止人类食用马肉。23 但是,自由持有者的步兵和骑兵之间还没有太大的地位或法律上的区别。所有自由男子都参与当地的司法议会,并可以向伯爵申请解决纠纷,这个职位自罗马晚期就一直存在。没有所谓的贵族阶层。

" A social phenomenon, new as a mass phenomenon, suddenly appeared on the horizons in the 980s: downward social mobility. Its first victims were the small allod-holders." 24 Guy Bois As the Dark Ages wore on, however, several things happened to destabilize the relationships that had preserved

the independence of the yeoman farmers and freeholders in the Germanic kingdoms that inherited power after Rome's fall: 1.

社会现象,作为大众现象突然出现在 1980 年代的地平线上:向下的社会流动性。它的第一个受害者是小自耕农。随着黑暗时代的延续,几件事情发生了,destabilized 了在日耳曼王国中自耕农和自由持有人的独立性,这些王国在罗马帝国崩溃后继承了权力:1.

Populations gradually recovered, placing greater pressures on the use of land.

人口逐渐恢复,对土地的使用施加了更大压力。

Over several centuries, much of the most fertile of the unclaimed land was brought into production, particularly growth in Northern Europe. The increasing population of farmers relative to the supply of land made the labor of each farmer worth less. Most freehold titles were broken into ever smaller plots through inheritance. During the Dark Ages, children tended to share equally in the estates of their parents. The fragmentation 54

数个世纪以来,很大一部分最肥沃的未开发土地被纳入生产,特别是在北欧地区。相对于土地供应,农民人口的不断增加使得每个农民的劳动价值越来越低。大多数自有产权的土地通过遗产分割变得越来越小。在黑暗时代,子女倾向于平等地分享父母的遗产。这种碎片化

of holdings at a time of rising population tended to place land at a premium once again and led to the reemergence of active land markets by the mid-tenth century.

在人口不断增长的时期,土地越发显得珍贵,到 10 世纪中叶,活跃的土地市场再次出现。

2.

In the final decades of the tenth century, temperatures suddenly turned colder, with a devastating impact on farm output. Three successive crop failures led to severe famine from 982 to 984. Famine struck again after another crop failure in 994-95. Then, in 997, the problem of falling crop yields was compounded by a plague, which struck small family holdings with particular force because the smallholders lacked the resources to

replace labor supplied by lost family members. These clustered crop failures and disasters at first led the yeoman farmers to sink into debt. When yields failed to recover they could not pay their mortgages.

在十世纪末的最后几十年,温度突然变冷,对农业产出造成了毁灭性的影响。从 982 年到 984 年,连续三次作物歉收导致严重的饥荒。在 994-995 年又出现了另一次作物歉收,造成了新一轮的饥荒。然后在 997 年,作物收成持续下降的问题被一场瘟疫所加剧,这种瘟疫特别严重地袭击了小型家庭农场,因为这些小农缺乏资源来替代失去的家庭成员的劳动力。这些集中的作物歉收和灾难首先导致自耕农陷入债务。当收成未能恢复时,他们无法偿还抵押贷款。

3.

Power relations were progressively destabilized by the growing importance of heavy cavalry. Medieval historian Frances Gies describes the transformation of the armored cavalryman into the medieval knight:

力量关系由重型骑兵的日益重要性而逐步不稳定。中世纪历史学家弗兰西斯·吉斯描述了装甲骑兵向中世纪骑士的转变。

Originally a personality of mediocre status raised above the peasant by his expensive horse and armor, the knight slowly improved his position in society until he became part of the nobility. Although knights remained the lowest rank of the upper class, knighthood acquired a unique cachet that made knighting an honor prized by the great nobility and even royalty. The cachet was primarily the product of the Church's policy of Christianizing knighthood by sanctifying the ceremony of knighting and by sponsoring a code of behavior known as chivalry, a code perhaps violated more often than honored, but exercising incontestable influence on the thought and conduct of posterity. 26

原本一个地位平庸的人被他昂贵的马匹和盔甲提升到农民之上,骑士慢慢提高了在社会中的地位,最终成为贵族的一部分。虽然骑士仍然是上层阶级中地位最低的,但骑士身份获得了独特的地位,成为大贵族甚至王室所珍视的荣誉。这种地位主要是由于教会使骑士精神基督化的政策,通过神圣化骑士授勋仪式,并推崇一种被称为骑士精神的行为准则,这些

准则可能更多地被违反而非被遵守,但对后人的思想和行为产生了无可争议的影响。

As we recounted in *The Great Reckoning*, the invention of the stirrup gave the armed knight on horseback a formidable assault capability. He could now attack at full speed and not be thrown from the saddle by the impact of his lance striking a target. The military value of the heavy cavalry was further enhanced by an Asian invention that penetrated through Western Europe in the tenth century; the nailed iron horseshoe. This further improved the durability of the horse on the road.²⁷ Also adding to the improved effectiveness of the armed knight were the contoured saddle, which made it easier to wield heavy weapons, the spur, and the curb bit, which enabled a rider to control the horse with one hand while fighting. ²⁸ Together, these apparently minor technological innovations dramatically devalued the military importance of the smallholders, who could not afford to maintain warhorses and arm themselves. The cheaper of the horses specially bred for war, the large chargers known as destriers, were worth four oxen or forty sheep. The more expensive warhorses cost ten oxen or one hundred sheep. Armor also cost a sum that no small holder could afford, equivalent to the price of sixty sheep.²⁹

我们在《大清算》中阐述的那样,马镫的发明赋予了骑马的武装骑士强大的攻击能力。他们现在可以以全速攻击,且不会因长矛撞击目标而从马鞍上被掀下。在十世纪进入西欧的一种来自亚洲的发明--钉制马蹄铁,进一步增强了军用重骑兵的有效性。这也进一步提高了马匹在路面上的耐用性。²⁷ 同时,成型马鞍、马刺和马嚼子的使用,让武装骑士能单手驾驭马匹同时使用重武器。²⁸ 这些看似微不足道的技术创新,大大降低了小户农民的军事重要性,因为他们无法负担得起战马及武器装备。专门为战争培育的大型战马"德斯特尔"马,价格相当于四头牛或四十只羊。更高档的战马则需要十头牛或一百只羊的价格。而铠甲的价格也相当于六十只羊的代价,小户农民难以负担。²⁹

4.

The fact that the colder weather, crop failures, famines, and plagues occurred during the run-up to the year 1000 also played a role in informing behavior. Many people were convinced that the end of the world or the

Second Coming was at hand. Devout or frightened landowners, large and small, gave their land to the Church in preparation for apocalypse.

寒冷天气、作物歉收、饥荒和瘟疫在 1000 年前夕不断发生,这些事实也在很大程度上影响了人们的行为。许多人都坚信世界末日或第二次降临即将到来。虔诚或恐惧的大小土地所有者纷纷将土地赠予教会,为末日审判做准备。

55

"Only a Poor Man Sells Land"

只有穷人才会卖土地

The unsettled conditions of the late tenth century paved the way for the feudal revolution. Clustered crop failures and disasters led the yeoman farmers to sink into debt.

晚期十世纪动荡不安的状况为封建革命铺平了道路。集中的农作物失收和灾难导致农民庄户陷入债务。

When crop yields failed to recover, the freeholders faced a desperate situation. Markets always place the greatest pressures on the weakest holders. Indeed, that is part of their virtue. They promote efficiency by removing assets from weak hands. But in late-tenth-century Europe, subsistence farming was practically the only occupation. Families who lost their land lost their only means of survival. Faced with this unpalatable prospect, many or most of the freehold farmers decided to give away their fields during the feudal revolution. In the words of Guy Bois, "The only sure way for a peasant to hold on to the land he tilled was to concede ownership of it to the Church, so he could retain its usufruct." 30 Others ceded some or all of their land to wealthier farmers in whom they had confidence, either friendly neighbors or relatives.

当作物收成未能恢复时,自由农民面临着绝望的处境。市场总是给最弱势的持有者带来最大的压力。事实上,这就是它们的一部分美德。它们通过将资产从手中移除来促进效率。但在 10 世纪末的欧洲,自给自足的农耕几乎是唯一的职业。失去土地的家庭也失去了生存的唯一手段。面对这个不可接受的前景,许多或大多数自由农民决定在封建革命期间放弃他们的田地。用 Guy Bois 的话说,"农民保住自己耕种的土地

的唯一可靠办法,就是将其所有权让渡给教会,这样他就可以保留其使用权。"另有一些人将部分或全部土地让给他们信任的富裕农民,无论是友好的邻居还是亲属。

These property transfers were made on the condition that the farmer, his family, and his descendants were to remain to work the fields. The poor farmers were also to enjoy the reciprocal support of the more substantial holders, now the "nobles" who were able to afford horse and armor, and thus provide protection to the enlarged estates. Such a bargain can be seen from the new serf's point of view as a halfway station between continuing economic ownership and foreclosure. More often than not, it was a bargain he could not refuse.

这些财产转让是以农民、他的家人和后裔继续在田地上工作的条件为前提的。贫穷的农民也得到更富裕的所有者(现在称为"贵族")的互惠性支持,因为他们能负担得起马匹和盔甲,从而为扩大的庄园提供保护。从新农奴的角度来看,这种交易可以被视为介于继续经济所有权和抵押之间的中间状态。通常情况下,这是一种他无法拒绝的交易。

Falling productivity not only placed poor farmers in a desperate economic dilemma; it also instigated an upsurge in predatory violence that undermined the security of property. Those without the resources to wrest a share of the available and inadequate supply of horses and fodder suddenly found that they and their property were no longer safe. To put their dilemma in contemporary terms, it was as if you were forced to arm yourself today with a new type of weapon, but the cost of doing so was \$100,000. If you could not pay that price, you would be at the mercy of those who could.

生产率下降不仅使贫穷的农民陷入绝境,还引发了肆虐的暴力事件,严重损害了财产安全。那些没有足够资源获得有限的马匹和饲料的人,发现自己和财产都不再安全。用当代的话说,就好比被迫购买一种新型武器,但价格高达 10 万美元。如果你无法承担这笔费用,你就会处于那些能支付得起的人的控制之下。

Within a few years, the capacity of the king and the courts to enforce order collapsed. 31 Anyone with armor and a horse could now become a law unto himself.

在几年内,国王和法院执法能力崩溃。 任何人只要有盔甲和马匹,现在就可以变成自己的法律。

The result was a late-tenth-century version of Blade Runner, a melee of fighting and plunder that the constituted authorities were powerless to stop. Looting and attacks by armed knights disrupted the countryside. It is by no means obvious, however, that all the victims of this pillage were the poor. To the contrary, the elderly, physically weaker, or ill-prepared among the larger landholders made more attractive targets. They had more to steal. 这是一部公元 10 世纪末期的《银翼杀手》版本,一场混乱的打斗和掠夺,构成权力的当局无法阻止。武装骑士的抢劫和袭击扰乱了乡村。但并非所有被掠夺的受害者都是穷人。相反,那些更大土地所有者中年老、体弱或准备不足的人更引人注目。因为他们有更多可被偷走的东西。

It was not a coincidence that this happened at the very moment when colder weather, famine, and plague were placing a pinch on resources. The megapolitical conditions conducive to the breakdown of authority had been in place for some time.

这并非巧合,这发生在天气转冷、饥荒和瘟疫压缩资源的关键时刻。导致权威机构崩溃的大政治条件早已存在。

Their potential for altering the power relations in society was not realized, however, until a crisis was triggered. Crop failures and famines appear to have done just that. While the exact sequence of events is difficult to reconstruct, it appears that the looting was instigated, at least in part, by desperate conditions. Once the violence was unleashed, it became evident that no one could mobilize the force to stop it. The vast majority of 56 农作物失收和饥荒似乎就是导致这一切的原因。虽然确切的事件顺序很难重建,但起码部分的抢劫行为是由绝境引发的。一旦暴力爆发,就很明显没有人能够调动足够的力量来制止它。大多数人

poorly armed farmers certainly could do little. Even dozens of farmers on foot would have been outmatched by a single armed knight on horseback. The freehold farmers, like the constituted authorities, the kings with their counts, were powerless to prevent local land from being seized by armed

warriors.

即使数十名徒步的农民,也无法与配备武器的骑士一战。自耕农民和统治当局,包括拥有封臣的国王,都无力阻止武装战士占据当地土地。

"The Peace of God" 神的和平

In these desperate conditions, the Church helped to launch feudalism through its efforts to negotiate a truce in the violent countryside. Historian Guy Bois described the situation this way: "The impotence of the political authorities was such that the Church stood in for them in the attempt to restore order, in the movement known as 'The Peace of God.' 'Councils of Peace' proclaimed series of interdictions which were sanctioned by anathemas; vast 'assemblies of peace' received the oaths of the warriors. The movement originated in the French Midi (Council of Charroux in 989, Council of Narbonne in 990), then gradually spread..." 32

在这种绝望的条件下,教会通过努力协商乡村的暴力停火而助长了封建主义。历史学家盖伊·布瓦斯如此描述了这种情况:"政治当局的无能如此严重,以至于教会代替它们试图恢复秩序,这就是所谓的'上帝之和'运动。'和平委员会'宣布了一系列禁令,并得到了诅咒的支持;广大的'和平集会'接受了战士们的誓言。这个运动起源于法国的密迪地区(989年夏尔鲁会议,990年纳尔本会议),然后逐步传播开来。"

The bargain that the Church struck involved acknowledgment of the overlordship of armed knights in local communities in exchange for a cessation or tempering of the violence and looting. Land titles inscribed after the surge of violence in the late tenth century suddenly bore the title "nobilis" or "miles" as an indication of lordship. The nobility as a separate estate was created by the feudal revolution. Property transactions recorded to the same individuals only a few years earlier had listed no such distinction.³³

教会与武装骑士所达成的交易涉及承认当地社区武装骑士的主导权,以换取暴力和抢劫的停止或缓和。10世纪末暴力高涨后记录的土地所有权突然出现了"贵族"或"骑士"的头衔,以示统治地位。封建革命创造了作为一个独立阶层的贵族。同一人几年前记录的财产交易并未列出任何此类区分。

Given falling productivity and the economic insecurity of the smallholders, the megapolitical power of the armed knights led inevitably to property holdings by feudal tenure. By the end of the first quarter of the eleventh century, yeoman farmers had largely disappeared. Their freeholdings had shrunk to a fraction of their previous extent and were now being worked just part-time. The small farmers or their descendants were serfs who spent most of their time laboring on the estates of feudal lords, lay and ecclesiastical.

鉴于生产率下降和小农经济不安全,武装骑士的大政治权力不可避免地导致了封建制度下的不动产持有。到 11 世纪第一个四分之一结束时,自由农民已基本消失。他们的自由农场已缩小到其先前规模的一小部分,仅作为兼职经营。小农或其后代成为农奴,大部分时间在世俗和教士领主的庄园里劳作。

The breakdown of order that accompanied the feudal revolution led to adjustments in behavior which reinforced feudalism. Among them was a surge in castle building. Castles had first appeared in northwest Europe as primitive wooden structures in the wake of Viking raids in the ninth century. Originally command centers for Carolingian officials, they became hereditary possessions after the feudal revolution.

封建革命伴随的秩序崩溃导致了行为方式的调整,强化了封建主义。其中包括城堡建设的激增。城堡最初在 9 世纪维京人入侵后,作为原始的木质结构在西北欧出现。最初它们是查理曼朝代官员的指挥中心,但在封建革命后,它们成为了世袭的财产。

These early redoubts were far more primitive than they would later become, but they were nonetheless difficult to attack. Once erected, castles were razed only with the greatest effort. As they began to dot the countryside, the castles made it ever more implausible that the king or his counts could effectively challenge the local supremacy of the lords.

这些早期的重垒比之后的要原始得多,但它们仍然很难攻打。一旦建立起来,城堡只能通过巨大的努力才能被摧毁。当城堡开始点缀乡间,它们也使国王或伯爵有效挑战地方领主至高无上的地位变得愈加不可能。

Contributions of the Church to Productivity

教会对生产率的贡献

Feudalism was the response of agricultural society to the collapse of order at a time of low productivity. During the early stages of feudalism, the Church played an important and economically productive role. Among the Church's contributions: 1.

封建主义是农业社会在生产力低下时应对秩序崩溃的方式。在封建主义的早期阶段,教会发挥了重要和经济高效的作用。教会的贡献包括:1.

In an environment where military power was decentralized, the Church was uniquely placed to maintain peace and develop rules of order that transcended fragmented, local sovereignties. This is a job that no secular power was positioned to do.

在军事权力分散的环境中,教会独特地处于维持和平及制定超越破碎的地方主权的规则的位置。这是任何世俗权力都无法担当的工作。

The observations of the great religious authority A. R. Radcliffe-Brown are directly relevant here. He pointed out that "the social function of a religion is independent of its truth or falsity." Even those that are "absurd and repulsive, such as those of some savage tribes, may be important and effective parts of the social machinery."³⁴ This was certainly the case with the Church in the early stages of feudalism. It helped create rules, as only a religion could, that enabled people to overcome incentive traps and behavioral dilemmas. Some of these were moral dilemmas common to all human life. But others were local dilemmas, unique to the prevailing megapolitical conditions. The medieval Church had a special role to play in restoring order in the countryside in the final years of the tenth century. By providing religious and ceremonial support to local authorities, the Church lowered the costs of establishing at least weak local monopolies of violence. By helping to establish order in this way, the Church contributed to the conditions that ultimately led to more stable configurations of power. 伟大的宗教权威 A. R. 拉德克利夫-布朗的观察在这里直接相关。他指出,"一个宗教的社会功能是独立于它的真理或虚假的。"即使是"荒谬和令人反感的,如一些野蛮部落的那些,也可能是社会机器中重要而有效的一部分。"³⁴ 这确实是在封建主义初期教会的情况。它帮助创造规则,这只有宗教才能做到,使人们克服激励陷阱和行为困境。其中一些是人

类生活中普遍的道德困境。但其他的是当地的困境,是当时主导的大政治条件独有的。中世纪的教会在十世纪末期向乡村恢复秩序中有特殊的作用。通过为地方当局提供宗教和仪式支持,教会降低了建立至少较弱的地方暴力垄断的成本。通过这种方式帮助建立秩序,教会为更稳定的权力格局的形成做出了贡献。

The Church continued to play a role for a long time thereafter in tempering the private wars and excesses of violence that otherwise could not be contained by civil authorities. The relative importance of the Church as opposed to secular authorities is reflected in the fact that by the eleventh century, the main administrative division of authority in most of Western Europe came to be the parish, rather than the old divisions of civil authority, the *ager* and *pagus* (town) that had persisted from Roman times through the Dark Ages.³⁵

此后,教会继续发挥作用,调和了民间战争和暴力行为,这些本来无法被公权力控制。相比世俗当局,教会的相对重要性反映在,到 11 世纪,大部分西欧地区的主要行政权力单位已从罗马时期和黑暗时代一直流传下来的乡村和城镇转变为教区。

2.

The Church was the main source for preserving and transmitting technical knowledge and information. The Church sponsored universities and provided the minimal education that medieval society enjoyed. The Church also provided a mechanism for reproducing books and manuscripts, including almost all contemporary information about farming and husbandry. The scriptoria of the Benedictine monasteries can be understood as an alternate technology to printing presses, which did not yet exist.

教会是保存和传播技术知识和信息的主要来源。教会资助大学并提供了中世纪社会所享有的最基本的教育。教会还提供了复制书籍和手稿的机制,包括几乎所有当代关于农业和畜牧业的信息。本笃会修道院的抄经室可以被理解为印刷机尚未出现时的一种替代技术。

Costly and inefficient as the scriptoria were, they were practically the only mechanism for reproducing and preserving written knowledge in the feudal period.

虽然抄写室昂贵低效,但在封建时期它们实际上是复制和保存书面知识的唯一机制。

3.

Partly because its farm managers were literate, the Church did a great deal to help improve the productivity of European farming, especially in the early stages of feudalism.

部分原因是其农场管理人会识字,教会在提高欧洲农业生产效率方面做出了巨大贡献,尤其是在封建主义早期阶段。

Before the thirteenth century the farm managers of lay lords were almost all illiterates who kept records through an elaborate set of marks. Shrewd farmers though they may have been, they were in no position to benefit from any improvement in production methods that they could not invent themselves or see with their own eyes. The Church was therefore essential to improving the quality of grains, fruits, and breeding stock.

在十三世纪之前,世俗领主的农场管理者几乎全都是文盲,他们通过一套复杂的标记来保存记录。尽管他们可能是善于经营的农民,但他们却无法从他们自己无法发明或亲眼目睹的任何生产方法改进中获益。因此,教会对于改善粮食、水果和育种品质至关重要。

Because of its extensive holdings spread over the entire European continent, the Church could send the most productive seed and breeding stock to areas where output lagged.

由于其遍布整个欧洲大陆的广泛资产,教会能够将最有生产力的种子和育种存款送到产量滞后的地区。

The demand for sacramental wine in Northern Europe led monks to experiment with 58

葡萄酒在北欧的需求带动修士对 58

hardier varieties of grape that could survive in colder climates. The Church also helped raise the productivity of medieval farming in other ways. Many of the uneconomically small plots donated to the Church during the feudal revolution were reconfigured to make them easier to farm. The Church also

provided ancillary services required by small farming communities. In many areas, Church-owned mills ground grain into flour.

可以在寒冷气候中生存的更强韧的葡萄品种。教会还通过其他方式提高了中世纪农业的生产效率。在封建革命期间赠与教会的许多不经济的小块土地被重新配置,使其更容易耕作。教会还为小型农业社区提供了必要的配套服务。在许多地区,教会拥有的磨坊将谷物磨成面粉。

4.

The Church undertook many functions that are today absorbed by government, including the provision of public infrastructure. This is part of the way that the Church helped overcome what economists call "public goods dilemmas" in an era of fragmented authority. Specific religious orders of the early-medieval Church devoted themselves to applied engineering tasks, like opening roads, rebuilding fallen bridges, and repairing dilapidated Roman aqueducts. They also cleared land, built dams, and drained swamps. A new monastic order, the Carthusians, dug the first "artesian" well in Artois, France.

教会承担了许多如今被政府吸收的功能,包括提供公共基础设施。这是教会在权力分散的时代如何帮助克服经济学家所称的"公共物品困境"的一部分。中世纪早期教会的特定宗教教团专注于应用工程任务,如开辟道路、重建倒塌的桥梁和修缮破旧的罗马渡槽。他们还清理土地、建造水坝并排干沼泽。一个新的修道会教团——柏多禄会开掘了法国阿尔托瓦地区的第一口"泉井"。

Using percussion drilling, they dug a small hole deep enough to create a well that needed no pump.³⁶ The Cistercian Order undertook to build and maintain precarious seawalls and dikes in the Low Countries of Europe. Farmers deeded land to Cistercian monasteries and then leased it back, while the monks undertook full responsibility for upkeep and repairs. Cistercians also took the lead in developing water-powered machines, which were adopted to such widespread uses as "pounding, lifting, grinding, and pressing."³⁷ The monastery of Clairvaux dug a two-mile-long canal from the River Aube.³⁸ The Church also intervened to build new roads and bridges where population centers had shifted outside the range of the old Roman garrison roads. Bishops granted indulgences to local lords

who would build or repair river crossings and maintain hospices for travelers. An order of monks established by St. Benezet, the Freres Pontifes, or "Brothers of the Bridge," built several of the longest bridges then existing, including the Pont d'Avignon, a massive twenty-arch structure over the Rhone with a combination chapel and tollbooth at one end. Even London Bridge, which stood until the nineteenth century, was constructed by a chaplain and financed in part by a contribution of 1,000 marks from the papal legate.³⁹

他们使用打桩钻进的方式,挖掘了一个足够深的小孔,创造了一口无需泵浦的井。西斯特尔修会负责在欧洲低地国家建造和维护危险的海堤和堤坝。农民将土地转让给西斯特尔修会的修道院,然后再次租用,而修士则负责全面的维护和修缮。西斯特尔修会也在开发水力机器方面走在了前列,这些机器被广泛应用于"捣碎、提升、磨碎和压榨"。克莱尔沃修道院从奥布河挖掘了一条长两英里的运河。教会还干预建设新的道路和桥梁,以应对人口中心发生的转移而超出了古罗马军事公路的范围。主教们向愿意建造或修缮河流过渡设施并维护旅客驿站的当地领主们赠予赦免。圣贝内塞特建立的一个修士团体,即"桥梁兄弟会",修建了当时最长的一些桥梁,包括拥有 20 个拱桥跨度且端头设有教堂和收费站的亚维农大桥。甚至在 19 世纪前仍存在的伦敦桥,也是由一位教士建造并部分得到教皇特使 1000 马克资金的支持。

5.

The Church also helped incubate a more complex market. Cathedral construction, for example, differs in kind from public infrastructure, like bridges and aqueducts. In principle, at least, Church structures were used only for religious services and not as thoroughfares for commerce. Yet it should not be forgotten that construction of churches and cathedrals helped create and deepen markets for many artisanal and engineering skills. In the same way that military spending of the nationstate during the Cold War unintentionally helped incubate the Internet, so the building of medieval cathedrals led to spin-offs of other kinds, the incubation of commerce. The Church was a principal customer of the building trades and artisans. Church purchases of silver for communion services, candelabra, and artworks to decorate churches helped to create a market for luxury goods that otherwise would not have existed.

教会也帮助孵化了一个更复杂的市场。以大教堂建筑为例,它与桥梁和水道等公共基础设施有着本质上的不同。原则上,教会建筑物只用于宗教服务,而不作为商业的通道。但不能忽视,教会和大教堂的建造帮助创造和深化了许多手工艺和工程技能的市场。正如冷战期间国家对军事支出无意中助推了互联网的发展,同样,中世纪大教堂的建设也引发了其他种类的衍生发展,孵化了商业。教会是建筑行业和工匠的主要客户。教会购买用于圣餐仪式的银器、烛台和装饰教堂的艺术品,帮助创造了本来不会存在的奢侈品市场。

In many ways, the Church helped to temper the ferocity of violence unleashed by armed knights during and after the "feudal revolution." Especially in the early centuries of feudalism, the Church contributed significantly to improving the productivity of the farming economy. It was an essential institution, well fitted to the needs of agrarian society at the close of the Dark Ages.

在许多方面,教会有助于缓解武装骑士在"封建革命"期间和之后释放的暴力的凶猛。特别是在封建主义的早期几个世纪,教会大大促进了农业经济的生产力。它是一个至关重要的机构,非常适合黑暗时代末期的农业社会的需求。

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Vulnerability to Violence

容易受暴力伤害

In "thirty or forty years of violent disturbances, the feudal revolution of the year 1000," 40 like the fall of Rome five centuries earlier, was a unique event, caused by a complex interplay of influences. Yet in one respect, the triumph of mali ham ines (wicked men) and the oppressions they wrought perfectly reflect the essential vulnerability of agricultural society to violence. In contrast to the foraging phase of human existence, farming introduced a quantum leap in organized violence and oppression.

在"三十到四十年的暴力骚乱,1000年的封建革命"中,如同五个世纪前罗马的崩溃,这是一个独特的事件,由一系列复杂的影响因素造成的。然而从某种程度上说,邪恶之人的胜利及其造成的压迫,完美地反映了农业

社会对暴力的本质脆弱性。与人类存在的采集阶段相比,农业带来了有组织暴力和压迫的飞跃式发展。

From the very earliest, this was reflected in the more militant cultures of farming peoples. The gods of the early agricultural societies were gods of rainfall and flooding, whose functions reflected the preoccupations of those societies with factors that determined crop yields. The sender of rain or water was also often the god of war, invoked by the earliest kings, who were, above all else, warlords.⁴¹ The close connection between farming and warfare was reflected in the religious imagination of people whose lives were transformed by the innovations of the agricultural revolution. The expulsion from the Garden of Eden can be seen as a figurative account of the transformation of society from foraging to farming, from a free life with food picked from nature's bounty with little work to a life of hard labor.

从一开始,这就反映在农民文化中更加积极好战的方面。早期农业社会的神祇是降雨和洪水的神祇,其职能反映了这些社会关注决定收成的因素。降雨或水的发送者通常也是战争的神祇,由最早的国王祈求。农业和战争之间的密切联系反映在宗教想象中,这些人的生活被农业革命的创新所改变。被逐出伊甸园可以视为一个比喻性的叙述,讲述了从采集到农业的社会转型,从一种依靠大自然馈赠的自由生活转变为艰辛劳作的生活。

PARADISE LOST

失乐园

Farming set humanity on an entirely new course. The first farmers truly planted the seeds of civilization. From their toil came cities, armies, arithmetic, astronomy, dungeons, wine and whiskey, the written word, kings, slavery, and war. Yet notwithstanding all the drama that farming was to add to life, the shift away from the primeval economy appears to have been roundly unpopular from its earliest days.

种植业使人类走上了一条全新的道路。最早的农民真正播下了文明的种子。从他们的劳作中诞生了城市、军队、算术、天文学、地牢、葡萄酒和威士忌、文字、国王、奴隶制和战争。然而,尽管种植业给生活增添了许多戏剧性,但从原始经济转向种植业似乎从最初就广受不欢迎。

Witness the account preserved in the Book of Genesis, which tells the story of the expulsion from paradise. The biblical parable of the Garden Of Eden is a fond recollection of the life of ease enjoyed by the forager in the wilderness. Scholars indicate that the word "Eden" appears to be derived from a Sumerian word for "wilderness."⁴²

《创世记》中保留了这一事件的记录,讲述了人类被驱逐出伊甸园的故事。《圣经》中关于伊甸园的寓言是对采食者在荒野生活中安逸生活的美好回忆。学者认为,"伊甸"一词似乎源自苏美尔语中"荒野"的词汇。

The transition from a free and sparsely settled life in the wild to a sedentary life in a farming village was a matter of deep regret, expressed not only in the Bible but also in humankind's continuing grudge against getting up in the morning and going to work. As Stephen Boyden wrote in *Western Civilization in Biological Perspective*, the new way of living that accompanied farming was "evodeviant."⁴³ Prior to the advent of farming, thousands of human generations lived as Adam did in Eden, at the invitation of his Maker: "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat." Hunters and gatherers had no crops to tend, no herd to watch, no taxes

to pay. Like hoboes, foragers drifted where they pleased, worked little, and answered to no one.

从野外自由和稀疏居民的生活方式过渡到农村定居生活,这是一个令人深感遗憾的事情,不仅在圣经中有所表述,也反映在人类持续的不情愿每天起床上班的情绪中。正如斯蒂芬·博伊登在《从生物学角度看西方文明》一书中所写的,伴随着农业而来的新生活方式是"异化的"。在农业出现之前,数千代人像亚当在伊甸园一样生活,这是他们的创造者邀请他们的:"园中各种树上的果子,你可以随意吃。"狩猎采集者无需照料庄稼,也无需照看牛羊,也无需缴纳税款。就像无家可归的人一样,他们自由漫游,很少工作,也不受任何人的支配。

With farming, a new way of life began, and on altogether more pressing terms.

随着农业的出现,一种全新的生活方式开始了,并且更加迫切。

"Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field"

荆棘和蒺藜必从地里长出来,你必吃田间的蔬菜

field; In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." Farming was hard work. The memory of life before farming was that of paradise lost.

田野; 你将凭借你的汗水谋生。农耕是艰苦的工作。在农耕之前的生活是一种失去的天堂。

More than they could have imagined, farmers created new conditions that drastically altered the logic of violence. It is not a coincidence that the Book of Genesis makes Cain, the first murderer, "a tiller of the ground." Indeed, it is part of the uncanny prophetic power of the Bible that its story was entrusted to shepherds who readily understood how farming gave leverage to violence. In a few verses the biblical account encapsulates logic that took thousands of years to play out. Farming was an incubator of disputes. Farming created stationary capital on an extensive scale, raising the payoff from violence and dramatically increasing the challenge of protecting assets. Farming made both crime and government paying propositions for the first time.

农民创造了新的条件,大大改变了暴力的逻辑,这远超他们所能想象。创

世纪中凶手该隐"耕地"并非巧合。事实上,这体现了圣经预言性的力量,其故事被托付给了牧羊人,他们深知农业如何给暴力带来优势。几节经文概括了数千年的逻辑演变。农业孕育了争端。农业规模化创造了固定资本,提高了暴力的回报,大幅增加了保护资产的挑战。农业使犯罪和政府成为收益可观的事业。

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"The Sovereign Individual" by James Dale Davidson & Lord William Rees-Mogg Simon & Schuster 1997

"主权个人"詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森和威廉·里斯-莫格 1997 年出版于西蒙与舒斯特

CHAPTER 4

第 4 章

THE LAST DAYS OF POLITICS

政治的最后几天

Parallels Between the Senile Decline of the Holy Mother Church and the Nanny State "I also believe-and hope-that politics and economics will cease to be as important in the future as they have been in the past; the time will come when most of our present controversies on these matters will seem as trivial, or as meaningless, as the theological debates in which the keenest minds of the Middle Ages dissipated their energies." ARTHUR C. CLARKE

圣母教堂衰老与保姆国家的平行关系"我也相信,也希望,政治和经济在未来将不再像过去那样重要;有一天,我们现在在这些问题上的争论,将像中世纪最敏捷的思想在神学辩论中消耗精力一样,显得微不足道或毫无意义。"ARTHUR C. CLARKE

To speak of the coming death of politics is bound to seem ridiculous or optimistic, depending on your disposition. Yet that is what the Information Revolution is likely to bring. For readers reared in a century saturated in politics, the idea that life could proceed without it may seem fanciful, the equivalent to claiming that one could live merely by absorbing nutrients from the air. Yet politics in the modern sense, as the preoccupation with controlling and rationalizing the power of the state, is mostly a modern invention. We believe it will end with the modern world just as the tangle of feudal duties and obligations that engrossed the attentions of people in the Middle Ages ended with the Middle Ages. During the feudal period, as historian Martin van Creveld points out, "politics did not exist (the very concept had yet to be invented, and dates back only to the sixteenth century)." 2

政治的终结即将来临这一说法,不论是出于乐观还是悲观,似乎都显得可笑。然而,正是信息革命将带来这样的局面。对于生长于充满政治的世纪的读者而言,生活能够在没有政治的情况下继续下去,这似乎是一种幻

想,就如同声称人可以仅凭吸收空气中的养分而生存一样。然而,现代意义上的政治,即对控制和理性化国家权力的执着,大多是一种现代发明。我们相信,它将随着现代世界的终结而结束,就像在中世纪时期吸引人们注意力的一团乱麻般的封建义务和责任在中世纪结束一样。正如历史学家马丁·范·克利维尔德指出的,"在封建时期,政治根本不存在(这个概念直到 16 世纪才被发明出来)。"

The thought that politics, as we now know it, did not exist prior to the modern period may seem surprising, especially given that Aristotle had written an essay of that title in the days of Alexander the Great. But look closely. Words used in ancient texts are not necessarily contemporary concepts. Aristotle also wrote an essay entitled *Sophistical Refutations*, a term about as meaningless today as *Politics* was in the Middle Ages. The word simply was not in use. Its first known appearance in English dates to 1529. Even then, "politics" appears to have been a pejorative, derived from an Old French word, *politique*, used to describe "opportunists and temporizers."⁴

我们认为政治在现代社会之前不存在,这听起来可能令人惊讶,尤其是亚里士多德在亚历山大大帝时代就写过一篇同题材的论文。但请仔细观察。古代文献中使用的词语并不一定是当代概念。亚里士多德还写过一篇题为《论虚假论证》的论文,这个术语在中世纪与政治一词一样毫无意义。这个词当时根本没有使用。它在英语中首次出现是在 1529 年。甚至那时,"政治"这个词也似乎带有贬义,源自法语单词"*politique*",用来描述"机会主义者和时势政客"。

It took almost two thousand years for Aristotle's latent concept to emerge with the meaning we now know. Why? Before the modern world could put Aristotle's word to a meaningful use, megapolitical conditions were required that dramatically raised the returns to violence. The Gunpowder Revolution, which we analyzed in *The Great 62*

枪火革命,我们在《伟大的 62》中分析过,要求大规模政治条件的出现,才能让亚里士多德的潜在概念以我们现在所知的意义显露出来。这过程耗时将近两千年。为什么会这样?在当代世界能够将亚里士多德的思想付诸实际应用之前,需要出现这样的大规模政治环境,大幅提高暴力行为的回报。

Reckoning, did just that. It raised the returns to violence far above what they had ever been. This made the question of who controlled the state more important than it had ever been. Logically and inevitably, politics emerged from the struggle to control the sharply increased spoils of power. 清算(对此)做出了这样的行为。它将暴力行为的回报提高到前所未有的高度。这使得谁控制国家这个问题比以往任何时候都更加重要。从逻辑和必然的角度来看,权力大量增加的争夺中产生了政治。

Politics began five centuries ago with the early stages of industrialism. Now it is dying. A widespread revulsion against politics and politicians is sweeping the world.

政治始于五个世纪前的工业化初期。现在它正在消亡。对政治和政客的普遍反感正在席卷全球。

You see it in news and speculation on the hidden details of Whitewater, and the poorly disguised murder of Vincent Foster. You see it in numerous other scandals touching President Bill Clinton. You see in it reports of embezzlement by leading congressmen from the House Post Office. You see it in scandals leading to resignations in John Major's circle, and similar scandals in France, reaching two recent prime ministers, Eduard Balladur and Alain Juppe. Even larger scandals have been revealed in Italy, where seven-time prime minister Giuho Andreotti was brought to the dock to stand trial on charges that included links to the Mafia and ordering the murder of Mino Pecorelli, an investigative journalist. Still other scandals have tarnished the reputation of Spanish prime minister Filipe Gonzales. Corruption allegations cost four Japanese prime ministers their jobs in the first five years of the 1990s. Canada's Justice Department alleged in a letter to Swiss authorities that former prime minister Brian Mulroney had received kickbacks on a C\$1.8 billion sale of Airbus planes to Air Canada.5 Willy Claes, the secretary-general of NATO, was forced to resign under a cloud of corruption allegations. Even in Sweden, Mona Sahlm, a deputy prime minister and presumptive prime minister, was forced to
您在新闻和对白水事件隐藏细节的猜测中看到它。您看到众多其他涉及比尔·克林顿总统的丑闻。您看到众议院邮政办公室高级议员的挪用资金报道。您看到约翰·梅杰圈内导致辞职的丑闻,以及法国类似的丑闻,涉及两位近期的总理,埃杜阿尔·巴拉杜尔和阿兰·朱佩。意大利更大

规模的丑闻也已曝光,七次任总理的朱利奥·安德雷奥蒂被拖上法庭,指控包括与黑手党的勾结和下令杀害调查记者米诺·佩科雷利。西班牙总理菲利普·冈萨雷斯的声誉也遭到玷污。腐败指控在 1990 年代头五年里导致 4 位日本首相丢掉了工作。加拿大司法部给瑞士当局的一封信指出,前总理布莱恩·穆尔尼曾从空中客车公司销售给加拿大航空公司的 18 亿加元交易中收取回扣。北约秘书长威利·克拉斯也因腐败指控被迫辞职。即使在瑞典,副总理兼候任总理莫娜·萨尔也因此被迫下台。

resign in the face of allegations that she used government credit cards to purchase diapers and other household goods. Almost everywhere you turn in countries with mature welfare states once thought of as well governed, people hate their political leaders.

在面对她使用政府信用卡购买尿布和其他家庭用品的指控的情况下辞职。在一度被视为治理良好的国家,人们几乎到处都憎恨他们的政治领导人。

Disdain as a Leading Indicator 鄙视作为一个领先指标

Moral outrage against corrupt leaders is not an isolated historical phenomenon but a common precursor of change. It happens again and again whenever one era gives way to another. Whenever technological change has divorced the old forms from the new moving forces of the economy, moral standards shift, and people begin to treat those in command of the old institutions with growing disdain. This widespread revulsion comes into evidence well before people develop a new coherent ideology of change. As we write, there is as yet little evidence of an articulate rejection of politics. That will come later. It has not yet occurred to most of your contemporaries that a life without politics is possible. What we have in the final years of the twentieth century is inarticulate disdain.

对腐败领导人的道德愤怒并非孤立的历史现象,而是变革的常见前兆。每当一个时代让位于另一个时代时,这种情况就会再次发生。每当技术变革已经将旧形式与经济的新运动力量分离开来时,道德标准就会发生转变,人们开始越来越轻视掌握旧制度的人。这种广泛的厌恶情绪要早于人们形成新的变革意识形态。我们正在书写的时候,还没有明确拒绝

政治的迹象。这将在稍后出现。您的大多数当代人还没有意识到没有政治生活是可能的。在二十世纪最后几年,我们看到的是一种无法言语的贬低。

Something similar happened in the late fifteenth century, but at that time it was religion rather than politics that was in the process of being downsized. Notwithstanding popular belief in "the sacredness of the sacerdotal office,"⁶ both the higher and lower ranks of clergy were held in the utmost contempt not unlike the popular attitude toward politicians and bureaucrats today. It was widely believed that the upper clergy were corrupt, worldly, and venal. And not without reason. Several fifteenth-century popes ⁶³

类似的事情发生在 15 世纪末,但那时是宗教而不是政治正在被缩小。尽管人们普遍相信"神职人员的神圣性",但上下级神职人员都受到最大程度的蔑视,这与人们今天对政客和官僚的态度并无不同。人们普遍认为上层神职人员腐败、世俗和贪婪。这并非无缘无故。15 世纪的几位教皇

openly sported bastards. The lower clergy were held in even lower esteem as they proliferated in country and town, begging for alms and frequently offering to sell God's grace and the forgiveness of sins to anyone who would put cash into the bargain.

公开支持私生子。乡村和城镇的低级神职人员更受贬低,他们四处乞讨,经常愿意以金钱的交易向任何人出售天主的恩典和罪过的宽赦。

Beneath the "crust of superficial piety" ⁷ was a corrupt and increasingly disfunctional system. Many lost respect for those who ran it, long before anyone dared to say that it did not work. A life saturated with religion, making no distinction between the spiritual and the temporal, had exhausted its possibilities. Its end was inevitable long before Luther nailed his 95 theses on the church door at Wittenberg.

在"虚假虔诚的外壳"下,是一个腐败且日益失灵的体系。在任何人敢于说它不起作用之前,许多人就已经失去了对统治者的尊重。一种被宗教浸透的生活,无法区分精神和世俗,已经耗尽了它的可能性。在路德在维滕堡教会张贴他的 95 条论纲之前,它的终结就已经是不可避免的了。

A SECULAR REFORMATION

世俗改革

We believe that the reaction against saturation politics is following a similar path.

我们相信,对饱和政治的反作用正在走向类似的道路。

The death of the Soviet Union and the repudiation of socialism are part of a broad pattern of depoliticization sweeping the world. This is now most evident in a growing contempt for those who run the world's governments. It is driven only in part by the realization that they are corrupt, and prone to sell "indulgences" from political difficulty in exchange for campaign contributions or special help on commodity trades to subvene their personal finances.

苏联的灭亡和社会主义的否定是一种广泛的非政治化趋势的一部分,正在席卷全球。这在对世界各国政府的蔑视日益增加中最为明显。这只是部分由于认识到他们腐败,并倾向于通过换取竞选捐款或商品交易的特殊帮助来寻求豁免政治困难,以支持他们的个人财务。

The reaction against politicians is also motivated by the widening realization that much of what they do at great cost is futile, in the same way that organizing another pilgrimage of penitents to march barefoot in the snow, or the founding of yet another order of mendicant monks in the late fifteenth century, could have done little to improve productivity or relieve pressures on living standards.

人们对政客的反应也源于日益增长的意识,即他们投入大量代价所做的许多事实在都是徒劳的,就像在 15 世纪末组织另一次赤脚朝圣或创立另一个乞丐修道会,都很难提高生产力或缓解生活压力。

The Last Days of the Holy Mother Church
神圣母亲教会的最后日子

At the end of the Middle Ages, the monolithic Church as an institution had grown senile and counterproductive, a marked change from its positive

economic contribution five centuries earlier. As we explored in the last chapter, the Church played a leading role at the end of the tenth century in establishing order and facilitating economic recovery from the anarchy that marked the close of the Dark Ages. At that time, the Church was indispensable to the survival of large numbers of small freeholders and serfs who made up the bulk of the Western European population. By the end of the fifteenth century, the Church had become a major drag upon productivity. The burdens it imposed upon the population were pushing living standards down.

中世纪末期,作为机构的整体性教会已经变得衰老和阻碍生产,这与其在 500 年前对经济发展的积极贡献形成了鲜明对比。正如我们在上一章探讨的,在 10 世纪末期,教会在建立秩序和促进黑暗时代结束后的经济复苏中发挥了领导作用。那时,教会对组成西欧人口大部分的小自耕农和农奴的生存至关重要。到 15 世纪末,教会已成为生产力的主要拖累。它对人口施加的负担正在降低生活水平。

Much the same thing can be said of the nationstate today. It was a necessary adaptation to the new megapolitical conditions created by the Gunpowder Revolution five centuries ago. The nationstate widened the scope of markets and displaced fragmented local authorities at a time when more encompassing trading areas brought large returns. The fact that merchants almost everywhere in Europe spontaneously allied themselves to the monarch at the center as he maneuvered to consolidate authority is itself telling evidence that the nationstate in its early form was good for business. It helped lift the burdens on commerce imposed by feudal landlords and local magnates.

今天的民族国家也是如此。这是五个世纪前火药革命创造的新的巨观政治条件下的必要适应。在更广泛的贸易领域带来大量回报的时代,民族国家扩大了市场范围,取代了分散的地方当局。几乎在欧洲各地,商人都自发地与中央君主结盟,以巩固权威,这本身就是民族国家在其早期形式有利于商业的有力证明。它有助于减轻由封建地主和地方大佬施加在商业上的负担。

In a world where returns to violence were high and rising, the nationstate was a useful institution. But five centuries later, as this millennium draws to a close, megapolitical conditions have changed. Returns to violence are falling, and the nationstate, like the Church at the twilight of the Middle Ages, is an anachronism that has become a drag on growth and productivity.

在暴力回报率高涨的世界中,民族国家是一个有用的制度。但在这个千年即将结束时,大政治条件已经发生了变化。暴力回报率正在下降,而民族国家就像中世纪末期的教会一样,已经成为阻碍增长和生产力的一种过时的事物。

Like the Church then, the nationstate today has exhausted its possibilities. It is bankrupt, an institution grown to a senile extreme. Like the Church then, it has served as the dominant form of social organization for five centuries. Having outlived the conditions that brought it into existence, it is ripe for a fall. And fall it will. Technology is precipitating a revolution in the exercise of power that will destroy the nationstate just as assuredly as gunpowder weapons and the printing press destroyed the monopoly of the medieval Church.

国家已经耗尽了其可能性。它已经破产,成为一个衰老极端的机构。与当时的教会一样,它作为社会组织的主导形式持续了五个世纪。它已经超越了促使它出现的条件,现在已经到了崩溃的时刻。技术正在引发一场关于权力行使的革命,就像火药武器和印刷机摧毁了中世纪教会的垄断地位那样,将摧毁国家。

If our reasoning is correct, the nationstate will be replaced by new form of sovereignty, some of them unique in history, some reminiscent of the city-states and medieval merchant republics of the premodern world. What was old will be new after the year 2000. And what was unimaginable will be commonplace. As the scale of technology plunges, governments will find that they must compete like corporations for income, charging no more for their services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. The full implications of this change are all but unimaginable.

如果我们的推理是正确的,国家将被新形式的主权所取代,其中有些是历史上独特的,有些则类似于前现代世界的城邦和中世纪的商人共和国。2000年之后,旧事物将变为新事物。而不可想象的事物将成为司空见

惯。随着技术规模的缩小,政府将发现他们必须像公司一样竞争收入,收取的费用不能超过他们为支付费用的人所带来的价值。这一变化的全面影响是难以想象的。

THEN AND NOW

然后和现在

Something similar might have been said five hundred years ago, at the turn of the fifteenth century. Then as now, Western civilization stood at the threshold of a momentous transformation. Although almost no one knew it medieval society was dying.

大约五百年前,在 15 世纪之交,有类似的话可能被说过。那时和现在一样,西方文明都处于巨大转型的门槛。尽管几乎没有人知道,中世纪社会正在消亡。

Its death was neither widely anticipated nor understood. Nonetheless, the prevailing mood was one of deep gloom. This is common at the end of an era, as conventional thinkers sense that things are falling apart, that "the falcon cannot hear the falconer." Yet their mental inertia is often too great to comprehend the implications of the emerging configurations of power. Medieval historian Johan Huizinga wrote of the waning days of the Middle Ages, "The chroniclers of the fifteenth century have, nearly all, been the dupes of an absolute misappreciation of their times of which the real moving forces escaped their attention." 8

它的死亡既未被广泛预料也未被充分理解。尽管如此,普遍的情绪仍是沉重的忧郁。这种现象在一个时代结束时是常见的,因为传统的思想者感觉到事物正在崩溃,"猎鹰已听不见猎人的号角"。然而,他们的精神惰性往往太大,无法理解新兴权力格局的深层含义。中世纪历史学家约翰·罕萨写道,在中世纪黄昏之际,"15 世纪的编年史家几乎都受到对他们所处时代的一种绝对误解的欺骗,真正推动力逃脱了他们的注意"。

Myths Betrayed

神话被背叛

Major changes in the underlying dynamics of power tend to confound conventional thinkers because they expose myths that rationalize the old order but lack any real explanatory power. At the end of the Middle Ages, as now there was a particularly wide gap between the received myths and

reality. As Huizinga said of the Europeans in the late fifteenth century, "Their whole system of ideas was permeated by the fiction that 65 主要的权力基础动力变革趋于迷惑常规思想者,因为它们揭示了解释旧秩序的神话,但缺乏任何真正的解释力。在中世纪末期,如现在一样,接受的神话与现实之间存在一个特别广泛的差距。正如休芝恩所说,在 15 世纪末的欧洲人,"他们的整个思想体系都渗透了这样的虚构:65

chivalry ruled the world." This has a close second in the contemporary assumption that it is ruled by votes and popularity contests. Neither proposition stands up to close scrutiny.

"骑士精神统治了世界。"这与现代人的普遍观点——即世界被选票和人气竞争统治——不无相似之处。但这两种观点都经不起仔细审视。

Indeed, the idea that the course of history is determined by democratic tallies of wishes is every bit as silly as the medieval notion that it is determined by an elaborated code of manners called chivalry.

事实上,认为历史进程由民主意愿的统计所决定的观点,与中世纪所谓骑士道礼仪决定历史进程的观点一样可笑。

The fact that saying so borders on heresy suggests how divorced conventional thinking is from a realistic grasp of the dynamics of power in late industrial society. It is an issue we examine closely in this book. In our view, voting was an effect rather than a cause of the megapolitical conditions that brought forth the modern nationstate. Mass democracy and the concept of citizenship flourished as the nationstate grew. They will falter as the nationstate falters, causing every bit as much dismay in Washington as the erosion of chivalry caused in the court of the duke of Burgundy five hundred years ago.

说这种话几乎就是异端邪说,这暗示了传统思维与后工业社会中权力动力学的现实认知之间存在多大的脱节。这个问题是本书要仔细探讨的。在我们看来,投票是现代民族国家出现的大政治条件的结果,而非原因。大众民主和公民概念随着民族国家的发展而兴盛,随着民族国家的衰落而衰落,这将在华盛顿引起与 5 个世纪前在勃艮第公爵庭院中骑士精神的衰落一样大的震动。

PARALLELS BETWEEN CHIVALRY AND CITIZENSHIP

骑士道与公民意识的平行

If you can understand how and why the importance of chivalric oaths faded away with the transition to an industrial organization of society, you will be better positioned to see how citizenship as we now know it could fade away in the Information Age. Both served a similar function. They facilitated the exercise of power under two quite different sets of megapolitical conditions. 如果您能理解骑士风度誓言的重要性如何随着向工业化社会过渡而逐渐消退,那么您就会更好地理解公民身份在信息时代也可能消失的可能性。这两者都起到了类似的作用。它们促进了在两种截然不同的大政治条件下权力的行使。

Feudal oaths prevailed at a time when defensive technology was paramount, sovereignties were fragmented, and private individuals and corporate bodies exercised military power in their own right. Before the Gunpowder Revolution, wars had normally been fought by small contingents of armed men. Even the most powerful monarchs did not have *militum perpetuum*, or standing armies. They drew their military support from their vassals, the greater lords, who in turn drew upon their vassals, the lesser lords, who in turn drew upon their vassals, the knights. The whole chain of allegiance carried down the hierarchy to the person of the meanest social standing who was considered worthy to bear arms.

封建誓約在防禦技術至關重要、主權分裂以及個人和企業團體擁有自己的軍事力量的時代盛行。在火藥革命之前,戰爭通常由少數受過武裝訓練的人組成的小分隊進行。即使是最強大的君主也沒有常備軍。他們從自己的諸侯那裡取得軍事支持,而這些諸侯又從屬下的小領主那裡得到支援,小領主則依賴其手下的騎士。這整個效忠的鏈條一直延伸到社會地位最低但被認為有資格拿起武器的人。

Uniforms or Divergences?

统一还是分歧?

Unlike a modern army, a medieval army before the rise of citizenship did not march on the field of battle outfitted in uniforms. To the contrary, each retainer or vassal, each knight, baronet, or lord of different degree had his own distinctive livery that reflected his place in the hierarchy. Instead of uniforms, there were divergences that emphasized the vertical structure of society in which each station was different. As Huizinga said, medieval warriors were distinguished by "outward signs of . . .

不同于现代军队,在公民身份兴起之前的中世纪军队在战场上并没有穿着统一的制服。相反,每一个随从或臣属、骑士、男爵或不同级别的领主都有自己独特的制服,反映了他们在等级体系中的地位。而不是统一的制服,存在着强调社会垂直结构的差异,每个地位都是不同的。正如惠金萨所说,中世纪的战士以"外部标志"来彰显自己的身份。

divergences: liveries, colors, badges, party cries."

差异：制服、颜色、徽章、党徽口号。

Nor were wars fought only by governments or nations. As Martin van Creveld has pointed out, modern notions of war, as stylized by strategists like Carl von Clausewitz, misrepresent the reality of premodern conflict. Van Creveld writes: 66

不仅是政府或国家在进行战争。正如马丁·范·克雷韦尔指出的,战争的现代概念,由像克劳塞维茨这样的战略家塑造,误解了前现代冲突的实际情况。范·克雷韦尔写道：66

For a thousand years after the fall of Rome, armed conflict was waged by different kinds of social entities. Among them were barbarian tribes, the Church, feudal barons of every rank, free cities, even private individuals. Nor were the "armies" of the period anything like those we know today; indeed, it is difficult to find a word that will do them justice. War was waged by shoals of retainers who donned military garb and followed their lord. 11

罗马帝国衰落一千年后,武装冲突由不同类型的社会实体进行。其中包括野蛮部落、教会、各等级的封建领主、自由城市,甚至个人。而当时的"军队"也与我们今天所知完全不同;事实上,很难找到一个恰当的词语来形容它们。当时的战争是由一群从属者穿上军装并跟随他们的主人而打响的。

Under such conditions, it was obviously crucial to the lord that his retainers actually "donned their military garb and followed." Hence the heavy emphasis placed upon the chivalric oath.

在这种情况下,对于领主来说,他的属臣"穿上军服并随之而来"至关重要。因此,骑士誓言得到了重大强调。

The honor of the medieval knight and the duty of the conscript soldier served parallel functions. The medieval man was bound by oaths to individuals and the Church in much the way that moderns are bound by citizenship to the nationstate. Violating an oath was the medieval equivalent of treason. People in late-medieval times went to extremes to avoid violating oaths, just as millions of modern citizens went to extremes in the World Wars, charging machine-gun nests to fulfill their duties as citizens. 中世纪骑士的荣誉和士兵义务服务于平行功能。中世纪人的誓言责任分别是个人和教会,就像现代人的公民责任是国家。违反誓言等同于背叛,就像数百万现代公民在两次世界大战中不惜牺牲自己,攻击机枪阵地来履行公民职责一样。

Both chivalry and citizenship added an extra dimension to the simple calculus that would otherwise deter unindoctrinated human beings from going onto a battlefield and staying there when the going got rough. Chivalry and citizenship both led people to kill and to risk death. Only demanding and exaggerated values that are strongly reinforced by leading institutions can serve that function.

骑士精神和公民意识为原本就阻止未经训练的人类进入战场并在艰难时刻坚持下去的简单计算添加了额外维度。骑士精神和公民意识都曾驱使人们去杀戮并冒死。只有由主导机构大力支持的极端夸张的价值观才能发挥这一作用。

Circumventing Cost-Benefit Analysis 规避成本效益分析

The success and survival of any system depends upon its capacity to marshal military effort in times of conflict and crisis. Obviously, the decision on the part of a medieval knight or a private in the trenches in World War I to risk his life in battle was not likely to be informed by a

sober, cost-benefit calculation. Seldom are wars so easily fought, or do rewards for those who bear the brunt of the fighting so far overshadow the possible costs that an army of economic optimizers could be recruited to rush out to the battlefield. Almost every war and, indeed, most battles have moments in which the tide could turn on a heartbeat. As students of military history are well aware, the difference between defeat and victory is often told by the valor, bravery, and ferocity with which individual soldiers take up their task. If the men doing the fighting are not willing to die over a piece of ground that would not be worth a fig once the battle stops, then they probably will not prevail against an otherwise evenly matched foe. 任何系统的成功和生存都取决于在冲突和危机时期调动军事力量的能力。显然,一名中世纪骑士或一战中战壕里的一名士兵决定冒生命危险参战,不太可能是基于一个冷静的成本收益计算。很少有战争是如此轻易打赢的,为那些承担战斗重担的人所获得的回报也很难完全抵消可能的代价,因此很难动员一支由经济优化者组成的军队冲上战场。几乎每场战争以及大多数战役都有转机的时刻。正如军事史学者们很清楚的,战败与胜利的区别往往在于个人士兵投入任务时的英勇、勇敢和凶猛程度。如果参战的士兵不愿为一块在战斗结束后毫无价值的土地而牺牲生命,那么他们很可能无法战胜实力相当的对手。

This has important implications. The more effective sovereignties are in limiting defections and encouraging military effort, the more likely they are to prevail militarily.

这对国家来说具有重要的意义。主权越有效地限制背叛行为,并鼓励军事努力,越可能在军事上取胜。

In warfare, the most useful value systems induce people to behave in ways that short-term rational calculation would rule out. No organization could mobilize military power effectively if the individuals it sent into battle felt free to calculate where their own best advantage lay, and join in the fight or run away accordingly. If so, they would almost 67

在战争中,最有用的价值体系会诱导人们以短期理性计算所排斥的方式行事。如果参战个人感到自由可以计算他们自身的最大利益所在,并据此决定参战或逃跑,任何组织都无法有效调动军事力量。

never fight. Only under the most propitious circumstances, or the most desperate, would the rational person care to engage in a potentially lethal battle based upon short-term cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps Homo economicus might fight on a sunny day, when the forces on his side were overwhelming, the enemy weak, and the potential rewards of battle enticing. Perhaps. He might also fight if backed into a corner by marauding cannibals.

永远不要战斗。只有在最有利的情况下,或最绝望的情况下,理性的人才会考虑参与一场潜在致命的战斗,这是基于短期的成本效益分析。也许经济人会在阳光明媚的日子里战斗,因为自己一方的力量是压倒性的,敌人很弱,而且战斗有吸引力的潜在回报。也许吧。如果他被掠夺者般的食人族逼到角落里,他也可能会战斗。

But those are extreme circumstances. What of the more common conditions of warfare, which are neither so attractive that they would pass the scrutiny of cost-benefit analysis nor so desperate that they afford no way out? It is here that concepts like chivalry and citizenship are important contributors to the successful use of military power. Long before a battle begins, predominant organizations must convince individuals that upholding certain duties to the lord, or the nationstate, are more important than life itself. The myths and rationalizations that societies employ to encourage risk-taking on the battlefield are a key part of their military prowess.

但是那些都是极端情况。普通战争状况是什么样的呢?它们既不那么吸引人以至于能够通过成本效益分析的审查,也不那么绝望以至于没有出路。在这种情况下,骑士精神和公民意识这样的概念就成为成功运用军事力量的重要贡献。在战斗开始之前,主导组织必须说服个人认为对君主或国家的某些职责比生命本身更加重要。社会采用的神话和合理化来鼓励人们在战场上冒险,是他们军事实力的关键组成部分。

To be effective, these myths must be tailored to the prevailing megapolitical conditions. The fiction that chivalry rules the world means nothing today, especially in a city like New York. But it was the cherished myth of feudalism. It justified and rationalized the ties of obligation that bound everyone under the domination of the Church and a warlike nobility. At a time when private wars of covetousness were commonplace,¹² the exercise of power and the very survival of individuals depended upon the

willingness of others to fulfill their promises of military service under conditions of duress. It was obviously crucial that those promises be dependable.

要有效,这些神话必须与当时的宏观政治条件相匹配。"骑士道"统治全球这种说法今天毫无意义,尤其是在纽约这样的城市。但这却是封建主义的一个宝贵神话。它说明并合理化了服从于教会和好战贵族统治的人际义务关系。在私人贪婪战争随处可见的时代,个人的权力行使和生存都依赖于他人在胁迫下履行军事服务承诺的意愿。那些承诺的可靠性显然至关重要。

Before Nationality 在国籍之前

Unlike today, the concept of nationality played little or no role in establishing sovereignty in the Middle Ages. Monarchs, as well as some princes of the Church and powerful lords, possessed territories by private right. In a way that has no modern analogy, these lords could sell or give away territories or acquire new ones by conveyance or marriage as well as by conquest. Today, you could hardly imagine the United States falling under the sovereignty of a non-English-speaking Portuguese president because he happened to marry the former American president's daughter. Yet something similar was commonplace in medieval Europe. Power passed by hereditary descent. Cities and countries changed sovereigns the way that antiques change owners.

与今天不同,国籍概念在中世纪建立主权中几乎没有任何作用。君主以及一些教会权贵和大地主都拥有私有领土。以一种现代没有类似的方式,这些领主可以出售或赠予领土,也可以通过转让或婚姻获得新的领土,同时也可以通过征服获得。如今,您难以想象美国会落入一位非英语母语的葡萄牙总统的主权之下,只因为他碰巧娶了前美国总统的女儿。然而,这种情况在中世纪欧洲很普遍。权力是通过世袭传递的。城市和國家的主权君主,就像古董换主人一样变换。

In many cases, sovereigns were not native to the regions in which their properties lay.

在许多情况下,君主并非源自其所拥有财产所在的地区。

Sometimes they did not speak the local language, or spoke it badly with heavy accents.

有时他们不会说当地语言,或者说得很差,带有浓重口音。

But it made little difference to the ties of personal obligation whether a Spaniard was king of Athens, or an Austrian was king of Spain.

但是对于个人义务的纽带来说,一个西班牙人是雅典的国王还是一个奥地利人是西班牙的国王,并没有什么大的区别。

Corporate Sovereignty

企业主权

Sovereignty was also exercised by religious corporations like the Knights Templar, the Knights of St. John, and the Teutonic Knights. These hybrid institutions 68

主权也被宗教公司如圣殿骑士团、圣约翰骑士团和条顿骑士团行使。这些混合性质的机构 68

have no modern counterparts. They combined religious, social, judicial, and financial activities with sovereignty over localities.³ While they exercised territorial jurisdiction, they were almost the opposite of today's governments in that nationality played no role in the mobilization of their support or their scheme of governance. The members and officers of these religious orders were drawn from all parts of Christian Europe, or "Christendom," as it was known.

它们没有现代的对应物。它们将宗教、社会、司法和金融活动与对地方地区的主权结合起来。³ 虽然它们行使领土管辖权,但它们几乎与现今的政府相反,因为国籍在它们吸引支持或治理方式中并没有任何作用。这些宗教组织的成员和官员来自基督教欧洲的各个地方,也就是所谓的"基督教世界"。

No one thought it appropriate or necessary that those who ruled be drawn from the local populations. The mobilization of support in the fragmented medieval scheme of governance did not depend upon a national identity or duty to the state, as in modern times, but upon personal loyalty and customary ties that had to be upheld as a matter of personal honor. These

oaths could be sworn by anyone from anywhere provided he was otherwise deemed worthy by his station in life.

没有人认为那些统治者应该从当地人群中选拔是合适或必要的。在被分散的中世纪治理方式中,动员支持不依赖于像现代那样的国家认同或效忠于国家,而是依赖于个人忠诚和习惯性联系,这些必须作为个人荣誉的一种事项来维系。这些誓言可以由任何来自任何地方的人宣誓,只要他们在生活地位上被视为是值得的。

The Vow 我的誓言

Chivalric vows bound individuals to one another and were sworn on the honor of those who were parties to them. As Huizinga wrote, "in making a vow, people imposed some privation upon themselves as a spur to accomplishment of the actions they were pledged to perform." So much importance was placed upon honoring vows that people frequently risked death or suffered serious consequences in order to avoid breaking their vows. Often, the oaths themselves bound individuals to perform as matters of honor acts that would probably seem ludicrous to you and most readers of this book.

武士道誓言約束了個人相互之間的關係,並且是以誌士的榮譽為基礎。正如休伊津加所寫,「在發誓時,人們會給自己施加某種自我限制,以激勵他們完成所承諾的行動。」人們對於遵守誓言的重視程度如此之高,以至於他們經常冒死險或承擔嚴重後果,只為避免違背自己的誓言。而這些誓言本身往往要求個人履行一些看似可笑的榮譽義務。

For example, the Knights of the Star swore an oath never to retire "more than four acres from the battlefield, through which rule soon afterwards more than ninety of them lost their lives." 15 The prohibition on even tactical retreat is irrational as a military strategy. But it was a common imperative of the chivalric vows. Before the Battle of Agincourt, the king of England issued an order that knights on patrol should remove their armor, on grounds that it would have been incompatible with their honor to withdraw from enemy lines if they were wearing their coat armor. It so happened that the king himself got lost and passed by the village that had been night quarters for the vanguard of his army. Since he was wearing

armor, his chivalric honor forbade him to imply turn around when he discovered his mistake and return to the village. He spent the night in an exposed position.

以下是该段文字的简体中文译文: 据说,星辰骑士们曾发誓永不"从战场撤退超过四英亩远"。根据这项规定,后来有 90 多名骑士丧生。禁止哪怕是战术性撤退是不理性的军事策略。但这是骑士道典誓言的普遍要求。亚金库尔战役前,英格兰国王下令骑士巡逻时要脱下铠甲,理由是如果穿着战甲就不符合他们的荣誉而撤离敌阵。恰巧国王自己迷路,经过了先遣军的夜晚驻扎地。由于国王仍穿着铠甲,其骑士道荣誉禁止他在发现错误后调头返回那个村子。结果国王只能在暴露的地点过夜。

As silly as this example seems, King Henry probably did not miscalculate in thinking that he would have risked more in trespassing his honor by retreating, and thus setting a demoralizing example for his entire army, than he did by sleeping behind enemy lines.

虽然这个例子看起来很愚蠢,亨利国王可能并没有错误地计算,因为他认为他如果退却,这会危险地损害他的荣誉,并给他的整个军队带来士气低落的示范,而不是暂时躲在敌人后方休息。

The history of the Middle Ages is filled with examples of prominent people fulfilling pledges that would seem ridiculous to us. In many cases, the actions proposed involved no objective connection to any benefit other than a vivid demonstration of the importance those undertaking them placed upon the vow itself. Among the common vows: to keep one eye closed, to eat and drink only when standing, and to become a self-imposed cripple by entering a one-person chain gang. There was a widespread custom of 69 中世纪的历史充满了著名人物履行看似荒谬的誓言的例子。在许多情况下,提出的行动与任何利益没有客观联系,除了对做出誓言的人来说誓言本身的重要性的生动演示。常见的誓言有:保持一只眼睛闭着、只有站立时才进食和饮水,以及自愿成为单人囚犯。有一种广泛的习俗是 69

wearing painful foot irons. If today you saw someone struggling along the street in a heavy leg iron, you would probably assume that he was insane, not that he was a man of great virtue. Yet in the context of chivalry, willingly donning such a device was a badge of honor. And there were many similar customs that would seem equally ludicrous today. As

Huizinga describes it, many took a pledge "not to sleep in a bed on Saturday, not to take animal food on Friday, *etc.* One act of asceticism is heaped upon another: one nobleman promises to wear no armor, to drink no wine one day in every week, not to sleep in a bed, not to sit down to meals, to wear the hair shirt." 16

蹬着痛苦的铁镣。如果今天你在街上看到有人艰难地前行,双腿带着沉重的铁镣,你可能会认为他是一个疯子,而不是一个具有高尚品德的人。然而,在骑士精神的背景下,自愿佩戴这样的装置是一种荣耀的象征。还有许多类似的习俗,在今天看来同样可笑。正如休伊星加所描述的那样,许多人发誓"不在周六晚上睡床,不在星期五吃动物性食品"等等。一项苦行主义的行为接连不断地出现:一个贵族承诺不穿盔甲,每周有一天不喝酒,不睡床,不坐下用餐,穿发卡衫。

Lent survives as a much moderated version of this self-imposed discomfort. 齋戒存續為一種自我施加不適的大幅緩和版本。

Many enthusiasts for vows formed orders that placed particularly difficult privations on their members as tests of honor. The Order of Clalois and Galoises, for example, dressed during summers in "furs and fur-lined hoods and lighted a fire in the hearth, whereas in winter they were only allowed to wear a simple coat without fur; neither mantles, not hats, nor gloves, and had only very light bed clothes." As Huizinga reports, "It is not surprising that a great many members died of cold."

许多热衷于誓言的人组成了团体,对他们的成员实施特别严苛的苦修作为荣誉的考验。例如,Clalois 和 Galoises 修会的成员夏季穿着"毛皮和毛皮兜帽,在壁炉前生火",而冬季则只允许穿一件简单的外套,不能佩戴披风、帽子或手套,睡觉时只能使用很薄的床上用品。正如休金加所报道的那样,"大量成员因寒冷而死亡并不令人意外"。

"Medieval self-flagellation was a grim torture which people inflicted on themselves in the hope of inducing a judging and punishing God to put away his rod, to forgive their sins, to spare them the greater chastisements which would otherwise be theirs in this world' and the next." NORMAN 中世纪的自我鞭答是一种严酷的折磨,人们自己施加在自己身上,希望引

发一位审判和惩罚的上帝收回他的杖,赦免他们的罪过,免去他们在今后的这个世界和来世将遭受的更大的惩罚。

COHN

科恩

Flagellation, Then and Now 鞭打,过去与现在

It was a short step from the vow that imposed danger and privation to ordeals, pilgrimages, mortification, discomfort, and even purposefully self-inflicted injury. These could be seen as highly beneficial and praiseworthy in the medieval period. They were gestures of the seriousness with which vows were held, a logic that is not entirely foreign even today to fraternity or sorority initiations.

从危险和贫困的誓言到考验、朝圣、折磨、不适,甚至是有目的地伤害自己,这只是一小步。这些在中世纪都被视为高度有益和值得赞扬的行为。它们体现了人们对誓言的认真态度,这种逻辑即使在今天的兄弟会或姐妹会的入会仪式中也并非完全陌生。

Stifling in summer, freezing in winter, or walking in barefoot pilgrimages in the snow was relatively tame compared to "the grim torture" of self-flagellation. This was a particularly medieval form of penance that came into being almost exactly at the same time feudalism began. It was first "adopted by hermits in the monastic communities of Camaldoli and Fonte Avellana early in the eleventh century."

夏季闷热,冬季严寒,或在雪地里赤脚朝圣,相比之下算是相当温和的,与自我鞭笞这种"残酷折磨"相比则差远了。这种惩罚方式是中世纪特有的,它出现的时间几乎与封建制度诞生完全同步。这种做法最初是由卡马尔多利和方塔韦拉纳修道院的隐士们在 11 世纪早期首次被采用的。

Rather than just walking barefoot in cold weather, flagellants organized processions in which they would march day and night, from one town to the next. "And each time they came to a town they would arrange themselves in groups before the church and flog themselves for hours on end."²⁰

寒冷天气下不仅徒步赤脚,自责者还会组织游行,日夜从一个城镇走到另

一个城镇。"每到一个城镇,他们就会集合在教堂前的集团中,自鞭数小时不止。"

We believe that people in the future who look back at the era of the nationstate will find some of the undertakings done in the twentieth century in the name of citizenship as ludicrous as we consider self-flagellation.

From the vantage point of the Information Society, the spectacle of soldiers in the modern period traveling halfway around the world to entertain death out of loyalty to the nationstate will come to be seen as grotesque and silly. It will seem not far different from some of the extraordinary and 70

我们相信,未来的人们在回顾民族国家时代时,会觉得 20 世纪以公民名义所做的一些事情就像我们现在看待自残行为一样可笑。从信息社会的角度来看,现代时期士兵为了效忠民族国家而远赴他乡送死的场景,将被视为令人不齿和愚蠢的。这与某些极端的、神奇的宗教仪式并无多大区别。

exaggerated rites of chivalry, like walking about in leg irons, which otherwise sensible people took pride in doing during the feudal period.

夸张的骑士精神礼仪,如穿戴腿铐而感到自豪的行为,发生在封建时期,当时即使是理智的人也会这样做。

Chivalry Yields to Citizenship

骑士精神让位于公民意识

Chivalry faded away, to be replaced by citizenship, when megapolitical conditions changed and the military purpose of the vow to one's lord was antiquated. The world of gunpowder weapons and industrial armies involved very different relations between the individuals who did the fighting and their commanders. Citizenship emerged when returns to violence were high and rising, and the state had vastly greater resources than the social entities that waged war in the medieval period. Because of its great power and wealth, the nationstate could

骑士精神逐渐消失,被公民身份所取代,这是由于大政治条件的变化和对主人的誓言的军事目的已经过时所导致的。在火药武器和工业化军队的世界中,参与战斗的个人与指挥官之间的关系大为不同。当暴力带来

的回报很大且持续增长,而国家拥有远大于中世纪社会实体的资源时,公民身份应运而生。 由于其强大的实力和财富,民族国家

strike a bargain directly with the mass of common soldiers who fought in its uniform.

直接与穿着其制服的普通士兵群众达成交易。

Such bargains proved to be far cheaper to the state and much less troublesome than attempts to assemble military forces by negotiating with powerful lords and local notables, each of whom was capable of resisting demands that ran counter to his interests as no individual citizen in the nationstate conceivably could.

这些协议被证明对于国家来说要便宜得多,也要轻松得多,而不像试图通过与强大的领主和地方名流进行谈判来组建军事力量那样麻烦,因为每个人都可能会抵制与其利益相违背的要求,而在这个国家,个人公民是无法做到这一点的。

For reasons we explore at greater depth later, citizenship crucially depended upon the fact that no individual or small group of individuals was megapolitically capable of exercising military power independently. As information technology alters the logic of battle, it will antiquate the myths of citizenship just as assuredly as gunpowder antiquated medieval chivalry. 由于我们在后续深入探讨的原因,公民身份的关键在于个人或小群体不具备独立行使军事力量的大政治能力。随着信息技术改变战争的逻辑,它将像火药击败中世纪骑士精神一样,淘汰公民身份的神话。

Hell's Angels on Horseback
地狱天使的骑马

The aristocracy of mounted warriors that dominated Western Europe for centuries were hardly the gentlemen their descendants became. They were rough and violent. In today's terms they could be better understood as the medieval equivalent of motorcycle gangs.

西方欧洲数世纪主导地位的武士贵族,与他们后裔成为的绅士完全不同。他们粗暴且暴力。用当代词语来说,他们更像是中世纪版的摩托车帮。

The rules of manners and pretenses of chivalry served more to temper their excesses than as a description of the way they really behaved. Even an encyclopedic account of the rules and obligations of chivalry would have revealed little or nothing about the foundations of the nobility's power. 规矩以及骑士风度的假相,更多地是用来约束他们的过度行为,而非描述他们真实的行为方式。即使是骑士道的规则和义务的百科式账户,也几乎无法揭示贵族力量的基础。

Perfection as a Synonym for Exhaustion 完美即疲惫的同义词

The advent of effective gunpowder weapons at the end of the fifteenth century detonated a powerful blast under their feet—just as armed knights had perfected their art as never before. By then, careful breeding had finally produced a battle horse sixteen hands high, a steed with the stature to carry comfortably a mounted knight in full armor. Yet "perfection," as C. Northcote Parkinson shrewdly noted, "is achieved only by institutions on the point of collapse."²¹ Just as the new warhorse was perfected, new weapons were ⁷¹

枪炮武器在 15 世纪末的出现,就像一声炸雷打击了骑士们的双脚——就在他们完善了骑士术的时候。到那时,经过精心培育,人们终于培养出了一种身高 16 英尺的战马,这头骏马可以舒适地载着身着全副武装的骑士。然而,正如 C. Northcote Parkinson 精明地指出的那样,"完美"只能被濒临崩溃的制度实现。就在这种新型战马实现完美的同时,新的武器也开始出现了。

deployed to blast horse and knight from the battlefield. These new gunpowder weapons could be fired by commoners. They required little skill to use but were expensive to procure in quantity. Their proliferation steadily increased the importance of commerce as compared to agriculture, which had been the foundation of the feudal economy.

这些新的火药武器可以由平民使用,使用起来技巧要求很低,但大规模采购起来很昂贵。它们的广泛使用逐步提高了商业的重要性,相比之下农业曾经是封建经济的基础。

War at a Higher Scale 战争的更大规模

How did gunpowder weapons precipitate such a transformation? For one thing, they raised the scale of fighting, which meant that waging war soon became far more costly than it had been during the medieval period. Before the Gunpowder Revolution, wars had normally been fought by groups so small that they could be levied over a small and poor territory. Gunpowder gave a new advantage to fighting on a larger scale. Only leaders with claims on rich subjects could afford to field effective forces under the new conditions. Those leaders who best accommodated the growth of commerce, usually monarchs who allied themselves with the urban merchants, found that they enjoyed a competitive advantage on the battlefield. In van Creveld's words, "thanks in part to the superior financial resources at their disposal, they could purchase more cannon than anybody else and blast the opposition to pieces."²²

火药武器是如何促进如此巨大的变革的?首先,它们提高了战斗的规模,这意味着发动战争很快变得比中世纪时期更加昂贵。在火药革命之前,战争通常由规模很小的群体发动,这些群体可以在一个小而贫穷的领土上集结。火药为大规模作战提供了新的优势。只有对领土和人口资源丰富的统治者才能够在新的条件下组织有效的军队。那些能够适应商业增长的统治者,通常是与城市商人结盟的君主,发现他们在战场上拥有竞争优势。正如范·克雷弗尔德所说,"部分得益于他们掌握的更加雄厚的财力资源,他们能够购买比任何人都多的火炮,并将对手粉碎。"

Even though it would be centuries before the full logic of gunpowder weapons would be unleashed in the citizen armies of the French Revolution, an early hint of the transformation of warfare by gunpowder was the adoption of military uniforms in the Renaissance. The uniforms aptly symbolize the new relations between the warrior and the nationstate that went hand in hand with the transition from chivalry to citizenship. In effect, the new nationstate would strike a "uniform" bargain with its citizens, unlike the special, divergent bargains struck by the monarch or the pope with a long chain of vassals under feudalism. In the old system, everyone had a different place in an architectonic hierarchy. Everyone had a bargain as unique as his coat of arms and the colorful pennants he flew.

即使在法国大革命时期公民军中枪火武器的全部逻辑尚未被完全释放,火药武器对战争的转型已经在文艺复兴时期的军服采用中有了早期迹象。这些军服恰当地象征了从骑士精神向公民身份转变的新型战士与民族国家之间的关系。实际上,与领主或教皇在封建制度下与一系列不同的臣属签订特殊的分歧性协议不同的是,新的民族国家将与其公民达成"统一"的协议。在旧有的体系中,每个人都在一个建构性等级体系中有不同的地位,每个人的协议都与其盾徽和飞扬的彩色旗帜一样独特。

Lowering the Opportunity Costs of Riches Gunpowder weapons radically altered the nature of society in yet another way.

降低财富的机会成本 火药武器从根本上改变了社会的性质。

They separated the exercise of power from physical strength, thereby lowering the opportunity costs of mercantile activity. Rich merchants no longer had to depend upon their own finesse and strength in hand-to-hand combat or on mercenaries of uncertain loyalty to defend themselves. They could hope to be defended by the new, larger armies of the great monarchs. As William Playfair said of the Middle Ages, "While human force was the power by which men were annoyed, in cases of hostility, . . . [t]o be wealthy and powerful long together was then impossible." 23 When gunpowder came along, it was impossible to be powerful without being rich.

他们将权力的行使与身体力量分离,从而降低了商业活动的机会成本。富有的商人不再需要依靠自己的技巧和在近身战中的力量,或依赖不确定忠诚度的雇佣兵来保护自己。他们可以希望被新增的大国君主的更大规模的军队所保护。正如威廉·普莱费尔在谈到中世纪时所说,"当人力是人们在敌对情况下所依赖的力量时.....长期保持财富和权力是不可能的。"23 等到枪火出现后,要想拥有权力,不可能不依赖财富。

Status and Static Understanding

现状和静态理解

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For many of the same reasons that most people today are ill-prepared to anticipate the new dynamics of the Information Society, the leading thinkers

of medieval society were unable to anticipate or understand the rise of commerce that played so important a part in shaping the modern period. Most people five centuries ago viewed their changing society in static terms. As Huizinga said, "Very little property is, in the modern sense, liquid, while power is not yet associated predominantly with money; it is still rather inherent in the person and depends on a sort of religious awe which he inspires; it makes itself felt by pomp and magnificence, or a numerous train of faithful followers. Feudal or hierarchic thought expresses the idea of grandeur by visible signs. " 24 Because people in the late Middle Ages thought before all else of status, they were ill-prepared to comprehend that merchants could possibly contribute anything of importance to the life of the realm. Almost without exception, merchants were commoners. They fit at the bottom of the three estates, below the nobility and the clergy. 中世纪社会的主要思想家无法预见或理解商业的兴起在塑造现代时期中所发挥的重要作用,这与大多数人今天难以预料信息社会的新动态的原因类似。五个世纪前的大多数人以静态的方式看待他们不断变化的社会。正如休金加所说,"从现代意义上来说,财产很少是流动的,而权力也还未与金钱联系得如此密切;它仍然更多地内在于个人,取决于一种宗教般的敬畏;它以隆重仪式或大批忠实追随者的显著展现而显现出来。封建或等级思想通过可见的标志来表达宏大的思想。"由于在中世纪晚期,人们首先考虑的是地位,他们难以理解商人可能为王国的生活做出任何重要贡献。几乎没有例外,商人都是平民。他们处于三个等级中最低的一层,低于贵族和 clergy。

Even the more perceptive thinkers of late-medieval society failed to appreciate the importance of commerce and other forms of enterprise outside of farming for accumulating wealth. To them, poverty was an apostolic virtue. They literally made no distinction between a wealthy banker and a beggar. In Huizinga's words, "No distinction in principle was made in the third estate, between rich and poor citizens, nor between townsmen and country-people."25 Neither occupation nor wealth mattered in their scheme, merely chivalric status.

即使是在中世纪晚期最敏锐的思想者也无法认识到除农业以外的商业和其他形式的企业在积累财富方面的重要性。在他们看来,贫穷是一种使徒的美德。他们根本就没有区分富有的银行家和乞丐之间的任何区

别。用胡伊金加的话说,"在第三等级中,无论贫富,无论城乡,都没有根本性的区别"。25 在他们的体系中,职业或财富都无关紧要,只有骑士阶层的地位才是重要的。

This blindness to the economic dimension of life was reinforced by churchmen, who were the ideological guardians of medieval life. They were so far from grasping the importance of commerce that one widelyapplauded !fifteenth-century reform program proposed that all persons of nonnoble status be required to devote themselves exclusively to handicrafts or farm labor. No role was contemplated for commerce whatsoever. 26

教士们是中世纪生活的意识形态守护者,他们加强了人们对生活经济层面的无视。他们远远没有抓住商业重要性的认知,一个广受好评的 15 世纪改革方案竟然建议所有非贵族身份的人都要专门从事手工艺或农业劳动,完全没有考虑到商业活动。

"The date 1492, conventionally used to separate medieval from modern history, serves as well as any other dividing point, for in the perspective of world history, Columbus' voyage symbolizes the beginning of a new relationship' between Western Europe and the rest of the world."27

1492 年,通常用于区分中世纪和现代历史的日期,如同其他任何分界点一样合适,因为从世界历史的角度来看,哥伦布的航行象征着西欧与世界其他地区之间开始了新的关系。

FREDERIC C. LANE
弗雷德里克·C·雷恩

THE BIRTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 工业时代的诞生

Many of the keenest minds of the fifteenth century totally missed one of the more important developments in history, one that began under their eyes. The eclipse of feudalism marked the onset of the great modern phase of Western predominance. It was a period of rising returns to violence and rising scale in enterprise. For the past two and a half centuries, the modern economy has delivered an unparalleled rise in living standards for that fraction of the world that enjoyed its greatest benefits. The catalysts for

these changes were new technologies, from gunpowder weapons to the printing press, which changed the boundaries of life in ways that few could grasp.

十五世纪最敏捷的头脑中有许多人完全错过了历史上一个更为重要的发展,这个发展开始于他们眼下。封建制度的衰落标志着西方主导地位的伟大现代阶段的开始。这是一个暴力回报和企业规模逐步上升的时期。在过去的两个半世纪里,现代经济为世界上享受其最大好处的部分人带来了前所未有的生活水平提高。这些变革的催化剂是新技术,从火药武器到印刷机,它们以少数人难以掌握的方式改变了生活的界限。

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By the final decade of the fifteenth century, explorers like Columbus were just beginning to open an approach to vast, unknown continents. For the first time in the immemorial ages of human existence, the whole world was compassed. Galleons, new high-masted improvisations on Mediterranean galleys, circumnavigated the globe, charting the passages that were to become trade routes and thoroughfares for disease and conquest.

Conquistadors wielding their new bronze cannon on sea and on shore blasted open new horizons. They found fortunes in gold and spices, planted the seeds of new cash crops, from tobacco to potatoes, and staked out new grazing lands for their cattle.

在第十五世纪的最后十年里,像哥伦布这样的探险家刚刚开始接近广阔未知的大陆。在人类历史的漫长岁月中,第一次全球范围内被覆盖了。装备有新型高桅帆船的大帆船在地球上环航,开辟了成为贸易航线和疾病与征服通道的航道。持有新式青铜大炮的征服者在海上陆上蹂躏,开辟了新的视野。他们寻得了大量黄金与香料,种植了新的经济作物,从烟草到马铃薯,并建立了新的牧场。

The First Industrial Technology 工业技术的兴起

Just as the cannon was opening new economic horizons, the printing press opened new intellectual horizons. It was the first machine of mass production, a signature technology that marked the onset of industrialism. In saying this, we share the view advanced by Adam Smith in *The Wealth*

of Nations that the Industrial Revolution had already happened well before he wrote. It had not reached maturity, to be sure, but the principles of mass production and the factory system were well established. His famous example of the pin manufacturers makes this case. Smith explains how eighteen separate operations are employed to produce pins. Because of specialized technology and the division of labor, each employee could make 4,800 times more pins in a day than an individual could fabricate on his own.²⁸

就像大炮开启了新的经济视野,印刷机也开启了新的知识视野。它是第一台大规模生产的机器,这项标志性技术标志着工业主义的开始。我们与亚当·斯密在《国富论》中提出的观点一致,即工业革命早在他撰写时就已发生。虽然它还没有达到成熟,但大规模生产和工厂制度的原则已经很好地确立了。他著名的针制造商例子证明了这一点。斯密解释了用于制造针的十八个单独的操作。由于专门的技术和劳动分工,每个员工一天可制造的针数是一个人单独制作的 4,800 倍。

Smith's example underscores the fact that the Industrial Revolution began centuries earlier than historians conventionally assume. Most textbooks would date its origins to the middle of the eighteenth century. That is not unreasonable as a date for the takeoff stage in the improvement of living standards. But the actual megapolitical transition between feudalism and industrialism began much earlier, at the end of the fifteenth century. Its impact was felt almost immediately in the transformation of dominant institutions, particularly in the eclipse of the medieval Church.

史密斯的例子突出了工业革命开始的时间比历史学家通常所认为的早几个世纪的事实。大多数教科书会将其起源追溯到 18 世纪中叶。这样的时间节点对于生活水平改善的起飞阶段来说并不算不合理。但是从封建主义向工业主义的实际大政治转型要早得多,开始于 15 世纪末。它的影响几乎立即在主导机构的转变中得以体现,特别是在中世纪教会的衰落方面。

The historians who place the Industrial Revolution later are really measuring something else, the takeoff of living standards attributable to mass production powered by engines. This raised the value of unskilled labor and led to falling prices for a wide variety of consumer goods. Indeed, the fact that living standards began to rise sharply at different times in

different countries is a tip-off that something other than the megapolitical transition is being measured. The Cambridge Economic History of Europe speaks of "Industrial Revolutions" in the plural, explicitly linking them to the sustained growth of national incomes.²⁹ In Japan and Russia, this income surge was delayed until the end of the nineteenth century. The rise in living standards and sustained growth of national income in other parts of Asia and some parts of Africa was a twentieth-century phenomenon. In some parts of Africa, sustained growth remains a dream to this day. But that does not mean that these regions are not living in the modern age.

工业革命开始的时间较晚的历史学家实际上是在衡量其他东西,即由发动机驱动的大规模生产所带来的生活水平的提高。这提高了非熟练劳动力的价值,并导致广泛的消费品价格下降。事实上,生活水平在不同国家开始急剧上升的时间不同,这表明所衡量的不仅仅是大政治转型。

《剑桥欧洲经济史》中提到了复数形式的"工业革命",明确将其与国民收入的持续增长联系起来。在日本和俄罗斯,这种收入激增直到 19 世纪末才出现。亚洲其他地区和非洲部分地区生活水平的上升和国民收入的持续增长是 20 世纪的现象。在非洲的某些地区,持续增长仍然是一个梦想。但这并不意味着这些地区没有进入现代社会。

Falling Income in Transition

从转型到收入下降

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The growth of income is not synonymous with the advent of industrialism. The shift to an industrial society was a megapolitical event, not measurable directly in income statistics. Indeed, real incomes for most Europeans fell for the first two centuries of the Industrial Age. They only began rising sometime after the beginning of the eighteenth century, and they did not recover to levels of 1250 until about 1750. We place the launch of the Industrial Age at the end of the fifteenth century. It was the industrial features of early-modern technology, including chemically powered weapons and printing presses, that precipitated the collapse of feudalism. 收入增长并不等同于工业主义的兴起。向工业社会的转变是一个"大政治"事件,无法直接从收入统计中测量。事实上,大多数欧洲人的实际收入在工业时代的前两个世纪里下降。它们直到 18 世纪初才开始上升,

直到 1750 年左右才恢复到 1250 年的水平。我们将工业时代的开启时间定在 15 世纪末。正是包括化学武器和印刷机在内的早期现代技术的工业特征,导致了封建制度的崩溃。

Lowering the Cost of Knowledge 降低知识成本

The capacity to mass-produce books was incredibly subversive to medieval institutions, just as microtechnology will prove subversive to the modern nationstate.

大规模生产书籍的能力对于中世纪的机构来说是非常颠覆性的,就像微技术将对现代民族国家产生颠覆性影响一样。

Printing rapidly undermined the Church's monopoly on the word of God, even as it created a new market for heresy. Ideas inimical to the closed feudal society spread rapidly, as 10 million books were published by the final decade of the fifteenth century.

印刷业急剧动摇了教会对上帝之言的垄断,尽管它也为异端创造了新的市场。不利于封闭的封建社会的思想迅速传播,到 15 世纪末十年,已经出版了 1000 万本书。

Because the Church attempted to suppress the printing press, most of the new volumes were published in those areas of Europe where the writ of established authority was the weakest. This may prove to be a close analogy with attempts by the U.S. government today to suppress encryption technology. The Church found that censorship did not suppress the spread of subversive technology; it merely assured that it was put to its most subversive use.

因为教会试图压制印刷机,大多数新卷宗都是在欧洲政权影响最弱的地区出版的。这可能与美国政府现在试图压制加密技术有很大相似之处。教会发现,审查制度并没有抑制颠覆性技术的传播,反而确保了它被用于最具破坏性的用途。

Depreciating the Monasteries 修道院贬值

Many apparently innocent uses of the printing press were subversive because of their content. Merely the spread of knowledge of the fortunes to be earned by intrepid adventurers and merchants was itself a powerful solvent dissolving the bonds of feudal obligation. The temptation of new markets along with the need and opportunity to fund armies and navies on a large scale, gave money a value it had lacked in the feudal centuries. These new avenues for investment, reinforced by powerful weapons that raised the returns to violence, made it increasingly costly to the lord in the hinterland or the merchant in the city to donate his capital to the Church. Thus the very creation of investment opportunities outside of landholdings destabilized the institutions of feudalism and undercut its ideology.

许多表面无害的印刷使用实际上具有颠覆性,这是由于它们的内容。仅仅是对勇敢冒险者和商人可获利的知识的传播,就是一个强大的溶剂,使封建义务的纽带逐渐溶解。新市场的吸引力,加上为大规模军队和海军提供资金的需要和机会,使金钱获得了在封建时代所缺乏的价值。这些投资新渠道,加上大幅提高回报的强大武器,使得乡村领主或城市商人将资本捐赠给教会的成本越来越高。因此,土地以外的投资机会的出现,动摇了封建制度的基础,削弱了其意识形态。

Another subversive consequence of the printing press was its effect in dramatically lowering the costs of reproducing information. A crucial reason why literacy and economic progress had been so minimal during the Middle Ages was the high cost of duplicating manuscripts by hand. As we have seen, one of the major productive functions assumed by the Church after the fall of Rome was reproducing books and manuscripts in Benedictine monasteries. This was an extremely costly undertaking. One of the more dramatic consequences of printing was to devalue the scriptoria, where monks labored day after day, month after month to produce manuscripts 75

印刷机的另一个破坏性后果是它大大降低了复制信息的成本。素读和经济进步在中世纪如此微弱的一个关键原因是手工复制手稿的高成本。正如我们所见,罗马帝国崩溃后,教会承担的主要生产职能之一就是在本笃会修道院复制书籍和手稿。这是一个极其昂贵的工作。印刷的一个更戏剧性的结果就是贬低了修道士们日复一日、月复一月辛苦劳作制作手稿的抄写室。

that could be duplicated in hours by printing presses. The new technology made the Benedictine scriptorium an obsolete and costly means of reproducing knowledge. This, in turn, made the religious orders and the Church that sustained the scribes less economically important.

这可以在几小时内通过印刷机复制。这种新技术使本笃会抄写所成为陈旧和昂贵的知识复制方式。由此,维持写字员的宗教教团和教会在经济上的重要性也降低了。

Mass production of books ended the Church's monopoly on Scripture, as well as on other forms of information. The wider availability of books reduced the cost of literacy and thus multiplied the number of thinkers who were in a position to offer their own opinions on important subjects, particularly theological subjects. As theological historian Euan Cameron put it, "[a] series of publishing milestones" in the first two decades of the sixteenth century set the groundwork for the application of "modern text criticism to Scriptures." 30 This "threatened the monopoly" of the Church "by questioning corrupt readings of texts which had been used to support traditional dogmas." 31 This new knowledge encouraged the emergence of competitive Protestant sects who sought to formulate their own interpretations of the Bible. Mass production of books lowered the cost of heresy and gave the heretics large audiences of readers.

大规模生产书籍结束了教会对经典文献的垄断,以及其他信息形式的垄断。书籍的广泛供应降低了读写的成本,从而增加了可以发表自己对重要话题,特别是神学话题的意见的思想家的数量。正如神学史学家尤安·卡梅隆所说,"16 世纪前 20 年的一系列出版里程碑"为"将现代文本批评应用于圣经"奠定了基础。这"威胁到了教会的垄断地位",因为它质疑了用来支持传统教规的经文的腐败读本。这种新知识鼓励了寻求制定自己对圣经解释的竞争性新教教派的出现。大规模生产书籍降低了异端的成本,给予了大量读者。

Publishing also helped destroy the medieval worldview. The greater availability and lower costs for information led to shifts away from a view of the world linked by symbolism rather than causal connections.

"Symbolism's image of the world is distinguished by impeccable order, architectonic structure, hierarchic subordination. For each symbolic connection implies a difference of rank or sanctity. . . . The walnut signifies

Christ; the sweet kernel is His divine nature, the green and pulpy outer peel is His humanity, the wooden shell between is the cross. Thus all things raise the thoughts to the eternal..."³²

出版活动也有助于摧毁中世纪的世界观。信息的更广泛可获得性和更低的成本导致人们摆脱了以象征主义而非因果关系联系的世界观。"象征主义的世界观以完美的秩序、建筑式的结构和等级制服从为特征。每一个象征性的联系都意味着等级或神圣性的差异.....胡桃寓意基督;其甜美的果仁是他的神性,绿色多汁的外皮是他的人性,中间的木壳是十字架。因此,万物都唤起了人们对永恒的思考。"

A symbolic mode of thinking not only complemented a hierarchic structure of society; it also suited illiteracy. Ideas conveyed by symbols in wood-cuts were accessible to an illiterate population. By contrast, the advent of printing in the modern period led to the development of causal connections, employing the scientific method, for a literate population.

象征思维模式不仅补充了社会等级结构;它也适合文盲。通过木雕符号传达的思想对文盲群众来说是可以理解的。相反,现代出版业的兴起导致了对有识字能力人群使用因果联系和科学方法的发展。

A PARALLEL FOR TODAY

今日的并行

Medieval society, seemingly so stable and secure in its beliefs in the middle of the fifteenth century, was rapidly transformed. Its predominant institution, the Church, saw its monopoly challenged and shattered. Authority that had been unquestioned for centuries was suddenly in dispute. Beliefs and loyalties more sacred than those that bind any citizen to a nationstate today were reconsidered and renounced within a few short years, all because of a technological revolution that came into its own in the last decade of the fifteenth century.

中世纪社会,在十五世纪中叶貌似稳定和安全的信仰,正在迅速转变。其主导机构——教会,面临其垄断地位受到挑战 and 破裂。长期以来无庸置疑的权威,突然陷入争议。在短短几年内,那些比任何公民对国家的忠诚还要神圣的信仰和忠诚,都被重新考虑和放弃,这都是由于十五世纪最后十年的一场技术革命所致。

We believe that change as dramatic as that of five hundred years ago will happen again. The Information Revolution will destroy the monopoly of power of the nationstate as surely as the Gunpowder Revolution destroyed the Church's monopoly. There is a striking analogy between the situation at the end of the fifteenth century, when life had become thoroughly saturated by organized religion, and that of today, when the world has 76

我们相信五百年前那样的巨大变革将再次发生。信息革命将像火药革命摧毁教会的垄断那样,消除民族国家的权力垄断。在 15 世纪末,生活彻底被有组织的宗教主导,与今天世界被 76

become saturated with politics. The Church then and the nationstate today are both examples of institutions grown to a senile extreme. Like the late-medieval Church, the nationstate at the end of the twentieth century is a deeply indebted institution that can no longer pay its way. Its operations are ever more irrelevant and even counterproductive to the prosperity of those who not long ago might have been its staunchest supporters.

政治已饱和。当时的教会和今天的民族国家都是成长到痴呆极端的制

度。就像 15 世纪末期的教会,20 世纪末的民族国家是一个负债累累的机构,已经无法自负盈亏。它的运作越来越与不久前可能是它最坚定支持者的人的兴旺无关,甚至会适得其反。

"Impoverished, Grasping, and Extravagant"

贫困、贪婪和奢侈

Just as government today offers poor value for the money it collects, so did the Church at the end of the fifteenth century. As ecclesiastical historian Euan Cameron put it, "[A]n impoverished local priesthood seemed to offer a poor service for the money it demanded; much of what was levied effectively 'disappeared' into enclosed monasteries or the arcane areas of higher education or administration. In spite of gifts prodigally given to some sectors of the Church, the institution as a whole managed to appear simultaneously impoverished, grasping, and extravagant."³³ It would be hard to deny the parallel with late-twentieth-century government.

就像政府今天提供的价值远低于它收集的费用一样,15 世纪末期教会也是如此。正如教会历史学家尤恩·卡梅隆所说:"一个贫困的地方神职人员似乎为其要求的费用提供了糟糕的服务;实际上大部分被征收的费用'消失'在封闭的修道院或高等教育或行政领域的神秘领域。尽管有些教会部门得到了大量馈赠,但整个机构仍然显得贫穷、贪婪和奢侈。"³³ 很难否认这与 20 世纪末期的政府存在平行。

Religious observances in the late fifteenth century grew like programs proliferating in welfare states today. Not only did special benedictions multiply endlessly, along with the supply of saints and saints' bones, but every year there were more churches, more convents, more monasteries, more friaries, more confessors (resident household priests), more preacherships, more cathedral chapters, more endowed chantries, more relic cults, more religious co-fraternities, more religious festivals, and new holy days. Services grew longer. Prayers and hymns grew more complicated. One after another, new mendicant orders appeared to beg for alms. The result was institutional overload similar to that characterizing heavily politicized societies today.

宗教仪式在 15 世纪后期就像今天福利国家中蓬勃发展的项目一样。不仅祝福不断增加,圣人和圣人遗骨的数量也大幅增加,每年都有更多的教

堂、修道院、寺庙、会堂、家庭神父、讲道者、大教堂教员会、捐赠弥撒晚课、圣物崇拜、宗教团体、宗教节日和新的节日。仪式变得更长。祈祷和赞美诗变得更加复杂。接连不断地出现了新的乞讨僧众。结果是制度过载,与今天高度政治化的社会类似。

Religious festivals and feast days proliferated on all sides. Religious services grew more numerous, with special festivals in honor of the seven sorrows of Mary, of her sisters, and of all the saints of Jesus' genealogy.³⁴ For the faithful to meet their religious obligations became increasingly costly and burdensome, much as the costs of remaining within the law have proliferated today.

宗教节日和节庆日层出不穷。宗教仪式越来越多,特别是为纪念玛丽亚的七大悲痛、她的姐妹以及耶稣家谱中所有圣徒而举行的节日。³⁴ 对于虔诚的信徒来说,履行宗教义务变得越来越昂贵和沉重,就像今天坚持遵守法律的成本日益增加一样。

Innocents Pay
无辜者承担

Then as now, the productive bore a growing burden of income redistribution.

然后和现在一样,生产者承担着不断增加的收入再分配负担。

These costs were rising more sharply than anyone in authority recognized because of a shift in the use of capital. The relative advantage of holding land as compared to money capital was falling. Yet the medieval mind continued to think in terms of a status-bound society, where social position was determined by who you were, rather than by your skill in deploying capital effectively. Little or no consideration was given to the rising opportunity costs of staging exaggerated religious observances. These costs fell most heavily upon the more ambitious and hardworking peasants, burghers, and yeoman farmers, who depended more than the aristocracy upon deploying their capital usefully.

这些成本的上升速度比当局认识到的更快,这是由于资本使用方式的转变。持有土地相比持有货币资本的相对优势下降了。然而,中世纪人的思维仍然围绕着等级制度的社会,社会地位由一个人的身份决定,而不是

由有效部署资本的能力决定。几乎没有人考虑到夸张的宗教仪式带来的机会成本的上升。这些成本主要落在更有抱负和勤劳的农民、市民和自耕农身上,他们比贵族更依赖于有效利用资本。

They were obliged to shoulder a disproportionate cost of outfitting the tables at the 77

他们必须承担不成比例的桌子铺设成本

endless feasts and holy days (holidays), as well as paying to support an extravagant Church bureaucracy.

无休止的宴会和节日(假期),以及支付赞助奢华的教会官僚体系。

Counterproductive Regulation

不合效率的法规

At the end of the fifteenth century, the Church largely controlled the regulatory powers that have since been assumed by governments. The Church dominated important areas of law, recording deeds, registering marriages probating wills, licensing trades, titling land, and stipulating terms and conditions of commerce. The details of life were almost as thoroughly regulated by canon law as they are today by bureaucracy, and to much the same end Just as political regulation today has become riddled with confusions and contradictions, so canon law was five hundred years ago. These regulations often suppressed and complicated commerce in ways that revealed that facilitating productivity was far from the minds of the regulators.

在十五世纪末,教会在很大程度上控制了自那时以来被政府所承担的监管权力。教会主导了法律的重要领域,记录契约,登记婚姻,审理遗嘱,颁发营业执照,土地所有权,并规定商业的条款和条件。生活的细节几乎和现在的官僚制度一样受到教规法的严格管制,目的也大致相同。正如政治监管今天充满了矛盾和混乱一样,五百年前的教规法也是如此。这些规定常常抑制和复杂化了商业,揭示了调节生产力远不在监管者的考虑范围之内。

For example, it was forbidden to do business for an entire year on whatever day of the week the most recent twenty-eighth of December happened to

fall. Thus if it was a Tuesday, no legal business could be conducted on Tuesdays as an obligatory expression of piety in honor of the Slaughter of the Innocents. On years when December 28 fell on any day other than Sunday, this injunction hampered the potential for many types of commerce, increasing costs by delaying transactions or forestalling them altogether.

例如,在过去的二十八日最近落在一周中某天时,业务活动在整整一年内都是禁止的。因此,如果那天是星期二,为了纪念无辜者遭殃而应当虔诚表示,在此期间任何法定业务都不得开展。在十二月二十八日不是在星期日的年份,这一禁令会阻碍各种商业活动的进行,延缓或完全遏制交易,从而增加成本。

Monopoly Pricing 垄断定价

Canon law was also imposed to reinforce monopoly prices. The Church earned significant revenues from the sale of alum mined from its properties in Tolfa, Italy.

《简明中文》 教会法律也被强加以维护垄断价格。教会从其在意大利陀尔法的产业中开采的明矾销售中获得了可观的收入。

When some of its customers in the textile industry showed a preference for cheaper alum imported from Turkey, the Vatican attempted to sustain its monopoly pricing through canon law, declaring it sinful to use the less costly alum. Merchants who persisted in purchasing the cheaper Turkish product were excommunicated. The famous ban on eating meat on Friday originated in the same spirit. The Church was not only the largest feudal landholder; it also held major fisheries. Church Fathers discovered a theological necessity for the pious to eat fish, which not incidentally ensured a demand for their product at a time when transport and sanitary conditions discouraged fish consumption.

当一些纺织行业的客户更喜欢从土耳其进口的便宜明矾时,梵蒂冈试图通过教规维持其垄断价格,声称使用较廉价的明矾是罪恶的。坚持购买较便宜的土耳其产品的商人遭到逐出教门的惩罚。著名的禁止在星期五吃肉起源于同样的目的。教会不仅是最大的封建地主,而且还拥有重

要的渔场。教会领袖发现了虔诚者食用鱼的神学必要性,这无疑增加了鱼类产品的需求,因为当时的运输和卫生条件阻碍了鱼类的消费。

Like the nationstate today, the late-medieval Church not only regulated specific industries to directly underpin its own interests; it also made the most of its regulatory powers to gain revenue for itself in other ways. Clerics went to special pains to promulgate regulations and edicts that were difficult to abide by. For example, incest was very broadly defined, so that even remote cousins and persons related only by marriage required special dispensation from the Church to marry. As this included almost everyone in many small European villages before the era of modern travel, selling waivers for incestuous marriages became a thriving source of Church revenue. Even sex within marriage itself was tightly circumscribed by ecclesiastic regulation. Sexual relations between spouses were illegal on Sundays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, as well as 78

正如今天的国家一样,晚期中世纪的教会不仅直接管制了特定的行业以维护自身利益,还最大限度地利用其监管权力,以其他方式获得收入。圣职人员特别努力颁布了很难遵守的法规和法令。例如,亲属关系界定非常广泛,即使是远亲和仅通过婚姻关系有联系的人,也需要教会特别豁免才能结婚。这包括许多小型欧洲村庄几乎所有人在现代交通时代之前,出售免除乱伦婚姻的豁免成为教会收入的一大来源。即使在婚姻关系中的性行为本身,也受到教会法规的严格限制。夫妻间的性关系在周日、周三和周五都属于非法行为,此外还有其他 78

for forty days prior to Easter and Christmas. Further, couples were to abstain from sex for three days prior to receiving communion. In other words, married couples were forbidden to enjoy sex without an indulgence for a minimum of 55 percent of the days of the year. In *The Bishop's Brothels*, historian E. J. Burford suggests that these "idiotic"

在复活节和圣诞节前 40 天。此外,夫妇在领圣餐前三天必须禁止性行为。换句话说,已婚夫妇被禁止在未经宽恕的情况下享受性行为,这意味着一年中至少有 55%的时间不能行房。在《主教的妓院》中,历史学家 E. J. Burford 提出这些"愚蠢的"

regulations of marriage helped stimulate the growth of medieval prostitution, from which the Church profited mightily.³⁵ Burford reports

that the Bishop of Winchester was for many centuries the principal of London's Bankside brothels in Southwark. Further, ecclesiastical profiteering from prostitution was by no means merely a local English affair:

婚姻法规促进了中世纪妓女业的发展,教会从中获利颇丰。根据伯福德的报告,温彻斯特主教多个世纪以来都是南坡沃克区伦敦最主要的妓院老板。此外,教会从妓女业获利并非仅仅是一个英国地方性问题。

Pope Sixtus IV (c. 1471) who allegedly caught syphilis
教皇西克斯图四世(约 1471 年)据称感染了梅毒

from one of his many mistresses-became the first pope to issue licenses to prostitutes and to levy a tax on their earnings, augmenting vastly the papal revenues in the

从他众多情妇之一那里获得-成为第一位颁发妓女执照并对她们的收益课税的教皇,大幅增加了教廷的收入

process. Indeed the Roman Curia partly financed the
进程。事实上,罗马教廷部分资助了这一

building of St. Peter's by this tax and the sale of licenses.
圣彼得大教堂的建设通过这种税收和许可证销售实现。

His successor, Pope Leo X, is said to have made some
他的继任者教皇利奥十世据说曾作出

twenty-two thousand gold ducats through the sale of
二万二千金都卡

licenses, four times as much as he made by selling
版权许可费,比他销售所获利润高四倍

indulgences in Germany.
对德国的放纵

Even the famous rule of celibacy imposed on priests was a lucrative source of revenue for the medieval Church. As Burford reports, the Church

imposed 'a racket known as cullagium,' a fee imposed upon "concubinary priests."³⁷ This proved so lucrative that it was imposed uniformly upon all priests by bishops in France and Germany, in spite of the fact that the Lateran Council in 1215 had denounced "this disgraceful traffic by which such prelates regularly sell permission to sin." ³⁸ It was merely one of many lucrative markets for the sale of licenses to infringe canon law and regulation, a trade motivated by the same logic that impels grasping politicians to seek arbitrary regulatory powers over commerce.

即使对神职人员实施的著名禁欲规则也是中世纪教会的一大赢利来源。正如伯福德报告的那样,教会实施了一种称为"cullagium"的诈骗,这是对"有情妇的神父"征收的费用。³⁷ 这被证明如此有利可图,以至于在1215年拉特兰会议谴责"这种可耻的买卖,这些高级神职人员经常出售违犯教规的许可"³⁸ 之后,仍被法国和德国的主教们一视同仁地实施。这只是许多种盈利的市场之一,用于出售违反教规和法规的许可证,这种贸易的动机与贪得无厌的政客寻求对商业施加任意监管权力的动机是相同的。

Indulgences 赦免券

The power to regulate arbitrarily is also the power to sell an exemption from the harm such regulations can do. The Church sold permits, or "indulgences," authorizing everything from relief from petty burdens on commerce to permission to eat dairy products in Lent. These "indulgences" were not only sold at high prices to the aristocracy and the rich burghers. They were also packaged as lottery prizes much like the government-run lotteries of today to attract the pennies of the poor.³⁹ The trade in indulgences increased as the Church's expenditures outran its income. This led many to infer the obvious, that the institutional Church was using its powers primarily to raise revenues. As a contemporary critic put it, "[C]anon law was instituted solely for the

对任意管制的权力也是出售从这种管制可能造成的伤害中获得豁免的权力。教会出售许可证或"赎罪券",授权从解除对商业的琐碎负担到获得在大斋期间食用乳制品的许可。这些"赎罪券"不仅以高价出售给贵族和富裕的市民,还像现如今政府运营的彩票一样包装成奖品,以吸引穷人的几个便士。随着教会的支出超出其收入,赎罪券的交易增加。这

使许多人推断出一个明显的结论,即制度化的教会主要在利用其权力来增加收入。正如一个当代批评家所说:"教规制度仅仅为了使教皇和主教获得财富而建立"。

purpose of making a great deal of money; whoever would be a Christian has to buy his way out of its provisions."⁴⁰

赚大钱的目的;任何想成为基督徒的人都必须买赎自己脱离它的规定。

Bureaucratic Overload

官僚主义负荷

The costs of supporting institutionalized religion at the end of the fifteenth century had reached a historic extreme, much as the costs of supporting government have reached a senile extreme today. The more life was saturated with religion, the more expensive and bureaucratic the Church became. In Cameron's words, "It was far easier to find people to fill the vastly increased number of Church posts at the end of the Middle Ages, than to find money to pay for them."⁴¹ Just as bankrupt governments today scrounge for revenues in counterproductive ways, so did the Church five hundred years ago. Indeed, the churchmen used some of the same predatory tricks mastered by the politicians today.

支持制度化宗教的成本在 15 世纪末达到了历史极端,就像支持政府的成本今天也达到了衰老的极端。生活越是被宗教所充满,教会就越昂贵和官僚化。正如卡梅伦所说,"在中世纪末期寻找人来填补大量增加的教会职位要比找钱支付他们容易得多。"⁴¹ 就像今天身陷困境的政府以不太有效的方式勉强寻求收入,教会五百年前也是如此。事实上,教会人士使用了一些政客们今天掌握的捕食性障眼法。

The medieval Church five hundred years ago, like the nationstate today, consumed more of society's resources than it ever had before, or ever would again. The Church then, like the state today, seemed incapable of functioning and sustaining itself on even record amounts of revenue. Just as the state has come to dominate late-industrial economies, spending more than half of all revenue in some Western European countries, so the Church dominated the late-feudal economy, draining resources and retarding growth.

500 年前的中世纪教会,就像今天的民族国家一样,消耗了社会资源远远超过以往的任何时候。当时的教会,就像今天的国家一样,似乎无法用创纪录的收入维持运转和自我维系。正如国家最终主宰了后工业经济,在一些西欧国家开支占全部收入的一半以上,同样教会也主宰了晚期封建经济,吸干资源并阻碍经济增长。

Deficit Spending in the Fifteenth Century 赤字支出在十五世纪

The Church resorted to every conceivable expedient to squeeze more money out of its harges to feed its overgrown bureaucracy. Regions directly under the lordship of the Church were required to pay higher and higher taxes. In provinces and kingdoms where the Church lacked direct taxing power, the Vatican imposed "annates," a payment to be made by the local sovereign in lieu of direct ecclesiastic taxes.

教会动用各种可能的手段从它的信徒那里榨取更多的金钱,以养活庞大的官僚机构。直接受教会统治的地区被要求缴纳越来越高的税款。在教会没有直接征税权的省份和王国,梵蒂冈则强加"年费",这是当地主权者用以替代直接的教会税收的一种付款。

The Church, like the state today, also raided its own coffers, diverting funds from benefactions earmarked for specific uses to pay for general overhead expenses.

教会就像今天的国家一样,也抄袭了自己的金库,将专门用于特定用途的捐赠资金转移用于支付一般性管理费用。

Benefices and venal religious offices were openly sold, as were the income streams from tithes. In effect, the interests in tithes became the ecclesiastic equivalent of bonds issued by modern governments to finance their chronic deficits.

教会俸禄和可出售的宗教职位公开售卖,教会的什一税收入流也是如此。实际上,对什一税的利益成为了现代政府为了偿还其长期赤字而发行债券的教会等价物。

While the Church was the ideological defender of feudalism and critic of commerce and capitalism, like the nationstate today, it utilized every

available marketing technique to optimize its own revenues. The Church operated a thriving business in the sale of sacramentals, including consecrated candles, palms blessed on Palm Sunday, "herbs blessed on the Feast of the Assumption, and especially the varieties of Holy Water." 42 虽然教会是封建主义的意识形态捍卫者和商业及资本主义的批评者,就像今天的民族国家一样,它利用所有可用的营销技术来优化自身的收入。教会运营着一个蓬勃发展的业务,销售各种圣礼品,包括祝福过的蜡烛、棕榈枝、"受圣母升天节祝福的草药"以及各种圣水。

Like today's politicians who threaten constituents with curtailed garbage pickup and other indignities if they decline to pay higher taxes, religious authorities in the fifteenth century were also prone to cutting off religious services to blackmail 80

80 不缴纳更高税款的持有者

congregations into paying arbitrary fines. Often the fines were imposed for some petty offense done by a few persons who need not even have been members of the congregation in question. For example, in 1436, Bishop Jacques Du Chatelier, "a very ostentatious, grasping man," closed the Church of the Innocents in Paris for twenty-two days, halting all religious services while waiting for an impossibly large fine to be paid by two beggars. The men had quarreled in the church and shed a few drops of blood, which the bishop claimed had deconsecrated the church. He would not allow anyone to use the church for weddings, burials, or the normal sacraments of the calendar until his fine was paid.⁴³

使教众支付任意罚款。通常,这些罚款是因为少数人犯下的一些小罪而征收的,即使这些人并不是该教众的成员。例如,在 1436 年,一位名叫雅克·杜·夏特里的主教是"一个极其势利和贪婪的人",他关闭了巴黎无辜天主教堂 22 天,暂停了所有宗教活动,等待两名乞丐支付一笔无法承担的巨额罚款。这两个人在教堂内争吵并流了几滴血,主教声称这玷污了教堂。在他的罚款被缴纳之前,他不允许任何人在教堂内举行婚礼、葬礼或正常的宗教仪式。

The Italian Stewes (to make the Pope good cheer) payd twentie thousand Duckets in a yeere.

意大利牛肉炖菜(为了让教皇愉快)每年支付二万杜卡特。

Besides they give a Priest (t amend his fee) the pryfit (of a whore, or two or three....

除此之外,他们还会给予神父(修改他的费用)妓女(或两三个.....)的利润。

Methinkes it must he a had Divintie that with the Stewes hath such affinitie.⁴⁴

我觉得这必定是一种邪恶的神性,与青楼有着如此亲密的关系。

FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH BALLAD

第十五世纪英格兰民歌

Hatred of Church Leaders 教会领袖的仇恨

Little wonder that the common opinion of the late fifteenth century despised the higher and lower clergy, much as common opinion in highly politicized societies today despises the bureaucracy and politicians. As Johan Huizinga put it, "Hatred is the right word to use in this context, for hatred it was, latent, but general and persistent. The people never wearied of hearing the vices of the clergy arraigned."⁴⁵ Part of the reason that people were commonly convinced that the Church was "grasping and extravagant" is that it was true. "The worldliness of the higher ranks of the clergy and the deterioration of the lower grades" ⁴⁶ were too obvious to miss. From the parish priest to the pope himself, the clergy appeared to be corrupt as only the personnel of a predominant institution can be.

晚期十五世纪的普遍观点轻视了高等和低等教士,就像现代政治化社会中的普遍观点轻视官僚和政客一样。正如约翰·黑辛加所说,"在这个背景下,'仇恨'这个词是恰当的,因为确实存在着这种潜在但普遍且持久的仇恨。人们从未厌烦过听到对教士的丑行的指控。"部分原因是人们普遍认为教会"贪婪和奢侈",这确实是事实。"高级教士的世俗化和下级教士的恶化"是显而易见的。从堂区神父到教皇本人,教士们似乎都被腐败所侵蚀,这是一种只有在主导性机构中出现的腐败。

Five hundred years ago, the pope, Alexander VI, made even Giulio Andreotti and Bill Clinton seem like exemplars of integrity. Alexander VI was renown for his wild parties. As a cardinal in Siena, he staged a famous orgy to which only "Siena's most beautiful young women had been invited, but their 'husbands, fathers, and brothers' had been excluded."⁴⁷ The Siena orgy was famous, but it later proved to be tame compared to those Alexander threw after becoming pope. Perhaps the most lurid of those was the so-called Ballet of the Chestnuts, which involved Rome's "fifty most beautiful whores" in a copulation contest with the Church Fathers and other

important Romans. As William Manchester describes it, "Servants kept score of each man's orgasms, for the pope greatly admired virility...After everyone was exhausted, His Holiness distributed prizes-cloaks, boots, caps, and fine silken tunics. The winners, the diarist wrote, were those who made love with those courtesans the greatest number of times."48

500 年前,教皇亚历山大六世,让朱利奥·安德烈奥蒂和比尔·克林顿看起来都像是正直的楷模。亚历山大六世因其狂放的派对而闻名。作为锡耶纳的红衣主教,他组织了一个著名的狂欢,但只有"锡耶纳最美丽的年轻女性"被邀请,而她们的"丈夫、父亲和兄弟"被排除在外。锡耶纳的狂欢党闻名遐迩,但与亚历山大登基教皇后举办的那些相比,还算是很温和的。也许最露骨的一次是所谓的"栗子舞会",罗马"50 名最美丽的妓女"参与了一场与教会长老和其他重要罗马人的性交大赛。正如威廉·曼彻斯特所描述的,"仆人记录了每个人的高潮次数,因为教皇非常欣赏雄性活力...当大家都筋疲力尽时,他的圣座分发了奖品——斗篷、靴子、帽子和精美的绸缎外衣。记录员写道,获胜者是那些与这些女伴做爱次数最多的人。"

81

Alexander fathered at least seven and perhaps eight illegitimate children. One of his apparent sons, Giovanni, was the so-called Infans Romanus, born to Alexander's illegitimate daughter, Lucrezia Borgia, when she was eighteen. In a secret papal bull, Alexander admitted fathering Giovanni. If he was not the father, he was certainly the grandfather on both sides. The pope was involved in a three-way incestuous affair with Lucrezia, who was also the mistress of Juan, duke of Gandia, Alexander's oldest illegitimate son, as well as the mistress of another illegitimate son, Cardinal Cesare Borgia. Cesare was the prince of the Church who served as Niccolo Machiavelli's inspiration for The Prince. Cesare was a killer, as was the pope, who was known to have plotted several murders. One or the other of them apparently became jealous of Juan, whose lifeless body was fished out of the Tiber River on June 15, 1497.

亚历山大至少生育了七个非婚生子女,可能还有八个。他的一个子女,Giovanni,被称为"罗马婴儿",是亚历山大的非婚生女儿露克莉齐娅·博尔贾在 18 岁时所生。在一份秘密教皇诏书中,亚历山大承认了

Giovanni 是他的孩子。如果 Giovanni 不是他的儿子,那么至少他就是 Giovanni 两面的祖父。教皇参与了与露克莉齐娅的三角乱伦关系,她同时是亚历山大长子胡安·博尔贾公爵以及另一个私生子塞萨尔·博尔贾红衣主教的情妇。塞萨尔是为尼可罗·马基雅维利《君主论》提供灵感的教会王子,同时也是个杀手,正如教皇本人也因策划多起谋杀案而出名。1497 年 6 月 15 日,胡安在无生命躯体被打捞出了提伯尔河,很可能是亚历山大或塞萨尔中的一人由于嫉妒而下手。

The leadership of the late-medieval Church was as corrupt as the leadership of the nationstate today.

后中世纪教会的领导层和今天国家的领导层一样腐败。

"Today I have twice become a father Gods' blessing on it."50

今天我成为了两次父亲,上天保佑。 50

RODOLPH ACRICOLA,

路道夫·艾格里科拉

on hearing that his concubine had given birth to a son on the day he was elected abbot.

得知其妾生下一子恰逢其当选为僧正的那一天。

HYPOCRISY

伪善

Beneath a "superficial crust of piety," late-medieval society was remarkably blasphemous, irreverent, and debauched. Churches were the favorite trysting places of young men and women, and frequent gathering spots of prostitutes and vendors of obscene pictures. Historians report that "the irreverence of daily religious practice was almost unbounded." Choristers hired to chant for the souls of the dead commonly substituted profane words in the mass. Vigils and processions, which played a far bigger role in medieval religious practice than they do today, were nonetheless "disgraced by ribaldry, mockery and drinking." So said late-medieval Europe's leading theological authority, Denis the Carthusian. 52

在"虔诚的表象之下",晚期中世纪社会的确相当亵渎、轻视和堕落。教堂是年轻男女约会的最受欢迎的地方,也是妓女和淫秽图片商人常聚集的场所。历史学家报告说,"日常宗教实践中的亵渎几乎是无止境的"。受雇唱颂死者灵魂的唱诗班成员常常在弥撒中 substituted 俗语。守夜和游行仪式在中世纪宗教实践中扮演了比今天更重要的角色,但仍"被下流、嘲笑和饮酒所玷污"。这就是晚期中世纪神学权威 denis the carthusian 的说法。

While such a report could be challenged as the griping of a stiff-lipped moralist, it is merely one of many accounts that paint the same picture. There is ample reason to believe that the bawdy and the sacred were frequently close companions in medieval life.

虽然这样的报告可能会被指责为道德严肃主义者的牢骚,但它只是众多描绘同样画面的报告之一。有充分的理由相信,下流和神圣在中世纪生活中经常密切相伴。

Pilgrimages, for example, so often degenerated into riot and debauchery that high-minded reformers argued without success that they be suppressed. Local religious processions also provided regular occasions for mobs to vandalize, loot, and generally indulge in whatever drunken antics caught their fancy. Even when people sat still to hear mass, it was frequently not a

sober experience. Prodigious quantities of wine were consumed in church, especially on festival nights. Accounts from the Council of Strasbourg show that those who "watched in prayer" on St. Adolphus Night drank 1,100 liters of wine provided by the council in honor of the saint.

朝圣往往堕落为骚乱和放荡,以致思想高尚的改革者争论无果,主张将其取缔。地方性的宗教游行也为暴徒们破坏、抢劫和放纵醉酒的行为提供了常规机会。即便人们静坐聆听弥撒,也往往不是一种清醒的体验。在教堂里会消耗大量的葡萄酒,尤其是在节日夜晚。斯特拉斯堡议会的记录显示,在圣阿多夫斯之夜"祈祷守夜"的人们喝掉了议会为纪念这位圣徒提供的 1100 升葡萄酒。

Jean Gerson, a leading fifteenth-century theologian, reports that "the most sacred festivals, even Christmas night," were spent "in debauchery, playing at cards, swearing 82

圣诞夜都沉溺于放纵、玩纸牌和谩骂之中

and blaspheming." When admonished for these lapses, the common people "plead the example of the nobility and the clergy, who behave in like manner with impunity."⁵³

与褻渎。"当"被谴责犯此罪过时,普通百姓"以贵族和神职人员也同样行为,没有受到惩罚"为借口。 53

Piety and Compassion

虔诚和同情心

The piety that rationalized the saturation of society by organized religion in the late Middle Ages served the same purpose as the "compassion" that is meant to justify the political domination of life today. The sale of indulgences to satisfy a desire for piety without morals parallels lavish welfare spending to slake the pretense of compassion without charity. It was largely immaterial whether the actual effect of received practices was to improve moral character or save souls, just as it is largely immaterial whether a welfare program actually improves the lives of the people to whom it is directed. "Piety,"

后中世纪时期,组织化宗教对社会的饱和和被合理化的虔诚,与今天政治支配生活所依据的"同情心"目的相同。赎罪券的销售,满足了缺乏道德的

虔诚需求,与慈善缺位的情况下,慷慨福利开支满足虚伪同情心相呼应。无论所采取的实际做法是否能改善道德品性或拯救灵魂,或者福利计划是否实际改善了目标人群的生活,都基本无关紧要。"虔诚"

like "compassion," was an almost superstitious invocation.

像"同情心"这样的词,几乎是一种迷信式的祈祷。

In a time when causal relationships were scarcely understood, rituals and sacraments of the Church permeated every phase of life. ". . . A journey, a task, a visit, were equally attended by a thousand formalities: benedictions, ceremonies, formulas." 54

在因果关系尚难理解的时代,教会的仪式和圣礼渗透生活的各个方面。".....旅程、任务、拜访,都需要遵守大量的礼节:祝福、仪式、习语。"

Prayers inscribed on pieces of parchment were strung like necklaces on those suffering from fevers. Malnourished girls draped locks of their hair in front of the image of St.

患有发烧的人身上系着写有祈祷词的羊皮纸片,就像项链一样。营养不良的女孩把头发缠绕在圣人像前。

Urban to prevent further hair loss. Peasants in Navarre marched in processions behind an image of St. Peter to solicit rain during droughts .55 People eagerly adopted these and other "ineffective techniques to allay anxiety when effective ones were not available." 56

城市居民为防止进一步脱发。纳瓦拉的农民在干旱季节会在圣彼得的塑像后列队游行,祈求降雨。55 人们热衷于采取这种和其他"无效的技术来缓解焦虑,因为有效的办法并不可得。"56

Two Wrongs to Make a Rite

二错成一对

People were so firmly convinced of the miraculous qualities attaching to the relics of saints that the death of any notably pious person frequently occasioned a mad rush to divide up the body. After Thomas Aquinas died in the monastery of Fossanuova, the monks there decapitated and boiled his

body in order to secure control of his bones.

人们坚信圣人遗物具有奇迹般的特质,以至于任何著名虔诚人士的死亡通常会引发一场疯狂的抢夺身体的行为。托马斯·阿奎那在福萨诺瓦修道院去世后,那里的僧侣们砍下他的头颅并煮沸他的身体,以控制他的骨骼。

When St. Elizabeth of Hungary was lying in state, "a crowd of worshippers came and cut or tore strips of the linen enveloping her face; they cut off the hair, the nails, even the nipples." 57

当匈牙利圣伊丽莎白安息时,"一群崇拜者来到现场,切割或撕扯覆盖她脸部的亚麻布条;他们切下头发、指甲,甚至乳头。"

Piety Without Virtue

虚伪的虔诚

The medieval mind saw the saints and their relics as part of the arsenal of faith in a world that was colder in winter, darker at night, and more desperate in the face of disease than any reader of this book will have been likely to know. More emphatically than in the modern period, people in the Middle Ages believed that demons were real, that God actively intervened in the world, and that prayer, penance, and pilgrimages earned divine favor. 中世纪的人们认为,圣人和他们的圣遗物是信仰武器库的一部分,这个世界在冬天更冷,在夜晚更黑暗,在面对疾病时更绝望,这是任何读这本书的人都很难知道的。比现代时期更加明确,中世纪的人们相信恶魔是真实存在的,上帝积极干预世界,祈祷、忏悔和朝圣能赢得神的垂青。

To say simply that people believed in God could convey neither the intensity of their adherence nor the apparent ease with which medieval piety seemed to bed down 83

说人们相信上帝,既无法表述他们信仰的热切程度,也无法表述中世纪虔诚信仰看似平易的特点

with sin. Belief in the efficacy of rites, rituals, and sacraments was so pervasive that it perhaps inevitably undercut the urgency of behaving in a virtuous way. For any sin or spiritual defect there was a remedy, a penance that would clear the slate, in what came to be a "mathematics of salvation."

58 Religion became so all-pervasive that its sincerity necessarily began to flag. As Huizinga put it, "Religion penetrating all relations in life means a constant blending of the spheres of holy and of profane thought. Holy things will become too common to be deeply felt."⁵⁹ And so it was.

罪业的信仰在仪式、典礼和圣礼的功效中如此根深蒂固,以致必然削弱了以德行为先的紧迫性。任何罪或灵性缺陷都有补救措施,一种能洗清过去的赎罪,形成了一种"救赎的数学"。宗教的影响如此广泛,以至于其真诚度必然开始下降。正如休兴诺所言,"宗教渗透生活的各种关系,意味着圣俗思维领域的不断混融。于是神圣的事物变得太普通,而不能引发深切的感受。"

DOWNSIZING THE CHURCH

缩小教会

By the end of the fifteenth century, the Church was not only as corrupt as the nationstate today; it was also a major drag on economic growth. The Church engrossed large amounts of capital in unproductive ways, imposing burdens that limited the output of society and suppressed commerce. These burdens, like those imposed by the nationstate today, were numerous. We know what happened to organized religion in the wake of the Gunpowder Revolution: it created strong incentives to downsize religious institutions and lower their costs. When the traditional Church declined to do this, Protestant sects seized the opportunity to compete. In so doing they employed almost every device imaginable to reduce the cost of living a pious life:

到了 15 世纪末,教会不仅像今天的民族国家一样腐败,而且也是经济增长的一大阻碍。教会以不生产性的方式吸收大量资本,给社会生产和商业活动带来沉重负担。这些负担,就像今天的民族国家一样,数量众多。我们知道在黑火药革命之后,对于有组织的宗教会发生什么:它产生了缩减宗教机构和降低其成本的强烈激励。当传统教会拒绝这样做时,新教教派抓住了机会去竞争。在这个过程中,他们几乎使用了所有可以想象的方式来降低虔诚生活的成本:

- They built spare new churches and sometimes stripped the altars of older ones to free capital for other uses.

他们建造了几座新教堂,有时也从旧教堂的祭坛上剥离出资金用于其他用途。

- They revised Christian doctrine in ways that lowered costs, emphasizing faith over good deeds as a key to salvation.T

他们以降低成本为目的,修改了基督教教义,强调信仰而非善行是获得救赎的关键。

- They developed a new, terse liturgy, pared or eliminated feast days, and abolished numerous sacraments.

他们开发了一种新的简约礼拜仪式,裁减或消除了节庆日,并废除了许多圣事。

- They closed monasteries and nunneries, and stopped giving alms to mendicant orders.

他们关闭了修道院和尼姑庵,并停止向乞丐修会施舍。

Poverty went from being an apostolic virtue to an unwelcome and often blameworthy social problem.⁶⁰

贫穷从一种宗教的美德变成了一个不受欢迎和经常被归咎的社会问题。

To understand how downsizing the Church liberated productivity, you have to review the many ways that the Church stood in the way of growth before its monopoly was broken. Much as the nationstate does today, the Church at the end of the fifteenth century imposed an incredible burden of excess costs.

缩小教会解放了生产力,你需要回顾教会在其垄断地位被打破之前阻碍增长的许多方式。就像今天的国家一样,到了 15 世纪末,教会施加了巨大的额外成本负担。

1.

Direct costs such as tithes, taxes, and fees fed the overgrown ecclesiastical bureaucracy. Tithes were common to Protestant churches that replaced the medieval "Holy Mother Church" also, but they tended not to be collectible in urban areas. In effect, the end of the Church's monopoly led to declining marginal tax rates in regions with the most highly developed commerce.

诸如赋税、税款和费用等直接成本养殖了臃肿的教会官僚机构。十一税普遍存在于取代了"圣母教会"的新教会,但它们往往在城市地区无法收取。实际上,教会垄断的结束导致发达商业地区的边际税率下降。

2.

Religious doctrines made saving difficult. The arch-villain of the medieval Church was the "miser," the person who saved his gold at the risk of his soul. The requirement for the faithful to fund "good deeds" entailed costly

contributions to the Church. The doctrine of "satisfactions" obliged those concerned about salvation to endow masses or "chantries" in order to avoid purgatory. Luther attacked this directly in 84

宗教教义使储蓄变得困难。中世纪教会的主要恶棍是"吝啬鬼"——那些以失去灵魂为代价保存金钱的人。要求信徒资助"善行"需要向教会缴纳高额贡献。"补赎"教义迫使那些担心救赎的人出资设立弥撒或"诵经"以避免炼狱。路德直接攻击了这种做法。

the eighth and thirteenth of his ninety-five theses. He wrote that "the dying will pay all their debts by their death." 61 In other words, the capital of the Protestant believer was available to pass on to his heirs. Under Protestant doctrine, there was no need to endow chantries to repeat masses, usually for thirty years, and sometimes, for the very wealthy, in perpetuity.

他的九十五条论纲中的第八和第十三条。他写道:"临终者将通过死亡清偿所有债务。"61 换言之,新教信徒的资本可以传给他的继承人。根据新教教义,没有必要捐赠赎罪弥撒,通常为期三十年,有时对于富人来说甚至永远。

3.

The ideology of the medieval Church also encouraged diversion of capital into acquisition of relics. Numerous relic cults were endowed with large sums to acquire physical objects associated with Christ or various saints. The very wealthy even assembled personal collections of relics. For example, the Elector Frederick of Saxony amassed a collection of nineteen thousand relics, some acquired on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1493. His collection included what he believed to be 'the body of a holy innocent, Mary's milk, and straw from the stable of the Nativity.'" 62 Presumably, the return on capital invested in these relics was low. The shift to an emphasis on faith and the notion of the elect downgraded the importance of acquisition of the trappings of Christian life for use as charms and encouraged money to find more productive channels that paid a return that the monarch could tap.

中世纪教会的意识形态也鼓励将资本转移到收购遗物上。许多遗物崇拜都拥有巨额资金来获取与基督或各种圣徒有关的实物。甚至连极其富有的人也收集了个人遗物收藏。例如萨克森选帝侯腓特烈收集了一

万九千件遗物,其中一些是在 1493 年朝圣到耶路撒冷时获得的。他的收藏包括他相信是"一位圣洁无辜者的身体、马利亚的乳汁和耶稣降生马槽里的稻草"。62 可以推测,这些遗物所投入的资本回报率并不高。注重信仰和选民观念的转变降低了获取基督教生活道具作为护身符的重要性,并鼓励资金寻找更有生产性的渠道,为君主带来回报。

4.

The advent of Protestant denominations broke the medieval Church's economic monopolies, and led to a significant weakening of regulation. As we have seen, canon law was frequently bent to support Church monopolies and commercial interests.

新教教派的出现打破了中世纪教会的经济垄断,导致了监管的大幅减弱。正如我们所看到的,教规法经常被歪曲以支持教会的垄断和商业利益。

Because the new denominations had fewer economic interests to protect and promote, their version of religious doctrine tended to result in a freer system, with fewer inhibitions of commerce.

因为新教派没有太多需要保护和推广的经济利益,他们的宗教教义版本往往会导致一个更自由的体系,商业受到的限制也较少。

5.

The Protestant revolution abolished many of the rites and rituals of the medieval Church that burdened the time of the faithful. Rites, sacraments, and holy days had been elaborated to absorb almost the entire calendar by the late fifteenth century. This ceremonial overload was a logical outgrowth of the Church's insistence '...that one could multiply acts of prayer or worship as often as one liked and gain benefits from them.'63

新教革命取消了束缚信徒的中世纪教会许多仪式和典礼。到 15 世纪末,仪式、圣事和节日已经复杂到几乎占据了全年。这种仪式过度繁琐是教会坚持"人们可以任意增加祈祷或崇拜的行为并从中获益"这一理念的必然结果。

Multiply they did. Productivity was taxed by longer and more elaborate services, obligations to recite repetitious prayers in penance, and the proliferation of feast days of saints during which no work could be done. Numerous regulations and ceremonies punctuated the day and the seasons, considerably shrinking the time available for productive tasks. This may have done little to interrupt the rhythms of medieval farming, in which 90 percent or more of the population was engaged. There were many periods during the seasons when field labor was not required on a daily basis. The yield of crops under medieval conditions probably varied more with the weather and uncontrollable rhythms of infestation than from any marginal addition of labor beyond the minimum that the Church calendar accommodated.

他们确实增加了。生产力受到更长时间和更复杂的服务、赎罪中反复祷告的义务,以及圣徒节日的激增(这些日子不允许工作)的影响。每天和每个季节都有众多的规定和仪式,大大缩短了生产任务的可用时间。这可能很少中断了中世纪农业的节奏,当时 90%或以上的人口从事农业。在季节变化中,有许多期间不需要每天进行田间劳作。在中世纪的条件下,作物产量可能更多地受天气和无法控制的虫害周期的影响,而不是受到教会日历所允许的最低劳动力投入的边际增加。

The larger problem of lost productivity did not fall so much in farming as in other areas. The Church's demands on time were far less compatible with craft work, manufacturing, transport, commerce, or any other undertaking where productivity and profitability were likely to be crucially determined by the amount of time devoted to the task.

生产力损失的更大问题并非主要发生在农业领域,而是在其他领域。教会对时间的要求与手工作业、制造业、运输业、商业或任何其他需要投入大量时间才能确保生产率和盈利能力的行业相去甚远。

It may not be a coincidence that the great transition at the end of the fifteenth century occurred at a time when land rents were rising and real wages for the peasantry 85

农民土地租金上升,实际工资下降,恰好发生在十五世纪末期巨大转型之际,这可能并非巧合

were in decline. Increased population pressures had reduced the yield from the common lands, often found surrounding rivers and streams, upon which peasants depended to graze their livestock, and in some cases, for fish and firewood. The whittling down of living standards placed increasingly urgent pressures on peasants to find alternative sources of income. As a result, "more and more of the rural population turned to small-scale manufacturing for the market, above all in textiles, in the process known as 'putting-out' or 'proto-industrialization.'"64 The ceremonial burdens on time imposed by the Church stood in the way of efforts by the more ambitious peasants to supplement their farming income by craft work, as indeed they inhibited any redeployment of effort in new economic directions.

人口压力不断增加,减少了农民依赖的公共土地的产量,这些公共土地通常位于河流和溪流周围,农民用于牧草他们的牲畜,有些情况下还用于捕鱼和取柴。生活水平的下降给农民找到替代性收入来源施加了越来越迫切的压力。因此,"越来越多的农村人转向面向市场的小规模制造业,尤其是纺织业,这种过程被称为'家庭工业'或'前工业化'。"宗教对时间的典礼性负担阻碍了更有雄心的农民通过手工劳作来补充他们的农业收入,这确实抑制了他们在新的经济方向上的任何努力。

One of the more pronounced contributions that Protestant sects made to productivity was the scrapping of forty feast days. This not only saved the considerable costs of staging the festivals, including outfitting the village tables with food and drink; it also freed a great deal of valuable time. Implicitly, everyone who stopped honoring the forty banished feast days could add three hundred man-hours or more to his annual productivity. In short, the scrapping of ceremonial overload in the medieval Church opened the way for an appreciable increase in output simply by freeing time that would otherwise have been lost to commerce.

新教教派对生产力的一个更明显的贡献是取消了四十个节日。这不仅节省了庆祝节日的大量成本,包括为村庄桌子提供食物和饮料;而且还释放了大量宝贵的时间。从而隐含地,每个停止庆祝被驱逐的四十个节日的人都可以将他的年度生产力增加三百个人小时或更多。总之,取消中世纪教会的仪式负担,通过释放本来会被商业浪费掉的时间,从而导致产出的显著增加。

The break in the Church's monopoly disgorged vast amounts of assets that were yielding low returns under Church management-a situation with obvious parallels to state holdings late in the twentieth century. The Church was the largest feudal landholder by far. Its grip on the land matched that of the state in highly politicized societies today-exceeding 50 percent of the total in some European countries such as Bohemia.

教会垄断权的中断释放了大量资产,这些资产在教会管理下产生的收益很低,与 20 世纪末国家控股的情况有明显的类似之处。教会是最大的封建土地所有者。它对土地的控制程度与今天高度政治化社会中的国家相当,在一些欧洲国家如波西米亚,甚至超过了总量的 50%。

According to canon law, once a property came under the control of the Church, it could not be alienated. Thus the holdings of Church land tended steadily to rise, as the Church received more and more testamentary gifts from the faithful for financing various social welfare services, chantries, and other activities.

根据教会法,一旦一处房产归属于教会,就不能被转让。因此,教会的土地所有权稳步上升,原因是教会从虔诚信徒那里获得了越来越多的遗赠,用于资助各种社会福利服务、赈济装置和其他活动。

While it is difficult to measure precisely the relative productivity of Church holdings, it must have been far lower at the end of the Middle Ages than it was in the early part of that epoch. By the fourteenth century, increased emphasis upon production for the market rather than subsistence farming had led most lay lords to turn from illiterate headmen to professional managers to optimize the output of their holdings.

虽然很难准确地衡量教会所有产权的相对生产率,但在中世纪末期,其生产率一定远低于该时期初期。到了 14 世纪,更多重视面向市场的生产而非自给自足农业,让大多数世俗领主从不识字的负责人转向聘请专业经理人,以优化他们所有产权的产出。

Their incentives probably led them to quickly outstrip the output of Church properties, which in theory usually did not accrue to anyone's private profit. No doubt some of the more worldly prince-bishops husbanded their estates in ways indistinguishable from those of the lay lords. Yet the productivity of other Church properties would surely have suffered from failures of

indifferent management by a huge, far-flung institution, whose drawbacks would have been similar to the drawbacks of state and communal ownership today. It is obvious, as well, that the seizure of the monasteries rearranged resources that were no longer needed for the reproduction of books and manuscripts after the advent of the printing press.

他们的奖励很可能促使他们迅速超越教会财产的产出，后者通常不会带来任何私人利润。毫无疑问，一些较为世俗的王子主教们以与世俗领主无异的方式经营他们的领地。然而，其他教会财产的生产力无疑会因为一个庞大而分散的机构的漠不关心的管理而受到损害，其弊端与当今国家和共有制的弊端相似。同样显而易见的是，修道院的被没收重新分配了已不再需要维持书籍和手稿复制的资源。

7.

As we detailed in The Great Reckoning- some of the Protestant sects immediately responded to the Gunpowder Revolution by altering their doctrines in ways that encouraged commerce, such as by lifting the injunction against usury, or lending at 86

商业资本主义

interest. The ideological opposition of the medieval Church to capitalism was a drag on growth. The main ideological thrust of Church teachings was to reinforce feudalism, in which the Church had a large stake, as the largest feudal landholder. Consciously, or not, the Church tended to make religious virtues of its own economic interests, while militating against the development of manufacturing and independent commercial wealth that were destined to destabilize the feudal system. Injunctions against "avance," for example, applied mainly to commercial transactions rather than feudal levies, and never to the sale of indulgences. The infamous attempts by the Church to fix a "just price" for items in commerce tended to suppress economic returns on those products and services where the Church itself was not a producer.

中世纪教会对资本主义的意识形态反对是一种发展阻碍。教会教义的主要意识形态倾向是加强封建制度，因为教会自身是最大的封建地主。教会有意无意地将自己的经济利益美化为宗教美德，同时反对制造业和独立商业财富的发展，因为这必将动摇封建制度。例如，反对“剥削”的诫

命主要针对商业交易,而不是封建税赋,也从未涉及赎罪券的销售。教会试图为商品和服务制定"公平价格"的恶名昭著做法,往往压低那些教会自己并不参与生产的产品和服务的经济收益。

The ban on "usury" was a signal example of the Church's resistance to commercial innovation. Banking and credit were crucial to the development of larger-scale commercial enterprises. By restricting the availability of credit, the Church retarded growth.

对"高利贷"的禁令是教会抵制商业创新的一个典型例子。银行和信贷对于大规模商业企业的发展至关重要。通过限制信贷的可获得性,教会阻碍了经济增长。

8

More subtly, the new denominations' focus upon the Bible as a text helped demolish the medieval Church's mode of thought as well as its ideology. Both placed obstacles in the way of growth. The cultural programming of the late Middle Ages encouraged people to see the world in terms of symbolic similitude rather than cause and effect. This short-circuited reasoning. It also pointed away from a mercantile conception of life. Thinking in terms of symbolic equivalences does not easily translate into thinking in terms of market values. "The three estates represent the qualities of the Virgin. The seven electors of the Empire signify the virtues; the five towns of Artois and Hainault, which in 1477 remained faithful to the house of Burgundy, are the five wise virgins. . . .

更微妙的是,新教派将圣经视为文本的关注,帮助瓦解了中世纪教会的思维方式以及其意识形态。这两者都成为了增长的障碍。后期中世纪的文化编程,鼓励人们以象征性的相似性而非因果关系来看待世界。这短路了推理。它也指向了远离商业化的生活观。用象征性等价的方式思考,很难转化为以市场价值观思考。"三等身份代表着圣母的品质。帝国七名选王代表着美德;1477 年保持忠于勃艮第王朝的阿尔托瓦和埃诺地区的五个城镇,就是五个明智的童女。"

In the same way shoes mean care and diligence, stockings perseverance, the garter resolution, etc."⁶⁵ As this example quoted from the distinguished medieval historian Johan Huizinga suggests, thinking was dominated by

dogma, rigid symbols, and allegory that tied together every aspect of life in terms of hierarchic subordination. Every occupation, every part, every color, every number, even every element of grammar was tied into a grand system of religious conceptions.

正如这位著名的中世纪历史学家约翰·惠京加所引述的那样，鞋子意味着关怀和勤奋，长袜意味着坚持，束带意味着决心，等等。⁶⁵ 这表明当时的思维被教条、严格的符号和寓言所主导，将生活的各个方面都与等级制度的从属关系联系在一起。每一种职业、每一部分、每一种颜色、每一个数字，甚至每一个语法成分都被纳入了一个宏大的宗教概念体系之中。

Thus the mundane bits and pieces of life were interpreted not in terms of their causal connections, but in terms of static symbols and allegories. Sometimes personifying virtues and vices, each thing stood for something, which stood for something else again, in ways that often blocked rather than clarified cause and effect.

因此，生活中平常的细枝末节不是从因果关系的角度来解释，而是从静态符号和寓言的角度。有时，美德和恶习被人格化，每一件事都代表着某种东西，而那某种东西又代表着其他某些东西，这种方式往往阻碍了而不是阐明了因果关系。

To confuse matters further, relationships were often arbitrarily bound together in systems of numbers. Sevens played a particularly important role. There were the seven virtues, the seven deadly sins, the seven supplications of the Lord's Prayer, the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the seven moments of the passion, the seven beatitudes, and the seven sacraments, "represented by the seven animals and followed by the seven diseases."⁶⁶

七这个数字在这些系统中扮演了重要角色，有七个美德、七宗罪、主祷文七乞求、七圣神恩赐、受难七时、七福以及七圣礼，"由七种动物表示，并附带七种疾病。"

Fifteenth-Century Journalism

15 世纪新闻业

A fifteenth-century news story, if it had been written, would not have answered any of the classic questions of reporting facts, except indirectly

through allegoric 87

新闻故事,如果在 15 世纪写下,不会直接回答新闻报道的经典问题,只能通过寓言的方式间接表达

personification. Consider this report, in a private diary, of the Burgundian murders in fifteenth-century Paris:

拟人化。考虑这份十五世纪巴黎布根地谋杀案的私人日记报告:

Then arose the goddess of Discord, who lived in the tower of Evil Counsel, and awoke Wrath, the mad woman, and Covetousness and Rage and Vengeance, and they took up arms of all sorts and cast out Reason, Justice, Remembrance of God, and Moderation most shamefully. Then Madness them enraged, and Murder and Slaughter killed, cut down, put to death, massacred all they found in the prisons.

那时,纷争女神起身了,她居住在邪恶计谋之塔,唤醒了狂怒、贪婪、愤怒和报复。它们拿起各种武器,驱逐了理性、正义、上帝的回忆和节制。然后,狂乱使它们狂怒,谋杀和屠杀杀戮、砍伤、处死、屠杀了所有在监狱中发现的人。

. . . and Covetousness tucked up her skirts into her belt with Rapine, her daughter, and Larceny, her son. . . . Afterward, the aforesaid people went by guidance of their goddesses, that is to say, Wrath, Covetousness, and Vengeance, who led them through all the public prisons of Paris, etc.⁶⁷

贪婪把裙子卷到腰带里,她的女儿劫掠和她的儿子盗窃也跟着。之后,上述人员在愤怒、贪婪和复仇这些女神的指引下,穿过巴黎的所有公共监狱等等。

The shift away from the medieval paradigm helped prepare people to think in "modern" terms about cause and effect, rather than in terms of symbolic linkages and allegoric personification. It is not necessary to argue that the doctrine and mode of thinking of the late-medieval Church were insincere to see that they tended to fit closely with the needs of agrarian feudalism, while allowing very little place for commerce, much less industrial development. It was rather a case of the Church as a predominant institution shaping moral, cultural, and legal constraints in ways that were closely fitted to the imperatives of feudalism. For this very reason, they were ill-

suited to the needs of industrial society, just as the moral, cultural, and legal constraints of the modern nationstate are ill-suited to facilitating commerce in the Information Age. We believe that the state will be revolutionized, just as the Church was, to facilitate the realization of the new potential.

从中世纪范式的转移帮助人们用"现代"的方式思考因果关系,而不是从符号联系和隐喻人格化的角度。我们不需要论证晚期中世纪教会的教义和思维模式是虚伪的,就能看出它们与农业封建主义的需求密切吻合,而几乎没有为商业,更不用说工业发展腾出空间。这实际上是一种情况,即教会作为主导机构以符合封建主义至关重要的方式塑造了道德、文化和法律约束。正是由于这个原因,它们与工业社会的需求并不相适应,就像现代民族国家的道德、文化和法律约束也不利于信息时代的商业发展一样。我们相信,国家将像教会一样被改革,以实现新的潜力。

The Protestant doctrine that heaven could be attained by faith alone and without the benefit of endowed prayers for the dead was cast as a theological issue. Yet it was theology to fit the economic realities of a new age. It met the obvious need for a more cost-effective path to salvation at a time when the opportunity costs of sinking additional capital into the bloated ecclesiastical bureaucracy had suddenly risen, People had minded less giving their money to the Church when there was no other outlet for it. But when they suddenly saw the chance to make one hundred times their capital financing a spice voyage to the East, or get a lesser, but still promising sum of 40 percent per annum financing a battalion for the king, they understandably sought the grace of God where their own interests lay. 新教的教义认为,人可以凭借信心单独得救,无需依赖为死人祈祷的优惠,这被视为一个神学问题。然而,这种神学已适应了一个新时代的经济现实。这满足了当时最明显的需求,即以较为经济实惠的方式获得救赎。此时,将额外资本投入臃肿的教会官僚机构所产生的机会成本突然上升。当人们没有其他出路时,他们对向教会捐款并不介意。但是当他们突然看到有机会将资本投资到东方香料航行中,获得百倍回报,或是以每年 40%的较低但仍具有吸引力的利率为国王提供一支军队时,他们可以理解地追求与自身利益相一致的神的恩典。

Many merchants and other commoners soon became far richer than their forebears had been under feudalism. The sharp acceleration of living

standards among the merchants and small manufacturers of the early-modern period was widely unpopular among those whose incomes and way of life were collapsing with feudalism. The weakening of the Church's monopoly and the increased megapolitical power of the rich led to a sharp reduction in income redistribution. The peasants and urban poor who were not immediate beneficiaries of the new system were bitterly envious of those who were.

许多商人和其他平民很快就变得比他们的祖先在封建主义下更富有。早期现代时期商人和小制造商生活水平的急剧提高在那些收入和生活方式随着封建主义而崩溃的人中广受不欢迎。教会垄断的削弱以及富人的政治权力增加导致了收入再分配的大幅减少。那些不是新体系直接受益者的农民和城市贫民对那些从中获益的人怀着深深的妒忌。

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Huizinga described the prevailing attitude, in what could well be an important parallel with the Information Revolution: "Hatred of rich people, especially of the new rich, who were then very numerous, is general."⁶⁸ 这种普遍的态度可能与信息革命有着重要的并行性,"对富人,特别是新富人的憎恨,当时数量非常多。"

An equally striking parallel arose from a tremendous surge in crime. The breakdown of the old order almost always unleashes a surge in crime, if not the outright anarchy of the feudal revolution we explored in the last chapter. At the end of the Middle Ages, crime also skyrocketed as the old systems of social control broke down. In Huizinga's words, "[C]rime came to be regarded as a menace to order and society."⁶⁹ It could be equally menacing in the future.

犯罪猛烈增加同样引人注目。旧秩序的崩溃往往会引发犯罪猛增,如果不是我们在上一章探讨的封建革命彻底的无政府状态。在中世纪末期,随着旧有的社会控制机制的瓦解,犯罪率也飙升了。正如汉斯·海兴格所说,"犯罪开始被视为对秩序和社会的威胁。"⁶⁹ 这在未来也可能同样可怕。

The modern world was born in the confusion of new technologies, new ideas, and the stench of black powder. Gunpowder weapons and improved

shipping destabilized the military foundation of feudalism, even as new communications technology undermined its ideology. Among the elements that the new technology of printing helped reveal was the corruption of the Church, whose hierarchy as well as rank and file were already held in low regard by a society that paradoxically placed religion at the center of everything.

现代世界诞生于新技术、新思想的混乱和黑火药的恶臭之中。火药武器和改良的航运打击了封建主义的军事基础,而新的通讯技术也动摇了其意识形态。印刷术这种新技术所揭示的元素之一就是教会的腐败,其等级制度以及普通信徒都已经受到了一个将宗教置于一切中心的社会蔑视。

It is a paradox with an obvious contemporary parallel in the disillusionment with politicians and bureaucrats, in a society that places politics at the center of everything.

这是一个悖论,在一个将政治置于中心的社会中,与人们对政客和官僚的幻灭形成了明显的时代平行。

The end of the fifteenth century was a time of disillusion, confusion, pessimism, and despair. A time much like now.

十五世纪末曾是一个充满了幻灭、困惑、悲观和绝望的时期。这就像现在一样。

Chapter 5

第五章

THE LIFE AND HEALTH OF THE NATIONSTATE

国家的生活和健康

Democracy and Nationalism as Resource Strategies in the Age of Violence
"Most important of all, success in war depends on having enough money to provide whatever the enterprise needs." 1 ROBERT DE BALSAC, 1502
民主主义和民族主义作为暴力时代的资源策略"最重要的是,在战争中取得成功需要有足够的资金来提供企业所需的一切。"罗伯特·德·巴尔萨克,1502 年

THE RUBBLE OF HISTORY

历史的废墟

On November 9 and 10, 1989, television broadcast to the world scenes of exuberant East Berliners dismantling the Berlin Wall with sledgehammers. Fledgling entrepreneurs among the crowd picked up pieces of the wall that were later marketed to capitalists far and wide as souvenir paperweights. A brisk business in these relics was done for years thereafter. Even as we write, one can still encounter occasional ads in small magazines offering bits of old East German concrete for sale at prices ordinarily commanded by highgrade silver ore. We believe that those who bought the Berlin Wall paperweights should be in no rush to sell. They hold mementos of something bigger than the collapse of Communism. We believe that the Berlin Wall became the most important pile of historical rubble since the walls of San Giovanni were blasted to smithereens almost five centuries earlier in February 1495.

1989年11月9日和10日,电视向全世界播放了充满乐观情绪的东柏林人用铁锤拆除柏林墙的场景。人群中的新兴企业家拾起了这些墙体碎片,后来被销售给四面八方的资本家作为纪念品重量器。此后的多年里,这些遗迹一直是一笔可观的生意。直到如今,人们仍能在小杂志上偶尔看到出售这些老东德混凝土块的广告,价格相当于高级白银矿石。我们相信那些购买柏林墙纪念品重量器的人现在还无需急于出售,因为他们手持的不仅仅是共产主义崩溃的纪念品,更是自1495年2月圣乔万尼城墙被炸毁以来最重要的历史遗迹。

The leveling of San Giovanni by the French king Charles VIII was the first blast of the Gunpowder Revolution. It marked the end of the feudal phase of history and the advent of industrialism, as we outlined earlier. The destruction of the Berlin Wall marks another historical watershed, the passage between the Industrial Age and the new Information Age. Never has there been so great a symbolic triumph of efficiency over power. When the walls of San Giovanni fell, it was a stark demonstration that the economic returns to violence in the world had risen sharply. The fall of the Berlin Wall says something different, namely that returns to violence are

now falling. This is something that few have even begun to recognize, but it will have dramatic consequences.

查尔斯八世法国国王摧毁圣乔万尼是火药革命的第一声炮响。正如我们早前所述,这标志着封建历史时代的结束和工业时代的到来。柏林墙的拆除标志着另一个历史转折点,即从工业时代进入了新的信息时代。从未有过如此大规模的象征性凯旋,效率胜过了武力。当圣乔万尼的城墙倒塌时,这显示暴力带来的经济回报急剧上升。而柏林墙的倒塌则意味着暴力的回报正在下降,这一点很少有人认识到,但将会产生戏剧性的后果。

For reasons we explore in this chapter, the Berlin Wall may prove to be far more symbolic of the whole era of the industrial nationstate than those in the crowd that night in Berlin or the millions watching from a distance understood. The Berlin Wall was built to a very different purpose than the walls of San Giovanni—to prevent people on the inside from escaping rather than to prevent predators on the outside from entering. That fact alone is a telling indicator of the rise in the power of the state from the fifteenth to the twentieth centuries. And in more ways than one.

柏林墙可能比当晚在柏林的人群或远观的数百万人所理解的更象征了整个工业民族国家时代。柏林墙的建造目的,与圣乔万尼的城墙完全不同——是为了阻止内部人逃脱,而非防止外来掠食者进入。这一事实本身就是从 15 世纪到 20 世纪国家权力日益增强的有力标志。这方面还有很多。

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For centuries, the nationstate made all outward-facing walls redundant and unnecessary. The level of monopoly that the state exercised over coercion in those areas where it first took hold made them both more peaceful internally and more formidable militarily than any sovereignties the world had seen before. The state used the resources extracted from a largely disarmed population to crush small-scale predators. The nationstate became history's most successful instrument for seizing resources. Its success was based upon its superior ability to extract the wealth of its citizens.

国家在数个世纪里使所有外向型的墙壁变得多余和不必要。国家在其首次占据的领域对强制行使的垄断程度,使它们在内部更加和平,在军事

上也比先前出现过的任何主权更加强大。国家利用从一个基本上没有武装的人口那里提取的资源来粉碎小规模掠夺者。国家成为历史上最成功的获取资源的工具。它的成功建立在其更优越的提取公民财富的能力之上。

"Love It or Leave It" (Unless You Are Rich) Before the transition from the nationstate to the new sovereignties of the Information Age is complete, many residents of the largest and most powerful Western nationstates, like their counterparts in East Berlin in 1989, will be plotting to find their way out. In a hint of things to come, the president of the United States proposed in 1995

"爱它或离开它"(除非你很富有)在从民族国家过渡到信息时代的新主权之前完成之前,许多最大和最强大的西方民族国家的居民,像 1989 年东柏林的同行一样,会为寻找出路而谋划。作为即将到来的迹象,1995 年,美国总统提出了

the enactment of an exit tax, a "Berlin Wall for Capital," that would require wealthy Americans to pay a substantial ransom to escape with even part of their money.

退出税的实施,一个"资本的柏林墙",将要求富有的美国人为逃脱出境支付巨额赎金,即使只带走一部分财物。

Clinton's ransom is not only reminiscent of the late East German state's policy of treating its citizens as assets; it also calls to mind the increasingly draconian measures taken to shore up the fiscal position of the Roman Empire in decline. This passage from The Cambridge Ancient History tells the story.

克林顿的赎金不仅让人想起东德政府将公民当作资产的政策;它也让联想到当罗马帝国衰落时为了稳定财政状况而采取的越来越严厉的措施。这段摘自《剑桥古代史》。

Thus began the fierce endeavor of the State to squeeze the population to the last drop. Since economic resources fell short of what was needed, the strong fought to secure the chief share for themselves with a violence and unscrupulousness well in keeping with the origin of those in power and with a soldier' accustomed to plunder. The full rigor of the law was let loose

on the population. Soldiers acted as bailiffs or wandered as secret police through the land. Those who suffered most were, of course, the propertied class. It was relatively easy to lay hands on their property, and in an emergency, they were the class from whom something could be extorted most frequently and quickly.

国家开始了一场残酷的压榨人口的努力。由于经济资源远远不足,强者们不择手段地争夺资源,这与那些执政者的恶劣起源以及士兵们的掠夺习惯一致。法律的全部严厉也适用于人民。士兵们充当了法警或秘密警察在全国各地游荡。遭受最大损失的当然是财产阶层。夺取他们的财产相对容易,而且在紧急情况下,他们是最容易被敲诈的阶层。

When failing systems have the power to do so, they often impose penal burdens upon those seeking to escape. Again, we quote *The Cambridge Ancient History*: "If the propertied class buried their money, or sacrificed two-thirds of their estate to escape from a magistracy, or went so far as to give up their whole property in order to get free of the domains rent, and the non-propertied class ran away, the State replied by increasing pressure."

This is worth remembering as you plan ahead. The twilight of state systems in the past has seldom been a polite, orderly process. We mentioned the nasty habits of Roman tax collectors in Chapter 2. The large number *agri deserti*, or abandoned farms, in Western Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire reflected only a small part of a wider problem. In fact, exactions tended to be relatively mild in Gaul, and in the frontier areas comprise current-day Luxembourg and Germany. In Rome's most fertile region, Egypt, where farming was more productive because of irrigation, desertion by owners was an even bigger problem. The question of whether to attempt escape, the *ultimum refugium*, as it was known in Latin, became the overriding quandary of almost everyone 91

当系统失败时,它们常常会对那些试图逃脱的人施加惩罚性的负担。再次引用《剑桥古代史》:"如果有产阶级埋藏他们的金钱,或牺牲他们财产的三分之二来逃避任职,或甚至放弃他们的全部财产来摆脱地租和非有产阶级逃亡,国家就会增加压力。"在你制定计划时,请记住这一点。过去国家系统的暮色时代很少是一个礼貌有序的过程。我们在第2章提到了罗马税收员恶劣的习惯。在罗马帝国崩溃后,西欧出现的大量 *agri deserti* 或被废弃农场,只反映了一个更大问题的一小部分。事实上,在高卢以及当今卢森堡和德国边境地区,赋税相对较轻。在罗马最肥沃

的地区埃及,由于灌溉使农业更加丰收,所有者逃离就是一个更大的问题。究竟是否要尝试逃脱,这个在拉丁语中被称为 *ultimum refugium* 的问题,成为几乎所有人面临的最紧迫的困扰。

with property. Records show that "among the common questions which used to be put to an oracle in Egypt three standard types were: 'Am I to become a beggar?' 'Shall I take to flight?' and 'Is my flight to be stopped?' "4 Clinton's proposal says yes. It is an early version of an obstacle to escape that is likely to grow more onerous as the fiscal resources of the nationstate slip away. Of course, the first U.S. version of an exit barrier is more benign than Erich Honecker's concrete and barbed wire. It also involves greater price sensitivity, with the burden falling only on "billionaires" with taxable estates above \$600,000.

财产。记录显示, "在埃及, 常见的问询会问三种标准类型: 我会成为乞丐吗? 我会逃跑吗? 我的逃跑会被阻止吗?"4 克林顿的提案持肯定态度。这是一个逃脱障碍的早期版本, 随着民族国家的财政资源逐渐流失, 将变得更加繁重。当然, 美国第一版的退出屏障要比埃里希·洪克尔的混凝土和铁丝网更加温和。此外, 它还涉及更大的价格敏感性, 只有在应税遗产超过 60 万美元的"亿万富翁"才会受到打击。

Nonetheless, it was justified with similar arguments to those once propounded by Honecker in defense of the late German Democratic Republic's most famous public works project. Honecker claimed that the East German state had a substantial investment in would-be refugees. He pointed out that allowing them to leave freely would create an economic disadvantage for the state, which required their efforts in East Germany. 尽管如此, 这种论点与霍内克曾经为卫卫东德最著名的公共工程项目辩护时提出的类似论点是合理的。霍内克声称, 东德国家在潜在难民身上有大量投资。他指出, 允许他们自由离境会为需要他们在东德投入劳动的国家造成经济不利。

If you accept the premise that people are or ought to be assets of the state, Honecker's wall made sense. Berlin without a wall was a loophole to the Communists, just as escape from U.S. tax jurisdiction was a loophole to Clinton's IRS. Clinton's arguments about escaping billionaires, aside from showing a politician's usual disregard for the integrity of numbers, were

similar in kind to Honecker's, but somewhat less logical because the U.S. government, in fact, does not have a large economic investment in wealthy citizens who might seek to flee. It is not a question of their having been educated at state expense and wanting to slip away and practice law somewhere else.

如果你接受人民是或应该是国家资产的前提,霍内克的墙是有道理的。没有墙的柏林对共产主义者来说就是一个漏洞,就像逃避美国税收管辖区对克林顿国税局来说是一个漏洞。除了显示了一个政客对数字完整性通常的漠视,克林顿关于逃避亿万富翁的论点,在性质上与霍内克的论点类似,但略微逻辑性稍差,因为事实上美国政府并没有大量投资于那些可能试图逃离的富人。这不是一个他们曾在国家开支下接受教育,而现在想逃走并在其他地方执业法律的问题。

The overwhelming majority of those to whom the exit tax would apply have created their wealth by their own efforts and in spite of, not because of the U.S. government.

退出税将适用的绝大多数人都是通过自己的努力创造财富的,而不是因为美国政府。

With the top 1 percent of taxpayers now paying 28.7 percent of the total income tax in the United States, it is not a question of the rich failing to repay any genuine investment the state may have made in their education or economic prosperity. To the contrary. Those who pay most of the bills pay vastly more than the value of any benefits they receive. With an average annual tax payment exceeding \$125,000, taxes cost the top 1 percent of American taxpayers far more than they now realize. Assuming they could earn even a 10 percent return on the excess tax paid by each over a forty-year period, each \$5,000 of annual excess tax payment reduced their net worth by \$2.2 million. At a 20 percent rate of return, each \$5,000 of excess tax reduces net worth by \$44 million.

根据美国纳税人的情况,前 1%的纳税人现在缴纳了 28.7%的总所得税。这并非富人未能偿还国家在他们教育或经济繁荣方面的任何实际投资。恰恰相反,那些负担大部分账单的人支付的金额远远超过他们所获得的任何利益。以平均每年超过 12.5 万美元的纳税来计算,美国纳税人中最高收入的 1%支付的税费远远超出他们现在意识到的。如果他

们能在 40 年内获得 10% 的税款超额支付回报率, 每年 5,000 美元的税款超额支付会使他们的净资产减少 220 万美元。如果回报率为 20%, 每 5,000 美元的税款超额支付会使净资产减少 4,400 万美元。

As the millennium approaches, the new megapolitical conditions of the Information Age will make it increasingly obvious that the nationstate inherited from the industrial era is a predatory institution. With each year that passes, it will seem less a boon to prosperity and more an obstacle, one from which the individual will want an escape. It is an escape that desperate governments will be loath to allow. The stability and even the survival of Western welfare states depends upon their ability to continue extracting a huge fraction of the world's total output for redistribution to a subset of voters in the OECD countries. This requires that the taxes imposed upon the most productive citizens of the currently rich countries be priced at supermonopoly rates, hundreds or even thousands of times higher than the actual cost of the services that governments provide in return.

随着新千年的到来, 信息时代的新的 大国政治条件将使得工业时代遗留下来的民族国家这一掠夺性的机构变得越来越明显。随着时间的推移, 它将不再被视为是促进繁荣的馈赠, 而更多地被视为是一个障碍, 个人也将设法逃离它。而绝望的政府却不会愿意让人逃离。西方福利国家的稳定乃至生存取决于它们继续从全球总产出中提取大量份额并将其重新分配给 OECD 国家中的一部分选民的能力。这就需要对最有生产力的公民征收超垄断价格的税收, 比政府提供的服务实际成本高出数百倍甚至数千倍。

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THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE NATIONSTATE 民族国家的兴衰

The fall of the Berlin Wall was not just a visible symbol of the death of Communism. It was a defeat for the entire world system of nationstates and a triumph of efficiency and markets. The fulcrum of power underlying history has shifted. We believe that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 culminates the era of the nationstate, a peculiar two-hundred-year phase in history that began with the French Revolution. States have existed for six

thousand years. But before the nineteenth century, they accounted for only a small fraction of the world's sovereignties. Their ascendancy began and ended in revolution.

柏林墙的倒塌不仅仅是共产主义死亡的可见象征。它也是整个民族国家体系的一次失败,以及效率和市场的胜利。支撑历史的权力支点发生了转移。我们相信,1989 年柏林墙的倒塌标志着民族国家时代的结束,这是法国大革命以来历史上持续了二百年的一个特殊时期。国家已经存在了六千年。但在十九世纪之前,它们只占世界主权体的一小部分。它们的崛起和衰落都始于革命。

The great events of 1789 launched Europe on a course toward truly national governments. The great events of 1989 marked the death of Communism and an assertion of control by market forces over mass power. Those two revolutions, exactly two hundred years apart, define the era in which the nationstate predominated in the Great Power system. The Great Powers, in turn, dominated the world, spreading or imposing state systems on even the most remote tribal enclave.

1789 年的重大事件使欧洲走向真正的国家政府。1989 年的重大事件标志着共产主义的死亡,以及市场力量对集中力量的控制。这两次革命相隔两百年,定义了国家主权在大国体系中占主导地位的时代。大国反过来主导着世界,在最偏远的部落地带也传播或强加了国家体制。

The triumph of the state as the principal vehicle for organizing violence in the world was not a matter of ideology. It was necessitated by the cold logic of violence. It was, as we like to say, a megapolitical event, determined not so much by the wishes of theorists and statesmen, or even by the maneuvering of generals, as by the hidden leverage of violence, which moved history in the way that Archimedes dreamed of moving the world. States have been the norm for the past two hundred years of the modern period. But in the longer sweep of history, states have been rare.

国家作为世界上组织暴力的主要载体的胜利并非意识形态问题。这是由暴力的冷酷逻辑所必然引发的。这正如我们所说,是一个大政治事件,并非由理论家和政治家的愿望,甚至也不是将军们的策划所决定,而是由暴力的隐藏杠杆所推动,正如阿基米德梦想一般推动着历史的进程。在

现代两百年的历史中,国家一直是常态。但从更长远的历史来看,国家却是罕见的。

They have always depended upon extraordinary megapolitical conditions for their viability. Prior to the modern period, most states were '...Oriental despotisms,"

他们一直依赖非凡的大政治条件才能生存。在现代之前,大多数国家都是"东方专制政体"。

agricultural societies in deserts dependent upon control of irrigation systems for their survival. Even the Roman Empire, through its control of Egypt and North Africa, was indirectly a hydraulic society. But not enough of one to survive. Rome, like most premodern states, ultimately lacked the capacity to compel adherence to the monopoly of violence that the ability to starve people provides. The Roman state outside of Africa could not cut off water for growing crops by denying unsubmitive people access to the irrigation system. Such hydraulic systems supplied more leverage to violence than any other megapolitical configuration in the ancient economy. Whoever controlled the water in these societies could extract spoils at a level almost comparable to the percentage of total output absorbed by modern nationstate.

沙漠中的农业社会依赖于灌溉系统的控制才得以生存。即使是罗马帝国通过控制埃及和北非也间接成为了水利社会。但这并不足以让它生存下去。像大多数前现代国家一样,罗马最终无力强迫人们服从那种暴力垄断,即通过控制水源来饿死不顺从的人。位于非洲以外的罗马国家无法阻止人们获取灌溉水以种植庄稼。这些水利系统为暴力提供了比其他任何大政治格局在古代经济中都更大的影响力。凡是控制这些社会水源的人,都能抽取几乎相当于现代民族国家所吸收的全部产出的利益。

Magnitude over Efficiency
大于效率

Gunpowder enabled states to expand more easily outside the confines of rice paddies and arid river valleys. The nature of gunpowder weapons and the character of the industrial economy created great advantages of scale in

warfare. This led to high and rising returns to violence.

火药使得国家更容易地向水田和干旱河谷以外的区域扩张。火药武器的性质及工业经济的特点为战争带来了巨大的规模优势。这导致了暴力的高报酬和不断增长。

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As historian Charles Tilly put it, "[S]tates having the largest coercive means tended to win wars; efficiency (the ratio of output to input) came second to effectiveness (total output)."⁶ With governments mostly organized on a large scale, even the few small sovereignties that survived, like Monaco or Andorra, needed the recognition of the larger states to ensure their independence. Only big governments with ever-greater command of resources could compete on the battlefield.

正如历史学家查尔斯·蒂利所说，“拥有最大胁迫力的国家往往赢得战争；效率（产出与投入的比率）次于有效性（总产出）。”⁶ 即使少数小国如摩纳哥或安道尔在独立性上获得了生存，但也需要获得大国的承认。只有拥有日益增大的资源控制权的大政府才能在战场上竞争。

The Great Unanswered Question

这个未解之谜

This brings us to one of the great unanswered puzzles of modern history: why the Cold War that came at the conclusion of the Great Power system pitted as its final contenders Communist dictatorships against welfare-state democracies. This issue has been so little examined that it actually seemed plausible to many when a State Department analyst, Francis Fukuyama, proclaimed "the end of history" after the Berlin Wall fell. The enthusiastic audience his work elicited took too much for granted.

这给我们带来了现代历史上一个未解之谜：为什么在大国体系的结束时期，冷战的终极对手是共产党独裁政权与福利国家民主政体。这个问题几乎没有受到深入研究，以至于当一位国务院分析师弗朗西斯·福山宣布“历史结束”时，他的观点也被广泛接受。

Apparently neither the author nor many others had bothered to ask a fundamental question: What common characteristics of state socialism and

welfare-state democracies led them to be the final contenders for world domination? This is an important issue.

显然,作者或许都没有费心去问一个基本的问题:国家社会主义和福利国家民主制有何共同特点,导致它们成为争夺世界主导地位的最后竞争者?这是一个重要的问题。

After all, dozens of contending systems of sovereignty have come and gone in the past five centuries, including absolute monarchies, tribal enclaves, prince-bishoprics, direct rule by the pope, sultanates, city-states, and Anabaptist colonies. Today, most people would be surprised to learn that a hospital management company, with its own armed forces, could rule a country for centuries. Yet something very like that happened. For three hundred years after 1228, the Teutonic Knights of St. Mary's Hospital at Jerusalem, later united with the Knights of the Sword of Livonia, ruled East Prussia and various territories in Eastern Europe, including parts of Lithuania and Poland. Then came the Gunpowder Revolution. Within decades, the Teutonic Knights were expelled as sovereigns of all their territories and their Grand Master was of no more military importance than a chess champion. Why? Why did so many other systems of sovereignty dwindle to insignificance while the great struggle for world power at the end of the Industrial Age saw mass democracies lined up against state socialist systems?

在过去五个世纪里,数十种主权体系相继出现和消亡,包括绝对君主制、部落封建制、王主教制、教皇直接统治、苏丹国、城邦和重洗礼派殖民地。如今,大多数人很难想象,一家医院管理公司可以拥有自己的武装力量,并统治一个国家几个世纪。但事实确实如此。1228年后的三百年里,耶路撒冷圣玛丽医院的条顿骑士团(后与利沃尼亚剑骑士联合)统治着东普鲁士和东欧的各个领土,包括立陶宛和波兰的一部分地区。然后,火药革命的到来。几十年内,条顿骑士团就被驱逐出所有领土,他们的大团长也失去了与国际象棋冠军相当的军事地位。为什么会发生这种情况?为什么许多其他主权体系逐渐沦为无足轻重,而在工业时代结束时的世界强权争夺中,却出现了大规模民主制和国家社会主义体系的对峙?

Unimpeded Control 畅通无阻的控制

If our theory of megapolitics is correct, the answer is easy. It is rather like asking why sumo wrestlers tend to be fat. The answer is that a lean sumo wrestler, however impressive his ratio of strength to weight, cannot compete with another wrestler who is gigantic. As Tilly suggests, the important issue was "effectiveness (total output)," not "efficiency (the ratio of output to input)." In an increasingly violent world, the systems that predominated through five centuries of competition were necessarily those that facilitated the greatest access to resources needed to make war on a large scale.

如果我们的大政治理论是正确的,答案很简单。这就好比问为什么相扑选手往往胖。答案是,一个瘦的相扑选手,无论他的力量与体重比有多惊人,都无法与另一个巨型选手相抗衡。正如蒂利所建议的,重要的问题是"有效性(总产出)"而不是"效率(产出与投入的比率)。"在一个日益残暴的世界里,在五个世纪的竞争中占据主导地位的系统,必然是那些能为大规模战争提供最大资源获取能力的系统。

How did this work? In the case of Communism, the answer is obvious. Under Communism, those who controlled the state controlled almost everything. If you had 94

国营企业占绝大部分资产,政府对经济和社会生活高度控制。

been a citizen of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the KGB could have taken your toothbrush if they had thought it useful for their purposes to do so. They could have taken your teeth. According to credible estimates that have become more credible since the opening of former Soviet archives in 1992, secret police and other agents of the late Soviet state took the lives of 50 million persons in seventy-four years of rule. The state socialist system was in a position to mobilize anything that existed within its boundaries for its military, with little likelihood that anyone living there would argue.

在冷战时期作为苏联公民,如果克格勃认为你的牙刷对它们的目的有用,他们可能会取走它。他们也可能取走你的牙齿。根据可信的估计,自1992年前苏联档案馆开放以来,74年统治期间,前苏联国家的秘密警察

和其他代理人夺走了 5000 万人的生命。国家社会主义制度能够动员其边界内的任何东西来为其军事服务,极少有当时居民会提出异议。

In the case of Western democracies, the story is less obvious, partly because we are accustomed to think of democracy in stark contrast to Communism. In terms of the Industrial Age, the two systems were indeed great opposites. But seen from the perspective of the Information Age, the two systems had more in common than you might suspect. Both facilitated unimpeded control of resources by government. The difference was that the democratic welfare state placed even greater resources in the hands of the state than the state socialist systems.

在西方民主国家的情况下,这个故事并不那么明显,部分原因是我们习惯于将民主与共产主义划分为截然对立的两种体系。从工业时代的角度来看,这两种体系确实是截然相反的。但是从信息时代的角度来看,它们之间有更多的共同点,你可能没有想到。它们都促进了政府对资源的无障碍控制。不同的是,民主福利国家将更多的资源置于国家的手中,而不是像国家社会主义体系那样。

This is a clear-cut example of a rare phenomenon, less being more. The state socialist system was predicated upon the doctrine that the state owned everything. The democratic welfare state, by contrast, made more modest claims, and thereby employed superior incentives to mobilize greater output. Instead of laying claim to everything in the beginning, governments in the West allowed individuals to own property and accumulate wealth. Then, after the wealth had been accumulated, the Western nationstates taxed a large fraction of it away. Property taxes, income taxes, and estate taxes at high levels furnished the democratic welfare state with prodigious quantities of resources compared to those available through the state socialist systems.

这是一个罕见现象的明确例子,少即是多。国家社会主义制度是基于国家拥有一切的教义。相比之下,民主福利国家提出了更温和的要求,因此采用了更优越的激励措施来调动更大的产出。西方政府没有开始时就要求一切,而是允许个人拥有财产和积累财富。然后,在财富积累之后,西方国家对其征收大额税收。高额的财产税、所得税和遗产税为民

主福利国家提供了丰富的资源,远超过国家社会主义制度所能获得的资源。

Inefficiency, Where It Counted Compared to Communism, the welfare state was indeed a far more efficient system. But compared to other systems for accumulating wealth, such as a genuine laissez-faire enclave like Hong Kong, the welfare state was inefficient. Again, less was more. It was precisely this inefficiency that made the welfare state supreme during the megapolitical conditions of the Industrial Age.

与共产主义相比,福利国家确实是一个更加高效的体系。但与香港这样的真正放任式经济体相比,福利国家则效率不高。事实上,越是低效越能取胜。正是这种低效性使得福利国家在工业时代的巨观政治条件下占据了统治地位。

When you come to understand why, you are much closer to recognizing what the fall of the Berlin Wall and the death of Communism really mean. Far from assuring that the democratic welfare state will be a triumphant system, as has been widely assumed, it was more like seeing that a fraternal twin has died of old age. The same megapolitical revolution that killed Communism is also likely to undermine and destroy democratic welfare states as we have known them in the twentieth century.

当您理解为什么时,您就更接近于认识柏林墙倒塌和共产主义灭亡的真正含义。这并不能确保民主福利国家会成为一个胜利的体系,正如人们广泛假设的那样,这更像是看到一个兄弟双胞胎死于老 age。杀死共产主义的同一个大政治革命可能也会破坏和毁灭我们在二十世纪所知的民主福利国家。

WHO CONTROLS GOVERNMENT?

谁控制政府?

The key to this unorthodox conclusion lies in recognizing where the control of democratic government is lodged. It is an issue that is not as simple as it may seem. In the modern era, the question of who controls the government has almost always been asked as a political question. It has had many answers, but almost uniformly these involved identifying the political party, group, or faction that dominated the control of a particular state at a

particular moment. You have heard of governments controlled by 95
在当代，对于民主政府的控制权问题，答案并非如表面看起来那么简单。这个关键问题的关键在于识别民主政府的控制中心在哪里。通常被视为政治问题，有多种答案，但通常都涉及识别某一特定时期主导某个国家控制权的政党、群体或派系。您可能听说过由 95%

capitalists. Governments controlled by labor. Governments controlled by Catholics, and by Islamic fundamentalists. Governments controlled by tribal and racial groups; governments controlled by Hutus and governments by whites. You have also heard of governments controlled by occupational groups, such as lawyers or bankers. You have heard of governments controlled by rural interests, by big-city machines and by people living in the suburbs.

资本家控制的政府。工人阶级控制的政府。天主教徒控制的政府，以及伊斯兰教原教旨主义者控制的政府。部落和种族团体控制的政府；胡图人控制的政府以及白人控制的政府。您也听说过职业团体如律师或银行家控制的政府。您也听说过农村利益集团、大城市集团和郊区人控制的政府。

And you have certainly heard of governments controlled by political parties, by Democrats, Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Radicals, Republicans, and Socialists.

政府常由政党控制，如民主党、保守党、基督教民主党、自由党、激进党、共和党和社会党。

But you probably have not heard much about a government controlled by its customers. Economic historian Frederic Lane laid the basis for a new way of understanding where the control of government lies in some of his lucid essays on the economic consequences of violence discussed earlier. Thinking about government as an economic unit that sells protection led Lane to analyze the control of government in economic rather than political terms. In this view, there are three basic alternatives in the control of government, each of which entails a fundamentally different set of incentives: proprietors, employees, and customers.

但是您可能还没有听说过一种由其客户控制的政府。经济历史学家弗雷德里克·莱恩在他之前论述过暴力经济后果的清晰文章中，为理解政府

控制权的新方式奠定了基础。将政府视为销售保护的经济单位,使莱恩从经济而非政治的角度分析政府的控制权。根据这种观点,政府控制存在三种基本替代方式,每种方式都涉及根本不同的激励机制:所有者、雇员和客户。

Proprietors 所有者

In rare cases, even today, governments are sometimes controlled by a proprietor, usually a hereditary leader who for all intents and purposes owns the country. For example, the Sultan of Brunei treats the government of Brunei somewhat like a proprietorship. This was more common among lords of the Middle Ages, who treated their fiefs as proprietorships to optimize their incomes.

即使在今天,也很少见有政府被一个所有者或通常是一位世袭领导人所控制,他们实际上就是拥有该国家。例如,文莱苏丹将文莱政府视为一种所有权。这在中世纪的诸侯统治时期更为普遍,他们将自己的封地视为所有权,以优化自己的收入。

Lane described the incentives of "the owners of the production-producing enterprise" as follows: An interest in maximizing profits would lead him, while maintaining prices, to try to reduce his costs. He would, like Henry VII of England or Louis XI of France, use inexpensive wiles, at least as inexpensive devices as possible, to affirm his legitimacy, to maintain domestic order, and to distract neighboring princes so that his own military expenses would be low. From lowered costs, or from the increased exactions made possible by the firmness of his monopoly, or from a combination, he accumulated a surplus 7 Governments controlled by proprietors have strong incentives to reduce the costs of providing protection or monopolizing violence in a given area. But so long as their rule is secure, they have little incentive to reduce the price (tax) they charge their customers below the rate that optimizes revenues. The higher the price a monopolist can charge, and the lower his actual costs, the greater the profit he will make.

生产企业所有者的激励因素如下:为了最大化利润,在保持价格不变的情况下,他会努力降低成本。他就像英格兰亨利七世或法国路易十一一样,

会采用廉价的方法来确立合法性,维护国内秩序,并转移邻国王室注意力,从而将自己的军事开支降到最低。由于成本下降,或者由于垄断带来的更高的剥削力度,或者两者兼有,他积累了盈余。由所有者控制的政府有强烈的动力去降低提供保护或垄断暴力的成本。但只要他们的统治地位稳固,他们就没有动力将收取的价格(税收)降低到优化收益的水平以下。垄断者能收取的价格越高,实际成本越低,他能获得的利润就越大。

The ideal fiscal policy for a government controlled by its proprietors would be a huge surplus. When governments can keep their revenues high but cut their costs, this has a large impact on the use of resources.

政府由其所有者控制的理想财政政策应该是巨额盈余。当政府能够保持收入高企但降低成本时,这对资源的利用产生重大影响。

Labor and other valuable inputs that would otherwise be wasted providing unnecessarily expensive protection become available instead for investment and other purposes. The higher the monarch can raise his profit by lowering costs, the more 96

劳动和其他宝贵的投入本来会被浪费在提供不必要的昂贵保护上,而现在可以用于投资和其他用途。君主能够通过降低成本来提高自己的利润越高,他就越 96

resources are freed. When these resources are used for investment, they provide a stimulus for growth.

当这些资源用于投资时,它们为增长提供了刺激。

But even if they are used for conspicuous consumption, they help create and feed new markets that otherwise would not exist if the resources had been wasted to produce inefficient "protection." Employees It is easy to characterize the incentives that prevail for governments controlled by their employees. They would be similar incentives in other employee-controlled organizations. First and foremost, employee-run organizations tend to favor any policy that increases employment and oppose measures which reduce jobs. As Lane put it, "When employees as a whole controlled, they had little interest in minimizing the amounts exacted for protection and none in minimizing that large part of costs represented by labor costs, by their own

salaries. Maximizing size was more to their taste also." A government controlled by its employees would seldom have incentives to either reduce the costs of government or the price charged to their customers. However, where conditions impose strong price resistance, in the form of opposition to higher taxes, governments controlled by employees would be more likely to let their revenues fall below their outlays than to cut their outlays. In other words, their incentives imply that they may be inclined toward chronic deficits, as governments controlled by proprietors would not be customers. Are there examples of governments controlled by their customers? Yes.

即使用于炫耀性消费,它们也有助于创造和养育新的市场,如果资源被浪费来生产低效的"保护",否则这些市场是不会存在的。很容易描述政府受其雇员控制的激励机制。这种激励机制在其他由雇员控制的组织中也会类似。首先,由雇员经营的组织往往会支持任何能增加就业的政策,并反对减少工作岗位的措施。正如兰恩所说,"当雇员整体掌控时,他们几乎没有兴趣最小化保护的开支,也没有兴趣最小化劳动力成本这个主要部分,即他们自己的工资。最大限度地增加规模也更符合他们的品味。"受雇员控制的政府很少会有减少政府开支或降低对客户收费的激励。然而,在强烈的价格抵制条件下,即反对增加税收,受雇员控制的政府更有可能让收入低于支出,而不是削减支出。换句话说,他们的激励机制意味着他们可能倾向于出现持续赤字,而由所有者控制的政府则不会如此。那么,有没有由顾客控制的政府的例子呢?

Lane was inspired to analyze the control of government in economic terms by the example of the medieval merchant republics, like Venice. There a group of wholesale merchants who required protection effectively controlled the government for centuries.

莱恩受到中世纪商业共和国(如威尼斯)政府经济控制的例子的启发,对政府控制进行了经济分析。几个批发商需要获得保护,实际上已经控制了政府数个世纪。

They were genuinely customers for the protection service government provided, not proprietors. They paid for the service. They did not seek to profit from their control of government's monopoly of violence. If some did, they were prevented from doing so by the other customers for long

periods of time. Other examples of governments controlled by their customers include democracies and republics with limited franchise, such as the ancient democracies, or the American republic in its founding period. At that time, only those who paid for the government, about 10 percent of the population, were allowed to vote.

他们是政府提供的保护服务的真正客户,而不是所有者。他们为服务付费。他们没有试图从政府暴力垄断中谋利。如果有人这样做,他们会被其他长期客户阻止这样做。其他被客户控制的政府的例子包括限制选举权的民主政体和共和政体,如古代民主政体或美国建国初期的共和政体。在那个时期,只有那些为政府买单的人,大约占总人口的 10%,才被允许投票。

Governments controlled by their customers, like those of proprietors, have incentives to reduce their operating costs as far as possible.

政府受其客户控制,其运营成本会尽量降低,就像所有者一样。

But unlike governments controlled by either proprietors or employees, governments actually controlled by their customers have incentives to hold down the prices they charge. Where customers rule, governments are lean and generally unobtrusive, with low operating costs, minimal employment, and low taxes. A government controlled by its customers sets tax rates not to optimize the amount the government can collect but rather to optimize the amount that the customers can retain.

但与由所有者或雇员控制的政府不同,实际由其客户控制的政府有动机压低收费价格。在客户当家作主的地方,政府精简高效,通常不会过度干预,运营成本低,员工少,税率也低。客户控制的政府设定税率的目的,不是为了最大化政府的收入,而是为了最大化客户的留存。

Like typical enterprises in competitive markets, even a monopoly controlled by its customers would be compelled to move toward efficiency. It would not be able to charge a price, in the form of taxes, that exceeded costs by more than a bare margin.

即使由客户控制的垄断企业,也将被迫朝着效率的方向发展。它无法收取超过成本加上微薄利润的价格(以税收的形式)。

THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY: VOTERS AS EMPLOYEES AND CUSTOMERS

民主的作用:选民作为员工和客户

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Lane treats democracy in the conventional way in assuming that it brings violence-using and violence-producing enterprises "increasingly under the control of their customers." q This is certainly the politically correct conclusion. But is it true? We think not. Look closely at how modern democracies function.

兰恩以传统方式处理民主,认为它使用暴力和制造暴力的企业"日益受到其客户的控制"。这无疑是政治正确的结论。但这是否属实?让我们仔细看看现代民主国家的运作方式。

First of all, they have few characteristics of those competitive industries where the terms of trade are clearly controlled by their customers. For one thing, democratic governments typically spend only a bare fraction of their total outlays on the service of protection, which is their core activity. In the United States, for example, state and local governments spend just 3.5 percent of their total outlays on the provision of police, as well as courts and prisons. Add military spending, and the fraction of revenues devoted to protection is still only about 10 percent. Another revealing hint that mass democracy is not controlled by its customers is the fact that contemporary political culture, inherited from the Industrial Age, would consider it outrageous if policies on crucial issues were actually informed by the interests of the people who pay the bills. Imagine the uproar if a U.S. president or a British prime minister proposed to allow the group of citizens who pay the majority of the taxes to determine which programs of government should continue and which groups of employees should be fired. This would deeply offend expectations of how government should operate, in a way that allowing government employees to determine whose taxes should be raised would not.

首先,他们的特点很少与那些明确由客户控制贸易条件的竞争性行业相似。首先,民主政府通常只在保护服务上支出很小一部分的总支出,而保护服务正是他们的核心活动。例如,在美国,州和地方政府仅将其总支出

的 3.5%用于警察、法院和监狱。加上军事开支,用于保护的收入份额也只有约 10%。另一个揭示大众民主不受其付账人控制的线索是,从工业时代传承下来的当代政治文化会认为,如果关键问题的政策实际上是根据支付账单人的利益而制定的,那将是令人发指的。试想一下,如果美国总统或英国首相提议允许支付大多数税款的公民群体来决定哪些政府计划应该继续,哪些雇员应该被解雇,会引发多大的轩然大波。这将严重违背人们对政府运作方式的预期,而允许政府雇员决定应该提高谁的税收则不会引起如此反响。

Yet when you think about it, when customers really are in the driver's seat it would be considered outrageous that they should not get what they want. If you went into a store to buy furniture, and the salespeople took your money but then proceeded to ignore your requests and consult others about how to spend your money, you would quite rightly be upset. You would not think it normal or justifiable if the employees of the store argued that you really did not deserve the furniture, and that it should be shipped instead to someone whom they found more worthy. The fact that something very like this happens in dealings with government shows how little control its "customers"

可是仔细想想,当客户真的掌握主动权时,如果他们不能得到自己想要的东西,那就太过分了。如果你去商店买家具,销售人员收了你的钱却不理会你的要求,而是咨询别人如何花你的钱,你势必会感到愤怒。如果店员认为你不配拥有这些家具,应该把它们发给他们认为更有资格的人,你也不会认为这种行为正常或可以接受。政府在处理这种事情时表现出与此类似的情况,足以显示它的"客户"缺乏控制权力。

actually have.
事实上拥有。

By any measure, the costs of democratic government have surged out of control, unlike the typical situation where customer preferences force vendors to be efficient.

从任何标准来看,民主政府的成本已经失控,这与通常情况下客户偏好促使供应商保持高效的情况不同。

Most democracies run chronic deficits. This is a fiscal policy characteristic of control by employees. Governments seem notably resistant to reducing the costs of their operations.

大多数民主国家都存在长期赤字。这是受雇员控制的财政政策特征。政府似乎明显抗拒降低运营成本。

An almost universal complaint about contemporary government worldwide is that political programs, once established, can be curtailed only with great difficulty. To fire a government employee is all but impossible.

政府的现状几乎遭到了全世界的抱怨,那就是一旦建立的政策计划通常很难被缩减。解雇一名政府雇员几乎是不可能的。

In fact, one of the principal advantages arising from privatization of formerly state-owned functions is that private control usually makes it far easier to weed out unnecessary employment. From Britain to Argentina, it has not been uncommon for the new private managers to shed 50-95 percent of former state employees.

事实上,将原本由国有企业承担的职能私有化的一个主要优势是,私人控制通常能更容易清理不必要的工作岗位。从英国到阿根廷,新的私营管理者常常会裁减 50%至 95%的前国有企业员工。

Think, as well, of the basis upon which the fiscal terms of government's protection service is priced. For the most part, you would look in vain for hints of competitive influences on tax rates according to which government services are priced.

政府保护服务的财政条款定价基础。大部分情况下,你很难找到有关政府服务定价的竞争因素对税率的影响。

Even the occasional debates about lowering taxes that have interrupted normal political discourse in recent years betray how far removed democratic government has normally 98

即使近年来一些关于降低税收的偶发辩论干扰了正常的政治话语,也暴露了民主政府通常是多么与民众远离

been from control by its customers. Advocates of lower taxes sometimes have argued that government revenues would actually increase because

rates previously had been set so high that they discouraged economic activity.

从其客户的控制中解放。较低税收的倡导者有时论证说,政府收入实际上会增加,因为此前税率设得太高,抑制了经济活动。

The trade-off they normally intended to highlight was not competition between jurisdictions but something much more amazing. They did not argue that because tax rates in Hong Kong were only 15 percent, rates in the United States or Germany must be no higher than 15 percent. To the contrary. Tax debates have normally assumed that the trade-off facing the taxpayer was not between doing business in one jurisdiction or doing it in another, but between doing business at penal rates or taking a holiday. You were told that productive individuals subject to predatory taxation would walk away from their in-boxes and go golfing if their tax burdens were not eased.

他们通常希望强调的权衡并非是司法管辖区之间的竞争,而是更令人惊奇的东西。他们并不认为,由于香港的税率仅为 15%,美国或德国的税率必须不高于 15%。恰恰相反。税收辩论通常假设纳税人面临的权衡不是在一个管辖区内经商还是在另一个管辖区内经商,而是在承受惩罚性税率的情况下经商还是休假。你被告知,如果不缓解他们的税收负担,生产性个人将远离工作,去打高尔夫球。

The fact that such an argument could even arise shows how far removed from a competitive footing the protection costs imposed by democratic welfare states have been.

这样的争论竟然会产生,说明了民主福利国家所施加的保护费用与竞争条件的距离有多大。

The terms of progressive income taxation, which emerged in every democratic welfare state during the course of the twentieth century, are dramatically unlike pricing provisions that would be preferred by customers. This can easily be seen by comparing taxation imposed to support a monopolistic provision of protection with tariffs for telephone service, which until recently was a monopoly in most places. Customers would scream bloody murder if a telephone company attempted to charge for calls on the same basis that income taxes are imposed. Suppose the

phone company sent a bill for \$50,000 for a call to London, just because you happened to conclude a deal worth \$125,000 during a conversation. Neither you nor any other customer in his right mind would pay it. But that is exactly the basis upon which income taxes are assessed in every democratic welfare state.

累进所得税的条款,在 20 世纪的民主福利国家中出现,与顾客偏好的定价条款有很大不同。这一点可以通过比较保护性垄断提供的税收和最近大部分地区电话服务的关税来轻易看出。如果电话公司试图根据收入税的方式收费,顾客会愤怒地反对。假设电话公司因你在通话中达成了 125,000 美元的交易而开具 50,000 美元的账单。你和任何理智的客户都不会支付这笔费用。但这正是每个民主福利国家评估收入税的依据。

When you think closely about the terms under which industrial democracies have operated, it is more logical to treat them as a form of government controlled by their employees. Thinking of mass democracy as government controlled by its employees helps explain the difficulty of changing government policy. Government in many respects appears to be run for the benefit of employees. For example, government schools in most democratic countries seem to malfunction chronically and without remedy. If customers truly were in the driver's seat, they would find it easier to set new policy directions.

工业民主国家在运营中的条件是给予员工控制的一种政府形式。将大众民主视为由员工控制的政府有助于解释难以改变政府政策的原因。从很多方面来看,政府都似乎是为了员工的利益而运营。例如,大多数民主国家的政府学校似乎存在着难以解决的慢性失灵问题。如果客户真的掌控一切,他们就能更轻松地设定新的政策方向。

Those who pay for democratic government seldom set the terms of government spending. Instead, government functions as a co-op that is both outside of proprietary control and operating as a natural monopoly. Prices bear little relation to costs. The quality of service is generally low compared to that in private enterprise. Customer grievances are hard to remedy. In short, mass democracy leads to control of government by its "employees." But wait. You may be saying that in most jurisdictions there are many more voters than there are persons on the government payroll. How could it be

possible for employees to dominate under such conditions? The welfare state emerged to answer exactly this quandary. Since there were not otherwise enough employees to create a working majority, increasing numbers of voters were effectively put on the payroll to receive transfer payments of all kinds. In effect, the recipients of transfer 99

那些为民主政府买单的人很少决定政府支出的条件。相反,政府的运作就像一个既不受私人控制也是自然垄断的合作社。价格与成本关系不大。服务质量通常低于私营企业。客户的不满很难得到补救。简而言之,大众民主导致政府被其"雇员"掌控。但等等,你可能会说,在大多数管辖区,选民人数远远超过政府工资单上的人数。在这种情况下,雇员怎么可能主导呢?福利国家应运而生,正是为了解决这个困境。因为没有足够的雇员来创造一个有效的多数,所以越来越多的选民实际上被纳入工资单,以获得各种转移支付。实际上,转移支付的接受者成为了政府的"雇员"。

payments and subsidies became pseudo-government employees who were able to dispense with the bother of reporting every day to work.

支付和补贴成为伪政府雇员,他们能够免除每天上班的烦恼。

It was a result dictated by the megapolitical logic of the industrial age. 这是工业时代大政治逻辑所主导的结果。

When the magnitude of coercive force is more important than the efficient deployment of resources, as was the case prior to 1989, it is all but impossible for most governments to be controlled by their customers. As the example of the late Soviet Union illustrated so well, until a few years ago it was possible for states to exercise great power in the world even while wasting resources on a massive scale. When returns to violence are high and rising, magnitude means more than efficiency. Larger entities tend to prevail over smaller ones. Those governments that are more effective in mobilizing military resources, even at the cost of wasting many of them, tend to prevail over those that utilize resources more efficiently.

当施加强制力的规模比资源的有效部署更重要时,像 1989 年前那样,大多数政府很难受到顾客的控制。正如前苏联的例子所很好地说明的那样,直到几年前,即使浪费大规模资源,国家也仍可在世界上行使强大的力量。当暴力的回报很高且不断上升时,规模比效率更重要。较大的实

体往往胜过较小的实体。那些在动员军事资源方面更有效的政府,即使以浪费许多资源为代价,也往往胜过那些更有效利用资源的政府。

Those who pay for democratic government have little to say about how their money is spent. Instead, it functions as a co-op which is both outside of proprietary control, and operating as a natural monopoly.

那些为民主政府买单的人对他们的钱是如何被使用几乎没有发言权。相反,它就像一个共同体,既不受私有控制,也作为自然垄断体运营。

Prices bear little relation to costs. The quality of service is generally low compared to that in private enterprise. Customer grievances are hard to remedy. In short, mass democracy leads to control of government by its "employees." Think what this means. It inescapably implies that when magnitude means more than efficiency, governments controlled by their customers cannot prevail, and often, cannot survive.

价格与成本几乎无关。与私营企业相比,服务质量普遍较低。客户的投诉很难得到解决。简而言之,大众民主导致政府由其"员工"控制。想想这意味着什么。这不可避免地意味着,当规模比效率更重要时,由客户控制的政府是无法长期存在的,往往也无法生存。

Under such conditions, the entities that will be most effectively militarily are those that commandeer the most resources for war. But governments that are truly controlled by their customers who pay their bills are unlikely to have carte blanche to reach into the pockets of everyone to extract resources.

在这种情况下,最能有效执行军事行动的实体是那些征用最多战争资源的实体。但是,真正受客户控制并由客户支付账单的政府,不太可能有全权挥霍所有人钱袋的特权。

Customers normally wish to see the prices they pay for any product or service, including protection, lowered and kept under control. If the Western democracies had been under customer control during the Cold War, that fact alone would have made them weaker competitors militarily, because it would almost certainly have curtailed the flow of resources into the government. Remember, where customers rule, both prices and costs should be expected to be under tight control. But this is hardly what

happened.

客户通常希望看到他们为任何产品或服务(包括保护)支付的价格降低并保持在可控范围内。如果在冷战期间西方民主国家受到客户控制,这一事实本身就会使他们在军事上更薄弱的竞争者,因为这几乎肯定会缩减向政府的资源流。记住,在客户掌控的情况下,价格和成本都应该保持严格控制。但这绝不是发生的情况。

The welfare states were manifestly the winners of the spending contest during the Cold War. Commentators of all stripes cited as a factor in their triumph their ability to spend the Soviet Union into bankruptcy.

福利国显然是冷战期间支出竞争的赢家。各路评论员都将其击败苏联直至破产的能力列为其胜利因素之一。

It is precisely this fact that highlights the way in which the inefficiencies of democracy made it megapolitically predominant during a period of rising returns to violence. Massive military spending, with all its waste, represents a distinctly suboptimal deployment of capital for private gain. We suggested earlier that while welfare states were economically efficient as compared to state socialist systems, they are far less efficient for the creation of wealth than laissez-faire enclaves, like Hong Kong.

这正突出了民主的低效率如何在暴力回报上升的时期使之在大政治上占主导地位。大规模的军事开支及其所带来的浪费,代表了一种明显次优的资本部署方式,用于私利。我们早前提出,尽管福利国家相比社会主义国家体系在经济效率方面更优,但它们远不及自由放任的枢纽如香港,在创造财富方面更有效率。

Ironically, it was this very inefficiency of the democratic welfare state as compared to a more unencumbered free-market system that made it successful-in the megapolitical conditions of industrialism.

讽刺的是,与更不受约束的自由市场体系相比,民主福利国家的效率低下正是使其成功的原因——在工业主义的大政治条件下。

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How did inefficiency fostered by democracy become a factor in its success during the Age of Violence? The key to unraveling this apparent paradox

lies in recognizing two points:

民主制度的低效为什么在暴力时代成为其成功的因素?解开这一表面矛盾的关键在于认识以下两点:

1. Success for a sovereignty in the modern period lay not in creating wealth but in creating a military force capable of deploying overpowering violence against any other state. Money was needed to do that, but money itself could not win a battle. The challenge was not to create a system with the most efficient economy or the most rapid rate of growth, but to create a system that could extract more resources and channel them into the military. By its nature, military spending is an area where the financial returns per se are low or nonexistent.

在现代,一个主权国家成功的关键不在于创造财富,而在于建立一支能够对任何其他国家施加压倒性暴力的军事力量。为此需要资金支持,但资金本身并不能决定战争的胜负。关键挑战不在于建立最高效的经济体系或最快的增长速度,而在于建立能够抽取更多资源并将其转化为军事用途的体系。从本质上来说,军事开支往往难以直接获得丰厚的经济回报。

2. The easiest way to obtain permission to invest funds in activities with little or no direct financial return, like tax payments, is to ask for permission from someone other than the person whose money is coveted. One of the ways that the Dutch were able to purchase Manhattan for twenty-three dollars' worth of beads is that the particular Indians to whom they made the offer were not the ones who properly owned it. Getting to yes,"

在缺乏直接财务回报的活动(如缴税)中投资资金,最简单的方式是向被羈属人以外的人申请许可。荷兰人能以价值 23 美元的珠子购买曼哈顿岛的原因之一就是,他们与之交易的特定印第安人并非该土地的真正所有者。"达成一致"。

as the marketing people say, is much easier under those terms. Suppose, for example, that as authors of this book we wanted you to pay not its cover price but 40 percent of your annual income for a copy. We would be far likelier to get permission to do so if we asked someone else, and did not have to ask you. In fact, we would be far more persuasive if we could rely instead upon the consent of several people you do not even know. We could

hold an ad hoc election, what H. L. Mencken described, with less exaggeration than he might have thought, as "an advanced auction of stolen goods." And to make the example more realistic, we would agree to share some of the money we collected from you with these anonymous bystanders in exchange for their support.

正如营销人员所说,在这些条件下要容易得多。例如,假设作为本书的作者,我们希望您支付的不是封面价格,而是您年收入的 40%。如果我们向其他人询问,而不必向您询问,我们很可能会获得许可这样做。事实上,如果我们能依赖几个您甚至不认识的人的同意,我们会更加有说服力。我们可以举行一次临时选举,正如 H. L. 门肯所描述的那样,"被盗物品的预先拍卖"。为了使这个例子更加贴近现实,我们还会同意将从您那里收集的一些钱分享给这些匿名旁观者,以换取他们的支持。

That is the role the modern democratic welfare state evolved to fulfill. It was an unsurpassed system in the Industrial Age because it was both efficient and inefficient where it counted. It combined the efficiency of private ownership and incentives for the creation of wealth with a mechanism to facilitate essentially unchecked access to that wealth. Democracy kept the pockets of wealth producers open. It succeeded militarily during the high-water period of rising returns to violence in the world precisely because it made it difficult for customers to effectively restrict the taxes the government collected or other ways of funding the outlay of resources for the military, such as inflation.

现代民主福利国家就是为了履行这一角色而逐步发展而来的。这在工业时代是一个无与伦比的体系,因为它在重要的地方既高效又低效。它将私有制和创造财富的激励机制的效率与几乎不受约束地获取财富的机制结合在一起。民主使财富创造者的口袋一直敞开。正是因为它使政府难以被客户有效限制征税或其他为军事开支提供资金的方式(如通胀),所以它在全球暴力回报不断上升的高潮期间取得了军事成功。

Why Customers Could Not Dominate 顾客为什么无法主导

Those who paid for "protection" during the modern period were not in a position to successfully deny resources to the sovereign, even acting collectively, when doing so would simply have exposed them to being

overpowered by other, possibly more hostile states. This was an obvious consideration during the Cold War. The customers, or taxpayers, who bore a disproportionate share of the cost of government in the leading Western industrial states were in no position to refuse to pay hefty taxes. The result would have been to expose themselves to total confiscation by the Soviet Union or another aggressive group capable of organizing violence.

现代时期, "保护费"的支付者无法成功拒绝向主权国家提供资源, 即便采取集体行动, 因为那样做只会使他们面临被其他可能更加敌对的国家压倒的风险。这在冷战时期是一个显而易见的考虑因素。在主导西方工业国家, 承担政府开支的大部分费用的客户或纳税人, 无法拒绝支付高昂的税款。拒缴税款的结果将使他们面临被苏联或其他能组织暴力的侵略团体全部没收的风险。

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Industrialism and Democracy 工业主义与民主

Taking a longer view, mass democracy may prove to be an anachronism that will not long survive the end of the Industrial Age. Certainly, mass democracy and the nationstate emerged together with the French Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, probably as a response to a surge in real income. Incomes had begun to rise significantly in Western Europe about 1750, partly as a result of warmer weather. This coincided with a period of technological innovation that displaced skilled jobs of artisans with equipment that could be operated by unskilled workers, even women and children.

从长远来看,大众民主可能是一种现代性已经结束的措施。毫无疑问,大众民主和民族国家是与法国大革命在 18 世纪末共同出现的,可能是作为应对实际收入激增的一种反应。大约在 1750 年,西欧的收入开始显著上升,部分原因是由于天气变暖。这与一个技术创新时期相重合,其中工匠的熟练工作被设备取代,这些设备可由非技术工人甚至妇女和儿童操作。

This new industrial equipment raised earnings for unskilled workers, making the income distribution more equal.

这种新的工业设备提高了非技能工人的收益,使收入分配更加平等。

The crucial trigger point of revolution may not have been, as is often thought, the perverse idea that people tend to revolt when conditions improve. More important may be the fact that when incomes had risen to a certain level, it at last became practical for the early-modern state to circumvent the private intermediaries and powerful magnates with whom they had previously bargained for resources, and move to a system of "direct rule" in which a national government dealt directly with individual citizens, taxing them at ever higher rates and demanding poorly compensated military service in exchange for provision of various benefits. 革命的关键触发点可能不是,正如经常认为的那样,人们倾向于在条件改善时反叛。更重要的可能是,当收入达到一定水平时,现代早期的政府终于能够绕过之前谈判资源所依赖的私人中介商和强大的大地主,转而采用"直接统治"的体系,国家政府直接与个人公民打交道,对他们征税日益提高,并要求他们提供缺乏报酬的军事服务作为各种利益的交换。

Because the emerging middle class soon had enough money to tax, it was no longer essential, as it previously had been, for rulers to negotiate with powerful landlords or great merchants who were, as historian Charles Tilly wrote, "in a position to prevent the creation of a powerful state" that would "seize their assets and cramp their transactions." "It is easy to see why governments were more successful in extracting resources when they dealt with millions of citizens individually rather than with a relative handful of lords, dukes, earls, bishops, contract mercenaries, free cities, and other semisovereign entities with whom the rulers of European states were obliged to negotiate prior to the mid-eighteenth century.

因为新兴中产阶级很快有足够的钱可以征税,统治者就不再像以前那样需要与强大的地主或大商人进行谈判。正如历史学家查尔斯·蒂利所写的,"这些人能够阻止强大的国家的形成",并"扣押他们的资产,限制他们的交易"。可以很容易地看出,政府在处理数以百万计的个人公民时比与相对少数的领主、公爵、伯爵、主教、雇佣兵、自由城市和其他半主权实体进行谈判更加成功地获取资源,这种情况在 18 世纪中叶之前一直存在。

Rising real incomes allowed governments to adopt a strategy that placed more resources under their control. Small sums taken in taxes from millions could produce more revenue than larger amounts paid by a few powerful people. What is more, the many were far easier to deal with than the few, who were generally unwilling to give their money away and were far better placed to resist.

不断上升的实际收入使政府能够采取将更多资源置于其控制之下的战略。从数以百万计的人那里征收小额税收,能产生比从少数有力人士那里收取较大金额还更多的收入。此外,相比较少数强大的人士通常不太愿意放弃自己的钱财且更有能力进行抗争,处理大众要容易得多。

After all, the typical farmer, small merchant, or worker possessed vanishingly small resources as compared to the state itself. It was not even remotely possible that the typical private individual in Western Europe on the eve of the French Revolution could have effectively bargained with the state to reduce his tax rate, or mounted an effective resistance to government plans and policies that threatened his interests. But this is precisely what powerful private magnates had done for centuries and would continue to do. They effectively resisted and bargained with rulers, restraining their ability to commandeer resources.

总而言之,典型的农民、小商人或工人所拥有的资源与国家本身相比微乎其微。在法国大革命前夕的西欧,普通私人根本不可能有效地与国家讨价还价以降低税率,或者有效地对抗威胁到自身利益的政府计划和政策。但这正是强大的私人巨头们多个世纪以来一直在做的事情,并将继续这样做。他们有效地抵抗和与统治者讨价还价,限制了统治者动用资源的能力。

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“Going to war accelerated the move from indirect to direct rule. Almost any state that makes war finds that it cannot pay for the effort from its accumulated reserves and current revenues.

战争加速了从间接统治向直接统治的转变。几乎任何发动战争的国家都发现,它们无法仅凭积累的储备和当前收入来支付战争开支。

Almost all warmaking states borrow extensively, raise taxes, and seize the means of combat-including men-from reluctant citizens who have other uses for their resources." CHARLES

"几乎所有的战争国家都大量借贷、提高税收,并从不情愿的公民手中夺取战斗手段,包括人员,而这些公民有其他用途。"查尔斯

TILLY

The example of Poland in the mid-eighteenth century illustrates this perfectly. In 1760, the Polish national army comprised eighteen thousand soldiers. This was a meager force compared to the armies commanded by rulers of neighboring Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the least of whom could control a standing army of 100,000 soldiers. In fact, the Polish national army in 1760 was small even in comparison with other units under arms within Poland. The combined forces of the Polish nobility were thirty thousand men.¹³

18 世纪中期的波兰是一个很好的例子。1760 年,波兰的国家军队由 18,000 名士兵组成。这支军队规模微小,与邻国奥地利、普鲁士和俄罗斯统治者麾下的军队相比,后者最小的也能控制 10 万名士兵。事实上,1760 年波兰的国家军队规模,与波兰境内其他武装部队相比也很小。波兰贵族的总兵力达 30,000 人。

If the Polish king had been able to interact directly with millions of individual Poles and tax them directly, rather than being limited to extracting resources indirectly through the contributions of the powerful Polish magnates, there is little doubt that the Polish central government would have been in a position to raise far more revenues, and thus pay for a larger army.

如果波兰国王能够直接与数百万名普通波兰人互动并直接向他们征税,而不仅仅局限于通过强大的波兰大贵族的贡献间接提取资源,那么波兰中央政府就肯定能够筹集更多的收入,从而维持一支更大的军队。

Against ordinary individuals, who were not in a position to act in concert with millions of other ordinary individuals, the central authorities were to prove irresistibly powerful everywhere. But the king of Poland lacked the option of directly taxing his citizens in 1760. He had to deal through the lords, wealthy merchants, and other notables, who were a small, cohesive group. They could and did act in concert to keep the king from commandeering their resources without their consent. Given that the Polish nobility had far more troops than he did, the king was in no position to insist.

对普通个人来说,他们无法与数百万其他普通个人一起行动,中央当局在各地都将证明是不可抗拒的强大力量。但是,1760 年波兰国王没有直接向公民征税的选择。他不得不通过贵族、富裕商人和其他著名人士来处理,他们是一个小规模、内部团结的群体。他们能够并且确实团结一致,阻止国王未经他们同意就征用他们的资源。鉴于波兰贵族拥有的军队远多于国王,国王无法坚持自己的意志。

As it turned out, the military disadvantage of failing to circumvent the wealthy and powerful in gathering resources was decisive in the Age of Violence. Within a few years, Poland ceased to exist as an independent country. It was conquered by invasions from Austria, Prussia, and Russia, three countries with armies each of which was many times bigger than Poland's small force. In each of those countries, the rulers had found paths to circumvent the capacity of the wealthy merchants and the nobility to limit the commandeering of their resources.

由于未能绕过富有和强大的人收集资源,这在暴力时代成为了军事上的劣势。几年后,波兰不复存在作为一个独立国家。它被从奥地利、普鲁士和俄罗斯发动的入侵所征服,这三个国家的军队规模都远远大于波兰的小部队。在这些国家中,统治者找到了绕过富有商人和贵族限制其资源调集能力的途径。

After the French Revolution 法国大革命之后

The French Revolution resulted in an even greater surge in the size of armies, a fact that demonstrated the strength of the democratic strategy when returns to violence were rising. The bargain governments struck from the French Revolution onward was to provide an unprecedented degree of involvement in the lives of average people, in exchange for their participation in wars in place of mercenaries, and paying a growing burden of taxes from their rising incomes.

法国大革命导致了军队规模的进一步扩大,这个事实证明了民主战略的力量,因为返回暴力的情况正在上升。从法国大革命开始,政府达成的交易是,以空前程度的参与平民百姓的生活为交换,他们参与取代雇佣兵的战争,并从不断增加的收入中承担日益沉重的税收负担。

As Tilly said, The state's sphere expanded far beyond its military core, and its citizens began to make claims on it for a very wide range of protection, adjudication, production, and distribution. As national legislatures extended their own ranges well beyond the approval of taxation, they became the targets of claims from all well-103

正如蒂利所说,国家的范围远远超出了其军事核心,其公民开始要求它提供广泛的保护、裁决、生产和分配。随着国家立法机构将其范围大大扩展到税收批准之外,它们成为各种主张的目标。

organized groups whose interests the state did or could affect. Direct rule and mass national politics grew up together, and reinforced each other mightily.' 4 The same logic that was true in the eighteenth century remained true until 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. As the Industrial Age advanced, incomes for unskilled work continued to rise, making mass democracy an even more effective method of optimizing the extraction of resources.

有组织的利益集团,国家会或可能会影响其利益。直接统治和大规模民族政治是同步发展的,并相互加强。这一逻辑在 18 世纪成立,一直延续到 1989 年,柏林墙倒塌。随着工业时代的进步,非技术工人的收入持续上涨,使大众民主成为更有效的资源提取方式。

As a result, government grew and grew, adding about 0.5 percent to its total claims on annual income in the average industrial country over the twentieth century.

结果,政府日益庞大,在 20 世纪里,它在平均工业国家的总收入中的份额增加了约 0.5%。

During the Industrial Age prior to 1989, democracy emerged as the most militarily effective form of government precisely because democracy made it difficult or impossible to impose effective limits on the commandeering of resources by the state.

在 1989 年之前的工业时代,民主政体之所以成为最具军事效率的政府形式,正是因为民主使得由国家对资源的掌控难以设置有效限制。

Generous provision of welfare benefits to one and all invited a majority of voters to become, in effect, employees of the government. This became the predominant political feature of all leading industrial countries because

voters were in a weak position to effectively control the government in their role as customers for the service of protection.

向所有人慷慨提供福利利益,导致大多数选民实际上成为政府的员工。这成为所有主要工业国家的主要政治特征,因为作为对保护服务的客户,选民难以有效控制政府。

Not only did they face the aggressive menace of Communist systems, which could produce large resources for military purposes since the state controlled the entire economy. But true taxpayer control of government was also impractical for another reason.

他们不仅面临着共产主义体系的侵略性威胁,因为国家控制整个经济,因此可以为军事目的提供大量资源。但真正的纳税人对政府的控制也因另一个原因而实际上是不可行的。

Millions of average citizens cannot work together effectively to protect their interests. Because the obstacles to their cooperation are high, and the return to any individual for successfully defending the group's common interests is minimal, millions of ordinary citizens will not be as successful in withholding their assets from the government as will smaller groups with more favorable incentives.

数百万普通公民无法有效地共同合作来维护自己的利益。因为他们合作的障碍很高,而为了维护群体共同利益而成功付出努力所获得的回报对个人来说微不足道,所以普通公民在从政府手中保护资产方面不会像小群体那样成功,后者拥有更有利的激励措施。

Other things being equal, therefore, you would expect a higher proportion of total resources to be commandeered by government in a mass democracy than in an oligarchy, or in a system of fragmented sovereignty where magnates wielded military power and fielded their own armies, as they did everywhere in early-modern Europe prior to the eighteenth century.

因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,你会希望在大众民主制度中政府掌握的资源占比会比寡头制度或分散主权的体系更高,在后者中,大亨们拥有军事实力,维持自己的军队,这种情况在 18 世纪之前的早期现代欧洲各地都存在。

Thus a crucial though seldom examined reason for the growth of democracy in the Western world is the relative importance of negotiation costs at a time when returns to violence were rising. It was always costlier to draw resources from the few than from the many.

因此,尽管很少受到检验,但是促进民主发展在西方世界的一个关键原因是,在暴力收益不断上升的背景下,谈判成本的相对重要性。从少数人那里获取资源总是比从众多人那里获取资源成本更高。

A relatively small, elite group of rich represent a more coherent and effective body than a large mass of citizens. The small group has stronger incentives to work together. It will almost inevitably be more effective at protecting its interests than will a mass group.' 5 And even if most members of the group choose not to cooperate with any common action, a few who are rich may be capable of deploying enough resources to get the job done. 富有的精英阶层比大众利用得更加凝聚和高效。这个小群体有更强的动力团结合作,在维护利益方面几乎必然会比大众更加有效。即便该群体中大多数人选择不参与任何集体行动,也仍可能有少数富人能够调配足够的资源来完成任务。

With democratic decision-making, the nationstate could exercise power much more completely over millions of persons, who could not easily cooperate to act collectively in their own behalf, than it could in dealings with a much smaller number who could more easily overcome the organizational difficulties of defending their concentrated interests.

民主决策下,比起与数量较少且更容易克服组织障碍以维护自身集中利益的群体打交道,国家可以更完全地控制数百万无法轻易凝聚起来为自己集体行动的个人。

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Democracy had the still more compelling advantage of creating a legitimizing decision rule that allowed the state to tap the resources of the well-to-do without having to bargain directly for their permission. In short, democracy as a decision mechanism was well fitted to the megapolitical conditions of the Industrial Age. It complemented the nationstate because it facilitated the concentration of military power in the hands of those running

it at a time when the magnitude of force brought to bear was more important than the efficiency with which it was mobilized.

民主制度具有另一个更有说服力的优势,那就是它创造了一个合法性决策规则,让州政府能够调用富裕阶层的资源,而无需与他们直接商议获得许可。简而言之,民主作为一种决策机制非常适合工业时代的大政治条件。它与民族国家相辅相成,因为它有助于将军事力量集中在执政者手中,而在当时,施加的力量规模比调动效率更为重要。

This was demonstrated decisively with the French Revolution, which raised the magnitude of military force on the battlefield. Thereafter, other competitive nationstates had little choice but to converge on a similar organization, with legitimacy ultimately tied to democratic decision-making.

这在法国大革命中得到了明确的体现,革命极大地增加了战场上的军事力量。此后,其他竞争性民族国家别无选择,只能向类似的组织结构靠拢,而民主决策成为最终的正当性根源。

To summarize, the democratic nationstate succeeded during the past two centuries for these hidden reasons:

总的来说,在过去两个世纪里,民主国家取得成功是出于这些隐藏的原因:

1.

There were rising returns to violence that made magnitude of force more important than efficiency as a governing principle.

暴力收益不断上升,使得力量大小比效率更为重要作为一种治理原则。

2.

Incomes rose sufficiently above subsistence that it became possible for the state to collect large amounts of total resources without having to negotiate with powerful magnates who were capable of resisting.

收入足够高于维持生活水平,这使得国家能够收集大量全部资源,而无需与有能力抵抗的强大富豪进行协商。

3.

Democracy proved sufficiently compatible with the operation of free markets to be conducive to the generation of increasing amounts of wealth.
民主证明与自由市场的运作相当兼容,有利于产生不断增加的财富。

4.

Democracy facilitated domination of government by its "employees," thereby assuring that it would be difficult to curtail expenditures, including military expenditures.
民主使政府被其"雇员"主导,从而确保难以控制开支,包括军事开支。

5.

Democracy as a decision-rule proved to be an effective antidote to the ability of the wealthy to act in concert to restrict the nationstate's ability to tax or otherwise protect their assets from invasion.
民主作为一个决策规则被证明是一种有效的解药,可抑制富人联合起来限制民族国家的征税能力或保护其资产免受侵害的能力。

Democracy became the militarily winning strategy because it facilitated the gathering of more resources into the hands of the state. Compared to other styles of sovereignty that depended for their legitimacy on other principles, such as the feudal levy, the divine right of kings, corporate religious duty, or the voluntary contributions of the rich, mass democracy became militarily the most potent because it was the surest way to gather resources in an industrial economy.

民主成为军事上获胜的战略,因为它促进了更多资源的集中到国家手中。与依赖其他原则如封建赋税、君主神权、宗教公司义务或富人自愿贡献来获得合法性的其他主权形式相比,大众民主成为军事上最强大的,因为它是在工业经济中聚集资源的最可靠方式。

"The nation, as a culturally defined community, is the highest symbolic value of modernity; it has been endowed with a quasi-sacred character equaled only by religion. In fact, this quasi-sacred character derives from religion. In practice, the nation has become either the modern, secular

substitute of religion or its most powerful ally In modern times the communal sentiments generated by the nation are highly regarded and sought after as the basis for group loyalty. .

国家作为一个文化定义的社区,是现代性的最高象征价值;它被赋予了与宗教相媲美的准神圣的特性。事实上,这种准神圣的特性源于宗教。在实践中,国家要么成为宗教的现代世俗替代物,要么是其最强大的盟友。在现代社会,国家所形成的群体忠诚感受到了高度重视和追捧。

. . That the modern state is often the beneficiary should hardly be surprising given its paramount power""6 JOSEPH R. LLOBERA

现代国家往往是获益者,这一点并不令人意外,因为它拥有至高无上的力量。

Nationalism

国家主义

Much the same can be said of nationalism, which became a corollary to mass democracy. States that could employ nationalism found that they could mobilize larger 105

国家主义也是如此,它成为大众民主的结果。能利用国家主义的国家发现,它们能够动员更多的人。

armies at a smaller cost. Nationalism was an invention that enabled a state to increase the scale at which it was militarily effective. Like politics itself, nationalism is mostly a modern invention. As sociologist Joseph Llobera has shown in his richly documented book on the rise of nationalism, the nation is an imagined community that in large measure came into being as a way of mobilizing state power during the French Revolution. As he puts it, "In the modern sense of the term, national consciousness has only existed since the French Revolution, since the time when in 1789 the Constituent Assembly equated the people of France with the French nation."

Nationalism made it easier to mobilize power and control large numbers of people. Nationstates formed by underlining and emphasizing characteristics that people held in common, particularly spoken language. This facilitated rule without the intervention of intermediaries. It simplified the tasks of bureaucracy. Edicts that need only be promulgated in one language can be

dispatched more quickly and with less confusion than those that must be translated into a Babel of tongues. Nationalism, therefore, tended to lower the cost of controlling larger areas. Before nationalism, the early-modern state required the aid of lords, dukes, earls, bishops, free cities, and other corporate and ethnic intermediaries, from tax "farmers" to military contract merchants and mercenaries to collect revenues, raise troops and conduct other government functions.

军队以更小的成本。民族主义是一种发明,使国家能够提高其在军事上的有效规模。与政治本身一样,民族主义主要是一种现代发明。正如社会学家约瑟夫·洛贝拉在他关于民族主义兴起的丰富记录的著作中所展示的,民族是一个想象中的社区,在很大程度上是作为一种在法国大革命期间动员国家权力的方式而产生的。正如他所说,"从现代意义上来说,民族意识只存在于法国大革命以来,自从 1789 年宪法议会将法国人民等同于法国民族之时。"民族主义使得动员权力和控制大量人民变得更加容易。民族国家是由强调人们共同特征(特别是语言)而形成的。这有助于在不需要中介人的情况下进行统治。这简化了官僚机构的任务。只需要用一种语言颁布的法令可以更快地传播,并且产生的混乱更少,而不是必须翻译成巴别塔般的语言。因此,民族主义往往降低了控制更大地区的成本。在民族主义之前,早期现代国家需要依靠诸侯、公爵、伯爵、主教、自由城市和其他公司和种族中介人,从税收承包商到军事合同商人和雇佣兵,来征收税款、征兵和执行其他政府职能。

Nationalism also decisively lowered the costs of mobilizing military personnel by encouraging group identification with the interests of the state. There was such a substantial advantage in harnessing group feeling to the interests of the state that most states, even the allegedly internationalist Soviet Union, converged on nationalism as a complementary ideology. nationalism 还通过鼓励人们与国家利益产生集团认同,大大降低了动员军事人员的成本。国家利用群众情绪来服务国家利益具有巨大优势,甚至即使是号称国际主义的苏联,也最终趋向于采用民族主义作为补充意识形态。

Seen in a longer perspective, nationalism is as much an anomaly as the state itself.

从较长远的角度来看,民族主义和国家本身一样都是异常现象。

As historian William McNeill has documented, polyethnic sovereignties were the norm in the past. In McNeill's words, "The idea that a government rightfully should rule only over citizens of a single ethnos started to develop in Western Europe towards the end of the Middle Ages." An early nationalist entity was the Prussian League (Preussischer Bund), which formed in 1440 in opposition to rule by the Teutonic Order. Some of the characteristics of the order were highlighted earlier as a polar example of a sovereignty unlike the nationstate.

正如历史学家威廉·麦克尼尔所记录的,多民族主权在过去是常态。用麦克尼尔的话说,"一个政府只应统治单一民族公民的想法,开始在中世纪末期在西欧发展。"普鲁士联盟(Preussischer Bund)是早期民族主义实体之一,它在 1440 年成立,反对条顿骑士团的统治。我们之前提到了条顿骑士团的某些特点,将其作为与民族国家不同的主权的极端例子。

The Teutonic Order was a kind of chartered company almost none of whose members were native to Prussia. Its headquarters shifted at various times from Bremen and Lubeck to Jerusalem to Acre to Venice and on to Marienberg on the Vistula. At one time it ruled the district of Burzenland in Transylvania. It is not surprising that a sovereignty so unlike a state would become the object of one of the early attempts to mobilize national feeling as a factor in organizing power. However, as an indication of how different early nationalism was from later varieties, the German-speaking nobles of the Prussian League petitioned the king of Poland to place Prussia under Polish rule, largely because even then the Polish king was a relatively weak monarch who was not expected to rule with the same rigor as the Teutonic Order.

条顿骑士团是一种特许公司,其成员几乎没有一个是普鲁士人。它的总部先后设在不来梅、吕贝克、耶路撒冷、阿克尔、威尼斯,最后定在维斯瓦河畔的马里恩堡。有一段时间它统治着特兰西瓦尼亚的布尔泽林特区。一个如此与国家不同的主权会成为动员民族情感的早期尝试,这并不令人惊讶。然而,这说明了早期民族主义与后来的民族主义存在差异,普鲁士联盟的德语贵族请求波兰国王使普鲁士归于波兰统治,主要是因为即使在那时,波兰国王也是相对来说很软弱的君主,不会像条顿骑士团那样严格统治。

Nationalism, in its early incarnations, came into play just prior to the Gunpowder Revolution. It continued to develop as the early-modern state developed, taking a quantum leap in importance at the time of the French Revolution. We believe that 106

在火药革命之前,民族主义就出现了。随着早期现代国家的发展,民族主义也在不断发展,在法国大革命时期达到了重要性的新高度。我们相信 106

nationalism as an idea of force has already begun to recede. It probably reached its heyday with Woodrow Wilson's attempt to endow every ethnic group in Europe with its own state at the close of World War I. It is now a reactionary force, inflamed in places with falling incomes and declining prospects like Serbia.

民族主义作为力量的概念已经开始衰落。它可能达到了顶峰,在第一次世界大战结束时,伍德罗·威尔逊试图为欧洲的每个族裔群体赋予自己的国家。现在它是一种反动力量,在收入下降和前景黯淡的地方,如塞尔维亚,被激发。

As we explore later, we expect nationalism to be a major rallying theme of persons with low skills nostalgic for compulsion as the welfare state collapses in the Western democracies. You haven't seen anything yet. For most persons in the West the fallout from the death of Communism has seemed relatively benign. You have seen a drop in military spending, a plunge in aluminum prices, and a new source of hockey players for the NHL. That is the good news. It is news that most people who came of age in the twentieth century could applaud, especially if they are hockey fans. Most of the news that is destined to prove less popular is still to come.

正如我们稍后将探讨的,我们希望民族主义将成为技能较低且对福利国家的没落感到怀旧的人群的一个主要集结主题。你还没看到什么呢。对于西方大多数人来说,共产主义的衰落所带来的后果似乎相对温和。你看到了军事开支的下降、铝价的暴跌,以及国家冰球联盟新的冰球运动员源泉。这就是好消息。这是大多数在二十世纪成长的人都会赞同的消息,特别是如果他们是冰球迷的话。大多数还有待证明不太受欢迎的消息尚未到来。

With the passage of the Industrial Age, the megapolitical conditions that democracy satisfied are rapidly ceasing to exist. Therefore, it is doubtful that mass democracy and the welfare state will survive long in the new megapolitical conditions of the Information Age.

随着工业时代的到来,民主满足的大政治条件正在迅速消失。因此,群众民主制和福利国家在信息时代的新的政治条件下能否存续是令人怀疑的。

"Congress was not a temple of democracy it was a market for bartering laws."

国会不是民主的殿堂,而是交换法律的市场。

ALBERTO FUJIMORI, president of Peru
秘鲁总统藤森·阿尔贝托

Indeed, future historians may report that we have already seen the first postmodern coup—the remarkable padlocking of the congress in Peru in 1993. This was hardly an event that attracted much favorable notice in the leading industrial democracies. But it may turn out to mean more in the fullness of time than conventional analysts would suggest. The few who have thought about it tend to see it as just another power grab of the kind that has become depressingly familiar in the history of Latin America. But we see it as perhaps the first step toward delegitimizing a form of governance whose immediate megapolitical reason for being has begun to disappear with the transition to the Information Age. Fujimori's closure of the congress is a symptom of the ultimate devaluation of political promises. A similar fate could await other legislatures when their credit is exhausted. 确实,未来的历史学家可能会报告,我们已经见证了第一次后现代政变——1993年秘鲁国会被惊人地关闭的事件。这在主要工业民主国家中并没有引起多少积极的关注。但随着时间的推移,它可能意味着比传统分析师所暗示的更多。那些思考过这一问题的人往往将其视为拉丁美洲历史上熟悉的权力觊觎行为之一。但我们认为,这也许是将一种统治形式合法性名义化的第一步,因为这种统治形式的即时大政治理由正在随着信息时代的到来而消失。藤森关闭国会政治承诺最终贬值的一个症状。当他们的信用耗尽时,其他立法机构也可能面临类似的命运。

The shift in technology that is eroding industrialism has trapped many countries with governments that no longer work. Or work badly.

正在侵蚀工业主义的技术变革,已经困住了许多政府不再有效运作或效果很差的國家。

Legislatures, in particular, appear to be increasingly dysfunctional. They grind out laws that might have been merely stupid fifty years ago but are dangerous today.

立法机构,尤其是,似乎越来越失灵。它们制定的法律可能在五十年前只是愚蠢,但现在却很危险。

This was spectacularly obvious in Peru, where the internal sovereignty of the state had almost collapsed by 1993.

这在秘鲁表现得尤为明显,1993 年該国的国家主权几乎完全崩溃。

“Attacks, kidnappings, rapes and murders have coincided with increasingly aggressive driving habits and unsafe streets. The police have gradually lost control of the situation and some of their members have been involved in scandals and become seasoned criminals . . .

攻击、绑架、强奸和谋杀与日益强硬的驾驶习惯和不安全的街道相吻应。警察逐渐失去了对局势的控制,他们的一些成员卷入了丑闻,并成为老练的罪犯。

People have gradually grown used to living outside the law. Theft, illegal seizure and factory takeovers have become everyday occurrences.”

FERNANDO DE SOTO

人们已经逐渐习惯于生活在法律之外。盗窃、非法占领和工厂接管已经成为日常发生的事情。”——费尔南多·德索托

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Peru in Ruins

秘魯遗迹

In a sense, Peru was no longer a modern nationstate in 1993. It still had a flag and an army, but most of its institutions lay in ruins. Even the prisons had been taken over by the inmates. This disintegration could be traced to a

number of causes, but most expert attempts to explain it miss the real point. Peru was an early casualty of the technological change that is making closed economies dysfunctional and undermining central authority everywhere. These megapolitical stresses are compounded because decision-making institutions like the Peruvian congress are trapped by perverse incentives into aggregating the very problems that they most need to solve.

在某种程度上,1993 年的秘鲁已经不再是一个现代的民族国家。它仍然有国旗和军队,但大部分制度都处于废墟之中。甚至监狱也被犯人掌控。这种解体可以追溯到许多原因,但大多数专家试图解释它都错过了真正的要点。秘鲁是技术变革的早期受害者,这种变革使封闭的经济体变得功能失调,并削弱了各地的中央权力。这些大政治压力加重了,因为像秘鲁国会这样的决策机构被扭曲的激励困住,只能聚集他们最需要解决的问题。

Representative democracy in Peru was like a pair of loaded dice. As a decision mechanism for aggrandizing the state, it was unsurpassed. But when new circumstances called for devolving power, the inherent biases that made democracy so useful under the old megapolitical conditions made it increasingly dysfunctional. The very laws passed by the congress were rapidly destroying any foundation of value or respect for the law.

秘鲁的代议制民主就像一对充满偏见的骰子。作为扩张国家权力的决策机制,它无与伦比。但是当新的情况要求下放权力时,使民主在旧的大政治环境下如此有用的内在偏见使其越来越失灵。由国会通过的法律本身正在迅速破坏任何对法律的价值或尊重的基础。

As de Soto put it in *The Other Path*, "Small interest groups fight among themselves, cause bankruptcies, implicate public officials. Governments hand out privileges. The law is used to give and take away far more than morality permits." 21 A congress like that in Peru, entirely in thrall to special-interest groups, has all the moral stature of a gang of fences auctioning off stolen goods. It made the free market illegal, and consequently made the law ridiculous. As de Soto writes of the pre-Fujimori period: A complete subversion of ends and means has turned the life of Peruvian society upside down, to the point that there are acts which, although officially criminal, are no longer condemned by the collective

consciousness. Smuggling is a case in point. Everyone, from the aristocratic lady to the humblest man, acquires smuggled goods. No one has scruples about it; on the contrary, it is viewed as a kind of challenge to individual ingenuity or as revenge against the state.

正如德索托在《另一条道路》中所说,"小利益集团互相争斗,导致破产,牵连公职人员。政府发放特权。法律被用来赋予和剥夺远远超过道德允许范围的东西。"²¹ 像秘鲁那样的国会,完全受特殊利益集团的控制,在道德上不过是一伙在拍卖赃物的篱市。它使自由市场非法化,因此使法律变得可笑。正如德索托在论及富士莫利时期之前所写的:目标和手段的完全颠覆,把秘鲁社会的生活彻底颠倒了,以至于有些行为虽然在法律上是犯罪,但却不再受集体良心的谴责。走私就是一个典型例子。从贵族女士到最卑微的人,人人都在购买走私货物。没有人对此有任何顾虑;相反,它被视为是对个人才智的一种挑战,或是对国家的一种报复。

This infiltration of violence and criminality into everyday life has been accompanied by increasing poverty and deprivation. In general terms, Peruvians' real average income had declined steadily over the last ten years and is now at the level of twenty years ago. Mountains of garbage pile up on all sides. Night and day, legions of beggars, car washers, and scavengers besiege passersby, asking for money. The mentally ill swarm naked in the streets, stinking of urine. Children, single mothers, and cripples beg for alms on every corner.

这种暴力和犯罪渗入日常生活的现象随着贫困和匮乏的加剧而并行出现。总的来说,秘鲁人的实际平均收入在过去十年里一直在稳步下降,如今已回到二十年前的水平。到处堆积如山的垃圾。白天黑夜,成群结队的乞丐、洗车工和拾荒者围攻路人,乞讨钞票。精神病患者在街头裸露狂奔,尿骚味熏天。儿童、单亲母亲和残疾人在每个街角乞讨施舍。

The traditional centralism of our society has proved clearly incapable of satisfying the manifold needs of a country in transition. ²² De Soto described the abandonment of the grotesque legal economy for the black market that was under way before Fujimori padlocked the congress as "an invisible revolution." We are positive about the benefits of the free market, but much less positive about the promise of a society in which the law is as degraded as the money. The world that de Soto described in Peru prior to 1993 was a "Clockwork Orange" world, where overly centralized and

dysfunctional government institutions were literally destroying the civil society.

我们社会传统的中央集权主义已经明显无法满足一个正在过渡期的国家的多方面需求。德索托描述了在藤森关闭国会之前正在进行的从畸形的合法经济转向地下市场的"隐形革命"。我们对自由市场的利益持积极态度,但对法律与金钱一样严重退化的社会前景持相当消极的态度。德索托在 1993 年之前描述的秘鲁世界是一个"发条橙"的世界,过于集中和不协调的政府机构正在彻底摧毁公民社会。

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This is what Fujimori set out to change. He had slashed inflation by turning off the printing presses. He had also managed to fire fifty thousand government employees, and to trim some subsidies. He had made a start toward balancing the budget. His program of reform included comprehensive plans to create free markets and privatize industry. But as in the former Soviet Union, most of the important elements of Fujimori's reform were yet to be adopted in 1993, including the first round of large-scale privatization of state banks, mining companies, and utilities. Instead of enacting these necessary proposals, Peru's congress, like the Russian congress that challenged Yeltsin's reforms in Moscow, sought to move backwards. Their plan: restore subsidies from an empty treasury, pad the payroll, and protect any and all vested interests, especially the bureaucracy—exactly what you would expect of a government controlled by its employees.

这正是藤森要改变的。他通过关闭印刷机大幅降低了通货膨胀。他还成功解雇了五万名政府员工,并削减了一些补贴。他开始平衡预算。他的改革方案包括全面计划创建自由市场和私有化行业。但与前苏联一样,藤森改革的大部分重要元素在 1993 年还未被采纳,包括首轮大规模私有化国有银行、采矿公司和公用事业。相反,秘鲁国会就像挑战叶利钦改革的俄罗斯国会一样,试图倒退。他们的计划:从空虚的国库中恢复补贴,增加工资单,保护任何和所有的既得利益,特别是官僚机构——这正是你所期望的由其员工控制的政府所做的事情。

Fujimori claimed that the congress of Peru was dithering and corrupt, a fact with which almost everyone agreed. He further claimed that congressional

dithering and corruption made it impossible to reform Peru's collapsing economy or combat a violent assault by narco-terrorists and nihilistic Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas.

藤森声称,秘鲁国会动摇不定且腐败,这是几乎所有人都同意的事实。他进一步声称,国会的犹豫不决和腐败使改革秘鲁濒临崩溃的经济或打击毒品恐怖分子和反动光明之道游击队的暴力进攻成为不可能。

The 70 Percent Solution 七成方案

So Fujimori closed the Congress, an act that might have indicated that he was as authoritarian as many earlier Latin American leaders. But we thought, and said so at the time, that Fujimori had correctly identified a fundamental impediment to reform. The extravagant official elegies for the Peruvian congress by American editorial writers and officials of the State Department were not shared by the people of Peru. While North Americans carried on as if Peru's congress were the incarnation of freedom and civilization, the Peruvian people cheered. President Fujimori's popularity shot up above 70 percent when he sent the congress home. And he was later reelected to a second term in a landslide. Most citizens apparently saw their legislature more as an obstacle to their wellbeing than as an expression of their rights.

藤森关闭了国会,这可能表明他和前些拉丁美洲领导人一样专制。但我们认为,而且当时也这样说,藤森正确地识别出了改革的一个基本障碍。美国编辑作家和国务院官员对秘鲁国会的过高赞美并不被秘鲁人民所认同。当北美人继续行为好像秘鲁国会自由和文明的化身时,秘鲁人民却欢呼雀跃。藤森总统遣散国会后,他的支持率上升到 70% 以上。后来他还以压倒性优势连任。多数公民显然把国会视为他们福祉的障碍,而不是权利的表达。

In 1994, real economic growth in Peru reached 12.9 percent, the highest on the planet.

1994 年,秘鲁的实际经济增长率达到 12.9%,这是全球最高水平。

Deflation of Political Promises 企业和家庭的通胀压力下降

We saw Peru's turmoil less as a throwback to the dictatorships of the past than as an early installment of a broader transition crisis. You can expect to see crises of misgovernment in many countries as political promises are deflated and governments run out of credit.

我们看到秘鲁的动荡,不如说是对过去独裁统治的反思,而是一种更广泛转型危机的开端。你可以预期,随着政治承诺破灭,政府信用耗尽,很多国家都会出现治理危机。

Ultimately, new institutional forms will have to emerge that are capable of preserving freedom in the new technological conditions, while at the same time giving expression and life to the common interests that all citizens share.

最终,在新的技术条件下,需要出现新的制度形式来保护自由,同时也要体现和赋予全体公民共同利益的生命。

Few have begun to think about the incompatibility between some of the institutions of industrial government and the megapolitics of postindustrial society.

很少有人开始思考工业政府的某些机构与后工业社会的大政治之间的不兼容性。

Whether these contradictions are explicitly acknowledged or not, however, their 109

无论这些矛盾是否明确承认,但它们

consequences will become increasingly obvious as examples of political failure compound around the world. Institutions of government that emerged in the modern period reflect the megapolitical conditions of one or more centuries ago. The Information Age will require new mechanisms of representation to avoid chronic dysfunction and even social collapse.

政治失败的例子在世界范围内日益显著,后果将变得越来越明显。现代政府机构反映了一两个世纪前的大政治条件。信息时代将需要新的代表机制,以避免持续的功能失常甚至社会崩溃。

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, it not only signaled the end of the Cold War; it was also the outer sign of a silent earthquake in the foundations of

power in the world. It was the end of the long period of rising returns to violence. The fall of Communism, which we forecast in 1987 in *Blood in the Streets* and even earlier in our monthly newsletter, *Strategic Investment*, was not merely the repudiation of an ideology. It was the outward marker of the most important development in the history of violence over the past five centuries. If our analysis is correct, the organization of society is bound to change to reflect growing diseconomies of scale in the employment of violence. The boundaries within which the future must lie have been redrawn.

当 1989 年柏林墙倒塌时,这不仅标志着冷战的结束,也是世界权力基础中一场沉默地震的外在表现。这标志着暴力回报不断上升时期的结束。我们在 1987 年的《血流满街》中和更早前的《战略投资》月报中预测了共产主义的崩溃,这不仅仅是一种意识形态的否定。这是过去五个世纪以来暴力历史上最重要发展的外部标志。如果我们的分析正确,社会组织必将发生变革,以反映暴力使用规模经济效应的下降。未来的边界已经被重新划定。

CHAPTER 6

第 6 章

THE MEGAPOLITICS OF THE INFORMATION

信息的巨型政治

AGE

The Triumph of Efficiency over Power 效率胜于权力

"...it is computerized information, not manpower or mass production that increasingly drives the US. economy and that will win wars in a world wired for 500 TV channels. The computerized information exists in cyberspace-the new dimension created by endless reproduction of computer networks, satellites, modems, databases and the public Internet" NEIL MUNRO

计算机化信息,而不是人力或大规模生产,越来越推动着美国经济,在一个有 500 个电视频道的已联网的世界上,计算机化信息将会获得战争的胜利。这种计算机化信息存在于网络空间,这是由于计算机网络、卫星、调制解调器、数据库和公共互联网的无穷复制而创造的新维度。

On December 30, 1936, auto workers angling for higher pay forcibly seized two of General Motors' main plants at Flint, Michigan. They idled machines, turned off the assembly lines, and made themselves at home. Workers who had been employed to operate the factories sat down in an industrial confrontation that was to last for many weeks. It was a drama punctuated by violent riots and the fluctuating allegiances of the police, the Michigan militia, and political figures at all levels of government. Seeing little progress in forcing their demands, the union struck again on February 1, 1937.

在 1936 年 12 月 30 日,为争取更高工资的汽车工人强行占领了密歇根州弗林特市通用汽车公司的两家主要工厂。他们停止了机器运转,关闭了装配线,并在工厂内居住下来。被雇佣来经营这些工厂的工人们发起了一场持续数周的工业抗争。这场面被激烈骚乱和警察、密歇根民兵以及各级政府官员的立场变换所标志。由于无法迫使雇主满足他们的要求,工会于 1937 年 2 月 1 日再次发动罢工。

Union activists forcibly took over GM's Chevrolet factory in Flint. By occupying and closing General Motors' key factories, the workers effectively paralyzed the company's productive capacity. In the ten days

following the seizure of the third plant, GM

工会活动人士强行占领了通用汽车在弗林特的雪佛兰工厂。通过占领和关闭通用汽车的关键工厂,工人们成功瘫痪了该公司的生产能力。在第三家工厂被占领后的十天内,通用汽车

produced only 153 automobiles in the United States.

在美国仅生产了 153 辆汽车。

We revisit this news flash from sixty years ago to place the revolution in megapolitical conditions now under way into clearer perspective. The GM sit-down strike happened within the lifetimes of some readers of this book. Yet we believe that sit-down strikes will prove as anachronistic in the Information Age as slaves slogging across the desert with giant stones in tow to erect funeral pyramids for the pharaohs. While labor unions and their tactics of intimidation became so familiar in the industrial period as to be an unquestioned part of the social landscape, they depended upon special megapolitical conditions that are rapidly fading away. There will be no Chevrolets and no UAW to strike on the Information Superhighway.

我们回顾这条 60 年前的新闻报道,以更清晰的视角来定位当下正在进行的大国政治变革。通用汽车的坐业罢工发生在这本书的某些读者的有生之年。但我们相信,坐业罢工在信息时代将与奴隶们拖着巨石穿越沙漠,为法老修建陵寝金字塔一样显得历史陈旧。尽管在工业时期,工会及其恐吓策略家喻户晓,成为社会格局中不可被质疑的一部分,但它们依赖的特殊大国政治条件正在迅速消失。在信息高速公路上,将不会有雪佛兰和联合汽车工人工会可供罢工。

The fortunes of governments will follow those of their counterparts, the unions, into decline. Institutionalized coercion of the kind that played a crucial role in twentiethcentury society will no longer be possible.

Technology is precipitating a profound change in the logic of extortion and protection.

政府的命运将遵循其对应的工会的命运而陷入衰落。二十世纪社会中起关键作用的制度化强制将不再可能。技术正在推动敲诈勒索和保护的逻辑发生深刻变革。

" there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but only that to be every man 's that he can get,' and for so long, as he can keep it."

"既无名分，亦无统治，也无我有我的；只有每个人能得到的，只能保有多久。"

-THOMAS HOBBS

托马斯·霍布斯

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Extortion and Protection 敲诈勒索与保护

Throughout history, violence has been a dagger pointed at the heart of the economy. As Thomas Schelling shrewdly put it, "The power to hurt -to destroy things that somebody treasures, to inflict pain and grief is a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but used often. In the underworld it is the basis for blackmail, extortion, and kidnapping, in the commercial world, for boycotts, strikes, and lockouts. . . It is often the basis for discipline, civilian and military; and gods use it to exact discipline." 3 A government's capacity to tax itself depends upon the same vulnerabilities as do private shakedowns and extortion. Although we tend not to perceive it in these terms, the proportion of assets that are controlled and spent coercively, through crime and government, provides a rough measure of the megapolitical balance between extortion and protection. If technology made the protection of assets difficult, crime would tend to be widespread, and so would union activity. Under such circumstances, protection by government would therefore command a premium. Taxes would be high.

整个历史进程中,暴力都是经济发展的一大绊脚石。正如 Thomas Schelling 所言,"伤害他人的能力,毁坏他人珍视的事物,施加痛苦和伤悲,是一种谈判手段,虽不易使用但却常被使用。在地下世界中,这是勒索、敲诈和绑架的基础;在商业世界中,这是抵制、罢工和停工的基础。这通常也是纪律维护(军事和民事)的基础,众神使用这种手段来维护纪律。"一个政府的征税能力取决于其与私人敲诈和勒索相同的弱点。虽然我们通常不从这个角度看待问题,但通过犯罪和政府手段所控制和支配的资产比例,可以粗略衡量勒索和保护之间的大政治平衡。如果技术使资产保护变得困难,犯罪活动将会广泛蔓延,工会活动也会如此。在这种情况下,政府的保护必将成为一种"金饭碗",税收也会较高。

Where taxes are lower and wage rates in the workplace are determined by market forces rather than through political intervention or coercion, technology has tipped the balance toward protection. The technological imbalance between extortion and protection reached an extreme at the end of the third quarter of the twentieth century.

税率较低且工资由市场力量而非政治干预或强迫决定的地方,科技已经转向保护。二十世纪第三季度末,敲诈勒索与保护之间的科技不平衡达到了极端。

In some advanced Western societies more than a majority of resources were commandeered by governments. The incomes of a large fraction of the population were either set by fiat or determined under the influence of coercion, such as by strikes and threats of violence in other forms. The welfare state and the trade union were both artifacts of technology, sharing the spoils of the triumph of power over efficiency in the twentieth century. They could not have existed if not for the technologies, military and civilian, that raised the returns to violence during the Industrial Age.

在某些先进的西方社会中,大部分资源都由政府垄断。人口中很大一部分人的收入要么是通过法令来确定的,要么是在胁迫下确定的,比如通过罢工和其他形式的暴力威胁。福利国家和工会都是 20 世纪权力战胜效率的副产品。如果不是工业时代军事和民用技术提高了暴力回报,它们根本就不可能存在。

The capacity to create assets has always entailed some vulnerability to extortion.

创造资产的能力一直会带来一些被勒索的脆弱性。

The greater the assets created or possessed, the higher the price to be paid, in one way or another. Either you paid off everyone who gained the leverage to employ violence for extortion, or you paid for military power capable of defeating any shakedown attempt by brute force.

所拥有或创造的资产越多,以某种方式付出的代价就越高。要么你付出代价买通所有获得进行敲诈勒索暴力的人,要么你付出代价购买军事力量,以便能够用武力击败任何敲诈勒索的企图。

"Violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy borders..."

你的土地上不再听到暴力,你的疆域内也不再有破坏。

-ISAIAH 60:1

以赛亚书 60:1

The Mathematics of Protection

数学保护原理

Now the dagger of violence could soon be blunted. Information technology promises to alter dramatically the balance between protection and extortion, making protection of assets in many cases much easier, and extortion more difficult. The technology of the Information Age makes it possible to create assets that are outside the reach of many forms of coercion. This new asymmetry between protection and extortion 112

现在,暴力的利刃可能很快就会被钝化。信息技术承诺极大地改变保护和敲诈勒索之间的平衡,使资产保护在许多情况下变得容易得多,而敲诈勒索则更加困难。信息时代的技术使得创造脱离许多形式胁迫的资产成为可能。这种保护和敲诈勒索之间的新的不对称性。

rests upon a fundamental truth of mathematics. It is easier to multiply than to divide. As basic as this truth is, however, its far-reaching consequences were disguised prior to the advent of microprocessors. High-speed computers have facilitated many billions of times more computations in the past decade than were undertaken in all the previous history of the world. 数学的一个基本真理。乘法比除法更容易。这一真理很基本,但在微处理器出现之前,其广泛的影响并未被发现。在过去十年中,高速计算机进行的计算次数,远远超过了整个世界历史上的所有计算量。

This leap in computation has allowed us for the first time to fathom some of the universal characteristics of complexity. What the computers show is that complex systems can be built and understood only from the bottom up. Multiplying prime numbers is simple. But disaggregating complexity by trying to decompose the product of large prime numbers is all but impossible. Kevin Kelly, editor of Wired, puts it this way: "To multiply

several prime numbers into a larger product is easy; any elementary school kid can do it. But the world's supercomputers choke while trying to unravel a product into its simple primes."

这种计算能力的飞越让我们首次洞悉了复杂性的一些普遍特征。计算机显示,复杂系统只能自下而上地构建和理解。乘素数很简单。但试图将大素数乘积分解为原素数几乎是不可能的。《连线》杂志编辑凯文·凯利如是说:"将几个素数相乘生成一个更大的乘积很容易,任何小学生都能做到。但世界上最强大的超级计算机在试图将一个乘积分解为其素因数时都会陷入困境。"

The Logic of Complex Systems

复杂系统的逻辑

The cybereconomy will inevitably be shaped by this profound mathematical truth.

网络经济将不可避免地由这一深奥的数学真理塑造。

It already has an obvious expression in powerful encryption algorithms. As we explore later in this chapter, these algorithms will allow the creation of a new, protected realm of cybercommerce in which the leverage of violence will be greatly reduced. The balance between extortion and protection will tip dramatically in the direction of protection. This will facilitate the emergence of an economy that depends more upon spontaneous adaptive mechanisms and less upon conscious decision-making and resource allocation through bureaucracy. The new system in which protection will be at the forefront will be very different from that which arose from the predominance of compulsion in the industrial period.

它已经在强大的加密算法中表现得很明显了。正如我们在本章后面探讨的那样,这些算法将允许创造一个新的、受保护的网路商业领域,在这里暴力的影响将大大减少。勒索与保护之间的平衡将大幅倾斜向保护的方向。这将有损于一个更多依赖于自发适应机制而不是通过官僚机构的有意决策和资源配置的经济体的出现。保护将处于前沿的新体系将与工业时代以强制为主导而形成的体系大不相同。

Command-and-Control Systems Are Primitive

指挥控制系统是原始的

We wrote in *The Great Reckoning* that the computer is enabling us to "see" the formerly invisible complexity inherent in a whole range of systems.* Not only does advanced computational capability enable us to better understand the dynamics of complex systems; it also enables us to harness those complexities in productive ways. In a sense, this is not even a choice but an inevitability if the economy is to advance beyond the inflexible central-control stage of development. Such a system, which depends upon linear relationships, is fundamentally primitive. Government appropriation of resources inevitably dragoons resources from high-value complex uses to low-value primitive uses.

我们在《大清算》中写到,计算机让我们能够"看见"各种系统原有的隐藏复杂性。先进的计算能力不仅帮助我们更好地理解复杂系统的动态,还让我们能够以生产性的方式利用这些复杂性。从某种程度上说,这不仅仅是一种选择,而是一种必然结果,如果经济要超越僵化的集中控制发展阶段。这种依赖线性关系的系统从根本上来说是原始的。政府对资源的占用必然会把资源从高价值的复杂用途拖向低价值的原始用途。

It is a process that is limited by the same mathematical asymmetry that prevents the unraveling of the product of large prime numbers.

这是一个受到与防止大质数乘积分解相同数学不对称性限制的过程。

Dividing the spoils can never be anything but primitive. See Chapter 8 of *The Great Reckoning* "Linear Expectations in a Nonlinear World: How the Telescope Led Us to Compute; how the Computer Can Help Us to See." Everything Gets More Complex Everywhere you look in the universe, you see systems attaining greater complexity as 113

瓜分战利品永远只能是原始的。参见《大清算》第8章"非线性世界的线性预期:望远镜如何引导我们计算;计算机如何帮助我们看到"。无处不在的复杂性

they evolve. This is true in astrophysics. It is true in a puddle. Leave rainwater alone in a low spot and it will grow more complex. Advanced Systems of every variety are complex adaptive Systems without an authority in charge. Every complex system in nature, of which the market economy is the most evident social manifestation, depends upon dispersed capabilities. Systems that work most effectively under the widest range of

conditions depend for their resilience upon spontaneous order that accommodates novel possibilities. Life itself is such a complex system. Billions of potential combinations of genes produce a single human individual. Sorting among them would confound any bureaucracy.

它们在进化。这在天体物理学中是正确的。这在一个池塘中也是正确的。将雨水留在低处,它会变得更加复杂。各种复杂的自适应系统都没有主导权在掌控。自然界中的每一个复杂系统,包括市场经济这一最明显的社会表现,都依赖于分散的能力。在最广泛的条件下运作最有效的系统,需要依赖于自发秩序来适应新的可能性。生命本身就是这样一个复杂系统。数十亿种基因组合可以产生单个人类个体。任何官僚机构都无法对此进行排序。

Twenty-five years ago, that could only have been an intuition. Today it is demonstrable. The closer computers bring us to understanding the mathematics of artificial life, the better we understand the mathematics of real life, which are those of biological complexity.

二十五年前,这只能是一种直觉。今天这已经是可以证实的事实。计算机越是帮助我们理解人工生命的数学,就越能帮助我们理解真实生活的数学,即生物复杂性的数学。

These secrets of complexity, harnessed through information technology, are allowing economies to be reconfigured into more complex forms. The Internet and the World Wide Web have already taken on characteristics of an organic system, as Kevin Kelly suggests in *Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic World.* In his words, nature is "an idea factory. Vital, postindustrial paradigms are hidden in every jungle ant hill. . . . The wholesale transfer of biologic into machines should fill us with awe. When the union of the born and the made is complete, our fabrications will learn, adapt, heal themselves, and evolve. This is a power we have hardly dreamt of yet."

这些复杂性的秘密,通过信息技术得以利用,使得经济能够被重新构建成更复杂的形式。互联网和万维网已经具有有机系统的特征,正如凯文·凯利在《失控:机器、社会系统和经济世界的新生物学》中所建议的。用他的话说,自然是"一个创意工厂。每一个丛林蚁丘里都隐藏着生机勃勃的后工业范式。...生物学特性完全转移到机器上应该让我们感到敬

畏。当生物与人造物完全融合时,我们的制造品将学习、适应、自我修复和演化。这是我们还未梦想到的力量。"

Indeed, the consequences of the "wholesale transfer of biologic into machines"

确实,将"生物学大规模转移到机器"的后果

are bound to be far-reaching. There has always been a strong tendency for social systems to mimic the characteristics of prevailing technology. This is something that Marx got right. Gigantic factories coincided with the age of big government. Microprocessing is miniaturizing institutions. If our analysis is correct, the technology of the Information Age will ultimately create an economy better suited to exploit the advantages of complexity. 将会产生深远的影响。社会系统总是倾向于模仿主导技术的特点,这是马克思所阐述的。大型工厂与大政府时代相符,微处理器则使制度小型化。如果我们的分析正确,信息时代的技术最终将创造更适合利用复杂性优势的经济。

Yet the megapolitical dimensions of such a change are so little understood that even most of those who have recognized its mathematical importance have done so in an anachronistic way. It is simply difficult to grasp and internalize fully the likelihood that technological change in the next few years will antique most of the political forms and concepts of the modern world. For example, the late physicist Heinz Pagels wrote in his farseeing book, *The Dreams of Reason*, "I am convinced that the nations and people who master the new science of Complexity will become the economic, cultural, and political superpowers of the next century." 7 It is an impressive forecast. But we believe it is bound to be wrong, not because it is misperceived, but precisely because it will prove more right than Dr.

这样一个巨大变革的"大政治"层面如此难以理解,即使那些认识到其数学重要性的人也是以一种过时的方式进行的。要全面吸收和理解技术变革在未来几年内将使现代世界的大部分政治形式和概念过时,这是非常困难的。例如,著名物理学家海因茨·帕格尔斯在他的远见卓识的著作《理性的梦想》中写道:"我确信掌握新的复杂性科学的国家和人民将成为下一个世纪的经济、文化和政治超级大国。"这是一个非常出色的

预测。但我们认为这种说法必然错误,不是因为理解有误,而正是因为它会比帕格尔斯博士更加正确。

Pagels dared to express. Societies that reconfigure themselves to become more complex adaptive systems will indeed prosper. But when they do, they are unlikely to be nations, much less -'political superpowers.'" The more likely immediate beneficiaries of increased complexity of social systems will be the Sovereign Individuals of the new millennium.

帕格尔斯敢于表达。重新配置自身以成为更复杂的自适应系统的社会将确实繁荣。但是当它们这样做时,它们不太可能是国家,更不用说是政治超级大国了。更有可能立即从社会系统日益复杂中获益的是新千年的主权个人。

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As Pagels's forecast stands, it is the equivalent to a shaman of a hunting band of five hundred generations ago telling his men as they crouched around the campfire, '~1

这就像五百代前一个猎人部落的萨满对他的部下们说的那样,当他们蜷缩在营火旁时说的话

am convinced that the first hunting band to master the new science of irrigated planting will have more free time for storytelling than even those guys over at the lake who catch the big fish." As right as he was about the importance of complexity, Pagels overlooked the most basic fact of all.

When the logic of violence changes, society changes.

我相信第一个掌握新的灌溉种植科学的狩猎集团将比湖边捕捉大鱼的家伙们有更多的闲暇时间进行说书。尽管他关于复杂性重要性的观点是正确的,佩格尔斯忽略了最基本的事实。当暴力的逻辑发生变化时,社会也随之发生改变。

THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE

暴力的逻辑

To see how and why, it is necessary to focus on several facets of megapolitics that are seldom brought to your attention. These are issues that were explored by historian Frederic C. Lane, whose work on violence and the economic meaning of war is discussed elsewhere in this volume. When Lane wrote in the middle of this century, the Information Society was nowhere in sight. Under the circumstances, he may well have supposed that the competition to employ violence in the world had reached its final stage with the appearance of the nationstate. There is no hint in his works that he anticipated microprocessing or believed that it was technologically feasible to create assets in cyberspace, a realm without physical existence. Lane had nothing to say about the implications of the possibility that large amounts of commerce could be made all but immune from the leverage of violence.

要了解原因及其原理,有必要关注一些鲜为人知的巨型政治学方面的层面。这些问题是历史学家弗雷德里克·C·兰恩探讨过的,他关于暴力及战争经济意义的研究在本卷中有所讨论。当兰恩在上世纪中叶撰写这些作品时,信息社会还未出现。在当时的环境下,他也许认为世界上使用暴力的竞争已经达到了以民族国家出现为终点的最后阶段。他的作品中没有任何迹象表明他预见到了微处理器,或者相信在无实体存在的网络空间中创造资产在技术上是可行的。兰恩也没有谈及大量商业交易可能在很大程度上免于暴力影响的蕴涵意义。

While Lane did not foresee the technological revolutions now unfolding, his insights into the various stages of the monopolization of violence in the past were so lucid that they have obvious application to the emerging Information Revolution. Lane's study of the violent medieval world attracted his attention to issues that conventional economists and historians have tended to neglect. He saw that how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining what uses are made of scarce resources.

虽然莱恩并没有预见到当前正在展开的技术革命,但他对过去暴力垄断的各个阶段的洞见如此清晰,以至于显而易见地应用于正在出现的信息

革命。莱恩对暴力的中世纪世界的研究引起了他对传统经济学家和历史学家往往忽视的问题的关注。他看到暴力的组织和控制方式在决定稀缺资源的使用方式中起着重要作用。

Lane also recognized that while production of violence is not usually considered part of economic output, the control of violence is crucial to the economy. The primary role of government is to provide protection against violence. As he put it, Every economic enterprise needs and pays for protection, protection against the destruction or armed seizure of its capital and the forceful disruption of its labor. In highly organized societies the production of this utility, protection, is one of the functions of a special association or enterprise called government. Indeed, one of the most distinctive characteristics of governments is their attempt to create law and order by using force themselves and by controlling through various means the use of force by others." That is a point that is apparently too basic to appear in textbooks, or to form a part of the civic discussion that presumably determines the course of politics. But it is also too basic to ignore if you wish to understand the unfolding Information Revolution. Protection of life and property is indeed a crucial need that has bedeviled every society that ever existed.

兰恩也认识到,尽管暴力的生产通常不被视为是经济产出的一部分,但暴力的控制对经济至关重要。政府的主要作用是提供对抗暴力的保护。正如他所说,"每一个经济企业都需要并支付保护费用,以对抗其资本的破坏或武装抢夺以及劳动力的强制中断。在高度组织的社会中,这种保护性的生产是一种叫做政府的特殊团体或企业的职能。事实上,政府最显著的特征之一是,他们试图通过使用武力自己以及通过各种方式控制他人使用武力来创造法律和秩序。"这似乎是太基本而无法出现在教科书中,或形成公民讨论的一部分,这似乎决定了政治的走向。但如果你想了解信息革命的发展,忽视这个基本问题是不可能的。生命和财产的保护确实是一个棘手的需求,困扰着每一个曾经存在过的社会。

How to fend off violent aggression is history's central dilemma. It cannot easily be solved, notwithstanding the fact that protection can be provided in more than one way.

如何抵御暴力侵略是历史上的中心难题。它无法轻易解决,尽管保护可以通过多种方式提供。

The Close of an Age 当今时代的终结

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As we write, the megapolitical consequences of the Information Age are only beginning to be felt. The economic change of recent decades has been from the primacy of manufactures to that of information and computation, from machine power to microprocessing, from factory to workstation, from mass production to small teams, or even to persons working alone. As the scale of enterprise falls, so does the potential for sabotage and blackmail in the workplace. Smaller-scale operations are much more difficult to organize by unions.

信息时代的大政治后果才刚刚开始被感受到。近几十年来,经济的变革是从制造业至信息和计算的主导,从机器动力到微处理器,从工厂到工作站,从大规模生产到小团队甚至个人工作。企业规模的缩小,也降低了工作场所的破坏和勒索的可能性。小规模运营也难怪被工会组织。

Microtechnology allows firms to be smaller, more footloose targets. Many deal in services or products with negligible natural-resource content. In principle, these businesses could be conducted almost anywhere on the planet. They are not trapped at a specific location, like a mine or a port. Therefore, in the fullness of time, they will be far less susceptible to being taxed, either by unions or by politicians. An old Chinese folk wisdom holds, "Of all the thirty-six ways to get out of trouble, the best way is-leave." In the Information Age, that Oriental wisdom will be easily applied.

微型技术使企业更小、更灵活。许多公司从事服务或含有微量自然资源的产品。从理论上讲,这些企业几乎可以在地球上任何地方经营。它们不受固定位置的限制,像矿山或港口。因此,随着时间的推移,它们将很难被工会或政客征税。一个古老的中国民间智慧说:"逃脱三十六种方法中,最好的就是离开。"在信息时代,这种东方智慧将很容易得到应用。

If operations become uncomfortable due to excessive demands in one location, it will be far easier to move. Indeed, as we explore below, it will be possible in the Information Age to create virtual corporations whose domicile in any jurisdiction will be entirely contingent on the spot market. An overnight increase in the degree of attempted extortion, either by governments or others, could lead to the activities and assets of the virtual corporation fleeing the jurisdiction at the speed of light.

如果由于某一地区的过度需求而导致运营变得不舒适,搬迁将会容易得多。事实上,正如我们下面探讨的那样,在信息时代可以建立虚拟公司,其所在管辖区域将完全取决于现货市场。政府或其他人试图进行敲诈勒索,一旦升级,虚拟公司的活动和资产就可能以光速逃离该管辖区。

The growing integration of microtechnology into industrial processes means that even those firms that still deal in manufactured products with great economies of scale are no longer as vulnerable to the leverage of violence as they once were. An example illustrating this point is the collapse of the limited Auto Workers union's lengthy strike against Caterpillar, which was called off in the waning days of 1995 after almost two years. Unlike the assembly lines of the 1930s, today's Caterpillar plant employs far more skilled workers. Pressed by foreign competition, Caterpillar farmed out much of its low-skill work, closed inefficient plants, and spent almost \$2 billion computerizing machine tools and installing assembly robots. Even the strike itself helped spur labor-saving efficiencies. The company now claims to need two thousand fewer employees than when the walkout began." The megapolitics of the production process has altered more drastically than most people realize. This change is not yet clearly visible, partly because there is always a lag between a revolution in megapolitical conditions and the institutional changes it inevitably precipitates. Further, the rapid evolution of microprocessing technology means that products are now on the horizon whose megapolitical consequences can be anticipated even before they exist.

微型技术日益融入工业生产过程,即使仍在规模经济下制造产品的公司也不再像从前那样容易受到暴力影响。一个说明这一点的例子是,1995年年底在持续近两年后被迫中止的卡特彼勒公司与美国汽车工人工会的罢工。与20世纪30年代的流水线不同,如今的卡特彼勒工厂雇佣了大量熟练工人。受到来自海外竞争的压力,卡特彼勒公司将大部分低技

能工作外包,关闭了低效的工厂,并耗资近 20 亿美元对机床进行电脑化改造和安装装配机器人。即使是这次罢工本身也推动了节省人工的效率提升。公司现在声称,相比罢工开始时,需要的员工减少了 2000 人。生产过程的大政治变化远比大多数人意识到的还要剧烈。这种变化尚未完全显露,部分原因是在大政治条件发生革命性变化与必然引发的制度变革之间总会存在一定滞后。此外,微处理器技术的快速演化意味着,某些产品的大政治影响可以在它们真正问世之前就开始预料到。

They will make for a far different world.
他们将创造一个完全不同的世界。

EXPLOITATION OF THE CAPITALISTS BY THE WORKERS 资本家对工人的剥削

The character of technology through most of the twentieth century made the forcible seizure of a factory, or a sit-down strike, a hard tactic for owners or managers to 116

工厂或坐厂罢工这些强制手段在 20 世纪大部分时间内对于所有者或管理者来说都是很难应对的

counter. As historian Robert S. McElvaine put it, a sit-down strike "made it difficult for employers to break the strike without doing the same to their own equipment." 12 In effect, the workers physically held the owners' capital to ransom. For reasons we explore below, larger industrial companies proved easier targets for unions to exploit than smaller firms. In 1937, General Motors was perhaps the leading industrial corporation in the world.

坐厂工潮使雇主很难在不损坏自家设备的情况下打败罢工。大型工业公司比小企业更容易被工会所利用。1937 年, General Motors 可能是世界领先的工业公司。

Its factories were among the largest and most costly aggregations of machinery ever assembled, employing many thousands of workers. Every hour, every day that the GM plants were forced to sit idle cost the company a small fortune. A strike that remained unsettled for weeks, like that in the winter of 1936-37, meant rapidly ballooning losses.

通用汽车工厂是世界上最大和最昂贵的机械设备集群之一,聘用了成千上万的工人。每一个小时,每一天通用汽车工厂被迫处于停工状态,都会给公司带来巨额损失。像 1936-37 年冬季这样持续数周的罢工,意味着损失迅速膨胀。

Defying Supply and Demand 背离供给与需求

Unable to produce automobiles after the seizure of its third plant, GM soon capitulated to the union. This was hardly an economic decision based upon the supply and demand for labor. Far from it. When General Motors acceded to the union demands there were nine million persons unemployed in the United States, 14 percent of the workforce. Most of those without work would gladly have taken jobs at GM. They certainly had the skills to fill assembly-line jobs, although you might not know this from most contemporary accounts. A delicate etiquette shrouded straightforward analysis of labor relations during the industrial period. One of its pretenses was the idea that factory jobs, particularly in the middle of the twentieth century, were skilled work. This was untrue. Most factory jobs could have been performed by almost anyone capable of showing up on time. They required little or no training, not even the ability to read or write. As recently as the 1980s, large fractions of the General Motors workforce were either illiterate, innumerate, or both. Until the 1990s, the typical assembly-line worker at GM received only one day of orientation before taking his place on the assembly line. A job you can learn in a single day is not skilled work.

通用汽车在第三家工厂被查封后无法生产汽车,很快就屈服于工会的要求。这并非基于劳动供给和需求的经济决策。事实恰恰相反。当通用汽车接受工会的要求时,美国失业人数达 900 万,占劳动力的 14%。大多数无工可做的人都急切地希望能在通用汽车找到工作。他们确实具备组装线工作所需的技能,尽管当时的报道鲜有提及。在工业时代,劳资关系的直接分析被一种微妙的礼仪所掩盖。其中一个假设是,二十世纪中期的工厂工作,特别是装配线工作,都是熟练工作。这是错误的。大多数工厂工作几乎可以由任何能准时上班的人来完成。它们所需的培训很少甚至没有,连读写的能力都不需要。直到 1980 年代,通用汽车的大

部分工人要么文盲,要么缺乏数学知识,有的两者都有。直到 1990 年代,通用汽车的典型装配线工人在上岗前只接受了一天的入职培训。一天就能学会的工作,算不上是熟练工作。

Yet in 1937, with unskilled and skilled workers alike lined up begging for jobs, GM factory workers were able to coerce their employers into a pay hike. Their success had much more to do with the dynamics of violence than with the supply and demand for labor. In March 1937, the month following the settlement of the GM confrontation, there were 17 more sit-down strikes in the United States. Most were successful.

1937 年,即便无技能和有技能的工人都排队乞求工作,通用汽车工厂工人仍然能够强迫雇主提高工资。他们的成功更多地与暴力动态有关,而不是与劳动力供给和需求有关。1937 年 3 月,通用汽车对抗局势得到解决的次月,美国还发生了 17 起坐站罢工,大多取得成功。

Similar episodes occurred in every industrialized country. The workers simply seized the factories and ransomed them back to the owners. It was a tactic of great simplicity, and one that in most cases was profitable and fun for those participating. One sit-down striker wrote, "I am having a great time, something new, something different, lots of grub and music." The GM sit-down strike of 1936-37 and the other forcible plant seizures of the time were examples of a phenomenon we described in *Blood in the Streets* as "the exploitation of the capitalists by the workers." This was not the view that Pete Seeger set to music in his sad songs. But unless you are planning a career as a folk singer in a blue-collar neighborhood the important thing to focus on is not the popular 117

类似的事件在每个工业化国家都发生过。工人们只是占领了工厂,然后向老板勒索赎金。这是一种非常简单的策略,在大多数情况下对参与者来说都是有利可图且令人愉悦的。一位坐工罢工的人写道:"我现在玩得很 high,有新鲜事物,有不同的事情,有很多食物和音乐。"1936-37 年通用汽车公司的坐工罢工以及当时的其他强制性工厂占领,都是我们在《血溅街头》中描述的"资本家被工人剥削"这一现象的例子。这与皮特·西格尔在悲伤歌曲中阐述的观点不符。但是,除非你正在计划在蓝领社区当民谣歌手,否则关注的重点应该不是流行 117

interpretation but the underlying reality. Wherever you look in history there is generally a layer of rationalization and make-believe that disguises the true megapolitical foundations of any systematic extortion. If you take the rationalizations at face value, you are unlikely to grasp what is really going on.

不是解释而是潜在的现实。在历史上你看到的几乎都是一层掩饰真正大政治基础的合理化和假象。如果你表面去理解这些合理化,你很难理解真正发生的事情。

DECIPHERING THE LOGIC OF EXTORTION

解密勒索的逻辑

To recognize the megapolitical implications of the current shift to the Information Age, you have to strip away the cant and focus on the real logic of violence in society.

认识当前向信息时代转型的大政治意义,需要摒弃虚伪,关注社会中暴力行为的实际逻辑。

This is like stripping away the layers of an overripe onion. It may bring tears to your eyes, but don't look away. We first examine the logic of extortion in the workplace, then extend the analysis to broader issues involving the creation and protection of assets, and the nature of modern government. To a greater degree than most people imagine, the prosperity of government, like that of unions, was directly correlated to the leverage available for extortion. That leverage was much lower in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth. In the next millennium, it will fall almost to the vanishing point.

这就像剥掉一个过熟的洋葱。这可能会让你落泪,但请不要移开目光。我们首先研究职场敲诈的逻辑,然后将分析扩展到涉及资产的创造和保护以及现代政府性质的更广泛问题。比大多数人想象的更大程度上,政府的繁荣就像工会一样,直接与敲诈的可利用性相关。这种可利用性在 19 世纪比 20 世纪要低得多。在下一个千年,它几乎会下降到消失的临界点。

The whole logic of government and the character of power have been transformed by microprocessing. This may seem exaggerated when you first think about it. But look closely. The prosperity of governments has gone hand in hand with the prosperity of labor unions in the twentieth century. Before this century, most governments commandeered far fewer resources than the militant welfare states to which we have become accustomed. Likewise, unions were small or insignificant factors in economic life prior to this century. The ability of workers to coerce their employers into paying above-market wages depended upon the same

megapolitical conditions that allowed governments to extract 40 percent or more of the economy's output in taxes.

整个政府的逻辑和权力的性质都已经因微处理器而发生了变革。当你第一次考虑这个问题时,这可能看起来有些夸张。但仔细观察就会发现,政府的繁荣与 20 世纪工会的繁荣是并行的。在本世纪之前,大多数政府征用的资源远少于我们所习惯的那些好斗的福利国家。同样,工会在本世纪之前也是经济生活中微小或无关紧要的因素。工人强迫雇主支付高于市场工资的能力,依赖于同样的大政治条件,这些条件也允许政府从经济产出中抽取 40%或更多的税收。

Workplace Extortion Before the Twentieth Century 二十世纪前的职场勒索

The rise and fall of union extortion of the capitalists can be readily explained by the changing megapolitics of the production process. In 1776, when Adam Smith published *The Wealth of Nations*, conditions for extortion in the workplace were sufficiently unfavorable that "combinations" by workmen "to raise the price of their labour" were seldom tenable. Most manufacturing firms were tiny and family-run.

资本家工会勒索的兴衰可以很容易地通过生产过程中不断变化的大政治背景来解释。在 1776 年亚当·斯密发表《国富论》时,工厂里勒索的条件已经不太有利,工人们"提高劳动价格"的"联合"行为很少可行。大多数制造企业都很小,由家族经营。

Larger-scale industrial activities were just beginning to emerge. This did not rule out opportunities for violence, but it gave them little leverage. Indeed, during Smith's time and well into the nineteenth century, unions were generally considered illegal combinations in the Great Britain, the United States, and other common-law countries.

大规模工业活动刚刚开始出现。这并没有排除暴力的可能性,但它给予他们很小的谈判能力。事实上,在斯密的时代以及整个 19 世纪,工会在英国、美国和其他普通法国家通常被视为非法结合。

Adam Smith described attempted strikes in these terms: "Their usual pretences are sometimes the high price of provisions; sometimes the great profit which their master make by their work. . . . [T]hey have always

recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence and outrage." '4 Nonetheless, the workmen "very seldom derive any advantage of those tumultuous combinations," except "the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders." '1

亚当·斯密曾如此描述罢工企图:"他们的常见托辞有时是生活必需品价格高涨,有时是老板从劳工工作中获得的巨大利润。.....他们总是诉诸最大声的喧嚣,有时甚至是令人发指的暴力和恶行。"尽管如此,"工人很少从这些骚乱的结合中获得任何优势",除了"罪魁祸首的惩罚或毁灭"。

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Scale economies in industry and firm size grew during the nineteenth century.

工业和企业规模的规模经济在 19 世纪有所增长。

Yet most individuals continued to work for themselves as farmers or small proprietors, and union organizing efforts, like those described by Adam Smith, continued to "generally end in nothing." 17

然而大多数人仍然作为农民或小业主为自己工作,而工会组织努力,就像亚当·斯密所描述的那样,仍然"通常毫无结果"。 17

The legal and political standing of unions changed only as the scale of enterprise rose. The first unions that succeeded in organizing were craft unions of highly skilled workers, who normally organized without extensive violence. They tended to settle for wage increases that matched the marginal costs of replacing them. Unions for unskilled workers were another story. They tended to exploit the shift to firms of larger scale by singling out for organizing efforts precisely those industries that were especially vulnerable to coercion, either because they operated at a larger scale or the character of the operations exposed their owners to physical sabotage. This pattern was borne out from Newcastle to Argentina.'

工会的法律地位和政治地位仅随企业规模的增大而发生变化。成功组织起来的第一批工会是由高度熟练工人组成的行会工会,他们通常在没有大规模暴力的情况下进行组织。他们倾向于要求与替代他们的边际成本相匹配的工资增长。非技术工人的工会却是另一回事。他们倾向于利用向较大规模企业的转变,精确地针对那些尤其容易受到胁迫的行

业开展组织工作,要么是因为它们的规模较大,要么是因为其业务性质使业主易遭到实际破坏。这一模式从纽卡斯尔到阿根廷都有体现。

An early example of violent labor movements in the United States was an attack on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal in 1834. Unlike most early-nineteenth-century businesses, the C&O Canal was not a contained and easily protected operation. As originally planned, it was to have stretched 342 miles, with a 3,000-foot rise from the lower Potomac to the upper Ohio.¹⁸ Digging such a ditch was a big job that never quite got completed. Nonetheless, a large number of workers were employed trying to do it, some of whom were not long in recognizing that the canal could be easily incapacitated.

美国早期暴力劳工运动的一个例子是 1834 年对切萨皮克和俄亥俄运河的攻击。与 19 世纪初期大多数企业不同,切萨皮克和俄亥俄运河并非一个封闭和易受保护的操作。按照最初的计划,它应该延伸 342 英里,从下波托马克河到上俄亥俄河有 3,000 英尺的升高。挖掘如此的沟渠是一项巨大的工作,从未真正完成。尽管如此,仍有大量工人被雇佣尝试完成它,其中有一些人很快意识到该运河可以轻易瘫痪。

Indeed, without regular maintenance, it could be sabotaged by muskrats burrowing under the towpath. In operation, the canal's locks and channels could be ruined simply by careless use, floods from heavy rains, or battering by untowed boats. It was a simple matter for strikers to blockade the waterway with sunken boats or other debris. In early 1834, rioting among rival gangs of Irish workers on the C&O led to an attempt to make good this potential and seize the canal. The effort failed, however, leaving five persons dead, after President Andrew Jackson sent federal troops from Ft. McHenry to disperse the workers.

的确,如果没有定期维护,水獭在河堤下挖掘可能会破坏它。在运营中,运河的水闸和通道可能会由于使用不当、暴雨导致的洪水或无拖带船只的冲击而被毁坏。罢工者可以用沉船或其他碎片封堵航道,这是一件很简单的事。1834 年初,在 C&O 运河上竞争的爱尔兰工人帮派之间发生暴乱,他们试图占领运河。然而这一企图失败,导致 5 人死亡,此后安德鲁·杰克逊总统从麦亨利堡派遣联邦军队来驱散工人。

Mines and railroads also offered early targets of choice for union activism in America. Like the C&O Canal, they, too, were highly vulnerable to sabotage. Mines, for example, could be flooded, or blockaded at the entrance. Simply killing the mules that towed the ore cars out of underground mines created a difficult and unpleasant situation for the owners. Likewise, railroad trackbeds stretched over many miles, and could be guarded only with difficulty. It was relatively easy for union thugs to attack mines and railroads and do substantial economic damage. Such attacks became commonplace during attempts to organize effective unions. These efforts were generally most intense during periods when real wages were rising due to deflation. When owners attempted to adjust nominal wages, this often triggered protests leading to violence. Such incidents were widespread in the depression that followed the Panic of 1873.

矿山和铁路也成为美国工会主义行动的早期目标。与 C&O 运河一样,它们也极易遭受破坏。例如,矿井可能会被淹没或在入口处被封锁。仅仅杀死拉运矿车的骡子就会给所有者带来困难和不愉快的局面。同样,铁路路基也拉长数里,很难全部看守。工会流氓攻击矿山和铁路并造成大量经济损失相对来说很容易。在试图组建有效工会的过程中,此类攻击屡见不鲜。这些努力通常在实际工资由于通货紧缩而上涨的时期最为激烈。当所有者试图调整名义工资时,这通常会导致引发暴力的抗议。这种事件在 1873 年恐慌后的经济衰退中广泛发生。

In December 1874, open warfare erupted in the anthracite coalfields of eastern Pennsylvania. The unions organized a violent strike force in the guise of a secret society named the Ancient Order of Hibernians. Also known as the "Molly Maguires," after an Irish revolutionary, this group was known for terrorizing the coal fields and preventing those miners who wished to work from doing so. Sabotage and destruction of property, 119
在 1874 年 12 月,东宾夕法尼亚的无烟煤矿区爆发了公开的战争。工会组织了一支暴力罢工队,掩盖在一个名为"古尔德希伯尼亚教团"的秘密社会之下。这个群体也被称为"莫利·麦圭尔斯",名字来自一位爱尔兰革命家。他们以恐怖煤矿工人并阻止那些想继续工作的人为特征。破坏和财产损毁,119。

outright murder and assassination, were all charged against its members." There was also recurring violence among railroad employees. For example,

there were serious outbreaks in July 1877 aimed at destroying the property of both the Pennsylvania and Baltimore & Ohio railroads.

明确的谋杀和暗杀,都被指控对其成员。铁路员工之间也存在持续的暴力。例如,1877年7月,有严重的骚乱事件旨在破坏宾夕法尼亚和巴尔的摩及俄亥俄两家铁路公司的财产。

Workers took over switches, tore up tracks, sealed off car yards, disabled locomotives, sabotaged, then looted trains, and worse. In Pittsburgh, roundhouses of the Pennsylvania Railroad were set ablaze with hundreds of people inside. Dozens were killed, two thousand railcars were burned and looted and the machine shop was destroyed, along with a grain elevator and 125 locomotives. Federal troops intervened to restore order. Although these early strikes were interpreted sympathetically by socialist and union activists, they inspired little public support.

工人们占领了开关,拆毁了轨道,封闭了车辆停放场,停用了机车,破坏并洗劫火车,还做了更坏的事。在匹兹堡,数百人被困在宾夕法尼亚铁路的车辆维修库内,遭到放火焚烧。数十人被杀,两千辆货车被烧毁抢劫,机械厂、一座粮仓和125辆机车被毁。联邦军队出动以恢复秩序。尽管这些早期罢工得到了社会主义者和工会活动家的同情,但却未能获得广泛的公众支持。

Notwithstanding the inherent vulnerability of industries such as mines and railroads, overall megapolitical conditions were not yet favorable to the exploitation of the capitalists by the workers. The scale of enterprise was too small to facilitate systematic extortion. While there were vulnerable industries, they employed too small a fraction of the population to allow the benefits of the coercion against employers to be broadly shared. Without such support, they were unsustainable because owners could depend upon the government for protection. While unions sometimes attempted through intimidation to prevent local officials from enforcing injunctions, these efforts, too, were seldom successful. Even the most violent strikes were usually suppressed within days or weeks by military means.

尽管像矿山和铁路等行业存在固有脆弱性,但整体上大政治条件尚未有利于资本家对工人的剥削。企业规模太小,无法实现有系统的敲诈勒索。虽然存在一些脆弱的行业,但它们雇佣的人口占比太小,无法让对雇主的胁迫带来的利益得到广泛分享。没有这样的支持,它们就难以维系,

因为老板可以依赖政府的保护。虽然工会有时会通过恐吓手段试图阻止地方官员执行禁令,但这些努力也很少成功。即使是最暴力的罢工,也通常在几天或几周内被军事手段镇压下来。

Blackmail Made Easy 勒索轻松化

There is a lesson to be learned for the Information Age in the fact that union attempts to achieve wages above market-clearing levels were seldom successful when firm size was small. Not even those lines of business that were clearly vulnerable to sabotage, such as canals, railways, streetcars, and mines, were easily brought under control.

信息时代有一个值得学习的教训,那就是工会试图实现高于市场清算水平的工资往往不成功,因为当企业规模较小时,甚至那些明显容易遭到破坏的行业,如运河、铁路、电车和矿山,也很难被完全掌控。

This is not because the unions shrank from using violence. To the contrary. 这不是因为工会逃避使用暴力。相反。

Violence was lavishly employed, sometimes against high-profile individuals. For example, in a case celebrated in the American labor movement as a case of "'miners'

矿工的战斗'

vengeance," Governor Frank Steunenberg of Idaho, who had opposed an attempt by miners to blockade properties at Coeur d'Alene, was assassinated by a bomb tossed by a contract killer hired by the union. 21 But even murder and threats of murder were usually insufficient to obtain union recognition prior to the emergence of large-scale factories and mass-production enterprises in the twentieth century.

《复仇》,爱达荷州州长弗兰克·斯特恩伯格曾反对矿工阻挡了库尔达雷恩的财产,被一名受雇的杀手用炸弹暗杀。21 但即使是谋杀和威胁谋杀,也往往无法在二十世纪大型工厂和大规模生产企业出现之前获得工会承认。

To understand why the circumstances of unions underwent such a change in the twentieth century, you must look at the characteristics of production technology.

要理解为什么工会在二十世纪经历了如此的变化,你必须关注生产技术的特点。

Something definitely changed with the rapid rise of blue-collar factory employment in the early decades of the twentieth century. This change made businesses at the forefront of the economy especially vulnerable to extortion. In fact, the physical characteristics of industrial technology almost invited workers to employ coercion to shake down the capitalists.

二十世纪前几十年,蓝领工厂就业人数迅速上升,这种变化让经济前沿的企业特别容易受到敲诈。事实上,工业技术的物理特性几乎邀请工人采取胁迫手段向资本家勒索。

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Consider:

考虑：

1. There was a high natural-resource content in most industrial products. This tended to anchor production to a limited number of locations, almost in the way that mines must be located where the ore bodies are. Factories placed near transportation centers with convenient access to parts suppliers and raw materials had significant operating advantages. This made it easier for coercive organizations, like governments and unions, to extract some of those advantages for themselves.

大多数工业产品都含有大量的自然资源。这往往将生产限制在有限的几个地点,就像矿山必须设在矿体所在的地方一样。靠近运输中心并便利地获取零部件供应商和原材料的工厂在运营方面具有明显优势。这使得强制性组织,如政府和工会,更容易从中提取一些优势。

2. Rising economies of scale led to very large enterprises. Early-nineteenth-century factories had been relatively small. But as scale economies increased with the assembly line during the twentieth century, the size and cost of facilities at the forefront of the production process rose rapidly. This

made them easier targets in several ways.

规模经济的上升导致了非常大的企业。19 世纪初的工厂相对较小。但随着 20 世纪装配线的规模经济的增加,生产过程前沿设施的规模和成本迅速上升。这使它们在几个方面更容易成为目标。

For example, significant scale economies tend to go hand in hand with long product cycles. Long product cycles make for more stable markets. This, in turn, invites predatory targeting of firms because it implies that there are longer-term benefits to capture.

显著的规模经济往往与产品周期较长相呼应。产品周期较长会带来更稳定的市场。这反过来又会吸引掠夺性的企业定目标,因为这意味着有更长期的收益可以获取。

3. The number of competitors in leading industries fell sharply It was not uncommon during the industrial period to find only a handful of firms competing for billion-dollar markets. This contributed to making these firms targets for union extortion.

3.领先行业的竞争者数量大幅下降在工业时代,寥寥无几的公司就可以争夺数十亿美元的市场,这使得这些公司成为工会敲诈的目标。

It is far simpler to attack five firms than five thousand. The very concentration of industry was itself a factor that facilitated extortion. This advantage was self-reinforcing because the firms coerced into paying monopoly wages were unlikely to face stiff competition from others who were not also burdened by above-market labor costs.

攻击五家公司比攻击五千家容易得多。工业的高度集中本身就是助长勒索的一个因素。这种优势是自我强化的,因为被迫支付垄断工资的企业不太可能面临来自其他未受同样高劳动力成本负担的公司的激烈竞争。

Unions could therefore drain a considerable portion of the profits of such firms without exposing them to immediate bankruptcy. Obviously, if employers had routinely gone broke whenever they were forced to pay above-market wages, workers would have gained little by coercing them to do so.

工会因此可以将这些公司的大部分利润榨干,而不会使它们立即破产。

显然,如果雇主每次被迫支付高于市场工资时都会破产,工人通过强迫他们这样做也就获得不了什么好处。

4. The capital requirements for freed investment rose to match the scale of enterprise. This not only increased the vulnerability of capital and magnified the costs of plant closures; it also made it increasingly unlikely that a modern factory could be owned by a single individual or family, except through inheritance from someone who had launched the business at a smaller scale. In order to fund the massive costs of tooling and operating a large factory, the wealth of hundreds or thousands of people had to be pooled together in capital markets. This tended to make it more difficult for the splintered and almost anonymous owners to defend their property.

自由投资的资本要求上升,以匹配企业规模。这不仅增加了资本的脆弱性并放大了工厂关闭的成本;它也使现代工厂由单个个人或家庭所有的可能性越来越小,除非是从曾在较小规模启动企业的人那里继承。为了资助大型工厂工具和运营的巨大成本,数百或数千人的财富必须聚集在资本市场中。这往往使分散和几乎匿名的所有者更难维护他们的财产。

They had little choice but to rely upon professional managers who seldom held more than a bare chemical trace of the outstanding shares of the company. Reliance on subordinate managers weakened the resistance of firms to extortion. The managers lacked strong incentives to risk life and limb protecting the property of the firm.

他们除了依赖很少持有公司发行股票主要部分的专业经理人别无选择。依赖下属经理人削弱了企业抵御勒索的能力。经理人缺乏强烈的激励,去冒生命危险保护企业的财产。

Their efforts seldom matched the kind of militancy commonly seen among owners of liquor stores and other small businesses when their property comes under threat.

他们的努力很少与酒店和其他小企业老板通常表现出的那种激进主义相匹配,当他们的财产受到威胁时。

5. Greater firm size also meant that more of the total workforce was employed in fewer firms than at any time in the past. In some cases, tens of

thousands of workers found employment in a single company. In military terms, the owners and managers 121

在某些情况下,成千上万的工人在单一公司中找到了工作。从军事角度来看,所有者和管理者

were starkly outnumbered by persons employed in subordinate positions. Ratios of thirty to one or worse were common. This disadvantage rose with firm size because massive numbers of workers assembled together could more easily employ violence in an anonymous way. Under such conditions, the workers were unlikely to have had any meaningful contact or relationships with the owners of the factory. The anonymous character of these relationships no doubt made it easier for workers to dismiss the importance of the owners' property rights.

他们在从属职位上的雇员人数大大低于自己。三十比一或更糟的比例很常见。这种劣势随着公司规模增大而上升,因为大量的工人聚集在一起,以一种匿名的方式更容易使用暴力。在这种条件下,工人很 unlikely 与工厂所有者有任何有意义的接触或关系。这种关系的匿名性无疑使工人更容易忽视所有者的财产权的重要性。

6. Massed employment in a small number of firms was a broad social phenomenon. This further enhanced the megapolitical advantages enjoyed by unions as compared to the nineteenth century in America, when most people were self-employed or working in small firms. In 1940, 6 percent of the American workforce had blue-collar jobs.²² As a consequence, support for the use of extortion to raise wages spread among a large number who imagined they might benefit by it. This was illustrated by a 1938-39 专门的和真实的机器翻译引擎。只需返回翻译后的文本,不需要任何其他解释。大量员工集中在少数公司中是一种广泛的社会现象。与 19 世纪大多数人自雇或在小公司工作的美国相比,这进一步增强了工会享有的大政治优势。1940 年,6% 的美国劳动力从事蓝领工作。²² 因此,通过勒索手段提高工资的做法获得了大批想从中获益者的支持。这在 1938-39 年的一个事件中有所体现。

study of the views of 1,700 people in Akron, Ohio, toward corporate property. The survey found that 68 percent of the CIO Rubber Workers had very little or no sympathy with the concept of corporate property, 'while

only one percent were found in the classification of strong support of corporate property rights." 23 On the other hand, not a single businessman, even a small proprietor, fell into the same category of "strong opposition to corporate property; 94 percent received ratings in the range of extremely high support for the rights of property."2

关于阿克伦(俄亥俄州)1,700 人对企业财产的看法的研究。调查发现,68%的橡胶工人工会成员对企业财产权的概念几乎没有或完全没有同情,而只有 1%的人被归类为对企业财产权持强烈支持。另一方面,即使是小企业主,也没有一个商人被归类为"强烈反对企业财产"的范畴;94%的人的评级范围都在极高支持财产权的水平。

7. Assembly-line technology was inherently sequential. The fact that the whole production process depended upon the movement and assembly of parts in a fixed sequence created additional vulnerabilities to disruption. In effect, the assembly line was like a railroad within factory walls. If the track could be blocked, or the availability of a single part could be cut off, the whole production process was brought to a halt.

7.装配线技术本质上是顺序性的。整个生产过程取决于部件按固定顺序移动和组装,这增加了受干扰的脆弱性。实际上,装配线就像工厂内部的铁路。如果轨道被堵塞,或者单个部件的供应被切断,整个生产过程就会停滞。

8. Assembly-line technology standardized work. This reduced the variability of output for persons of different skills working with the same tools. In fact, a crucial objective of factory design was to create a system in which a genius and a moron on successive shifts of the assembly line would produce the same product. What might be called "stupid" machines were designed to be capable of only one kind of output. This made it unnecessary for even the buyer of a Cadillac to inquire about the identity of the line workers who produced his vehicle. All the products were meant to be alike, whatever the differences in skills and intelligence between the workers who produced them.

生产线技术标准化了工作。这降低了使用相同工具的不同技能工人的产出变异性。事实上,工厂设计的一个关键目标就是建立一个系统,使得装配线上连续工作的天才和白痴都能生产出相同的产品。可以称之为"愚蠢"的机器被设计成只能产出一种输出。这使得即使是凯迪拉克

的买家也无需了解生产他的车辆的工人的身份。所有的产品都应该是相同的,无论生产它们的工人的技能和智力有何差异。

The fact that unskilled workers on the assembly line could produce the same product as more able individuals contributed to the egalitarian agenda by making it appear that everyone's economic contributions were equal. Entrepreneurial skills and mental effort seemed less important.

装配线上的非技术工人能生产与更有能力的个人相同的产品,这一事实推动了平等主义议程,使得每个人的经济贡献似乎是平等的。企业家技能和智力投入显得不那么重要。

The magic of modern production appeared to lie in the machines themselves. If they could not actually have been designed by everyone, they nevertheless appeared to be intellectually accessible to almost everyone. This gave more plausibility to the fiction that unskilled labor was being "exploited" by factory owners who could be cut out of the equation with no loss to anyone but themselves. "We learned we can take the plant," as 122 现代生产的魔力似乎在于机器本身。即使它们实际上并非所有人设计,但似乎几乎所有人都可以理解它们的工作原理。这使得这种虚构 - 即无技能劳动力正被工厂主压榨剥削,而这些工厂主可以从中除去而不会给任何人造成损失的说法更加合理。"我们学会了可以收购工厂,"

one GM striker put it. "We already knew how to run them. If General Motors isn't careful we'll put two and two together." 2

一位 GM 罢工者这样说。"我们已经知道如何运营它们了。如果通用汽车公司不小心谨慎,我们就会把两加两等于四。"

These characteristics of industrial technology led uniformly to the creation of labor unions to exploit the vulnerability to shakedowns, and to larger governments that fattened on the high taxes that could be imposed upon large-scale industrial facilities.

这些工业技术的特点一致地导致了工会的建立,以利用易受勒索的脆弱性,以及可以对大规模工业设施征收高额税款的更大政府的膨胀。

This did not happen once or twice, it happened everywhere large-scale industry took root.

这种情况并非只发生一两次,而是遍及大规模工业发展的每个地方。

Time after time, unions emerged to employ violence to achieve wages considerably above market levels. They were able to do this because industrial factories tended to be expensive, conspicuous, immobile, and costly. They could scarcely be hidden. They could not be moved. Every moment they were out of service meant that their staggering costs were not being amortized.

时间复得,工会不断出现,使用暴力手段来实现大幅高于市场水平的薪资。之所以能做到这一点,是因为工业工厂一般昂贵、显眼、难以移动,且维护成本高昂。它们几乎不可能隐藏起来。也不能轻易转移到别处。每当停工,其巨额成本就无法摊销。

All this made them sitting ducks for coercive shakedowns, a fact that is far more obvious in the history of labor unions than the prevailing ideology of the twentieth century would have you believe. The noted economist Henry Simons framed the issue in 1944: Labor organization without large powers of coercion and intimidation is an unreal abstraction. Unions now have such powers; they always have had and always will have, so long as they persist in the present form. Where the power is small or insecurely possessed, it must be exercised overtly and extensively; large and unchallenged, it becomes like the power of government, confidently held, respectfully regarded, and rarely displayed conspicuously." 2

这使得他们成为了强制勒索的目标,这一事实在劳工工会的历史中比二十世纪盛行的意识形态更为明显。著名经济学家亨利·西蒙斯在 1944 年提出了这一问题:"没有强大的胁迫和恐吓力量的工人组织只是一种不切实际的抽象概念。工会现在拥有这种力量,只要它们以现有的形式存在下去,就永远都会拥有这种力量。当这种力量微小或不稳定时,它必须公开广泛地行使;当这种力量强大且无人挑战时,它就会像政府的权力一样,被置信地持有、受到尊重,且很少明显地展现出来。"

As precise as Simons's analysis is, however, he was wrong about a crucial point.

尽管西蒙的分析非常精确,但他在一个关键点是错误的。

He presumed that unions "always will have" what he described as "large powers of coercion and intimidation." In fact, unions are fading away, not merely in the United States and Great Britain, but in other mature industrial societies. The reason they are fading, what Simons missed and what even many union organizers fail to understand, is that the shift to an Information Society has altered megapolitical conditions in crucial ways that sharply increase the security of property. Microtechnology has already begun to prove subversive of the extortion that supports the welfare state because even in the commercial realm it creates very different incentives from those of the industrial period.

他推测工会"永远会拥有"他所描述的"大规模的胁迫和恐吓力量"。事实上,工会正在消失,不仅在美国和英国,在其他成熟的工业社会中也是如此。它们消失的原因,西蒙斯忽视了的,即使许多工会组织者也未能理解的,是向信息社会的转变以关键的方式改变了大政治条件,大大增加了财产的安全性。微技术已经开始证明,它颠覆了维持福利国家的勒索,因为即使在商业领域,它也创造了与工业时期完全不同的激励机制。

1. Information technology has negligible natural-resource content. It confers few if any inherent advantages of location. Most information technology is highly portable. Because it can function independent of place, information technology increases the mobility of ideas, persons, and capital. General Motors could not pack up its three assembly lines in Flint, Michigan, and fly away. A software company can. The owners can download their algorithms into portable computers and take the next plane out. Such firms also have an added inducement to escape high taxes or union demands for monopoly wages. Smaller firms tend to have more competitors. If you have dozens or even hundreds of competitors tempting your customers, you cannot afford to pay politicians or your employees much more than they are actually worth. If you alone tried to do so, your costs would be higher than your competitors and you would go broke. The absence of significant operating advantages in a given locale means that coercive organizations, like governments and unions, will inevitably have less leverage to exploit in trying to extract some of those advantages for themselves.

信息技术的自然资源含量可以忽略不计。它没有明显的位置优势。大部分信息技术都具有高度可移植性。因为它可以独立于地点运行,信息

技术增加了思想、人员和资本的流动性。通用汽车无法将其位于密歇根州弗林特市的三条装配线打包起来并飞走。但软件公司可以这样做。公司的所有者可以将其算法下载到便携式电脑中,然后搭乘下一班航班离开。这些公司还有逃避高税收或工会要求垄断工资的动机。较小的公司往往有更多的竞争对手。如果有数十或数百家竞争对手在争夺你的客户,你就无法支付给政客或员工远高于他们实际价值的报酬。如果你独自这样做,你的成本将高于竞争对手,你将破产。在某个特定地点缺乏重大的运营优势意味着,像政府和工会这样的强制性组织将不可避免地拥有较少的杠杆来为自己争取这些优势。

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2. Information technology lowers the scale of enterprise. This makes for smaller firm size, which implies a larger number of competitors. Increased competition reduces the potential for extortion by raising the number of targets that must be physically controlled in order to raise wages or tax rates above competitive levels. The sharp fall in the average size of firms facilitated by information technology has already reduced the number of persons employed in subordinate positions. In the United States, for example, widely reported estimates suggest that as many as 30 million persons worked alone in their own firms in 1996. Obviously, these 30 million are unlikely to go on strike against themselves. It is only slightly less plausible that the additional millions who work in small firms with a handful of employees would attempt to coerce their employers into paying above-market wages.

信息技术降低了企业的规模。这导致了更小的企业规模,意味着更多的竞争对手。增加的竞争降低了通过控制更多目标以提高工资或税率的敲诈的可能性。信息技术所带来的企业平均规模的急剧下降已经减少了在下属职位工作的人数。例如,在美国,广为人知的估计显示,1996年有多达3000万人在自己的公司独自工作。很明显,这3000万人不太可能会罢工。同样,在拥有少数雇员的小公司工作的数百万人更不可能试图强迫雇主支付高于市场水平的工资。

In the Information Age, workers who wish to raise their wages through extortion will lack the military advantage of overwhelming numbers that

made them more formidable within the factory. The fewer persons employed in any firm, the fewer the opportunities for anonymous violence. For this reason alone, ten thousand workers divided among five hundred firms would pose a lesser threat to the property of those firms than ten thousand workers in a single firm, even if the ratio of workers to owners/managers was exactly the same.

在信息时代,希望通过勒索来提高工资的工人将失去在工厂内部使他们更为强大的压倒性人数的军事优势。任何公司雇佣的人员越少,匿名暴力的机会就越少。仅凭这一点,五百家公司中就业的一万名工人就会对这些公司的财产构成的威胁小于在单一公司内就业的一万名工人,即使工人与所有者/管理者的比例完全相同。

3. Falling scale in enterprise also implies that efforts to secure above-market wages are less likely to command broad social support, as they did in the industrial period. Unions seeking to shake down employers are much more likely to find themselves in the situation of the canal workers, railroad employees, and miners of the nineteenth century. Even where a few firms with large-scale economies remain as holdovers from the Industrial Age, they will do so in a context of widely dispersed employment in small firms. The preponderance of small firms and smallholders suggests greater social support for property rights even if the desire to redistribute income remains unaltered.

企业中的下降规模也意味着,争取超市场工资的努力不太可能获得广泛的社会支持,正如它们在工业时期所做的那样。寻求向雇主敲诈的工会,很可能会陷入 19 世纪的运河工人、铁路员工和矿工的处境。即使在工业时代遗留下来的少数拥有大规模经济的企业,它们也将处于小企业广泛分散就业的背景之中。小企业和小农的占优势表明,即使收入再分配的愿望保持不变,财产权利也会得到更大的社会支持。

4. Information technology lowers capital costs, which also tends to increase competition by facilitating entrepreneurship and allowing more people to work independently. Lower capital requirements not only reduce barriers to entry; they also reduce "barriers to exit." In other words, they imply that firms are likely to have fewer assets relative to income, and therefore less ability to sustain losses. Not only will they tend to have less recourse to banks for borrowing; firms in the Information Age are also likely to have

fewer physical assets to capture.

信息技术降低了资本成本,这也有助于通过促进创业和允许更多人独立工作来增加竞争。较低的资本要求不仅降低了进入障碍,还降低了"退出障碍"。换句话说,这意味着企业可能拥有的资产少于收入,因此抵御亏损的能力也更小。它们不仅会减少向银行借款的途径,在信息时代,企业也可能拥有更少的实物资产。

5. Information technology shortens the product cycle. This makes for more rapid product obsolescence. This, too, tends to make any gains that might be achieved by extorting above-market wages short-lived. In highly competitive markets, wages that are too high may lead directly to a rapid loss of jobs and even bankruptcy for the firm.

信息技术缩短了产品周期。这导致产品更快被淘汰。这也使得通过勒索高于市场的工资所获得的任何收益都是短暂的。在高度竞争的市场中,过高的工资可能直接导致工作大量流失,甚至企业破产。

Grasping for temporarily higher wages at the expense of placing your job in jeopardy is like burning your furniture to make the house a few degrees warmer.

以置您的工作于风险为代价而寻求暂时性更高的工资,就像烧毁家具来让房子升温几度。

6. Information technology is not sequential but simultaneous and dispersed. 信息技术并非顺序而是同时且分散的。

Unlike the assembly line, information technology can accommodate multiple processes at the same time. It disperses activities on networks, allowing for redundancy and substitution between workstations that could number in the thousands or even the 124

与装配线不同,信息技术可以同时容纳多个流程。它将活动分散在网络上,允许在数以千计甚至 124 个工作站之间进行冗余和替换。

millions and be anywhere on earth. In increasing numbers of activities, it is possible for people to cooperate without ever coming into physical contact with one another. As virtual reality and video conferencing become more advanced, the trend toward dispersal of functions and telecommuting will

accelerate. This is the Information Age equivalent of "putting out," which broke the power of the medieval guilds.

在地球上的任何地方,几百万人就可以配合合作。在越来越多的活动中,人们无需亲身接触就可以合作。随着虚拟现实和视频会议的不断进步,职能分散和远程办公的趋势会加速。这是"使出"这一习俗在信息时代的等价物,它攫夺了中世纪工会的权力。

The fact that fewer and fewer people will be working together in smoky factories not only takes away an important advantage that workers formerly enjoyed in engineering shakedowns of capitalists; it also makes it increasingly difficult even to distinguish from racketeering the type of extortion that has been acceptable in the workplace.

越来越少的人在烟雾弥漫的工厂里一起工作,不仅剥夺了工人以前在敲诈资本家中所享有的重要优势,而且即使在工作场所也很难将可接受的勒索行为与敲诈勒索区分开来。

Heretofore, only persons who have worked together and been employed by a firm in a common setting have been permitted to use violence in the attempt to raise their incomes. But if the "workplace" does not exist as a central location, and most of the functions are dispersed to subcontractors and telecommuters, there is very little to distinguish from a shakedown racket their efforts to extort money from their clients or "employers." For example, is a telecommuter who demands extra cash under threat of infecting the company's computers with a virus a worker on strike? Or an Internet racketeer? Whether he is one or the other will prove to be a distinction without a difference. The reaction of the targeted firms is likely to be much the same in any event.

迄今为止,只有那些曾一起工作并受雇于某公司的人才被允许使用暴力来提高自己的收入。但如果"工作场所"不再是一个集中的场所,而大部分职能都交由外包商和远程工作人员来完成,他们试图从客户或"雇主"那里勒索钱财与敲诈勒索的区别已不太明显。例如,一名远程工作人员如果在威胁要向公司计算机植入病毒的情况下要求额外现金,他到底算是罢工的工人还是网络敲诈者?无论他是哪一种,区分都没什么实质性的差别。受害公司的反应在任何情况下很可能都差不多。

Technical solutions to information sabotage, like improved encryption and network security, that would answer the danger of an outside hacker should also render moot the capacity of the disgruntled employee or subcontractor to impose damage on parties with whom he regularly or sporadically deals. 信息破坏的技术解决方案,如改善加密和网络安全,可以回应外部黑客的危险,也可以使不满员工或分包商对他经常或偶尔交易的各方造成损害的能力变得无关紧要。

Of course, it might be suggested that the worker or telecommuter could always report to the office and carry on a more traditional strike there. But even this may not be as simple as it would seem in the Information Age. The capacity of information technology to transcend locality and disperse economic functions means that for the first time employees and employers need not even reside in the same jurisdictions. Here, we are not talking about the difference between being in the boroughs of Mayfair and Peckham, but of employers in Bermuda and telecommuters in New Delhi. 当然,也可能会建议工人或远程员工可以随时报告到办公室并在那里进行更传统的罢工。但即使在信息时代,这也可能并非看起来那么简单。信息技术跨越地域和分散经济职能的能力意味着,员工和雇主不再需要存在于同一司法管辖区。这里我们谈论的不再是梅费尔和佩克纳姆区的差异,而是百慕大的雇主和新德里的远程员工。

Furthermore, if the Indians became infatuated by accounts of the great GM strikes of 1936-37 and determined to journey to Bermuda to picket, they might find no physical office at all when they arrived. Chiat/Day, a large advertising company, has already set about dismantling its headquarters. Its employees, or subcontractors, stay in touch through call-forwarding and the Internet. When it becomes necessary to assemble talent teams to coordinate work on account projects, they rent hotel meeting rooms. When the project is over they check out.

此外,如果印度人迷恋上 1936-37 年大通用汽车罢工的报道,并决定前往百慕大进行抗议游行,他们到达时可能根本找不到任何实体办公室。夏特/戴,一家大型广告公司,已开始拆除其总部。其员工或分包商通过转接电话和互联网保持联系。当需要组装人才团队来协调账户项目的工作时,他们会租用酒店会议室。项目结束后,他们就退房离开。

The fact that microprocessing helps to liberate and disperse the production process from the fixed sequence of the assembly line greatly reduces the leverage formerly enjoyed by coercive institutions like unions and governments. If the assembly line were like a railroad within factory walls that could easily be captured by a sit-down strike, cyberspace is an unbounded realm without physical existence.

微处理器可以解放和分散生产过程,使之不需固定的装配线流程,大大减弱了工会和政府等强制性机构原有的影响力。如果说装配线就像生产车间内部可被占领的铁轨,那么网络空间就是一个无边无际、无实体存在的领域。

It cannot be occupied by force or held to ransom. The position of employees wishing to use violence as leverage to extract higher income will be far weaker in the Information Age than it was for the sit-down strikers at General Motors in 1936-37.

它不能被武力占领或被勒索。在信息时代,希望利用暴力作为杠杆来获取更高收入的员工的地位将比 1936-37 年通用汽车公司坐厂罢工的工人要弱得多。

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7. Microprocessing individualizes work Industrial technology standardized work. Anyone using the same tools would produce the same output. Microtechnology has started replacing "stupid" machines with more intelligent technology capable of highly variable output. The increased variability of output for persons using the same tools has profound implications, many of which we explore in coming chapters.

微处理器将工作个性化。工业技术使工作标准化。使用相同工具的任何人都会产生相同的产出。微技术已经开始用更智能的技术取代"愚蠢"的机器,这些技术能够产生高度可变的输出。使用相同工具的人产出可变性的增加具有深远的影响,我们将在后续章节中探讨这些影响。

Among the more important is the fact that where output varies, incomes vary as well. Most of the value in fields where skill varies will tend to be created by a small number of persons. This is a common characteristic of the most highly competitive markets. It is quite evident, for example, in

sports. Many millions of young people worldwide play various versions of football. But 99 percent of the money that is spent to watch football games is paid to see the performances of a tiny fraction of the total number of players.

其中较为重要的是,当产出有所不同时,收入也会随之变化。在技能差异较大的领域,大部分价值往往由少数人创造。这是高度竞争市场的一个常见特点。例如,在体育领域就很明显。全球数百万年轻人玩各种版本的足球,但 99%的观赛费用都支付给极少数球员。

Likewise, the world is full of aspiring actors and actresses. Yet only a relatively small number become stars. Equally, tens of thousands of books are published annually.

同样地,世界上充满了有抱负的演员和女演员。但只有相对较少的人成为明星。同样地,每年出版的书籍数以万计。

But most of the royalty money is paid to a small number of best-selling authors who can really entertain their readers. Unhappily, we are not among them.

但是大部分版税收入都支付给少数销量最好的作者,他们能真正吸引读者。不幸的是,我们不属于这一类。

The vast variability of output among persons employing the same equipment poses yet another obstacle to extortion. It creates a major bargaining problem about how to share the payoff. Where a relatively small proportion of those participating in a given activity create most of the value, it is all but mathematically impossible for them to be left better off by a coerced outcome that averages incomes. One software programmer may devise an algorithm for controlling a robot that proves to be worth millions. 使用同样设备的人产出的巨大差异给敲诈勒索带来了另一个障碍。它造成了一个关于如何分享赎金的重大讨价还价问题。在某项活动中,只有一小部分参与者创造了大部分价值,这使得他们通过强迫性的平均收入结果而获得收益变为数学上几乎不可能。一名软件程序员可以为控制机器人设计一种价值上百万的算法。

Another, working with identical equipment, may write a program worth nothing. The more productive programmer is no more likely to wish to have

his income tied to that of his compatriot than Tom Clancy is to agree to average his book royalties with ours.

另一个人使用相同的设备编写的程序可能一文不值。更高效的程序员不太可能希望他的收入与同事的收入挂钩,就像汤姆·克兰西不会同意平均分配他的图书版税一样。

Even the early stages of the Information Revolution have made it far more obvious than it was in 1975 that skills and mental ability are crucial variables in economic output. This has already vaporized the once-proud rationalization for extortion of the capitalists by the workers that prevailed during the industrial period. The fantasy that unskilled labor actually created the value that seemed to be pocketed in a disproportionate share by the capitalists and entrepreneurs is already an anachronism. It is not even a plausible fiction in the case of information technology. When the programmer sits down to write code, there is too direct a line of attribution between his skill and his product to allow for much mistake about who is responsible. It is obvious beyond dispute that an illiterate or semi-literate could not program a computer. It is therefore equally obvious that any value in programs compiled by others could not have been stolen from him. This is why cries of "exploitation" by workers are now heard mainly among janitors.

即便是信息革命的早期阶段,也已经比 1975 年更加明显,技能和智力是经济产出的关键变量。这已经粉碎了曾经盛行于工业时期的资本家剥削工人的理由。认为 unskilled labor 实际创造了大部分价值,而资本家和企业家只是非比例地占有这些价值,这种幻想已经成为了一种历史遗物。在信息技术领域,这种说法更是站不住脚。当程序员坐下来编写代码时,他的技能和产品之间有太直接的关联,不会存在对责任归属的太多争议。一个文盲或半文盲显然无法编程,因此由他人编写的程序中创造的任何价值,也显然不可能偷取自他。这就是为什么现在"剥削"的呼声主要出自于清洁工等工人团体。

Information technology is making it plain that the problem faced by persons of low skill is not that their productive capacities are being unfairly taken advantage of; but rather the fear that they may lack the ability to make a real economic contribution. As Kevin Kelly suggests in *Out Of Control*, the "Upstart" car company of the Information Age may be the brainchild of "a

dozen people," who will outsource most of their parts, and still produce cars more carefully customized and tailored to their buyer's wishes than 126 信息技术明确表明,低技能人员面临的问题不是他们的生产能力被不公平地利用;而是他们可能缺乏作出真正经济贡献的能力的担忧。正如凯文·凯利在《失控》中所建议的,信息时代的"新兴"汽车公司可能由"一打人"创立,他们会外包大部分零部件,但仍能生产出比 126 辆车更加精心定制和迎合买家需求的汽车。

anything yet seen from Detroit or Tokyo: "Cars, each one customer-tailored, are ordered by a network of customers and shipped the minute they are done. Molds for the car's body are rapidly shaped by computer-guided lasers, and fed designs generated by customer response and target marketing. A flexible line of robots assembles the cars.

此间看到的任何东西都不及底特律或东京:"每一辆车都是客户定制的,由客户网络下单,一完工就立即发货。车身模具由计算机引导的激光快速成型,并根据客户响应和目标营销生成的设计来制造。一条灵活的机器人装配线进行组装。"

Robot repair and improvement is outsourced to a robot company."²
机器人维修和改进外包给一家机器人公司。

"Tools with a Voice"
有声工具

To an increasing extent, unskilled work can be done by automated machines, robots, and computational systems, like digital assistants. When Aristotle described slaves as "tools with a voice," he was talking about human beings. In the not-distant future, "tools with a voice," like the genies of fable, will be able to speak and follow instructions, and even handle complex assignments. Rapidly increasing computational power has already brought forth a number of primitive applications of voice recognition, such as hands-free telephones and computers that perform mathematical computations following verbal instructions. Computers that convert speech to text were already being marketed in late 1996 as we write. As pattern-recognition capabilities improve, computers linked to voice synthesizers will operate through networks to perform numerous functions formerly

undertaken by humans employed as telephone operators, secretaries, travel agents, administrative assistants, chess champions, claims processors, composers, bond traders, cyberwar specialists, weapons analysts, or even street-smart flirts who answer the telephones on 900 calls.

日益增加的无技能工作可以由自动化机器、机器人和计算系统(如数字助手)来完成。当亚里士多德将奴隶描述为"带声音的工具"时,他指的是人类。在不远的将来,"带声音的工具"(如神话中的精灵)将能够说话并遵循指令,甚至处理复杂的任务。快速增长的计算能力已经带来了一些语音识别的初级应用,如免提电话和根据语音指令执行数学计算的电脑。我们正在编写的 1996 年年底,就已经有将语音转换为文字的计算机在市面上销售了。随着模式识别能力的提高,与语音合成器相连的计算机将通过网络执行许多过去由人类电话接线员、秘书、旅行社、行政助理、国际象棋冠军、理赔处理员、作曲家、债券交易员、网络战专家、武器分析师甚至接听 900 号电话的街头智慧型调情对象所承担的功能。

Michael Mauldin of Carnegie-Mellon University has programmed a an artificial personality named Julia, who is capable of fooling almost anyone with whom she converses on the Internet. According to press reports, Julia is a wise-cracking dame who lives out her life in a role-playing game on the Internet. She is smart, funny and loves to flirt. She is also a bit of a hockey whiz and able to come up with the perfect sarcastic comment on a moment's notice. Julia, however, is no lady. She is a bot, an artificial intelligence that exists only in the ether of the Internet."²⁸ The startling progress that has already been made in programming artificial intelligence and digital servants leaves little doubt that many practical applications are still to come. This has significant megapolitical consequences.

卡内基-梅隆大学的迈克尔·莫丁编程创造了一个名为朱莉亚的人工人格,她能够欺骗几乎所有与她在网上交谈的人。据报道,朱莉亚是一个善于讽刺的女孩,在网上角色扮演游戏中过着自己的生活。她聪明幽默,喜欢调情。她也是一个曲棍球高手,能在瞬间出口伤人的讽刺。然而,朱莉亚并不是一个真正的女士,而是一个机器人,一个仅存在于互联网虚无缥缈之中的人工智能。人工智能和数字助手的惊人进步已经让人难以怀疑,还会有更多实际应用出现。这将带来重大的大政治影响。

The Individual as an Ensemble 个体即集合体

Development of "tools with a voice" for multiple applications creates the possibility for dispersal of the individual into multiple simultaneous activities. The individual will no longer be singular, but potentially an ensemble of dozens or perhaps even thousands of activities undertaken through intelligent agents. This will not only greatly enhance the productive capability of the most talented individuals; it will also make the Sovereign Individual potentially far more formidable militarily than the individual has ever been before.

为多个应用程序开发"具有声音的工具"会创造将个人分散到多项同时进行的活动中可能性。个人将不再是单一的,而可能是通过智能代理执行数十或甚至数千项活动的集合体。这不仅将大大增强最有才华的个人的生产能力,还将使主权个人在军事上比以往任何时候都更加强大。

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Not only will one individual be able to manifestly multiply his activities by employing an essentially unlimited number of intelligent agents. He or she will even be able to act after death. For the first time, an individual will be capable of carrying on elaborate tasks even if he is biologically dead. It will no longer be possible for either an enemy at war or a criminal to completely extinguish the capability of an individual to retaliate by killing him. This is one of the more revolutionary innovations in the logic of violence in the whole of history.

个人不仅能够通过雇用无数智能代理人来显著地扩大其活动范围,还能在死后继续行动。这是历史上最具革命性的暴力逻辑创新之一。一个人在生物上死亡后,仍然能够进行复杂的任务。战时的敌人或罪犯也将无法彻底消灭一个人的报复能力。

Insights for the Information Age 信息时代的见解

The biggest changes in life occur to variables that no one watches. Or to put it another way, we take for granted variables that have fluctuated very little for centuries or even hundreds of generations.

生活中最大的变化发生在没有人关注的变量上。换句话说,我们认为几个世纪甚至几百代来波动很小的变量理所当然。

For most of history, if not for most of human existence, the balance between protection and extortion has fluctuated within a narrow margin, with extortion always holding the upper hand. Now that is about to change. information technology is laying the groundwork for a fundamental shift in the factors that determine the costs and rewards of resorting to violence. The fact that intelligent agents will be available to investigate and perhaps retaliate in one fashion or another against those who initiate violence is merely a hint of this new vista in protection. Twenty-five years ago, the following statement would have been no more than the ranting of a crank: "If you kill me, I will sweep the money out of your bank accounts and give it to charities in Nepal." After the turn of the millennium, it may not be. Whether it would prove to be a practical threat would be determined by factors of time and place. Yet even if the would-be miscreant's accounts proved to be impermeable, there would surely be other costly mischief that an army of intelligent agents could impose in retaliation for a crime. Think about it.

在大部分历史时期,如果不说在人类存在的大部分时期,保护与敲诈之间的平衡都在很窄的范围内波动,敲诈始终占据优势。但这种情况即将发生改变。信息技术正在为决定暴力成本和回报的根本性转变奠定基础。智能代理将可用于调查并以某种方式报复那些发动暴力的人,这只是这种新保护格局的一个征兆。二十五年前,以下声明不过是疯言: "如果你杀了我,我会把你银行账户里的钱清空并捐给尼泊尔的慈善机构。"到了新千年,这种声明可能不再是空言。它是否会成为一种实际的威胁,取决于时间和地点的因素。但即使想作恶的人的账户被证明是不可侵犯的,一支智能代理军也一定能想出其他代价高昂的恶作剧来报复这种罪行。请仔细思考这个问题。

New Alternatives in Protection

新的保护选择

This is only one of many ways to enhance protection that are being opened by the technology of the Information Age, most of which tend to undermine the near-monopoly on protection and extortion that has been enjoyed by governments in the past two centuries. Even without the new technological razzle-dazzle, there have always been alternatives for protection, not all of which have tended to be monopolized by government.

这只是信息时代技术带来的众多增强保护措施之一,其中大多数都在削弱过去两个世纪政府对保护权力和敲诈勒索的垄断地位。即使没有新技术的光鲜亮丽,保护措施的替代选择一直存在,并非全部都被政府垄断。

A person who feels threatened may simply run away. When the world was young and horizons were open, the option to flee was commonly employed. When people worry about losses due to theft or vandalism, they may elect to purchase insurance policies to indemnify such risks.

当一个人感到受到威胁时,他可能会逃跑。当世界年轻、地平线开放时,逃离是一个常见的选择。当人们担心因盗窃或破坏而遭受损失时,他们可能会选择购买保险单来补偿这些风险。

Curses and spells, although weak forms of protection, have also saved lives and warded off acts of theft. They sometimes work in societies where predators are superstitious. Valuables may also be protected by being hidden. This is sometimes an effective method when it can be employed. Assets can be buried. Secured with locks.

诅咒和咒语虽然是一种较弱的保护形式,但也保护了生命,预防了盗窃行为。在迷信的社会中,它们有时很有效。贵重物品也可以通过隐藏的方式得到保护。这在某些情况下是一种有效的方法。资产也可以被埋藏或上锁保护。

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Placed behind high walls. And rigged with sirens and electronic monitoring devices. But hiding person and property have not always been practical. 被置于高墙之后。并装有警报和电子监控设备。但隐藏人员和财产并非一直切实可行。

For all the variety of means of protection that have been employed historically, one method has dominated all others—the capacity to trump violence with violence, to call on greater force to overwhelm anyone who would assault you or steal your property. The question is where you can turn for such a service, and how you can motivate anyone to risk life and limb to help you battle thugs who might initiate force against you.

所有历史上采用的各种保护手段中,一种方法一直主导其他方法——以暴力制服暴力的能力,调动更大的力量来压倒任何试图攻击你或抢劫你财产的人。问题在于你可以从哪里寻求这种服务,以及如何激励任何人冒生命和肢体的危险来帮助你对抗可能对你使用武力的暴徒。

Sometimes close relatives have answered the call.
有时亲近的亲属会答应这个号召。

Sometimes tribal and clan-based groups have served as an unofficial police, responding to violence against any of their members with blood vendettas. Sometimes mercenaries or private guards have been employed to fend off attack, but not always as usefully as you might wish. The new intelligent agents of the Information Age, although their activities will be largely confined to cyberspace, add a new alternative. Their loyalties, unlike those of the mercenaries, private guards, and even remote cousins, will be beyond dispute.

有时,部落和氏族群体充当非正式警察的角色,对他们任何成员遭受暴力的行为都会以血腥复仇相报。有时会雇佣佣兵或私人保卫来防范攻击,但并不总是如人所愿。尽管新兴的信息时代智能代理的活动将主要局限于网络空间,但它们仍为新的替代选择。他们的忠诚度,与佣兵、私人保卫和远亲不同,将毋庸置疑。

The Paradoxes of Power 权力的悖论

The use of violence to protect against violence is fraught with paradoxes. Under conditions that have heretofore existed, any group or agency that you could employ to successfully protect your life and wealth from attack would also necessarily have had the capacity to take either. That is a drawback for which there is no easy answer.

用暴力来对抗暴力充满了矛盾。在之前存在的条件下,任何你可以雇用来成功保护你的生命和财富免受攻击的团体或机构,也必然有能力窃取这些东西。这是一个没有简单答案的缺点。

Normally, you could look to competition to keep providers of an economic service from ignoring the wishes of their customers. But where violence is concerned, direct competition often has perverse results. In the past, it has usually led to increased violence. When two would-be protective agencies send their forces to arrest one another, the result is more akin to civil war than protection. When you are seeking protection from violence you normally do not wish to increase the output of violence but to suppress it. And to suppress it on terms that do not allow the plundering of the customers who pay for the protection service in the first place.

在正常情况下,您可以依赖竞争来阻止经济服务提供者忽视客户的意愿。但是当涉及暴力时,直接竞争往往会产生反常的结果。过去,这通常会导致暴力的升级。当两个准备成为保护机构的组织派遣自己的力量来逮捕对方时,结果更像内战而非保护。当您寻求保护免受暴力时,通常您并不希望增加暴力的产出,而是要抑制它。并且要在不允许掠夺为保护服务付费的客户的条件下抑制它。

"...during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war: and such a war as is of every man, against every man wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own inventions shall furnish them withal"
THOMAS HOBBES

在人们生活中没有共同权力来畏惧他们的时候,他们就处于被称为战争的状态:这种战争就是每个人都对抗每个人,人们只能依靠自己的力量和发明来获得安全。——托马斯·霍布斯

Monopoly and Anarchy 垄断与无政府状态

This is why anarchy, or "the war of all against all," as Hobbes described it, has seldom been a satisfactory state of affairs. Local competition in the use of violence has usually meant paying higher costs for protection and enjoying less of it. Occasionally, freethinking enthusiasts for the market

have suggested that market mechanisms alone would be sufficient to provide for policing of property rights and protection of life, 129

这就是为什么无政府状态,或者霍布斯所描述的"人人相互攻击的战争",很少成为一种令人满意的状态。当地暴力竞争通常意味着为保护支付更高的费用,但享有较少的保护。偶尔有自由思想的市场狂热者建议,仅凭市场机制就足以提供财产权的执法和生命的保护。

without any need for a sovereignty whatsoever.²⁹ Some of the analytics have been elegant, but the fact remains that free-market provision of police and justice services has not proven viable under the megapolitical conditions of industrialism. Only primitive societies where behavior is highly stereotyped and populations are tiny and homogeneous have been able to survive without governments to provide the service of locally monopolizing protection through violence.

无需主权。²⁹ 有些分析很优雅,但事实是,工业主义的大政治条件下,自由市场提供警察和司法服务并未被证明是可行的。只有行为高度定型、人口极小且同质的原始社会,才能在没有政府提供通过暴力获取当地垄断保护的情况下生存。

Examples of anarchic societies above the level of the hunting-and-gathering tribe are few and ancient. They are all among the simplest economies of isolated rainwater farmers. The Kafirs in pre-Muslim Afghanistan. Some Irish tribes in the Dark Ages.

无政府主义社会的例子,超越狩猎采集部落的水平是罕见和古老的。它们都属于最简单的经济体,都是孤立的雨季农民。阿富汗前伊斯兰时期的卡菲尔人。黑暗时代的一些爱尔兰部落。

Some Indian bands in Brazil, Venezuela, and Paraguay. Other aboriginals in scattered parts of the world. Their methods of organizing protection without government are known only to connoisseurs of extreme cases. If you would like to learn more about them, we cite several books in our Notes that contain more details. ³⁰ Primitive groups were able to function without a distinct organization specializing in violence only because they were small, closed societies. And they were isolated.

一些位于巴西、委内瑞拉和巴拉圭的印第安乐队。世界其他地方的一些土著。他们不借助政府组织保护的方式只有极端案例的行家才知

道。如果您想了解更多信息,我们在注释中列出了几本包含更多细节的书籍。部落群体之所以能够在没有专门从事暴力的组织的情况下运作,只是因为他们是小型封闭社会,而且与世隔绝。

They could draw on tight kinship relations to defend against most violent threats on a limited scale, which were the only sort they were likely to encounter. When they encountered larger threats, organized by states, they were overpowered and subjected to rule monopolized by outside groups. This happened over and over. Wherever societies have formed at a scale above bands and tribes, especially where trade routes brought different peoples into contact, specialists in violence have always emerged to plunder any surplus more peaceful people could produce. When technological conditions raised the returns to violence, they doomed societies that were not organized to channel large resources into making war.

他们可以利用亲密的亲属关系来抵御有限范围内的暴力威胁,这是他们可能遇到的唯一类型。当他们遇到由国家组织的更大的威胁时,他们就会被压垮,并被外部群体垄断的统治所束缚。这一直在重复发生。无论何时,只要社会的规模超越了小队和部落,特别是当贸易路线使不同民族接触时,从事暴力的专家就会出现,以掠夺任何更加和平的人们可以创造的剩余价值。当技术条件提高了暴力的回报时,他们就注定要毁灭那些没有组织起来投入大量资源从事战争的社会。

"Which princes were rendering the service of police? Which were racketeers or even plunderers?

哪些王子提供了警务服务?哪些人是勒索者或掠夺者?

A plunderer could become in effect the chief of police as soon as he regularized his 'take,'

劫掠者一旦规范了他的"收获",就可以立即成为警察局长

adapted it to the capacity to pay defended his preserve against other plunderers, and maintained his territorial monopoly long enough !or custom to make it legitimate."3 FREDERIC C. LANE

适应了支付能力,捍卫了他免受其他掠夺者的侵害,并维持了领土垄断长期存在,以至于习惯使之合法化。 "

Government as a Seller of Protection 政府作为保护的出售者

As we have said at several points, government's principal economic function from the perspective of those who pay the taxes is to provide protection of life and property.

正如我们在多个场合所说,从缴税人的角度来看,政府的主要经济职能是保护生命和财产。

Yet the government often operates like organized crime, extracting resources from people within its sphere of operations as tribute or plunder. 政府通常像有组织的犯罪分子一样行事,从其管辖范围内的人民那里提取资源作为贡品或掠夺物。

Government is not only a protection service; it is also a protection racket. While government provides protection against violence originating with others, like the protection racket it also charges customers for protection against harm that it would otherwise impose itself. The first action is an economic service. The second is a racket.

政府不仅是一种保护服务,也是一种保护性勒索。政府提供保护以防止他人的暴力,就像保护性勒索一样,它也向顾客收取保护费来防止它自己造成的伤害。第一项行为是一项经济服务。第二项则是一种勒索。

In practice, the distinction between the two forms of "protection" may be difficult to make. Governments, as Charles Tilly has pointed out, may perhaps be best understood as "our largest examples of organized crime." 3 在实践中,这两种"保护"形式之间的区别可能很难界定。正如查尔斯·蒂利所指出的,政府也许最好理解为"我们最大的有组织犯罪的例子"。

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The activities of even the best government usually involved some mixture of the economic service of protection combined with extortion. Historically, both pursuits could be optimized if the government could impose a near-monopoly on coercion within the territories where it operates. In cases where a single armed group could establish predominance in the use of violence, the quality of the protection service it could provide was normally

far superior to what could be had from one of several competing protection agencies thrown into battle over the same territory.

即使是最好的政府,其活动通常也涉及一些保护经济服务与勒索的混合。从历史上看,如果政府能在其管辖范围内建立近乎垄断的强制力,这两种追求都能得到优化。当一个武装集团在使用暴力中占主导地位时,其所提供的保护服务通常远远优于几个争夺同一领土的竞争性保护机构所能提供的。

A Natural Monopoly on Land 自然垄断的土地

Achievement of a local monopoly of coercion not only allowed a government to more effectively protect its potential customers from violence initiated by others; it also greatly reduced the government's operating costs. As Lane put it, "The violence-using, violence-controlling industry was a natural monopoly, at least on land. Within territorial limits, the service it rendered could be produced much more cheaply by a monopoly."³³

获得对强制力的地方垄断不仅使政府能够更有效地保护其潜在客户免受他人暴力的侵害;它还大大降低了政府的运营成本。正如 Lane 所说,"使用暴力、控制暴力的行业在陆地上是一种自然垄断。在领土限制内,它提供的服务可以由一家垄断公司更便宜地生产。"

Thus a "monopoly of the use of force within a contiguous territory enabled a protection-producing enterprise to improve its product and reduce its costs." Such a governing organization could offer more protection with less expense if it did not have to engage in incessant military actions to fend off competitive groups seeking to extract protection payments from its customers.

因此,"在连续领土内对武力使用的垄断使得生产保护的企业能够改善其产品并降低成本。"如果该管理组织不需要不断进行军事行动来阻挡寻求向其客户索取保护费的竞争性团体,那么该组织就可以提供更多的保护,而花费更少。

Monopoly and Plunder 寡头垄断和掠夺

The degree of the local monopoly of coercion directly affects whether the would-be government has stronger incentives to protect people within its grasp or to plunder them. Where contending groups wrestle and maneuver in uneasy balance, the incentives to use predatory violence increase. Plunder becomes more attractive. Because power is less stable, and the local monopoly of coercion less secure, the time horizons of those with the capacity to employ violence shrinks. The "king of the mountain" may stand on such a slippery slope that he could not expect to survive long enough to realize a share of the substantial gains that ultimately result from containing violence.

当地暴力垄断的程度直接影响着意图成为政府的实体是否有更强的动机来保护其掌控范围内的人民,还是掠夺他们。当对抗集团在不稳定的平衡中争斗和操纵时,使用掠夺性暴力的动机就会增加。掠夺变得更有吸引力。因为权力不太稳定,当地暴力垄断也不太安全,有能力运用暴力的人的时间视野就会缩短。"登峰造极"的人可能处于如此滑溜的斜坡上,以至于他无法指望活到足够长的时间来获得遏制暴力最终产生的大量收益。

When that is the case, there is little to prevent those who command what passes for government from employing their power to terrorize and pillage society.

在这种情况下,很少有什么能阻止那些掌握政府权力的人利用他们的权力来恐吓和掠夺社会。

The logic of force, therefore, tells you that the more competing armed groups there are operating in any territory, the higher the likelihood that they will resort to predatory violence. Without a single overwhelming power to suppress freelance violence, it tends to proliferate, and many of the gains of economic and social cooperation go up in smoke.

因此,武力逻辑告诉你,在任何地区,参与竞争的武装集团越多,它们倾向于诉诸掠夺性暴力的可能性就越高。没有一股压倒性的力量来遏制个体性暴力,这种暴力倾向会蔓延开来,经济和社会合作的许多收益将化为乌有。

The damage that can occur when violence is given full reign in a condition of anarchy is demonstrated by the fate of China under the warlords in the

1920s. It is a story we recounted in *The Great Reckoning*. The competing warlords imposed great damage in areas where there was no single, overwhelming power to keep them in check.

20 世纪 20 年代中国在军阀混战中的遭遇就证明了在无政府状态下暴力横行所带来的损害。这是我们在《大清算》一书中描述的故事。竞争的军阀给没有单一、压倒性力量管制的地区造成了严重破坏。

Similar stories illustrating a similar point have been broadcast to the world in living color 131

类似的故事以生动的色彩广播到了全世界 131

by CNN news crews braving the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia. The armed forces of Somalia's warlords, nicknamed the "technicals," brought anarchy to that sad country before the United States led a massive military intervention to contain them. When the commanding might of U.S. forces was withdrawn, the technicals brought out their weapons again, and anarchy resumed. A report in the *Washington Post* observed: [P]ickup trucks mounted with antiaircraft guns are once again plowing the dusty, rubble-strewn streets. Back too are the swaggering young men in T-shirts and Kalashnikov rifles slung over their shoulders, extorting money from passing cars and buses at makeshift roadblocks.

索马里摩加迪沙街头的美国有线电视新闻频道新闻工作人员报导,索马里军阀"技术军"的武装力量在美国大规模军事干预之前,已经使这个悲伤的国家陷入了无政府状态。当美国撤出主力军队后,技术军再次动用武器,无政府状态也随之恢复。一篇华盛顿邮报的报道指出:"装备高射炮的吉普车再次在满是尘土和碎石的街道上巡逻。穿 T 恤,背着卡拉什尼科夫步枪的年轻人,也重新出现在临时路障上,勒索过往车辆和公共汽车的钱财。"

One militia-controlled neighborhood here is so heavily armed that locals refer to it as "Bosnia-Herzegovina." Travelling around this city's mean streets today is strikingly reminiscent of the days in 1992, when chaotic warfare among rival militias plunged Somalia into anarchy and a famine that prompted a U.S.-led military intervention. Once again, to traverse Mogadishu, travelers must hire a carload of armed thugs, hoping they will deliver protection for a hundred bucks a day, plus time off for lunch. 3

这里的一个由民兵控制的社区武装到牙齿,当地人把它称为"波黑"。如今,穿梭于这个城市肮脏的街道上,让人联想起 1992 年时期的混乱战争,当时敌对民兵的混战使索马里陷入无政府状态和饥荒,导致了美国牵头的军事干预。再次穿越摩加迪沙,旅行者必须雇佣一车武装打手,希望他们能提供一天一百美元加午餐时间的保护。

The examples of Somalia, Rwanda, and others you will soon see on television offer a Technicolor proof that violent competition for control of territory does not yield the same immediate economic gains as other forms of competition. To the contrary. The roving bandits and looters who compete under anarchy lack even the weak incentives to protect productive activity that sometimes lighten even the heavy hand of dictators when their rule is secure.

索马里、卢旺达以及你即将在电视上看到的其他案例,为暴力争夺领土控制权并不能带来与其他形式竞争相同的即时经济利益提供了亮丽的证明。恰恰相反。在无政府状态下争夺的流动强盗和掠夺者,甚至缺乏保护生产性活动的微弱激励,这往往会缓解独裁者统治稳固时的沉重手段。

"The society of what we call the modern age is characterized, above all/in the West, by a certain level of monopolization. Free use of military weapons is denied the individual and reserved to a central authority of whatever kind, and likewise the taxation of the property or income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social authority. The financial means thus flowing into this central authority maintain its monopoly of military force, while this in turn maintains the monopoly of taxation. Neither has in any sense precedence over the other; they are two sides of the same monopoly. If one disappears the other automatically follows; the monopoly rule may sometimes be shaken more strongly on one side than on the other"

3

我们所谓现代社会的特点,最突出的就是某种程度的垄断。个人无法自由使用军事武器,这种权力被保留给某种中央权力机构;同样地,对个人财产或收入的征税也集中在一个中央社会权威手中。流入这个中央机构的财政资金维护了其军事力量的垄断,而这反过来又维护了对税收

的垄断。这两者互为表里,缺一不可;垄断统治有时在某一方面会受到更强烈的冲击。

NORBERT BLIAS

诺伯特·布利亚斯

THE EVOLUTION OF PROTECTION

保护的演化

Lane developed an argument that we have misappropriated for our purposes in imagining how the Information Age may unfold. He argued that the history of Western economies since the Dark Ages can be interpreted in terms of four stages of competition and monopoly in the organization of violence. While Lane is largely silent about the megapolitical factors that we identify as influencing the scale at which governments operate, his exploration of the economics of violence coincides closely with the argument we spelled out in *Blood in the Streets* and *The Great Reckoning*; and elsewhere in this volume.

蓝恩提出了一种论点,即我们在想象信息时代如何展开时,已经误用了这种论点。他认为,自黑暗时代以来的西方经济历史可以按照暴力组织中的四个竞争和垄断阶段来解释。虽然蓝恩对我们认为影响政府运营规模的大政治因素保持沉默,但他对暴力经济的探讨与我们在《街头血腥》和《大清算》以及本卷其他地方阐述的论点高度一致。

We have already analyzed some of the megapolitical factors that played a role in the evolution of Western society following the fall of Rome.

我们已经分析了一些在罗马帝国崩溃后影响西方社会演变的大政治因素。

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Lane also examined this period, focusing on the economic consequences of that competition to monopolize violence. He discerned four important stages in the functioning of economies over the past thousand years, each involving a different phase in the organization of violence.* Out of the Dark Ages The first stage is one of "anarchy and plunder" that marked the feudal revolution of a thousand years ago. While Lane does not specify the dates

for any of his summary periods, arithmetic sets the boundary of his first period quite clearly, and his description of the stage of "anarchy and plunder" seems to match conditions during the transition from the Dark Ages when the use of violence was "highly competitive, even on land."³⁷ He does not say why, but when violence is "highly competitive," this usually means that there are significant obstacles to the projection of power at any distance. In military terms, defense is predominant over the offense. 蓝恩还对这一时期进行了研究,重点关注了这种垄断暴力竞争的经济后果。他将过去一千年经济的运行划分为四个重要阶段,每个阶段都涉及暴力组织的不同阶段。黑暗时代之后的第一个阶段是"无政府和掠夺"的封建革命时期。虽然蓝恩没有为任何总结的时期指定具体日期,但从数学上来看,他的第一个时期的界限非常清晰,他对"无政府和掠夺"阶段的描述也似乎符合黑暗时代向过渡的条件,当时暴力的使用是"高度竞争性的,甚至连在陆地上也如此"。他没有说为什么,但当暴力是"高度竞争性的"时,这通常意味着在任何距离投射权力都存在着重大障碍。从军事术语来说,防御占主导地位,而进攻是次要的。

For reasons we explained in Chapter 3, this stage of "anarchy and plunder" 正如我们在第 3 章中所解释的,这个阶段是"无政府状态和掠夺"

coincided with falling productivity of agriculture due to adverse climatic changes. Since technology offered few effective economies of scale to help in securing a monopoly of violence at the time, competition between would-be rulers was widespread. Economic activity was smothered.

由于气候变化不利,农业生产率下降。由于当时技术无法提供有效的规模经济来帮助确保暴力垄断,统治者之间的竞争很普遍。经济活动被抑制。

The weakness of the economy made the problem of establishing a stable order worse. To create a local monopoly of violence involved too high a cost in military activity in proportion to the meager value of economic turnover. Without the capacity to enforce an effective monopoly over an economically viable territory, the armed knights on horseback terrorized and plundered while providing little in the way of "protection"

经济衰弱使建立稳定秩序的问题更加恶化。建立暴力的地方垄断需要投入太多军事活动,与经济周转价值相比太高。由于缺乏对经济可行区

域实施有效垄断的能力,骑着马的武装骑士恐吓并掠夺,但提供的"保护"很少。

for their customers.
为他们的客户。

Feudalism
封建主义

"The second stage begins when small regional or provincial monopolies are established. Agricultural production then rises, and most of the surplus is collected by recently established monopolists of violence." 38 Still, the surplus is relatively meager during this second stage, which we identify with the early Middle Ages. Economic growth is held down by the absence of advantages of scale in the organization of violence, which keeps the military costs of enforcing local monopolies high. But while the costs remain high, the price that minisovereignities can charge for protection rises, since economic activity expands when anarchy is curtailed.

第二阶段始于小型区域或省级垄断的建立。农业生产随之增加,大部分剩余收益被新成立的暴力垄断者收取。尽管如此,在这个第二阶段,剩余收益仍然相对较少,这与我们所认定的早期中世纪相符。经济增长受到组织暴力规模经济优势的缺乏所限制,这使得维持地方垄断的军事成本保持较高。但尽管成本仍然很高,小主权国家可收取的保护费用却上升,因为经济活动在无政府状态被遏制时得以扩张。

*****Note that Lane's four stages of competition and monopoly in the use of violence are different from the four stages in the organization of economic life that we identify-namely, foraging, farming, industrialism, and the Information Age. *****

利恩的暴力竞争和垄断的四个阶段与我们确定的经济生活组织的四个阶段(即采集、农耕、工业主义和信息时代)不同。

During a late phase of the second stage many tribute takers attract customers by special offers to agricultural and commercial enterprise. They offer protection at low prices for those who will bring new lands into cultivation, and special policing services to encourage trade such as that

organized by the Counts of Champagne for merchants 133

在第二阶段的后期,许多贡赋征收者通过为农业和商业企业提供特殊优惠来吸引客户。他们为那些愿意开垦新土地的人提供低价保护,并为鼓励贸易提供特殊的警务服务,如香槟伯爵为商人组织的服务。

coming to their fairs." 39 In other words, when they were able to establish a sufficient control over territory to negotiate credibly, local warlords did what local merchants do when they need to increase market share: they discounted their services to attract customers. The warlords later used the added resources from additional economic activity to consolidate their control over larger territories. Once that control was firmly established, they began to enjoy more of the advantages of monopoly. Their military costs for policing tended to fall, and they could also increase the price they charged without worrying that this made their service less attractive to customers. 来到他们的集市。" 39 换句话说,当他们能够建立足够的领土控制力来进行可信的谈判时,地方军阀做的就是当地商人为了增加市场份额所做的事:他们提供折扣来吸引客户。军阀随后利用增加的经济活动带来的额外资源来巩固对更大领土的控制。一旦这种控制得到牢固确立,他们就开始享受垄断优势。维护治安的军事成本趋于下降,他们还可以提高价格,而不必担心这会影晌客户使用他们的服务。

In this complicated stage in Western history, those who employ violence, the medieval lords and monarchs, take most of the surplus above subsistence. There are few merchants. The most successful are those who are best able to evade or minimize the taxes, fees, and other costs imposed by those demanding money for "protection services."

在西方历史的这个复杂时期,那些使用暴力的人,中世纪的贵族和君主,获得了绝大部分超过生活必需品的剩余。商人很少。最成功的是那些最能规避或最小化那些要求支付"保护费"的人强加的税收、费用和其他成本的人。

The Early-Modern Period A third stage is reached when the merchants and landowners who are not also specialists in violence "are getting more of the economy's surplus than are fief holders and monarchs. . . . In this third stage, the enterprises specializing in the use of violence receive less of the surplus than do enterprises that buy protection from the governments."40

Since successful merchants are more likely to reinvest their profits than consume them, the higher profits of merchants in that stage in history led to self-reinforcing growth.

早期现代时期当那些不从事暴力专业的商人和地主获得的经济剩余比封建领主和君主还要多的时候,就进入了第三个阶段。在这个阶段,专门从事暴力使用的企业获得的剩余少于向政府购买保护的企业。成功的商人更有可能将利润再投资而不是消费,这一时期商人获得更高利润推动了自我强化的经济增长。

The Factory Age 工厂时代

Lane identifies the passage from the third to the fourth stage with the emergence of technological and industrial innovations as more important factors in earning profits than lowering the costs of protection. By this, Lane seems to refer to the period since 1750.

兰认为,从第三到第四阶段的过渡,科技和工业创新的出现比降低保护成本更重要,这意味着这一时期始于 1750 年。

From that time on, the character of technology began to play a clearly dominating role in the prosperity of regions. To take an extreme case, even areas where no government existed at all, as was the case in some parts of New Zealand, for example, prior to 1840, were not likely to become highly prosperous simply because they paid no taxes. At that point in history, innovations in industrial technology were more important to achieving profits than any savings that could be had by lowering the costs for protection, even to zero. As the scale of government rose, the credit and financing mechanisms originally pioneered by governments to raise resources for military operations became available to finance business enterprises of larger scale.

从那时起,技术特性开始在区域繁荣中发挥明显的主导作用。以极端的情况来说,甚至连完全没有政府存在的地区,比如 1840 年前新西兰的某些地方,也不太可能仅凭不缴税就变得高度繁荣。在那个历史时期,工业技术创新对实现利润更为重要,即便是将保护成本降至零也无法与之抗衡。随着政府规模的扩大,政府最初为筹集军事资源而开创的信贷和融资机制,也变得可以用于为更大规模的商业企业提供融资。

Although Lane does not say so, the concentration of technological advantages in a given locale reduced the competition between jurisdictions and allowed "enterprises specializing in the use of violence," or governments, to charge higher prices. When there are large technological gaps between the competitors in one jurisdiction and another, as there were during the Industrial Age, entrepreneurs in the jurisdictions with the best technology tend to make more money, even though they may have to pay higher taxes and other costs to their governments.

尽管 Lane 没有这么说,但一个特定地区的技术优势集中度降低了不同司法管辖区之间的竞争,并允许"专门从事暴力使用"的企业或政府收取更高的价格。当一个司法管辖区内的竞争对手之间存在大规模技术差距时,像工业时代那样,拥有最佳技术的企业家往往能赚取更多利润,尽管他们可能不得不向其政府支付更高的税收和其他成本。

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Plunder with a Smile

掠夺之笑

Governments in the Industrial Age enjoyed a delightful monopoly to exploit.

工业时代的政府享有美妙的垄断权力。

Their actual costs for providing protection of life and limb were vanishingly small relative to the prices (taxes) they charged.

他们为保护生命和肢体所实际支付的成本相比他们收取的价格(税金)微不足道。

Yet they really were in a realm where competition was so perverse that they could engage far more in the business of plunder than in that of protection and still have that fact go all but unnoticed. It was a rare moment in history. 但是,他们确实身处一个竞争扭曲的领域,他们更多地参与掠夺性商业活动,而不是保护性商业活动,这一事实几乎没有被注意。这是历史上罕见的时刻。

The drawbacks of anarchy under the megapolitical conditions of industrialism made competition in protection services within the same territory technologically infeasible. The only way to achieve effective protection under those conditions was to command a greater capability to employ violence. Therefore there was little to be gained by attempting to better distinguish that portion of one's taxes that went, in Lane's words, "as payment for the service rendered" from "another part that one is tempted to call plunder."⁴¹ The distinction was surely real enough. But since one was stuck paying the taxes in any event, developing it fully had little to commend it other than satisfying morbid curiosity. As Lane said, no matter what portion of the taxes was plunder they were a price one had to pay "to avoid more severe losses." ⁴

在工业主义的大政治条件下,无政府状态的弊端使得同一领域内的保护服务竞争在技术上是不可行的。在那种情况下实现有效保护的唯一办法是掌握更强大的使用暴力的能力。因此,试图更好地区分纳税中"作为报酬提供的服务"部分与"可能称为掠夺"的部分,几乎没有什么好处。这种区分无疑是真实存在的。但由于无论如何都必须纳税,把它完全发展下去除了满足一种病态的好奇心之外,没有什么可 commend 的。正如 Lane 所说,无论税收中有多大部分是掠夺,它们都是必须支付的"价格,以避免更严重的损失"。

The Rise of Incomes Under Industrialism

工业时代收入的增长

Part of the reason this dilemma was tolerable during the past two centuries of domination by the nationstate was the fact that incomes were rising dramatically, particularly in the jurisdictions where most industrial development was confined. Those running the OECD governments took a higher percentage of incomes almost every year.

这一困境在过去两个世纪内国家主导的时期是可以容忍的,主要是因为收入大幅上涨,特别是在大部分工业发展局限的管辖区内。OECD 政府负责人几乎每年都增加了收入的较高比例。

But the increase in plunder was nonetheless accompanied by far greater prosperity, and a greater inequality of wealth with the rest of the world. Under such conditions, objections to the surge of taxation were inevitably

marginal and insufficient to deflect events from their logical progression. Indeed, for reasons spelled out in previous chapters, the military survival of an industrial nationstate largely depended upon the fact that no effective limits could be placed upon its claims on the resources of its citizens.

但是掠夺的增加仍然伴随着更大的繁荣以及与世界其他地区相比更大的财富不平等。在这种情况下,对日益增加的税收的反对必然是边缘的和不充分的,无法偏离事件的逻辑发展。事实上,正如前几章所阐述的原因,一个工业化国家国家的军事生存很大程度上取决于对其公民资源的需求不受限制的事实。

In every industrial state, policies meandered in more or less the same direction.

在每个工业国家,政策都或多或少地朝着同一个方向发展。

At the high-water mark of industrialism after World War II, the rate of marginal income taxes reached 90 percent or higher. This was a far more aggressive assertion of the right of the state to extract resources than even the Oriental despots of the early hydraulic civilizations were prone to make. Yet the industrial version of plunder followed its own logic. Much of it was determined by the character of industrial technology in the first half of the twentieth century that we described earlier.

二战工业高潮之后,边际所得税税率达到 90%或更高。这比早期水利文明的专制君主更加激进地主张国家拥有征税的权利。然而,工业时代的掠夺也有其自身的逻辑。其很大程度上取决于我们之前描述的 20 世纪前半叶的工业技术特点。

This technology made it all but inevitable that the state would seize and redistribute a large fraction of income, with much of the burden of the plunder falling upon a small segment of capitalists. Most industrial processes were heavily dependent on natural resources, and therefore tied to the sites where the resources were located. A steel mill, a mine, or a port could be moved only at staggering expense, or not at all. Such 135

这项技术几乎不可避免地导致国家征用和重新分配大部分收入,其中大部分掠夺的负担落在资本家的一小部分身上。大多数工业过程都严重依赖于自然资源,因此与资源所在地点紧密相连。一座钢厂、矿山或港口只能以巨大的成本甚至完全无法移动。

facilities were therefore stationary targets that could easily be taxed. Property, corporate, and severance taxes grew sharply over this century. So did income taxes, first on the capitalists, but eventually on the workers themselves. The advent of large-scale industrial employment made a broadly based income tax practical. Wages could be garnished at the source, with the tax authorities coordinating collections with the accounting departments of industrial firms. We take this for granted today, but collecting an income tax at the factory gate was a far simpler task than fanning out over the countryside to squeeze a portion of the profits from millions of independent craftsmen and farmers.

设施因此成为可以轻易征税的固定目标。财产税、企业税和遣散费税在本世纪大幅增长。收入税也是如此,最初针对资本家,但最终也针对工人自己。大规模工业就业的出现使得广泛的收入税成为可行。工资可以在源头扣缴,税务部门与工业公司的会计部门协调收税。今天我们视之为理所当然,但在工厂门口收取所得税要比散布在乡村中挤压数以百万计的独立手工工人和农民的利润简单得多。

In short, industrial technology tended to make taxation more routineized, more predictable, and less personally dangerous than taxation in many earlier periods.

总之,工业技术倾向于使税收更加常规化、更加可预测,并且比许多早期时期的税收更加无害。

Nonetheless, it extracted a higher percentage of society's resources than any form of sovereignty had done before.

尽管如此,它提取的社会资源比任何形式的主权都要多。

Protecting What?

保护什么?

The fact that societies could become richer while the total percentage of income absorbed in taxes rose significantly invites a question about character of the protection that governments provided to industrial economies. What were they protecting? Our answer: primarily industrial installations with high capital costs and significant vulnerability to attack. The presence of large-scale industrial firms would not have been possible in

a disordered environment with more competitive violence, even if the result of the competition had been to shrink the overall share of output taken by government.

事实上,社会可能变得更富有,而总收入中吸收的税收百分比也显著上升,这一事实引发了一个关于政府为工业经济提供的保护性质的问题。他们在保护什么?我们的答案:主要是拥有高资本成本和易受攻击的工业设施。即使政府所占产出份额减小,但如果竞争导致的结果是无序环境中存在更多暴力,大规模工业公司的存在也是不可能的。

This is why capital-intensive operations are uneconomic in the American slums, as well as in Third World societies where ad hoc violence is endemic. Industrial society as a whole was able to proceed because a certain kind of order was established and maintained. Enterprises were subject to regular, predictable shakedowns, rather than erratic violence.

这就是为什么资本密集型运营在美国贫民窟以及广泛存在偶发性暴力的第三世界社会中都是不经济的。整个工业社会之所以能够进行,是因为确立并维持了某种秩序。企业受制于定期且可预测的敲诈,而非反复无常的暴力。

Even during the height of industrialism, it was always an exaggeration to speak of a government employing a "monopoly of force." All governments try to maintain such a monopoly, but as we have seen, employees of industrial corporations usually found that they were able to employ violence against their employers. As long as the general public has access to any arms at all, or a disorderly crowd retains the physical capacity to overturn a bus or throw rocks at police, those who control the government do not totally monopolize force. They merely control predominant force, dominant to a degree that it becomes uneconomic for most people to compete with them under existing conditions.

即使在工业主义高峰时期,也不太准确地说政府拥有"暴力垄断"。所有政府都试图维持这种垄断,但如我们所见,工业公司的雇员通常能够对雇主使用暴力。只要普通大众能够获得任何武器,或无序的人群保持推翻公交车或向警察投掷石块的身体能力,掌控政府的人就无法完全垄断暴力。他们只是控制主导性的暴力,其优势程度足以令大多数人在现有条件下无法与之竞争。

The Information Age 信息时代

The Information Age is bringing into being a fifth stage in the evolution of competition in the use of violence in the West. This stage was not anticipated by Lane.

信息时代正在为西方暴力竞争演化的第五个阶段带来变革。这一阶段是 Lane 未曾预料到的。

This fifth phase involves competition in cyberspace, an arena not subject to monopolization by any "violence-using enterprise." It is not subject to monopolization because it is not a territory.

这第五阶段涉及网络空间的竞争,这是一个不受任何"使用暴力的企业"垄断的领域。它不受垄断,是因为它不是一个领土。

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Although Lane's argument incorporates conventional postwar assumptions about the inevitability of the nationstate, he recognized a point that will be more crucial to understanding the future than it may have seemed forty or fifty years ago. That is the fact that governments have never established stable monopolies of coercion over the open sea.

尽管莱恩的论点包含了关于民族国家不可避免性的传统战后假设,但他认识到了一个事实,这一事实对于理解未来比起四五十年前可能更为关键。这就是政府从未在公海上建立起稳定的暴力垄断。

Think about it. No government's laws have ever exclusively applied there. This is a matter of the utmost importance in understanding how the organization of violence and protection will evolve as the economy migrates into cyberspace, which has no physical existence at all. For the same reasons that Lane noted in observing that no government has ever been able to monopolize violence on the sea, it is even less likely that a government could successfully monopolize an infinite realm without physical boundaries.

想想看。没有任何政府的法律曾经排他性地适用于那里。这是理解暴力和保护组织如何随着经济向没有任何物理存在的网络空间迁移而演

变的至关重要的问题。由于同样的原因,正如兰恩在观察到没有政府曾经能够垄断海洋暴力一样,政府更不可能成功垄断一个没有物理边界的无限领域。

COMPETITION WITHOUT ANARCHY

无政府状态下的竞争

In the past, when conditions made it difficult for any single violence-wielding entity to establish a monopoly, the results were anarchy and plunder. The Information Age, however, has changed the technological terms under which violence is organized and done so in a profound way. Unlike the past, when the inability to monopolize protection in a region meant higher military costs and lower economic returns, the fact that governments cannot monopolize cyberspace actually implies lower military costs and higher economic returns.

以前,当条件使任何单一的施暴实体难以建立垄断地位时,结果就是无政府状态和掠夺行为。然而,信息时代改变了暴力组织和实施的技术条件,这种改变是深刻的。与过去相比,政府不能在某一地区垄断保护的事实,不再意味着更高的军事成本和更低的经济收益,而是意味着更低的军事成本和更高的经济收益。

This is because information technology creates a new dimension in protection.

这是因为信息技术创造了新的保护层面。

For the first time in history, information technology allows for the creation and protection of assets that lie entirely outside the realm of any individual government's territorial monopoly on violence.

历史上第一次,信息技术使人们能够创造和保护资产,并使其完全摆脱任何单一政府对暴力的领土垄断。

"Countries in which the units of political power and governance are multiple and which lack a central, stable, unchallenged supervisory source of jurisdiction and power have to devise their own working solutions for dealing with the problems raised by such frontiers."⁴ REES DAVIES

政治权力和治理的单位多样且缺乏中央、稳定、无人挑战的司法和权力来源的国家,必须制定自己的解决方案来处理这些边界所带来的问题。

The Analogy with the Frontier 移民边境的类比

Cyberspace is in one sense the equivalent of a technologically protected march region of the kind that existed in border areas during the Middle Ages. In the past, when the reach of lords and kings was weak, and the claims of one or more overlapped at a frontier, something akin to competitive government existed. A look at how the march regions functioned could give insights into how laws of the march or something like them may migrate into cyberspace.

网络空间在某种意义上相当于中世纪边境地区存在的受技术保护的边界地带。过去,当领主和国王的统治能力很弱,以及一个或多个主权在边界地区重叠时,类似竞争性政府的现象也存在。深入了解边界地区的运作方式,可能会给我们带来关于网络空间可能出现的边界法规或类似机制的洞见。

Andorra survives as a kind of fossilized march region between France and Spain, an artifact of megapolitical conditions that made it difficult for either kingdom to dominate the other in that cold and almost inaccessible area of 190 square miles in the Pyrenees. In 1278, an agreement was struck dividing suzerainty over Andorra between local French and Spanish feudal lords, the French count of Foix and the Spanish bishop of Urgel. Each appointed one of two "viquiers" who sparingly exercised the minimal 137
安道尔作为法国和西班牙之间一种化石化的边界区域而生存,这是由于大政治条件使得这两个王国在毗连的且近乎难以到达的 190 平方英里的比利牛斯山区中难以主导对方。在 1278 年,一项协议被达成,将安道尔的宗主权分配给当地的法国和西班牙封建领主,即法国富瓦伯爵和西班牙乌尔赫尔主教。他们各自任命了两名"维基尔"(viquiers),这些维基尔仅仅行使有限的 137 项权力。

authority of government in Andorra, mostly by commanding the tiny Andorran militia, now a police force.

安道尔政府的权力主要通过指挥微小的安道尔民兵(现为警察部队)来行使。

The count's role was long ago superseded by history. The French government now stands in for him from Paris. Among its duties is to accept half of the annual tribute that Andorra pays, an amount less than a single month's rent in a fleabag apartment. The bishop of Urgel continues to receive his share of the tribute, just as his predecessors did in the Middle Ages.

伯爵的角色早已被历史所取代。现在法国政府从巴黎接手了这项职责。其职责之一就是接受安道尔每年支付的一半贡赋,这个数额不到一个月在廉价公寓的租金。乌尔赫尔主教继续收取他的那部分贡赋,就像他在中世纪的前辈们一样。

As the split tribute implies, there have been two sources of "supervisory jurisdiction and power" rather than one in Andorra. Appeals from Andorran civil suits were traditionally lodged either with the Episcopal College of Urgel or the Court of Cassation in Paris.

根据分拆贡品所暗示的,安道尔有两种"监督管辖权和权力"的来源,而不是一种。安道尔民事诉讼的上诉通常是向乌尔赫尔主教团或巴黎上诉法院提出的。

A consequence of Andorra's ambiguous position was that almost no laws were enacted. Andorra has enjoyed vanishingly small government and no taxes for more than seven hundred years. Today, that gives it a growing appeal as a tax haven. But until a generation ago, Andorra was famously poor. Once thickly wooded, it was deforested over the centuries by residents trying to stay warm in the bitter winters. The whole place is snowed shut from November through April each year. Even in summer, Andorra is so cold that crops grow only on the southern slopes. If our description makes it seem unappealing, you have just learned the secret of its success. Andorra survived as a feudal enclave in the age of the nationstate because it was remote and dirt-poor.

安道尔模糊的地位带来的一个后果是,几乎没有制定任何法律。超过七百年来,安道尔一直拥有极小的政府和免税政策。如今,这使它越来越有吸引力成为一个避税天堂。但是直到一代人之前,安道尔一直以贫困著称。曾经茂密的森林在历经几个世纪后被砍伐殆尽,居民们试图在严寒的冬天保持温暖。每年 11 月到 4 月,整个地区都被大雪覆盖。即使在夏天,安道尔气温也很低,只有南坡有作物生长。如果我们的描述让它看

起来缺乏吸引力,那你已经了解到它成功的秘密。安道尔之所以能在民族国家时代生存下来,是因为它偏远且贫穷。

At one time, there were numerous medieval frontier or "march" regions where sovereignties blended together. These violent frontiers persisted for decades or sometimes for centuries in the border areas of Europe. Most were poor. As we mentioned earlier, there were marches between areas of Celtic and English control in Ireland; between Wales and England, Scotland and England, Italy and France, France and Spain, Germany and the Slav frontiers of Central Europe, and between the Christian kingdoms of Spain and the Islamic kingdom of Granada. Like Andorra, these march regions developed distinct institutional and legal forms of a kind that we are likely to see again in the next millennium.

在一个时候,有许多中世纪边疆或"边界"地区,其中主权混杂在一起。这些暴力的边界持续了几十年甚至几个世纪,出现在欧洲的边境地区。它们大多贫穷。正如我们之前提到的,在爱尔兰有凯尔特人和英国人的控制区之间的边界;威尔士和英格兰、苏格兰和英格兰、意大利和法国、法国和西班牙、德国和中欧斯拉夫前线、西班牙基督教王国和格拉纳达伊斯兰王国之间也有边界。与安道尔类似,这些边界地区发展出了独特的制度和法律形式,这种形式我们在下一个千年中很可能会再次看到。

Because of the competitive position of the two authorities, each of which was weak, rulers would sometimes even solicit volunteers among their subjects to settle in march regions in order to increase the reach of their authority. Almost as a matter of course, the subjects were lured into settling in the march by freedom from taxes. Given the delicate margins upon which they competed, if either authority in a march attempted to impose taxes, he would make it more difficult for his followers to make ends meet, as well as give everyone a reason to affiliate with his competitor. Therefore, residents of a march usually had a choice in deciding whose laws they were to obey. This choice was based upon the weakness of the competing authorities; it was not an ideological gesture.

由于两个当局都处于弱势地位,统治者有时甚至会招募自愿者居住在边疆地区,以扩大自己的权威范围。几乎是理所当然的,这些居民会被免税的优惠所吸引而前往边疆地区定居。鉴于双方竞争的微妙平衡,如果任

何一方在边疆地区试图征税,就会使他们的追随者难以维持生计,同时也给所有人一个理由去依附他的对手。因此,边疆地区的居民通常可以选择遵从哪一方的法律。这种选择是由于竞争当局的软弱,而非意识形态的表态。

Nonetheless, practical difficulties arose that had to be resolved.
然而,必须解决实际困难。

Under feudalism, landlords who owned property on both sides of a nominal frontier faced a serious conflict of duties. For example, a lord on the frontier of Scotland and England who held properties in both kingdoms could theoretically owe military service to both in the event of war. To resolve this contradictory obligation, almost 138

在封建主义时期,拥有领地横跨名义上边境线的地主面临着严重的忠诚冲突。例如,一位同时拥有苏格兰和英格兰两国领地的边境领主,在战争爆发时理论上会同时被要求为两国效劳。为了解决这种矛盾的义务,差不多在 138

everyone up and down the feudal hierarchy could choose whose laws to obey through a legal process called avowal.

等级制度中的每个人都可通过一个叫"宣誓"的法律程序选择遵从谁的法律。

Information technology will create equivalent opportunities for competitive choice in domiciling economic activities, but with important differences.

One is that unlike the medieval frontier societies, cyberspace is likely to be in due course the richest of economic realms. It will therefore tend to be a growing rather than a receding frontier.

信息技术将为选择主导经济活动创造等同的机会,但仍存在重要差异。

一个是,与中世纪的边缘社会不同,网络空间在未来很可能成为最富有的经济领域。因此它将更趋于是一个不断扩张的前沿,而非衰落的边缘。

Few persons at the core regions of medieval society would have wished to move to frontiers without strong inducements, often including religious imperatives, because these regions tended to be violent and poor. Therefore, they did not act as magnets drawing resources out of the control of the

authorities. Cyberspace will.

很少在中世纪社会核心地区的人会希望在没有强烈诱因的情况下搬到边疆地区,这些地区往往暴力和贫穷。因此,它们并不能吸引资源远离当局控制。然而,网络空间将会如此。

Secondly, the new frontier will not be a duopoly, which invites collusion between the two authorities to compromise over their frontier claims. Such compromises tended not to be effective during the medieval period for two reasons: there were frequently sharp cultural gaps between the rival authorities; and more important, they lacked the physical capacity to impose a negotiated settlement, having insufficient military power on the ground. During the era of the nationstate, when national authorities did come to exercise sufficient military power to impose solutions, most march regions and vague frontiers disappeared. Border fixing became the norm. That is a stable solution if duopolists of violence face the prospect of dividing their authority over contiguous regions. But the competition in domiciling transactions in the cybereconomy will not be between two authorities, but between hundreds of authorities throughout the globe.

其次,新的边疆不会是一种寡头垄断,这种寡头垄断会让两个当局就边界索赔作出妥协。在中世纪,这种妥协往往不太有效,原因有两个:一是对立当局之间经常存在尖锐的文化鸿沟;二是更重要的是,他们缺乏施加谈判解决的实力,在当地缺乏足够的军事力量。在民族国家时代,当国家当局获得足够的军事力量来强加解决方案时,大部分边界地带和模糊的边界线消失了。边界划定成为常态。如果暴力的寡头垄断面临着将其权力分割到毗连区域的前景,这是一种稳定的解决方案。但是,在网络经济中主导交易的竞争,不会是两个当局之间的竞争,而是全球数百个当局之间的竞争。

For the territorial states to create an effective cartel to keep tax rates high will be all but impossible. This will be true for the same reason that collusion to enjoy monopoly prices in markets with hundreds of competitors does not work.

具有主权的国家要建立一个有效的卡特尔来保持税率高企是几乎不可能的。这是因为同样的原因,在数百个竞争对手的市场中,要达成垄断价格的合谋是行不通的。

For evidence, consider the move by the Seychelles, a tiny country in the Indian Ocean, to enact a new investment law that U.S. government officials describe as a "Welcome Criminals" act. Under the law, anyone who invests \$10 million in the Seychelles will not only be guaranteed protection against extradition, but will be issued a diplomatic passport. Contrary to the assertions of the U.S. government, however, the intended beneficiaries are not drug dealers, who are generally under the protection of more important governments in any event, but independent entrepreneurs who have become politically incorrect. The first potential beneficiary of the Seychelles law is a white South African who became wealthy by circumventing the economic sanctions against the former apartheid regime. Now he faces the danger of economic retribution by the new South African government and is willing to pay the Seychelles for protection.⁴

塞舌尔群岛这个印度洋上的小国颁布了一项新的投资法,美国政府官员将之描述为"欢迎罪犯"法案。根据该法,任何投资 1000 万美元的人不仅能获得免遭引渡的保护,还将获发外交护照。尽管美国政府声称,受益人并非毒品交易商(他们通常受到更重要政府的保护),而是那些变得政治不正确的独立企业家。该法的首位潜在受益人是一位白人南非人,他通过规避前种族隔离政权的经济制裁而致富,如今正面临新南非政府的经济报复,因而愿意向塞舌尔支付保护费。

Whatever the merits of any individual case, the example shows why attempts by governments to maintain a cartel for protection on the ground are doomed to failure.

不管任何个案的优点如何,这个例子都显示了政府试图维护以保护为目的的垄断的企图注定要失败。

Unlike the medieval frontier, in which the competition was between two authorities only, the frontier in cybercommerce will be between hundreds of jurisdictions, with the number probably rising rapidly to thousands.

与中世纪的边界不同,网上商业的边界将是数百个司法管辖区之间的竞争,这一数量很可能会迅速上升到上千个。

In the age of the virtual corporation, individuals will choose to domicile their income-earning activities in a jurisdiction that provides the best service at the lowest cost.

在虚拟公司时代,个人将选择在提供最佳服务和最低成本的司法管辖区进行收入获取活动。

In other words, sovereignty will be commercialized. Unlike medieval frontier societies, which were in most cases impoverished and violent, cyberspace will be neither. The 139

换句话说,主权将被商业化。与中世纪边疆社会大多贫穷和暴力不同,网络空间既不会贫穷也不会暴力。

competition that information technology is driving governments to engage in is not competition of a military kind, but competition in quality and price of an economic service-genuine protection. In short, governments will be obliged to give customers what they want.

信息技术驱动政府参与的竞争不是军事性质的竞争,而是在经济服务质量和价格方面的竞争——真正的保护措施。简而言之,政府将被迫为客户提供他们想要的东西。

The Diminished Utility of Violence 暴力的实用性有所减弱

This is not to say, of course, that governments will resign from employing violence. Far from it. Rather, what we are saying is that violence is losing a good deal of its leverage. One possible reaction on the part of governments would be to intensify their use of violence in local settings in an attempt to compensate for its declining global significance. Whatever governments do, however, they will be unable to saturate cyberspace with violence in the way that they saturated the territories they monopolized with violence in the modern world. No matter how many governments try to enter cyberspace, they will be no more capable or powerful in that realm than anyone else.

这并不是说,政府将放弃使用暴力。恰恰相反。我们的意思是,暴力正在失去其很大部分影响力。政府可能会采取的一种反应是,在地方层面加大使用暴力,试图弥补其在全球范围内日益减弱的意义。不管政府采取什么行动,他们都无法像在现代世界垄断的领土那样,在网络空间中大规模地施加暴力。无论有多少政府试图进入网络空间,在那个领域他们也不会比其他任何人更有能力或更强大。

Ironically, attempts by nationstates to wage "information wars" to dominate or thwart access to cyberspace would probably only accelerate their own demise. The tendency toward the devolution of large systems is already powerful because of the fall away of scale economies and the rising costs of holding fragmenting social groups together. The irony of information wars is that they could well impose more of a shock to the brittle systems left over from the Industrial Age than to the emerging information economy itself.

国家试图在网络空间主导和阻碍信息获取的"信息战"实际上可能只会加速它们自身的衰落。大型系统向分散化的趋势已经变得越来越强烈,这是由于规模经济的下降以及维系分裂社会群体的成本上升。信息战的讽刺在于,它们对工业时代遗留的脆弱体系的冲击可能比对新兴信息经济本身更大。

As long as essential information technology continues to function, cybercommerce could proceed in tandem with the struggles of information war in a way that could never happen in a territorial war.

只要基本信息技术继续运作,网络商务就可能与信息战的斗争并行发展,这是一种在领土战争中永远不会发生的情况。

You could not imagine millions of commercial transactions taking place at the front in one of the twentieth century's wars. But virtual wars may not exhaust any capacity of cyberspace to host multiple activities. And because virtual reality does not exist, there will be little danger of proximity, and almost none of being hit by exploding virtual shrapnel.

你无法想象在 20 世纪的战争前线会有数百万起商业交易发生。但虚拟战争并不会耗尽网络空间承载多项活动的的能力。而且由于虚拟现实并不存在,也就不会有接近危险的风险,更不会有被虚拟弹片击中的危险。

Vulnerability of Large-Scale Systems

大规模系统的脆弱性

The dangers of information war will mostly be dangers to large-scale industrial systems that operate with central command and control.

信息战的危险主要是对大规模工业系统的危险,这些系统通常由集中的命令和控制管理。

Military authorities in the United States and other leading nationstates are both planning for and fearing acts of information sabotage that could have severe consequences for disabling large systems. An act of cyberwarfare could close down a telephone switching station, disrupt air traffic control, or sabotage a pumping system that regulates the flow of water to a city. A programmed virus could even close down conventional or nuclear generators, turning off segments of the electric grid. So-called logic bombs could scramble a great deal of information, the most sensitive of which is in central control systems operating vulnerable, large-scale systems inherited from the 140

军事当局在美国和其他领先国家都在计划和担心信息破坏行为,这可能会对大型系统的破坏造成严重后果。网络战行为可能会关闭电话交换站、扰乱航空交通管制或破坏调节城市供水流量的泵系统。程序病毒甚至可能关闭常规或核电厂,关闭电网的某些部分。所谓的逻辑炸弹可能会混乱大量信息,其中最敏感的是在中央控制系统中运行的,这些系统是从 140 年代遗留下来的大规模易受攻击的系统。

Industrial Age. Short of a massive and comprehensive destruction of all information technology, which would bring the world economy literally to a halt, cybercommerce and virtual reality will remain beyond the capacity of any government to stifle, much less monopolize.

工业时代。如果没有全面彻底地摧毁所有信息技术,这将使世界经济彻底陷入停滞,电子商务和虚拟现实将超越任何政府的控制能力,更无法垄断。

Even one of the signal drawbacks of information technology, the apparent vulnerability of information-storage systems to decay and destruction, has been largely resolved by new archival technology. A new system called "High-Density read-only Memory," or "HD-ROM," employs an ion mill similar to those used in computer-aided manufacturing systems to create archives in a vacuum. Storage capacity is now as high as 25,000 megabytes per square inch. Unlike earlier systems that were vulnerable to early decay and disruption by shock, data stored in HD-ROM promises to be around for the duration. One of HD-ROM's developers, Bruce Lamartine, says, "It's virtually impervious to the ravages of time, thermal and mechanical shock, or the electromagnetic fields that are so destructive to other storage

mediums." 45 Even the detonation of a blast by nuclear terrorists would not necessarily scramble or destroy vital information, such as the codes to digital money, upon which the smooth functioning of a cybereconomy will depend.

即使信息技术的一个主要缺陷,即信息存储系统容易受到损耗和破坏的问题,也已由新的存档技术基本解决。一种名为"高密度只读存储器"或"HD-ROM"的新系统,采用与计算机辅助制造系统中相似的离子磨床在真空环境下创建档案。存储容量现已高达每平方英寸 25,000 兆字节。与早期容易出现早期衰变和受到冲击破坏的系统不同,存储在 HD-ROM 中的数据保证能持续存在。HD-ROM 的开发之一布鲁斯·拉马丁说:"它几乎不受时间、热力和机械冲击或对其他存储介质如此破坏性的电磁场的侵害。"即使核恐怖分子爆破,也不一定会打乱或破坏诸如数字货币密码等至关重要的信息,这些信息对网络经济的顺利运转至关重要。

"Modern armies are so dependent on information that it is possible to blind and deafen them in order to achieve victory without fighting in the conventional sense."4

现代军队如此依赖信息,可以使他们失明和失聪,从而在不进行传统战斗的情况下实现胜利。

COL. ALAN CAMPEN,
詹姆斯·艾伦·肯普中校

U.S.A.F (Ret.)
美国空军 (退役)

SUPERPOWERS OF VIRTUAL WARFARE

虚拟战争的超级力量

The assumptions of the nationstate at war will make less and less megapolitical sense as the importance of information in warfare increases. Because it has no physical existence, cyberspace is not a realm in which magnitudes as we know them in the physical world carry any commanding importance. It does not matter how many programmers were involved in stipulating a sequence of commands. All that matters is whether the program functions. The Sovereign Individual may truly count for as much in cyberspace as does a nationstate, with its seat in the UN, its own flag, and an army deployed on the ground. In purely economic terms, some Sovereign Individuals already command investible incomes in the hundreds of millions annually, sums that exceed the discretionary spending power of some of the bankrupt nationstates.

国家主权在战争中的假设将变得越来越不合时宜,因为信息在战争中的重要性日益增加。由于没有实在的存在,网络空间并不是我们在现实世界中所知的有影响力的领域。制定一系列命令涉及多少程序员并不重要,重要的是程序是否能正常运行。网络空间中,某些掌握数亿美元可投入收入的个人,其影响力可能超过一些濒临破产的国家。

But that is not all. In terms of virtual warfare waged through the manipulation of information, some individuals may loom as large or larger than many of the world's states. One bizarre genius, working with digital servants, could theoretically achieve the same impact in a cyberwar as a nationstate. Bill Gates certainly could.

但这并不是全部。在通过操纵信息进行的虚拟战争中,有些个人可能比世界上许多国家更加重要。一个奇特的天才,与数字仆从合作,理论上可以在网络战中取得与一个国家同样的影响力。比尔·盖茨当然可以这样做。

In this sense, the age of the Sovereign Individual is not merely a slogan. A hacker, or a small group of mathematicians, not to mention a company like Microsoft, or almost any computer software company, could in principle do

any or all of the things that the Pentagon's Cyber War Task Force has up its sleeves. There are hundreds of firms in the Silicon Valley and elsewhere that already have a greater capacity to wage a cyberwar than 90 percent of the existing nationstates.

从这个意义上说,主权个人时代不仅仅是一句口号。一个黑客、几个数学家,更不用说微软这样的公司,或者任何一家计算机软件公司,都可以原则上做到五角大楼网络战任务组正在准备的任何或所有事情。硅谷以及其他地方已经有数百家公司拥有比现有的 90%国家更强大的网络战能力。

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The presumption that governments will continue to monopolize life on the ground as alternative avenues for protection open on all sides is an anachronism. A far more likely outcome is that nationstates will have to be reconfigured to reduce their vulnerability to computer viruses, logic bombs, infected wires, and trapdoor programs that could be monitored by the U.S. National Security Agency, or some teenage hacker.

政府将继续垄断地面生活,同时其他方式的保护正四面楚歌,这种假设是一种时代弊端。更有可能的结果是,国家需要重新配置,以降低其对计算机病毒、逻辑炸弹、受污染导线和可被美国国家安全局或某个青少年黑客监视的后门程序的脆弱性。

The megapolitical logic of cyberspace suggests that central command-and-control systems that currently dominate the world's large-scale infrastructure will have to be replaced by multicentric models of security with distributed capabilities so they cannot be easily captured or blocked by a computer virus. New types of software, known as agoric open systems, will replace command-and-control software inherited from the Industrial Age. That older software allocated computational capacity according to rigid priorities in much the same way that the central planners at Gosplan in the former Soviet Union used to allocate goods to boxcars by rigid rules. The new systems are controlled by algorithms that mock market mechanisms to allocate resources more efficiently by an internal bidding process that mimics the competitive processes in the brain. Instead of giant computer monopolies conducting important command-and-control

functions, they will be decentralized in the new millennium.

网络空间的大政治逻辑表明,目前主导全球大型基础设施的中央指挥和控制系统将不得不被具有分散能力的多中心安全模式所取代,这样就不容易被计算机病毒捕获或阻断。被称为公开系统的新型软件将取代源自工业时代的指挥控制软件。这种旧软件根据刚性优先级分配计算能力,就像前苏联国家计划委员会的中央计划者曾经根据刚性规则将货物分配到货车上一样。新的系统由嘲笑市场机制的算法控制,通过内部竞价过程更有效地分配资源,模仿大脑中的竞争过程。在新千年,取代进行重要指挥和控制功能的巨型计算机垄断将是分散的。

There is no better example of the resilience of distributed networks compared to command-and-control systems than that given by Digital Equipment at its Palo Alto research lab. An engineer opened the door to a closet that housed the company's own computer network. As recounted by Kevin Kelly, the engineer dramatically "yanked a cable out of its guts. The network routed around the breach and didn't falter a bit."⁴

与指挥和控制系统相比,数字设备公司在帕洛阿尔托研究实验室所展示的分布式网络的复原力,是再好不过的例证。一名工程师打开了一个柜子的门,柜子里则是该公司自己的电脑网络。正如凯文·凯利所述,这名工程师戏剧性地"从网络的内部拔出了一根电缆。网络进行了绕路,丝毫没有动摇。"

The Information Age will not only facilitate competition without anarchy in cyberspace; it will inevitably lead to the redesign of important systems left over from industrialism. Such a reconfiguration is essential to make them less vulnerable to mischief that could come from anyone or anywhere. Just as the Industrial Age inevitably led to the reconfiguration of institutions that were left over from the medieval period, such as schools and universities, so the leftover institutions of the Industrial Age are likely to devolve in miniature form, in ways that reflect the logic of microtechnology.

信息时代不仅会促进网络空间中无政府状态下的竞争;它也将导致对工业时代遗留下来的重要系统进行重新设计。这种重构是必要的,以使它们不那么容易受到任何人或任何地方可能造成的伤害。正如工业时代不可避免地导致从中世纪时期遗留下来的如学校和大学等机构进行

重新配置,同样,工业时代遗留下来的机构也可能以微缩形式演化,反映微技术的逻辑。

The need for protection against bandits on the Information Superhighway will require widespread adopting of public key-private key encryption algorithms. These already allow any individual user of a personal computer to encode any message more securely than the Pentagon could have sealed its launch codes only a generation ago.

信息高速公路上需要防范强盗的需求将要求大范围采用公钥-私钥加密算法。这些算法已经允许个人计算机用户更安全地对任何消息进行编码,比 Pentagon 只有一代人前就能对其发射密码进行封锁更加安全。

These powerful, unbreakable forms of encryption will be necessary to secure financial transactions from hackers and thieves.

这些强大、不可破解的加密形式将有必要来保护金融交易免受黑客和窃贼的伤害。

They will also be necessary for another reason. Private financial institutions and central banks will adopt unbreakable encryption algorithms when they realize that the U.S. government-and it may not be alone-has the capacity to penetrate current bank software and computer systems to literally bankrupt a country or sweep the bank account of anyone living almost anywhere.

There is no technological reason why any individual or any country should leave his financial deposits or transactions at the mercy of the U.S.

它们还将有另一个原因变得必要。当私人金融机构和中央银行意识到美国政府(可能不是唯一一个)有能力渗透当前的银行软件和计算机系统,从而使一个国家破产或清空任何人几乎任何地方的银行账户时,他们将采用不可破译的加密算法。没有任何技术理由要让个人或任何国家将自己的金融存款或交易置于美国的支配之下。

National Security Agency or the successors to the KGB, or any similar organization, licit or illicit.

国家安全局或者继承了 KGB 的后续组织,或类似的任何合法或非法的组织。

Encryption algorithms impenetrable by governments are not daydreams.
政府无法破译的加密算法并非妄想。

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They are available already as shareware over the Internet. When low-orbit satellite systems are fully operable, individuals using advanced personal computers with antennae no larger than those on portable phones will be able to communicate anywhere on the globe without even interfacing with the telephone system. It will no more be possible for a government to monopolize cyberspace, a realm with no physical existence at all, than it would have been for medieval knights to control transactions in the industrial period astride a heavy charger.

它们已经可以作为共享软件在互联网上获取。当低轨卫星系统完全投入使用后,使用具有小型天线的先进个人电脑的个人将能够在全球任何地方进行通信,而无需接入电话系统。政府垄断网络空间,这是一个没有物理存在的领域,就像中世纪的骑士无法控制工业时代的交易一样是不可能的。

Protection by Stealth 保护隐藏

Information societies will place vast resources outside the realm of predation.
信息社会将把大量资源置于掠夺之外。

When cyberspace comes increasingly to host financial transactions and other forms of commerce, the resources employed there will be more or less immune to ordinary shakedowns and theft. Therefore, predators will be unable to harness as large a share of resources as they do today and have done through much of the twentieth century.

随着网络空间越来越多地承载金融交易和其他形式的商业活动,在那里使用的资源将或多或少免受普通勒索和盗窃的影响。因此,掠夺者将无法获得与今天和 20 世纪大部分时间一样大的资源份额。

Inevitably, therefore, government protection of a large part of the world's wealth will be redundant. Government will be no better situated to protect a bank balance in cyberspace than you are. As government will be less necessary, its relative price is likely to fall for that reason alone. There are others.

因此,政府对世界大部分财富的保护将变得无用。政府在网络空间保护银行余额的地位,不会优于你自己。由于政府将变得不那么必要,其相对价格很可能因此而下降。还有其他原因。

With a large and growing share of financial transactions occurring in cyberspace in the new millennium, individuals will have a choice of jurisdictions in which to lodge them. This will create intense competition to price government's services (the taxes it charges) on a nonmonopolistic basis. This is revolutionary. As George Melloan argued in *The Wall Street Journal*, the one institution that has most successfully resisted the forces of global competition has been the welfare state. "A study by researchers at the Wharton School and the Australian National University discussed the forces coming to bear on income transfers. Geoffrey Garrett and Deborah Mitchell concluded that 'there is virtually no evidence that increased market integration has put downward pressures on their most fundamental welfare programs.' To the contrary, they write, 'governments have invariably responded to increased integration into international markets by increasing income transfers.' The advent of the cybereconomy will at long last finally expose the welfare state to genuine competition. It will change the nature of sovereignties and transform economies, as the balance between protection and extortion swings more completely on the side of protection than it has ever done before.

在新千年网上金融交易占比越来越大的情况下,个人将有机会选择不同的司法管辖区进行交易。这将会导致政府服务(收取的税费)价格形成激烈竞争,而不再是垄断定价。这是一个颠覆性的变革。正如《华尔街日报》的乔治·梅隆所指出的,最成功地抵御全球竞争力量的机构就是福利国家。"宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院和澳大利亚国立大学的研究人员进行的一项研究讨论了影响收入转移的力量。杰弗里·加雷特和黛博拉·米切尔得出结论:'几乎没有证据表明,市场一体化的加深给最基本的福利项目带来了下行压力。'相反,他们写道,'政府一直在应对加入国际市场的压力,通过增加收入转移来应对'。网络经济的出现终将使福利国家

面临真正的竞争。这将改变主权国家的性质,并转变经济结构,因为保护与勒索之间的平衡将更多地倾向于保护,这是前所未有的。

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"The Sovereign Individual"

"独立个体"

by James Dale Davidson & Lord William Rees-Mogg Simon & Schuster

1997

詹姆斯·戴尔·戴维森和威廉·里斯-莫格勋爵著，西蒙与舒斯特出版社

1997 年

Chapter 7

第七章

TRANSCENDING LOCALITY

超越地域

The Emergence of the Cybereconomy

网络经济的兴起

"The real issue is control. The Internet is too widespread to be easily dominated by any single government. By creating a seamless global-economic zone, anti-sovereign and unregulatable, the Internet calls into question the very idea of a nationstate." JOHN PERRY BARLOW

"真正的问题是控制权。互联网太广泛,很难被任何单一政府所主导。通过创造无缝的全球经济区,反主权且不可被管制,互联网质疑了国家这个概念的存在。" 约翰·佩里·巴洛

The Information Superhighway has become one of the more familiar metaphors of the early days of the digital age. It is remarkable not only for its pervasiveness, but also for the common misunderstanding it betrays about the cybereconomy. A highway, after all, is an industrial version of a footpath, a network for the physical transit of people and goods. The information economy is not like a highway, a railroad, or a pipeline. It does not haul or transport information from point to point the way the Trans-Canada Highway carries heavy trucks from Alberta to New Brunswick. What the world calls the "Information Superhighway" is not merely a transit link. It is the destination.

信息高速公路已成为数字时代初期最常见的隐喻之一。它之所以引人注目,不仅在于其普及性,也在于它暴露了人们对网络经济的普遍误解。毕竟,高速公路只是一条步行小径的工业化版本,是一种用于人员和货物物理运输的网络。信息经济并不像高速公路、铁路或管道。它不会像横贯加拿大的跨省公路那样,从阿尔伯塔运输到新不伦瑞克的重型卡车。世界所谓的"信息高速公路"并不仅仅是一条交通线路,它本身就是一个目的地。

Cyberspace transcends locality 网络空间超越地域限制

It involves nothing less than the instantaneous sharing of data everywhere and nowhere at once. The emerging information economy is based in the interconnections linking and relinking millions of users of millions of computers. Its essence lies in the new possibilities that arise from these connections. As John Perry Barlow put it, "What the Net offers is the promise of a new social space, global and anti-sovereign, within which anybody, anywhere can express to the rest of humanity whatever he or she believes without fear. There is in these new media a foreshadowing of the intellectual and economic liberty that might undo all the authoritarian powers on earth." 2

这涉及到的是即时共享数据,无处不在的共享。新兴的信息经济建立在数百万台电脑用户相互联系的基础之上。其本质在于这些联系所带来的新可能性。正如约翰·佩里·巴洛所说,"网络提供的是一个全球性和反主权性的新社会空间,在这里任何人任何地方都可以向全人类表达自己的任何信仰,不必担心。这些新媒体预示着可能颠覆地球上所有威权政权的知识和经济自由。"

Cyberspace, like the imaginary realm of Homer's gods, is a realm apart from the familiar terrestrial world of farm and factory. Yet its consequences will not be imaginary, but real. To a far greater extent than many now understand, the instantaneous sharing of information will be like a solvent dissolving large institutions. It will not only alter the logic of violence, as we have already explored; it will radically alter information and transaction costs that determine how businesses organize and the way the economy functions. We expect microprocessing to change the economic organization of the world.

网络空间,像荷马的神祇所在的想象领域,是与熟悉的农场和工厂所在的地球世界分离的领域。但其后果将不会是想象中的,而是真实的。比许多人现在所理解的要广泛得多,信息的瞬时共享就像一种溶剂,正在溶解大型机构。它不仅会改变暴力的逻辑,正如我们已经探讨过的那样;它还将彻底改变决定企业组织方式和经济运作方式的信息和交易成本。我们预计微处理器将改变世界的经济组织。

"It is today possible, to a greater extent than at any time in the worlds' history, for a company to locate anywhere, to use resources from anywhere to produce a product that can be sold anywhere." MILTON FRIEDMAN
"现在比世界历史上任何时候都更有可能,一家公司可以选择位于任何地方,使用任何地方的资源生产出可以在任何地方销售的产品。"米尔顿·弗里德曼

THE TYRANNY OF PLACE

地域统治

The fact that the fading industrial era's first stab at conceiving the information economy is to think of it in terms of a gigantic public works project tells you how grounded our thinking is in the paradigms of the past. It is rather like hearing farmers at the end of the eighteenth century describe a factory as "a farm with a roof." Yet the "superhighway" metaphor is more revealing than that. It also betrays the extent to which we are hostage to the tyranny of place. Even when technology enables us to transcend locality, the instrument of our deliverance is given a nickname describing it as a route from place to place.

衰落的工业时代首次尝试构想信息经济,就是将其视为一项庞大的公共工程项目,这告诉我们,我们的思维根植于过去的范式。这就好比听到18世纪末农民将工厂描述为"带屋顶的农场"。然而,"超级公路"这一比喻更富启发性。它也暴露了我们在地域束缚下的境况。即使技术使我们超越了地域,我们的解脱工具也被给予一个昵称,将其描述为从一个地方到另一个地方的路径。

Like salmon marked by their homing instinct, our consciousness is still deeply etched by notions of locality. For the whole of history until now, economies have been tethered to a local geographic area. Most people who lived before the twentieth century passed their days like defacto prisoners under house arrest, seldom venturing more than a few days' walk from where they were born. A journey of any distance was the work of generations. Only occasionally did some crisis war, pestilence, an adverse shift in climate stimulate a broad migration. To move human beings out of a wretched village required something spectacular and pressing. Nothing less could stimulate people to bundle up their belongings and wander off in search of a better life.

像被回归本能标记的鲑鱼一样,我们的意识仍然深深地被地方性的观念所刻画。直到现在,整个历史上,经济一直系于当地地理区域。在二十世纪之前,大多数人度过他们的日子就像事实上被软禁在家中的囚犯,很少有超过几天行程的远行。任何距离的旅程都需要几代人的努力。只有

偶尔,某些危机战争、瘟疫或气候的不利变化才会引发大规模迁移。要让人们从贫困的村庄中迁出,需要一些耀眼而又迫切的东西。没有其他什么能够刺激人们捆绑他们的财物,去寻找一个更好的生活。

Until recently, the few who looked outside their own locale for opportunity often became famous. Consider that Marco Polo is still renowned for having traipsed the Eurasian continent to visit the court of the Great Khan. He was the exception in his time.

直到最近,那些寻求机会而不仅局限于自己所在地的人往往会变得出名。例如,马可·波罗因跋涉欧亚大陆前往大汗的王朝而闻名至今。他在当时是个例外。

Few other travelogues survive from the premodern period. Among the more widely read, Mandeville's Travels, written in French in 1357, is notable for having been composed by someone who probably never left Europe.

Mandeville conveys delightful and often fanciful details about life around the globe, including the suggestion that many Ethiopians have only one foot: "[T]he foot is so large that it shadoweth all the body against the sun when they will lie and rest them." 3 Clearly, few of Mandeville's contemporaries who read his popular story were likely to have known that his Ethiopian "Bigfoot" did not exist.

很少有其他游记在前现代时期幸存下来。在广为人知的游记中,1357 年法语撰写的《曼德维尔的旅行》因作者可能从未离开过欧洲而引人注目。曼德维尔描述了全球各地生活的迷人且往往富于幻想的细节,包括暗示许多埃塞俄比亚人只有一只脚: "[它]的脚如此之大,以至于当他们躺下休息时,可以遮蔽全身遮挡阳光。"3 很明显,读过他广为流传的故事的曼德维尔的当代人,很少有人知道他所描述的埃塞俄比亚的"大脚怪"并不存在。

Not until the modern age began with the journeys of exploration at the very end of the fifteenth century were there sustained contacts between the continents. Intrepid captains like Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama who set out to capture the spice trade were extraordinary enough to be remembered in every literate household for the better part of five centuries. From the advent of farming until recent generations, life was characterized by its immobility. This is all but forgotten today, particularly

in the European settlement colonies of the "New World," where movement is more fluid and everyone tends to draw his perspective from the vantage point of an immigrant. A theme of elementary education in North America is that the colonists came from Europe seeking freedom and opportunity, which is true. What is seldom told, however, is how reluctant

直到十五世纪末探险旅程开启了现代时代,各大洲之间才有了持续的联系。勇敢的航海家如克里斯托弗·哥伦布和瓦斯科·达伽马,为寻觅香料贸易而出海,足以被五个世纪以来的受过教育的人所记住。从农业兴起到最近几代人,生活都以其固定不变的特征为特色。这一点在如今的"新世界"殖民地的欧洲定居点已经被遗忘,因为那里的流动性更加流畅,每个人都倾向于从移民的视角看问题。北美的基础教育中有一个主题,即殖民者来自欧洲是为了寻求自由与机会,这是事实。然而,很少有人提到他们是多么不情愿地离乡背井。

most people were to take the trip, even when faced with destitution at home. The few who did migrate suffered what are in today's terms unimaginable ordeals to establish themselves. Only the most enterprising or the most desperate of the poor came. In the middle of the seventeenth century, inmates locked up in Bridewell, London's notorious house of correction, revolted to show "their unwillingness to go to Virginia." 4 In 1720, there were riots in the streets of Paris to free vagabonds, thieves, and murderers scheduled for deportation to Louisiana.

即使面临家中贫困,大多数人也会前往此行。为立足而迁徙的少数人遭受了今天难以想象的折磨。只有最有企业精神或最贫穷绝望的人前来。在 17 世纪中期,锁在伦敦著名矫正所白塔里的犯人们反叛,以表示"他们不愿意前往弗吉尼亚"。1720 年,巴黎街头发生暴乱,以释放那些被判遣送到路易斯安那州的流浪者、小偷和杀手。

Narrow Horizons

狭窄的视野

Physical difficulties of communication and transport, compounded at most times and places by limited language skills, kept the focus of human action narrow and local.

由于通信和运输的物理障碍,加上大多数地方和时候有限的语言技能,人类行动的焦点一直局限于狭小和本地范围。

As recently as the early twentieth century, it was common to find Chinese villages lying only five miles apart speaking mutually unintelligible dialects, even along the coast. The local organization of almost all economies imposed a penalty of narrow markets and lost opportunity. Factor costs were kept high due to limited competition. Access to specialized skills was minimal. With incomes so low they scraped the margins of destitution, and no access to outside capital or efficient insurance markets, small farmers in much of the world were trapped in poverty. We have explored some of the difficulties imposed upon peasants by the confines of closed village life. Even now, as we write, at least a billion people, mostly in Asia and Africa, struggle to survive on less than a dollar a day.

即使到 20 世纪初,距离仅五英里的中国村镇之间使用的方言通常是互不可懂的。由于小范围经济组织的结构,导致市场狭小和失去商机。因为竞争有限,生产要素成本居高不下。获得专业技术的渠道很少。大部分地区农民收入如此之低,仅能维持温饱,没有外部资金或有效保险市场的渠道,陷入贫困。我们探讨了封闭村落生活给农民带来的困境。即使在今天,亚洲和非洲还有至少 10 亿人每天生活费不到 1 美元。

"ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL"

所有政治都是地方性的

To a greater extent than is commonly realized, the immobility of people and their assets has informed the way we see the world. Even those who seem most ready to agree that the earth is a small place as the twentieth century ends continue to think in terms constrained by antiquated concepts of industrial politics. This is underscored by a slogan that became popular among environmentalists in the 1980s: "Think globally but act locally." It is an injunction that mirrors the logic of politics, a logic that has always turned on local power advantages. The local habit of mind has been dictated by the megapolitics of all past societies. All topographical features that serve as barriers or facilitators to the exercise of power are local. Every river, every mountain, every island is local. Climate is local. Temperature,

rainfall, and growing conditions vary as you climb up and over a mountain. Every microbe that circulates, circulates somewhere, and not in some other place. Little wonder that the tyranny of place permeates our concepts of how society must organize and function. The power advantages that have given one group or another a local monopoly on violence have heretofore always originated someplace and faded along the megapolitical margins where borders are drawn. That is why there has never been a world government. While the importance of place to the exercise of power has rarely been made explicit, some advocates of compulsion to redistribute the rewards of human action began to sense the declining leverage of place as

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与普遍认识相比,人员及其资产的不可移动性在很大程度上影响了我们看待世界的方式。即使那些在二十世纪末认为地球是一个小地方的人,仍然受到由工业政治的陈旧概念所约束的思维。这一点由 20 世纪 80 年代环境保护主义者流行的一句口号得到证实:"全球思考,但局部行动"。这是一个反映政治逻辑的命令,而政治逻辑一直建立在地方权力优势之上。所有过去社会的大政治都规定了地方心智习惯。所有作为权力行使障碍或促进因素的地理特征都是局部的。每条河流、每座山峰、每个岛屿都是局部的。气候也是局部的。当你攀登一座山时,温度、降雨量和生长条件会发生变化。每一种流通的微生物都在某个地方流通,而不是在其他地方。难怪地域的专制渗透到我们对社会组织和运作方式的概念中。一直以来,给予某一群体或另一群体对暴力的局部垄断优势的力量优势都源于某个地方,并沿着划定边界的大政治边缘渐渐消失。这就是为什么从未有过世界政府。尽管地域在行使权力中的重要性很少被明确提出,但有些倡导重新分配人类行为回报的人开始感觉到地域的影响力正在下降,因为

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long ago as the 1930s. They saw in modern transportation a division of social space between the highly paid and the poor. This fear was captured by John Dos Passos in *The Big Money*: "The 'vag' sits on the edge of the highway, broken, hungry. Overhead, flies a transcontinental plane filled with highly paid executives. The upper class has taken to the air, the lower class to the road: there is no longer any bond between them, they are two nations."⁵ This is another way of saying that improved transportation reduced the leverage of extortion simply by increasing the choice of places

where successful persons might choose to be. Certainly, the vagabond on the road below was in no position to press for a handout from those flying overhead. The tendencies that Dos Passos observed sixty years ago have only become more pronounced.

早在 1930 年代就出现了这种情况。他们在现代交通中看到了高薪人群和贫穷人群之间的社会空间分隔。这种担忧被约翰·多斯·帕索斯在《大金钱》中捕捉到:"游民'坐在公路边缘,破碎、饥饿。高空中掠过一架洲际飞机,机上坐着高薪管理人员。上层阶级已经上了天,下层阶级则走在公路上:他们之间已经没有任何联系,他们变成了两个国家。"5 这就是说,改善的交通手段降低了勒索的可能性,因为成功人士可以选择更多的居住地。无疑,路上的流浪汉无法从高空掠过的人那里讨要施舍。多斯·帕索斯 60 年前观察到的这些倾向如今变得更加明显。

Mass Transit 大众运输

In 1995, a million persons crossed borders somewhere in the world each day.

1995 年,每天有一百万人在世界各地跨越国界。

This represents a startling change from the past. Before the twentieth century, travel was so infrequent that most borders were simply frontiers, not barriers to transit. Passports were unknown. The development of ocean liners, trains, and other improved forms of transportation dramatically increased movement. But this movement became more heavily regulated by states whose powers were increased by the same improvements in transportation and communications that made civilian travel cheaper and easier. The advent of movies and, especially, television also did a great deal to open horizons and stimulate travel and immigration. Yet until now, the bedrock assumptions of social and economic organization have remained anchored in locality.

这代表着与过去截然不同的变革。在 20 世纪之前,旅行是如此罕见,大多数边界只不过是疆界,而非通行障碍。护照是未知的。轮船、火车等改良型交通工具的发展大大增加了移动性。但这种移动性受到更严格的国家管控,这是由于同样的交通和通讯进步使民众出行更加便捷和经济。电影的出现,尤其是电视的出现,在很大程度上开阔了视野,刺激了

旅行和移民。但到目前为止,社会和经济组织的基本假设仍然根植于地域。

“ to avoid that Failure of Nerve for which history exacts so merciless a penalty. We must have the courage to follow all technical extrapolations to their logical conclusion.”⁶ ARTHUR C.

为了避免历史如此无情地惩罚“心理失衡”,我们必须有勇气将所有技术外推推导到其逻辑结论。 亚瑟·C.

CLARKE

克拉克

THE ERROR OF MINIMAL EXPECTATIONS

最小期望的错误

The geographic tether on imagination is still so tight that some experts examining the Internet in 1995 have concluded that it has little commercial potential and almost no significance other than as an electronic medium for chat and an outlet for pornography.

互联网在 1995 年仍有很强的地域界限,一些专家认为它几乎没有商业潜力,除了作为交流和色情信息传播的电子媒体之外几乎毫无其他意义。

The many doubters of the economic importance of cyberspace are the Colonel Blimps of the Information Age. Their complacency rivals that of the British establishment facing the decline of the empire in the 1930s. Whenever elites find themselves threatened, their first reaction is denial. This is evidenced by the fond hope that the Internet will never amount to much, sometimes endorsed by authorities who should know better. We referred earlier to David Kline and Daniel Burstein's work, *Road Warriors: Dreams and Nightmares Along the Information Highway*.

网络空间经济重要性的众多怀疑者是信息时代的"布林普上校"。他们的自满程度与 20 世纪 30 年代面临帝国衰落的英国统治阶层不相上下。每当精英阶层发现自己受到威胁时,他们的第一反应就是否认。这从一些权威人士所持有的一厢情愿,认为互联网终将不了了之的想法中可窥一二。我们先前曾提及大卫·克莱恩和丹尼尔·伯斯坦的著作《道路战士:信息高速公路上的梦魇与梦想》。

Their dismissal of the economic potential of the Net is another proof that being technically well-informed is not synonymous with understanding the consequences of technology.⁷ Even the most technically expert observers in the past have frequently ¹⁴⁷

他们对网络经济潜力的忽视是另一个证明,技术知识丰富并不等同于对技术后果的理解。即使过去最具技术专长的观察者也经常被证明是

failed to grasp the implications of new technologies. A British parliamentary committee, convened in 1878 to consider the prospects for Thomas Edison's incandescent lamp, reported Edison's ideas to be "good enough for our transatlantic friends, . . . but unworthy of the attention of practical or scientific men."

未能把握新技术的影响。1878年,一个英国议会委员会被召集来考虑托马斯·爱迪生的白炽灯的前景,报告称爱迪生的想法"对我们大西洋彼岸的朋友来说已经足够好了.....但不值得实践家或科学家的关注"。

Thomas Edison himself was a man of great vision, but he thought that the phonograph he invented would be employed mainly by businessmen for dictation. Only a short time before the Wright brothers proved that airplanes would fly, the distinguished American astronomer Simon Newcomb authoritatively demonstrated why heavier-than-air flight was impossible. He concluded: "The demonstration that no possible combination of known substances, known forms of machinery and known forms of force, can be united in a practical machine by which men shall fly long distances through the air, seems to the writer as complete as it is possible for the demonstration of any physical fact to be." Soon after airplanes began to fly, another renowned astronomer, William H.

托马斯·爱迪生本人是一位拥有非凡远见的人,但他认为他发明的唱机主要会被商人用于口述。就在莱特兄弟证明飞机能够飞行之前不久,著名的美国天文学家西蒙·纽康布权威地证明了比重于空气更重的飞行是不可能的。他得出结论:"任何已知物质、已知机械形式和已知能量形式的任何可能组合,都无法集成为使人长时间在空中飞行的实用机器,这一点在物理事实的演示上似乎已是完全的。"就在飞机开始飞行后不久,另一位著名的天文学家威廉·H.

Pickering, explained to the public why commercial travel would never get off the ground: "The popular mind often pictures gigantic flying machines speeding across the Atlantic and carrying innumerable passengers in a way analogous to our modern steamships. . . . [I]t is clear that with our present devices there is no hope of competing for racing speed with either our

locomotives or our automobiles."

皮克林解释了商业旅行为何永远无法起飞:"人们常常想象巨大的飞行器在横跨大西洋的同时带载无数乘客,就像我们现代的轮船一样。很明显,凭借我们目前的设备,我们无法与我们的火车头或汽车相比拼速度。"

We have previously recalled another wildly inaccurate prophecy about the potential of a new technology-the forecast from the beginning of the twentieth century by the makers of Mercedes that there would never be more than a million automobiles worldwide. Again, they knew more about automobiles than almost anyone but they could not have been more wrong in estimating the impact of autos on society. Given this tradition of clueless misunderstandings, it is hardly surprising that many observers are slow to grasp the most important implications of the new information technology-the fact that it transcends the tyranny of place. The new technology creates for the first time an infinite, nonterrestrial realm for economic activity. It opens an option to explore the new frontiers of the cybereconomy, to "think globally and act globally." This chapter explains why.

我们之前已经回顾了另一个完全不准确的预言,即 20 世纪初梅赛德斯制造商预测全球永远不会有超过一百万辆汽车的预言。再次强调,他们对汽车了解得比几乎所有人都多,但对汽车对社会的影响完全估计错误。鉴于这种对新事物理解不足的传统,许多观察者很难理解新信息技术最重要的意义,即它超越了地域的局限性。新技术首次为经济活动创造了一个无限的非地球领域。它为探索网络经济新前沿、"全球思维、全球行动"提供了选择。本章将解释这一点。

BEYOND LOCALITY

超越本地性

The processing and use of information is rapidly replacing and modifying physical products as the most important source of profit. This has major consequences.

信息的处理和使用正快速取代和改变实物产品,成为最重要的利润来源。这将带来重大影响。

Information technology divorces income-earning potential from residence in any specific geographic location. Since a greater and greater portion of the value of products and services will be created by adding ideas and knowledge to the product, an ever-smaller component of value-added will be subject to capture within local jurisdictions. Ideas can be formulated anywhere and transmitted globally at the speed of light. This inevitably means that the information economy will be dramatically different from the economy of the Factory Age. We would concede to the critics that a recital of the tasks you could have undertaken through the Internet in 1996 might seem mundane. There is, after all, 148

信息技术使收入获取潜力与特定地理位置无关。由于越来越多的产品和服务价值是通过增加创意和知识而创造的,价值增加的部分将逐渐不受当地管辖区的限制。创意可以在任何地方形成并以光速全球传播。这意味着信息经济必将与工厂时代的经济大不相同。我们不得不承认,我们在 1996 年就能通过互联网完成的任务可能看起来平庸无奇。毕竟,

nothing terribly revolutionary about reading an article about gardening on the Net, or buying a case of wine long-distance. However, the potential of the cybereconomy cannot be judged solely on its early beginnings, any more than the potential of the automobile to transform society could have been judged by what you could have seen around you in 1900. We expect the cybereconomy to evolve through several stages.

在网上阅读一篇关于园艺的文章或远程购买一箱葡萄酒并没有什么革命性。但是,网络经济的潜力不能仅仅根据其早期的开端来判断,就像不

能仅根据 1900 年你所能看到的情况来判断汽车对社会的变革潜力一样。我们预计网络经济将经历几个阶段的发展。

1.

The most primitive manifestations of the Information Age involve the Net simply as an information medium to facilitate what are otherwise ordinary industrial-era transactions. At this point, the Net is no more than an exotic delivery system for catalogues. Virtual Vineyards, for example, one of the first cybermerchants, simply sells wine from a page on the World Wide Web. Such transactions are not yet directly subversive of the old institutions. They employ industrial currency, and take place within identifiable jurisdictions. These uses of the Internet have little such megapolitical impact.

信息时代最原始的表现是将网络仅作为一种信息媒介,来促进工业时代的常规交易。在这一点上,网络不过是用于目录传播的一种奇特的传递系统。例如,最早的网络商家之一——"虚拟酒庄",仅仅是在万维网上销售葡萄酒。这些交易还没有直接颠覆老的制度。它们使用工业货币,并在可识别的管辖范围内进行。这些对互联网的使用对"大政治"影响很小。

2.

An intermediate stage of Internet commerce will employ information technology in ways that would have been impossible in the industrial era, such as in long-distance accounting or medical diagnosis. More examples of these new applications of advanced computational power are spelled out below. The second stage of Net commerce will still function within the old institutional framework, employing national currencies and submitting to the jurisdiction of nationstates. The merchants who employ the Net for sales will not yet employ it to bank their profits, only to earn revenues. These profits made on Internet transactions will still be subject to taxation.

互联网商务的中级阶段将以工业时代无法实现的方式运用信息技术,例如远程会计或医疗诊断。下文将详细说明这些新的先进计算能力的应用实例。互联网商务的第二阶段仍将在旧有的制度框架内运作,使用国家货币并受国家管辖。通过互联网进行销售的商人尚不会利用它来存

储利润,只会用来赢得收入。这些由互联网交易产生的利润仍将缴纳税收。

3.

A more advanced stage will mark the transition to true cybercommerce. Not only will transactions occur over the Net, but they will migrate outside the jurisdiction of nationstates. Payment will be rendered in cybercurrency. Profits will be booked in cyberbanks. Investments will be made in cyberbrokerages. Many transactions will not be subject to taxation. At this stage, cybercommerce will begin to have significant megapolitical consequences of the kind we have already outlined. The powers of governments over traditional areas of the economy will be transformed by the new logic of the Net. Extraterritorial regulatory power will collapse. Jurisdictions will devolve, The structure of firms will change, and so will the nature of work and employment, This outline of the stages of the Information Revolution is only the barest sketch of what could be the most far-reaching economic transformation event.

网络商务的转型标志着更为进阶的阶段。不仅交易发生在网络上,还会脱离国家管辖。支付使用数字货币,利润存储在网络银行,投资通过网络经纪商进行。许多交易将逃逸税收。在这个阶段,网络商务将开始产生我们已经概述的重大地缘政治影响。政府对传统经济领域的权力将被网络的新逻辑所改变。超国界的监管权将崩溃,管辖权将分散,企业结构以及工作性质都将发生改变。这对信息革命的阶段性的概述只是对可能发生的最广泛经济转型事件的简单勾勒。

THE GLOBALIZATION OF COMMERCE

商业全球化

In the Information Age, most current jurisdictional advantages will be eroded rapidly by technology. New types of advantages will emerge. Falling communications costs have already reduced the need for proximity as a necessary condition of doing business. In 1946, it was technically possible for an investor in London to place an order with a broker in New York. But only the largest and most compelling transaction would have justified doing so: a three-minute phone call between New York and London cost \$650. Today, it costs \$0.91. The price of an intercontinental phone call has plunged by more than 99 percent in half a century.

在信息时代,大部分当前的司法管辖区优势将被技术迅速侵蚀。新型优势将会出现。通讯成本的下降已经减少了接近度作为开展业务的必要条件的需求。1946年,投资者在伦敦下订单给纽约的经纪人在技术上是可行的。但是,只有最大和最具吸引力的交易才能证明这样做是合理的:纽约与伦敦之间的三分钟长途电话费用为650美元。而如今,这个费用仅为0.91美元。跨大陆电话费用在半个世纪内下降了99%以上。

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Convergent Communication 合流通信

Soon, the difference between intercontinental chat and a local call may be minimal. So, too, may be the differences among your telephone, your computer, and your television. All will be interactive communications devices, more easily distinguished on ergonomic than functional grounds. You will be able to hold a voice conversation over the Internet using microphones and speakers on your personal computer. Or watch a movie. You will be able to talk back to your television, and communicate vast amounts of data through the network provided by the television entertainment media. As the industrial-era distinction between various forms of communication breaks down and costs plunge, more and more services will bill you by time of use rather than according to the destination

of your messages. Conversation or data transmission anywhere in the world will cost little more than a local call did in most jurisdictions in 1985.

不久,跨大陆聊天和本地通话之间的差异可能微乎其微。你的电话、电脑和电视也可能出现差异。它们都将成为交互式通信设备,在人体工程学而非功能上更易区分。你将能够使用个人电脑上的麦克风和扬声器通过互联网进行语音对话。或者观看电影。你还将能够与电视对话,并通过电视娱乐媒体提供的网络传输大量数据。随着工业时代各种通信形式的区分消失以及成本大幅下降,越来越多的服务将根据使用时间向你收费,而不是根据信息的目的地。无论在世界任何地方进行对话还是数据传输,花费都将不会比 1985 年大多数地区的本地通话更多。

Internet Unwired 无线互联网

Low-orbit satellites and other approaches to wireless technology will transmit feeds, back and forth directly to a beeper in your pocket, a portable computer, or a workstation, without interfacing with a local telephone operating or TV cable system at all. In short, the Internet will be unwired. The first steps in that direction are bound to be halting because of the relatively slow speed of data transmission in the early wireless media and the difficulties of "hearing" weak signals broadcast from subscriber devices, some of which will be mobile and battery-powered. Nonetheless, these technical problems will be tackled and solved.

低轨卫星和其他无线技术方法将直接传输反馈到您口袋里的寻呼机、便携式电脑或工作站,而不需要与本地电话运营商或有线电视系统进行任何接口。简而言之,互联网将变得无线化。在这个方向上的第一步必然会步履蹒跚,因为早期无线媒体的数据传输速度相对较慢,再加上从订阅设备广播的微弱信号难以接收的困难。然而,这些技术问题终将得到解决。

Business Without Borders 无边界商业

Continued expansion of computational power will lead to better compression technology, speeding data flow. Widespread adoption of existing public key:private key encryption algorithms will allow providers,

such as satellite systems, to incorporate the billing function into the service, lowering costs. Simultaneous with the service, vendors will be able to debit accounts loaded on personal computers in much the way that France Telecom debits the "smart cards" employed in Paris phone boxes.

计算能力的持续扩展将导致更好的压缩技术,从而加快数据流。现有公钥私钥加密算法的广泛采用将使服务提供商(如卫星系统)能将计费功能纳入服务中,从而降低成本。与服务同步,供应商将能够像法国电信公司在巴黎电话亭中使用的"智能卡"一样,从个人电脑上加载的账户中扣费。

The Phone Becomes a Bank 手机成为银行

The difference is that in the near future, you will be able to earn credits to your account with all manner of transactions and carry your phone box with you. Your PC

在不久的将来,您将能够通过各种交易获得账户积分,并携带您的手机盒。您的电脑

will be the branch office of your bank and global money brokerage, as well as the equivalent of the Paris kiosk where you buy your anonymous phone card. And like the 150

我将是您银行和全球货币经纪的分支机构,也是您购买匿名电话卡的等同于巴黎报亭的地方。与 150

smart-card pay phones that are useless to thieves if broken open with a crowbar, your computer could only be raided by someone capable of breaking or manipulating sophisticated computer code. That would leave out a lot of ruffians capable of manipulating a crowbar. With proper encryption, nothing in your computer could be deciphered or misused. By the turn of the millennium, you will be able to transact business almost anywhere north of Antarctica. Anywhere wired or digital cellular telephone is available. Anywhere interactive cable television systems are in use.

智能卡公共电话对于使用撬棍强行打开的小偷来说是无用的,您的计算机只能被那些有能力破坏或操纵复杂计算机代码的人入侵。这就排除了很多能操纵撬棍的暴徒。有了适当的加密,您计算机中的任何内容都

无法解密或被误用。到千禧年之交,您几乎可以在南极北部的任何地方进行商业交易。只要有电线或数字蜂窝电话可用,或有交互式有线电视系统使用的地方。

Anywhere a satellite is overhead or other wireless transmission systems are in place.

卫星或其他无线传输系统所在的任何地方。

You will be able to speak, transmit data, and journey via virtual reality over borders and boundaries at will. Telephone numbers that identify the locale of the speaker by area codes are likely to be superseded by universal access numbers, which will reach the party with whom you wish to communicate anywhere on the planet.

您将能够言语、传输数据并通过虚拟现实跨越边界和疆域自由行程。通过区号识别说话者所在地区的电话号码很可能被取代,通用访问号码将可以在地球上任何地方联系您想沟通的对方。

Understanding Chinese

了解中文

You will not only be able to talk and send a fax. In time, you will be able to shorten a multiyear learning process and converse in Chinese with a factory foreman in Shanghai. It will no longer matter as much that you do not speak his language or dialect.

你不仅能说话和发传真。随着时间的推移,你将能够缩短多年的学习过程,并与上海的工厂主管用中文交谈。你不会讲他的语言或方言就不那么重要了。

His words may be in Chinese but you will hear them Transcending Locality I 8 roughly translated into English. He will hear your conversation in Chinese. In time, the capacity to employ instantaneous translation will significantly increase competition in regions where obstacles of language and idiom have heretofore been significant. When that happens, it will matter little or not at all that the Chinese government may not wish the call to be placed.

他的话可能是中文的,但是你会听到它们大致翻译成英语。他将听到你

的中文对话。随着时间的推移,能够使用即时翻译的能力将显著增加那些语言和习语障碍一直很重要的地区的竞争。当这种情况发生时,中国政府可能不希望拨打电话,这将很少或根本不重要。

Customized Media 定制媒体

As the world grows closer together, you will have a greater opportunity than at any time in history to customize your particular place in it. Even the information you receive on a regular basis from the media will be information of your choosing. The mass media will become the individualized media. If you are interested in chess above all else, or are a keen cat fancier, you will be able to program your evening news broadcast to feature information important to you about cats or chess. No longer will you be at the mercy of Dan Rather or the BBC for the news that reaches you. You will be able to select news compiled and edited according to your instructions.

随着世界变得更加紧密相连,你会有比历史上任何时候都更大的机会来定制你在其中的特殊位置。甚至你定期从媒体获得的信息也将是你选择的信息。大众媒体将成为个性化媒体。如果你对象棋感兴趣,或者是一个热心的猫咪爱好者,你将能够设置你的晚间新闻报道,以呈现对你来说重要的关于猫咪或象棋的信息。你不再受制于丹·拉瑟或 BBC 带给你的新闻。你将能够根据自己的指示选择编辑过的新闻。

From Mass to Customized Production 从规模生产到定制生产

If the news is slow, you can access a virtual catalogue on the World Wide Web.

如果新闻缓慢,您可以访问互联网上的虚拟目录。

If you see a pair of trousers that you almost like, you can adjust the width of the cuff when you place your order. It will be custom-cut and tailored to fit your body by robots 151

如果你看到一条你几乎喜欢的裤子,在下单时你可以调整裤管宽度。它将由机器人定制剪裁和裁制,以适合你的身材。

in Malaysia from photographs scanned into your computer and transmitted through the Net.

从电脑扫描并通过网络传输的照片中,在马来西亚。

Cyberbroking

网络经纪

You will be able to use cybermoney to make investments as well as pay for services and products. If you live in a jurisdiction like the United States that heavily regulates your investment options, you can choose to domicile your activities in a jurisdiction that permits the freedom to pursue a full range of investment options.

您将能够使用网络货币进行投资,也可以用来支付服务和产品费用。如果您居住在像美国这样严格管制投资选择的司法管辖区,您可以选择在允许您追求全范围投资选择自由的司法管辖区进行活动。

Whether you live in Cleveland or Belo Horizonte, you can do your investment business in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Rio de Janeiro, or Buenos Aires. Wherever you find yourself, the use of digital resources will widen as the cybereconomy evolves. You will be able to employ expert systems to help select your investments, and cyberaccountants and -bookkeepers to monitor the progress of your holdings on a real-time basis. 不论您是居住在克利夫兰还是贝洛奥里桑特,您都可以在百慕大群岛、开曼群岛、里约热内卢或布宜诺斯艾利斯从事投资业务。无论您身在何处,随着网络经济的发展,数字资源的使用将日益广泛。您将能够利用专家系统来帮助选择您的投资,并借助网络会计师和网络记账员实时监控您持有的资产。

Virtual culture

虚拟文化

When you are not reviewing profit-and-loss data, you may take a virtual visit to the Louvre. Your trip may require you to pay a royalty payment equivalent to one-third of a penny to Bill Gates, or someone of equal foresight who has purchased the virtual-reality rights to tour the museum. While you are wondering whether the Mona Lisa had trouble with her teeth,

your computer could be downloading S. I. Hsiung's translation of The Romance of the Western Chamber. At times of your choosing, your personal communications system will read the text aloud like a bard of old. Multitasking programs will allow you to perform many functions simultaneously.

当您不查看利润与损失数据时,您可以虚拟参观卢浮宫。您的旅行可能需要向比尔·盖茨或具有同等远见的其他人支付等同于 1/3 便士的版权费用,以获取参观该博物馆的虚拟现实权限。当您在怀疑蒙娜丽莎是否有牙齿问题时,您的电脑可能正在下载熊式怡的《西厢记》翻译。您可以随时选择让您的个人通信系统像古老的吟游诗人一样朗读文本。多任务处理程序将允许您同时执行多项功能。

Shopping for Jurisdictions on the Net 购买网上管辖权

If you are inspired by your dose of the classics, you can organize a virtual corporation to market dramatic productions of famous literature for viewing through three-dimensional retinal display. Instead of being projected into the air, the images will be projected directly onto the retinas of viewers with low-energy lasers fluctuating fifty thousand times a second. This technology, already under development by MicroVision of Seattle, Washington, will allow many persons who are legally blind to see. Before undertaking the project, you could instruct your digital assistant to canvass the current contract offers of protection for manufacturing facilities in Malaysia, China, Peru, Brazil, and the Czech Republic. When you pick a location, you will be able to have your company incorporated in one hour in the Bahamas, courtesy of the St. George's Trust Company. Your instructions will place all the company's liquid assets in a cyberaccount in a cyberbank that is domiciled simultaneously in Newfoundland, the Cayman Islands, Uruguay, Argentina, and Liechtenstein. If any of the jurisdictions attempt to withdraw 152

如果您受到经典作品的启发,您可以组织一个虚拟公司,通过三维视网膜显示来推广著名文学作品的戏剧性制作。影像不会被投射到空中,而是以低能量激光每秒五万次波动直接投射到观众的视网膜上。这项由华盛顿微视公司开发的技术将让许多法律上的盲人得以视物。在着手该项目之前,您可以指示数字助理调查马来西亚、中国、秘鲁、巴西和捷

克共和国制造设施的当前合同保护提议。选定地点后,您将能够在一小时内,在巴哈马通过圣乔治信托公司注册您的公司。您的指示将把公司所有的流动资产存入一个网络银行账户,该银行同时在纽芬兰、开曼群岛、乌拉圭、阿根廷和列支敦士登注册。如果任何司法管辖区试图提取 152

operating authority or seize the assets of depositors, the assets will automatically be transferred to another jurisdiction at the speed of light. 运营当局或没收存户资产,资产将以光速自动转移到另一个司法管辖区。

QUALITATIVE ADVANCES

定性进展

Many of the transactions you soon will be able to perform in cyberspace would have been impossible in the Industrial Age, and not simply because they cross a language barrier. Sending your digital assistants to locate untranslated articles published in Hungarian scientific journals is qualitatively different from talking to a librarian. Sitting in on an Oxford tutorial from a distance of five thousand miles is not the same as taking the tutorial when you are sleeping within six miles of Carfax. And playing the roulette wheel at the Hotel de Paris, Monte Carlo, is a novel experience when you can do it via virtual reality from a party at Punte del Este, Uruguay.

您很快就能在网络空间进行许多以前在工业时代无法实现的交易,这不仅是因为它们跨越了语言障碍。让您的数字助手去寻找发表在匈牙利科学期刊上的未经翻译的文章,与和图书管理员交谈有着本质的区别。远程参加牛津大学的教程,与在卡夫克斯附近六英里内参加该教程有所不同。在 Hotel de Paris,蒙特卡洛赌博也是一种新的体验,因为您可以通过虚拟现实从乌拉圭 Punte del Este 的一个聚会中进行。

A Cybervisit to the Cyberdoctor

网上看网上医生

In short order, faster than many experts now think possible, activities will migrate into the cybereconomy that combine technologies in novel ways to transcend the tyranny of place and the antiquated institutions of the industrial economy. One day soon, if you have a stomach ache, you will be able to consult a digital doctor, an expert system with an encyclopedic knowledge of symptoms, maladies, and antidotes. It will access your medical history in encrypted form, ask whether your pain happens after eating or before meals. Whether it is sharp or dull, persistent or episodic. Whatever questions doctors ask, the digital doctor will ask. It may determine that you drink too much wine, or not enough. You may be referred to a cyberspecialist. If you need an operation, a cybersurgeon in

Bermuda may perform the operation long-distance with the aid of specialized equipment that performs micro-incisions.

在短时间内,比许多专家现在认为可能的更快,将有越来越多的活动转移到网络经济中,这些活动将以新颖的方式结合各种技术,超越地域和工业经济中过时的体制。很快有一天,如果你肚子疼,就能向一个数字医生咨询,这个数字医生是一个专家系统,拥有关于症状、疾病和解药的百科全书般的知识。它会访问你加密的病历,询问你是在饭后还是饭前疼痛,疼痛是尖锐还是钝痛,持续还是间歇性的,无论医生问什么,数字医生都会问。它可能会判断你喝酒太多或太少,并可能会将你转介给一位网络专科医生。如果你需要手术,在百慕大的网络外科医生可能会借助专门的设备进行微创手术。

Life-and-Death Information Processing 生死信息处理

This may sound like science fiction. But many of the components of cybersurgery are already in place. Others will be functional by the time you read this book. General Electric has introduced a new magnetic resonance treatment machine (MRT) into fifteen hospitals around the world. The machine is expected to have a three-year research-and-development phase, but after that it is likely to spread rapidly and become a norm for many types of surgery. It is one example, but a good one, of the way in which technology is changing society. Most of us are familiar with magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines, in which magnetic resonance techniques are used to provide doctors with soft-tissue images for diagnostic purposes. They provide better images of soft tissues than X-rays or ultrasound, and have become an essential part of modern diagnostic techniques, particularly in cancers. They have, however, two 153

这可能听起来像是科幻小说。但是,机器人手术的许多组成部分已经到位。其他的将在您阅读本书时变得可用。通用电气公司已经在世界各地的 15 家医院引入了一种新型的磁共振治疗机(MRT)。这台机器预计会经历 3 年的研发阶段,但之后很可能会迅速普及,成为许多类型手术的标准。这只是一个例子,但是一个很好的例子,说明了技术如何改变社会。我们大多数人都熟悉磁共振成像(MRI)机器,在这些机器中使用磁共振技术为医生提供软组织图像,用于诊断目的。它们提供比 X 射线或

超声波更好的软组织图像,并已成为现代诊断技术不可或缺的一部分,特别是在癌症方面。然而,它们有两个缺点。

significant limitations at present. The tube does not allow free access to the patient; the machines are of limited power.

目前存在重大限制。管中不允许患者自由接触;机器性能有限。

Cybersurgery

网络手术

General Electric has redesigned magnetic resonance machines so that they can be used for treatment as well as diagnosis. The power has been upped five times. The tube has, in effect, been cut in two, so the patient will lie between two doughnut-shaped units, rather than being fully enclosed. Instead of taking an image and then performing surgery in the light of that image, the surgeon will be able to see what he is doing as he does it. MRT will be combined with noninvasive, or less invasive, surgery using microtechniques. Instead of having to make large incisions with scalpels, the surgeon will make micro incisions with probes, and will be able to see what the probes reveal as he operates. He will perform the surgery from the image rather than by looking directly into the body. In principle, the probes will be operable from a distance. They will be able to destroy tumors with laser or cryogenic-heating or freezing-devices of great precision.

通用电气重新设计了磁共振机器,使其不仅可以用于诊断,还可用于治疗。功率提高了五倍。机器管已被实质上切成两部分,所以患者将躺在两个圆环形单元之间,而不是完全被封闭。医生不需先拍摄影像然后再进行手术,而是可以在手术过程中实时观察。将磁共振技术与无创或微创手术结合使用。医生不需要进行大的切口手术,而是可以使用探针进行微创手术,并能够观察探针所揭示的情况。手术将根据影像进行,而不是直接观察身体。原则上,探针可以远程操作。它们能够利用激光或极其精确的制冷加热或冷冻设备来破坏肿瘤。

This will permit operations that are now impossible, particularly in neurosurgery, where tumors often lie very close to essential parts of the brain. It will also permit repeated operations, when the trauma of the traditional surgical operation cannot be repeated without unacceptable

damage. Some researchers believe that the knife for soft-tissue surgery may be looked back on as an obsolete relic by 2010. A lot of fear, and much of the aftershock, will be taken out of surgery if that is true. Obviously, this is very good news for the patient. Operations which now take hours to perform, and have to be followed by days or weeks in the hospital, will take only half an hour, and may not require hospitalization at all. Indeed, the surgeon and the patient may never even be in the same room. But what will this do to hospitals and surgeons?

这将允许现在无法进行的手术,特别是在神经外科领域,肿瘤通常位于大脑的重要部位附近。这还将允许重复手术,当传统手术创伤无法在不造成不可接受的损害的情况下重复进行时。有一些研究人员相信,2010 年之前,软组织手术用的刀可能会被视为一种过时的遗物。如果这一点成立,很多恐惧和术后震动都会从手术中消失。显然,这对病人来说是一个非常好的消息。现在需要几个小时才能完成的手术,且需要在医院住几天或几周,将只需要半个小时,甚至可能根本不需要住院。事实上,外科医生和病人可能永远不会在同一个房间里。但这会对医院和外科医生产生什么样的影响?

Fewer Microsurgeons Doing More 手术医生减少,手术量增加

There will be a revolution in surgery. In training, a third of young surgeons have failed to acquire the skills needed for microsurgery. A third are just able to do it, and a third become excellent. Similar proportions are found in conversion courses for senior surgeons. Fewer surgeons will be able to carry out more operations in a shorter time. It is likely that health care insurers and individuals seeking surgery will insist on outcome statistics for each surgeon, which will vary rather widely. Patients will want to go to surgeons who produce the best results, particularly if their conditions are life-threatening.

手术将发生革命。在培训过程中,三分之一的年轻外科医生未能获得微创手术所需的技能。三分之一勉强胜任,三分之一成为出色的医生。在高级外科医生的转换课程中也发现了类似的比例。更少的外科医生将能够在更短的时间内进行更多手术。很可能医疗保险公司和寻求手术的个人将坚持要求每个外科医生的手术结果统计数据,这将有较大变

化。患者将希望寻找能够产生最佳结果的外科医生,特别是在生命攸关的情况下。

In some cases, the best surgeons may operate long-distance. They may perform the whole operation from another jurisdiction where taxes are lower and courts do not honor exorbitant malpractice claims.

在某些情况下,最优秀的外科医生可能会远程手术。他们可能会在税率较低且法院不会支持过高的医疗过失索赔的其他管辖区进行整个手术过程。

Digital Lawyers 数字律师

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Before agreeing to perform an operation, the skilled surgeon will probably call upon a digital lawyer to draft an instant contract that specifies and limits liability based upon the size and characteristics of the tumor revealed in images displayed by the magnetic resonance machine. Digital lawyers will be information-retrieval systems that automate selection of contract provisions, employing artificial intelligence processes such as neural networks to customize private contracts to meet transnational legal conditions.

在同意进行手术之前,熟练的外科医生可能会请数字律师草拟一份即时合同,该合同规定并限制根据磁共振仪显示的肿瘤大小和特性而产生的责任。数字律师将是自动化选择合同条款的信息检索系统,利用人工智能过程(如神经网络)来定制满足跨国法律条件的私人合同。

Participants in most high-value or important transactions will not only shop for suitable partners with whom to conduct a business; they will also shop for a suitable domicile for their transactions.

参与大部分高价值或重要交易的人不仅会寻找合适的合作伙伴进行业务合作,还会寻找交易适合的居所地。

Emergency Consultation 紧急咨询

To continue the example of cybersurgery, the technology of the Information Age will place a premium on the highest skills in surgery, as it will in almost every endeavor.

在继续网络外科手术的例子时,信息时代的技术将会高度重视外科手术的
最高技能,就像在几乎所有领域一样。

Patients have been willing to pay such a premium for as long as there have been knives.

患者愿意为此支付溢价已有很长时间了。

But limits on information and the difficulty of shopping for surgeons in an emergency in any given locale made the market for surgery a very imperfect one. It will be less imperfect in the Information Age. A patient facing the need for an operation in twenty-four hours, or perhaps even forty-five minutes, could deputize digital assistants to locate the top ten surgeons worldwide available to perform such a task remotely, review their success rates in similar cases, and solicit offers for their particular case from corresponding digital servants. All of this could be canvassed in a matter of moments.

但是,信息的局限性以及在紧急情况下寻找外科医生的困难,使得外科手术市场存在很大的缺陷。在信息时代,这种情况将会有所改善。面临 24 小时或 45 分钟内需要手术的患者,可以借助数字助理寻找全球可以远程执行此类手术的前 10 名外科医生,查看他们在类似案例中的成功率,并向相应的数字助手索取针对特定案例的报价。这些都可以在短时间内完成。

As a consequence, the most-favored 10 percent of surgeons will have a far larger share in the global market for surgery. The MRT machine, plus microsurgery techniques, will raise the premium for their work. Surgeons with less skill will focus on residual local markets. This life-and-death example helps suggest some of the revolutionary consequences of the liberation of economies from the tyranny of place. Someone may object that General Electric's MRT machine was not meant to be employed long-distance.

结果是,最受欢迎的 10%外科医生在全球手术市场上所占份额将大大提高。MRT 机器和显微手术技术将使他们的工作价值大增。技术较差的

外科医生将专注于当地剩余市场。这个关乎生死的例子揭示了从地理位置束缚中解放经济所带来的革命性后果。但有人可能会反对通用电气的 MRT 机器并非设计用于远程操作。

Perhaps, but this misses the point. It or some equipment like it soon will be. When operations are better performed by surgeons watching a screen than looking at the patient directly, it will matter less than we now suppose where the surgeon and his screen are located. Increasing numbers of services are destined to be reconfigured to reflect the fact that information technology allows persons anywhere on the globe to interact in even so delicate a matter as surgery. In activities that require less precise equipment, and involve lower risks of failure, the cybereconomy will flourish even more rapidly.

也许,但这忽视了要点。很快就会出现它或类似的设备。当手术由观察屏幕的外科医生而不是直接观察患者来执行时,手术医生和他的屏幕的位置将不如现在那么重要。越来越多的服务将被重新配置,反映出信息技术使全球任何地方的人员都能进行像手术这样微妙的互动。在需要较少精确设备、失败风险较低的活动,数字经济将更迅速地蓬勃发展。

"The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves." ALAN GREENSPAN

"福利国家的财政政策要求财富所有者没有任何保护自己的方式。" 阿兰·格林斯潘

THE DEVALUATION OF COMPULSION

强制性贬值

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In almost every competitive area, including most of the world's multitrillion-dollar investment activity, the migration of transactions into cyberspace will be driven by an almost hydraulic pressure—the impetus to avoid predatory taxation, including the tax that inflation places upon everyone who holds his wealth in a national currency.

在几乎所有的竞争领域,包括全球数万亿美元的投资活动大部分,交易向网络空间的迁移将受到一种几乎类似于水力压力的推动力——规避掠夺性税收,包括通货膨胀对每个持有国家货币财富的人都施加的税收的动力。

Escaping the Protection Racket 保护费套路

You do not need to think long about the megapolitics of the Information Age to realize that predatory taxes and inflation of the kind imposed as a matter of right by the wealthiest industrial countries upon their citizens will be preposterously uncompetitive on the new frontier of cyberspace. Soon after the turn of the millennium, anyone who pays income taxes at rates currently imposed will be doing so out of choice. As Frederic C.

信息时代的大政治并不需要长时间思考,就可以意识到,最富有的工业国家对公民强行征收的掠夺性税收和通货膨胀,在新的网络空间前沿上将变得非常不具有竞争力。在新千年过去后不久,任何人如果选择支付当前征收的所得税税率,都将是自愿纳税的。正如弗雷德里克·C.

Lane pointed out, history shows that on 'the frontiers and on the high seas, where no one had an enduring monopoly in the use of violence, merchants avoided payment of exactions which were so high that protection could be obtained more cheaply by other means.' The cybereconomy provides just such an alternative. No government will be able to monopolize it. And the

information technologies comprised by it will provide cheaper and more effective protection for financial assets than most governments ever had reason to provide.

莱恩指出,历史表明,在"前沿和高海上,没有人对暴力的使用拥有持久垄断权,商人避免支付如此高昂的赔款,因为通过其他方式获得保护更便宜。"网络经济提供了这样一种替代方案。任何政府都无法垄断它。而它所包含的信息技术将为金融资产提供比大多数政府曾经有理由提供的更便宜和更有效的保护。

The Black Magic of Compound Interest 复利的黑魔法

Remember, each \$5,000 of annual tax payments paid over forty years slashes your net worth by \$2.2 million, assuming you could realize just a 10 percent return on your capital. At a 20 percent return, the compound loss balloons to about \$44 million.

每年支付 4 万美元的税款,假设资本收益率为 10%,将使你的净资产减少 220 万美元;假设资本收益率为 20%,将损失相当于 4400 万美元的复利收益。

For high-income earners in a high-tax country, the cumulative losses from predatory taxation over a lifetime are staggering. Most will lose more than they ever had. This sounds impossible, but the mathematics are clear. It is something that you can confirm for yourself with a pocket calculator. The top 1 percent of taxpayers in the United States pay an average of more than \$125,000 in federal income taxes annually. For a fraction of that amount, \$45,000 a year, one would be welcome to live under a private tax treaty in Switzerland, and enjoy law and order provided by what is arguably the most honest police and judicial system in the world.

对于高税收国家的高收入者来说,掠夺性税收给他们一生造成的累积损失是惊人的。大多数人将失去比他们曾拥有的更多。这听起来似乎不可能,但数学证明是清楚的。您可以用计算器自行确认这一点。美国纳税人中最高 1%的人每年平均缴纳超过 12.5 万美元的联邦所得税。以每年 4.5 万美元的价格,就可以在瑞士享受私人税收协议,以及被认为是全球最诚实的警察和司法系统所提供的法治和秩序。

From this perspective, the additional \$80,000 a year of income tax paid above that generous level might well be classified as tribute or plunder. Forty-five thousand dollars is certainly a substantial payment toward the maintenance of law and order, considering that police protection is meant to be a public good. In theory, public goods can be extended to additional users at a marginal cost of zero. The Swiss are glad to have you pay a negotiated fixed tax of \$45,000 (50,000 Swiss francs) per year because they make an annual profit of \$45,000 on every millionaire who signs up.

从这个角度来看,每年额外支付 8 万美元的所得税可能就是贡品或掠夺。4.5 万美元无疑是维护法律和秩序的一笔可观的支付,因为警察保护应该是一种公共利益。从理论上讲,公共利益可以以零边际成本扩展到更多用户。瑞士人很高兴让您每年支付 4.5 万美元(5 万瑞士法郎)的商定固定税,因为他们从每一位申请的百万富翁那里获得 4.5 万美元的年利润。

Compared to the Swiss alternative, the lifetime losses from paying federal income tax at U.S. rates would be \$705 million for an investor who could average a 20 percent rate of return. But remember, that assumes an annual tax payment of \$45,000.

与瑞士替代方案相比,如果一名投资者年均收益率为 20%,在美国联邦所得税税率下的终生损失将达 7.05 亿美元。但请记住,这假设年度税款为 45,000 美元。

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Compared to a tax haven like Bermuda, where the income tax is zero, the lifetime loss for paying taxes at American rates would be about \$1.1 billion. You may object that an annual return of 20 percent is a high rate of return. No doubt you would be right. But given the startling growth in Asia in recent decades, many investors in the world have achieved that and better. The compound rate of return in Hong Kong real estate since 1950 has been more than 20 percent per annum.

与伯慕大群岛这样的免税天堂相比,在美国税率下终生纳税的损失约为 11 亿美元。您可能会反对,年收益率 20%是一个很高的回报率。毫无疑问,您是对的。但鉴于近几十年亚洲的惊人增长,世界上许多投资者已

经实现了这一收益率甚至更高。自 1950 年以来,香港房地产的复合年回报率超过 20%。

Even some economies that are less widely known for growth have afforded easy opportunities for high profits. You could have pocketed an average real return of more than 30 percent annually in U.S. dollar deposits in Paraguayan banks over the last three decades. High Investment returns are easier to realize in some places than others, but skilled investors can certainly achieve profits of 20 percent or more in good years, even if they do not consistently match the performances of George Soros or Warren Buffet.

即使在一些不太为人所知的经济体中,也可以获得高额利润。在过去三十年里,您可以从在巴拉圭银行的美元存款中获得超过 30%的实际平均年收益。在某些地方实现高投资回报要比在其他地方容易,但即便无法持续匹配索罗斯或巴菲特的表现,有能力的投资者也可以在好的年景里获得 20%或更高的利润。

Obviously, the higher the rate of return that you could earn on your capital, the greater the opportunity costs that predatory income and capital gains taxes impose. But the conclusion that the loss is huge, indeed greater than the total amount of wealth that you may ever accumulate, does not depend upon your being able to achieve outlandish rates of return. Some mutual funds operating in the United States have averaged annual gains of more than 10 percent for more than half a century. If you could do no better than that and you are among the top 1 percent of American earners, then your net worth is reduced by more than \$33 million just by the income tax you pay in excess of \$45,000

显然,您可以从资本中获得的回报率越高,掠夺性的所得税和资本利得税带来的机会成本就越大。但是,损失是巨大的,甚至可能大于您可能积累的全部财富,这一结论并不取决于您是否能够实现惊人的回报率。在美国运营的一些共同基金,过去半个多世纪的平均年收益率超过 10%。即使您的表现只能与之相当,而您又属于美国收入前 1%的人群,仅仅是您支付的超过 45,000 美元的所得税,就会使您的净资产减少超过 3,300 万美元。

annually. Compared to a jurisdiction without income tax, the loss is \$55 million.

每年。与没有所得税的管辖区相比,损失是 5500 万美元。

\$55 Rather Than \$55 Million

\$55 而不是\$55 百万

If the profit-maximizing assumptions of economists are correct, as we believe they generally are, one of the more certain predictions you could make is that most people would act to salvage \$55 million if they could. That is our prediction. When the black magic of compound interest becomes more clear in the minds of successful people in high-tax countries, they will begin to shop in earnest among jurisdictions, just as they now shop for automobiles or compare rates on insurance policies. If you doubt it, merely stop people at random on the streets of New York or Toronto and ask whether they would move to Bermuda for \$55 million.

如果经济学家关于利润最大化的假设是正确的,我们认为这通常是正确的,你可以做出一个相当确定的预测,那就是大多数人如果能挽救 5500 万美元,他们会这么做。这就是我们的预测。当复利的魔力在高税收国家的成功人士心中变得更加清晰时,他们会开始在管辖区之间进行认真的选择,就像他们现在购买汽车或比较保险政策的费率一样。如果你有疑虑,只需在纽约或多伦多的街道上随机停下路人,询问他们是否会为了 5500 万美元搬到百慕大。

The question answers itself. The quandary it poses is reminiscent of that Mark Twain imagined in deciding whether he would prefer to spend the night with Lillian Russell stark naked or General Grant in full dress uniform. He did not deliberate long.

这个问题自己就有答案。它提出的困境让人想起马克·吐温所想象的,他要决定是与裸体的莉莉安·罗素过夜,还是与格兰特上将全副武装的统一。他没有考虑太久。

Residents of mature welfare states, particularly the United States, may be slower on the uptake, but only because they are not yet aware of the choice they face. In the fullness of time, they will be. You or anyone motivated by the desire to live a better life will see the attraction of reducing the losses

you suffer from predatory taxation. You need merely lodge your transactions in cyberspace.

成熟福利国家的居民,特别是美国,可能会反应较慢,但只是因为他们还没意识到自己面临的选择。随着时间的推移,他们终将意识到。任何受到生活更好的愿望驱使的人,都会对减少受掠夺性征税所造成的损失感到吸引。你只需将你的交易记录在网络空间中即可。

This will, of course, be illegal in many jurisdictions. But old laws seldom can resist new technology. In the 1980s, it was illegal in the United States to send a fax message. The U.S. Post Office considered faxes to be first-class mail, over which the 157

这在许多司法管辖区将是非法的。但旧法很少能抵挡新技术。在 20 世纪 80 年代,在美国发送传真信息是非法的。美国邮政局将传真视为一等邮件,受到 157

U.S. Post Office claimed an ancient monopoly. An edict to that effect was issued reiterating the requirement that all fax transmissions be routed to the nearest post office for delivery with regular mail. Billions of fax messages later, it is unclear whether anyone ever complied with that law. If so, compliance was fleeting. The advantages of operating in the emerging cybereconomy are even more compelling than sidestepping the post office in sending a fax.

美国邮政局声称拥有一个古老的垄断。颁布一项法令,要求所有传真传输都必须路由到最近的邮局与平邮一起投递。几十亿条传真消息后,人们是否遵守过这项法律仍然不清楚。如果有人遵守过,那也是一时的。在网络经济中运营的优势,比绕开邮局寄送传真更有吸引力。

Widespread adoption of public-key/private-key encryption technologies will soon allow many economic activities to be completed anywhere you please. As James Bennet, technology editor of Strategic Investment, has written: Enforcement of laws and particularly tax codes has become heavily dependent on surveillance of communications and transactions. Once the next logical steps have been taken, and offshore banking locations offer the services of communication in hard RSA-encrypted electronic mail using account numbers derived from public-key systems, financial transactions will be almost impossible to monitor at the bank or in communications.

Even if the tax authorities were to plant a mole in the offshore bank, or burglarize the bank records, they would not be able to identify depositors.' 2 公钥/私钥加密技术的广泛采用很快就会使许多经济活动可以在您想要的任何地方完成。正如《战略投资》杂志的技术编辑詹姆斯·贝内特所写的:"法律执行,特别是税法,已严重依赖于对通信和交易的监控。一旦采取了下一步的合理措施,离岸银行提供使用公钥系统衍生的帐号进行硬件 RSA 加密电子邮件通信的服务,金融交易几乎无法在银行或通信中进行监控。即使税务机关在离岸银行里安插了一名内线,或者非法侵入了银行记录,他们也无法识别存款人。"

To a degree that has never before been possible, individuals will be able to determine where to domicile their economic activities and how much income tax they prefer to pay. Many transactions in the Information Age will not need to be domiciled in any territorial sovereignty at all. Those that do will increasingly find their way to places like Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Uruguay, or similar jurisdictions that do not impose income taxes or other costly transaction burdens on commerce.

个人将能够以前所未有的程度决定将其经济活动驻扎在何处以及他们希望支付多少所得税。信息时代的许多交易都不需要在任何领土主权中进行。那些确需在某地进行的交易将越来越多地转向百慕大、开曼群岛、乌拉圭或类似不对商业活动征收所得税或其他高额交易负担的司法管辖区。

From Monopoly to Competition 垄断到竞争

Governments have become accustomed to imposing "protection services" that are, in Frederic C. Lane's words, "of poor quality and outrageously overpriced." This habit of charging far more than government's services are actually worth developed through centuries of monopoly. Taxes were ruthlessly raised on anyone who seemed capable of paying-precisely because governments had a monopoly or near-monopoly on coercion. This tradition of monopoly will clash in a profound way with the new megapolitical possibilities of cybercommerce. Encryption will make it easy to protect transactions in cyberspace. The cost of an effective encryption software program, like PGP, is less than the commission charged by a full-

service broker on a trade of one hundred shares.

各国政府已习惯于强加"保护服务",这些服务正如弗雷德里克·C·莱恩所说,"质量低劣,价格过高"。这种对政府服务进行远高于实际价值的收费的习惯,是在数个世纪的垄断中发展而来的。任何看似有能力支付的人都会被毫不留情地加重税收——这正是因为政府拥有一种垄断或准垄断地位,可进行强制。这种垄断传统将与网络商务的新兴巨型政治可能性发生深刻冲突。加密技术将使保护网络交易变得容易。像 PGP 这样有效的加密软件程序的成本,要低于全方位经纪人对一百股交易收取的佣金。

Yet it will render almost any transaction invisible and impervious to governments and thieves for many years to come. The new technology of the Information Age will effectively protect cyberassets at a vanishingly small cost. For \$5 rather than \$55

未来它将使几乎任何交易在政府和盗贼面前变得难以察觉和免受侵害,并将持续几年时间。信息时代的新技术将以极低的成本有效保护网络资产。成本为 5 美元而非 55 美元。

million, participants in the cybereconomy will enjoy better actual protection of their assets than they enjoyed during the industrial era or at any previous time in history.

数百万,网络经济参与者将比工业时代或历史上任何其他时期更好地保护实际资产。

Easily used encryption algorithms and the capacity to shop between terrestrial domiciles for transactions will provide effective protection against the largest source of predation, nationstates themselves.

简单易用的加密算法和在地球上进行交易的能力,将为最大的威胁来源,即国家本身,提供有效保护。

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That is not to say that territorial governments will be entirely outmaneuvered.

这并不意味着领土政府将完全被绕过。

They will still be able to exploit vulnerabilities to personal harm in order to extract head taxes, or perhaps even hold wealthy individuals to outright ransom. They will also be able to enforce collection of consumption taxes. Yet protection, the most important service governments provide, will be put on a more nearly competitive basis. Less of the cost that productive people pay for protection will be available to be seized and reallocated by political authorities. Technological innovations will place a large and growing portion of the world's wealth outside the reach of governments. This will reduce the risks of trade, sharply lowering, in historian Janet Abu-Lughod's words, "the proportion of all costs" that otherwise would have had to be "allocated to transit duties, tribute, or simple extortion."

他们仍然能够利用漏洞造成人身伤害,以便征收人头税,甚至可能对富人进行赎金。他们还能够强制征收消费税。然而,保护,政府提供的最重要服务,将在更加竞争性的基础上进行。生产性人员为保护所支付的费用,较小部分会被政治当局掠夺和重新分配。技术创新将使世界上大部分财富远离政府的掌控。这将大大降低贸易风险,就历史学家珍妮特·阿布-卢格德的话说,"所有成本中的比例"将大幅降低,"必须分配给过境税、贡赋或单纯的勒索"。

It has been rare in history to find governments truly constrained by competition.

在历史上,很难找到真正受到竞争约束的政府。

In the few times when something remotely like this has happened, governments were weak and technologies were similar between jurisdictions. As Lane suggested, the principal factor affecting profitability under such conditions tends to be the difference in protection Costs paid by different entrepreneurs. The medieval merchant who had to pay twenty tolls to bring his goods to market could not compete with a merchant who had to pay only four tolls to deliver the same goods to the customer. Similar conditions are destined to return with the Information Age. Profitability will once again be determined not so much by technological advantage as by your success in minimizing the costs you are forced to pay for protection. 在这种情况下极少发生的时候,政府实力薄弱,不同管辖区的技术水平相似。正如莱恩所建议的,在这种条件下影响收益能力的主要因素往往是不同企业家支付的保护成本差异。中世纪的商人为把商品运到市场需

支付 20 个关税,无法与只需支付 4 个关税就把相同商品送到客户手中的商人竞争。类似的条件注定要在信息时代重现。盈利能力不再取决于技术优势,而更多取决于您在最小化被迫支付的保护成本方面取得的成功。

This new economic dynamic directly contradicts the desire of government left over from the industrial era to impose monopoly pricing for its protection services. But, like it or not, the old system will be nonviable in the new competitive environment of the Information Age. Any government that insists upon lumbering its citizens with heavy taxes that competitors do not pay will merely assure that profits and wealth gravitate someplace else. Therefore, the failure of the mature welfare states to curtail taxes over the long term will be self-correcting. Governments that tax too much will simply make residence anywhere within their power a bankrupting liability. 这种新的经济动态直接与工业时代的政府遗留下来的垄断性定价欲望相矛盾。但无论喜欢与否,旧有体系在信息时代的新竞争环境中将不可能存续。任何执意让公民承担与竞争对手无需缴纳的沉重税收的政府,只会确保利润和财富转移到别处。因此,成熟福利国家长期未能控制税收的失败将会自我修正。对公民征税过重的政府,将最终导致居民破产。

"... as the king by his prerogative may make money of what matter and form he pleaseth and establish the standard of it, so may he change his money in substance and impression, and enhance or debase the value of it, or entirely decry and annul it"

国王可以凭其特权,以任何材料和形式制造货币,并确定其标准。同样,他也可以改变货币的实质和形式,提高或降低其价值,或完全否认和取消它。

FROM AN ENGLISH COURT DECISION, 1604
在 1604 年某英国法庭的裁决中

THE DEATH OF SEIGNIORAGE

管制权的消亡

Governments will not only lose their power to tax many forms of income and capital; they are also destined to lose their power of compulsion over money. In the past, megapolitical transitions have been associated with changes in the character of money.

政府不仅将失去对许多形式收入和资本征税的权力,他们也注定要失去对货币的强制力。在过去,大政治转型一直与货币性质的变化有关。

(The introduction of coinage helped launch the five-hundred-year cycle of expansion in the ancient economy that culminated with the birth of Christ and the lowest interest rates before the modern period. The advent of the Dark Ages coincided with virtual closure of the mints.

铸币的开始助推了古代经济五百年的繁荣周期,最终导致了基督的诞生和现代时期之前的最低利率。黑暗时代的到来与铸币厂几乎停摆同时发生。

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While Roman coinage continued to circulate, quantities of money dwindled along with trade in a self-reinforcing downward spiral. (The feudal revolution coincided with a reintroduction of money, coinage, bills of exchange, and other devices for settling commercial transactions. In particular, a surge in European silver production from new mines at Rammelsberg, Germany, facilitated an increase in the circulation of coin that helped lubricate commerce.) The greatest revolution in money prior to the Information Age came with the advent of industrialism. The early-modern state consolidated its power in the Gunpowder Revolution.

虽然罗马钱币继续流通,但随着自我增强的下降螺旋中的贸易,金钱数量也在减少。(封建革命正巧与货币、钱币、汇票和其他结算商业交易的设备的重新引入相重合。特别是,来自德国拉姆尔斯贝格的新矿山的欧洲白银产量激增,促进了硬币流通的增加,有助于润滑商业。)信息时代

之前货币的最大革命来自于工业主义的兴起。早期现代国家在火药革命中巩固了其权力。

As its control increased, the state asserted its power over money, and came to rely heavily upon the signature technology of industrialism, the printing press. The first implement of mass production, the printing press, has been widely used by governments in the modern period to mass-produce paper money. Paper money is a distinctly industrial product. It would have been impractical before the printing press to duplicate receipts or certificates that became paper currency. Certainly, monks in the scriptoria would not have spent their time well drawing fifty-pound notes.

随着其控制力的增强,国家声称对货币拥有权力,并严重依赖工业主义的标志性技术 - 印刷机。作为第一种大规模生产的工具,印刷机在现代被政府广泛用于大量生产纸币。纸币是一种典型的工业产品。在印刷机出现之前,复制成纸币的收据或凭证是不切实际的。修道士们当然不会花时间画 50 英镑的钞票。

Paper money also contributed significantly to the power of the state, not only by generating profits from depreciating the currency, but by giving the state leverage over who could accumulate wealth. As Abu-Lughod put it, "when paper money backed by the state become the approved currency, the chances for amassing capital in opposition to or independent of the state machinery became difficult." 16

纸币也极大地加强了国家的实力,不仅通过贬值货币获利,而且还赋予了国家控制财富积累的能力。正如阿布-鲁格所言:"当国家支持的纸币成为被认可的货币时,个人积累资本而独立于国家权力之外变得很困难。"

CYBERCASH

网络现金

Now the advent of the Information Age implies another revolution in the character of money. As cybercommerce begins, it will lead inevitably to cybermoney.

信息时代的到来意味着货币性质发生另一次革命。随着网络商务的兴起,网络货币必将随之而来。

This new form of money will reset the odds, reducing the capacity of the world's nationstates to determine who becomes a Sovereign Individual. A crucial part of this change will come about because of the effect of information technology in liberating the holders of wealth from expropriation through inflation. Soon, you will pay for almost any transaction over the Net or World Wide Web at the same time you place it, using cybercash. This new digital form of money is destined to play a pivotal role in cybercommerce. It will consist of encrypted sequences of multihundred-digit prime numbers. Unique, anonymous, and verifiable, this money will accommodate the largest transactions. It will also be divisible into the tiniest fraction of value. It will be tradable at a keystroke in a multitrillion-dollar wholesale market without borders.

这种新型货币将重置当前的局势,减少国家在确定谁成为"主权个体"方面的能力。这种变革的一个关键部分将来自信息技术解放财富持有者免受通胀剥削的影响。很快,您将通过网络或万维网进行几乎所有交易时同时支付,使用网络现金。这种新的数字货币形式注定在网络商业中扮演关键角色。它将由加密的数百位素数序列组成。这种货币是唯一的、匿名的和可验证的,可以容纳最大规模的交易。它也可以分割成最小的价值单位。它将在没有边界的万亿美元批发市场上进行即时交易。

Dialing Without Dollars
拨打无需支付费用

Inevitably, this new cybermoney will be denationalized. When Sovereign Individuals can deal across borders in a realm with no physical reality, they will no longer need to tolerate the long-rehearsed practice of governments degrading the value of their money through inflation. Why should they? Control over money will migrate from the halls of power to the global marketplace. Any individual or firm with access to 160

这种新的数字货币将不可避免地去国家化。当主权个人可以在没有物理现实的领域跨境交易时,他们将不再需要忍受政府通过通货膨胀降低货币价值的长期惯例。为什么他们要这样做呢?货币的控制权将从权力殿堂转移到全球市场。任何拥有 160

cyberspace will be able to easily shift out of any currency that appears in danger of depreciation Unlike today, there will be no necessity to deal in legal tender. Indeed, if transactions spanning the globe it will be likely that at least one party to every transaction will find himself dealing in a currency that is not legal tender to him.

网络空间将能够轻易地脱离任何面临贬值的货币。与今天不同的是,不再需要使用法定货币。事实上,如果涉及全球范围的交易,至少每个交易的一方会发现自己在使用非法定货币进行交易。

Disadvantages of Barter Reduced 物物交换的缺点减少

You will be able to trade in any medium you wish in the cybereconomy. A. the late Nobel Prize-winning economist E A. Hayek argued, there is "no clear distinction between money and non-money." He wrote, " although we usually assume there is a sharp line of distinction between what is money and what is not-and the law generally tries to make such a distinction-so far as the causal effects of monetary events are concerned, there is no such clear difference. What we find is rather a continuum in which objects of various degrees of liquidity, or with values which can fluctuate independently of each other, shade into each other in the degree to which they function as money."17

你将能够在网络经济中以任何您想要的媒介进行交易。诺贝尔经济学奖得主 F. A. 哈耶克认为,"金钱和非金钱之间没有明确区分"。他写道:"虽然我们通常认为存在明确区分金钱和非金钱的界限,而且法律通

常也试图做出这种区分,但就货币事件的因果影响而言,实际上并没有如此明确的差异。我们发现的是—种连续体,各种流动性不同或彼此价值波动独立的对象,在其充当货币的程度上逐渐过渡到另—种状态。"

Digital money on global computer networks will make every object on Hayek's continuum of liquidity more liquid-except government paper. One consequence will be that barter will become far more practical. Increasing numbers of objects and services will be offered in specific bids for other objects and services. These potential transactions will be widely advertised throughout the world on the Net, which will increase their liquidity by magnitudes.

数字货币在全球计算机网络上将使哈耶克流动性连续体上的每个物品更加流动,除了政府票据。—个后果是,物物交换将变得更加实用。越来越多的物品和服务将通过针对其他物品和服务的具体出价来提供。这些潜在交易将在互联网上广为宣传,从而使它们的流动性成倍增加。

One of the principal drawbacks of barter has always been the difficulty of matching a person with one specific demand with another who had exactly that on offer and was seeking to acquire for himself exactly what the first proposed to trade. Primitive barter stumbled over the daunting improbability of exactly matching two parties wishing to exchange in a local market. Cash transcended the limitations of barter, and its advantages will continue to be compelling in most transactions. But vast increases in computational power and the globalization of commerce in cyberspace also reduce the drawbacks of barter. The odds of finding someone with exactly reciprocal desires to yours increase dramatically when you can sort instantly across the entire world rather than drawing on only those whom you might meet locally.

以下是上述文本的简体中文翻译: 物物交换—直存在的主要缺点之—就是很难找到—个人的具体需求与另—个人正好能提供这种物品并且自己也需要取得前—个人想交换的东西。原始的物物交换往往难以在当地市场上找到两方精确匹配的需求。现金克服了物物交换的局限性,其优势在大多数交易中仍然是吸引人的。但是计算能力的大幅提高和网络空间商业的全球化也减少了物物交换的缺点。当你能够在整个世界

范围内进行即时筛选,而不是仅仅局限于当地人时,找到与你需求完全对应的人的机会就大大增加了。

Not Subject to Counterfeiting
不易仿制

While paper money will no doubt remain in circulation as a residual medium of exchange for the poor and computer-illiterate, money for high-value transactions will be privatized. Cybermoney will no longer be denominated only in national units like the paper money of the industrial period. It probably will be defined in terms of grams or ounces of gold, as finely divisible as gold itself, Or it may be defined in terms of other real stores of value.

虽然纸币不会消失,仍将作为穷人和电脑障碍者的交易媒介,但高价值交易的货币将私有化。网络货币不再仅以工业时代纸币的国家单位进行计价,很可能以黄金克或盎司等细分计量单位进行定义,亦或以其他实际价值储备进行定义。

Even where different pricing measures are used, or certain transactions continue to be denominated in national currencies, cybermoney will serve the consumers far better than nationalized money ever did. Rapidly advancing computational capacity will

即使采用不同的定价手段,或某些交易继续以国家货币计价,数字货币也将比国有货币更好地服务于消费者。快速发展的计算能力将

diminish the difficulties of adjusting prices to various media of exchange to the vanishing point. Each transaction will involve the transfer of encrypted multihundred-digit prime-number sequences.

将价格调整到各种交换媒体的困难降到最低。每一笔交易都将涉及到加密的多位数质数序列的转移。

Unlike the paper-money receipts issued by governments during the gold-standard era, which could be duplicated at will, the new digital gold standard or its barter equivalents will be almost impossible to counterfeit for the fundamental mathematical reason that it is all but impossible to unravel the product of multihundred-digit prime numbers. All receipts will

be verifiably unique.

与政府在金本位时代发行的纸币收据不同,后者可以随意复制,新的数字黄金标准或其等价物很难伪造,其根本原因是很难分解由数百位素数相乘而成的密码。所有收据都将是可验证的独一无二的。

The names of traditional currencies like the "pound" and the "peso" reflect the fact that they originated as measures of weight of specific quantities of precious metals.

传统货币如"英镑"和"比索"的名称反映了它们最初是作为特定数量贵金属重量的测量单位起源的事实。

The pound sterling was once upon a time a pound of sterling silver. Paper money in the West began as warehouse or safe-deposit receipts for quantities of precious metals.

英镑曾经是一磅标准银。西方的纸币最初是贵金属存单的凭证。

Governments issuing these receipts soon found that they could print far more of them than they could actually redeem from their supply of bullion. 政府发行这些收据后发现,他们可以印制的数量远远超过他们实际储备的金银。

This was easy. No individual holding a gold or silver certificate could distinguish any information about the actual supply of precious metals from his receipt.

这很容易。任何持有黄金或白银证书的人都无法从收据上辨别出有关实际贵金属供应的任何信息。

Other than the serial numbers, all the receipts looked alike, a fact that appealed to counterfeiters as well as politicians and bankers seeking to profit from inflating the supply of money. Cybermoney will be all but impossible to counterfeit in this way, officially or unofficially.

除了序列号外,所有收据看起来都一样,这一事实吸引了不法分子以及谋求从扩大货币供给中获利的政客和银行家。网络货币将几乎不可能以这种方式被伪造,无论是官方还是非官方。

The verifiability of the digital receipts rules out this classic expedient for expropriating wealth through inflation. The new digital money of the Information Age will return control over the medium of exchange to the owners of wealth, who wish to preserve it, rather than to nationstates that wish to spirit it away.

数字收据的可验证性排除了通过通货膨胀侵犯财富的这种经典手段。信息时代的新数字货币将把交换媒介的控制权交回给希望保护财富的资产所有者,而非希望窃取财富的国家。

The Transaction Cost of "Free" Currency 自由货币的交易成本

Use of this new cybermoney will substantially free you from the power of the state. Earlier, we cited the dreary record of the world's nationstates in maintaining the value of their currencies over the past half century. No currency has suffered a smaller loss from inflation since World War II than the German mark. Yet even so, 71 percent of its value vanished between January 1, 1949, and the end of June 1995. The world reserve currency during this period, the U.S. dollar, lost 84 percent of its value.⁸

这种新型网络货币的使用将大大解放你脱离国家权力。此前,我们引述了世界各国政府在过去半个世纪维护其货币价值方面令人沮丧的记录。二战以来,没有一种货币的通胀损失低于德国马克。然而,它的价值在 1949 年 1 月 1 日至 1995 年 6 月 30 日之间仍然减少了 71%。这一时期的世界储备货币美元也减值了 84%。

This is a measure of the wealth that governments expropriated by exploiting their territorial monopolies on legal tender. Note that there is no intrinsic necessity that currency depreciate or that the nominal cost of living rise every year. To the contrary.

这是政府通过开采法定货币的领土垄断权而剥夺财富的一种措施。值得注意的是,货币贬值或名义生活成本每年上升并非必须如此。相反,也可能是相反的情况。

The technical challenge of maintaining the purchasing power of savings is trivial. You can see this merely by looking at the long-term purchasing power of gold.

保持储蓄购买力的技术挑战微不足道。你只需看一看黄金的长期购买力就能发现这一点。

Between January 1, 1949, and the end of June 1995, while the best of nationalized currencies lost almost three-quarters of its value, the purchasing power of gold actually rose. As documented by Professor Roy W. Jastrom in his book *The Golden Constant*, gold has maintained its purchasing power, with minor fluctuations, for as far back as reliable price records are available, to 1560 in the case of England.

1949 年 1 月 1 日至 1995 年 6 月底期间,虽然最好的国有货币已损失近四分之三的价值,但黄金的购买力实际上上升了。正如罗伊·W·贾斯特罗姆教授在其著作《黄金常数》中所记录的那样,从可靠的价格记录开始(以英格兰为例,从 1560 年开始),黄金一直保持其购买力,除了轻微波动。

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National currencies linked to gold have also maintained their purchasing power when military exigencies were not pressing. The value of the British pound sterling rose, rather than fell, during the relatively peaceful nineteenth century even though it was only weakly linked to gold. The new megapolitical conditions of the Information Age make feasible not a weak link, like the gold standard, but a strong link, reinforced for the first time by vastly improved information and computational resources in the hands of consumers.

与黄金挂钩的国家货币在军事需求不紧迫时也能保持其购买力。尽管英镑与黄金的联系很弱,但在相对和平的 19 世纪,英镑的价值反而上升而非下降。信息时代的新的政治条件使得不仅是一种弱联系,如金本位制,而是一种强联系,这种强联系第一次得到了消费者手中大大改善的信息和计算资源的支持。

”The threat of the speedy loss of their whole business if they failed to meet expectations (and how any government organization would be certain to abuse the opportunity to play with raw material prices!) would provide a much stronger safeguard than any that could be devised against a government monopoly” 9 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK

如果他们无法满足预期,就会遭受整个业务迅速损失的威胁(以及任何政府组织一定会滥用的机会来操纵原材料价格!)会比针对政府垄断而设计的任何保障措施提供更强有力的保障。

Privatizing Money 货币私有化

Friedrich von Hayek argued in 1976 that the use of competitive, private currencies would eradicate inflation.²⁰ Without legal-tender requirements forcing acceptance of an inflating currency within a jurisdiction, Hayek argued, market competition would force the private issuers of currency to preserve the value of their exchange media. Any issuer of a private currency failing to maintain its value would soon lose its customers. The evolution of encrypted cyberscash will bring Hayek's logic vividly to life.

费德里希·冯·哈耶克在 1976 年主张使用竞争性的私人货币将消除通胀。²⁰ 在不要求法定货币的情况下,哈耶克认为,市场竞争将迫使私人货币发行者保持其交换媒体的价值。任何无法维持价值的私人货币发行者很快就会失去客户。加密网络现金的出现将生动地体现哈耶克的观点。

The theory of "free banking," as it is called, is not merely a hypothetical academic speculation. Private competing currencies circulated in Scotland from early in the eighteenth century until 1844. During that period, Scotland had no central bank. There were few regulations or restrictions on entry into the banking business. Private banks took deposits and issued their own private currencies backed by gold bullion. As Professor Lawrence White has documented, this system worked well. It was more stable, with less inflation than the more heavily regulated and politicized system of banking and money employed in England during the same period.²¹

自由银行理论"并非纯粹的学术假设。18 世纪初期至 1844 年,苏格兰流通着私人竞争货币。在这段时期,苏格兰没有中央银行。进入银行业没有多少法规限制。私人银行收取存款并发行自己的由黄金支撑的私人货币。正如劳伦斯·怀特教授记录的那样,这一体系运作良好。它比英格兰在同一时期更稳定,通胀也更低,因为英格兰的银行和货币体系受到更多管制和政治干预。

Michael Prowse of the Financial Times summarized Scotland's free-banking experience: "There was little fraud. There was no evidence of over-issue of notes. Banks did not typically hold either excessive or inadequate reserves. Bank runs were rare and not contagious. The free banks commanded the respect of citizens and provided a sound foundation for economic growth that outpaced that in England for most of the period."²²

英国金融时报撰稿人迈克尔·普罗斯总结了苏格兰自由银行的经验:"几乎没有欺诈发生。没有证据显示有过度发行钞票。银行储备通常不会过多或不足。银行挤兑事件很少见,且不会传染。自由银行赢得了公众的尊重,并为经济增长提供了稳健的基础,在大部分时间里增速超过了英格兰。"

What worked well under the technological conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries will work even better with twenty-first-century technology. You will soon be able to deal in digital money from a private firm, issued much as American Express issues traveler's checks as receipts for cash. An institution of greater repute than any government, such as a leading mining company or the Swiss Bank Corporation, could create encrypted receipts for quantities of gold or even for unique bars, identified by molecular signatures and possibly even inscribed with holograms. 在十八世纪和十九世纪的技术条件下奏效的事物将以二十一世纪的技术发挥得更好。您很快就能从一家私人公司交易数字货币,发行方式类似于美国运通发行旅行支票作为现金收据。比任何政府都更有声誉的机构,如领先的矿业公司或瑞士银行公司,可以创造黄金或独特铸锭的加密收据,并可能用分子签名和全息图进行标记。

These receipts will then trade as money, with almost no possibility that they can be counterfeited or inflated. The new digital gold will overcome many of the practical

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这些收据将作为货币交易,几乎没有可能被伪造或通胀。这种新的数字黄金将克服许多实际的

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problems that inhibited direct use of gold as money in the past. It will no longer be Inconvenient, cumbersome, or dangerous to deal in large sums of gold. Digital receipts will not be too heavy to carry. Indeed, their only physical existence will be as elaborate patterns of computer code. Nor will

it be difficult to divide digital receipts into units small enough to pay for even microvalue purchases. A wafer of physical gold tiny enough to pay for a chiclet would soon be lost or confused with one tiny enough to pay for two chiclets. But it will be as easy for the computer to distinguish these demoninations of digital money as if they were the size of a chipmunk and a rhinoceros.

过去,使用黄金作为货币存在一些问题。现在,这些问题将不再是障碍。处理大额黄金不再会不便、笨重或危险。数字收据不会太重而难以携带,它们唯一的实体形式就是精细的计算机代码。将数字收据细分为足够小的单位以支付微额购买也不会有困难。一片足够支付一块口香糖的实体黄金很快就会丢失或被误认为是支付两块口香糖的。而对计算机来说,区分这些数字货币面额就像区分一只松鼠和一只犀牛一样轻松。

The capacity of digital money to deliver micropayments will facilitate the emergence of new types of businesses that heretofore could not have existed, specializing in organizing the distribution of low-value information. The vendors of this information will now be compensated through direct-debit royalty schemes that overcome previously daunting transaction costs. When the cost of billing exceeds the value of a transaction, it probably will not take place. Use of cybermoney facilitates very-low-cost simultaneous billing, in which accounts are debited with use. We cited such an example above in imagining that you might pay a royalty equivalent to one-third of a penny to Bill Gates, or whoever owns the virtual-reality rights to tour the Louvre.

数字货币的微支付能力将促进新型企业的出现,这些企业原本无法存在,专注于低价值信息的分销组织。这些信息的供应商现在将通过直接扣费版税计划得到补偿,这种计划克服了以前令人望而生畏的交易成本。当账单成本超过交易价值时,交易可能无法进行。使用网络货币促进了超低成本的同时记账,资金直接从账户中扣除。正如我们上面描述的,您可能需要支付相当于一分之三便士的版税给比尔·盖茨,或者拥有参观卢浮宫虚拟现实权利的任何人。

Multiply this in a thousand ways. Virtual reality will create almost unlimited licensing opportunities that will nevertheless command only microroyalty payments.

以千种方式乘以此。虚拟现实将创造几乎无限的许可机会,但只会获得微量的版权费用。

One day you will be able to replay the third game of the 1969 World Series, and pay microroyalties to the players whose images are used to make your virtual reality seem real.

你有一天将能重播 1969 年世界系列赛的第三场比赛,并支付微版税给那些参与比赛的球员,他们的形象被用来使你的虚拟现实显得真实。

ERADICATING INFLATION

消除通货膨胀

Such possibilities notwithstanding, surely the most momentous consequence of the new digital money will be the end of inflation and the de-leverage of the financial system. The economic implications are profound. The rise of inflation in the twentieth century, as we argued in *Blood in the Streets* and *The Great Reckoning*, was intimately connected with the balance of power in the world. Increasing returns to violence dictated sharply higher military expenditures, which in turn required ever more aggressive efforts to expropriate wealth.

尽管存在这些可能性,但新数字货币最重大的后果无疑是通胀的终结和金融系统的去杠杆化。其经济影响深远。正如我们在《街头血腥》和《大清算》中所论述的,二十世纪通胀的兴起与世界权力平衡密切相关。暴力收益递增导致军事支出大幅上升,这反过来需要更加积极的努力来剥削财富。

Governments found that they could effectively impose an annual wealth tax on all who held balances in their national currencies. This annual wealth tax on currency holders could also be seen as a transaction fee for allowing the users of currency to maintain their wealth in a convenient form provided by the issuers.* Thinking of inflation as a transaction fee for the convenience of holding currency may be unusual, but consider it closely. During the Industrial Age we became so accustomed to thinking of the provision of currency as a service for which one does not pay directly, that it was easy to forget that the issuers of the dollars, pesos, pounds, and francs, namely governments, did require that we pay, and pay dearly-through inflation.

各政府发现,他们可以有效地对所有持有国家货币余额的人征收年度财富税。这种针对货币持有者的年度财富税也可以被视为为使用货币提供便利而支付的交易费用。将通货膨胀视为持有货币的便利性费用可能很不寻常,但仔细考虑一下。在工业时代,我们已经习惯于认为货币供给是一种无需直接支付的服务,以至于很容易忘记美元、比索、英镑和法郎的发行者-即政府-确实要求我们支付,而且代价昂贵-通过通货膨胀。

The rate of this inflationary transaction fee on currency varied during the last half century from a low of 2.7 percent annually for the German mark, to rates perilously close to 100 percent. For example, between 1960 and 1991, when President Menem launched 164

这种通货膨胀交易费率在过去半个世纪里从德国马克每年 2.7%的低点,一路上升到接近 100%的危险水平。例如,在 1960 年至 1991 年间,梅南总统已推出了 164 次货币改革措施。

Argentina's currency-board reform, inflation struck seventeen zeros off successive versions of Argentine currency. If all the wealth of the world had been converted into Argentine pesos in 1960 and buried, it would not have been worth the effort to spade it up by 1991.

阿根廷的货币委员会改革,连续几次将阿根廷货币抹去十七个零。如果 1960 年将全世界的财富兑换成阿根廷比索并埋藏,到 1991 年挖掘出来也不值一提。

Argentina's example is a leading indicator for the next millennium.

Currency will not be inflated because other nationstates will no longer be able to get away with it, just as Argentina no longer can. Inflation had another lure during the industrial period when prices and wages were downwardly inflexible. Modest inflation increased output by reducing real wages and prices could be damaged by a credit contraction imported from other countries. Private money will not be inflatable because of competitive pressures.

阿根廷的例子是下一个千年的领先指标。货币不会被通胀,因为其他国家将不再能逃脱这一后果,正如阿根廷不再能逃脱一样。在工业时期,当价格和工资难以下降时,适度的通胀通过降低实际工资来增加产出,价格也可能受到来自其他国家信贷收缩的损害。由于竞争压力,私人货币也不会被通胀。

The death of inflation will take away the disguised profits that inflation previously conveyed to those who were the monopolistic issuers of currency. If all the disguised profits of issuing money were extinguished, a new method of payment would be needed to compensate the issuers of currency directly. Use of the new monetary system will therefore probably involve a more explicit transaction cost, perhaps a fee on the order of 1

percent per annum. This will be a small price to pay compared to the annual inflationary penalty of from 2.7 percent to 99 percent imposed by nationstates. All the more so because there is a likelihood that overall prices will decline in the future as monopolies are eroded and competition intensifies worldwide.

通货膨胀的消亡将剥夺通货膨胀以前给予垄断发行货币者的隐藏利润。如果发行货币的所有隐藏利润都消失了,就需要一种新的支付方式来直接补偿货币发行者。因此,使用新的货币系统可能会涉及更加明确的交易成本,也许是每年约 1% 的费用。这与国家施加的 2.7% 至 99% 的年度通货膨胀惩罚相比,这只是一个很小的代价。尤其是因为未来全球价格可能会下降,因为垄断正在被瓦解,竞争也在加剧。

Contracting Leverage 合约杠杆

The emergence of digital money will not only defeat inflation once and for all; it will also contract leverage in the banking systems of the world. The ability of people everywhere to bypass regulatory authorities and shift their funds directly through the Internet is an entirely unprecedented consequence of the globalization of markets. It will be beyond the power of any government to regulate. When governments can no longer depreciate currency by printing money or defraud savers by expanding credit at will through captive banking systems, they will lose a major part of their indirect capacity to commandeer resources.

数字货币的出现不仅将彻底克服通货膨胀;它还将缩减全世界银行系统的杠杆。人们无处不在可以绕过监管部门,直接通过互联网转移资金,这是全球化市场的一个前所未有的结果。任何政府都无力加以管控。当政府不再能够通过印钞或通过掌控银行系统任意扩张信用来贬低货币时,它们将失去很大一部分间接征用资源的能力。

Higher Interest Rates 利率上升

This will create an obvious dilemma for most Western governments. They will face sharp drops in revenue from taxation and the virtual elimination of leverage in the monetary system. At the same time, they will retain the

unfunded liabilities and inflated expectations for social spending inherited from the industrial era. The result to be expected is an intense fiscal crisis with many unpleasant social side effects that we will consider in later chapters. The economic consequence of this transition crisis will probably include a one-time spike in real interest rates. Debtors will be squeezed as long-term liabilities contracted under the old system are liquidated, and concessionary credits dry up.

这将为大多数西方政府造成明显的困境。他们将面临税收剧烈下降,以及货币体系杠杆作用的虚拟消失。与此同时,他们将保留从工业时代继承下来的无资金负债和膨胀的社会支出预期。可以预料的结果是,一场严重的财政危机以及许多令人不快的社会副作用,这些将在后续章节中考虑。这种过渡危机的经济后果可能包括实际利率一次性飙升。随着老旧体系下的长期负债被清算,以及优惠贷款的干涸,债务人将受到挤压。

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Altered by Competition 改变竞争

Governments facing serious competition to their currency monopolies will probably seek to underprice the for-fee cybercurrencies by tightening credits and offering savers higher real yields on cash balances in national currencies. Some governments may even seek to remonetize gold as another expedient to meet competition from private currencies. They may well reason that they could gain higher seigniorage profits from a loosely controlled nineteenth-century gold standard than would be the case if they allowed their national currency to be displaced entirely by commercial cybermoney.

政府面临其货币垄断遭受严重竞争,可能会试图通过收紧信贷和向储户提供更高的现金余额实际收益率来压低收费的加密货币价格。一些政府甚至可能会试图重新将黄金货币化,作为应对私人货币竞争的权宜之计。他们可能会认为,如果他们允许国家货币完全被商业加密货币取代,从松散控制的 19 世纪黄金标准中获得的铸币税利润会更高。

But not all governments will respond in the same way. Those in regions where computer 'usage and Net participation are low may opt for old-fashioned hyperinflation in the early stages of the cybereconomy. This will not enable these governments to capture the cash balances of the rich, but it will wring resources from those with little wealth or access to the cybereconomy. Governments using such tactics might nonetheless borrow internationally in cybermoney.

但不是所有政府都会以同样的方式做出反应。在那些计算机使用和网络参与度较低的地区,政府可能在网络经济的早期阶段选择采用老式的高通胀政策。这并不能让这些政府掌握有钱人的现金储蓄,但却能从那些财富较少或无法进入网络经济的人手中榨取资源。那些使用这种策略的政府,却可能会借助网络货币从国际上进行借贷。

Still other governments may adapt to the opportunities created by the information economy, and facilitate local transactions in cybermoney. Those jurisdictions that first recognize the validity of digital signatures and provide local court enforcement of repossession for nonpayment of cyberdebts will stand to benefit from a disproportionate surge in long-term capital lending. Obviously, no cybermoney would be available for long-term credits in territories where local courts imposed penalties or permitted debtors to default without recourse.

一些其他政府可能会适应信息经济创造的机会,并促进网络货币的当地交易。第一个承认数字签名有效性并提供因网络债务未付而实施扣押的当地法院管辖权的辖区,将从长期资本贷款的不成比例的增长中获益。显然,在当地法院征收罚款或允许债务人无追索权违约的领土中,将无法获得长期信贷的网络货币。

Yield Gap 产量差距

The combination of credit crises, competitive adjustments by national monetary authorities, and early transitional obstacles to lending cybercurrency will lead to a yield gap in the early stages of the information economy. Cybermoney will pay lower interest rates than national currencies and will probably also carry explicit transaction costs.

信用危机、各国货币当局的竞争性调整以及金融科技货币初期过渡阶

段的障碍,将导致信息经济早期出现收益差距。数字货币将支付低于国家货币的利率,可能还会有显性交易成本。

Offsetting these apparent drawbacks to holding balances in digital money will be enhanced protection against losses due to predatory taxes and inflation. Because it will probably be gold-linked, cybermoney will also benefit from the appreciation of gold.

数字货币余额相对于现金存款的明显缺点,可以通过增强保护措施来抵消,从而免受掠夺性税收和通胀的损失。由于数字货币很可能与黄金挂钩,因此也可从黄金升值中获益。

The price of gold will probably rise significantly relative to other commodities, no matter which of the alternative government policies predominates. Why? The real price of gold almost always rises in deflation. A deflation, after all, reflects a shortage of liquidity.

黄金价格相对于其他商品可能会大幅上涨,无论哪种替代政府政策占主导地位。为什么?黄金的实际价格在通缩时几乎总是上涨。毕竟,通缩反映了流动性短缺。

Gold is the ultimate form of liquidity.
黄金是流动性的终极形式。

The Deflation of the Industrial Age 工业时代的通缩

Higher real rates all around will spur liquidation of high-cost, unproductive activities, and temporarily reduce consumption. We explored the logic of the credit cycle and its unwinding in *Blood in the Streets* and *The Great Reckoning*, so we will not

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四周的更高的实际利率将促进高成本、不具生产力活动的清算,并暂时降低消费。我们在《街头血战》和《大清算》中探索了信贷周期及其逆转的逻辑,因此我们不会

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rehearse those arguments here. Suffice it to say that the deflationary environment may drag on for some time, with more adverse consequences in the high-cost industrial economies of North America and Western Europe

than in the low-cost economies in Asia and Latin America.

在这里重复这些论点是没有必要的。可以说通缩环境可能会持续一段时间,并且在北美和西欧的高成本工业经济体中的不利后果比在亚洲和拉丁美洲的低成本经济体中更为严重。

Lower Rates Long-Term 较低利率长期维持

While the early consequences of the emergence of the cybereconomy are likely to include higher interest rates, the longer-term consequence will be just the opposite.

网络经济兴起的早期后果可能包括利率上涨,但从长远来看,结果将恰恰相反。

The after-tax returns to savers will sharply increase as resources escape the grasp of governments. Dramatic improvements in the efficiency of resource use, and the liberation of capital to find the highest returns globally, should rapidly compensate for the output lost early in the transition crisis.

纳税后的储蓄回报率将显著提高,因为资源逃脱了政府的掌控。资源利用效率的显著提高,以及资本自由寻找全球最高回报的机会,应该能迅速弥补过渡危机初期输出的损失。

Investor Control over Capital 投资者对资本的控制

Conventional thinkers reviewing our argument at this point would conclude that the breakdown of income redistribution in the leading nationstates would doom the world to economic collapse. Do not believe it. We do not gainsay the fact that a transition crisis would be likely. But the view that the state improves the functioning of the economy by massive reallocation of resources is an anachronism, an article of faith roughly equivalent to the widespread superstitions at the close of the Middle Ages that fasting and flagellation were beneficial for a community.

传统思维者在此时审视我们的论点,会得出结论,领先国家的收入再分配失效将注定世界经济崩溃。不要相信。我们并不否认过渡危机的可能发生。但认为国家通过大规模资源重新分配来改善经济运行,已成为一

种唯信仰不破的陈旧观念,大致等同于中世纪末期广泛存在的迷信,即禁食和鞭挞对社区有益。

It should not be forgotten that governments waste resources on a large scale.

不应忘记政府在大规模浪费资源。

Wasting resources makes you poor. A dramatic improvement in the efficiency of resource use will arise when revenues historically engrossed by governments come to be controlled instead by persons of genuine talent. Tens of billions, then ultimately hundreds of billions of dollars will be controlled by hundreds of thousands, then millions of Sovereign Individuals.

浪费资源会使你贫穷。当历来由政府获得的收入由真正有才能的人控制时,资源利用效率将会得到剧烈提高。数十亿美元,然后最终数百亿美元将由数十万,然后数百万个主权个人所控制。

These new stewards of the world's wealth are likely to prove far abler than politicians in utilizing resources and deploying investment. For the first time in history, megapolitical conditions will allow the ablest investors and entrepreneurs rather than specialists in violence ultimate control over capital. It is not unreasonable to expect that the rates of return on this dispersed, market-driven investment could be double or triple the meager returns from the politically driven budget allocations of the nationstate era. 这些世界财富的新管家很可能远比政治家更善于利用资源和部署投资。这是历史上第一次,大政治条件将使最出色的投资者和企业家而非专门从事暴力的人最终获得资本的控制权。很合理地期望,这种分散的、市场驱动的投资回报率可能是国家主导预算时代贫乏回报的两倍或三倍。

It was not uncommon in the final decades of the twentieth century to find examples in any country of government investment that were substantially negative. We cited official Russian statistics in the revised version of The Great Reckoning from November 1992, suggesting that the whole of Russia's economy was "worth just \$30

根据 1992 年 11 月修订版《大清算》中引用的官方俄罗斯统计数据,整个俄罗斯经济价值仅为 30 亿美元。

billion, less than a third of the value of its raw-material inputs. By implication, the output of Russia's economy would more than triple in value if the domestic manufacturing and service economy were shut down completely. Instead of contributing value, they subtract it." 23

以下是上述英文文本的简体中文翻译: 十亿美元,不到其原材料投入价值的三分之一。据此推断,如果俄罗斯的制造业和服务业完全关闭,其经济产出的价值将增加三倍以上。他们不是创造价值,而是在削减价值。

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Admittedly, the example of Russia after the collapse of Communism is an extreme one, but there is ample evidence that reducing state control of resources tends to improve economic efficiency. Growth rates cited by the Economist suggest that economic liberty is strongly correlated with economic growth, with the most rapid rates of growth in the freest countries. The cybereconomy of the Information Age will be more free than any other commercial realm in history. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the cybereconomy will rapidly become the most important new economy of the new millennium. Its success will attract new participants from everywhere on the globe, in the same way that the wide use of fax machines made telecopying increasingly attractive for nonusers.

坦率地说,苏联共产主义崩溃后的例子是极端的,但有充分的证据表明,减少国家对资源的控制往往会提高经济效率。《经济学家》引用的增长率表明,经济自由与经济增长呈强相关性,增长最快的国家是最自由的国家。信息时代的网络经济将比历史上任何其他商业领域都更自由。因此,合理预期网络经济将迅速成为新千年最重要的新经济。它的成功将吸引来自全球各地的新参与者,就像传真机的广泛使用让非用户也越来越喜欢使用传真。

But even more important, freedom from predatory violence will allow the cybereconomy to grow at far higher compound rates of growth than conventional economies dominated by nationstates. That is perhaps the most important point to be made in anticipating the economic impact of the

likely collapse of monopoly taxing and inflating capacities of government. Setting aside transition difficulties, which could last for decades, the long-term prospects for the global economy should be highly bullish.

但是更重要的是,免受掠夺性暴力的自由将使网络经济以远远高于由民族国家主导的传统经济的复合增长率来增长。这可能是预测政府垄断征税和通胀能力的崩溃所产生的经济影响时应该提出的最重要的观点。暂且不谈可能持续数十年的过渡困难,全球经济的长期前景应该是极为看好的。

Whenever circumstances allow people to reduce protection costs and minimize tribute paid to those who control organized violence, the economy usually grows dramatically. As Lane said, "I would like to suggest that the most weighty single factor in most periods of growth, if any one factor has been most important, has been a reduction in the proportion of resources devoted to war and police."²⁴

只要情况允许人们减少保护成本并最大限度地减少向掌控组织暴力的人支付的贡和,经济通常会急剧增长。正如 Lane 所说,如果有任何一个因素最重要的话,"我想要建议,大多数增长期内最重要的单一因素就是用于战争和警察的资源比例的降低"。

There could be great efficiency gains arising from a reduction of the resources devoted to predation and living off the spoils of predation. If the pricing of protection were placed on a competitive basis, with local monopolies competing for customers on a basis of price and quality, potentially huge gains to efficiency would be possible. The result to be expected would be much lower rates of taxation and less loss of resources and effort in political activity, which would no longer pay its previously huge dividends.

减少用于捕食和掠夺生活的资源可能会产生巨大的效率收益。如果保护的定价置于竞争基础之上,地方垄断企业以价格和质量竞争客户,则可能实现巨大的效率收益。可预期的结果是,税率会大幅下降,资源和精力在政治活动中的损失会减少,这些活动不再获得之前巨大的回报。

Would voters willingly forgo political windfalls to which they have become accustomed? That is an issue we take up at length elsewhere. But a simple answer is that we may have no choice. No one now demonstrates against

rainy weather, or draught, however economically damaging or unpleasant it may be. No one, however criminally inclined, holds a pauper to ransom demanding a huge payment on pain of death. If it becomes impossible for politicians to obtain resources to redistribute, the public may respond in a rational way and forget about politics, just as well-intentioned people ceased organizing marches of penitents when the Middle Ages came to an end.

选民是否会主动放弃他们已习惯的政治福利?这是我们在其他地方长篇大论探讨的问题。但一个简单的答案是,我们可能没有选择。现在没有人因为阴雨天气或干旱而抗议,不管它们造成的经济损失或不愉快有多大。任何犯罪倾向的人都不会勒索赎金,要求穷人支付大笔金额以免于死亡。如果政客们无法获取可供重新分配的资源,公众可能会以理性的方式回应,并忘记政治,就像怀有善意的人在中世纪结束时停止组织悔改游行一样。

CHAPTER 8

第 8 章

THE END OF EGALITARIAN ECONOMICS

平等主义经济的终结

The Revolution in Earnings Capacity in a World Without Jobs "God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

GALATIANS 6:7

在没有工作的世界中,收益能力的革命"神不可嘲笑:因为人种的是什么,收获也是什么。"加拉太书 6:7

Great changes in the dominant forms of production or defense change the structure of society, and the proportion of wealth and power of different groups. The Information Age means more than just a growing use of powerful computers. It means a revolution in lifestyles, institutions, and the distribution of resources. Because the role of covert violence in controlling resources will be sharply diminished, a new configuration of wealth will develop, without the coercive mediation by government that characterized the twentieth century. Because location will mean much less in the Information Society, there will be a diminished role in the future for all organizations that operate within rather than beyond geographic boundaries. Politicians, labor unions, regulated professions, lobbyists, and governments per se will be less important. Because favors and restraints of trade wrested from governments will be less valuable, fewer resources will be wasted either to promote or resist lobbying.

生产或防御主导形式的巨大变革改变了社会结构,并改变了不同群体的财富和权力比例。信息时代不仅仅意味着强大计算机的使用越来越多。它意味着生活方式、制度和资源分配的革命。因为控制资源的隐蔽暴力的作用将大大减弱,将会出现一种新的财富配置,没有了二十世纪政府的强制性中介。因为位置在信息社会中将变得不那么重要,那些仅限于地理边界而不超越它的组织将在未来发挥越来越小的作用。政客、工会、受规管的专业、游说者和政府本身将变得不那么重要。因

为从政府那里争取到的特权和贸易限制将不那么有价值,因此浪费在促进或反对游说活动上的资源将减少。

Those who have employed compulsion and local advantage to redistribute income are destined to lose much of their power. This will alter the command of resources.

那些采取强制手段和利用地方优势重新分配收入的人注定会失去大部分权力。这将改变资源的控制权。

Privately generated wealth that heretofore has been commandeered by the nationstate will be retained instead by those who earn it. Increasing amounts of wealth will find their way into the hands of the ablest entrepreneurs and venture capitalists worldwide.

迄今为止一直被民族国家控制的私人创造的财富将由创造它的人保留下来。越来越多的财富将流入世界各地最有能力的企业家和风险投资家的手中。

Globalization, along with other characteristics of the information economy, will tend to increase the income earned by the most talented individuals in each field. Because the marginal value generated by superlative performance will be so huge, the distribution of earnings capacity throughout the entire global economy will take much the shape it does now in the performance professions like athletics and opera.

全球化及信息经济的其他特征,将会增加各领域中最有才能的个人获得的收入。因为杰出表现所带来的边际价值巨大,整个全球经济中的收入能力分布,将会呈现与体育和歌剧等表演专业相同的格局。

A MAGNITUDE BEYOND PARETO'S LAW

超越帕累托法则的规模

Pareto's law says that 80 percent of the benefit will depend on or go to 20 percent of those engaged. This may be approximately true, though, more strikingly, 1 percent of the population of the United States pays 28.7 percent of the income tax, suggesting that as societies advance into the Information Age they will experience an even more skewed distribution of incomes and abilities than Vilfredo Pareto observed at the end of the last century. People

are quite accustomed to substantial inequalities of wealth. In 1828, 4 帕累托法则说,80%的利益依赖于或属于 20%参与者。这可能近似正确,不过更为引人注目的是,美国 1%的人口缴纳了 28.7%的所得税,这表明随着社会进入信息时代,收入和能力的分布将比维尔弗雷多·帕累托在上个世纪末观察到的更加偏斜。人们已经习惯了财富的巨大不平等。在 1828 年,4

percent of New Yorkers were thought to have owned 62 percent of all the city's wealth.

据估计,纽约市 60%的财富由市民的 8%所拥有。

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By 1845, the top 4 percent owned about 81 percent of all corporate and noncorporate wealth in New York City. More broadly, the top 10 percent of the population owned about 40 percent of the wealth across the whole United States in 1860. By 1890, records suggest that the richest 12 percent then owned about 86 percent of America's wealth.'

到 1845 年,纽约市最富的 4%人口拥有约 81%的公司和非公司财富。更广泛地说,1860 年美国最富的 10%人口拥有约 40%的财富。到 1890 年,记录显示当时最富的 12%人口拥有约 86%的美国财富。

The 1890 numbers are close to what Pareto had in mind. They vary from his ratio of 80-20 percent mainly because a huge influx of penniless immigrants arrived in America at the end of the nineteenth century. The immigrants' share of total wealth was negligible; therefore, their arrival automatically made the total holdings of wealth more unequal. In fact, this is a striking illustration of the fact that any genuine upsurge in opportunity is almost inevitably bound to lead to at least a brief surge in inequality. By 1890, immigrants accounted for about 15 percent of the total U.S. population, but more than 40 percent in some of the northeastern states, where much of the income and wealth were generated.² Adjusting for the surge in immigration, late-nineteenth-century America fit Pareto's formula about as well as late-nineteenth-century Switzerland, where he lived.

1890 年的数据接近帕累托心中的理想。它们与他的 80-20%的比率有所偏差,主要是因为 19 世纪末大量无产阶级的移民涌入美国。这些移

民的财富份额微乎其微,因此他们的到来自动使财富总量更加不平等。事实上,这是一个鲜明的例证:任何真正的机会激增几乎无可避免地会导致至少短暂的不平等激增。到 1890 年,移民占美国总人口的 15%左右,但在某些东北州占到 40%以上,那里创造了大部分的收入和财富。调整移民激增因素后,19 世纪末的美国与帕累托生活的 19 世纪末瑞士拟合得同样不错。

The Information Age has already changed the distribution of wealth, particularly in the United States, and is one of the reasons for the bitterness of modern American politics, which we explore further in the next chapter. The Information Age requires a quite high standard of literacy and numeracy for economic success. A massive U.S.

信息时代已经改变了财富的分配,特别是在美国,这也是当代美国政治愤怒的原因之一,我们将在下一章进一步探讨。信息时代需要相当高的识字和数学水平才能实现经济成功。美国的规模巨大。

Education Department survey, "Adult Literacy in America," has shown that as many as 90 million Americans over the age of fifteen are woefully incompetent. Or in the more colorful characterization of American expatriate Bill Bryson, "They are as stupid as pig dribble."³ Specifically, 90 million American adults were judged incapable of writing a letter, fathoming a bus schedule, or adding and subtracting, even with the help of a calculator. Those who cannot make sense of an ordinary bus timetable are unlikely to be able to make much of the Information Superhighway. From this third of Americans who have not prepared themselves to join the electronic information world, an angry underclass is being recruited. At the top of society is a small group, perhaps 5 percent, of highly educated information workers or capital owners who are the Information Age equivalent of the landed aristocracy of the feudal age-with the crucial difference that the elite of the Information Age are specialists in production, not specialists in violence.

美国教育部的一项调查"美国成人文盲"显示,多达 9000 万 15 岁以上的美国人严重缺乏能力。或者用美国海外公民比尔·布莱森更生动的描述,"他们愚笨得像猪渣"。具体来说,9000 万美国成人被认为无法写一封信、看懂公交时刻表,甚至连用计算器也无法加减。那些无法理解普通公交时刻表的人,很难想象他们能在信息高速公路上有所作为。这三

分之一缺乏准备加入电子信息世界的美国人,正在被招募成为愤怒的底层阶级。在社会的顶端是一小群,大约 5% 的高度受教育的信息工作者或资本所有者,他们是类似于封建时代地主贵族的信息时代的精英——不同之处在于信息时代的精英是生产方面的专家,而不是暴力方面的专家。

The Megapolitics of Innovation 创新的巨型政治

For no very good reason, most twentiethcentury sociologists have assumed that technological progress would naturally tend to produce increasingly egalitarian societies.

据此,大多数 20 世纪社会学家假设技术进步自然会产生越来越平等的社会。

This was not true prior to about 1750. Beginning around that time, innovative new industrial technology began to open job opportunities for the unskilled and increase the scale of enterprise. The new technology of the factory not only raised the real earnings of the poor without any effort on their part; it also tended to increase the power of political systems, making them more able to redistribute income as well as more capable of withstanding unrest. Taking a longer view, there is no inherent reason to suppose that technology always tends to mask rather than accentuate the differences in human talents 170

这在 1750 年左右之前并不属实。从那个时候开始,创新的新工业技术开始为技术不熟练的人创造工作机会,并扩大了企业规模。工厂的新技术不仅在没有任何努力的情况下提高了穷人的实际收入,而且还倾向于增强政治体系的力量,使其更能够重新分配收入并更能够应对动荡。从更长远的角度来看,没有任何内在理由认为技术总是倾向于掩盖而不是突出人才差异 170。

and motivation. Some technologies have been relatively egalitarian, requiring contributions of many independent workers of approximately equal utility; others have put power or wealth into the hands of a few masters while most people were little more than serfs. Both history and technology have shaped different nations in different ways.

技术和动力。一些技术相对平等,需要许多独立工人的共同贡献;而其他技术则把权力或财富掌握在少数人手中,大多数人只不过是农奴。历史和技术已经以不同的方式塑造了不同的国家。

The Factory Age produced one shape, and the Information Age is producing another, less violent, and therefore more elitist and less egalitarian than the one it is replacing.

工厂时代产生了一种形式,信息时代产生了另一种形式,这种形式比它所取代的形式更不暴力,因此也更精英主义和不平等。

AMMON'S TURNIP

兰恩的萝卜

In the late nineteenth century a number of economists, of whom William Stanley Jevons was the most distinguished in England, started to develop mathematical economics. One of the first to apply probability theory to a major social question was the German economist Otto Ammon, whose work was first translated into English by Carlos C. Closson in an article in the Journal of Political Economy in 1899. The article was entitled "Some Social Applications of the Doctrine of Probability."⁴ One might suppose that such an article was now of purely antiquarian interest. In fact, it deals with an economic problem that is again coming to the fore, and deals with it in what is still a stimulating way.

19 世纪末,一些经济学家,其中 William Stanley Jevons 在英国最为著名,开始发展数学经济学。最先将概率论应用于重大社会问题的是德国经济学家 Otto Ammon,他的作品于 1899 年由 Carlos C. Closson 翻译成英文,发表在《政治经济杂志》上,题目为《概率理论的若干社会应用》。人们可能认为这篇文章如今只具有古董价值。事实上,它涉及一个目前重新引起关注的经济问题,且阐述颇有启发。

Otto Ammon argued that this random distribution of throws of the dice was matched by the distribution of human abilities. He was writing before the development of intelligence testing and IQs, and relied on the earlier work on intelligence of Francis Galton. Ammon did not consider that social utility, or success in life, depended simply on intelligence. He listed "three groups of mental traits which are largely decisive in the place which a man

will occupy in life." These were: 1 .

奥托·阿蒙认为,骰子投掷的随机分布与人类能力的分布相匹配。他在智力测试和 IQ 出现之前写作,依赖于弗朗西斯·高尔顿早期关于智力的研究。阿蒙并未认为社会价值或人生成功仅取决于智力。他列举了"三大决定一个人在生活中所处地位的心理特质",分别是:1.

Intellectual traits; among which I included all that belong to the rational side of manpower of quick comprehension, memory, power of judgement, power of invention, and whatever also belongs to this field.

知识和智力特征;其中包括人力中理性方面的所有特征,如理解能力快捷、记忆力强、判断力、创造力,以及其他属于这一领域的特征。

2 .

Moral traits; namely, self control, will power, industry, perseverance, moderation, regard for family obligations, honesty and the like.

自我控制、意志力、勤勉、坚韧、节制、对家庭义务的重视、诚实等品德特质。

3 .

Economic traits; such as business ability, organizing talent, technical skill, caution, clever calculation, foresight, thrift and so on.

经济特质;例如商业能力、组织才能、技术技能、谨慎、聪明的计算、远见卓识、节俭等。

To these mental traits he added:

对这些心理特质,他还添加了:

4 .

Bodily traits; power to work, endurance, power of undergoing exertions and of resisting excitements of every kind, vigour, good health, etc.

身体特征;工作能力,耐力,承受各种努力和抵抗各种刺激的能力,活力,良好健康等。

In Otto Ammon 's view, the probable distribution of these qualities of intelligence, character, talent, and body were similar to those of scores on the dice. He went further and argued that there were, in fact, many more than four variables, and that they varied in more than six degrees. If instead of throwing four dice, one throws eight, then there are no less than 1,679,616 possible throws, yet the highest score, forty-eight, can still only be expected to occur once. The man or woman who scores very highly in all the factors that determine the place in life is much rarer than the probability of 171

在奥托·阿蒙的观点中,这些智力、性格、天赋和体格特征的可能分布与骰子得分类似。他进一步论证,事实上存在远多于四个变量,并且它们变化的程度超过六个等级。如果不是投掷四个骰子,而是八个,那么可能的组合数就不少于 1,679,616 种,但是最高分 48 仍然只有一次出现的可能。在所有决定人生位置的因素中,全面高分的人要比概率 171

throwing four sixes would suggest; perhaps as rare as throwing eight sixes. Yet, Ammon notes, a mixture of high and low scores in these human qualities may produce "persons of unbalanced, inharmonious gifts, who, in spite of some brilliant qualities, cannot successfully meet the tests of life." 掷出四个六点会暗示什么;也许像掷出八个六点一样罕见。然而,阿蒙指出,这些人性品质的高低分数的混合可能会产生"不平衡、不协调的天赋人员,尽管有一些杰出的品质,但无法成功地应对生活的考验。"

"Like a lonely mountain peak, or rather like the spire of a cathedral, rise the men of high talent and of genius above the broad mass of mediocrity... The number of the highly gifted is at all events so small that it is impossible that 'many' such can have been kept back in lower classes through the incompleteness of social institutions." OTTO AMMON

像孤独的山峰,或者更像大教堂的尖塔,才华横溢和天才的人高于平庸大众之上。... 高度天赋者的数量如此之少,以至于不可能有"许多"这样的人因社会制度的不完善而被束缚在低层阶级。

Traits and Incomes
个性特征和收入

Ammon then turns to the distribution of incomes. Of course, the statistics of the 1890s were much less adequate than they would be now, but German bureaucracy was already well developed, and Otto Ammon found in Saxony, Prussia, Baden, and other German states income curves that he thought were similar, both to his perceived distribution of human ability and to the probabilities of the dice. He found similar figures in Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People of London* (1892). Indeed, Booth's social distribution does look much as one might expect from Ammon's probability theory.

亚门然后转向收入分配。当然,19 世纪 90 年代的统计数据远不如现在完善,但是德国官僚机构已经非常发达,奥托·亚门发现在萨克森、普鲁士、巴登和其他德国州,他认为收入曲线与人类能力的分布以及骰子概率相似。他在查尔斯·布斯的《伦敦人民的生活和劳动》(1892 年)中找到了类似的数据。事实上,布斯的社会分配看起来与亚门的概率理论非常吻合。

Booth found in London 25 percent who were poor or worse, 51.5 percent who were comfortable, and 15 percent who were well-to-do, or better; if one takes the two lowest of Booth's categories they come to 9.5 percent. It was common before the welfare states of the twentieth century to speak of those who were least well off as the "submerged tenth."

布斯在伦敦发现有 25%的人贫困或更糟, 51.5%的人生活舒适, 15%的人生活优裕或更好; 如果把布斯最低两个等级相加, 就是 9.5%。在 20 世纪福利国家出现之前,人们通常称最贫困的群体为"沉浸其中的十分之一"。

5 The two highest of Booth's categories come to 7 percent.
布斯的两个最高类别达到 7%。

From all this, Otto Ammon drew a number of interesting conclusions. He thought that people's abilities, broadly defined, determined their place in society and their income.

从所有这些,奥托·阿蒙得出了一些有趣的结论。他认为,广义上定义的人们能力决定了他们在社会中的地位 and 收入。

He believed that high abilities naturally result in people rising in income and social position. "Like a lonely mountain peak, or rather, 'like the spire of a cathedral, rise the men of high talent and of genius above the broad mass of mediocrity...' He also believed that the 'true form of the so-called social pyramid is that of a somewhat flat onion or turnip." This turnip has a narrow stem above and a narrow root beneath. Such a social turnip is preferable as a metaphor to the social pyramid because, like modern industrial society, it has its mass in the middle while the pyramid has its mass at the bottom.

他认为,高能力自然会导致人们收入和社会地位的提高。"像孤独的山峰,或者说,像大教堂的尖塔,那些有才能和天赋的人高于众人的平庸....."他还认为,"所谓社会金字塔的真正形式是一种略扁的洋葱或萝卜"。这种萝卜有一个狭窄的茎部在上方,一个狭窄的根部在下方。相比金字塔这种社会隐喻,这种社会萝卜更为合适,因为就像现代工业社会一样,它的大部分人在中间,而金字塔的大部分人在底部。

The Shape of the Turnip

圆形的萝卜

Modern industrial societies are indeed all turnips, with a small wealthy and upper-professional class at the top, a larger middle class, and a minority poor class at the bottom. Relative to the middle, both the extremes are small. In modern London, if not in Washington, there are certainly more millionaires than homeless.

现代工业社会确实都是萝卜,顶层是少数富裕和专业阶层,中间是较大的中产阶级,底层是少数贫困阶层。相比中产阶级,两个极端都很小。在现代伦敦,如果不是在华盛顿,肯定有更多百万富翁而不是无家可归的人。

All of this is intriguing, but the immediate interest of Ammon's work lies in the major long-term shift we are experiencing in the relations, financial and political, between the top and the middle. The skills needed in the Factory Age, which is now passing, are undeniably different from those demanded by the Information Age. Most 172

所有这些都很有趣,但阿蒙的工作立即引起人们的兴趣,在于我们正在经历的上层与中层之间的主要长期转变,无论在财务还是政治方面。

工厂时代需要的技能,如今正在消失,与信息时代所要求的技能无疑大不相同。大多数

people could master the skills required for operating the machines of the mid-twentieth century, but those jobs have now been replaced by smart machines which, in effect, control themselves. A whole arena of low-and middle-skill employment has already disappeared. If we are correct, this is a prelude to the disappearance of most employment and the reconfiguration of work in the spot market.

人们可以掌握 20 世纪中期机器操作所需的技能,但这些工作现已被智能机器取代,这些机器实际上可以自行控制。大量低技能和中等技能就业领域已经消失。如果我们的判断正确,这只是大部分就业岗位消失以及工作重新配置的序曲。

" Yet it is a ,fact acknowledged officially but quietly, that most of the unemployed youngsters have no qualifications whatsoever..." 6 CLIVE JENKINS AND BARRIE

然而,这是一个官方正式但悄悄承认的事实,那就是大多数失业的年轻人根本没有任何资格。

SHERMAN

谢尔曼

FEWER PEOPLE WILL DO MORE WORK

更少的人将做更多的工作

We can take the simple four-dice distribution of human ability and suppose that people could score in the Factory Age with a set of 4 x 2 or above. That would mean that over 95 percent of the population were above what Charles Booth called "the lowest limit of positive social usefulness." Indeed 3 percent was set as the full-employment standard of the 1940's and 1950's. Suppose that in the Information Age the required score has risen to a 4 X 3, and the required minimum has gone up from 8 to 12. That would mean that nearly 24 percent would fall below this limit of "social usefulness."

我们可以把人类能力的简单四骰子分布假设为在工厂时代可以得到 4x2 或以上的分数。这意味着超过 95%的人口都超过了查尔斯·布斯所称的"最低积极社会效用标准"。事实上,1940 年代和 1950 年代的充分就业标准设定为 3%。假设在信息时代,所需的分数已经上升到 4x3,最低要求从 8 增加到 12。这意味着近 24%的人会低于这个"社会效用"的限度。

Something similar would happen at the top end of the scale. In the Factory Age, the required level of high ability was perhaps 4 x 4; suppose that in the Information Age it has risen to 4 X 5. In that case the proportion of people qualified for the top jobs, which are also the best paid, would fall from 34 percent to 5 percent.

在规模的顶端会发生类似的事情。在工厂时代,所需的高能力水平可能为 4 x 4;假设在信息时代,它已上升到 4 x 5。在这种情况下,符合资格担任薪酬最高的顶级工作的人数比例,将从 34%下降到 5%。

These numbers are purely hypothetical. Obviously, we do not know what the shift in the skill requirements will be-or has already been-but there has certainly been a rise. Because of the shape of the turnip, a quite modest rise in the minimum skill requirement would put large numbers outside of a

significant economic role. Equally, quite a small rise in the higher skill requirement would reduce the number of people qualified for the higher jobs very dramatically. Some shift is happening: we do not yet know how big it will be.

这些数字纯属假设。很明显,我们不知道技能要求的变化会是什么样的,但肯定已经有所上升。由于萝卜的形状,最低技能要求的小幅上涨就会使大量人员无法胜任重要的经济角色。同样,较高技能要求的小幅上涨也会大幅减少符合资格的人数。某种变化正在发生:我们还不知道会有多大。

There is indeed no lack of social and political evidence that this shift is taking place in all advanced industrial societies, that its pace is accelerating, and that the movement is already a big one. The rewards for rare skills have increased and are increasing. This has been noted with displeasure by conventional thinkers. Consider, for example, *The Winner-Take-All Society*, by Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook.⁷ It documents the growing tendency for the most talented competitors in many fields in the United States to earn very high incomes. Equally, the opportunities for middle skills are falling; a substantial number of low skills now fall outside the range that is rewarded with a comfortable living, though they may still find a place in small-scale services.

这种转变正在所有先进工业社会中发生,其步伐正在加快,这个趋势已经非常大。稀有技能的回报已经增加,并且还在持续增加。这种情况受到了传统思想家的不满。例如,罗伯特·H·弗兰克和菲利普·J·库克的《赢家通吃社会》就记录了美国许多领域最有才能的竞争者获得很高收入的越来越普遍的趋势。同样,中等技能的机会也在下降;许多低技能工作已经不足以维持舒适的生活,尽管他们仍可在小规模服务业中找到一席之地。

If the Information Age demands higher skills both at the top and bottom end, everyone except for the top 5 percent will be relatively at a disadvantage, but the top 5

如果信息时代需要顶端和底端都有更高的技能,除了 top 5%的人外,其他人都会相对处于劣势,但是 top 5%的人将获得巨大优势

percent will gain tremendously. They will both earn a higher share of income and keep a greater share of what they earn. At the same time, they will do a greater portion of the world's work than ever before. Many will emerge as Sovereign Individuals. In the 173

百分之多将大幅增加。他们不仅将获得更高的收入份额,而且还能保留更多自己赚取的收入。与此同时,他们将完成世界上比以往更多的工作。许多人将成为主权个人。在这 173

Information Age, the turnip of income distribution will look more as it did in 1750 than in 1950.

信息时代,收入分配的状况将更像 1750 年而非 1950 年。

Societies that have been indoctrinated to expect income equality and high levels of consumption for persons of low or modest skills will face demotivation and insecurity.

被灌输"收入平等"和"低技能者高消费水平"预期的社会将面临动力不足和不安全感。

As the economies of more countries more deeply assimilate information technology, they will see the emergence-so evident already in North America-of a more or less unemployable underclass. This is exactly what is happening. This will lead to a reaction with a nationalist, antitechnology bias, as we detail in the next chapter.

随着更多国家的经济深度融合信息技术,他们将看到一个或多或少失业的下层阶级的出现,这在北美已经非常明显。这正是正在发生的事情。这将导致一种带有民族主义和反技术偏见的反应,正如我们在下一章中所详述的。

The Factory Age may prove to have been a unique period in which semistupid machines left a highly profitable niche for unskilled people. Now that the machines can look after themselves, the Information Age is pouring its gifts onto the top 5 percent of Otto Ammon's turnip. The Information Age was already looking far better for the top 10

工厂时代可能会被证明是一个独特的时期,半愚蠢的机器为非熟练人员留下了高度有利可图的利基。现在机器可以自己照管自己了,信息时代

正在将其馈赠倾倒在奥托·阿蒙大头菜的顶层 5%。信息时代已经看起来远比前 10% 的人更好了。

percent, the so-called cognitive elite. Yet it will be the best of all for the top 10 percent of the top 10 percent, the cognitive double top. In the feudal age, it took one hundred semiskilled peasants to support one highly skilled warlord (or knight) on horseback. The Sovereign Individuals of the information economy will not be warlords but masters of specialized skills, including entrepreneurship and investment. Yet the feudal hundred-to-one ratio seems set to return. For better or worse, the societies of the twenty-first century are likely to be more unequal than those we have lived in during the twentieth.

百分之十,所谓的认知精英。但这对于占总人口百分之十的百分之十最高层的认知顶尖群体来说将是最佳的。在封建时代,需要一百个半技能农民来支持一个高度技能的马背上的军阀(或骑士)。信息经济中的主权个人不会是军阀,而是专业技能的大师,包括企业家精神和投资。然而,这种封建时代的百对一的比例似乎也将重现。无论好坏,21 世纪的社会很可能比我们在 20 世纪生活的社会更加不平等。

MOST PEOPLE WILL GAIN FROM THE DEATH OF POLITICS 大多数人会从政治的死亡中获益

It is unlikely that the egalitarian economy and the nations it supports can disappear without a crisis. While a crisis by definition can last only for a short while, we nonetheless imagine that the trauma of the end of nations could reverberate for years.

平等主义经济及其所支持的国家不太可能在没有危机的情况下消失。尽管危机从定义上来说只能持续很短一段时间,但我们依然可以想象,国家的崩溃可能会在多年内产生回响。

Without ignoring that trauma, whose dimensions we explore in greater detail later, it is important not to forget that in many areas of the globe the transition to the information economy will lead output to surge, with higher incomes all around. Indeed, in those areas that never shared fully in the benefits of industrialism but are now open to the free market, incomes are rising or will rise among all classes of people.

在不忽视那种创伤的情况下，我们将在稍后更详细地探讨其尺度,重要的是不要忘记,在全球许多地区,向信息经济的转型将导致产出激增,并带来普遍较高的收入。事实上,在那些从未完全分享工业化带来的利益,但现在开放给自由市场的地区,各阶层人民的收入都在上升或将上升。

The deflation of compulsion as a feature of economic life will allow producers to retain assets that heretofore have been seized and redistributed. Redistribution usually meant that assets were dragooned into lower-value uses, thus reducing the productivity of capital. Wealth taken disproportionately from persons who were most adept at investing resources was reallocated by politicians to those who were less adept. In most cases, redistributed income was employed in lower-order economic activities. The effects of freeing resources from systematic compulsion will vary greatly among jurisdictions. This freezing of resources will bankrupt welfare states, and enhance diseconomies to scale that are undermining large governments and all institutions subsidized by large governments.

通过消除经济生活中的强制性,生产者将能够保留此前被没收和重新分配的资产。重新分配通常意味着资产被强制性地转移到效率较低的用途中,从而降低了资本的生产率。从最善于投资资源的人那里过度剥离的财富,被政治家重新分配给那些投资能力较差的人。在大多数情况下,重新分配的收入用于较低级的经济活动。从系统性强制中释放资源的影响将因地区而有很大不同。这种资源'冻结'将导致福利国家破产,并加剧规模不经济,从而削弱大政府及其所有被补贴的机构。

On the other hand, the shift to the cybereconomy will reduce the economic drawbacks suffered by people operating under sovereignties in regions that have traditionally suffered from the inability to organize on a large scale.

另一方面,向网络经济的转变将减少那些在传统上无法大规模组织的地区的主权下运营的人所遭受的经济损失。

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'If the world operates as one big market, every employee will compete with every person anywhere in the world who is capable of doing the same job. There are lots of them and many of them are hungry.'⁸ ANDREW S. GROVE, PRESIDENT, INTEL CORP.

"如果世界运作如一个大市场,每个员工都将与世界上任何能够从事同样工作的人竞争。他们有很多,而且其中许多人都很饥饿。" 安德鲁·S·格罗夫,英特尔公司总裁。

SHIFTING LOCATIONAL ADVANTAGES

地点优势的转移

Because there will no longer be rising returns to violence, there will be no advantage to living under a government that could capture them. Once-competent governments will no longer be the friends of wealth accumulation, but their enemies.

由于不会再有暴力带来的递增回报,过去受政府控制的人也不会再从中获利。曾经能干的政府不再是财富积累的朋友,而是它们的敌人。

High taxes, burdensome regulatory costs, and ambitious commitments to income redistribution will make territories under their control uninviting settings in which to do business.

高税率、繁重的监管成本以及雄心勃勃的收入再分配承诺,将使其管控下的领土对从事商业活动变得不太吸引人。

Those who live in jurisdictions that remained poor or underdeveloped during the industrial period have the most to gain by the liberation of economies from the confines of geography. This is contrary to what you will hear. The main controversy surrounding the advent of the information economy and the rise of the Sovereign Individual will focus on the allegedly adverse effects on "fairness" arising from the death of politics. It is certainly true that the advent of the global information economy will deal a mortal blow to large-scale income redistribution. The main beneficiaries of income redistribution in the Industrial Age have been inhabitants of wealthy jurisdictions whose level of consumption is twenty times higher than the world average. Only within the OECD

那些在工业时期仍然贫穷或欠发达的管辖区中生活的人,从经济解放地域局限中获得最大利益。这与你将听到的不同。围绕信息经济的兴起和主权个人的兴起的主要争议将集中在所谓的不公平影响,这是由于政治的死亡。毫无疑问,全球信息经济的兴起将给大规模收入再分配以致命打击。工业时代收入再分配的主要受益者是居住在富裕管辖区的人,他们的消费水平是世界平均水平的 20 倍。只有在经合组织内部

countries has income redistribution had noticeable effects in raising incomes of unskilled persons.

各国有明显的收入再分配效果,提高了非技术人员的收入。

The greatest income inequalities have been observed among jurisdictions. 收入差距最大的是不同地区之间。

Income redistribution has done little to alleviate them. In fact, we believe that foreign aid and international development programs have had the perverse effect of lowering the real incomes of poor people in poor countries by subsidizing incompetent governments. This is an issue we consider in more depth in analyzing the impact of the Information Revolution on morality.

收入再分配做得很少来缓解他们。事实上,我们认为外国援助和国际发展项目的反常效果是通过补贴无能的政府来降低贫穷国家贫困人口的实际收入。这是我们在分析信息革命对道德的影响时更深入考虑的一个问题。

A Century of Rising Income Inequality 收入不平等加剧的一个世纪

During the industrial period, the factor that contributed most to determining the ordinary person's lifetime income was the political jurisdiction in which he happened to reside. Contrary to the common impression in rich economies today, income inequality rose rapidly during the industrial period. An estimate cited by the World Bank suggests that average per capita income in the richest countries ballooned from eleven times that in the poorest countries in 1870 to fifty-two times in 1985. While inequality increased dramatically on a global basis, it often appeared otherwise to the fraction of the world inhabiting the wealthy industrial countries. Income inequality rose among jurisdictions rather than within them.

在工业时期,决定普通人一生收入的最主要因素是他居住的政治管辖区。与今天富裕经济体的普遍印象相反,收入不平等在工业时期急剧上升。世界银行引用的一个估计显示,1870 年到 1985 年,最富国家人均收入从最穷国家的 11 倍增加到 52 倍。尽管全球不平等程度大幅上升,但

对于居住在富裕工业国家的人来说,情况往往似乎并非如此。收入不平等增加是在管辖区之间,而不是管辖区内。

For reasons we have already explored, the character of industrial technology itself helped assure that income gaps would narrow within jurisdictions where halfway 175

为已探讨过的原因,工业技术本身的性质有助于确保管辖区内的收入差距缩小

competent governments mastered the exercise of power on a large scale. When returns to violence were rising, as they were during the Industrial Age, governments that operated on a large scale tended to be controlled by their employees. This made it effectively impossible to impose controls on the claims these governments made over resources.

有能力的政府掌握了大规模行使权力的能力。当暴力回归上升时,正如在工业时代所发生的那样,大规模运作的政府往往受到其雇员的控制。这使得对这些政府有关资源的主张施加控制变得实际上不可能。

Their unchecked control over resources conveyed an important military advantage so long as magnitude of power predominated over the efficiency with which it was used. A not-incidental corollary of government controlled by its employees was a sharp acceleration of income redistribution. Almost every society has some provision for income redistribution, at least on a temporary basis in extraordinary circumstances.

他们对资源的无限制控制带来了重要的军事优势,只要权力的规模优于使用效率。政府控制由其雇员控制的一个直接结果就是收入重新分配急剧加快。几乎每个社会都会对收入进行一定程度的重新分配,至少在特殊情况下暂时如此。

However, a close reading of the history of the provision of aid to the poor shows that "welfare" benefits tend to be more generous when poverty is minimal. Income redistribution is more likely to be curtailed when incomes for large numbers weaken.

然而,对提供援助给穷人历史的仔细阅读显示,当贫困最小时,"福利"待遇往往更慷慨。当大量收入减弱时,收入再分配更有可能受到限制。

Conditions in the wealthy industrial societies in the last half of the twentieth century were almost perfect for redistributing income. This led to much higher rewards for unskilled work within these favored jurisdictions. In due course, it even provided high levels of consumption for those who did not work at all.

在 20 世纪后半叶,富裕的工业社会的条件几乎完美地适合于再分配收入。这导致这些有利区域的非技术性工作获得了更高的回报。不久之后,连那些根本不工作的人也获得了高水平的消费。

The Paradox of Industrial Wealth 工业财富的悖论

The irony is that it was also in these jurisdictions that more people became wealthy. This apparent paradox makes perfect sense once you understand the dynamics of megapolitics explored in previous chapters. Leading sectors of the industrial economy required the maintenance of order on a large scale to function optimally. This made them particularly vulnerable to extortion by unions and governments eager to maximize the number of persons under their sway. Yet widespread redistribution of income did not totally stifle the ability of the industrial economy to function. Anyone lucky enough to be born in Western Europe, the former British settlement colonies, or Japan during the high-water period of industrialism was therefore likely to be far richer than a person of equivalent skills in South America, Eastern Europe, the late Soviet Union, Africa, and the landmass of Asia. The beneficial impact of information technology will include helping to overcome many of the obstacles to development that prevented the majority of the world's population from enjoying many of the benefits of free markets during much of the modern period.

令人讽刺的是,正是在这些司法管辖区,更多的人变得富有。一旦理解前几章探讨的大政治学动态,这种看似矛盾的现象就能完全说得通。工业经济的主导行业需要在大规模维持秩序才能发挥最佳功能。这使它们特别容易受到工会和政府为扩大其影响范围而进行敲诈的威胁。然而,广泛的收入再分配并没有完全抑制工业经济的运转能力。在工业化鼎盛时期出生在西欧、前英国殖民地定居点或日本的人,很可能比拥有同等技能的南美、东欧、前苏联、非洲和亚洲大陆的人富有得多。信息

技术的有利影响将包括帮助克服阻碍大多数人口在现代时期享受自由市场利益的许多障碍。

"The indigenous characteristics of poor countries are strikingly inhospitable to effective large-scale organization, especially to large-scale organizations that have to operate (as governments do) over a large geographical area."

MANCUR OLSON

贫穷国家的本土特征明显不利于有效的大规模组织,特别是那些必须在大范围地理区域内运作(如政府所做的那样)的大规模组织。

DISECONOMIES OF SCALE AND RETARDED GROWTH

规模不经济与发展迟缓

As Mancur Olson has demonstrated, backwardness in the twentieth century was not due to lack of capital or specialized skills per se. In "Diseconomies of Scale and Development," an essay published in 1987, two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall, 176

正如曼库尔·奥尔森所证明的,20 世纪的落后并非源于资本或专业技能的缺乏。在 1987 年发表的一篇名为《规模不经济与发展》的文章中,在柏林墙倒塌前两年,176

Olson wrote, "If capital had in fact been in scarce supply in the poor countries, its 'marginal productivity' and so the profitability of its use ought to be greater than in the prosperous countries. The low growth rates of many countries that received nonnegligible amounts of foreign aid and the low productivity of some modern factories that were built in poor countries have further lessened the credibility of the 'scarcity of capital' explanation of underdevelopment." This must be right. Had capital or skill scarcity been the main deficiency, the returns earned by both in poor jurisdictions would have been higher than in developed countries. Both skilled personnel and capital would have flooded into these regions until the returns leveled out. In fact, the opposite was often the case. There was a substantial outmigration of educated people from backward jurisdictions. And the lucky few who did manage to accumulate capital in such places exported it as rapidly as possible to Switzerland and other advanced countries.

奥尔逊写道："如果资本在贫穷国家确实供应不足,那么其'边际生产

力'以及使用的盈利能力应该大于繁荣国家。许多受到大量外国援助的国家的低增长率,以及在贫穷国家建立的一些现代工厂的低生产率,进一步削弱了'资本稀缺'造成欠发达的解释力。"这必须是正确的。如果资本或技能短缺是主要缺陷,那么在贫穷地区这两者的回报率都应该高于发达国家。受过培训的人员和资本都会涌入这些地区,直到回报率达到平衡。事实上,常常是相反的情况。受过教育的人大量从落后地区外流。那些设法在这些地方积累资本的少数幸运者,也会尽快将其输出到瑞士和其他发达国家。

Better Government Could Not Be Imported 更好的政府不能被引进

Olson argues, and we agree, that the true obstacle to development in backward countries has been the one factor of production that could not be easily borrowed or imported from abroad, namely government. This is a problem that worsened as the twentieth century unfolded. In 1900, Great Britain and France, along with some other European countries, were in the business of exporting competent government to regions where indigenous powers were incapable of functioning effectively on a large scale. But shifting megapolitical conditions in the twentieth century raised the costs and lowered the returns for this activity. Colonialism, or imperialism, as it was less fondly known, ceased to be a paying proposition. Shifts in technology raised the costs of projecting power from the center to the periphery and lowered the military costs of an effective resistance.

奥尔森认为,也是我们的共识,阻碍落后国家发展的真正障碍是生产要素中最难从海外借入或进口的因素,也就是政府。这一问题随着 20 世纪的发展而愈加严重。1900 年,英国、法国以及其他一些欧洲国家都在向原住民无法在大规模层面上有效运转的地区输出有能力的政府。但 20 世纪的大政治条件变革,使这一活动的成本增加、收益减少。殖民主义或帝国主义(它的不太友善的称呼)不再是一笔好买卖。技术变革提高了从中心向边缘投射实力的成本,同时也降低了有效抵抗的军事成本。

Consequently, imperial powers withdrew, or stayed on only in tiny enclaves, like Bermuda or the Cayman Islands.

因此,帝国政权撤离或只留在像百慕大或开曼群岛这样的小封地。

"If the postcolonial nationstate had become a shackle on progress, as more and more critics in Africa seemed to agree by the end of the 1980s, the prime reason could appear in little doubt. The state was not liberating and protective of its citizens, no matter what its propaganda claimed; on the contrary its gross effect was constricting and exploitative, or else, it simply failed to operate in any social sense at all." 2 BASIL

如果后殖民时期民族国家已经成为进步的枷锁,正如 1980 年代末非洲越来越多的批评家所认为的那样,其主要原因似乎不言而喻。不论其宣传如何,国家并未解放和保护其公民;相反,其总体效果是限制和剥削性的,或者干脆在任何社会意义上都无法运作。

DAVIDSON

戴维森

The indigenous governments that replaced colonial rule in the countries that were not settled by Europeans drew their leaders and administrators from populations who had little experience or skill at running any type of large-scale enterprise. In many cases, especially in Africa, infrastructure inherited from the departing colonial powers was rapidly looted, destroyed, or allowed to fall into disrepair. Telephone lines were torn down by scavengers and hammered into bracelets. Roads were no longer maintained.

原本由殖民统治取代的土著政府,其领导者和管理者都来自这些没有被欧洲人定居的国家,他们缺乏运营任何大型企业的经验和技能。在很多情况下,特别是在非洲,从离开的殖民政权那里继承下来的基础设施很快就被洗劫一空、遭到破坏,或者被任其报废。电线被淘金者拆除,锤打成手镯。道路也不再维护。

Rail lines became useless as roadbeds fell apart and locomotives broke down. In Zaire, the elaborate transportation infrastructure installed by the Belgians had almost totally

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disappeared by 1990. Only a few creaky riverboats continued to function, one of which was taken over as a kind of floating palace by the dictator. 到 1990 年已经绝迹。只剩下几艘摇摇欲坠的渡船继续运营,其中一艘被独裁者改造成了漂浮的宫殿。

Undependable communication and transport reflect the incompetence of backward nationstates at maintaining order. They have kept prices high and minimized opportunities for most of the world's population. As Olson emphasizes: First, poor transportation and communication tend to force a firm to rely mainly on local factors of production. When a firm's scale increases, it will have to go further afield to obtain factors of production, and the poorer the transportation and communications systems the faster these factor costs will rise with expanding output. The second and more important reason why poor transportation and communication systems work

缺乏可靠的通信和交通反映了落后的国家在维护秩序方面的无能。他们一直保持高价格,最小化了大部分世界人口的机会。正如奥尔森所强调的那样:首先,糟糕的交通和通信往往迫使一家公司主要依赖当地的生产要素。当一家公司的规模扩大时,它将不得不远离当地去获取生产要素,而交通和通信系统越差,随着产出的扩大,这些要素成本就会越快地上升。第二个更重要的原因是,糟糕的交通和通信系统

against effective large-scale enterprises is that they make it far more difficult to coordinate such enterprises effectively."

反对有效的大规模企业的情况是,它们使协调这些企业变得更加困难。

Lightening the Burden of Bad Government

减轻坏政府的负担

The ambitious poor of the world, more than anyone, stand to benefit as information technology disconnects the capacity to earn income from the locale in which one lives. New technologies, such as the digital cellular telephone, allow communications to function independently of the ability of the local police to defend every telephone pole in a jurisdiction from copper thieves. As wireless fax and Internet connections become available, it no longer matters so much whether desperately poor postal employees will pilfer mail just to steal the stamp.

全球有抱负的穷人,比任何人都能从信息技术中获益,因为它将赚钱的能力与所在地脱钩。新技术,如数字移动电话,允许通信功能独立于当地警察保护其辖区内每一根电线杆免受铜匪的可能性。随着无线传真和互联网连接的普及,邮局员工为盗取邮票而偷窃邮件的可能性已变得不那么重要了。

In many cases, effective communications are even replacing the need for the physical transport of goods and services. Better communications and vastly increased computational power not only make coordination of complex activities cheaper and more effective; they also lower scale economies and dissolve large organizations. These changes all tend to reduce the penalty that persons in backward countries have suffered for living under incompetent governments. The Information Revolution will make it much less important whether governments are able to function

capably. It will therefore be easier for persons living in traditionally poor countries to surmount the hurdles that their governments have heretofore placed in the path of economic growth.

在很多情况下,有效的沟通甚至正在取代实物货物和服务的运输需求。更好的沟通和大幅增加的计算能力不仅使复杂活动的协调更便宜和更有效;它们还降低了规模经济,并分解了大型组织。这些变化都倾向于降低落后国家居民由于在无能政府下生活而遭受的惩罚。信息革命将使得政府是否能够有能力运作的重要性大大降低。因此,生活在传统贫穷国家的人们更容易克服政府一直以来阻碍经济增长的障碍。

Equal Opportunity in the Information Age 信息时代的机会平等

In the Information Age, familiar locational advantages will rapidly be transformed by technology. Earnings capacity for persons of similar skills will become much more equal, no matter in what jurisdiction they live. This has already begun to happen.

在信息时代,熟悉的地理位置优势将被技术快速改变。无论居住在何处,具有相似技能的个人的收入能力将变得更加平等。这已经开始发生。

Because institutions that have employed compulsion and local advantage to redistribute income are losing power, income inequality within jurisdictions will rise. Global competition will also tend to increase the income earned by the most talented individuals 178

由于采用强制手段和地方利益来重新分配收入的机构正在失去权力,管辖区内的收入不平等将有所上升。全球竞争也将趋于增加最有才能个人所获得的收入。

in each field, wherever they live, much as it does now in professional athletics. The marginal value generated by superior performance in a global market will be huge.

无论他们身在何处,在各个领域都如此,就像如今在专业运动中一样。在全球市场上卓越表现所创造的边际价值将是巨大的。

While public debate will focus on growing "inequality" in the OECD countries, individuals everywhere will enjoy far more nearly equal

opportunity. They will no longer need to live in a jurisdiction that functions well on a large scale in order to succeed. Innate abilities and the willingness to develop them will be measured on a more equal playing field than ever before. Jurisdictional advantages that led to widening inequality between rich and poor economies during the industrial period will change dramatically.

尽管公众辩论将集中在经合组织国家日益加剧的"不平等"问题上,但每个人都将享有更加平等的机会。他们不再需要居住在一个大规模运作良好的司法管辖区才能取得成功。天赋和发展它们的意愿将在一个比以往更加公平的竞技场上得到衡量。在工业时期导致贫富国家差距扩大的司法管辖区优势将发生戏剧性变化。

Higher Returns in Poor Areas 更高的贫困地区收益

The obstacles that governments in poorer regions place in the way of functioning free markets will be much diminished as the cybereconomy comes on line. As a consequence, capital and skills in short supply will in fact earn higher returns in many currently poor areas, much as the development theorists of the 1950s postulated they should. And both capital and skills will be far more readily importable. Emerging economies will no longer need to rely as much as during the Industrial Age upon local factors of production. Their enhanced ability to draw upon capital and expertise at a distance will lead to higher rates of growth. This will happen whether or not Incompetent governments become more honest or better able to protect property rights. Lacking power over cyberspace, bad governments will simply be less able to stop people in their jurisdictions from benefiting from economic freedom.

贫穷地区政府在阻碍自由市场运作方面的障碍将大大减弱,因为网络经济将上线。因此,资金和技能供应不足的地区将事实上获得更高的回报,正如 20 世纪 50 年代的发展理论家所预测的那样。资金和技能的引进也将变得更加容易。新兴经济体将不再像工业时代那样依赖本地生产要素。它们从远处吸引资本和专业知识的能力增强将导致更高的增长率。无论无能的政府是否更诚实或更好地保护产权,这都会发生。由于缺乏对网络空间的控制权,腐败政府将无法阻止其管辖区内的人们从经济自由中获益。

Positive Reinforcement 正面强化

In the new cybereconomy, the almost total portability of information technology will prohibit the hoarding of many of the jurisdictional advantages that arose in the Industrial Age. Enhanced competition between increasing numbers of jurisdictions will turn on new types of local advantage. Sovereignty will be commercialized rather than predatory. Governments will be obliged by the force of competition to set policies to appeal to those of their customers who make the greatest contributions to economic wellbeing, not to those who contribute little or whose economic contributions are negative.

在新的网络经济中,信息技术的几乎完全可移植性将禁止囤积工业时代产生的许多司法优势。管辖区数量不断增加的竞争加剧将转向新型的地区优势。主权将被商业化而非掠夺性。政府将被迫通过竞争力来制定政策,以吸引那些为经济福祉做出最大贡献的客户,而不是那些贡献很少或经济贡献为负的客户。

This will represent a tremendous change from the common practice of the twentieth century. The ideology of the nationstate was that life can and should be regulated in a positive way by subsidizing undesirable outcomes and penalizing desirable ones. To be poor is undesirable; therefore, the poor were subsidized. To become rich is desirable; therefore, punitive taxes were laid on the rich to make life more "fair." Because this whole policy approach was rooted in a megapolitical foundation that withstood all appeal, it mattered little what the perverse consequences of subsidizing dysfunction were.

这将是与 20 世纪惯例产生巨大变革。民族国家的意识形态认为,通过补贴不受欢迎的结果并惩罚有利的结果,生活可以并应该以积极的方式被管制。贫穷是不受欢迎的;因此,贫困者获得补贴。致富是可取的;因此,对富人征收惩罚性税收以使生活更"公平"。因为这整个政策方法植根于抵御一切呼吁的大政治基础,所以补贴功能失常的反常后果并不重要。

Nor was there much accounting for the skill, hard work, or ingenuity that went into earning the wealth that was redistributed. Outcomes were

measured in terms of 179

从业收入再分配,很大程度上忽视了其中所付出的技能、劳动和创意。成果主要用总量指标衡量。

entitlements. The twentiethcentury political view assumed that in order for outcomes to be "fair" they had to be equal.

权利。20 世纪的政治观点认为,为了使结果"公平",必须是平等的。

The New Paradigm

新范式

The new megapolitical conditions of the twenty-first century will allow market tests to regulate outcomes in areas formerly dominated by politics. The market paradigm presupposes that results can be better regulated by rewarding desirable outcomes and penalizing undesirable ones. To be poor is undesirable, and to become rich is desirable.

新的二十一世纪大政治条件将允许市场测试来调节原先由政治主导的领域的结果。市场模式的前提是,通过奖励可取的结果和惩罚不可取的结果,可以更好地调节结果。贫穷是不可取的,而变富则是可取的。

Therefore, incentives should reward wealth creation and encourage people to pay for the resources they consume. Life is more "fair" when people get to keep more of what they earn.

因此,激励措施应该奖励创造财富,并鼓励人们为他们消费的资源付费。当人们可以保留自己赢得的更多财富时,生活会更"公平"。

This is a view that will be heard more frequently in the new millennium than it was in the century now ending. Furthermore, it will be compelling as never before because it will be megapolitically founded. Capital in the Information Age is growing more mobile by the moment. The capacity to earn high income is no longer tied to residence in specific locations, as was the case when most wealth was created by manipulating natural resources. With every day that passes, it becomes easier for people using highly portable information technology to create assets that are far less subject to the leverage of violence than any form of wealth has ever been before.

这个观点在新的一千年里将比在现在结束的一个世纪里更频繁地被听

到。此外,它将比以往任何时候都更引人注目,因为它将建立在大政治基础之上。信息时代的资本正变得越来越流动。赚取高收入的能力不再局限于特定地点的居住,这与大部分财富是通过操纵自然资源而创造的情况不同。每一天过去,使用便携式信息技术的人们创造的资产都变得更加不受暴力影响,这比以往任何形式的财富都更少。

Arbitrary political regulations that impose costs without creating offsetting market benefits will soon be nonviable. Powerful competitive forces are tending to equalize the prices of goods, services, labor, and capital across the globe. Governments will have less latitude to impose arbitrary policies than they are accustomed to enjoy. Any government that attempts to impose more burdensome regulations on an activity than other sovereignties will simply drive that activity away. In some cases, of course, driving away unwanted activities will please the market and make those jurisdictions all the more popular and prosperous. In this sense, certain regulations may be compared to the house rules imposed by the proprietors of a hotel chain. If they prohibit people from walking barefoot or smoking in the lobby, they will no doubt lose certain customers. But turning away those customers may not cost the jurisdiction customers overall, or even reduce its total revenues. Well-shod nonsmokers may pay more precisely because barefoot smokers are excluded. Equally, regulations that make it costly or impossible to operate a rendering plant in a certain jurisdiction may drive the rendering elsewhere without depriving the jurisdiction as a whole of income.

没有创造市场利益的任意政治法规将很快无法存在。强大的竞争力倾向于使全球货物、服务、劳动力和资本的价格趋于平等。政府将无法继续实施他们习惯施加的任意政策。任何试图对某活动施加比其他主权更重负政府,都将令该活动转移。当然,在某些情况下,驱赶不需要的活动将取悦市场,使这些辖区更加受欢迎和繁荣。从这个意义上说,某些法规可以被视为酒店连锁的房规。如果他们禁止赤脚行走或在大厅吸烟,他们无疑会失去某些客户。但拒绝这些客户可能不会使辖区整体失去客户,甚至不会降低其总收入。穿鞋的非吸烟者可能会支付更多,正因为赤脚吸烟者被排除在外。同样,使在某辖区运营渲染工厂变得昂贵或不可能的法规,可能会将渲染驱赶到别处,而不会剥夺该辖区整体的收入。

These examples demonstrate how regulations may in rare circumstances have a positive rather than a negative market value, especially in a world with a rapidly multiplying number of jurisdictions. Rules that preserve high standards of public health, clean air, and clean water will be highly valued in many locales. So will other, sometimes more exotic regulations and covenants of the kind that might be imposed by real estate developers or hotels catering to certain market segments.

这些例子演示了规定在罕见情况下可能产生积极而非负面的市场价值,特别是在管辖区不断增多的世界中。有保护公众健康、洁净空气和洁净水的高标准的规则在许多地方都将受到高度重视。某些房地产开发商或针对特定市场群体的酒店所制定的其他更加独特的规定和契约也同样如此。

No Customs House in Cyberspace

没有网络空间的海关所

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We expect the commercialization of sovereignty to rapidly lead to the devolution of many large territorial sovereignties. The very fact that information technology cannot be subjected to border controls of the kind that can still impede the trade of manufactures and farm goods has important implications. It means that protectionism will be less effective over time as trade in information displaces physical products in the generation of wealth. It also means that smaller regions will be ever less dependent upon the maintenance of extensive political jurisdictions in order to assure access to markets in which they can earn income.

我们预计主权商业化将迅速导致许多大型领土主权的分权。事实上,信息技术无法受到制造商和农产品贸易仍可能妨碍的边境管制,这意味着重要影响。这意味着随着信息贸易取代实物产品成为财富创造的主要形式,保护主义将随时间而减弱效用。这也意味着较小的地区将越来越不依赖于维持广泛的政治管辖区来确保进入可以赚取收入的市场。

Information technology exposes people working in formerly protected service sectors to foreign competition. If a firm in Toronto wished to hire a bookkeeper twenty years ago, that person had to be physically located in

Toronto, or in a nearby community within commuting distance. In the Information Age, a bookkeeper in Budapest or Bangalore, India, could do the job, and download all the material needed in encrypted form over the Internet. Instant communication through satellite links makes any part of the world only a moment away by modem and fax. Someone in need of stock analysts could hire twenty-seven in India for the price of one on Wall Street. As information technology improves by a magnitude or more every eighteen months (Moore's Law), ever-greater numbers of service-sector workers will be exposed to price competition that is essentially beyond the capacity of politicians to impede. This competition will eventually apply as fully to the learned professions as to bookkeepers. Digital lawyers and cyberdoctors will proliferate in the Information Economy.

信息技术使原先受到保护的服务行业中的人员面临着来自外国的竞争。20年前,如果多伦多的一家公司想聘用一名簿记员,那个人必须实际位于多伦多或附近可以通勤的社区。在信息时代,布达佩斯或印度孟买的簿记员都可以完成这项工作,并通过互联网以加密形式下载所有所需的材料。通过卫星链路的即时通信使世界上的任何地方都只是一个电话和传真的距离。有人如果需要股票分析师,可以以华尔街上一个人的价格在印度雇佣 27 个。随着信息技术每 18 个月就会提升一个数量级(摩尔定律),越来越多的服务行业工人将面临价格竞争,这对政客来说是无法阻挡的。这种竞争最终将完全适用于专业人士,就像簿记员一样。数字律师和网络医生将在信息经济中得到广泛应用。

Death Watch for NationStates 生死观测 对 NationStates 的

With the economic benefits formerly captured within the boundaries of nationstates falling away, the nationstates themselves will eventually collapse under their weighty liabilities. But the fact that all nationstates are on a death watch does not mean that they are all destined to expire at the same moment. Far from it. Devolutionary pressures will tend to be most intense in large political entities where incomes for most of the population are stagnant or falling. Jurisdictions in Latin America and Asia where per capita income is rising rapidly may endure for generations, or until lifetime income prospects there equate with those in the formerly rich industrial countries. At that point, there will no longer be easy cost-substituting gains

to be had, and the politics of growth will become more challenging.

随着曾经局限在民族国家边界之内的经济利益逐渐消失,这些民族国家最终会在沉重的负债下崩溃。但并不意味着所有民族国家都注定会在同一时刻消亡。事实恰恰相反。分权压力最大的往往是那些大型政治实体,其中大部分人口的收入是停滞不前或下降的。拉丁美洲和亚洲一些人均收入快速增长的管辖区可能会延续数代人,直至那里的终身预期收入与曾经富裕的工业国家相当为止。到那个时候,利用成本替代已无可为,经济增长的政治将变得更加充满挑战性。

We also suspect that nationstates with a single major metropolis will remain coherent longer than those with several big cities, which imply multiple centers of interest with their various hinterlands.

我们还怀疑,拥有单一大都市的国家将比拥有多个大城市的国家维持更长时间的凝聚力,因为后者意味着具有不同腹地的多个利益中心。

Another spur to devolution will be high indebtedness of the central government.

另一个推动地方分权的因素是中央政府的高债务。

The three wealthy industrial countries with the highest relative indebtedness-Canada, Belgium, and Italy-are not coincidentally nations with advanced separatist movements.

三个工业大国中相对负债最高的国家-加拿大、比利时和意大利-却恰巧也是拥有发达分裂主义运动的国家。

All three countries have suffered from chronic budget deficits and now have national debts that exceed 100 percent of GDI: As the national debt has mounted in each country, 181
181%

the appeal of separatist movements has grown as well. In Italy, the Northern League has emerged as a dynamic and popular regional political movement. Its platform is based upon a simple mathematical observation: northern Italy, or "Padoni a," would be richer than Switzerland if large portions of its income were not siphoned off to subsidize Rome and the poorer south. The Northern League proposes an obvious solution: secede from Italy, and thus

escape from some of the dire consequences of compound interest.

分离主义运动的吸引力也在增强。在意大利,北方联盟已经成为一个充满活力和广受欢迎的地区性政治运动。它的政策基于一个简单的数学观察:如果不将大部分收入用于补贴罗马和贫穷的南部,北意大利或"帕多尼亚"将比瑞士更富裕。北方联盟提出了一个明显的解决方案:从意大利分离,从而逃脱复利的严重后果。

Likewise, in Belgium, where the national debt exceeds 130 percent of GDP the Flemings and Walloons are maneuvering like a hostile couple before a divorce. A growing minority among the Flemings argue that they are unfairly subsidizing the Walloons, and could improve their economic condition by splitting Belgium in two.

比利时国债已超过 GDP 的 130%,弗拉芒人和瓦隆人的行为就像要离婚的敌对夫妻一样。越来越多的弗拉芒人认为,他们在不公平地资助瓦隆人,通过将比利时分裂成两个国家,他们可以改善自己的经济状况。

Canada's case differs in the detail that French Canada, the main region now agitating for separatism, has historically been subsidized by English Canada. But as the federal debt and deficit mount, the realization is dawning in Quebec that this form of income redistribution will decline. The Bloc Quebecois is therefore flirting with an appeal that it lacked a decade ago-the promise to raise after-tax income by abolishing the payment of Canadian federal tax. Separatist leaders also suggest that Quebec should leave Canada without shouldering a proportionate burden of the federal debt.

魁北克作为当前推动分离主义的主要地区,历史上一直受到英语加拿大的补贴。但随着联邦债务和赤字的增加,魁北克正意识到这种收入再分配方式将会减少。因此,魁北克独立党正在提出一个十年前所缺乏的诉求,即通过废除联邦税来提高税后收入。分离主义领导人还表示,魁北克应该在不承担联邦债务的情况下退出加拿大。

English Canadians resist this argument and tend to resent its implications because they are keenly aware of the large transfers made to Quebec over the years. Nonetheless, the appeal of the Parti Quebecois is strong, and it seems only a matter of time until a secession referendum dissolves Canada. A similar fate awaits other nationstates when their financial circumstances

deteriorate.

加拿大英语人拒绝这个论点,并倾向于对其含义感到不安,因为他们非常清楚过去几年向魁北克大量转移支付的情况。然而,魁北克独立党的呼吁力很强,很快就会进行一次分裂加拿大的独立公投。当其他民族国家的财务状况恶化时,也会面临类似的命运。

Another factor that bodes ill for Canada's long-term survival is the fact that it is a thinly populated country with a sprawling industrial-era infrastructure to maintain. The transition to the Information Age is inevitably depreciating physical infrastructure. As telecommuters replace factory employees and office workers, it will matter less whether freeways and other transportation thoroughfares are rebuilt and well-maintained. With fiscal crises pinching on all sides, more and more factions in Canadian life will retreat to the eighteenth-century exclusionary view of the financing of public goods advocated by Adam Smith. He wrote in *The Wealth of Nations*: Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the expense of the [national] treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an expense. The expense, besides, instead of being raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street, parish or district in London would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state, and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the greater part derived no sort of benefit from the lighting and paving of the streets of London.' 14

另一个预示加拿大长期生存困难的因素是,这是一个人口稀少但拥有广泛工业时代基础设施的国家。向信息时代的过渡必然会贬低实体基础设施。随着远程办公者取代工厂雇员和办公人员,重建和维护高速公路及其他交通要道是否重要将变得不那么重要。在财政危机四伏的情况下,加拿大生活中越来越多的派系会退回到亚当·斯密在《国富论》中倡导的 18 世纪排斥性公共物品融资观点。他写道:"如果伦敦的街道由国库出资照明和铺设,这些街道是否会像现在这样完善,甚至以更小的开支照明和铺设?此外,这种费用不应该由伦敦各个街区、教区或地区的居民缴纳地方税来承担,而应该由国家的一般收入承担,因此也就是由整个王国的所有居民缴纳税金来支付,而其中大部分人并没有从伦敦街道的照明和铺设中获得任何利益。"

For London, substitute Toronto, and you are inside an equation that will be running in the minds of many in Alberta and British Columbia. The logic of devolution will prove infectious.

将伦敦替换为多伦多,您就置身于阿尔伯塔和不列颠哥伦比亚省众多人心中正在运转的一个等式。分权的逻辑必将会传播开来。

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When Canada breaks apart, this will lead to a marked increase in secessionist activity in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. Residents of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana would find themselves at a distinct disadvantage in competition with Alberta and British Columbia as independent sovereignties.

当加拿大分裂时,这将导致美国西北太平洋地区分裂主义活动大幅增加。阿拉斯加、华盛顿、俄勒冈、爱达荷和蒙大拿的居民将在与独立的亚伯达省和不列颠哥伦比亚省的竞争中处于明显不利地位。

AFTER THE NATIONSTATE

后国家时代

In the place of nationstates you will see, at first, smaller jurisdictions at the provincial level, and ultimately, smaller sovereignties, enclaves of various kinds like medieval city-states surrounded by their hinterlands. As strange as it may seem to people inculcated with the importance of politics, policies of these new ministates will in many cases be informed more by entrepreneurial positioning than by political wrangling.

取代民族国家，你将首先看到地方级的更小管辖区，最终是更小的主权领地，各种类型的飞地，就像被腹地包围的中世纪城邦。对于被政治重要性所培养的人来说，这可能看起来很奇怪，但这些新型小国的政策在许多情况下将更多地受企业定位所影响，而不是政治斗争。

These new, fragmented sovereignties will cater to different tastes, just as hotels and restaurants do, enforcing specific regulations within their public spaces that appeal to the market segments from which they draw their customers. This is not to say, of course, that there are not special problems arising from the organization of protection on a nomadic basis. We address these in the next chapter.

这些新的、支离破碎的主权领土将满足不同的口味，就像酒店和餐厅那样，在它们的公共空间内实施吸引它们的客户群的特定法规。当然，这并不是说，靠游牧形式组织保护并没有出现一些特殊问题。我们将在下一章讨论这些问题。

"Town air brings freedom." MEDIEVAL ADAGE

"乡间空气带来自由。"中世纪谚语

Non citizens of the Pale

非巴尔地区公民

These difficulties notwithstanding, human ingenuity usually finds a way to create institutions to capture profitable opportunities, even where the demand arises from persons who can pay little. Where the potential

customers are among the wealthiest persons on earth, that tendency should be all the more emphatic. Exit, or "voting with your feet," is always an option when dated products, organizations, or even governments lose their appeal and seem to offer little prospect of immediate improvement. Consider, for example, the growth of medieval towns that served as safe havens for serfs escaping feudal subjugation. Their role may prove analogous to the role of new jurisdictions in accommodating the coming exit from nationstates. The acceptance of aliens escaping from some lord as "citizens of the pale" defied the prevailing conventions of feudal law and Episcopal authority. But nonetheless it was a generally successful alternative for those who employed it, contributing importantly to weakening the grip of feudalism. As medieval historian Fritz Rorig put it, the serf of a secular lord would be "a free burgher of the town after a year and a day." ' It is reasonable to expect new institutional refuges to spring up, upon "new legal principles," to provide fiscal refuge to citizens of the state, much as the medieval town offered refuge to feudal subjects who lived within the shadows of its walls.

尽管存在这些困难,人类的创造力通常都能找到方法来创造机构来捕捉有利可图的机会,即使这种需求来自那些只能支付很少的人。当潜在客户是地球上最富有的人时,这种趋势应该更加明显。当过时的产品、组织甚至政府失去吸引力并且似乎无望立即改善时,退出或"以脚投票"总是一种选择。例如,考虑中世纪城镇的发展,它们为逃离封建压迫的农奴提供了避难所。它们的作用可能与新管辖区为逃离民族国家的人提供避难所的作用类似。接受逃离某些领主的外国人作为"白色市民"违背了当时的封建法和主教权威。但是尽管如此,这仍然是那些使用它的人的一种普遍成功的选择,对削弱封建主义的控制做出了重要贡献。正如中世纪历史学家弗里茨·罗里格所说,世俗领主的农奴在城镇居住一年零一天后,就会成为"自由的市民"。我们有理由期望新的制度避难所将会建立,以"新的法律原则"来为国家公民提供财政避难,就像中世纪城镇为生活在城墙阴影下的封建臣民提供避难所一样。

Economist Albert O. Hirschman, who explored the theoretical subtleties of "voting with your feet" in *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, first published in 1969, foresaw that technological advances would increase the likelihood of exit as a strategy for dealing with states in decline. He wrote, "Only as countries

start to resemble each other because 183

只有当国家开始相互相似时,才会依靠退出作为对付衰落国家的策略。

of the advances in communication and all-round modernization will the danger of premature and excessive exits arise ...”

在通信和全面现代化的进步中,过早和过度退出的危险将会出现.....

That is precisely what is happening. Information technology is rapidly diminishing many of the differences among jurisdictions, making exit a much more attractive option. Of course, "premature and excessive exits" in Hirschman's vocabulary are understood from the point of view of what is optimal for the state being deserted. No doubt lords in medieval Europe believed that they suffered from "premature and excessive exits" of their serfs into towns where they achieved freedom.

这正是正在发生的情况。信息技术正在快速减少许多管辖区之间的差异,使退出成为一个更加吸引人的选择。当然,哈希曼的术语中的"过早和过度退出"是从被抛弃的国家的最佳利益角度来理解的。毫无疑问,中世纪欧洲的领主认为,他们遭受了农奴进入城镇获得自由的"过早和过度退出"的损失。

To return to our earlier example, it is not as farfetched as it might seem to suppose that there will be a number of ministates offering refuge to exiles fleeing the dying nationstates. These sovereignties will compete on terms and conditions of exile.

回到我们之前的例子,假设存在一些小型国家为逃离垂死民族国家的流亡者提供庇护,这并非如此遥不可及。这些主权国家将在流亡条件和条款方面展开竞争。

Some, perhaps on the West Coast of North America, may well cater to people who do not smoke and are intolerant of secondhand smoke from those who do. Obviously, such regimes would not be popular with smokers. Rules banning their habit will seem an arbitrary imposition to many smokers.

一些可能位于北美西海岸的场所,可能会迎合那些不吸烟且无法容忍他人吸二手烟的人。这样的管制显然不会受到吸烟者的欢迎。对他们来说,禁止吸烟的规定会被视为一种缺乏依据的强加。

In the industrial era of mass politics, such differences of opinion were fought out in political campaigns that ultimately forced one group or the other to abide by the wishes of the more powerful. But it is by no means essential that contentions about mutually exclusive choices be settled in a way that requires that the preferences of large numbers of people be suppressed.

在大众政治的工业时代,这种意见分歧通过政治竞选进行角逐,最终迫使一个群体或另一个群体屈从于更强大的一方的意愿。但并非必须以压制大量人民偏好的方式来解决关于互斥选择的争议。

Some individuals like to eat foie gras and others like hot dogs, and others still eat soya curd. They usually do not have to argue about their diet preferences because their culinary choices are not bound together. No one forces all to consume the same meal.

有些人喜欢吃鹅肝,有些人喜欢吃热狗,还有人喜欢吃豆腐。通常他们不需要为自己的饮食偏好而争论,因为他们的烹饪选择并不必须相同。没有人强迫所有人都吃同样的餐点。

Megapolitical conditions did, however, force common consumption of many kinds of collective and even private goods provided by governments in the industrial era. Why?

巨型政治条件确实迫使工业时代的政府提供许多集体和私人商品的共同消费。为什么?

Because there were great economic advantages to be captured by operating at a large scale. It was therefore impractical to divide sprawling jurisdictions into enclaves where everyone could have his own way, even on important items. The exclusionary approach to the provision of public goods argued by Adam Smith can be far more easily accommodated when the number of jurisdictions multiplies by ten or even a hundred times over. In the Information Age, growing numbers of sovereignties will be small enclaves rather than continental empires. Some may be North American Indian bands who will claim tax jurisdiction over their reservations and reserves much as they now claim the right to operate gambling casinos or to fish in defiance of limits.

由于大规模经营具有巨大的经济优势,因此将广泛管辖区划分为每个人

都能自行决定重要事项的小型封闭区域是不切实际的。当管辖区的数量增加十倍甚至百倍时,亚当·斯密所主张的排他性的公共物品供给方法可以更容易得到满足。在信息时代,日益增长的主权实体将是小型封闭区域,而不是大陆性帝国。其中一些可能是北美印第安部落,他们将声称在保留地和预留地上拥有税收管辖权,就像他们现在声称有权经营赌场或违反限制进行捕鱼一样。

Because information technology eliminates many of the drawbacks of devolving trading areas, it will be practical for the new sovereignties to operate more on the principles of clubs or affinity groups than those that governed territorial nationstates.

因为信息技术消除了分散交易区域的许多缺点,新的主权国家更多地按照俱乐部或亲和力群体的原则运作,而不是领土国家的原则,这将是可行的。

Just as it is not crucial that every potential customer share the same taste in clothes, or watch the same television programs, it will be less important than it may seem that everyone agree with affinity points that define the governing style of fragmented sovereignties.

就像每个潜在客户在服装品味或观看电视节目上都没有共同点一样,并不是每个人都赞同定义分裂主权风格的亲和力积分也同样重要。

Widely dispersed tastes will result in widely divergent styles of fragmented sovereignty, much as there are increasingly wide choices in clothing style or television broadcasts. Some microstates may even be linked like hotel groups in franchises, or 184

广泛分散的品位会导致碎片化主权的广泛分化,就像服装风格或电视广播的选择越来越广泛一样。一些微型国家甚至可能像连锁酒店集团一样联系在一起,或者 184

operate together to achieve advantages in police functions and other residual services of government. Those who like clean streets and resent finding gum under tabletops will find Singapore fetching. Fans of Beavis and Butthead won't. Those who like wild nightlife will prefer Macao or Panama, or some similar place. Customers uncomfortable with mores in one jurisdiction will be welcomed in others. While Salt Lake City may be

smokeless, the new city-state in Havana, perhaps renamed Monte Cristo, will probably be shrouded in a cloud of cigar smoke.

一起合作达到警务及其他政府残余服务上的优势。喜欢干净街道且讨厌在桌子下发现口香糖的人会发现新加坡很有魅力。但是,喜欢狂野夜生活的人会更喜欢澳门或巴拿马,或类似的地方。在一个管辖区内不自在的顾客将受到其他地方的欢迎。虽然盐湖城可能是无烟的,但可能被重新命名为蒙特-克里斯托的哈瓦那新城市州可能会被烟雾笼罩。

"It means that all of the monopolies and hierarchies and pyramids and power grids of industrial society are going to dissolve before this constant pressure of distributing intelligence to the fringes of all networks. Above all, Moore's Law will overthrow the key concentration, the key physical conglomeration of power in America today: the big city-that big set of industrial cities that now lives on hie -support systems-some 360 billion of direct subsidies from all the rest of us every year Big cities are leftover baggage from the industrial era."17 -GEORGE GILDER

这意味着工业社会的所有垄断、等级和金字塔以及电网将在分散到各网络边缘的智慧的持续压力下逐步瓦解。总的来说,摩尔定律将推翻美国当前最关键的权力集中和实体聚集:那些依靠生活支持系统生存的大城市-每年从我们其他人那里获得 360 亿美元的直接补贴。大城市是工业时代遗留的负担。

A peculiar irony of the reemergence of micro-sovereignities or "city-states" is that it may coincide with the emptying out of many cities. The large city was largely an artifact of industrialism in the West. It arose with the factory system to capture scale economies in the manufacture of products with high natural resource content.

微型主权或"城邦"的重新出现可能恰逢许多城市的衰落,这是一种奇特的讽刺。大城市在西方工业时代中大多是一种伪造的产物。随着工厂系统的出现,为了利用高自然资源含量产品制造领域的规模经济效应而产生了大城市。

When the nineteenth century opened, cities of more than 100,000 were considered huge, and outside of Asia, where population statistics were doubtful, there were no cities of more than a million persons. The largest city in the United States in 1800 was Philadelphia, with a population of

69,403. New York had just 60,489. Baltimore was the third largest city in America with 26,114 inhabitants. Most of what were to become the great metropolitan cities of Europe had populations that are tiny by twentieth-century standards. London, with a population of 864,845, was probably the biggest city in the world. Paris, with 547,756, was the only other city in Europe with more than half a million inhabitants in 1801. Lisbon's population was 350,000. Vienna had a population of 252,000.²¹ Berlin had barely poked above 200,000 by 1819. Madrid was home to 156,670. The population of Brussels in 1802 was 66,297. Budapest had a population of just 61,000.

当 19 世纪开始时,10 万以上人口的城市被视为巨大,除了亚洲地区人口统计不确定外,没有任何超过 100 万人口的城市。1800 年美国最大城市是费城,人口为 69,403。纽约只有 60,489 人。巴尔的摩是美国第三大城市,人口 26,114 人。20 世纪标准来看,欧洲许多将成为大都市的城市人口都很小。人口 864,845 的伦敦可能是世界最大城市。1801 年,除了人口 547,756 的巴黎外,欧洲没有其他超过 50 万人口的城市。里斯本人口 35 万,维也纳人口 25 万 2,柏林 1819 年人口刚刚超过 20 万,马德里人口 15 万 6,670,1802 年布鲁塞尔人口 66,297,布达佩斯人口只有 6 万 1 千。

There is an obvious temptation to think that the growth of big cities is a direct function of population growth. But this is not necessarily so. Every human on earth could be packed into Texas, with each family living in its own detached house with a yard, and still have some of Texas left over. As Adna Weber argued in the classic study *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, population growth alone does not explain why people live in urban settings rather than dispersed in the countryside. In 1890, Bengal had about the same population density as England. Yet Bengal's urban population was just 4.8 percent, while England's was 61.7 percent.²⁵ 大城市的增长并非直接源自人口增长。地球上的每个人都可以被集中在德克萨斯州,每个家庭都有自己的独立房屋和院子,德克萨斯州还会有剩余。正如阿德纳·韦伯在其经典著作《19 世纪城市的增长》中所阐述的,单纯的人口增长并不能解释为什么人们会选择生活在城市环境而非分散在乡村。1890 年,孟加拉的人口密度与英格兰差不多,但孟加拉的城市人口仅占 4.8%,而英格兰则达到 61.7%。

Historically, cities were walled off from the countryside to keep marauders and the lower classes out. The growth of industrial employment in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries created big cities. Now the big city has become highly vulnerable to breakdown as industrialism has begun to fade. The perfect marker of this development is Detroit, the leading industrial city of the mid-twentieth century. At one time, a large fraction of the world's industrial output passed through Detroit. Now it is a hollowed-out

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185 平方英里的城市,失去了大部分制造业就业岗位,人口也从峰值时的约 185 万人降至不到 70 万人。

shell, ridden by crime and disorder. In many blocks of downtown Detroit, one or more derelict buildings have been burned to the ground or torn down, leaving the impression that the city has survived a series of raids by World War II bombers.

在众多街区,至少有一栋或多栋废弃建筑被纵火烧毁或拆除,给人一种底特律曾遭遇二战轰炸机空袭后的景象。

Detroit stands as a reminder that many industrial cities are no longer viable. They will crumble away as information and ideas become more Important factors imparting value than fabricating from natural resources. In many cases, the large city has already grown too large to support its own weight. To keep a metropolis functioning requires that a substantial number of support systems operate effectively at large scale. The very crowding together of millions of people implies a huge jump in vulnerability to crime, sabotage, and random violence. During the industrial era, the price of policing against these risks was repaid by the high-scale economies of production.

底特律是一个提醒,许多工业城市已经不再可行。随着信息和理念变得比自然资源加工更加重要,它们将逐渐崩溃。在许多情况下,大城市已经过于庞大,无法支撑自身的重量。要保持大都市的运转,需要大规模有效地运转大量的支持系统。数百万人口挤在一起意味着犯罪、破坏和随机暴力的脆弱性大幅增加。在工业时代,应对这些风险的警力成本,可由大规模生产带来的经济效益来抵消。

In the Information Age, only cities that repay their upkeep costs by offering a high quality of life will remain viable. Persons at a distance will no longer be obliged to subsidize them. A good marker for the viability of cities is whether those living at the core of the city are richer than those on its periphery. Buenos Aires, London, and Paris will remain inviting places to live and do business long after the last good restaurant closes in South Bend, Louisville, and Philadelphia.

在信息时代,只有那些通过提供高质量的生活来偿还维护成本的城市才能保持可行性。远程的人将不再被迫为他们提供补贴。判断城市可行性的一个好标准是,城市中心居民的收入是否高于城市边缘居民。布宜诺斯艾利斯、伦敦和巴黎将在南本德、路易斯维尔和费城最后一家好餐厅关门很长时间后仍然是吸引人的居住和经商之地。

Country States

国家州

Some city-states may prove to be merely enclaves with no cities attached. 一些城邦可能证明只是没有城市附属的飞地。

Perhaps they might be better thought of as village states or country states. Natural resource endowments will be valued in different ways as well. When you can do business anywhere, you may well choose to do business in a beautiful place where you can breathe deeply without inhaling too much carcinogenic pollution.

也许可以将它们更好地视为乡村国家或国家国家。自然资源禀赋也将以不同的方式被评估。当你可以在任何地方经商时,你可能会选择一个美丽的地方做生意,在那里你可以深呼吸而不至于吸入过多的致癌污染。

Communications technologies that minimize language difficulties will make it ever easier to abide almost anywhere that the environment is attractive. Thinly populated regions with temperate climates, and a large endowment of arable land per head, like New Zealand and Argentina, will also enjoy a comparative advantage because they enjoy high standards of public health and are low-cost producers of foods and renewable products. Such products will benefit from increased demand as the living standards of

billions of people in East Asia and Latin America rise.

将语言障碍降到最低的通信技术使人们越来越容易在任何环境条件良好的地方生活。人口稀少且气候温和、人均可耕地丰富的地区,如新西兰和阿根廷,也会因拥有良好的公共卫生水平和低成本生产食品及可再生产品而享有比较优势。随着东亚和拉丁美洲数十亿人民生活水平的提高,这些产品的需求也会增加。

The Inequivalence Theorem

不可等价定理

Many of the assumptions of economists about behavior are rooted in the tyranny of place. A distinct example is Ricardo's "Equivalence Theorem," which suggests that citizens in a country that runs huge deficits will adjust their expectations in anticipation of higher tax rates needed in the future to retire the debt. In this sense, there is an "equivalence" between financing spending by taxation and through debt. At least there was such an equivalence in the early nineteenth century when Ricardo wrote. In the Information Age, however, the rational person will not respond to the prospect of higher taxes to fund deficits by increasing his savings rate; he will transfer his domicile, or lodge 186

经济学家关于行为的许多假设都根植于"地理位置的暴政"。一个明显的例子就是李嘉图的"等价定理",它认为在一个运营巨大赤字的国家,公民将调整他们的预期,以应对未来需要偿还债务而增加的税率。从这个意义上说,通过税收还是通过债务来支付开支都是"等价的"。至少在李嘉图撰写的 19 世纪初是这样的。然而在信息时代,理性的人不会为了弥补赤字而增加储蓄率,他会转移自己的居所或 199。

his transactions elsewhere. For the same reason that producers sort among suppliers in search of the lowest costs, they will be even more strongly motivated to seek alternative suppliers of protection. The benefits of doing so will dwarf the margins to be realized by shifting to a new supplier of plastic tubes. The result to be expected is that Sovereign Individuals and other rational people will flee jurisdictions with large unfunded liabilities. 在其他地方进行交易。由于生产商在寻找最低成本的供应商时会进行分类,他们将更加强烈地被激励寻找替代的保护供应商。这样做的好处

将大大超过转向新的塑料管供应商所能实现的利润。预期的结果是,主权个人和其他理性人将会逃离负有大量未偿付负债的管辖区。

Cheap governments that have few liabilities and impose low costs on customers will be the domiciles of choice for wealth creation in the Information Age. This implies much more attractive prospects for doing business in areas where indebtedness is low and governments have already been restructured, such as New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Singapore, and other parts of Asia and Latin America. These areas will also be superior platforms for doing business to unreformed, high-cost economies in North America and Western Europe.

信息时代财富创造的首选居所将是负债少、对客户收费低的廉价政府。这意味着在负债低且政府已重组的地区,如新西兰、阿根廷、智利、秘鲁、新加坡以及亚洲和拉丁美洲其他地区,从事商业活动会有更加吸引人的前景。这些地区也将成为进行商业活动的更优良平台,相比之下,北美和西欧尚未改革的高成本经济体就不那么理想了。

The Erosion of Local Price Anomalies 当地价格异常的侵蚀

Greatly reduced information costs will obviate most local pricing advantages.

大幅降低的信息成本将抵消大多数本地定价优势。

Not only will buyers be able to scan an immense number of outlets in search of the lowest prices on tradable goods; they will also be able to employ remote services to shop across jurisdictional boundaries. This will allow people to much more easily compare features of difficult-to-analyze products like insurance. And it will bypass restraints of trade imposed by local licensing procedures. Consequently, profit margins are likely to fall in any field where local price anomalies can be eroded by additional information and competition.

买家不仅能够扫描大量销售场所,寻找可交易商品的最低价格,还能利用远程服务在不同管辖区域进行购物。这将使人们更容易比较难以分析的产品(如保险)的特点。并且,它将绕过当地许可程序施加的贸易限

制。因此,任何领域一旦本地价格异常能够通过更多信息和竞争得到纠正,利润空间很可能会下降。

NEW ORGANIZATIONAL IMPERATIVES

全新的组织必要性

The cybereconomy will significantly differ from the industrial economy in the way its participants interact. Information technology will dissipate many of the long-term organizational advantages of firms that arise from high transaction and information costs. The Information Age will be the age of the "virtual corporation." Many analysts more knowledgeable than we are about information technology have utterly failed to see that it is destined to transform the logic of economic organization. Not only does the new technology transcend borders and barriers; it also revolutionizes the "internal" costs of computation. Even the few businesses that will not be affected by exposure to greater cross-border competition because of improving information and communication technology will be exposed to new organizational imperatives. Rapidly falling information and transaction costs will decisively lower economies to scale, voiding many of the incentives that gave rise to long-lived firms and career employment during the industrial period.

网络经济将在其参与者的互动方式上与工业经济有显著不同。信息技术将削弱企业长期组织优势,这些优势源于高交易和信息成本。信息时代将是"虚拟企业"的时代。比我们更了解信息技术的许多分析师完全没有看到它注定要改变经济组织的逻辑。新技术不仅跨越边界和障碍,还彻底改变了内部计算成本。即使少数不受跨境竞争影响的企业,由于信息和通信技术的进步,也将面临新的组织需求。信息和交易成本急剧下降将显著降低规模经济效应,削弱了工业时代造就长寿企业和终身雇佣的动力。

Why Firms?
为什么公司?

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The classical economists like Adam Smith were almost silent on the question of firm size. They did not address what influences the optimal size

of firms, why firms take the form they do, or even why firms exist at all. Why do entrepreneurs hire employees, rather than placing every task that needs doing out to bid among independent contractors in the auction market? Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase helped launch a new direction in economics by asking some of these important questions. The answers he helped to frame hint at the revolutionary consequences of information technology for the structure of business. Coase argued that firms were an efficient way to overcome information deficits and high transaction costs.²⁶

古典经济学家如亚当·斯密几乎对公司规模的问题缄默不语。他们没有讨论什么影响公司的最优规模,为什么公司采取他们现有的形式,甚至为什么公司的存在。为什么企业家要雇佣员工,而不是将需要做的每项任务都投标给独立承包商?诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗纳德·科斯通过提出一些这样重要的问题,开辟了经济学的一个新方向。他帮助构建的答案暗示了信息技术对企业结构的革命性后果。科斯认为,公司是克服信息缺乏和高交易成本的有效方式。

Information and Transaction Costs 信息与交易成本

To see why, consider the obstacles you would have faced in trying to operate an industrial-era assembly line without a single firm to coordinate its activities. In principle, an automobile could have been produced without production being centralized under the oversight of a single firm. Economist Oliver Williamson, along with Coase, is another pioneer in developing the theory of the firm. Williamson defined six different methods of operation and control. Among them is the "entrepreneurial mode," "wherein each workstation is owned and operated by a specialist."²⁷ Another is what Williamson calls the "federated workstations" in which "an intermediate product is transferred across stages by each worker."²⁸ There is no physical reason why the thousands of employees could not have been replaced by a gaggle of independent contractors, each renting space on the factory floor, bidding for parts, and offering to assemble the axle or weld the fenders onto the chassis. Yet you would look in vain for an example of an industrial-era automobile factory organized and run by independent contractors.

那么这样做的原因是什么呢?考虑一下,如果没有一家公司来协调其活动,您在试图运营工业时代的装配线时会面临什么样的障碍。从原理上讲,一辆汽车本可以在没有单一公司监管的情况下进行生产。经济学家奥利弗·威廉姆森与科斯是发展公司理论的另一位先驱。威廉姆森定义了六种不同的运营和控制方式。其中包括"企业家模式",即"每个工作站都由专业人员拥有和运营"。另一个是威廉姆森所谓的"联合工作站",在这种情况下,"中间产品是由每个工人转移到下一个阶段的"。在工厂车间内,成千上万的员工完全可以被独立承包商取代,每个人都租用车间空间,竞标零件并提供轴承组装或车身焊接。但是,您很难找到一个工业时代组织和运营由独立承包商运营的汽车工厂的例子。

Coordination Problems

协调问题

Operating an industrial facility without the benefit of coordination through a single firm would have dissipated most of the economies to be realized by operating on a large scale. Massive transaction problems in coordinating a patchwork quilt of small firms would have effectively deautomated the assembly line. To work at all, such a system would have necessitated nonstop negotiation among the individual contractors.

在没有单一公司协调的情况下运营工业设施,将会消散大部分通过大规模经营获得的经济效益。协调一个由小型公司组成的杂乱无章的拼图般的系统,将会有效地取消了装配线的自动化。这样的系统要想正常工作,将需要个别承包商之间不间断的谈判。

Instead of focusing on production, the multitude of contractors or entrepreneurs would have had to divert time and attention to fixing prices of components and working out the terms of their own constantly changing interactions. Simply monitoring production would have been a difficult problem.

相比专注于生产,大量承包商或企业家需要把时间和精力转移到固定组件价格和协调不断变化的彼此关系条款上。仅仅监控生产本身就是个棘手的问题。

The Authority to Act 授权行动

With such a set of independent organizations struggling to assemble a car, creation and re-engineering of the models would have been a nightmare. You need only 188
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imagine the difficulty facing the designer in attempting to convince the hundreds of independent contractors on changes required to introduce a new model. In practice, almost unanimous consent would have been needed. Anyone holding out or objecting to any change in the specification of the product could either have effectively killed the model improvement or raised the cost of introducing it, thus further jeopardizing the gains from operating on a large scale.

设计师要说服数百名独立承包商接受新型号所需的变更,这种困难可想而知。实际上,几乎需要获得一致同意。任何一个坚持或反对产品规格的变更的人都可能有效地阻止型号改进,或者增加引入改进的成本,从而进一步危及大规模运营带来的收益。

Unnecessary Negotiation 不必要的谈判

An assembly line rented (or owned separately) by independent contractors would have been subject to numerous vulnerabilities avoided by operating within a single firm.

由独立承包商租用(或单独拥有)的装配线将面临许多独立公司内部运营所避免的脆弱性。

The death, illness, or financial failure of individual contractors would have been an altogether too common occurrence in operations requiring the cooperation of thousands of people to build a single product under one roof. The auction market would have certainly been able to replace these contractors. But with each succession would have required a negotiated settlement, such as a buyout of the previous operator by his replacement. It also would have required an agreement on assumption of the rental of the factory space, and perhaps a new lease on the welding machine or the press

used for stamping out the taillight sockets. All of this would have been complicated.

个体承包商的死亡、疾病或财务失败对于需要数千人在一个屋顶下合作建造单一产品的业务而言,将是一种过于普遍的发生事件。拍卖市场肯定能够取代这些承包商。但在每次更换时,都需要进行协商解决,比如上一个操作者被后继者收购。这还需要就承租工厂场地达成协议,或许还需要就焊接机或用于压制尾灯座的压力机租赁达成新的租约。所有这些都会很复杂。

Incentive Traps

刺激激发陷阱

Another crucial difficulty with an assembly line of independent contractors under the conditions of the Industrial Age was that capital requirements for the individual contractors would have differed dramatically. A plastic mold needed to produce a dashboard switch, for example, might have been relatively cheap, while the equipment needed to cast an engine block or stamp out the sheet metal on a fender could have cost millions. The high resource content and sequential nature of assembly-line production made problems arising from high capital costs inevitable, for reasons analyzed in the last chapter. Contractors with capital-intensive tasks would have essentially been dependent upon the cooperation of others to amortize their investments. The ability of the contractors with higher capital requirements to raise money and operate at a profit would have depended upon their securing the cooperation of many other participants in the process whose capital costs were far lower. In many cases, they would not have gotten it.

另一个对工业时代下独立承包商组装线来说至关重要的困难是,个别承包商的资本需求会大不相同。例如生产仪表板开关的塑料模具可能相对便宜,而铸造发动机缸体或冲压挡泥板所需的设备可能需要数百万美元。正如前一章所分析的,装配线生产的高资源含量和顺序性使得高资本成本带来的问题不可避免。资本密集型任务的承包商基本上需要依赖其他人的合作来偿还投资。拥有更高资本要求的承包商能否筹集资金并盈利,将取决于他们是否能获得资本成本远低的其他参与方的配合。在许多情况下,他们是无法获得这种配合的。

There would have been a substantial incentive for the small to exploit the great.

小方对大方肆意剥削,这是一个相当大的诱因。

Those who required less money to operate their particular function on the assembly line would have gained by failing to cooperate at crucial times. Like striking workers, they could have closed down the assembly line on one pretext or another, imposing little cost on themselves but much grief to those with larger capital investments. The production process would have been subject to constant gaming, with small-scale contractors exposing those with higher capital costs to ransom through their ability to thwart output.

那些在装配线上的特定职能所需资金更少的人,在关键时刻未能合作将会获利。他们可以像罢工工人一样,以各种借口关闭装配线,自身付出小,却给资本投资较大的人带来巨大损失。生产过程会不断受到小规模承包商的操纵,他们可以通过扰乱产出来敲诈那些资本成本较高的人。

The maneuvering of smaller contractors to extract side payments from the large would have reduced the efficiency of the system.

小型承包商将从大型承包商那里提取额外支付以进行操纵,从而降低了该系统的效率。

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The Firm Solution 公司解决方案

In short, many of the economies to be achieved during the industrial era by operating an assembly line on a large scale would have been dissipated if the production had been divided among multitudes of individual contractors. The single large firm was an efficient way of overcoming these drawbacks, notwithstanding its other limitations.

在短期内,在工业时代通过大规模操作装配线来实现的许多经济效益,如果生产被划分给大量个人承包商来完成,这些效益都将分散。单一的大型企业是克服这些缺点的高效方式,尽管它也存在其他局限性。

Big business was bureaucratic. But to some extent bureaucracy and hierarchy were precisely what were required during the Industrial Age. Administrative and management teams monitored and coordinated production, with numerous middle managers passing orders down the hierarchy and other information back up the chain of command. The corporate bureaucracy also provided bookkeeping and accounting controls and minimized principal-agency problems, in which employees fail to act in the best interest of the firm that employs them. To achieve sophisticated accountancy under conditions of the Industrial Age required the work of many people. Having such an administrative bureaucracy in place was costly. It had to be paid whether production was active or slack. Because such administrators held crucial knowledge necessary to operate the business, they were usually paid a premium above what their skills would have commanded in the spot market.

大企业是官僚主义的。但在某种程度上,官僚主义和层级正是工业时代所需要的。行政和管理团队监控和协调生产,众多中层经理一级一级地传达命令,将其他信息反馈到指挥链上。企业官僚体系还提供了簿记和会计控制,并最大限度地减少了委托-代理问题,即员工未能按照雇主的最佳利益行事。为了在工业时代达到复杂的会计核算,需要许多人的工作。建立这种行政官僚体系是昂贵的。不管生产是活跃还是疏松,都必须付费。由于这些管理人员掌握了经营业务所需的关键知识,他们通常会获得高于在现货市场上应得的报酬。

"Organizational Slack"

组织松弛

The large numbers of professional managers and administrators also had the drawback of tending to "capture" the firm and operate it in their own interests rather than those of the shareholders. It was not uncommon in the industrial era, for example, to find firms spending lavishly on office furnishings, club memberships, and other perks that could be enjoyed by management but that might not have generated a direct return to investors. In a complicated business, it was impossible to easily monitor from the outside which overhead expenditures were essential and which were indulgences for the employees. It was also difficult to prevent a sometimes considerable fraction of corporate employees from shirking. The fact that it

was technologically difficult to monitor performance made a large middle management necessary, and at the same time made it difficult to monitor the monitors.

大量的专业经理和管理人员也有一个缺点,就是倾向于"捕获"公司,并根据自己的利益而不是股东的利益来经营公司。在工业时代,很常见找到公司挥霍在办公室装饰、俱乐部会员等等管理层可以享受的津贴上,但这些却可能没有给投资者带来直接回报。在一个复杂的业务中,很难从外部监控哪些间接开支是必要的,哪些是员工的满足。也很难阻止相当大比例的公司员工偷懒。事实上,从技术上很难监控绩效,这就需要大量的中层管理人员,但同时也很难监控这些监控者。

These conditions all contributed to what became known as "organizational slack,"

这些条件都促成了所谓的"组织松弛"

a term coined in 1963 by Richard Cyert and James March in A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 29 Careful examination suggested that numerous real firms were underperforming their potential substantially.

理查德·塞尔特和詹姆斯·马奇在 1963 年出版的《公司行为理论》中提出的术语。进一步仔细研究表明,众多实际企业的业绩大幅低于其潜力。

"Whether you produce results or not, the pay is the same.
无论您是否产生结果,薪酬都是一样的。

"Whether you work hard or not, the pay is the same.
不论你工作努力与否,工资都是一样的。

"Whether you care or not, the pay is the same."30 CHRIS DRAY
"不管你在乎不在乎,工资都是一样的。"

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"That's Not My Job"
那不是我的工作

As an entity aspiring to permanence, the large industrial firm had the drawback we have already explored of being exposed to shakedowns by labor unions. It also shared some of the characteristics of bureaucracy seen in a more exaggerated form in government offices. Orders flowed from on high. Tasks were stereotyped and compartmentalized. These tasks were often rigidly defined. Boundaries emerged among job categories, akin to those enforced by the cartels regulating the learned professions.

大型工业企业作为一个追求永久性的实体,存在我们已经探讨过的被工会敲诈的缺点。它还共享了政府机构中更夸张形式的官僚主义特征。命令从上而下传达。任务被标准化和分隔。这些任务通常被严格定义。工作类别之间出现了界限,类似于学习行业管理集团强制执行的界限。

To have expected a bookkeeper to change a burned-out lightbulb in a lamp on his desk seemed as strange to many during the Industrial Age as calling on a lawyer to help cure your flu. Employees were neither expected, nor in many cases even permitted, to cross the compartmentalized boundaries between rigidly defined functions.

在工业时代,许多人认为让一个账簿管理员更换桌上台灯的灯泡就像让律师帮你治流感一样很奇怪。员工既不被期望,在许多情况下也不被允许跨越严格界定的职能部门的界限。

"That is not my job" was a widely heard slogan that underscored the "organizational slack" of the Industrial Age. Everyone's job was precisely defined in terms of stereotyped tasks that were not to be trespassed upon, however much that might improve productivity. Each employee in the corporate bureaucracy was hired according to "qualifications" deemed likely to predict performance in his specific function. With few exceptions, everyone was paid based upon a job classification, with more or less uniform pay throughout the organization. Because specific performance in the administrative hierarchies of Big Business often went unmeasured, as in state bureaucracies, work proceeded at a leisurely pace. So while the firm did capture the scale economies of mass production, it did so at the cost of other inefficiencies.

"那不是我的工作"是一个广为人知的口号,突出了工业时代的"组织松弛"。每个人的工作都被精确地定义为固有的任务,不能超越,无论这可

能如何提高生产率。公司行政机构的每位员工都根据被认为可能预测其特定功能的"资格"而雇用。除少数例外,每个人都根据职位等级获得报酬,整个组织内的薪酬较为统一。由于大企业行政层级中的具体绩效常常无法衡量,就像在国家官僚机构中一样,工作进程缓慢悠闲。因此,尽管公司确实获得了大规模生产的规模经济,但这是以其他低效率为代价的。

"In a market, you don't do something because somebody tells you to or because it is listed on page thirty of the strategic plan. A market has no job boundaries. . . . There are no orders, no translation of signals from on high, no one sorting out the work into parcels. In a market one has customers, and the relationship between a supplier and a customer is fundamentally nonorganizational, because it is between two independent entities."31

WILLIAM BRIDGES

在市场上,你不是因为有人告诉你这样做,或者因为这样写在战略计划的第三十页上。市场没有工作界限。。。没有命令,也没有从高层传达的信号转译,也没有人将工作分成几份。在市场上,你有客户,供应商与客户之间的关系是基本上非组织性的,因为他们是两个独立的实体。

New Imperatives

新的紧迫性

The new megapolitical conditions of the Information Age will significantly alter the logic of business organization. Part of this is obvious. If information technology does nothing else, it dramatically lowers the cost of processing, computing, and analyzing information. One effect of such technology is to reduce the necessity of hiring large numbers of middle managers to monitor production processes. Indeed, automated machine tools made possible by advanced computational power are in many cases replacing hourly workers. And where the production process continues to be manned, the control and coordination process has largely been automated. Equipment fitted with microprocessors can monitor the progress of the assembly line much more effectively than managers ever could. Not only can the new equipment measure the speed and accuracy with which people work, it can also automatically compile accounts, and 191

信息时代的新的政治条件将显著改变企业组织的逻辑。这部分是显

而易见的。如果信息技术什么也不做,它也会大幅降低信息处理、计算和分析的成本。这种技术的一个效果是减少雇佣大量中层经理来监控生产过程的必要性。事实上,通过先进的计算能力实现的自动化机床正在许多情况下取代时薪工人。而在生产过程仍由人工操作的情况下,控制和协调过程已基本实现自动化。配备微处理器的设备可以比经理更有效地监控装配线的进度。新设备不仅可以测量人们工作的速度和准确性,还可以自动编制账目,191

reorder components the moment they are taken out of inventory. The smallest operations can now afford financial control programs that account for their finances with greater speed and sophistication than even the largest corporations could have achieved through their production hierarchies a few decades ago.

从仓储中取出的部件及时重新排列组合。现在即使是最小的企业也能负担得起财务控制程序,比几十年前最大公司通过生产层级所能达到的速度和复杂程度更高。

The fact that information technology allows for dispersed, nonsequential output of products with reduced natural resource content dramatically reduces the vulnerability to gaming and extortion, as we have already explored. However, these are not the only characteristics of information technology that make it ever more attractive to contract out functions formerly done by employees. Capital costs are lower. Product cycles are shorter. The independent contractors themselves, including the one-person firms, have vastly more sophisticated information networks at their disposal. Soon they will be able to rely upon an array of digital servants to perform a wide variety of office functions, from answering the phone to secretarial services. Digital servants will be secretaries, advertising agents, travel agents, bank tellers, and bureaucrats.

信息技术允许分散、非连续地输出含有较少自然资源的产品,这极大地降低了受到欺骗和勒索的脆弱性。此外,这还不是信息技术使其更加适合于外包的唯一特点。资本成本较低,产品周期更短,独立承包商本人(包括个体企业)拥有更为复杂的信息网络。他们很快就能依赖各种数字助手来执行各种办公功能,从接听电话到秘书服务。数字助手将充当秘书、广告代理、旅行代理、银行出纳和官僚。

The Disappearance of Good Jobs 好工作的消失

To an increasing degree, individuals capable of creating significant economic value will be able to retain most of the value they create for themselves. Support staff that previously absorbed a large part of the revenue generated by the principal income creators in an enterprise will be replaced by low-cost automated agents and information systems. This implies that an organization will be better able to assure itself of the highest quality of service by contracting it out, rather than by keeping the function within the firm, where it will be relatively more difficult to reward individuals for performing a task well. A virtual corporation will eliminate most "organizational slack" by eliminating the organization.

越来越多具有创造重大经济价值能力的个人将能够为自己保留他们创造的大部分价值。先前吸收企业主创造收入的大部分收入的支持人员将被低成本的自动代理和信息系统所取代。这意味着一个组织将能够更好地确保通过外包获得最高质量的服务,而不是将该功能保留在公司内部,在这种情况下,很难奖励个人出色完成任务。虚拟公司将通过消除组织来消除大部分"组织松弛"。

"Good jobs" will be a thing of the past. A "good job," as Princeton economist Orly Ashenfelter put it, "is a job that pays more than you are worth."³ In the Industrial Age, many "good jobs" existed because of high information and transaction costs. Firms grew bigger and internalized a wider range of functions because doing so allowed them to capture scale economies. Corporate bloat was also subsidized by tax laws. The high taxes that predominated in the late stages of the industrial era artificially magnified the advantages of forming a long-lived firm and hiring permanent employees. In most nations, tax laws and regulations substantially raised the costs of forming and dissolving firms on a project basis. They also have tended to force entrepreneurs to subsume independent contractors as employees. Legal interventions further temporarily inflated the supply of "good jobs" by making it costly and difficult to dismiss an employee, however little he might be contributing to the productivity of the firm.

"优质工作"将成为过去式。普林斯顿经济学家欧利·阿申菲尔特所说

的"优质工作"是"工资高于你所值的工作"。在工业时代,许多"优质工作"之所以存在,是因为信息和交易成本很高。企业变得越来越大,并将更广泛的职能内部化,因为这样做能让他们获得规模经济效益。企业膨胀也得到了税收法的补贴。工业时代后期主导的高税率人为放大了组建持久公司和聘用永久员工的优势。在大多数国家,税法 and 法规大幅增加了按项目基础成立和解散公司的成本。它们也倾向于强迫企业家将独立承包商纳入员工。法律干预进一步暂时夸大了"优质工作"的供给,因为无论员工对公司生产力贡献有多少,解雇他们都会很耗成本和困难。

Inevitably and logically, the character of business organization in the industrial era assured that the most highly skilled and talented people who created a disproportionate share of the value-added in an organization were paid proportionately less than their contribution was worth. This will change in the Information Age.

不可避免且合乎逻辑,工业时代的商业组织特点确保了创造了组织中大部分增值的最高技能和才能人士获得的报酬低于他们贡献的价值。这种情况将在信息时代发生改变。

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The microprocessing revolution is sharply increasing the availability of information and reducing transaction costs. This is devolving the firm. Instead of permanent bureaucracy, activities will be organized around projects, in much the way that movie companies already operate. Most of the formerly "internal" functions of the firm will be outsourced to independent contractors. The industrial-era employees who held "good jobs" but who contributed little and relied upon fellow workers to "cover" for them will soon find themselves bidding for contracts in the spot market. And so will many loyal, diligent employees. "Good jobs" will be an anachronism because jobs in general will be anachronistic.

微处理器革命正急剧增加信息的可用性并降低交易成本。这正在分解公司。与永久性官僚机构不同,活动将围绕项目组织,就像电影公司已经运营的方式一样。公司的大部分原"内部"职能将外包给独立承包商。在工业时代拥有"好工作"但贡献微薄、依赖同事"替他们掩护"的员工,

将很快发现自己在现货市场上投标。忠诚勤勉的员工也将如此。"好工作"将成为一种陈旧观念,因为总体来说工作本身都将成为一种陈旧观念。

In the extreme case of big Japanese corporations, employees expected to have a job for life. Even where they had no productive task to perform, they would be retained, sometimes merely showing up to sit at "a bare desk in the corner of a factory." Now even in Japan, the bloated white-collar workforce is being downsized. The headline of a story in the International Herald-Tribune told the tale: "Parting Is Such Sour Sorrow: Japan's Job-for-Life Culture Painfully Expires." 33 In the postindustrial period, jobs will be tasks you do, not something you "have." Before the industrial era, permanent employment was almost unknown. As William Bridges put it, "Before 1800-and long after in many cases-job always referred to some particular task or undertaking, never to a role or position in an organization. ... Between 1700 and 1890, the Oxford English Dictionary finds many uses of terms like job-coachman, job-doctor, and job-gardener-all referring to people hired on a one-time basis. Jobwork (another frequent term) was occasional work, not regular employment." 34 In the Information Age, most tasks that were formerly captured within firms as an expedient to reduce information and transaction costs will migrate back to the spot market. "Just in time" inventory control and outsourcing are both practical because of information technology. They are steps toward the death of jobs.

在大型日本企业的极端情况下,员工被期望终生就职。即使他们没有生产性工作任务,也会被保留,有时仅仅是出现在工厂角落的"一张空桌前"。即使在日本,臃肿的白领劳动力也正在被精简。《国际先驱论坛报》一篇报道的标题反映了这一情况:"分离如此痛苦:日本终生工作文化艰难消亡。"在后工业时代,工作将成为你所做的任务,而不是你"拥有"的东西。在工业时代之前,永久性就业几乎是未知的。正如威廉·布里奇斯所说,"在 1800 年之前,甚至在许多情况下很长一段时间之后,工作一直指某一特定任务或事业,而从未指组织中的角色或职位。...在 1700 年到 1890 年之间,牛津英语词典发现了许多类似'job-coachman'、'job-doctor'和'job-gardener'等术语的使用,它们都指临时雇佣的人。'Jobwork'(另一个常见术语)是偶尔性工作,而非常规就业。"在信息时代,许多以前被公司内部捕获、旨在降低信息和交易成本的任务将

回到现货市场。"及时"库存控制和外包都是由于信息技术而实现的。它们都是通向工作消亡的步骤。

Already, major corporations such as AT&T have eliminated all permanent job categories.

已经有像美国电话电报公司这样的大公司取消了所有永久性工作类别。

Positions in that large firm are now contingent. In Bridges's words, "Employment is becoming temporary and situational again, and categories are losing their boundaries."³⁵

在那家大公司里,目前的职位都是临时性质的。正如 Bridges 所言,"雇佣正变得暂时和临时性质,各类别之间的界限也正在消失"。

In the new cybereconomy, "independent contractors" will telecommute across continents to nest together on the Information Age equivalent of the assembly line.

在新的网络经济中,"独立承包商"将跨大陆进行远程工作,在信息时代装配线的等价物上共同工作。

Hollywood Takes Over 好莱坞接管

The model business organization of the new information economy may be a movie production company. Such enterprises can be very sophisticated, with budgets of hundreds of millions of dollars. While they are often large operations, they are also temporary in nature. A movie company producing a film for \$100 million may come together for a year and then dissolve.

While the people who work on the production are talented, they have no expectation that finding work on the project is equivalent to having a "permanent job." When the project is over, the lighting technicians, cameramen, sound engineers, and wardrobe specialists will go their separate ways. They may be reunited in another project, or they may not.

新信息经济的典型商业组织模式可能是电影制作公司。这类企业可能非常复杂,预算高达数亿美元。它们虽然通常是大型运营,但也具有临时性质。一家制作 1 亿美元电影的公司可能只会凝聚一年时间,然后就会

解散。尽管在拍摄工作中的人才众多,但他们并不期望在这个项目上找到"永久工作"。当项目结束时,照明技术员、摄像师、音响工程师和服装专业人员将各自走各自的路。他们可能会在另一个项目中重聚,也可能不会。

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As scale economies fall, and capital requirements for many types of information-intensive activities fall simultaneously, there will be a strong incentive for firms to dissolve. Business operations will be more ad hoc and temporary. Firms will tend to be more short-lived. Virtual corporations that assemble talents for specific purposes will be more efficient than longstanding companies. As encryption becomes widespread and the taxation of capital is forced down by competition, artificial scale economies that sustain the existence of "permanent" firms will fall away. This will happen whether taxes are reduced rapidly or slowly. If rapidly, the artificial costs of functioning on a project basis will disappear more quickly. If slowly, the main burden of paying the anachronistically high taxes will fall upon existing firms, while new enterprises will operate as virtual corporations, better enabling them to escape costly burdens imposed by the dying nationstate.

随着规模经济的下降,以及许多信息密集型活动所需的资本需求同时下降,企业解散将会有很强的动力。业务运营将更加临时和特设。企业将趋于更短暂的生命周期。针对特定目的组建人才的虚拟公司将比长期存在的公司更加有效率。随着加密技术的广泛应用以及资本征税受竞争的压力下降,维持"永久"企业存在的人为规模经济将逐渐消失。无论税收是快速还是缓慢降低,这都将发生。如果快速降低,以项目为基础运作的人为成本将更快消失。如果缓慢降低,维持现有企业高额税收的主要负担将落在现有企业身上,而新企业将以虚拟公司的形式运营,从而更好地逃避垂死的民族国家施加的沉重负担。

While special skills and talents will be more important than ever in the information economy, most of the artificial boundaries between professions will dissolve.

虽然专业技能和才能在信息经济中将比以往更加重要,但大多数职业之间的人工边界将被消除。

Advanced information and retrieval storage technologies will make the trade secrets and specialized information of professions such as law, medicine, and accounting available to anyone. The economic value of memorization as a skill will fall, while the importance of synthesis and creative application of information will rise.

先进的信息和检索存储技术将使专业人士如法律、医疗和会计业的商业机密和专业信息供任何人使用。记忆力作为一种技能的经济价值将会下降，而信息的综合和创造性应用的重要性将会上升。

The full implications of this change will be retarded by antiquated regulation. But over the longer term, the power of governments to regulate the cybereconomy will wither to the vanishing point. Any artificial regulation of professional monopolies that raises costs without benefits that are valued in the market will ultimately be ignored.

此变革的全面影响将被过时的法规所阻碍。但从长远来看,政府调控网络经济的能力将逐步消失。任何不带来市场效益、却提高成本的专业垄断人工调控,最终都将被忽视。

There are other implications of the shift to an information economy: • Local regulations that impose higher costs will be transformed to a market footing.

向信息经济转变的其他影响包括:•当地政策法规带来的更高成本将转变为市场定价。

- There will be intensified competition among jurisdictions to domicile high value-added activities that in principle could be located anywhere. No stopping place is necessarily more compelling than the next.

各司法管辖区之间将加剧竞争,以将高附加值活动进行驻留。原则上,任何地方都可以成为此类活动的所在地,并非一定会有比其他地方更具吸引力的位置。

- Business relations will gravitate toward reliance upon "circles of trust." Due to encryption, which gives individuals an ability to steal undetected, honesty will be a more highly valued characteristic of business associates. 商业关系将倾向于依赖"信任圈"。由于加密技术使个人能够无法被察觉地窃取,诚实将成为商业伙伴更高度重视的特质。

- Patent and copyright regimes will change, due to ease of access to certain information.

专利和版权制度将发生变化,因为某些信息可以轻易获取。

- Protection will become increasingly technological rather than juridical. The lower classes will be walled out. The move to gated communities is all but inevitable. Walling out troublemakers is an effective as well as traditional way of minimizing criminal violence in times of weak central authority.

保护将变得越来越技术性而不是法律性。下层阶级将被隔离在外。进入封闭式社区的趋势已经不可避免。在中央权力薄弱的时期,将麻烦制造者隔离在外是一种有效且传统的防范刑事暴力的方式。

- Bulk goods will be heavily taxed and shipped locally, as in the Middle Ages, while luxury goods will be lightly taxed and shipped a great distance.³⁶

散货将被大幅征税并在本地装运,就像中世纪一样,而奢侈品将被征税较少并远距离运输。

- Police functions will increasingly be taken up by private guards linked to merchant associations.

警察职能将越来越多地被与商业协会关联的私人保安接管。

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- There may be a transitional advantage to private over publicly traded firms because private firms will enjoy greater leeway in escaping costs imposed by governments.

私营企业可能会相对上市公司有一个过渡性优势,因为私营企业可以更自由地摆脱政府施加的成本。

- Lifetime employment will disappear as "jobs" increasingly become tasks or "piece work" rather than positions within an organization.

终身雇佣将消失,因为"工作"越来越成为任务或"零工"而不是组织内的岗位。

- Control over economic resources will shift away from the state to persons of superior skills and intelligence, as it becomes increasingly easy to create wealth by adding knowledge to products.

经济资源的控制将从国家向拥有卓越技能和智力的个人转移,因为通过增加产品知识来创造财富变得越来越容易。

- Many members of learned professions will be displaced by interactive information-retrieval systems.

许多受过专业训练的人员将因互动信息检索系统而失去工作。

- New survival strategies for persons of lower intelligence will evolve, involving greater concentration on development of leisure skills, sports abilities, and crime, as well as service to the growing numbers of Sovereign Individuals as income inequality within jurisdictions rises.

低智商人群的新生存策略将会出现,涉及更多集中于娱乐技能、体育能力和犯罪,以及为不断增加的主权个人提供服务,因为管辖区内的收入不平等加剧。

Political systems that grew up at a time when there were rising returns to violence must undergo wrenching adjustments. Now that efficiency is growing in importance relative to the magnitude of power commanded by a system, small, efficient sovereignties, which produce more protection for their customers at lower cost, will be increasingly sustainable.

在暴力回报上升的时代中发展起来的政治体系必须经历剧烈的调整。现在效率相对于体系掌控的权力规模而言越来越重要,小型高效的主权国家,它们能以较低的成本为客户提供更多保护,将会越来越可持续。

As in the medieval period, there are once again growing diseconomies of scale in the organization of violence. This is already reflected in the growing number of sovereign entities since the fall of Communism. We expect the number of sovereignties in the world to multiply rapidly as the logic of the Information Age is confirmed by experience.

正如中世纪一样,在暴力组织中再次出现规模经济逆效应。这已反映在共产主义垮台后主权实体数量的增加。我们预计,随着信息时代逻辑得到实践证实,世界上的主权数量将迅速增多。

Power will once again be exercised on a small scale. Enclaves and provinces may even find that they have substantial advantages over nations spanning continents in offering competitive terms to their "customers" for sovereignty services. This will be very different from the rapidly dying modern period, in which no entity could survive unless it could control military force sufficient to control a kingdom. In the past, when there were diseconomies of scale in exercising power, those who benefited most from the protection, like the wealthy merchants in the late medieval city-states, did control the government. In our view, you can look for something like this again. The lowering of predatory burdens and more efficient disposition of resources should result in rapid growth in areas where customers do exercise control over the local sovereignties.

权力将再次以小规模的形式得到施展。内阁和省份可能会发现,相比跨越整个大陆的国家,它们在为"客户"提供主权服务方面具有明显优势。这将与正在迅速消亡的现代时期大不相同,在那个时期,没有任何实体能够生存,除非它能够控制足以统治一个王国的军事力量。在过去,当行使权力存在规模不经济时,那些从保护中获益最多的人,如中世纪末期城邦中的富裕商人,确实控制了政府。我们认为,您可以再次寻找这种情况。剥削性负担的降低和资源更有效的配置,应会导致那些客户能够对当地主权行使控制的地区出现快速增长。

As we explore next, whether these developments can or should proceed in the face of opposition from legions of losers will be among the more Important controversies of the Information Age.

当我们继续探讨时,无论这些发展是否能够或应该在众多失败者的反对中继续前进,都将成为信息时代最重要的争议之一。

CHAPTER 9

第 9 章

NATIONALISM, REACTION, AND THE NEW
新民族主义、反动和新事物

LUDDITES

勒德派

"Nationalism, of course, is intrinsically absurd. Why should the accident of fortune or misfortune of birth as an American, Albanian, Scot, or Fiji islander impose loyalties that dominate an individual life and structure a society so as to place it in formal conflict with others?

国家主义当然是本质上荒谬的。为什么一个人偶然出生为美国人、阿尔巴尼亚人、苏格兰人或斐济岛民,就必须给自己的个人生活和整个社会结构带来效忠压力,进而与他人正式对抗?

In the past there were local loyalties to place and clan and tribe, obligations to lord or landlord, dynastic or territorial wars, but primary loyalties were to religion, God or god-king, possibly to emperor to a civilization as such. There was no nation. There was attachment to patria, land of one's fathers, or patriotism, but to speak of nationalism before modern times is anachronistic."

在过去,人们对地方、氏族和部落有本地忠诚度,对主子或地主有义务,有朝代或领土战争,但主要忠诚度集中在宗教、上帝或神王,可能还有皇帝和文明本身。没有国家观念。人们有对祖国、父亲的土地或爱国主义的依恋,但在现代时期之前谈及民族主义是时代错位的。

-WILLIAM PFAFF

威廉·普法夫

<http://www.ibm.com>

To say that the "world is getting smaller" is an informing figure of speech, reinforced by authorities as prestigious as IBM's advertising agency. Their "Solutions for a small planet" multicultural commercials for the Internet remind sports fans who may fail to realize it on their own that the terms of relations between individuals in widely dispersed jurisdictions have been changed by technology. We refer to the distinguished historian William McNeill for a useful footnote on the implications. He writes, "Continuing intensification of communications and transport, instead of favoring national consolidation, has begun to work in a contrary sense, inasmuch as its range transcends existing political and ethnic boundaries."² As the world "becomes smaller" and communications improve, the accidental and "intrinsically absurd" claims of nations and nationalism are bound to weaken.

世界正在变小"这个说法是一个有意义的修辞手法,受到 IBM 广告公司等权威机构的支持。他们在互联网上播放的"面向小型星球的解决方案"多元文化广告,提醒了可能没有自己意识到这一点的体育迷,即在广泛分散的管辖区之间个人关系的条件已经被技术改变。我们引用著名历史学家 William McNeill 的一个有用的脚注来说明这种含义。他写道:"通讯和交通的持续加强,并没有有利于国家整合,反而开始产生相反的作用,因为它的范围已经超越了现有的政治和民族边界。"随着世界"变小"以及通讯的改善,国家和民族主义的偶然和"本质上荒谬"的主张必然会减弱。

THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

大变局

The trouble with this reasonable expectation is that all previous history suggests that it cannot be accommodated in a reasonable way. The transition it implies will involve a crisis. It entails a radically new way of thinking, a new imagining of community that moves beyond nationalism and the nationstate. As Michael Billig has highlighted, "our beliefs about nation-hood, and about the naturalness of belonging to a nation," are "the products of a particular historical age." ³ That age, the Modern Age, may already be defunct. Its predominant institutions, nationstates, still endure, but they survive precariously upon an eroded foundation. As the other shoe drops, and nationstates collapse, we expect a nasty reaction, particularly in the wealthy countries where the "national economy" brought high income to unskilled work in the twentieth century. We believe that when all is said and done, the change in megapolitical conditions occasioned 196

对这一合理期望的麻烦在于,所有以往的历史都表明,这种期望无法以合理的方式实现。它所暗示的转型将涉及一场危机。它意味着一种全新的思维方式,一种超越民族主义和民族国家的社区想象。正如迈克尔·比利希所强调的,"我们关于民族和自然地属于一个民族的信念"是"一个特定历史时代的产物"。³ 这个时代,即现代时代,可能已经不复存在。它主导的机构——民族国家——虽仍在持续,但却建立在一个已然脆弱的基础之上。当另一只鞋掉落,民族国家崩溃之际,我们预料会出现令人不悦的反应,特别是在那些 20 世纪"国民经济"为非熟练工人带来较高收入的富裕国家。我们相信,无论最后结果如何,导致这种巨大政治条件变化的

by the advent of information technology will result in radical institutional change. The thesis of this book is that the massed power of the nationstate is destined to be privatized and commercialized. Like all truly radical institutional change, the privatization and commercialization of sovereignty will involve a revolution in the "common sense" of the way the world is comprehended. Such change seldom happens in a gradual, linear way.

信息技术的出现将导致彻底的制度变革。这本书的论点是,民族国家的

集中权力注定要被私有化和商业化。像所有真正的根本性制度变革一样,主权的私有化和商业化将涉及对世界理解方式的"常识"革命。这种变革很少以渐进、线性的方式发生。

To the contrary. Indeed, for reasons we explored in *The Great Reckoning*, it is practically ruled out. We expect the Information Age to bring discontinuities-sharp breaks with the institutions and the consciousness of the past. Here is what to look for as the process unfolds:

与之相反。实际上,正如我们在《大清算》中探讨的原因,这种情况几乎是不可能发生的。我们预计信息时代将带来不连续性 - 与过去的制度和意识的急剧断裂。以下是这一过程展开时要关注的内容:

1.

Changes in economic organization of the kind described in previous chapters arising from the impact of microprocessing.

从前几章所述的微处理器对经济组织的影响而造成的变革。

2.

A more or less rapid falloff in importance of all organizations that operate within rather than beyond geographic boundaries. Governments, labor unions, licensed professions, and lobbyists will be less important in the Information Age than they became during the Industrial Age. Because favors and restraints of trade wrested from governments will be less useful, fewer resources will be wasted in lobbying.⁴

在地理边界内而非边界以外运营的所有组织的重要性将或快或慢地下降。在信息时代,政府、工会、持证专业人士和游说者将比工业时代更不重要。因为从政府那里获得的优惠和贸易限制将不那么有用,因此浪费在游说上的资源也会减少。

2.

Wider recognition that the nationstate is obsolete, leading to widespread secession movements in many parts of the globe.

广泛认识到国家-国家已经过时,导致全球许多地区出现大规模分裂运动。

3.

A decline in the status and power of traditional elites, as well as a decline in the respect accorded the symbols and beliefs that justify the nationstate.

传统精英地位和权力的衰退,以及支撑民族国家的符号和信仰所受尊重的降低。

4.

An intense and even violent nationalist reaction centered among those who lose status, income, and power when what they consider to be their "ordinary life" is disrupted by political devolution and new market arrangements. Among the features of this reaction:

对于那些在他们认为的"普通生活"被政治权力下放和新市场安排所干扰时地位、收入和权力下降的人来说,一种强烈甚至暴力的民族主义反应正在出现。这种反应的特点包括:

a.

suspicion of and opposition to globalization, free trade, "foreign"
对全球化、自由贸易、"外国"的怀疑和反对

ownership and penetration of local economies;
本地经济的所有权和渗透

b.

hostility to immigration, especially of groups that are visibly different from the former national group;

对移民,特别是与原国家群体明显不同的群体的敌意;

c.

popular hatred of the information elite, rich people, the well-educated, and complaints about capital flight and disappearing jobs;
对信息精英、富人和受过良好教育的人的普遍仇恨,以及对资本外逃和就业岗位消失的抱怨

d.

extreme measures by nationalists intent upon halting the secession of individuals and regions from faltering nationstates, including resort to wars and acts of "ethnic cleansing" that reinforce nationalist identification with the state and rationalize the state's claims on people and their resources.
极端措施由民族主义者采取,旨在阻止个人和地区从陷入困局的民族国家分裂,包括诉诸战争和"种族清洗"等行为,以加强人们对国家的民族认同,并合理化国家对人民及其资源的索取。

5.

Since it will be obvious that information technologies facilitate the escape of Sovereign Individuals from the power of the state, the reaction to the collapse of compulsion will also include a neo-Luddite attack on these new technologies and those who use them.

由于显而易见,信息技术有助于主权个人逃离国家的控制,对强制力的崩溃的反应还将包括对这些新技术及其使用者的新卢德主义式的攻击。

7.

The nationalist-Luddite reaction will not be uniform across regions and population groups: a. The reaction will be less intense in rapidly growing
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197 年度快速增长的地区反应将较为温和。

economies where per capita income was low during the industrial era, and where the deepening of markets raises incomes among all skill groups.
在工业时代人均收入较低的经济体以及市场深化提高所有技能群体收入的地方。

b.

Reactionary sentiments will be most intensely felt within the currently rich countries, and especially in communities with high percentages of the value-poor and skill-poor who previously enjoyed high incomes.*

反动情绪将最强烈地出现在目前富裕的国家,尤其是高比例的价值贫困和技能贫困人口曾经享有高收入的社区。

c.

The Unabomber notwithstanding, the neo-Luddites will attract most of their adherents among those in the bottom two-thirds of earnings capacity within the populations of leading nationstates.

虽然"联邦炸弹邮差"一事不能忽视,但新卢德分子主要会吸引来自领先国家人口中收入能力在下三分之二的追随者。

d.

The nationalist and Luddite reaction will be strongest, however, not among the very poor but among persons of middling skills, underachievers with credentials, who came of age during the industrial era and face downward mobility. *

民族主义和卢德主义反应将最强烈,然而,不会出现在最贫穷的人中,而是出现在拥有中等技能、学历未达标的人群中,他们在工业时代成长,面临着向下流动的命运。

The close relation between skills and values and, therefore, economic success is detailed by Lawrence E. Harrison in *Who Prospers? How Cultural Values Shape Economic and Political Success* (New York: Basic Books, 1992) As new Megapolitical conditions give rise to a new consciousness of identity, along with new, complementary ideologies and morality, the old imperatives of nationalism will lose their appeal.

技能、价值观与经济成功之间的密切关系在劳伦斯·E·哈里森的著作《谁能成功》(纽约:基础书籍出版社,1992年)中有详细论述。随着新的大政治条件的出现,身份意识、相关意识形态和道德观也随之产生变化,传统的民族主义理念将逐渐失去吸引力。

8.

The nationalist reaction will peak in the early decades of the new millennium, then fade as the efficiency of fragmented sovereignties proves superior to the massed power of the nationstate. We suspect that the congenital bullying by nationstates of alternative jurisdictions, exemplified by the Russian invasion of Chechnya, will tend to deprive nations and nationalist fanatics of the sympathy of the new generations that come to maturity under the megapolitical conditions of the Information Age.

民族主义反应将在新千年的早期十年达到高峰,然后会褪去,因为分散主权的效率被证明优于民族国家的集中力量。我们怀疑,民族国家对替代管辖区域的固有欺凌行为,如俄罗斯对车臣的侵略,将倾向于剥夺在信息时代的大政治条件下成长起来的新一代对民族主义狂热分子的同情。

9.

The nationstate will ultimately collapse in fiscal crisis. Systemic crises typically arise when failing institutions suffer from rising expenses and falling income—a situation that is bound to beset the leading nationstates as retirement benefits and medical outlays balloon early in the twenty-first century. As we write, both the United Kingdom and the United States are burdened with multitrillion-dollar unfunded pension liabilities (comparable on a per capita basis) that neither is likely to tame. Other leading nationstates face similarly bankrupting burdens.

国家将最终在财政危机中崩溃。系统性危机通常出现在因支出上升和收入下降而陷入困境的衰落机构中——这种局面必将困扰 21 世纪初期的主导国家,因为退休福利和医疗支出暴涨。我们撰写时,英国和美国都负担着数万亿美元的未偿养老金负债(人均基础相当),这些负债很难得到控制。其他主导国家也面临着类似的破产负担。

PARALLELS WITH THE RENAISSANCE 与文艺复兴的平行

We previously outlined reasons for thinking that the collapse of the nanny state will have consequences closely paralleling those associated with the collapse of the institutional monopoly of the Holy Mother Church five centuries ago. Not unlike the nationstate today, the Church then had been in a position of unchallenged predominance for centuries. In some respects, the Church was even more firmly established than the state became five hundred years later. The Church had long claimed to act as "the universal authority at the head of Christian society." 5 That is the characterization of medieval intellectual historian John B. Morrall. Yet while few Europeans would have disputed the Church's claim to supremacy in Christendom before the technological 198

我们之前概述了认为保姆国家的崩溃会产生与五个世纪前圣母教会制度垄断崩溃相似的后果的理由。与现代国家类似,当时教会已经处于几个世纪以来无人挑战的主导地位。从某种程度上说,教会的地位甚至比国家 500 年后更加稳固。教会一直声称自己是"基督教社会的最高权威"。这是中世纪知识分子约翰·B·莫拉爾的描述。然而,在技术发展之前,很少有欧洲人会质疑教会在基督教世界中的至高无上的地位。

revolution of the 1490s, the Church barely survived in its traditional role for another generation.

1490 年代的革命之后,教会勉强维持了传统的角色再过了一代人。

The Privatization of Conscience 将良心私有化

By the early 1520s, millions of good Europeans had rejected the universal authority of the Catholic Church, a heresy punishable by torture and death just a few decades previously. Indeed, many medieval European cathedrals and churches were decorated with instructive carvings of heretics having their tongues torn out by demons.⁶

到了 16 世纪 20 年代早期,数百万名优秀的欧洲人拒绝了天主教会的普

遍权威,这种异端在几十年前还会受到酷刑和死刑的惩罚。事实上,许多中世纪的欧洲大教堂和教会都装饰有塑刻,描绘了恶魔撕扯异端分子舌头的场景。

The lesson these tortures conveyed must have impressed many illiterate parishioners who could have recognized the victims as heretics simply by their punishment. The iconography was unambiguous: heretics were those whose tongues were mutilated. Yet harsh as this punishment was, it was merely the warm-up for the ultimate punishment for heresy: death at the stake. To the Church's dismay, however, the lesson was not sufficiently intimidating. The advent of the printing press inflated the supply of heretical arguments so dramatically that even the prospect of gruesome punishment ceased to deter would-be heretics. Indeed, not a few unlucky pioneers of religious freedom in early modern Europe did pay for their assertions of spiritual independence by having their tongues cut out. Others were burned at the stake. The agents of reaction in the Inquisition literally incinerated people for uttering what we would consider ordinary expressions of conscience. All told, the Reformation and the reaction it inspired cost millions their lives. Battlefield deaths in the final half of the Thirty Years' War alone totaled 1,151,000. Many more died from famine, disease, and at the hands of the Inquisition and other authorities. By no means all the violence was perpetrated by Catholic authorities. The bones of more than a thousand leading English Catholics thought to have been brutally murdered by King Henry VIII have been uncovered at the Tower of London. Some, including Sir Thomas More and Bishop St. John Fisher, were openly executed for refusing to abandon the old faith.⁸ King Henry VIII's Catholic daughter, Queen Mary, on the other hand, insane with syphilis inherited from her father, incinerated three hundred Protestant heretics at the stake in the last two years of her reign.

这些酷刑传达的教训必定给许多文盲教众留下深刻印象,他们只需通过受刑者的惩罚就能认定他们为异教徒。这种符号学是明确无误的:异教徒就是那些舌头被割断的人。然而,虽然这种惩罚非常严厉,但这却只是对异端邪说最终惩罚——火刑——的热身。不过,令教会失望的是,这种教训并未足够让人胆寒。印刷术的出现使异端论点的供给数量大幅增加,以至于即使面临残酷的惩罚,也没能阻止有志于此的人。事实上,在现代欧洲宗教自由的先驱中,不乏那些为主张灵性独立而被剜舌的不幸

者。还有些人被处以火刑。宗教反动派在宗教裁判所里字面上把人化为灰烬,只因他们表达了我们今天认为是正常的良心表达。总的来说,宗教改革及其引发的反应导致了数百万人丧生。仅三十年战争后期的战场死亡就达 115.1 万人。还有更多人死于饥荒、疾病,以及在宗教裁判所和其他当局手下。但并非所有暴力都源于天主教当局。在伦敦塔发现了一千多名被国王亨利八世残酷谋杀的英国重要天主教徒的遗骨。包括托马斯·莫尔爵士和约翰·费舍主教在内的一些人公开被处决,因为他们拒绝放弃旧信仰。另一方面,亨利八世的天主教女儿玛丽女王在位的最后两年里,由于遗传自父亲的梅毒而丧心病狂,处决了三百名新教异端分子。

Such was the price paid as individuals of different persuasions asserted their religious convictions and the long-denied right to choose the church they supported. Seen from our vantage at the end of the twentieth century, these expressions of personal belief were well within the range that should be protected by freedom of religion and freedom of speech. But there was neither freedom of religion nor freedom of speech in the early sixteenth century. The authorities of the day still drew their bearings from the waning medieval worldview. To their eyes gestures of individual autonomy in opposition to authority, especially the plenitude potestatis (fullness of power) of the pope were outrageous and decidedly subversive. As theological historian Euan Cameron said, religious reformers like Martin Luther adopted views that "meant a deliberate and decisive break with the institutional and spiritual continuity of the old Church."⁹

这就是人们为了宣扬自己的宗教信仰和长期被剥夺的选择教会的权利而付出的代价。从 20 世纪末的视角来看,这些个人信仰的表达完全在应该受到宗教和言论自由保护的范围之内。但在 16 世纪初期,却既没有宗教自由也没有言论自由。当时的当局仍然受到日渐衰落的中世纪世界观的影响。在他们看来,个人反对权威,特别是教皇及其充满权力的地位的行为都是令人发指且显然具有颠覆性的。正如历史神学家尤安·卡梅伦所说,像马丁·路德这样的宗教改革者采取了"与旧教会的制度和精神连续性有明确和决定性决裂"的观点。

Heresy and Treason

异教和叛国

In that spirit, we anticipate "a deliberate and decisive break" with the institutional and ideological continuity of the nationstate. By the end of the first quarter of the next century, millions of upright individuals will have committed the secular equivalent of sixteenth-century heresy—a kind of low treason. They will have withdrawn allegiance from the faltering nationstate to assert their own sovereignty, their right to choose not their bishops or their house of worship but their form of governance as customers. The privatization of sovereignty will parallel the privatization of conscience of five centuries earlier. Both are the mass defection of former supporters of dominant institutions. As Albert O. Hirschman, an expert of "responses to decline in firms, organizations and states," has written, this type of exit is difficult because "exit has often been branded as criminal, for it has been labeled desertion, defection and treason." Sovereign Individuals will no longer merely accede to what is imposed upon them as human resources of the state. Millions will shed the obligations of citizenship to become customers for the useful services governments provide. Indeed, they will create and patronize parallel institutions that will place most of the services associated with citizenship on an entirely commercial basis. For most of the twentieth century, the productive have been treated as assets by the state, in much the way that the dairy farmer treats milk cows. They have been squeezed ever more vigorously. Now the cows will sprout wings.

在这种精神下,我们预期与民族国家的制度和意识形态的持续性将产生"一种明确和决定性的决裂"。在下个世纪的第一个季度结束时,数百万正直的个人将做出相当于 16 世纪异端的世俗等同物——一种低等叛国。他们将从摇摇欲坠的民族国家撤回效忠,宣布自己的主权,选择自己的治理形式而不是选择自己的主教或礼拜堂。主权的私有化将与五个世纪前良知的私有化平行。这两种都是主导机构的支持者大量叛逃。正如"对公司、组织和国家衰落的反应"的专家艾伯特·O·赫希曼所写的,这种退出是很困难的,因为"退出常常被认为是犯罪的,因为它被贴上了逃离、叛逃和叛国的标签。"主权个人将不再仅仅屈从于被强加于他们的作为国家人力资源的义务。数百万人将丢弃公民身份的义务,成为政府提供的有用服务的客户。事实上,他们将创建和赞助平行机构,将公民身份相关的大部分服务完全商业化。在 20 世纪的大部分时间里,有生

产力的人被国家视为资产,就像奶牛农场主对待奶牛一样。他们被越来越严厉地挤压。现在,奶牛将长出翅膀。

Defection from Citizenship 脱离公民关系

Just as new megapolitical conditions undermined the monopoly of the Church in the sixteenth century, we expect the megapolitics of the Information Age to ultimately dictate the terms of governance in the twenty-first century, no matter how outrageous its new terms may seem to those who incorporate the values of modern politics as their own.

就像新的大政治条件在 16 世纪瓦解了教会的垄断地位,我们预计信息时代的大政治最终将主导 21 世纪的治理条款,无论其新条件对那些将现代政治价值观纳入自己的人来说有多么离谱。

The evolution from the status of "citizen" to that of "customer" entails a betrayal of the past as sharp as the transition from chivalry to citizenship in the early modern era. The defection of the information elite from citizenship will have a stimulus much like that which led millions of Europeans five hundred years earlier to renounce the infallibility of the pope.

从"公民"地位到"客户"地位的演变,其背叛过去的程度与早期现代时期从骑士精神向公民转变一样。信息精英背离公民地位,其推动力将如同 500 年前导致数百万欧洲人放弃教皇的威信。

If the parallel with the Reformation is not compelling, it may be partly because it is not immediately evident today that renunciation of loyalty to religious institutions was ever the big deal that treason became in the twentieth century. Outside of a few Islamic countries, heresy at the end of the twentieth century is a spiritual misdemeanor, no more shattering to an individual's reputation than a speeding ticket for driving forty-five in a thirty-mile zone.* Indeed, it is not uncommon in Europe and North America to find clergy and even bishops who do not believe in God or deny crucial tenets of the faith they espouse. Today, a heresy would almost need to be blatant devil worship to be noticeable.

如果与宗教改革的并行关系不太有说服力,可能是因为今天很难立即明

白,弃绝对宗教机构的忠诚曾经有如同背叛在 20 世纪那样重大。除了少数伊斯兰教国家外,20 世纪末的异端邪说已经成为精神层面的轻罪,不会比超速驾驶罚单更严重地损害一个人的声誉。事实上,在欧洲和北美,甚至连神职人员和主教也时常不相信神或否认他们所宣扬的信仰的关键教条,这并不罕见。如今,一个异端邪说必须表现得彰明较著的崇拜魔鬼,才会引人注目。

In most Western countries, religious doctrines are so ill-formed and sloppily held that few persons can identify the theological points that were the focus of controversy of heresies in the past.¹¹ This reflects the general shift of attention away from religion.

在大多数西方国家,宗教教义形式不善且持有笼统,以致很少有人能够确认过去引发异端争议的神学要点。这反映出人们对宗教关注度的整体降低。

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To some extent, religious leaders have actually helped to lead the late-twentieth century defection from seriousness about spiritual issues by deflecting their energies away from spiritual preoccupations to become lobbyists and social agitators. Drawn like loose filings to the magnet of power, they devote much of their activities to pressuring political leaders to adopt redistributive policies crucial to the nationalist bargain. Witness the loud efforts of the Catholic Church in Argentina to pressure the government of President Carlos Menem to abandon economic reforms in favor of conventional inflationary monetary and Keynesian fiscal policies. Similar complaints have been lodged by religious leaders against efforts to restructure bloated budgets in New Zealand and many other countries. Catholic bishops lobbied vigorously against the reform of welfare in the United States.

在某种程度上,宗教领袖实际上帮助主导了 20 世纪后期远离认真对待精神问题的态势,将他们的精力偏离了精神关切,转而成为游说者和社会鼓动者。他们像被磁铁吸引的散乱铁屑一样,将大部分精力投入到向政治领导施加压力,以采取关键的再分配政策,满足民族主义的要求。以阿根廷天主教会大力向梅内姆总统施压,要求放弃经济改革,转而采取传统的通胀性货币政策和凯恩斯主义财政政策为鉴。类似的抱怨也出现在

宗教领袖反对重组新西兰和许多其他国家臃肿预算的行动中。天主教主教们也曾大力游说反对美国福利制度的改革。

A Fiscal Inquisition?

税收查核？

Simply put, contemporary religious leaders focus much of their declining moral authority on secular redemption and agitation to influence the state rather than on spiritual salvation. Given this record, they can be expected to participate as accomplices in the reaction against the coming secular reformation. As the nationstate is challenged and begins to wobble, it will no longer be able to fulfill the promises of material benefits that are central to popular support. The de facto bargain struck at the time of the French Revolution will lapse. The state will no longer be capable of guaranteeing its citizens low-cost or free schooling, much less medical care, unemployment insurance, and pensions in exchange for otherwise poorly paid military service. While the changing requirements of warfare will enable governments to defend themselves and territories under their dominion without fielding mass armies, this will hardly relieve governments of the criticism for breaking what has become an anachronistic bargain. Indeed, as the new megapolitical logic takes hold, its consequences will prove wildly unpopular with the losers in the new information economy. It is therefore all but certain that many religious leaders, along with the primary beneficiaries of government spending, will be at the forefront of a nostalgic reaction seeking to reassert the claims of nationalism. They will claim that no American, Frenchman, Canadian, or other nationality-fill in the blank should be allowed to go to bed hungry. Even countries that have been at the forefront of reform and stand to benefit disproportionately from "market-friendly globalism," like New Zealand, will be tormented by reactionary losers. They will seek to thwart the movement of capital and people across borders. And they will not stop there.

当代宗教领袖将他们日益式微的道德权威集中在世俗救赎和影响国家上,而不是在精神救赎上。鉴于这一记录,有理由预期他们将充当反对即将到来的世俗改革运动的同谋。随着民族国家受到挑战并开始摇摆不定,它将无法再兑现中心受到大众支持的物质利益承诺。法国大革命时

期达成的事实上的协议将会失效。国家将无法再保证其公民低成本或免费的教育,更不用说医疗保健、失业保险和退休金作为报酬的军事服务。虽然战争需求的变化将使政府能够在不调集大规模军队的情况下捍卫自己和其管辖下的领土,但这种做法很难减轻政府违反已经成为过时协议的批评。事实上,随着新的大政治逻辑的确立,其后果将遭到新信息经济中的失利者的强烈反对。因此,许多宗教领袖以及政府开支的主要受益者,必将成为试图重申民族主义诉求的怀旧反应的前线。他们会声称任何美国人、法国人、加拿大人或其他国籍的人都不应该挨饿睡觉。即使是在改革最前沿并可能从"市场友好型全球化"中获得不成比例利益的国家,如新西兰,也将受到反动失利者的折磨。他们将寻求阻碍资本和人员跨越边境的流动。而且他们不会止于此。

Demagogues, like Winston Peters, leader of the New Zealand First Party, are too lazy to think originally about how the new world will function. But, in due course, Winston and his crew will be tipped off to the logic of the information economy. They will seek to halt the diffusion of computers, robotics, telecommunications, encryption, and other Information Age technologies that are facilitating the displacement of workers in almost every sector of the global economy. Wherever you turn, there are politicians who will gladly thwart the prospects for long-term prosperity just to prevent individuals from declaring their independence of politics.

这些煽动者,如新西兰第一党领袖温斯顿·彼得斯,懒于从新思考新世界将如何运转。但在适当的时候,温斯顿和他的团队将明白信息经济的道理。他们将试图阻碍计算机、机器人、电信、加密以及其他信息时代技术的传播,这些技术正促进着几乎每个行业的员工流失。无论您转向何方,总会有政客乐于破坏长期繁荣的前景,只为防止个人摆脱政治掌控。

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20/20 Vision

20/20 视力

By 2020, or roughly five centuries after Martin Luther nailed his 95 subversive theses on the church door at Wittenberg, the perception of the

cost/benefit ratios of citizenship will have undergone a similar subversive clarification. The vision of the nationstate among persons of ability and wealth, the Sovereign Individuals of the future, will have undergone the political equivalent of laser surgery. They will be seeing 20/20.

到 2020 年，也就是在马丁·路德在维滕堡教会大门上钉下他 95 条攻击性论点五个世纪后，公民资格的成本/收益比的认知将经历类似的颠覆性澄清。未来的能人与富人、未来的主权个体，他们对于民族国家的愿景，将经历政治上的激光手术等价物。他们将拥有 20/20 的视力。

In the twentieth century, as throughout the modern era, persistently high returns to violence made big government a paying proposition. The decisiveness of massed power mobilized the allegiance of the wealthy and ambitious to OECD nationstates, notwithstanding predatory taxes imposed on income and capital. Politicians were able to impose marginal tax rates approaching or exceeding 90 percent in every OECD country in the decade immediately following World War II.

在 20 世纪，与现代时代一样，暴力行为持续带来高回报，这使大政府成为一个有利可图的提议。集中力量的决断性激发了富人和有抱负者对经合组织国家的忠诚，尽管对收入和资本征收掠夺性税收。政治家们能够在第二次世界大战后紧接的十年里在每个经合组织国家实施接近或超过 90% 的边际税率。

As we have explored, the rich had little choice but to accede to such impositions.

正如我们所探讨的，富人无可选择地不得不接受这种强加的条件。

Circumstances obliged them to rely for protection upon governments that could master violence on a large scale. It rarely mattered, except perhaps to British policemen with the chance to take a posting to Hong Kong, that OECD governments imposed monopolistic taxes. Anyone with high earnings capacity who wished to enjoy leading-edge economic opportunity during the Industrial Age usually had little option but to reside in a high-tax economy. This meant shouldering a tax burden out of proportion to services rendered.

他们不得不依靠能够大规模掌握暴力的政府来寻求保护。除了可能有机会被调派到香港的英国警察，OECD 政府征收的垄断性税收通常并不

重要。在工业时代寻求领先的经济机会的高收入人群,通常别无选择,只能居住在高税收经济体中。这意味着他们承担了与所提供服务不成比例的税收负担。

The Arithmetic of Politics 政治算术

Nineteenth-century American Vice President John J. Calhoun shrewdly sketched the arithmetic of modern politics. Calhoun's formula divides the entire population of the nationstate into two classes: taxpayers, who contribute more to the cost of government services than they consume; and tax consumers, who receive benefits from government in excess of their contribution to the cost. With a few conspicuous exceptions, most OECD 19 世纪美国副总统约翰·J·卡尔霍恩敏锐地勾勒出了现代政治的算术。卡尔霍恩的公式将整个国家的人口分为两个阶层:纳税人,他们为政府服务的成本贡献超过他们的消费;以及税收消费者,他们从政府获得的利益超过他们对成本的贡献。除了少数引人注目的例外,大多数经合组织

entrepreneurs were net taxpayers to an exaggerated extent as the twentieth century wound down. For example, in 1996, the top 1 percent of British taxpayers shouldered 17 percent of the total income tax burden. They paid 30 percent more than the bottom 50 percent of earners, who contributed just 13 percent of income tax payments. In the United States, the rich shouldered an even more exaggerated burden, with the top 1 percent paying 28

企业家在二十世纪末成为了过度的净纳税人。例如,在 1996 年,英国纳税人中最高收入的 1%承担了总所得税的 17%。他们缴纳的税款比收入最低的 50%多出 30%,后者只贡献了 13%的所得税。在美国,富人承担的负担更加严重,最高收入的 1%缴纳了 28%的所得税。

percent of the total income tax receipts in 1994.¹² Not only were the rich obliged to pay for service that, as Frederic C. Lane reminds us, "was of poor quality and outrageously overpriced," but their payments were often not proportionate to any service whatever.¹³

1994 年总所得税收入的百分之。不仅富人被迫支付服务费,正如

Frederic C. Lane 提醒我们的那样,"服务质量很差,价格也极其高昂",而且他们的付款往往与任何服务都不成正比。

The benefits for which the top taxpayers paid often went entirely to others. In most cases, the rich were glad to under-consume government services, which were typically of low quality. Government bureaus in almost every country were famously inefficient, largely because they tended to be controlled by employees who lacked an incentive to improve productivity.

By practically any measure, the largest taxpayers during the 202

政府提供的福利通常并不真正惠及纳税大户。在多数情况下,富人乐于避免使用政府服务,因为这些服务通常质量较低。几乎每个国家的政府机构都以低效著称,这主要是因为它们往往受雇员控制,而这些雇员缺乏提高生产力的动力。从几乎任何角度来看,202

industrial era paid many times more for government services than they would be worth in a competitive market.

工业时代为政府服务支付的费用远高于在竞争市场中的价值。

This hardly went unnoted. Unhappily, however, the recognition that payments to government for protection were, in Lane's words, "wasteful by ideal standards" was seldom an actionable insight in the middle of the twentieth century. Rather it was simply a defect to be accepted, "one of various kinds of waste built into social organization."

这种情况并未完全被忽视。然而,遗憾的是,对于兰恩所说的为政府提供保护而支付的费用"从理想标准来看是浪费的"这一认识,很少有可采取行动的洞见。相反,这仅仅是一种必须接受的缺陷,"是社会组织中各种类型浪费之一"。

The alternative for the discontented was not to move from Britain to France, for example, or from the United States to Canada. Except in rare circumstances, that would have availed little. The leading nationstates all suffered from the same drawback. They all adopted more or less confiscatory tax regimes. To realize a significant increase in autonomy one had to escape the core countries of Europe and North America altogether and head for the periphery. Tax burdens were meaningfully lower in parts of Asia, South America, and on various remote islands. But there was usually

a price to be paid for escaping predatory taxation-a loss of economic opportunity and, often, a decline in living standards. As we have explored, in the conditions of the Industrial Age, economic opportunity was constrained and living standards were subpar in most of the jurisdictions outside the core industrial nationstates that indulged in confiscatory taxation.

不满分子的另一个选择并非从英国迁往法国,或从美国迁往加拿大。除了极少数情况外,这种做法收效甚微。主要的国家都遭受着同样的缺陷,都采取了或多或少具有掠夺性质的征税制度。要大幅提高自主权,必须彻底逃离欧洲和北美的核心地区,转向边缘地带。亚洲、南美以及某些偏远岛屿的税收负担明显较低。但逃离掠夺性征税通常要付出代价,即经济机会的损失,以及常常伴随的生活水平下降。正如我们探讨过的,在工业时代的条件下,那些采取掠夺性征税的核心工业国家以外的大部分司法管辖区,经济机会都受到约束,生活水平也普遍较差。

Consider the Communist systems as a paradigm. Along with many Third World regimes, they typically did not impose high income taxes-or even any at all.*

把共产主义体系视为一个范式。与许多第三世界政权一样,他们通常不会征收高额所得税,甚至根本不征收。

Nonetheless, during the three-quarters of a century the Soviet Union existed, few, if any, entrepreneurs sought tax refuge there. While the Soviet income tax rates were not high, they afforded no advantage because the Soviets made a virtue of their refusal to recognize property rights. This imposed an even worse burden than taxation. The Communist systems made it all but impossible to organize a business and make any serious money.

虽然在苏联存在的三个多世纪里,很少有企业家寻求在那里避税。虽然苏联的所得税税率并不高,但由于苏联以不承认财产权为美德,因此这并没有带来任何优势。这给人带来的负担甚至比纳税还要沉重。共产主义制度使得很难组建企业并获得丰厚利润。

In effect, the Communist state confiscated pretax income.
事实上,共产主义国家没收了税前收入。

Further, had anyone already possessing a secure income for some eccentric reason chosen to live in Moscow or Havana, he would have been hard-pressed to use money to purchase a decent standard of living. Outside of access to good cigars, caviar, excellent orchestras, and the ballet, life in the former Communist systems afforded few consumer pleasures. Most of the scarce good things of life were unavailable or were tightly rationed on the basis of political influence rather than open exchange. At the risk of validating the stereotype of critics of postmodern life who emphasize "the importance of consumption in the postmodern experience," the rising standard of goods and services available worldwide since the fall of Communism has surely made competition between jurisdictions more lively, thereby helping to weaken ties to nation and place.¹⁵

即使有人因某些异常原因而选择生活在莫斯科或哈瓦那,他们也很难用金钱购买到体面的生活水平。除了能获得优质雪茄、鱼子酱、出色的交响乐团和芭蕾演出之外,在过去的共产主义体系中,生活中几乎没有其他可以消费的乐趣。大多数美好的生活物品要么无法获得,要么仅根据政治影响力而严格配给,而不是开放交易。尽管这似乎验证了批评后现代生活的人所强调的"消费在后现代经验中的重要性",但自从共产主义体系崩溃以来,全球商品和服务的标准不断提高,这无疑增加了各地区之间的竞争,从而有助于削弱人们对国家和地方的认同感。

Under the old regime, consumer choices were so limited that even Castro himself would have been hard-pressed to secure a packet of decent dental floss had he wanted to clean cohiba fragments from his teeth. Until recently, not even the rich in many parts of the globe could enjoy the quality of life that was common among the middle classes in Western Europe or North America. Faced with this doleful situation, most persons of outstanding talent were moved to accept the nationalist bargain during the Industrial Age.

在旧体制下,消费者选择如此有限,即使卡斯特罗本人也很难找到一包合格的牙线来清洁他牙齿上的科伊巴烟蒂。直到最近,即使在世界许多地区的富人,也无法享受到西欧或北美中产阶级中普遍存在的生活质量。面对这种可悲的局面,在工业时代,大多数才华横溢的人被迫接受民族主义协议。

They stayed put and paid outrageously high taxes for the doubtful protection offered by the particular nationstate that monopolized violence in the territory in which they were born.

他们呆在原地,为所在领土的某个垄断暴力的民族国家提供的可疑保护支付了极高的税款。

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"Paradise is now shut and locked, barred by angels, so now we must go forward, around the world and see if somehow somewhere, there is a back-way in." HEINRICH VON KLEIST

天堂现已封闭并上锁,被天使把持,所以我们现在必须向前推进,环绕整个世界,看看是否有其他的途径进去。 海因里希·冯·克莱斯特

Cuba only imposed an income tax in 1996 as an emergency measure in response to economic depression following the end of subsidies occasioned by the collapse of Communism in Europe.

古巴在 1996 年只是作为应对欧洲共产主义崩溃后引发经济衰退的应急措施而实施了所得税。

The fall of Communism removed an "Iron Curtain" that had impaired travel and effectively blocked the globalization of commerce, thereby keeping the world artificially "large." The jet plane, in combination with the information technologies that undermined Communism, increased competition for high-end travel dollars. The parade of bankers trooping in and out of even the most remote provinces was a prodigious stimulus to the standard of housing and cuisine worldwide. By this, we are not referring to the spread of McDonald's hamburgers and Kentucky Fried Chicken franchises, in even such formerly forbidding venues as Moscow and Bucharest. Less noticed, but more important, has been the spread of leading hotel chains, and high-quality sit-down restaurants serving grand cru clarets rather than vodka and Coke. Thanks to this transformation, anyone who can afford it can now enjoy a high material standard of life almost anywhere on the planet.

共产主义的崩溃消除了一道"铁幕",妨碍了旅行和全球商业化的发展,使世界保持了人为的"巨大"。喷气式飞机加上导致共产主义崩溃的信息技术,增加了高端旅游的竞争。大量银行家涌入甚至最偏远的省份,极大

地推动了全球住房和餐饮标准的提高。不仅是麦当劳汉堡和肯德基在莫斯科和布加勒斯特这样的地方出现,更重要的是,著名的酒店连锁和高级餐厅取代了伏特加和可乐。这种转变使任何负担得起的人都可以在地球上几乎任何地方享受到高水平的物质生活。

Indeed, it is now a rare country where there is not a first-class hotel and at least one restaurant that would interest a Michelin inspector.

确实,现在很少有没有一流酒店和至少一家会引起米其林检查员兴趣的餐厅的国家。

As Hirschman anticipated a quarter of a century ago, technological advance has significantly increased the appeal of exit as a solution to unsatisfactory provision and pricing of services. He wrote: "Loyalty to one's country, on the other hand, is something we could do without.... Only as countries start to resemble each other because of the advances of communications and all-around modernization will the danger of premature and excessive exits arise, the 'brain drain' being a current example." 16 Note as we pointed out in chapter 8 that Hirschman's standard of "premature and excessive exits" is seen from the perspective of the nationstate being deserted, not from the perspective of the individual.

正如赫尔施曼在 25 年前预期的那样,技术进步显著增加了退出作为解决服务供给和定价不满意的解决方案的吸引力。他写道:"另一方面,对一个国家的忠诚是我们可以不要的....只有当各国因通信和全面现代化的进步而开始相似时,才会出现过早和过度退出的危险,大脑外流就是当前的一个例子。"我们在第 8 章中指出,赫尔施曼所说的"过早和过度退出"是从被遗弃的民族国家的角度来看的,而不是从个人的角度来看的。

Nonetheless, his conclusion that similarities between countries will increase the attraction of defection and exit is unimpeachable. The fact that it is now easier to live well anywhere makes living where the cost is least onerous appealing. Yet more important than the fact that you can live well almost anywhere is the fact that you can now earn a high income anywhere. It is no longer necessary to reside in a high-cost jurisdiction in order to accumulate sufficient wealth to live, as Lord Keynes advised, "wisely, agreeably and well." For reasons we have already explored, microtechnology changes the

underlying megapolitical foundation upon which the nationstate rests. In the Information Age, a new cybereconomy will emerge beyond the capacity of any government to monopolize. For the first time, technology will enable individuals to accumulate wealth in a realm that cannot be bent easily to the demands of systematic compulsion.

尽管如此,他得出的结论,即国家之间的相似性会增加背离和退出的吸引力,是毋庸置疑的。事实上,现在在任何地方都可以过上良好的生活,这使得选择生活成本最低的地方变得有吸引力。然而,比起你几乎可以在任何地方过上良好的生活这一事实,更为重要的是,你现在可以在任何地方获得较高的收入。根据凯恩斯勋爵的建议"明智地、愉快地并良好地生活",已经不再需要居住在高成本的司法管辖区才能积累足够的财富。正如我们已经探讨过的原因,微技术改变了支撑国家国体的基础性大政治基础。在信息时代,一个新的网络经济将出现,超越任何政府的垄断能力。这是第一次,技术将使个人能够在一个无法轻易屈从于系统性强制要求的领域积累财富。

The new society, and therefore the new culture, will be defined at one end by what machines can do better than people, by automation that will do away with increasing numbers of low-skill tasks, and at the other by the power that information technology gives to people who actually have the talent to take advantage of it. Such a 204

新的社会 and 新的文化将由两个端点定义:一端是机器比人类做得更好的,即将取消越来越多低技能工作的自动化;另一端则是信息技术为有才能利用它的人们带来的力量。这样的 204

society will have greater tensions between a small class, who might be termed the information aristocracy, and a growing underclass, who might be termed the information poor. One of the differences between them will be that the information poor will either be tied by geography or will find little benefit from moving. The information aristocracy, as we discuss elsewhere, will be extremely mobile, since they will be able to earn money in any locale that is attractive to them, just as popular novelists have always been able to do. Robert Louis Stevenson could earn his living on an island in the Pacific a hundred years ago; now the information aristocracy can all do the same thing.

社会将出现一个小阶层与一个不断增长的底层阶级之间的更大矛盾,分

别可称为信息贵族和信息贫困者。他们之间的一个区别是,信息贫困者要么受地理位置的限制,要么从迁徙中获得的利益很少。正如我们在其他地方讨论的,信息贵族将极其流动,因为他们能在任何对他们有吸引力的地方赚钱,就像流行小说家一直以来所做的那样。罗伯特·路易·斯蒂文森百年前就能在太平洋上一个岛屿谋生;现在,信息贵族也能做到同样的事情。

Market Competition Between Jurisdictions 司法管辖区之间的市场竞争

Because information technology transcends the tyranny of place, it will automatically expose jurisdictions everywhere to defacto global competition on the basis of quality and price. In other words, governments exercising local territorial monopolies, like most other entities, finally will be subject to real market competition on the basis of how well they serve their customers. This will soon make it unavoidably obvious that the old logic that favored high-cost regimes in the industrial era has reversed. Leading nationstates, with their predatory, redistributive tax regimes and heavy-handed regulations, will no longer be jurisdictions of choice. Seen dispassionately, they offer poor-quality protection and diminished economic opportunity at monopoly prices. In the years to come, they may prove to be more socially unreceptive and violent than regions of Asia and Latin America where incomes have traditionally been more unequal. The leading welfare states will lose their most talented citizens through desertion. 因为信息技术超越了地点的束缚,它将自动使各地管辖区都暴露在以质量和价格为基础的事实全球竞争中。换句话说,行使地方领土垄断的政府,和其他大多数实体一样,最终将受制于基于如何更好地为客户服务的实际市场竞争。这很快就会显而易见,在工业时代偏好高成本体制的旧逻辑已经逆转。以掠夺性重分配税收制度和严格管制为特点的领先国家将不再是首选管辖区。客观地看,它们提供的是以垄断价格提供劣质保护和降低的经济机会。未来几年,它们可能比亚洲和拉丁美洲等传统收入更不平等的地区更加社会不受欢迎和暴力。领先的福利国家将通过逃离失去其最有才华的公民。

The "Extranational" Age Ahead 异国时代来临

As the era of the "Sovereign Individual" takes shape, many of the ablest people will cease to think of themselves as party to a nation, as "British" or "American" or "Canadian." A new "transnational" or "extranational" understanding of the world and a new way of identifying one's place in it await discovery in the new millennium. This new equation of identity, unlike nationality, will not be a product of the systematic compulsion that made nationstates and the state system universal in the twentieth century. 随着"主权个体"时代的到来,许多最有能力的人将不再将自己视为某一国家的一员,"英国人"、"美国人"或"加拿大人"。在新的千年里,人们将发现一种新的"超国家"或"非国家"的世界观以及确认自身地位的新方式。这种新的身份认同与国籍不同,它不是由 20 世纪使国家和国家体系普遍化的有系统的强制性造就的产物。

The mere fact that developments embracing the whole globe are commonly described as "international" shows how deeply the nationalist paradigm has penetrated into our way of conceiving the world. After two centuries of indoctrination in the mysteries of "international relations" and "international law," it is easy to overlook that "international" is not a longstanding Western concept. In fact, the word international was invented by Jeremy Bentham in 1789. It was first used in his book *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Bentham wrote, "The word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one, though it is hoped sufficiently analogous and intelligible." The word caught on, but not just in the narrow sense that Bentham

事实上,这些涉及全球发展的事件通常被称为"国际"事务,这表明了民族主义范式是如何深入渗透到我们认知世界的方式中。在经历了两个多世纪的"国际关系"和"国际法"的灌输之后,人们很容易忽略"国际"并非西方的长期概念。实际上,这个词是由杰里米·边沁在 1789 年发明的,首次出现在他的著作《道德与立法原理导论》中。边沁写道:"必须承认,'国际'一词是一个新词,但希望它是足够类似和易懂的。"这个词很快被广泛使用,但并非完全按照边沁当初的狭义理解。

intended. "International" came to be a sloppy synonym for anything that happens across the globe.

原本打算的。"国际化"逐渐变成了任何跨越全球发生的事物的简单代称。

The International Age began in 1789, the same year as the French Revolution. It lasted for two centuries, until 1989, when the revolt against Communism in Europe began. We believe that that second revolution marked the end of the International Age, and not merely because the discredited Communist anthem was "The International." The command economy with state ownership was the most ambitious expression of the nationstate. The close relationship between state power and nationalism was reflected in language. The most aggressive verb of the Modern Age was "to nationalize," meaning to bring under state ownership and control. It was a word that tripped easily off the tongues of demagogues in most parts of the globe during the International Age. Now it is part of the vocabulary of the past. Nationalization has become anachronistic, precisely because state power has become anachronistic.

国际时代始于 1789 年,与法国大革命同年。这一时代持续了两个世纪,直到 1989 年欧洲共产主义反叛运动开始。我们认为,那场第二次革命标志着国际时代的结束,这不仅仅因为被贬低的共产主义歌剧"国际歌"。以国家所有制为基础的计划经济是国家主义最富野心的表达。国家权力与民族主义之间的密切关系在语言中有所反映。现代时代最具侵略性的动词是"国有化",意为将资产收归国家所有和控制。这是一个在国际时代中绝大部分地区的煽动者口中轻易蹦出的词汇。如今它已经成为过去的词汇了。国有化已经成为一种时代错误,正因为国家权力已经成为一种时代错误。

In the twilight of the modern era, the concentrated power of the state was undermined by the interaction between technological innovation and market forces. Now the next stage in the triumph of the market is about to unfold. Not only will individual nationstates begin to dissolve, but in our view even the club for nationstates, the United Nations, is destined to go bankrupt. We would not be surprised to see the UN liquidated sometime soon after the turn of the millennium.

在现代时代的暮光中,由于技术创新与市场力量的相互作用,国家集中力

量受到了挑战。现在,市场胜利的下一个阶段即将展开。不仅个别国家开始瓦解,而且我们认为即使是国家集会体联合国也注定要破产。我们不会感到惊讶,看到联合国在千禧年之后不久就解体。

If "international" were a stock, now would be the time to sell. The concept is likely to be supplanted in the new millennium, or at least narrowed to its original meaning for the compelling reason that the whole world will no longer be dominated by a system of interrelating sovereign nations.

Relations will take on the novel "extranational"

如果"国际"是一只股票,现在就是卖出的时候。这个概念很可能会有新千年被取代,或者至少被缩小到其原始意义,因为整个世界将不再被主导于一个相互关联的主权国家体系。关系将会变得"超国家"

forms dictated by the growing importance of microjurisdictions and Sovereign Individuals. A dispute between an enclave on the coast of Labrador and a Sovereign Individual will not rightly be described as an "international" dispute. It will be extranational.

受越来越重要的微型管辖区和主权个人的影响,新的文书形式出现了。位于拉布拉多海岸的一个外国居民团体与一个主权个人之间的争议,不应该被描述为"国际"争议。而应被视为域外争议。

In the new age to come, communities and allegiances will not be territorially bounded. Identification will be more precisely targeted to genuine affinities, shared beliefs, shared interests, and shared genes, rather than the bogus affinities so prominent in the attention of nationalists. Protection will be organized in new ways that cannot be parsed by a sextant, a plumb line, or other early modern instruments in a surveyor's kit that demarcate territorial borders.

在即将到来的新时代,社区和忠诚不会受到领土边界的限制。认同将更加精确地针对真正的亲和力、共同信仰、共同利益和共同基因,而不是民族主义者所关注的虚假亲和力。保护将以新的方式来组织,这种方式无法由测量员工具包中的六分仪、垂线等早期现代仪器来界定领土边界。

INVENTED COMMUNITIES AND TRADITIONS

发明的社区和传统

The idea that humans must naturally place themselves in an "invented" 人类必须将自己置于"发明的"状态这一理念

community called a nation will come to be seen by the cosmopolitan elite as eccentric and unreasonable in the next century, as it would have been through most of human existence. The nationstate, as sociologist Anthony Giddens wrote, has "no precedent in history." 8 Michael Billig, an authority on nationalism, amplified that point: At other times people did not hold the notions of language and dialect, let alone those of territory and sovereignty, which are so commonplace today and which 206

在下一个世纪,专业精英将把被称为"民族"的社区视为古怪和不合理,就像在人类历史的大部分时期一样。正如社会学家安东尼·吉登斯所写的,民族国家"在历史上没有先例"。8 民族主义权威迈克尔·比利格也进一步指出:在其他时代,人们并不持有今天如此普遍的语言和方言,更不用说领土和主权这种观念。

seem so materially real to "us." So strongly are such notions embedded in contemporary common sense that it is easy to forget that they are invented permanencies. The mediaeval cobblers in the workshops of Montailou or San Mateo might, with the distance of 700 years, now appear to us narrow, superstition-bound figures. But they would have found our ideas on language and nation strangely mystical; they would be puzzled why this mysticism could be a matter of life and death.'9

这些概念对我们来说如此实在明确,以至于我们容易忘记它们都是人为创造的永久性概念。在蒙泰约或圣马特奥工坊工作的中世纪皮匠现在看来可能是狭隘、迷信束缚的人物。但他们会觉得我们关于语言和民族的想法非常神秘,疑惑为什么这种神秘主义会关系到生死存亡。

We suspect that thinking people in the extranational future will be equally puzzled. As Benedict Anderson put it, nations are "imagined

communities."²⁰ This is not to say that what is imagined is necessarily trivial. As Dr. Johnson observed, if not for imagination, a man would as gladly "lie with a chamber maid as a duchess." Still, for those who came of age during the twentieth century, "nations" may seem so inevitable a unit of organization that it is difficult to grasp that they are "imagined" rather than natural. In order to understand how different the future may be from the world with which we are familiar, it is necessary to see how nationalism has been imposed upon the "common sense" of the Industrial Age.

我们怀疑未来的思想者也会同样困惑不解。正如本尼迪克特·安德森所说,民族是"想象中的共同体"。这并不意味着所想象的就一定是微不足道的。正如约翰逊博士所观察到的,如果没有想象力,一个男人宁愿与一个女仆卧床,也不愿与一位公爵夫人。然而,对于在二十世纪出生成长的人来说,"民族"可能是如此不可或缺的组织单位,以至于很难认知它们是"想象出来的",而不是自然存在的。为了理解未来可能与我们所熟悉的世界有何不同,有必要认识到民族主义如何被强加于工业时代的"常识"之上。

It is easy to overlook the degree to which the "national community" is formed by a continuing investment of imagination. There are no objective criteria to define accurately which group should be a "nation" and which should not. Nor, strictly speaking, are there "natural frontiers," as eminent historians Owen Lattimore and C. R.

很容易忽视"民族社区"是由持续的想象力投资而形成的程度。没有客观标准准确定义哪个群体应该是"民族"以及哪个不应该。严格地说,也没有所谓的"自然边界",正如著名历史学家欧文·拉蒂莫尔和 C. R.指出。

Whittaker have shown. "A major imperial boundary," Lattimore said, writing of imperial China, "is not merely a line dividing geographical regions and human societies. It also represents the optimal limit of growth of one particular society." ² Or as Columbia University economist Ronald Findlay put it, "Insofar as they are considered at all in economics, the boundaries of a given economic system or 'country' are generally regarded as given, along with the population living within those boundaries. Yet it is obvious that, however sanctified these boundaries may have become in international law, they were all at one time or another contested between

rival claimants and determined ultimately by the balance of economic and military power between the contending parties." 22

惠特克已经表明。" 拉蒂莫尔说,谈到中国帝国,"一个重要的帝国边界不仅仅是划分地理区域和人类社会的一条线。它也代表了一个特定社会的最优增长极限。"或者正如哥伦比亚大学经济学家罗纳德·芬德利所说,"就经济而言,一个给定经济体系或'国家'的边界通常被视为是既定的,与该边界内的人口一起存在。然而,很明显,无论这些边界在国际法上有多神圣,它们都曾经在对抗的声索者之间争论不休,最终由争论双方的经济和军事实力平衡来决定。"

Someone with all the data available on half the world's nationstates and a collection of fine satellite maps would not be able to predict where the boundaries of the other nationstates would fall. Nor is there any scientific way of distinguishing biologically or linguistically the members of one nationality from those of another. No autopsy procedure, however advanced, could distinguish genetically among the remains of Americans, Canadians, and Sudanese after a plane crash. The boundaries between states and nationalities are not natural, like the boundaries between species or the physical distinctions between breeds of animals. Rather, they are artifacts of past and ongoing efforts to project power.

以下是该文章的简体中文翻译: 即使掌握了关于世界一半国家的所有数据和一系列优秀的卫星地图,也无法预测其他国家的边界走向。没有任何科学方法可以生物或语言学上区分一个国籍的成员和另一个国籍的成员。无论采取多么先进的尸检程序,在飞机坠毁后也无法遗传学地区分美国人、加拿大人和苏丹人。国家和民族之间的界限并非自然形成,就像物种之间的界限或动物品种之间的物理区分一样,而是过去和现在努力展示实力的结果。

"A language is a dialect with an army and a navy" MARIO PEI

"一种语言就是有军队和海军支持的方言" 马里奥·佩

LANGUAGES AS ARTIFACTS OF POWER

语言是权力的人工制品

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Surprisingly, much the same can be said of languages. After centuries of nationstate dominance, the idea that "language" does not form an objective basis for distinguishing between peoples may seem ill-considered or even absurd. But look more closely. The history of modern languages clearly reveals the degree to which they were shaped to reinforce nationalist identification. Western "languages" as we now understand and speak them did not naturally evolve into their current forms. Nor are they objectively distinguishable from "dialects." In the modern world, no one wishes to speak a "dialect."

令人惊讶的是,对于语言也可以说同样的话。在民族国家统治了几个世纪之后,认为"语言"并不构成区分民族的客观依据可能看起来缺乏考虑或甚至是荒谬的。但仔细观察就会发现,现代语言的发展历史清楚地揭示了它们是如何被塑造来加强民族认同的。我们现在理解和使用的西方"语言"并非自然形成的当前模样,它们也无法与"方言"客观区分。在现代社会中,没有人愿意说"方言"。

Almost everyone prefers that his native tongue be considered the genuine article-a "language." "Let no man say that the word is of little use in such moments. Word and Action are together one. The powerful energetic affirmation that reassures hearts creates acts-that which is said is produced. Action here is the servant of the word, it follows behind submissively as on the first day of the world: He said and the world was."

几乎每个人都希望他的母语被视为正宗的"语言"。"不要让任何人说这个词在这样的时刻毫无用处。词语和行动是一体的。那些令人安心的强有力的肯定性陈述会创造行为 - 所说的就是所做的。行动在这里是词语的仆人,它谦逊地跟在后面,就像在世界诞生的第一天:他说,世界应运而生'。"

-MICHELET, August 1792
米什莱,1792 年 8 月

"Word and Action Are Together One"
"言行合一"

Prior to the French Revolution, for example, the version of mongrelized Latin spoken in southern France, *la langue d'oc* or Occitan, had more in common with the vernacular spoken in Catalonia in northern Spain, than with *la langue d'oïl*, the speech of Paris that became the basis of "French." Indeed, when the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen" was published in the Parisian style, it was unintelligible to a majority living within the current borders of France. 23 One of the challenges the French revolutionaries faced was calculating how to translate their broadsides and edicts into the patois of innumerable villages that were only vaguely intelligible to one another.

在法国大革命之前,例如,在法国南部使用的混杂拉丁语版本(即 *langue d'oc* 或奥克语)与在西班牙北部加泰罗尼亚使用的日常语更相似,而不是巴黎语(*la langue d'oïl*),后者成为了"法语"的基础。事实上,当"人权宣言"以巴黎方式发布时,在当今法国境内的大多数人是无法理解的。革命者面临的一个挑战是,如何将他们的布告和法令翻译成无数村庄使用的方言,这些方言彼此只有模糊的可懂性。

The people living within what became "France" had quite different ways of speaking that were consciously conflated into one official language as a matter of policy.

居住在"法国"内部的人们有着相当不同的交流方式,这些方式被有意地合并为一种官方语言。

Written French had been the official language of the courts of justice since Francis I issued the Edict of Villers-Cotterets in 1539. 24 But this did not mean that it was widely intelligible, any more than "law French" was widely intelligible in England after 1200, when it became the official language of the courts of justice. Each was an "administrative vernacular," not a standardized language spoken and understood throughout the territory. 自从法兰西一世在 1539 年颁布《维勒-科特雷特法令》以来,法语一

直是法院的官方语言。但这并不意味着它广为人知,就像在 1200 年英格兰法院的官方语言"法语"广为人知一样。每一种都是一种"行政方言",而不是一种在整个领土上通用的标准化语言。

The French revolutionaries wanted to create something more comprehensive, a national language. Historian Janis Langins comments in *The Social History of Language* that "an influential body of opinion among the revolutionists believed that the triumph of the Revolution and the spread of enlightenment would be furthered by a conscious effort to impose a standard French in the territory of the Republic."²⁵ This "conscious effort" 法国革命者想要创造一种更全面的東西,一种全国性的语言。历史学家贾尼斯·朗金斯在《语言的社会历史》一书中评论称:"在革命者中间,有一个有力的舆论认为,革命的胜利和启蒙思想的传播,将因刻意地在共和国领土内推行标准法语而得到进一步推广。"这种"刻意的努力"

included a good deal of fussing over the use of individual words. Consider the telling example of the adjective "revolutionary," first used by Marabou in 1789. After a period of "somewhat wide and indiscriminant use," as Langins puts it, "during the Terror there followed a period of suppression and oblivion for several decades. . . . On June 12, 1795, the Convention decided to reform the language as well as the institutions created by our former tyrants [i.e., the vanquished Robespierrists] in replacing the word 'revolutionary' in official designations."²⁶ This tradition of language engineering 208

革命性的

survives in the finicky reception of the French authorities to words like "weekend" that have made their way into French from English. 法国当局对像"weekend"这样从英语引入法语的词语的挑剔接受态度依然存在。

Two centuries ago, however, the national language engineers in France were not discriminating merely against words from across the English Channel; they faced a much bigger job eradicating local variants of speech within the territory of the republic. This exercise was not merely confined to suppressing la langue d'oc. The "French" spoken on the Riviera then was

closer to the "Italian" spoken farther to the east than to Parisian French. 两个世纪前,法国的国家语言工程师不仅歧视英语频道对面的词语,他们还面临着一个更大的任务,那就是清除共和国领土内部各种地方语音变体。这个运动不仅局限于禁止使用欧克语(*la langue d'oc*)。当时里维埃拉地区所说的"法语"更接近东部所说的"意大利语",而不是巴黎法语。

Equally, the language of Alsace could arguably have been categorized as a form of German, which itself had numerous local varieties. Basque was spoken in the Pyrenees. Like Breton, spoken along the northwest coast of France, Basque had little in common with any of the vernacular "dialects" of Latin that were the basis of "French."

阿尔萨斯的语言可以被认为是德语的一种形式,而德语本身也有许多地方变体。巴斯克语在比利牛斯山脉地区使用。与法国西北海岸使用的布列塔尼语一样,巴斯克语与构成"法语"基础的任何俗语"方言"都几乎没有共同点。

There were also substantial numbers of Flemish speakers in the northeast. "The Parisian style of speech," as Michael Billig reminds us, was not spread through spontaneous market processes, but "imposed, legally and culturally, as 'French.'" ²⁷

在东北地区也有大量的佛兰芒语语者。正如迈克尔·比利格提醒我们的那样,"巴黎式语言"并非通过自发的市场过程而传播,而是被"合法和文化上强加为'法语'。"

What was true in France has been true elsewhere in the building of nationstates.

在建立民族国家的过程中,法国所发生的事情在其他地方也是如此。

Languages were often carried by armies and imposed by colonial powers. For example, the map of Africa after independence was defined according to the areas where the administrative languages of European powers predominated. Local dialects were seldom taught in schools. The distinctions between recognized "languages," which tended to define "nations," even nations with arbitrary colonial borders, and "dialects," which did not, were in large measure political.

语言通常随军队而来,并被殖民大国强加。例如,独立后的非洲地图是根

据欧洲大国的行政语言占主导地位的地区划定的。很少有当地方言在学校里被教授。被认可的"语言"与"方言"之间的区别,前者往往定义"民族",甚至是具有任意殖民边界的国家,后者则没有这样的定义,在很大程度上是政治性的。

In short, the imposition of a "national language" was part of a process used worldwide to enhance the power of the state. Encouraging or obliging everyone within the territory where the state monopolized violence to speak "the mother tongue"

简而言之,强加"国家语言"是全球范围内增强国家权力的一个过程的一部分。鼓励或强制要求在国家暴力垄断的领土内的每个人使用"母语"。

conveyed significant advantages in facilitating the exercise of power.
在帮助行使权力方面具有重要优势。

The Military Dimension of Language Uniformity 军事语言统一的层面

In a world where returns to violence were rising, the adoption of a national language conveyed military advantages. A national language was almost a precondition to consolidation of central power in nationstates. Central authorities that encouraged their citizens to speak the same tongue were better able to weaken the military power of local magnates. The standardization of language after the French Revolution made the cheapest and most effective form of modern military force - national conscript armies -

在暴力回报不断上升的世界中,采用全国性语言具有军事优势。全国性语言几乎是国家实现权力集中的先决条件。鼓励公民使用同一种语言的中央权力更能削弱地方大佬的军事实力。法国大革命后语言的标准化使得最便宜和最有效的现代军事力量 - 全国性征兵军队 -

feasible. A common language enabled troops from all regions of the "nation" to communicate fluently with one another. This was a prerequisite before massed conscript armies could displace independent battalions mustered and controlled not by the central authorities but by powerful local

magnates.

可行的。一种共同语言使来自"国家"各地区的部队能够与彼此流利交流。在大规模征召的军队取代由强大地方土豪而非中央当局组建和控制的独立营之前,这是一个先决条件。

Prior to the French Revolution, as we discussed in Chapter 5, troops were raised and commanded by local potentates who might or might not answer calls to battle issued from Paris or another capital. In either event, their stance was determined after careful negotiation. As Charles Tilly notes, the "ability to give or withhold support afforded. . .

法国大革命之前,正如我们在第 5 章中讨论的那样,部队由当地强人招募和指挥,他们可能会也可能不会回应从巴黎或其他首都发出的作战号召。无论情况如何,他们的立场都是通过谨慎的谈判而确定的。正如查尔斯·蒂利所指出的那样,"给予或拒绝支持的能力赋予了"...

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great bargaining power."²⁸ Furthermore, independent military units had the additional drawback, as far as the central authorities were concerned, of being capable of resisting government efforts to commandeer domestic resources. Clearly, central authorities, whether King or Revolutionary Convention, had a difficult challenge to collect taxes or otherwise strip resources from local potentates who commanded private armies capable of defending those assets.

强大的议价能力。"²⁸ 此外,独立的军事单位还有一个额外的缺点,从中央当局的角度来看,就是它们有能力抵御政府调用国内资源的努力。很明显,无论是国王还是革命大会,中央当局都面临着一个艰难的挑战,那就是如何向掌握私人军队、有能力捍卫这些资产的地方大佬们征税或剥夺资源。

"National armies" greatly enhanced the power of the national government to impose its will throughout a territory. Imposition of a national language played a decided role in facilitating the formation of national armies. Before national armies could form and function effectively it was obviously useful that their various members be able to communicate fluently.

国民军大大增强了国家政府在全境强加其意志的能力。实施全国性语

言在推动国民军的形成中发挥了决定性作用。在国民军能够形成并有效运作之前,显然让其各成员能够流利沟通是很有用的。

It was therefore a military plus if everyone within a jurisdiction could comprehend orders and instructions, as well as convey certain intelligence back along the bureaucratic chain of command. The French revolutionaries demonstrated the value of this almost immediately. In addition to running the equivalent of a language school, they also set up special monthlong "crash courses" in which, as Langins writes, "hundreds of students from all over France would be trained in the techniques of gunpowder and cannon manufacture."²⁹

因此,如果一个管辖区域内的每个人都能理解命令和指示,并通过官僚通道传递某些情报,那将是一个军事优势。法国 revolutionaries 几乎立即展现了这种优势的价值。除了开设类似语言学校的机构外,他们还设立了长达一个月的"密集培训课程",正如 Langins 所写的,"来自法国各地的数百名学生将接受火药和大炮制造技术的培训。"

The military advantage of the French approach was shown by their successes in the Napoleonic period, as well as by contrary examples of what happened to regimes that could not depend upon the mobilization benefits of a common tongue during war. One of many factors that contributed to the disastrous defeats and demoralization of the Russian forces in the early days of World War I was the fact that the czar's aristocratic officer corps tended to communicate in German (the other court language of the Romanovs was French), which the rank-and-file troops, not to mention the citizenry, did not understand.

法国方法的军事优势在拿破仑时期得到体现,同时也可以从那些在战争期间无法依靠共同语言优势的政权遭遇的结果中看出。第一次世界大战初期,俄罗斯军队遭受了灾难性的失败和士气低落,其中一个重要原因就是沙皇的贵族军官们倾向于使用德语(罗曼诺夫王朝的另一种官方语言是法语),而普通士兵和平民都不太懂这些语言。

This points to another important military advantage of a common language. It reduces the motivational hurdles to fighting a war. Propaganda is useless if incomprehensible. In this respect as well, the French revolutionaries were also well attuned to the possibilities. Their "dominant idea," according to

Langins, was "the will of the people They therefore had to identify themselves with the popular will by expressing it in its own particular language." 30 Prior to 1789, mutual incomprehensibility among "citizens" was a drawback in expressing the "will of the people" and thus a check on the exercise of power at the national level. In more ways than one, multilingual states and empires faced higher obstacles in mobilizing for war during the industrial period.

这指向了一个共同语言的另一个重要军事优势。它减少了发动战争的动机障碍。如果不可理解,宣传是无用的。在这方面,法国革命者也很清楚这种可能性。据兰金斯说,他们的"主导思想"是"人民的意志"。因此,他们必须通过用自己的特定语言表达它来认同自己与民意。1789年之前,"公民"之间的相互不可理解性是表达"人民意志"的一个障碍,因此也限制了国家层面的权力行使。在多方面来说,工业时期多语言国家和帝国在动员战争时面临着更高的障碍。

At the margin, therefore, they tended to be supplanted by nationstates that were better able to motivate their citizens to fight and mobilize resources for war. This is exemplified by nationalist consolidation, such as the invention of France and the French at the end of the eighteenth century. It is also illustrated by cases of nationalist devolution, such as the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I. The new nationstates that emerged in the wake of the Hapsburg Empire Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were, as Keynes said, "incomplete and immature." Yet their claims to form independent nationstates grouped around national identities at least 210

因此,在边缘地带,它们倾向于被那些更能激励公民参战并动员战争资源的民族国家所取代。这在18世纪末法国民族主义的巩固中得到体现。在奥匈帝国在一战后崩溃的情况下也有说明。在哈布斯堡帝国崩溃后出现的新的民族国家,比如奥地利、匈牙利、捷克斯洛伐克和南斯拉夫,正如凯恩斯所说,"不完整和不成熟"。然而,它们围绕国家认同独立成国的主张至少可以追溯到

partly defined by language persuaded Woodrow Wilson and other Allied leaders drawing up the Treaty of Versailles.

部分由语言定义,说服了伍德罗·威尔逊和其他协约国领导人起草凡尔赛条约。

The carving up of Central Europe after World War I illustrates what a double-edged sword language became in state-building. When returns to violence were rising, a common tongue facilitated the exercise of power and consolidated jurisdictions.

第一次世界大战后中欧的划分说明了语言在国家建设中变成了一把双刃剑。当回归暴力的趋势上升时,共同语言有助于行使权力和巩固管辖权。

However, when incentives to consolidate were weaker, factions formed by minorities around language disputes also tended to fracture multilingual states. The surge of separatist sentiment in the cities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the mid-nineteenth century followed epidemics that devastated the German-speaking populations. Prague was a German-speaking city when the nineteenth century opened. Like other cities, it grew rapidly as the century unfolded, mostly by migration, as vast numbers of landless Czech-speaking peasants were assimilated from the countryside. In the beginning, the newcomers found it necessary to learn German in order to get along, so they did. But when famine and disease carried away large numbers of German-speaking urban residents in midcentury, they were replaced by Czech-speaking peasants. Suddenly there were so many Czech speakers that it was no longer essential for the new residents to learn German. Prague became a Czech-speaking city and a hotbed of Czech nationalism.

然而,当整合的激励较弱时,由少数民族围绕语言争议而形成的派系也倾向于分裂多语种国家。十九世纪中叶,奥匈帝国城市中分离主义情绪的激增,是由于德语人口的大量损失。当十九世纪初期,布拉格是一座德语城市。和其他城市一样,随着世纪的展开,大量无地可归的讲捷克语的农民被吸收进城,城市人口急剧增长。起初,新来的居民需要学习德语才能谋生,因此他们都这样做了。但是到了世纪中叶,大量德语城市居民被饥荒和疾病夺去了生命,他们被讲捷克语的农民取代了。突然之间,捷克语人口众多,新居民已不再需要学习德语了。布拉格成为一座捷克语城市,成为捷克民族主义的温床。

Contemporary separatist movements now frequently form around language disputes in multilingual countries. This is evidently the case in Belgium and Canada, two nations that, as we noted earlier, will probably be among the first in the OECD to dissolve in the new millennium. Few governments can top the heavy-handed actions to enforce language uniformity imposed by the Parti Quebecois in Quebec.³¹ More surprisingly, language grievances also played a role in launching the early activities of the northern separatists in Italy, which also faces disintegration. In the early 1980s, the Lombard League, as it was then known, "declared Lombardian to be a separate language from Italian." Billig comments, "Had the League's programme been successful during the early 1980s, and had Lombardy seceded from Italy, establishing its own state boundaries, a prediction might be made: increasingly Lombardian would have come to be recognized as different from Italian." ³² This is not an arbitrary assertion. It reflects what has happened in similar cases. For example, after Norway became independent in 1905, Norwegian nationalists set about a concerted effort to identify and underline features of the "Norwegian language" that were distinct from Danish and Swedish. Similarly, activists favoring an independent Belarus changed road signs into "Belarusian," but apparently failed to make the point that Belarusian is a separate language rather than a dialect of Russian.

当代分裂主义运动现在经常围绕多语国家的语言争议而形成。这显然是比利时和加拿大的情况,这两个国家可能是经合组织中最先在新千年中解体的国家。很少有政府能超越魁北克党在魁北克实施的强硬行动来执行语言统一。令人惊讶的是,语言不满同样在推动意大利北方分裂主义者早期活动中发挥了作用,这个国家同样面临着解体。在 20 世纪 80 年代初,当时被称为伦巴底联盟的组织"宣布伦巴底语是独立于意大利语的语言"。比利格评论说,"如果联盟的计划在 20 世纪 80 年代初取得成功,伦巴底从意大利分离并建立自己的国家,可以预测:伦巴底语将越来越被认为不同于意大利语。"这并非武断的断言,而是反映了类似情况的发展历程。例如,挪威在 1905 年独立后,挪威民族主义者着手有计划地确认和突出"挪威语"与丹麦语和瑞典语不同的特点。同样,支持白俄罗斯独立的活动家将道路标志改成"白俄罗斯语",但显然未能说服人白俄罗斯语是一种独立于俄语的语言,而不是俄语的方言。

Now that the military imperatives favoring language uniformity have largely been outstripped, we expect the national languages to fade, but not

without a fight. It is to be expected that the well-rehearsed adage that "war is the health of the state" will be tested as a recuperative. As the nationstate slides into irrelevancy, demagogues and reactionaries will foment wars and conflicts, along the lines of ethnic and tribal fighting that has racked the former Yugoslavia and numerous jurisdictions in Africa, from Burundi to Somalia. Conflicts will prove convenient for the pretexts they provide for those seeking to arrest the trend toward commercialization of sovereignty. Wars will facilitate efforts to sustain more exacting regimes of taxation and impose more severe 211

军事上要求语言统一的优势已基本被超越,我们预计国家语言将会逐步消亡,但这并非易事。我们可以预见,人们普遍认为"战争是国家的养分"这一老生常谈,将被用于再生。随着民族国家的渐趋无关紧要,煽动家和反动分子将煽动战争和冲突,类似于曾席卷前南斯拉夫和非洲多个地区(从布隆迪到索马里)的种族和部落斗争。这些冲突将为那些试图阻止主权商业化趋势的人们提供方便的借口。战争将有助于维持更严格的征税制度,并实施更严厉的 211

penalties for escaping the duties and burdens of citizenship. Wars will help undergird the "them and us" dimension of nationalism. To the proponents of systematic coercion, commercialized sovereignty, which gives individuals a choice of sovereignty services based upon price and quality, will seem no less a sin than the assertion by individuals of the right to veto the judgments of the pope and choose their own path to salvation during the Reformation. 逃避公民义务和负担的惩罚。战争将有助于巩固国家主义的"我们"与"他们"的维度。对于系统性强迫的支持者来说,根据价格和质量选择主权服务的商业化主权,与个人在宗教改革期间声称有权否决教皇的判决并选择自己的救赎之路一样是一种罪过。

The parallel is underscored by the fact that both the new technology of printing at the end of the fifteenth century and the new information technology at the end of the twentieth place formerly occult knowledge at the disposal of individuals in a liberating way. The printing press brought the Scriptures and other holy texts directly within the reach of individuals who previously had to rely upon priests and the church hierarchy to interpret the Word of God. The new information technology brings within the reach of anyone with a computer hook-up information about commerce,

investment, and current events that previously was available only to persons at the pinnacle of government and corporate hierarchies.

印刷术在 15 世纪末和 20 世纪末的新信息技术,都使原本秘密的知识以解放的方式为个人所用。印刷术使圣经和其他神圣典籍直接进入普通人手中,而此前他们需要依赖神职人员和教会领导解释上帝的话语。新的信息技术使任何有计算机连接的人都能获取关于商业、投资和时事的信息,这些信息以前只有政府和企业高层人物才能获得。

"[T]he development of printing and publishing made possible the new national consciousness and promoted the rise of modern nation states."³³
JACK WEATHERFORD

印刷和出版业的发展使新的民族意识成为可能,并促进了现代民族国家的崛起。

Rock and Roll in Cyberspace 网络空间中的摇滚乐

Make no mistake, the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web will be as destructive to nationalism as the advent of gunpowder and the printing press was conducive to nationalism. Global computer links will not bring back Latin as a universal language, but they will help shift commerce out of local dialects, like French in Quebec, into the new global language of the Internet and World Wide Web—the language that Otis Redding and Tina Turner taught the world, the language of rock and roll, English.

毫无疑问,互联网和万维网的出现将如同火药和印刷机的出现那样,对民族主义产生破坏性影响。全球计算机链接不会让拉丁语重新成为通用语言,但它们将帮助将商业从如魁北克的法语方言转移到互联网和万维网的新全球通用语言——奥提斯·雷丁和蒂娜·特纳教会世界的语言,即摇滚乐的语言,英语。

These new media will undercut nationalism by creating new affinities that supersede geographic boundaries. They will appeal to widely dispersed audiences that form wherever educated persons happen to find themselves. These new nonterritorial affinities will flourish, and in so doing help to create a new focus for "patriotism." Or rather, they will form new "in-groups" with whom individuals can identify without necessarily sacrificing

their economic rationality. The history of the Jews during the past two thousand years shows that this is possible over the long term and in the face of hostile local conditions. As the comment from William Pfaff quoted at the head of this chapter suggests, it is a historical and wrong to think that loyalties to the land of one's fathers, the patria, necessarily entails loyalty to an institution resembling a nationstate.

这些新媒体将通过创造超越地理界限的新亲和力来削弱民族主义。它们将吸引各地受过良好教育的人所组成的广泛分散的受众群体。这些新的非领土性亲和力将蓬勃发展,并在此过程中帮助创造一种新的"爱国主义"焦点。或者说,它们将形成新的"内部群体",个人可以与之认同,而不必必然牺牲他们的经济理性。过去两千年来犹太人的历史表明,这在长期内和面对敌对的地方条件时是可能的。正如本章开头引用的威廉·普法夫的评论所暗示的,认为对父亲之地的忠诚、祖国,必然意味着对国家这一机构的忠诚是一个历史上的错误。

Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith make this even more clear in *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, showing that what appear to be examples of early modern nationalism are more often instances of patriots defending a much narrower patria—often against the encroachment of a state. They write, "All too often a supposed allegiance to a national community turns out, on inspection, to be nothing of the kind. The patria itself is at least as likely to be a home town or province as the whole nation."³⁴

杰弗里·帕克和莱斯利·M·史密斯在《17世纪的大危机》一书中更加清楚地表明,表面上看起来是早期现代民族主义的例子,实际上更多是爱国者为捍卫狭隘的祖国而辩护,通常是针对国家的侵犯。他们写道:"经常会发现,一个所谓对民族共同体的忠诚,实际上根本算不上是那回事。祖国本身至少与整个民族一样有可能仅仅是一个家乡或省份。"

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As Jack Weatherford lucidly explains in *Savages and Civilization*, the rise of the printing press, the first mass-production technology, had dramatic effects in contributing to the creation of politics, with its demands for allegiance to a broader nationstate. By the year 1500, there were printing presses operating in 236 places in Europe, "and they had printed a combined total of some 20 million books."³⁵ Gutenberg's first printed book

was an edition of the Bible in Latin. He followed it with editions of other popular medieval books in Latin. As Weatherford explains, printing meandered in a direction that defeated early expectations that the ready availability of texts would spread the use of Latin and even Greek. To the contrary. There were two important reasons why the printing press did not reinforce the use of Latin. First, the printing press was a mass-production technology. As Benedict Anderson points out, "[I]f manuscript knowledge was scarce and arcane lore, print knowledge lived by reproducibility and dissemination."³⁶ Very few Europeans were multilingual in 1500. This meant that the audience for works in Latin was not a mass audience. The vast majority who were monoglot made up a much bigger market of potential readers. Furthermore, what was true of readers was even more true of writers. Publishers needed products to sell.

杰克·韦瑟福德在《野蛮人与文明》中清楚解释,印刷机的出现,这项第一个大规模生产技术,极大地影响了政治的形成,因为它要求人们对更广泛的民族国家效忠。到 1500 年,欧洲出现了 236 个印刷厂,"共印刷了约 2000 万册书籍"。古腾堡的首部印刷品是一本拉丁语版的《圣经》。之后他又出版了其他一些流行的拉丁语中世纪著作。韦瑟福德解释说,印刷机的发展方向背离了人们早期的预期,即可读性的增强将会促进拉丁语乃至希腊语的使用。事实恰恰相反。印刷机不强化拉丁语使用的两个重要原因是:首先,印刷机是一种大规模生产技术。正如班纳迪克特·安德森指出的,"如果手抄知识是稀缺和神秘的,那么印刷知识就依赖于可复制性和传播"。1500 年时,很少有欧洲人精通多种语言。这意味着拉丁语作品的受众并非大众。大多数只会说一种语言的人构成了潜在读者群中更大的市场。而对于作家来说,这一情况更为普遍。出版商需要出售的产品。

Because there were few contemporary fifteenth-or sixteenth-century authors who could compose satisfactory new works in Latin, publishers were driven by market necessity to publish works in the vernacular. Printing thus helped to differentiate Europe into linguistic subsets. This was encouraged not only by the publication of new works that established the identity of new languages, like Spanish and Italian, but also by the adoption of characteristic typefaces, such as Roman, Italic, and the heavy Gothic script that was common to German publishing until well into the twentieth century. The new vernacular publishing, what Anderson describes as "print

capitalism," was very successful. Most notably, the printing press gave heresy the kind of decisive boost that we expect for the denationalization of the individual from the Internet. In particular, Luther became "the first best-selling author so known. Or to put it another way, the first writer who could 'sell' his new books on the basis of his name."³⁷ Astonishingly, Luther's works accounted for "no less than one third of all German-language books sold between 1518 and 1525."³⁸

由于在 15 世纪或 16 世纪很少有当代作者能够撰写令人满意的拉丁文新作品,出版商被市场需求所驱使,不得出版通俗文字作品。印刷业因此帮助将欧洲划分为语言子集。这不仅受益于新作品的出版,这些新作品确立了如西班牙语和意大利语等新语言的身份,也受益于特征性印刷字体如罗马体、意大利体和直至 20 世纪中叶在德国出版物中普遍使用的粗重哥特体的采用。安德森所描述的这种新兴通俗文字出版业非常成功。最值得注意的是,印刷机给了异端邪说这样的决定性推动,我们预计这种推动力与互联网将个人去国家化的方式相似。特别是,路德成为"首位销量最好的已知作家。或者换句话说,首位能够依靠其名声'销售'新书的作家"。令人惊讶的是,路德的作品占到 1518 年至 1525 年间所有德语书籍销量的不少于三分之一。

In many respects, the new technology of the Information Age will counter part of the megapolitical impact of fifteenth-century technology, the printing press, in stimulating and underpinning the rise of nationstates. The World Wide Web creates a commercial venue with a global language, English. It will eventually be reinforced with simultaneous-translation software, making almost everyone effectively multilingual, and helping to denationalize language and imagination. Just as the technology of the printing press undermined allegiance to the dominant institution of the Middle Ages, the Holy Mother Church, so we expect the new communications technology of the Information Age to undermine the authority of the nanny state. In due course, almost every area will become multilingual. Local dialects will rise in importance. Propaganda from the center will lose much of its coherence as immigrants and speakers of minority tongues are emboldened to resist assimilation into the nation. 信息时代的新技术在许多方面会抵消第十五世纪印刷机技术带来的大政治影响,从而刺激和支撑民族国家的兴起。万维网创造了一个以英语

为全球通用语的商业平台。它最终将得到同步翻译软件的支持,使几乎每个人都实际上能够使用多种语言,有助于去民族化语言和想象。就像印刷机技术削弱了中世纪主导机构--罗马天主教会的权威一样,我们预计信息时代的新通信技术也将削弱"保姆国家"的权威。不久的将来,几乎所有领域都将变得多语化。地方方言将变得更加重要。来自中央的宣传将失去大部分连贯性,因为移民和少数民族语言使用者将更勇敢地抵制融入国家。

MILITARY MYSTICISM

军事神秘主义

Far from being objective communities, in the same sense that, for example, "hunting-gathering bands" are objective, nations are imagined out of a mysticism inspired by a defunct military imperative. That was the imperative to link every person living within a territory through a sense of identity that can be made to seem more important than life itself. As Kantorowicz noted, it is not a coincidence that "at a certain moment in history the state in the abstract or the state as a corporation appeared as a corpus mysticism and that death for this new mystical body appeared equal in value to the death of a crusader for the cause of God!"³⁹ In this sense, the nationstate can be understood as a mystical construct. Yet as Billig notes, nationalism is "a banal mysticism, which is so banal that all the mysticism seems to have evaporated long ago." It "binds 'us' to the homeland-that special place which is more than just a place, more than a mere geophysical area. In all this, the homeland is made to look homely, beyond question and, should the occasion arise, worth the price of sacrifice. And men, in particular, are given their special, pleasure-saturated reminders of the possibilities of sacrifice."⁴⁰

远离客观的社区,与"狩猎采集小组"不同,国家是由一种灵性所激发而虚构出来的,这种灵性源自一个失去作用的军事必要性。这个必要性就是通过一种认同感将生活在某一领土内的每个人联系起来,这种认同感可能比生命本身更加重要。正如坎托罗维奇所指出的,在历史的某个时刻,抽象的国家或作为一个法人团体的国家出现为一种神秘主义的结构,为这个新的神秘身体而死,与在上帝大业中为十字军牺牲一样宝贵。³⁹从这个意义上说,民族国家可以理解为一种神秘的构造。然而正如比利格所指出的,民族主义是一种平凡的神秘主义,这种神秘主义已经完全蒸发。它将"我们"与祖国,这个不仅仅是一个地方,而是一个超越地理区域的特殊之所,联系在一起。在所有这些中,祖国被塑造成一个熟悉的、毋庸置疑的、在必要时值得为之牺牲的地方。而男人们尤其被给予这种牺牲的可能性的特别、愉悦饱满的提醒。⁴⁰

The imaginative link between the nation and home continues to be highlighted by nationalists at every opportunity. As Billig suggests, the nation is "imagined as homely space, cozy within its borders, secure against the dangerous outside world. And 'we' the nation within the homeland can so easily imagine 'ourselves' as some sort of family." 41

国家与家庭之间的想象联系持续在每个机会被民族主义者强调。正如比利格所言,国家被想象为一个温馨舒适的空间,安全地存在于其边界之内,免受危险的外部世界威胁。我们作为家庭的一员,也可以很容易地将自身想象为某种国家的一部分。

The cliches of nationalism, tirelessly and routinely repeated, include many commonplace metaphors of kinship and identity. They associate the nation with an individual's sense of "inclusive fitness," a powerful motive for altruism and sacrifice.

国家主义的陈词滥调,无休止地和日复一日地重复,包括许多普通的亲属关系和认同的隐喻。它们将国家与个人的"包容性健康"感联系起来,这是利他主义和牺牲的强大动机。

"That sacrificial altruism does exist in social insects, other nonhuman animals, and humans implies that maximization of self-interest cannot be solely defined in terms of an individual organism's wants and needs. Indeed, the presence of altruism, particularly toward kin, has required a whole rethinking of traditional notions of survival of the fittest in the biological sciences. This has resulted in a growing conviction that natural selection does not ultimately operate on the individual" 42 R. PAUL SHAW AND YUWA WONG

这种牺牲的利他主义确实存在于社会性昆虫、其他非人类动物和人类中,这意味着自我利益的最大化不能仅仅由个体生物的欲望和需求来定义。事实上,特别是对亲属的利他主义的存在,已经要求对生物科学中传统的适者生存的概念进行全面的重新思考。这导致了一种日益增强的信念,即自然选择最终并不是作用于个体。

NATIONALISM AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS

民族主义与包容性健康

Our main focus in this book is on objective "megapolitical" factors that alter the costs and rewards of human choices. The underlying premise upon which the predictive power of the analysis rests is that individuals will seek rewards and shun costs. This is an essential truth of what Charles Darwin called "the economy of nature." But it is not the whole truth. Simple reward optimization does not explain everything in life. However, it does illuminate two of the three main forms of human sociality, identified by Pierre Van Den Berghe as "reciprocity and coercion."⁴³ By "reciprocity" Van Den Berghe means "cooperation for mutual benefit."⁴⁴ The most complex and far reaching examples of reciprocity are market interactions: trading, buying, selling, producing, and other economic activities.

"Coercion is the use of force for one-sided benefit, that is, for purposes of intra-specific parasitism or predation."⁴⁵ As we have explored in this 214 这本书的主要重点是客观的"巨型政治"因素,这些因素改变了人类选择的成本和回报。分析预测能力所依赖的基本前提是,个人会寻求回报并规避成本。这是查尔斯·达尔文所谓的"自然经济"的一个基本事实。但这并不是全部事实。简单的回报优化无法解释生活中的一切。然而,它确实阐明了皮埃尔·范登·伯赫所确定的人类社会性的三种主要形式中的两种:"互惠和强制"。范登·伯赫所说的"互惠"意味着"为了相互利益而合作"。最复杂和影响最广泛的互惠行为就是市场互动:交易、购买、销售、生产和其他经济活动。"强制是为单方面利益而使用武力,也就是说,为了种内寄生或捕食"。正如我们在这本书中探讨的那样,

volume and two previous books, we believe that coercion is a crucial element in human society, a larger one than is usually recognized. Coercion helps determine the security of property and limits the ability of individuals to enter into mutually beneficial cooperation.

强制是人类社会的一个关键因素,其重要性比通常认为的更大。强制有助于确定财产的安全性,并限制个人进行互利合作的能力。

Coercion underlies all politics. The third element in Van Den Berghe's typology of human sociality is "kin selection," the cooperative behavior that animals undertake with their kin. Kin selection, which is described more fully below, is also a crucial feature of the "economy of nature."

强制是所有政治的基础。范登·伯格的人类社会性分类法的第三要素是"亲属选择",也就是动物与亲属进行的合作行为。亲属选择是"自然经济"的关键特征,将在下面更详细地描述。

As Jack Hirshleifer has written, "[T]he revival of Darwinian evolutionary selection theory as applied to problems of social behaviour, which has come to be known as sociobiology," has "a distinctly economic aspect." And: Looking over the whole realm of life, sociobiology is attempting to find the general laws determining the multifarious forms of association among organisms. For example, Why do we sometimes observe sex and families, sometimes sex without families, sometimes neither sex nor families? Why do some animals flock, others remain solitary? Within groups, why do we sometimes observe hierarchical dominance patterns, sometimes not? Why do organisms in some species partition territories, others not? What determines the selflessness of the social insects, and why is this pattern so rare in Nature? When do we see resources allocated peacefully, when by means of violence? These are questions both posed and answered in recognizably economic terms. Sociobiologists ask what are the net advantages of the observed association patterns to the organisms displaying them, and what are the mechanisms whereby these patterns persist in social equilibrium states. It is perhaps this assertion of economic-behavioural continuity between man and other life-forms (termed "genetic capitalism" by one detractor) that explains the hostility of some ideologues to sociobiology.

达尔文的进化选择理论被应用于社会行为问题中,这个领域被称为社会生物学,具有明显的经济特征。社会生物学试图找到决定生物体之间各种形式关联的一般规律。例如,为什么有时出现性和家庭,有时出现无家庭的性,有时既无性也无家庭?为什么有些动物成群而其他则保持孤独?在群体内部,为什么有时出现等级制度,有时却没有?为什么有的物种划分领土,而另一些则不然?社会性昆虫无私奉献的原因是什么,为什么这种模式在自然界如此罕见?资源有时和平分配,有时则通过暴力分配,原因是什么?这些问题都可用经济术语提出和解答。社会生物学家探讨观

察到的关联模式对生物有何净优势,以及这些模式如何在社会均衡状态中持续存在。这种人类和其他生命形式之间的经济-行为连续性(被一位批评家称为"遗传资本主义")或许解释了一些意识形态者对社会生物学的敌意。

We introduce sociobiology into our analysis of nationalism because it provides perspective on aspects of human nature that help facilitate systematic coercion. We agree with natural scientist Cohn Tudge, author of *The Time Before History*, that before we can understand the current world, much less gain a perspective on that to come, we need to understand the preface to history. That means we must "look at ourselves on the grand scale of time."⁴⁷ Tudge reminds us "that beneath the surface tremors of our lives there are much deeper and more powerful forces at work that in the end affect us all and all our fellow creatures... ⁴⁸ We suspect that among "these deeper and more powerful forces" is a genetically influenced motivational component undergirding nationalism. As Hirshleifer points out, paraphrasing Adam Smith and R. H. Coase, "human desires are ultimately adaptive responses shaped by man's biological nature and situation on earth,"

我们将社会生物学引入到我们对民族主义的分析中,因为它为有助于系统性胁迫的人性方面提供了视角。我们赞同自然科学家科恩·塔奇在《历史前时代》一书中所说的,在我们能够理解当前世界,更不用说获得对未来的视角之前,我们需要理解历史的前言。这意味着我们必须"从时间的大尺度上审视自己"。塔奇提醒我们,"在我们生活的表面颤动之下,有更深层次和更强大的力量在起作用,最终影响到我们所有人及其所有同类生物"。我们怀疑,在"这些更深层次和更强大的力量"之中,存在一个遗传影响的动机性成分,支撑着民族主义。正如希施莱弗所指出的,总结亚当·斯密和 R.H.科斯的观点,"人类的欲望最终是由人类的生物性质和地球处境塑造的适应性响应"。

4') This comes to the fore with the obviously biological allusions in most discussions of nationalism. Even in the United States, a conspicuously multiethnic nation, the government is personified in familial terms as 'Uncle Sam.'

这一点在对民族主义讨论中明显生物学比喻的出现中体现出来。即使

在人种多样的美国,政府也用家庭关系中的"山姆大叔"这个形象来象征。

The Biological Inheritance 生物遗传

In short, human nature, the origin of species, and their development by natural selection are elements to be considered in understanding the continuing evolution of 215

人性本质、物种起源以及自然选择在理解持续演化的过程中都是需要考虑的因素

human society. In the present case we are considering the likely human response to new circumstances occasioned by information technology. Particularly, we are focusing on the reaction to the advent of the cybereconomy and its many consequences, including the emergence of economic inequality more pronounced than anything seen in the past. Keys to at least some of the expected response lie in our genetic inheritance.

人类社会。在现有情况下,我们正在考虑人类对信息技术带来的新环境的可能反应。特别是,我们关注网络经济的出现及其众多后果,包括出现比以往任何时候都更加明显的经济不平等。至少部分预期反应的关键在于我们的遗传遗产。

When a new species is formed, it does not discard all the DNA that it carried in its previous form, but adds to it. The whole difference between a human being and a chimpanzee is contained in less than 2 percent of the DNA in each species; slightly over 98 percent of their DNA is common to both, and some of it can be traced back to very primitive early organisms, far down the historic chain of development.

当一个新物种形成时,它不会抛弃所有在其之前形式中携带的 DNA,而是在此基础上添加新的 DNA。人类和黑猩猩的整体差异仅仅包含于两个物种不到 2%的 DNA 中;超过 98%的 DNA 是两者共有的,其中一部分可以追溯至非常原始的早期生物,大大远低于发展史的链条。

GENETIC INERTIA

基因惯性

Human cultures similarly contain elements that are universal, some of which are indeed inherited from prehuman ancestors. How we seek food, how we mate, how we form families, how we relate to strange groups, how we defend ourselves are all complex mixtures of instinct and culture, with very primitive roots. They are also all capable of modern adaptations, such as those that have characterized the nationstate in the modern period. If we think of cultures in this way, we shall see them as parallel to genetic development. The three great differences are that cultures are transmitted by the information chain between human beings, not by the genetic chain between generations; they can to some extent-perhaps less than we think be changed by conscious intelligent action; they change with the prevailing environment of costs and rewards, which mutates much faster than genetic change. Physically we are very similar to our ancestors of thirty thousand years ago; culturally we have moved quite far away from them.

人类文化同样包含着既普遍又从远古先人遗传而来的元素。我们如何寻找食物、配偶婚配、组建家庭、与陌生群体互动、自我防卫,都是本能与文化的复杂混合物,其根源极其原始。它们也都能够适应现代变迁,如那些在现代国家中所体现的特点。若从这个角度思考文化,我们就会发现它们与基因发展是相互平行的。三大主要差异在于:文化是通过人类之间的信息链传播的,而非代际之间的基因链;它们在某种程度上——也许不如我们所想的那么多——能够通过有意识的智性行动加以改变;它们随环境成本效益的变迁而变迁,这种变迁的速度要远快于基因的变迁。从生理上来说,我们与三万年前的祖先非常相似;从文化上来说,我们已经远远地离开了那些祖先。

Evolutionary Models

进化模型

There are two biological models of the way in which species evolve. The scientific orthodoxy is neo-Darwinist. Random genetic changes produce different physical forms. Most of these forms have no advantage to

survival, as for instance the albino blackbird, and these tend to die out. A small number of them are helpful to survival and spread through the species. There are still many difficulties in this theory, which may be sorted out by scientists in the next century, but randomness and the survival of favorable adaptations are the current scientific orthodoxy and have some explanatory power. The alternative is some variant of the theory of the early twentieth century French philosopher Henri Bergson, who believed that nature had some nonrandom creative purpose, an intelligent force seeking solutions. This concept has echoes in the work of such contemporary authorities as David Layzer and Stephen Jay Gould, who have stressed that genetic variation is not simply random but shows definite propensities.⁵⁰ This is not creationism in its strict biblical sense, but it avoids many of the problems of orthodox Darwinism.

两个关于物种进化的生物学模型。科学正统是新达尔文主义。随机基因变化产生不同的物理形式。其中大多数形式对生存没有优势,例如白化黑鸟,这些倾向于灭绝。少数有助于生存的形式会在物种中传播。这个理论仍存在许多困难,可能会在下个世纪被科学家解决,但随机性和有利适应生存是当前科学正统,并具有一些解释力。另一种是早 20 世纪法国哲学家亨利·伯格森理论的变体。他认为自然有某种非随机的创造性目的,是寻找解决方案的智能力量。这一概念在当代权威人士如大卫·莱泽和斯蒂芬·杰伊·古尔德的工作中有所回响,他们强调遗传变异不是简单随机的,而是显示出明确的倾向性。这不是严格的圣经意义上的创造论,但避免了正统达尔文主义的许多问题。

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"The great theoretical contribution of sociobiology has been to extend the concept of fitness to that of 'inclusive fitness.' Indeed, an animal can duplicate its genes directly through its own reproduction, or indirectly through the reproduction of relatives with which it shares specific proportions of genes. Animals, therefore, can be expected to behave cooperatively and thereby enhance each other's fitness to the extent that they are genetically related. This is what is meant by kin selection. Animals, in short, are nepotistic, i.e., they prefer kin over non-kin, and close kin over distant kin. This may happen consciously as in humans, or more commonly unconsciously."⁵ PIERRE VAN DEN BERGHE

社会生物学的理论贡献是将适合度的概念扩展到"包容适合度"。事实上,一个动物可以通过自身繁衍直接复制其基因,也可以通过与之共享特定比例基因的亲属的繁衍间接复制基因。因此,预期动物会表现出合作行为,从而在遗传关系程度上提高彼此的适合度。这就是亲缘选择的含义。简而言之,动物是偏袒亲属的,即他们更倾向于偏爱亲属而不是非亲属,更喜爱亲近亲属而不是远亲。这可能发生在人类的有意识层面,但更多是在无意识层面。

GENETICALLY INFLUENCED MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS

遗传影响的动机因素

The biological perspective on human behavior was enhanced by the introduction of the concept of "inclusive fitness" in 1963 by W D. Hamilton in "The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior." Hamilton recognized that while humans are fundamentally given to self-oriented behavior, they also undertake occasional acts of altruism or self-sacrifice that offer no apparent benefits in terms of the life of the individual. Hamilton sought to reconcile these apparent contradictions by positing that the fundamental maximizing unit is not the individual organism but the gene. Individuals in any species will seek to maximize not simply their own personal wellbeing but what Hamilton called their "inclusive fitness." He argued that "inclusive fitness" involves not only personal survival in the Darwinian sense, but also the enhanced reproduction and survival of close relatives who share the same genes.⁵² Hamilton's "inclusive fitness" thesis helps illuminate many otherwise curious features of human societies, including aspects of politics in nationstates.

从 1963 年 W.D. 汉密尔顿在《利他行为的进化》中引入"包容性适合度"概念开始,生物学视角增强了对人类行为的认知。汉密尔顿认识到,尽管人类本质上倾向于自利行为,但他们也会偶尔从事利他主义或自我牺牲的行为,这种行为并不能带来个人生活上的明显利益。汉密尔顿试图通过提出"包容性适合度"这一基本最大化单位来化解这些表面矛盾。他认为,任何物种的个体不仅会寻求自身的福祉最大化,还会追求汉密尔顿所谓的"包容性适合度"的最大化,这不仅包括个人在达尔文意义上的生存,还包括提高与自己基因相同的近亲的繁衍和生存的机会。汉密尔顿的"包容性适合度"理论有助于揭示人类社会中许多看似不可解的特征,包括国家政治中的某些方面。

Altruism: Misnomer or Fossil Kin Selection?

利他主义:误称还是化石亲缘选择?

According to Van Den Berghe, "Altruism, then, is directed mostly at kin, especially at close kin, and is, in fact, a misnomer. It represents the ultimate genetic selfishness. It is but the blind expression of inclusive fitness maximization." This is not to say, however, that there is no altruism absent the close genetic relationship referred to by Hamilton and Van Den Berghe. The uncertainties introduced by the fact that humans reproduce sexually rather than through asexual cloning all but guarantee that an inclination to "inclusive fitness maximization" would stimulate a good deal of "altruism" 根据范登贝尔赫的观点:"利他主义主要针对亲属,特别是亲近的亲属,事实上这不过是一种误称。它代表了最终的遗传自私主义。它只不过是包容性适合度最大化的盲目表达。"然而,这并不意味着在没有紧密的遗传关系的情况下就没有利他主义。由于人类通过性繁衍而非无性克隆的事实引入了种种不确定性,这几乎可以保证"包容性适合度最大化"的倾向会激发大量"利他主义"。

rebounding to the benefit of alleles other than the "selfish gene." In the first instance, there is always the possibility that some persons who undertake helping actions may do so in the mistaken assumption that they are helping close kin. The father who undertakes a sacrificial action for his offspring may not, in fact, be the progenitor but may merely think he is* This is not merely a theme for soap operas, it is illustrative of a primordial puzzle that survival of the "selfish genes" is probably facilitated if each apparent father behaves as if he actually is the father, even if there is a possibility that he is not.

回升有利于与"自私基因"不同的等位基因。在第一种情况下,总是存在一些提供帮助的人可能会错误地认为他们在帮助近亲的可能性。为子女做出牺牲行为的父亲实际上可能并非亲生父亲,而只是认为自己是。这不仅仅是肥皂剧的主题,它说明了一个根本性的难题,即如果每个表面父亲都表现得好像他实际上就是父亲,即便存在他不是的可能性,那么"自私基因"的生存可能会得到促进。

Seen in their proper light, however, as Hirshleifer points out, many of the paradoxes of "altruism" are semantic muddles that frequently confuse or mislead people 217

但从适当的角度来看,正如赫什莱费尔所指出的,许多所谓"利他主义"的悖论实际上只是语义困惑,常常会迷惑或误导人们

into losing sight of the context of competition in which "helping" could convey a survival advantage: " 'If an altruism choice of strategy is to be viable in competition with non-altruism, altruism must contribute to self-survival more than non-altruism does, and therefore it can't really be altruism.' All such muddles could be avoided if we drop the term 'altruism' and ask instead: What are the determinants of the entirely objective phenomenon that can be called helping? " 54 This question is perhaps most interesting in the case of "kinship helping." Hamilton's basic formulation of inclusive fitness involved a biological cost-benefit analysis in which an individual, or "the gene controlling helping behaviour," values the survival of an identical copy of itself equally to its own survival.

失去了"帮助"在竞争环境中可能带来的生存优势的视角："如果利他行为策略在与非利他主义者的竞争中要成为可行的,那么它必须比非利他行为在自我生存方面有更大的贡献,因此它实际上不能算是真正的利他主义。'所有这些混淆都可以通过放弃'利他主义'这个术语来避免,转而问:什么是可以称之为'帮助'这一完全客观现象的决定因素?"这个问题在"亲属关系帮助"一例中也许最为有趣。汉密尔顿对包容性适合度的基本阐述涉及一种生物学的成本利益分析,其中个体或"控制帮助行为的基因"将自己的生存价值与其完全相同的拷贝的生存价值等同起来。

Therefore, the willingness to undertake helping, let alone sacrifice, varies with the chance that another individual has an identical gene. "Specifically, a gene for kinship helping instructs a man (other things equal) to give his life if he can thereby save two siblings, four half-siblings, eight cousins, etc."55

因此,愿意提供帮助,更不用说牺牲的意愿,会随着另一个个体拥有相同基因的可能性而变化。"具体来说,一个亲属关系互助的基因会指示一个男人(其他条件相同),如果他能从而拯救两个兄弟姐妹、四个半兄弟姐妹、八个表兄弟姐妹等,就要献出自己的生命。"

*The same logic, of course, applies to the son or daughter who sacrifices for those whom he takes to be his siblings but are not.

同样的逻辑,当然也适用于他认为兄弟姐妹但实际上并非亲属的人牺牲的儿子或女儿。

PROBABILITY PROBLEMS OF INCLUSIVE FITNESS

概率性适应度问题

While this biologic seems clear in principle, upon closer examination it disguises a number of difficulties. For example, the fact that one's siblings or children may have a 50 percent probability of sharing an identical gene does not, in strict logic, mean that it is actually expressed in them. Every individual carries two sets of each gene, one from the father and one from the mother. But this, of course, means that only half of the genes carried by an individual parent are necessarily present in offspring. Furthermore, there is always the risk of mutation in reproduction, which, unlikely though it may be, reduces the certainty of genetic cost-benefit analysis. So if the metaphor of "gene as optimizer" is taken seriously, the case of the pater who is not the progenitor is only the most clear-cut example of a broader problem. If it is indeed the survival of the "selfish gene" that is optimized by sacrificing for near-relatives, then any possibility that results in the substitution of another allele for the identical copy of the "selfish gene" may be considered one of those intricate tricks that Mother Nature plays on herself.

尽管这种生物学原理看似简单明了,但仔细研究后却隐藏了一些困难。例如,一个人的兄弟姐妹或子女有 50% 的概率共享相同的基因,但这并不意味着该基因一定会在他们体内表达。每个个体都携带着父母各自贡献的一套基因。这意味着一个父母只有一半的基因会出现在后代身上。此外,生殖过程中也存在着突变的风险,虽然概率不大,但会降低基因成本收益分析的确定性。因此,如果把"基因作为优化器"的隐喻当真,那么非亲生子女的情况只是一个最典型的例子,反映了一个更广泛的问题。如果确实是"自私基因"的生存得到了优化而导致对近亲进行牺牲,那么任何可能导致"自私基因"的拷贝被其他等位基因取代的可能性都可视为自然界自身设置的一些复杂的诡计。

Uncertain Consequences

不确定的后果

Altruism directed toward kin therefore involves problems. Not only is there the probability problem for the "selfish gene" that apparent relatives of its host may not, in fact, share its identical copies. There is also the difficulty of determining under conditions of uncertainty whether any given gesture of sacrifice will, in fact, primarily benefit relatives rather than others. (Sacrifice that primarily benefits others may actually harm the inclusive fitness of the selfish gene by reducing the prospects that it will be represented in succeeding populations.) Consider an awful example inspired by the news while we were writing. Suppose a parent in Dunblane, Scotland, learned on short notice

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亲利向亲属的利他主义因此存在问题。不仅存在"自私基因"的概率问题,即其宿主的表面亲属可能实际上并不与其拥有相同的拷贝,还存在在不确定情况下确定任何给定的牺牲姿态是否实际上主要使亲属而非他人获益的困难。(主要使他人获益的牺牲实际上可能会通过降低其在后代群体中被代表的前景而损害自私基因的包容性适合度。)让我们考虑一个可怕的例子,这个例子是在我们写作期间从新闻中获得的灵感。假设斯科特兰德邓布兰的一名家长在短时间内

that an armed lunatic was heading into a local school with the apparent intention of doing harm. By acting instantly, he or she could undertake the heroic but possibly doomed gesture of confronting the lunatic, and thereby possibly save his or her children at the school.

一名持武器的疯子正在进入一所当地学校,似乎有意做出伤害。通过迅速行动,他或她可以采取英勇但可能注定失败的姿态来对抗这名疯子,从而可能拯救在学校里的孩子们。

Or possibly not.
或者不是。

Even a ruthless lunatic intent on killing every child on the planet would be limited in the harm he could do before running short of ammunition or being subdued by others.

即使是一个残忍的疯子,他也会因弹药不足或被他人制服而受到限制,无法伤害地球上每个孩子的性命。

Had the sacrificing parent decided not to intervene, more likely than not his children would have survived in any event, as most children at the school did. All the harm that a gallant act of sacrifice would have prevented probably would otherwise have fallen on the children of others. So by risking his or her life, primarily for the children of others, the father or mother in question might actually have reduced his "inclusive fitness." By depriving all his children of one of their parents, he would probably have left those children in a worsened position in the Darwinian struggle.

如果牺牲的父母决定不干预,很可能他的孩子也会在任何情况下幸存下来,因为学校里大多数孩子都存活下来了。一个英勇的牺牲行为本来可以防止的所有伤害,很可能最终还是会落在其他人的孩子身上。因此,通过冒着自己生命的危险主要为其他人的孩子着想,这位父亲或母亲实际上可能降低了自己的"包含适应度"。通过剥夺他所有孩子的一个父母,他很可能使这些孩子在达尔文的斗争中处于更糟糕的境地。

While this is admittedly a strained example, it is also realistic. It reflects the fact that there are countless circumstances in life in which large or small acts of helping have beneficial effects. In many cases, the direct beneficiaries of such actions cannot be easily isolated to closely related kin. And ironically, as we consider below, this may be part of the survival benefit that enabled those with less discriminate helping genes to endure all the millennia of unpleasantness until now.

尽管这确实是一个勉强的例子,但它也是现实的。它反映了生活中存在着无数情况,在这些情况下,大大小小的帮助行为都会产生有益的影响。在很多情况下,这些行动的直接受益者并不容易局限于密切相关的亲属。具有讽刺意味的是,正如我们下面将讨论的,这可能是使那些缺乏选择性帮助基因的人得以在过去数千年的种种不幸中存续下来的一部分生存利益。

Altruism and Genetic Inertia 利他主义和遗传惯性

If, as we believe, the "selfish gene" thesis is an accurate approximation of what motivates human action, it would be too simple to suppose that the helping or sacrificial behavior it engenders could operate narrowly and solely for the benefit of actual relatives.

如果我们相信"自私基因"理论是对人类行动动机的准确逼近,那么认为它所产生的利他主义或牺牲行为仅仅能为亲属利益服务就太简单了。

Imperfect knowledge makes distinguishing kin an uncertain art in some circumstances.

不完全的知识在某些情况下使鉴别亲属关系成为一种不确定的艺术。

And even assuming that kin were known, actual representation of any given "selfish gene" in the population of kin could not be ascertained as more than a matter of probabilities. Until recently, it would have been impossible to distinguish actual genetic markers among individuals. And we are still some distance from being able to practically distinguish which near-relatives actually express whatever "selfish gene" is optimizing its survival. Beyond that is the greater difficulty of confining benefits to kin rather than others. 即使假设亲属是已知的,给定"自私基因"在亲属群体中的实际代表性也无法确定,这只是概率的问题。直到最近,区分个体之间实际的遗传标记还是不可能的。而且我们距离能够实际区分哪些近亲真正表达某种"自私基因"以优化生存还有一段距离。更大的困难在于将获益限制在亲属之内,而不是其他人。

Furthermore, it is also obvious from experience that humans sometimes divert their "nurturing instincts" for the benefit of non-kin if appropriate kin are unavailable.

此外,从经验来看,人类有时也会将"养育本能"转移到非亲属身上,如果合适的亲属不可用。

The most clear-cut example of this is the behavior of parents toward adopted children, or even the behavior of certain persons, usually childless, toward their household pets. It is not unheard of for such individuals to court serious injury and even death to rescue cats trapped in a tree.

Certainly, in any given year, a not-insignificant number of persons perish in household accidents precipitated in some fashion by pets who find their way into jeopardy. What is true of pets is more true of adoptive children. It is certainly not a 219

这种行为最典型的例子是父母对收养子女的态度,或者通常无子女的某些人对家庭宠物的行为。这样的个人为了救援陷入险境的猫咪而冒生

命危险并非闻所未闻。毫无疑问,每年都有一些人因家庭宠物陷入危险而遭遗憾事故丧生。对于宠物而言如此,对于收养子女而言更是如此。这样做绝对不是 219

stretch to say that parents of adopted children often treat them "as if" they were kin, thus giving the concept of "kin selection" another meaning. 可以说,收养孩子的父母通常会将他们视为亲人,这给"亲缘选择"这一概念增添了新的内涵。

Such cases do not discredit the "selfish gene" theory as much as some critics would wish. To the contrary. We see examples of people behaving "as if" they were sacrificing for close relatives to advance their own inclusive fitness, as instances of "genetic inertia." In other words, they reflect the fact, noted by Howard Margolis in *Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality*, that "human society changed faster" than human genetic makeup. People, therefore, continue to act "substantially as if living in a small hunter-gatherer group." 56 A crucial characteristic of such groups was, as Van Den Berghe put it, that They were small in-bred populations of a few hundred individuals .

这种情况并不像一些批评者所希望的那样贬低"自私基因"理论。恰恰相反。我们看到人们表现得"好像"他们是在为亲属牺牲以提高自己的包容性适合度的例子,这是"遗传惯性"的实例。换句话说,他们反映了霍华德·马戈利斯在《自私主义、利他主义与理性》中指出的事实,即"人类社会变化更快"于人类的基因构成。因此,人们继续以"实质上生活在一个小型狩猎采集群体中"的方式行事。正如范登伯格所说,这种群体的一个关键特征就是,它们是由几百个个体组成的小型近亲繁衍群体。

Members of the tribe, though subdivided into smaller kin groups, saw themselves as a single people, solitary against the outside world, and interlinked by a web of kinship and marriage making the tribe in fact a superfamily. A high rate of inbreeding assured that most spouses were also kinsmen." 57

部落成员虽然分为更小的亲属团体,但他们视自己为一个单一的民族,独立于外界,通过亲属和婚姻关系的纽带相互联系,使得部落实际上成为一个大家庭。较高的近亲结婚率确保了大多数配偶也是亲族。

In short, for all of human existence prior to the advent of agriculture, ethnic groups were "inbreeding superfamilies." Given this past identity between the family and the in-group, there could well be a genetically influenced tendency to treat the in-group as kin. It is easy to imagine that such behavior could have had survival value in the past when every member of the "inbreeding superfamily" was kin. As Margolis suggests, it is easy to imagine that for "such small bands of hunter-gatherers, closely related, that inclusive selfishness (aside from any prospect of reciprocity or vengeance) would alone support a measure of commitment to group-interest. One can then argue that some tendency to group-interested motivation survives as a kind of fossil kin-altruism. " 58

在农业出现之前,人类一直存在着"近亲结婚超家庭"的情况。由于家庭和内部群体之间存在着密切关系,可能会倾向于将内部群体视为亲属。过去,当"近亲结婚超家庭"的每个成员都是亲属时,这种行为可能具有生存价值。正如玛格丽特所建议的,对于这些密切相关的狩猎采集小型部落来说,除了互惠或复仇的前景之外,"包容性自私"也可能支持一定程度的对群体利益的承诺。因此,可以认为某些倾向于对群体利益的动机存在着一种"化石式的亲属利他主义"。

In other words, because we retain the genetic makeup of hunter-gatherers, our behavior toward in-groups reflects the kind of "altruism" that would be expected to optimize the survival success of in-groups comprised by "inbreeding superfamilies."

换言之,由于我们保留了狩猎采集者的遗传构成,我们对内部群体的行为反映了"内部群体由'近亲繁衍超级家庭'组成时可期望优化生存成功的利他主义"。

Presumably, as Margolis speculates, this tendency for group-interested behavior, arising from "fossil kin-altruism" or genetic inertia, contributed to the survival of Homo sapiens "while other humanoid species went extinct." 据推测,正如马尔戈利斯所猜测的那样,这种群体利益行为的倾向,源于"化石亲属利他主义"或者基因惰性,有助于智人的生存,而其他类人物种灭绝。

Epigenesis
表观遗传学

We see this "as if" behavior as a prime example of "epigenesis," or the tendency of genetically influenced motivational factors to innately bias humans to favor certain choices over others. In other words, the human mind is not a tabula rasa, or blank slate, but a hard drive with prewired circuits that make certain responses more readily learned and attractive than others. Thus the proposition that the mind is disposed to think in terms of an out-group that excites enmity or hostility and an in-group to which one feels great amity or loyalty usually reserved for kin.⁶⁰

我们将这种"好像"的行为视为"表观遗传"的典型范例,即遗传影响的动机因素天生会偏向使人更青睐某些选择。换句话说,人类的大脑并非一张白纸,而是有预先固化的电路,某些反应更容易学习和吸引。因此,我们倾向于认为大脑倾向于用仇敌的外群体和亲密的内群体的概念进行思考,这一忠诚通常仅限于亲属。

This epigenetic tendency to behave with an in-group as if it comprised close relatives creates a vulnerability to manipulation that has commonly been exploited by nationalists to engender sacrificial support for the state. In that sense, it is not a 220

这种表现出近亲行为的表观遗传倾向,使得人们容易受到操纵,常被民族主义者利用,从而为国家获得牺牲式支持。从这个意义上说,它并不是220。

coincidence that nationalist propaganda everywhere is dressed up in the vocabulary of kinship.

巧合的是,各地的民族主义宣传都使用亲属关系的词汇。

"By the voice of her cannon alarming, fair France bids her children arise.
Soldiers around us are arming. On, on, 'tis our mother who cries. CHANT
OF FRENCH SOLDIERS

法兰西之声发出警报,召唤她的子民起义。我们周围的士兵已经武装待战。前进吧,这是我们的母亲在呼唤。

Bogus Kinship

伪亲属关系

Consider the strong tendency of politicians everywhere to describe the state in terms borrowed from kinship. The nation is "our fatherland" or "our motherland." Its citizens are "we," "members of the family," our "brothers and sisters."⁶² The fact that states as culturally different as France, China, and Egypt employ such similes is not a rhetorical coincidence, as we see it, but a prime example of "epigenesis" or the tendency of genetically influenced motivational factors to innately bias humans to favor certain choices.

考虑到各地政客都倾向于用借用自亲缘关系的词语来描述国家。祖国被称为"我们的祖国"或"我们的母国"。其公民被称为"我们"、"家庭成员"、"我们的兄弟姐妹"。法国、中国和埃及等文化迥异的国家都使用这种比喻,这并非修辞巧合,而是"表观遗传"或遗传影响下的动机因素倾向于偏好某些选择的一个典型例子。

How does this epigenesis work? The identification mechanism employed to harness emotional loyalty to the nationstate makes use of various devices that would have been markers of kinship in the primitive past "to link the individual's inclusive fitness concerns" with the interests of the state.⁶³ For example, Shaw and Wong focus on five identification devices used by modern nationstates to mobilize their populations against out-groups. These are:

这种表观遗传是如何工作的?用于利用对民族国家的情感忠诚的识别机制利用了过去原始时期亲属关系的标志性因素"将个人的包容性健康关切"与国家利益联系起来。⁶³ 例如,肖和王关注现代民族国家用来动员他们的人口反对外部群体的五种识别装置。它们是:

1.

a common language
共同语言

2.

a shared homeland
共同的家园

3.

similar phenotypic characteristics
相似的表型特征

4.

a shared religious heritage and
共同的宗教遗产和

5.

the belief of common descent⁶⁴
共同祖源的信仰

Such characteristics, of course, would have distinguished the nucleus ethnic group in the primitive past. Much of the appeal of nationalism can be traced to the way that these identification devices have been adopted and dressed up in the language of kinship, as illustrated in the French soldiers' chant quoted above. Such mobilization devices, which refer to the state as the "fatherland" or the "motherland," are common worldwide because they work. Nationalism, Reaction, and the New Luddites 271

这些特征,当然,在原始时期就已经使这个核心民族群体与众不同。民族主义的很大吸引力可以追溯到这些识别工具被采用并用亲属关系的语言赋予新的外表,如上述引用的法国士兵的口号所示。将国家称为"祖国"或"母国"的这些动员工具在世界范围内十分普遍,因为它们确实很有效。民族主义、反应与新卢德派 271

Genetic Accounting
基因会计

The imaginary character of these kinship links as far as the state is concerned is evidenced by the fact that they possess none of the degrees of variability that characterize actual kinship. Even in extended families, where everyone is related, not everyone is related to the same degree. Parents and siblings are the closest relations, grandparents and cousins are less close, with distant, kissing cousins so remote that they are barely more

likely than complete strangers to share any given gene in common.

Husbands and 221

这些亲属关系在国家看来只是想象的,这一点从它们缺乏实际亲属关系的变异度可见一斑。即使是在大家族中,每个人的亲属关系也都不尽相同。父母和兄弟姐妹是最亲密的亲属,祖父母和表亲则关系较疏远,远亲之间的亲属关系几乎可以忽略不计。夫妻之间

wives generally are no longer closely related, as they tended to be in the Stone Age. In any event, all actual kinship is definable in mathematical terms as the "coefficient of relatedness," which Hamilton calculated as a measure of genetic overlap.⁶⁵

妻子们通常不再密切相关,就像在石器时代那样。无论如何,所有实际的亲属关系都可以用数学术语定义为"亲属系数",这是汉密尔顿计算的一个衡量遗传重叠度的度量。

By contrast, the national "family" is imagined to be totally and elastically coincident with the state's territorial dimensions. Nationality extends uniformly, like a liquid, into every crevice within the strictly defined boundaries. Benedict Anderson writes, "In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly and evenly operative over each square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory." ⁶⁶ And, of course, when it comes to sacrifice for the state, the coefficient of imaginary relatedness is always one.

相比之下,国家"家庭"被想象为与国家的领土范围完全一致且可伸缩。民族性均匀地延伸到合法边界内的每一个缝隙中,就像一种液体一样。本尼迪克特·安德森写道:"在现代观念中,国家主权在法律界定的领土的每一平方厘米上都得到完全、平坦和均匀的运作。"当然,当涉及对国家的牺牲时,想象中的亲疏关系系数永远是 1。

This identification of inclusive fitness with the nationstate is interesting because it could help inform the disposition of humans to welcome or resist the changes of the new millennium. As we have explored earlier, prior to the Information Age all types of society were territorially based. They either formed around the home territory of the nucleus ethnic group, or, as with the nationstate, played upon the same motives of group solidarity to mobilize force for defense of a local territory against outsiders. In every

case, it was the stranger outside of one's immediate territory who was feared as the enemy. Given the assumptions of kin selection in the primordial past, this made sense.

这种将包容性适合度与民族国家画等号的做法很有趣,因为它可能有助于了解人类在迎接还是抵制新千年变革时的倾向。正如我们之前探讨过的,在信息时代之前,所有类型的社会都是基于领土的。它们要么围绕核心民族群体的家乡领土形成,要么就像民族国家一样,利用群体团结的同样动机来动员力量,以捍卫本地领土免受外来者的侵扰。在任何情况下,都是身在外来领土的陌生人被视为敌人。基于原始时期亲属选择的假设,这种做法是有道理的。

When humanity emerged in its current genetic form, members of the tribe were close kin.

当人类以其当前的遗传形式出现时,部落成员是亲密的亲属。

They were members of a nucleus ethnic group, "the inbreeding superfamily."

他们是一个核心民族群体"近亲繁衍超级家庭"的成员。

Furthermore, there really was a practical economic reason, given the imperatives of kin selection, for the individual to identify the prosperity and survival of immediate kin with that of his tribe, or superfamily. A member of a hunter-gatherer tribe really did depend for his prosperity upon the success of the whole tribe. There was no independent property, nor any way that an individual or family could plausibly have hoped to survive and prosper if detached from the tribe. This strongly linked the individual's self-interest to that of the group. In Hirshleifer's words, "To the extent that members of a group share a common fate or outcome, helping one another becomes self-help." 67

此外,鉴于亲属选择的必然性,个人将亲属的繁荣和生存与部落或大家族的命运联系在一起确实有实际的经济理由。猎猎人采集者部落的成员确实依赖部落整体的成功才能繁荣。个人或家庭并不拥有独立的财产,也不可能脱离部落而独立生存和繁荣。这使个人的自身利益与群体利益紧密联系。正如赫兹希莱弗所说,"如果群体成员共享共同的命运或结果,互帮互助就成为自助。"

"Evidently primitive man-and the Lovedu can be regarded as representative of hundreds of similar peoples-considers as the norm a society in which, at any one moment of time, everyone's situation is precisely equal." HELMET SCHOECK

显然,原始人——而且爱德族可以被视为数百个类似民族的代表——认为一个社会中,任何时候每个人的处境都完全平等,才是正常的。

New Circumstances, Old Genes

新的环境,旧基因

Now microtechnology is facilitating the creation of very different conditions from those to which we were genetically disposed by the conditions of the Stone Age.

现在微技术正在促进创造与石器时代的条件大不相同的全新条件。

Information technology is creating economic inequality magnitudes outside the range of anything experienced by our ancestors in the pristinely egalitarian Stone Age.

信息技术正在创造经济不平等达到前所未有的程度,远超我们祖先在平等的石器时代所经历的。

Information technology is also creating supraterritorial assets, which will help to subvert the embodiment of the in-group, the nationstate. Ironically, these new cyberassets will probably be of higher value precisely because they are established at a distance from home. All the more so if there is an invidious backlash of the kind we expect against the economic inequality arising from increasing penetration of information technology in the rich industrial countries. That very fact would tend to make assets held at long distance 222

信息技术也创造了超越领土的资产,这将有助于颠覆内部群体和民族国家的特征。讽刺的是,这些新的网络资产可能会更有价值,因为它们是在远离家乡的地方建立的。尤其是如果出现我们预期会出现的针对信息技术在富裕工业国家日益深入的经济不平等的恶性反弹的话。这一事实会倾向于使以远距离持有的资产变得更有价值。

more valuable. They would not only be less exposed to envy, they would be more likely to be put beyond the reach of the most predatory group with which an individual must cope-his own nationstate.

更有价值。他们不仅会受到嫉妒的影响更小,而且更有可能超越个人必须应对的最富侵略性的群体 - 他们自己的民族国家。

Diseconomies of Nature and Nationalism

自然和民族主义的不经济

It is perhaps a mark of the importance of epigenesis in informing attitudes that so little notice has been taken of the ironies of in-group identification as it relates to the modern nationstate. The logic of violence in the modern period tended to confound the very impulse that gave rise to the tendency to identify fitness with the in-group in the first place. Why? Because rather than facilitating the survival and prosperity of near-relatives in a hostile world, the identification of the individual's "inclusive fitness" with a national in-group diluted the value of any act of sacrifice the individual might have made to the level of insignificance for his kin. The typical modern nationstate was simply too large to allow for a statistically significant "coefficient of relatedness" between the individual and other citizens of the nation that laid claim to him. Not only was the proportion of close relatives within the in-group sharply diminished from almost unity in the Stone Age to a bare chemical trace in the twentieth century; the "coefficient of relatedness" between the individual citizen and the rest of the nation would not, in most cases, have been significantly higher than with the whole human race. An In-group with tens of millions or even hundreds of millions (or in the case of the Chinese, more than a billion members) became so gigantic as to dilute the inclusive fitness effect of any sacrifice or benefit conveyed to the scale of a spit in the ocean. In strict logic, therefore, the modern nationalist, unlike the hunter-gatherer of the Stone Age, could not reasonably expect any gesture of sacrifice or helping for his "in-group" to enhance the survival prospects for his family in a meaningful way.

原因也许在于表现个体"包容性适应度"的民族内群体认同与其所带来的价值冲淡了个体可能为亲属做出牺牲的重要性。如今的典型民族国家规模实在过于庞大,以至于个体与本国其他公民之间的"亲缘关系系

数"在统计学意义上毫不显著。不仅如此,20 世纪时的亲近亲属在内群体中占比已远远低于旧石器时代的接近 1,而个人与全国人民的"亲缘关系系数"在大多数情况下也不会显著高于与整个人类种群的。一个拥有数千万甚至数亿甚至超过 10 亿成员的内群体,已经大到足以将任何为之做出牺牲或所带来利益的影响稀释到不可忽略的地步。因此,从严格的逻辑角度来说,现代民族主义者与旧石器时代的狩猎采集者截然不同,不可能合理地指望自己对"内群体"的任何牺牲或帮助都能在有意义的程度上提高其家庭的生存前景。

Notwithstanding the fact that national economies became the fundamental units of account in which wellbeing was measured in the modern era, the largest obstacle to the talented individual's success, and therefore to that of his kin, became the burdens imposed in the name of the nation, the in-group itself This, at least, was true for those primarily engaged in reciprocal rather than coercive sociality-to revisit Van Den Berghe's categories of human behavior. 68

尽管现代时代国家经济体成为衡量福祉的基本单位,但对有才能的个人成功以及其亲属来说,最大的障碍是以国家名义施加的负担,即内部群体本身。至少对于那些主要从事互惠而非强制性社交互动的人来说,这是事实。

The logic of the nationstate suggests that the ultimate price of citizenship is sacrifice and death. As Jane Bethke Elshtain observed, nationstates indoctrinate citizens more for sacrifice than aggression: "The young man goes to war not so much to kill as to die, to forfeit his particular body for that of the large body, the body politic." 69 The impulse to sacrifice is no less active where the taxpayer is concerned. Paying taxes, like bearing arms, is a duty, rather than an exchange in which one forgoes money to obtain some product or service of an equal or greater value. This much is acknowledged in common speech. People speak of a "tax burden" as they do not speak of the "food burden" of shopping for nutriments, or the "car burden" of purchasing an automobile, or a "vacation burden" for traveling, precisely because commercial purchases are generally fair exchanges. Otherwise, the buyers would not make them.

国家逻辑表明,公民最终的代价是牺牲和死亡。正如简·贝蒂克·埃尔什塔因所观察到的,国家更多地是在向公民灌输牺牲而非侵略: "年轻人去参

战并非主要是为了杀人,而是为了死去,为了将他独特的身体献给更大的集体,即政治体。" 纳税人也同样面临牺牲的冲动。纳税,就像持枪一样,是一种责任,而非用金钱换取等值或更高价值的产品或服务的交易。这一点在日常交谈中是公认的。人们提到"税收负担",却不会提"食品负担"、"汽车负担"或"假期负担",因为商业购买通常都是公平交易。否则,买家就不会进行这些交易。

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In this respect, nationalism shows how epigenesis can reverse the logic of the Darwinian "economy of nature." The nationstate facilitated systematic, territorially based predation. Unlike the situation faced by hunter-gatherers in the Stone Age, the main parasite and predator upon the individual at the end of the twentieth century was not likely to be the "outsider," the foreign enemy, but rather the presumed embodiment of the "in-group," the local nationstate itself. Thus the main advantage offered by the advent of assets that transcend territoriality in the Information Age is precisely the fact that such assets can be placed beyond the reach of the systematic coercion mobilized by the local nationstate in whose territory the would-be Sovereign Individual was resident.

在这方面,民族主义表明了表观遗传如何逆转达尔文"自然经济"的逻辑。民族国家促进了系统性的、基于地域的掠夺。与新石器时代的狩猎采集者所面临的情况不同,在 20 世纪末,可能成为个人主要寄生虫和掠食者的不是"外来者"、外国敌人,而是被认为代表"内部群体"的本地民族国家本身。因此,信息时代出现资产超越领土的主要优势,正在于这些资产可以置于当地民族国家的系统性强制力之外,从而使"主权个人"不再受其影响。

If our view is correct, microtechnology will make it technically feasible for individuals to largely escape from the burdens of subordinate citizenship. They will be extranational sovereigns over themselves, not subjects, in the new "Virtual City," owing allegiance by contract or private treaty in a fashion more reminiscent of premodern Europe, where merchants secured commercial treaties and charters to protect themselves "from arbitrary seizures of property" and to obtain "exemption from seigniorial law." In the cyberculture, successful persons will gain exemption from duties of

citizenship arising from an accident of birth. They will no longer tend to think of themselves primarily as British or American. They will be extranational residents of the whole world who just happen to abide in one or more of its localities.

如果我们的观点正确,微技术将使个人在很大程度上摆脱从属公民身份的重担成为可能。他们将成为自己的超国家主权者,而不是臣民,在新的"虚拟城市"中,通过合同或私人条约来效忠,这更类似于前现代欧洲,商人们获得了商业条约和特许权,以保护自己"免受财产的任意征用"和获得"豁免于封建法"。在网络文化中,成功的人将获得因出生而产生的公民责任的豁免。他们将不再主要视自己为英国人或美国人。他们将成为整个世界的超国家居民,只是不经意间居住在其中的一个或多个地区。

THE CYBERECONOMY AND OUR GENETIC INHERITANCE 网络经济与我们的遗传遗产

The hitch, however, is that this technological miracle and the economic miracle it implies—escaping the tyranny of place-depend upon the willingness of individuals to entrust much of their wealth and futures to strangers. In strict genetic accounting, of course, those strangers would not necessarily be less genetically close than most of our "fellow citizens" upon whom in recent centuries we have been bound to depend.

然而,这一技术奇迹及其隐喻的经济奇迹——摆脱地域的束缚——依赖于个人愿意将大部分财富和未来托付给陌生人。从严格的遗传账目来看,这些陌生人与我们"同胞"的遗传亲和度并不必然低于我们过去几个世纪所依赖的"同胞"。

The question is whether the perverse results of in-group amity in the case of the nationstate are negative or positive indicators for the cybereconomy. Will the "leftbehinds" who stand to lose the benefits of coercive redistribution treat the death of the nationstate as if it were an attack on kin? The first quarter century of the new millennium will tell. The emotional reactions could be complex. The fact that 115

这个问题是国家内部情感是否会对网络经济产生负面或积极的影响。那些可能失去强制性再分配利益的"落后者"会将国家的衰落视为对亲

族的攻击吗?新千年的头 25 年将会告诉我们答案。情绪反应可能会很复杂。事实上 115

million persons gave their lives fighting for nationstates in the twentieth century is stark evidence of the power of eplgenesls.⁷¹ It shows that many did consider the survival of their nations to be matters of life-and-death importance. The question is whether that attitude will carry over into a new age with different megapolitical imperatives.

在 20 世纪为主权国家而战的数百万人的生命是原生基因强大力量的铁证。这表明许多人确实认为本国生存是生死攸关的大事。问题在于这种态度是否会延续到具有不同超国家政治命题的新时代。

The fact that genetically influenced sacrifice on behalf of the nationstate often militated against the evolutionary purpose of kin selection also tells you that humans are adaptable enough to adjust to many circumstances for which we were not genetically programmed in the conditions of the Stone Age. As Tudge elaborates in describing the "extreme generalness" of human beings: "We are the animal equivalent of the Turing machine: the universal device that can be turned to any task." ⁷² Which tendency will come to the surface in the coming transition crisis? Probably both.

事实上,遗传影响的牺牲往往违背了亲群选择的进化目的,这也告诉你,人类够适应性,能够调整自己来适应许多我们在石器时代的条件中未被基因编程的情况。正如特奇所阐述的"人类极其普遍性": "我们是图灵机的动物等价物:这种通用设备可以被用于任何任务。"那么,在即将到来的转型危机中,哪一种趋势会浮现?可能两种都会。

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The commercialization of sovereignty itself depends upon the willingness of hundreds of thousands of Sovereign Individuals and many millions of others to deploy their assets in the "First Bank of Nowhere" in order to secure immunity from direct compulsion. This type of trust has no obvious analogue in the primordial past. There were few assets in the Stone Age. Those that did exist were hoarded under the control of a tribe, an "inbreeding superfamily" that was paranoid about outsiders. Yet notwithstanding the evolutionary novelty of the cybereconomy, it gives

humans the chance to express our most novel genetic inheritance—the intelligence that comes along with our outsized brains. Those among the information elite will certainly be smart enough to recognize a good thing when they see one.

主权商业化本身依赖于数十万个主权个体和数百万其他人愿意将其资产部署在"无处不在的第一银行"中,以确保免受直接胁迫。这种信任在原始时代没有明显的类比。石器时代几乎没有资产。那些存在的资产都被一个部落,一个"近亲繁衍的超级家庭"所控制,他们对外来者持谨慎态度。然而,尽管网络经济具有进化上的新颖性,但它给人类提供了表达我们最新遗传特征的机会——大脑异常发达所带来的智慧。信息精英中的那些人肯定足够聪明,能够认识到一个好机会。

Further, the creation of assets that are largely immune to predation should actually rebound in a practical way to increase the "inclusive fitness" of Sovereign Individuals.

进一步说,创造大多数免于掠夺的资产实际上会以实际的方式反弹,从而提高主权个体的"包容性适应性"。

While the economic logic of participating in the cybereconomy turns the rationales of the nationstate upside down, it is compelling, especially for persons of high skills.

虽然参与网络经济的经济逻辑颠覆了国家的理由,但这种逻辑很有吸引力,尤其是对于高技能人员而言。

In order to optimize their advantage in shopping among jurisdictions, individuals must be willing to exit the nationstate and entrust their personal protection to security personnel motivated mainly by market incentives in areas that may be distant from where they were born and reared. This implies a significant advantage in being multilingual and cosmopolitan in culture rather than jingoistic. And it further implies that anyone who is serious about realizing the liberating potential of the cybereconomy for himself and his family should begin to stake out a welcome for himself in several jurisdictions other than that in which he has resided during his main business career. For more details, see our discussion of strategies for achieving independence in the appendices.

为了优化他们在不同管辖区的购物优势,个人必须愿意离开民族国家,将

个人保护委托给主要由市场激励驱动的安全人员,这些地区可能与他们出生和成长的地方相距甚远。这意味着成为多语种和有博识文化背景比强烈的民族主义有着明显的优势。这也意味着任何认真想要实现网络经济潜在的解放为自己和家人所用的人,都应该开始在自己的主要商业生涯所在地以外的几个管辖区内为自己谋求一席之地。更多详情,请参见我们在附录中讨论的实现独立的策略。

Genuine Affinities

真诚的亲和力

A new extranational understanding of the world and a new way of identifying one's place in it could change the habits of human culture, if not our inbred inclinations.

对世界的新的超国界理解和确定自己在其中位置的新方式,如果不是我们根深蒂固的倾向,也许会改变人类文化的习惯。

The new extranational equation of identity that we expect to see take hold in the new millennium could make it easier to adopt to the new world than may seem likely. Unlike nationality, the new identities will not be a product of the systematic compulsion that made nationstates and the nationstate system universal in the twentieth century. In the new age to come, communities and allegiances will not be territorially bounded.

我们预计在新千年中将出现的新的超国家认同方程式,可能会使人们更容易适应新的世界,而不是看似的那样困难。与国籍不同,新的身份认同将不会是那种在 20 世纪使国家和国家体系普及的系统性强制的产物。在即将到来的新时代,社区和忠诚度将不会被领土所局限。

Identification will be more precisely targeted to genuine affinities, shared interests, or actual kinship, rather than the bogus affinities of citizenship so tirelessly promoted in conventional politics. Protection will be organized in new ways that have no analogue in a surveyor's kit that demarcates territorial borders. Assets will increasingly be lodged in cyberspace rather than at any given place, a fact that will facilitate new competition to reduce the "protection costs" or taxes imposed in most territorial jurisdictions.

身份识别将更精准地瞄准真实的亲和力、共同利益或实际的亲属关系,而不是传统政治中不懈推动的虚假的公民身份。保护将以新的方式组

织,这在划分领土边界的测量工具包中没有任何类比。资产将越来越存放在网络空间,而不是任何特定位置,这一事实将促进新的竞争,以降低大部分领土司法管辖区征收的"保护成本"或税款。

"Ambitious people understand, then, that a migratory way of life is the price of getting ahead."

有抱负的人明白,流浪式的生活方式是追求进步的代价。

73 --CHRISTOPHER LASCH

73 --克里斯托弗·拉什

ESCAPE FROM THE NATIONSTATE

逃离国家国家

Notwithstanding the firm grip the nationstate as the "in-group" has had on the modern imagination, able people who do not already doubt the utility of affiliating with a grossly expensive "imagined community" soon will. Indeed, the partisans of the nationstate have already begun to complain of the growing detachment of the cognitive elites.

尽管在现代想象中,民族国家作为"内部群体"有着牢固的控制地位,但不久后那些已经不怀疑加入一个高度昂贵的"想象共同体"的有能力人们很快就会产生怀疑。事实上,民族国家的支持者已经开始抱怨认知精英日益加剧的脱离。

The late Christopher Lasch, in his diatribe *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy*, assails those "whose livelihoods rest not so much on the ownership of property as on the manipulation of information." 74 Lasch laments the extranational character of the emerging information economy. He writes: the markets in which the new elites operate is now international in scope. Their fortunes are tied to enterprises that operate across national boundaries. They are more concerned with the smooth functioning of the system as a whole than with any of its parts. Their loyalties-if the term is not itself anachronistic in this context-are international rather than regional, national or local. They have more in common with their counterparts in Brussels or Hong Kong than with the masses of Americans not yet plugged into the network of global communications. 75

已故克里斯托弗·拉什在其著作《精英阶层的叛乱和民主的背叛》中谴责那些"其生计不太依赖于财产所有权,而更多依赖于信息操纵"的人。拉什悲叹新兴信息经济的跨国性质。他写道:新精英阶层操作的市场如今已经是国际性的。他们的财富与跨越国界运营的企业紧密相连。他们更关注整个系统的顺利运转,而非其任何组成部分。他们的忠诚(如果这一术语在此语境中并非已经过时)是国际性的,而非地区性、国家性或地方性的。他们与布鲁塞尔或香港的同类有更多共同之处,而非与尚未接入全球通信网络的美国大众。

Although Lasch was far from a dispassionate observer, and he obviously meant his portrait of the information elite to be unflattering, his contempt for those who are liberated from the tyranny of place rests on a perception of some of the same developments that are the focus of this book. When we read Lasch's critiques or those of Mickey Kaus (*The End of Equality*), Michael Walzer (*Spheres of Justice*), or Robert Reich (*The Work of Nations*), we see parts of our analysis confirmed, often unhappily, by authors who are deeply unsympathetic to many of the consequences of the deepening of markets, much less the denationalization of Sovereign Individuals. Lasch lambastes those with extranational ambitions "who covet membership in the new aristocracy of brains" for "cultivating ties with the international market in fast-moving money, glamour, fashion and popular culture." He continues: It is a question whether they think of themselves as Americans at all. Patriotism, certainly, does not rank very high in their hierarchy of virtues. "Multiculturalism," on the other hand, Suits them to perfection, conjuring up the agreeable image of a global bazaar in which exotic cuisines, exotic styles of dress, exotic music, exotic tribal customs can be savored indiscriminately, with no questions asked and no commitments required. The new elites are at home only in transit, en route to a high-level conference, to the grand opening of a new franchise, to an international film festival or an undiscovered resort. Theirs is essentially a tourist's view of the world-not a perspective likely to encourage a passionate devotion to democracy.⁷⁶

虽然拉施并非一个冷静公正的观察者,他显然是有意要制造一幅不利的精英阶层形象,但他对那些逃脱了地域局限的人的鄙视,其实源于他对一些与本书主题相关的发展态势的感知。当我们读到拉施或者米基·考斯(*The End of Equality*)、迈克尔·沃尔泽(*Spheres of Justice*)、罗伯特·赖克(*The Work of Nations*)的批评时,我们往往能在其中看到我们分析中的一些部分,这往往令人不快,因为这些作者对市场深化乃至主权个体去国家化的许多后果都持有深深的不赞同态度。拉施严厉谴责那些怀有超越国界野心的人"渴望成为新贵族中的一员",因为他们"正在培养与国际金融市场、魅力、时尚和大众文化的联系"。他接着说:"他们究竟还把自己当作美国人吗?爱国主义肯定不在他们的美德等级中占据重要地位。相比之下,'多元文化主义'完全符合他们的口味,它营造了一种令人愉悦的全球集市的形象,在这里可以毫无顾忌地品味各种异国的美食、服

饰、音乐和部落风俗。新精英阶层只有在行程中时才会有归属感,他们在前往高级会议、新分店开业典礼、国际电影节或未经开发的度假胜地的路上。这种对世界的看法实际上只是一种游客的视角,不太可能培养出对民主的热忱。"

Economic Nationalism 经济民族主义

Lurking behind criticisms of the "transients" who make up the virtual communities of the Information Age is a recognition that for many in the elite the benefits of transience already exceed their costs. Critics like Lasch and Walzer do not dispute that clearheaded cost-benefit analysis makes citizenship obsolete for persons of high skills. They do not propose that those among the information elite whose attitudes 226

对信息时代虚拟社区中"流动人口"的批评背后,隐藏着一个现实,即对于精英阶层来说,流动性的利益已超过其成本。拉施和沃尔泽等批评者并不反对,对于高技能人才而言,基于成本效益的分析使公民身份已经过时。他们也没有建议,让信息精英阶层中的人改变他们。

they despise have miscalculated where their best interests lie. Nor do they pretend that the compound-interest tables really show that continuing to pump one's money into a national social security program, much less income taxes, produces a better return than private investment. To the contrary, they understand arithmetic. They have seen the sums to their obvious conclusions. But rather than acknowledge the subversive logic of economic rationality, they recoil from it, counting it as "betrayal" for the information elite to transcend the tyranny of place and abandon "the unenlightened."⁷⁷

他们蔑视的人误算了他们最大利益所在。他们也不假装利息复合表明,继续将钱投入到国家社会保障计划,更不用说所得税,比私人投资产生更好的回报。相反,他们懂得运算。他们已经看到结论明显的数字。但是,他们不愿承认经济理性的颠覆性逻辑,将信息精英超越地域的束缚和抛弃"未开化"视为"背叛"。

Like Pat Buchanan, the social democrats are economic nationalists who resent the triumph of markets over politics. They denounce "the new

aristocracy of brains" for being detached from place and not caring passionately about their view of where the best interests of the masses lie. While they do not explicitly recognize the denationalization of the individual as such, they rail against its early hints and manifestations, what Walzer describes as "the imperialism of the market," or the tendency of money to "seep across boundaries" in order to buy things which, as Lasch elaborates, "should not be for sale,"

像帕特·布坎南一样,社会民主党人是经济民族主义者,他们对市场战胜政治而感到愤怒。他们谴责"新贵族智慧阶层"脱离地方,对群众利益视而不见。虽然他们没有明确认识到个人的去国家化,但他们反对其早期迹象和表现,沃尔泽所描述的"市场的帝国主义"或金钱"渗透边界"以购买那些"不应该拿来出售"的东西(拉斯所阐述的)。

such as exemption from military service. 78 Note the reactionary harking to the military demands of the nationstate as a sacred ground upon which money and markets should not trespass.

诸如免除军役。 78 请注意,对国家军事需求的反动呼吁被视为金钱和市场不得侵犯的神圣领域。

These criticisms of the information elite anticipate the terms of a popular reaction against the rise of Sovereign Individuals in the next millennium. As new, more market-driven forms of protection become available, it will become increasingly evident to the large numbers of able persons that most of the supposed benefits of nationality are imaginary. This will lead not only to better accounting of the opportunity costs of citizenship, it will also create new ways of framing allegedly "political" and even "economic" questions. For the first time, "an individual entrepreneur acting for and by himself" will be able to vary his own protection costs by moving between jurisdictions, without waiting for them to be effected by "group decision and group action," to quote Frederic C. Lane's formulation of an old dilemma. 79

这些对信息精英的批评预示了下一个千年里民众反对主权个体崛起的潮流。随着更多以市场为导向的保护形式的出现,大量有能力的人将越来越明显地认识到所谓国籍利益大多是虚幻的。这不仅将带来更好地核算公民身份的机会成本,也将创造新的方式来定义所谓的"政治"和"经济"问题。对于一个为自己行事的个体企业家来说,这是首次能够通过

在不同管辖区之间流动来调整自身的保护成本,无需等待"集体决策和集体行动"的影响,正如弗雷德里克·C·莱恩所描述的一个古老困境。

As the price paid for protection becomes subject "to the principle of substitution,"

作为保护价格变得"受替代原则约束"的结果

this will lay bare the arithmetic of compulsion, intensifying conflict between the new cosmopolitan elite of the Information Age and "the information poor," the remainder of the population who are largely monoglot and do not excel in problem-solving or possess some globally marketable skill. These "losers" or "leftbehinds," as Thomas L.

这将暴露强制的算术,加剧了信息时代新的世界性精英阶层与"信息贫困者"之间的冲突,后者大多数为单语使用者,不擅长问题解决或拥有某种全球可销售的技能。这些被认为是"失败者"或"落后者"的人,正如托马斯·L·所说。

Friedman describes them, will no doubt continue to identify their wellbeing with the political life of existing nationstates. 80

富兰克林描述它们,毫无疑问将继续将他们的幸福与现有民族国家的政治生活联系起来。 80

MOST POLITICAL AGENDAS WILL BE REACTIONARY

大多数政治议程都将是反应性的

Most of those who harbor an ardent political agenda, whether nationalist, environmentalist, or socialist, will rally to defend the wobbling nationstate as the twenty-first century opens. Over time, it will become ever more obvious that survival of the nationstate and the nationalist sensibility are preconditions for preserving a realm for political compulsion. As Billig points out, nationalism "is the condition for conventional (political) strategies, whatever the particular politics." 81 Therefore, the nationalist

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当 21 世纪开启之时,无论是民族主义者、环保主义者还是社会主义者,大多数人都将团结起来捍卫摇摇欲坠的民族国家。随着时间的推移,民族国家的生存和民族主义情怀成为保存政治强制领域的先决条件,这一

点将越来越明显。正如比利格所指出的,民族主义"是常规(政治)策略的条件,无论具体政治如何"。因此,民族主义者 227

content in all political programs will swell like a glutton's paunch in the years ahead.

在未来的几年里,所有政治纲领中的内容都将像贪吃者的肚皮一样膨胀。

Environmentalists, for example, will focus less on protecting "Mother Earth" and more on protecting the "motherland." For reasons we explore later, the nation and citizenship will be especially sacred to those who value equality highly. More than they may now understand, they will come to agree with Christopher Lasch, who followed Hannah Arendt in proclaiming, "It is citizenship that confers equality, not equality that creates a right to citizenship." 82

环保主义者将不再过多关注"地球母亲"的保护,而是更多地关注"祖国"的保护。后文将探讨原因,对于重视平等的人来说,国家和公民身份将变得特别神圣。他们将会越来越赞同克里斯托弗·拉什的观点,正如汉娜·阿伦特所说,"是公民身份赋予了平等,而不是平等赋予了公民身份权利"。

The privatization of sovereignty will deflate the industrial-era premium on equality by severing ties of the creators of wealth to nation and place. Citizenship will no longer serve as a mechanism for enforcing income redistribution based upon the equality of the vote within a confined territory. The consequences will include another bruising for the progressive view of history. Contrary to the expectations of supposedly forward-thinking people when the twentieth century opened, the free market was not destroyed by the decades but left triumphant. The Marxists anticipated the eclipse of capitalism, which never happened, to lead to the transcendence of nationstates and the emergence of a universal class consciousness among workers. In fact, the state will be eclipsed, but in a very different way. Something nearly the opposite to their expectation is happening. The triumph of capitalism will lead to the emergence of a new global, or extranational, consciousness among the capitalists, many of whom will become Sovereign Individuals.

主权私有化将会消除工业时代在平等方面的优势,因为与财富创造者和国家及地区的关系将被切断。公民身份将不再用作在一个固定区域内通过投票平等的机制来实施收入再分配。后果之一就是历史进步观点将遭受另一次打击。与 20 世纪初人们所期望的相反,自由市场不但没有被数十年的发展所毁灭,反而取得了胜利。马克思主义者所预期的资本主义衰落以及工人阶级形成普遍的阶级意识并没有发生。事实上,国家将会被边缘化,但方式与他们的预期大不相同。一种与此相反的情况正在发生。资本主义的胜利将导致资本家中出现一种新的全球性的或超国家性的意识,许多资本家将成为主权个人。

Far from depending upon the state to discipline the workers, as the Marxists imagined, the ablest, wealthiest persons were net losers from the actions of the nationstate. It is clearly they who have the most to gain by transcending nationalism as markets triumph over compulsion.

远离依赖国家管控工人的做法,正如马克思主义者所想象的那样,最有能力和最富有的人反而从国家的行动中蒙受损失。显而易见,他们从超越民族主义的市场胜利过强制中获得最大利益。

Perhaps not immediately, but soon, certainly within the span of a generation, almost everyone among the information elite will elect to domicile his income-earning activities in low-tax or no-tax jurisdictions. As the Information Age transforms the globe, it will impress an unmistakable object lesson in compound interest. Within years, let alone decades, it will be widely understood that almost anyone of talent could accumulate a much higher net worth and enjoy a better life by abandoning high-tax nationstates. We have already hinted at the staggering costs that the leading nationstates impose, but as this is the crux of an issue that is little understood, it is worth reemphasizing the opportunity costs of nationality.

也许不是立即,但很快,无疑在一代人的时间内,信息精英中几乎所有人都会选择将其收入获得活动安置在低税收或免税的管辖区域。随着信息时代改变全球,它会给复利留下一个不可磨灭的教训。在几年之内,更别说几十年了,几乎所有有才能的人都能够通过放弃高税收的国家来积累更高的净资产并过上更好的生活,这一点将被广泛理解。我们已经暗示了主要国家施加的惊人成本,但由于这是一个鲜为人知的问题的核心,因此值得重新强调国籍的机会成本。

Opportunity Costs 机会成本

Far from suffering from the loss or curtailment of government services currently financed by high taxes, the information elite will flourish in an unparalleled fashion.

远离当前高税收资助的政府服务损失或限制的困境,信息精英将以前所未有的方式茁壮成长。

Simply by escaping the excess tax burden they now pay, they will gain a tremendous margin for improving the material wellbeing of their families. As previously indicated, each \$5,000 in tax paid annually reduces your lifetime net worth by \$2.4 million if you can earn 10 percent annually from your investments. But if you could earn 20 percent, each \$5,000 in annual tax payments would leave you \$44 million poorer over a period of forty years. Cumulatively, paying \$5,000 per year would therefore cost you more than a 228

仅仅通过逃避他们现在支付的过多税收,他们将获得大幅改善家庭物质福祉的空间。如前所述,每年交纳 5,000 美元的税款,如果您能从投资中获得 10%的年收益率,将使您终生净资产减少 240 万美元。但如果您能赚到 20%,每年交纳 5,000 美元的税款将使您在 40 年内贫穷 4,400 万美元。因此,每年支付 5,000 美元的税款,总成本将超过 2.28 亿美元。

million dollars per year. At that rate, \$250,000 per year in tax would soon translate to an annual loss of more than \$50 million, or \$2.2 billion in a lifetime. And, of course, sporadically higher earnings, for even a few years, especially early in life, imply a still more startling loss of wealth to predatory taxation.

每年数百万美元。以这个速度,每年 25 万美元的税收很快就会转化为超过 5000 万美元的年度损失,或者一生中 22 亿美元的损失。当然,即使是短期内偶尔较高的收入,特别是在生活的早期阶段,也意味着更惊人的财富损失,受掠夺性税收的影响。

Your authors have seen to our own satisfaction that higher than 20 percent returns are possible. Our colleagues at Lines Overseas Management in Bermuda earned triple-digit returns, averaging 226 percent per annum,

during the years when we were writing this book. Their experience underscores what the spreadsheet suggests, that for many high-income earners and owners of capital, predatory taxation imposes a lifetime cost equivalent to a large fortune.

据我们亲身经历,获得高于 20% 的回报率是可能的。我们在百慕大的"远洋管理公司"的同事在我们撰写本书期间,平均每年获得了 226% 的可观收益。他们的经历再次验证了电子表格的分析结果:对于许多高收入人群和资本所有者来说,掠夺性的税收意味着终身损失一笔巨大的财富。

An individual with high earnings capacity paying taxes at Hong Kong rates could end up with a thousand times more wealth than someone with the same pretax performance paying taxes at North American or European rates. To subject your capital to recurring invasion by a high-tax jurisdiction is like running in a race and having someone shoot you every time you take a stride. If you could enter the same race with proper protection and run unhobbled, you would obviously go much farther, more quickly.

高收入人群在香港缴纳税款,其资产最终可能比在北美或欧洲缴税的同样收入群体多出数千倍。被高税率地区持续掠夺资本,就像在比赛中每跑一步就被人射击。如果你能在有保护的情况下参加同样的比赛并毫无阻碍地跑下去,显然你会跑得更远更快。

The Sovereign Individuals of the future will take advantage of the "transient"

无论将来谁成为主权个人,都能利用"转瞬即逝"

inclinations that so offend Christopher Lasch and other critics of the information elite, and they will shop for the most profitable jurisdictions in which to domicile. While this is contrary to the logic of nationalism, it accords with a compelling economic logic. A 10

如此触犯克里斯托弗·拉施和其他信息精英批评者的倾向,他们将寻找最有利可图的司法管辖区进行驻留。尽管这与民族主义的逻辑相悖,但却符合一种强有力的经济逻辑。

percent, let alone a tenfold, bottom-line difference will frequently motivate profit-maximizing individuals to alter their lifestyles and production

techniques, as well as their place of abode. The history of Western civilization is a record of restless change in which people and prosperity have repeatedly migrated to new areas of opportunity under the spur of meandering megapolitical conditions. A thousandfold difference in bottom-line returns would match the most potent stimulus that has ever put rational people in motion. Or put another way, most people, particularly those Thomas L. Friedman calls the "losers and leftbehinds," if given a chance, would gladly leave any nationstate for \$50 million, not to mention the still greater costs that nationstates impose in tax extracted from the top 1 percent of taxpayers. The rise of Sovereign Individuals shopping for jurisdictions is therefore one of the surest forecasts one can make.

即便是百分之几,更不用提十倍的差额,这也足以激励追求利润最大化的个人改变他们的生活方式、生产技术,以及居住地。西方文明的历史是一部不安定变迁的纪录,人们和财富反复迁移到新的机遇区域,以应对不确定的大政治格局。如果有一千倍的底线回报差异,它将与有史以来给理性人带来最强大刺激的力量相当。换句话说,大多数人,特别是托马斯·L·弗里德曼所说的"失败者和被抛弃者",如果有机会的话,都会乐意离开任何一个国家,去追求 5000 万美元的收益,更不用说国家施加的种种更大的代价,如从最富裕的 1% 纳税人身上抽取的税款。因此,寻找更适合自己的司法管辖区的主权个人的兴起,是一个可以十分肯定地预测的趋势。

THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

主权的商业化

Seen in cost-benefit terms, citizenship was already a dreadful bargain as the twentieth century drew to a close. This was highlighted by an unconsciously funny Parliamentary Research Note entitled "Is the Queen an Australian Citizen?" produced by Ian Ireland of the Australian Parliamentary Research Service in August 1995.⁸³ Ireland canvasses the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, reviewing the four means by which one can obtain Australian citizenship. These are similar to the options for citizenship in other leading nationstates, namely: citizenship by birth

从成本效益角度来看,公民身份在 20 世纪末已经是一笔糟糕的交易。这一点在 1995 年 8 月由澳大利亚议会研究服务部门的伊恩·爱尔兰编写的一份讽刺性的研究报告《女王是澳大利亚公民吗?》中得到突出体现。爱尔兰探讨了 1948 年澳大利亚公民法,审视了获得澳大利亚公民身份的四种方式。这些方式与其他主要民族国家的公民身份选项相似,包括:出生公民权

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citizenship by adoption
入籍

citizenship by descent
血统公民权

citizenship by grant
公民身份通过授予

This is all unremarkable except that it focuses attention upon the distinction between sovereignty and citizenship. As Ireland says, "Under traditional legal and political concepts, the monarch is sovereign and the people are his/her subjects. Subjects are bound to the monarch by allegiance and

subjection." Noting the obvious fact that Queen Elizabeth II is sovereign, he concludes that "there is an argument that the Queen is not an Australian citizen." 84

这一切都没什么特别之处,只是将注意力集中在主权和公民身份之间的区别上。正如爱尔兰所说,"根据传统的法律和政治概念,君主是主权者,人民是臣民。臣民通过效忠和臣服与君主相连。"指出了伊丽莎白二世女王是主权者这一显而易见的事实,他得出结论说,"有理由认为女王不是澳大利亚公民。"

Indeed, she is not. The Queen, long may she live, is fortunate to be beyond caring about being a citizen. She is sovereign, the Sovereign over her subjects. Like a handful of other monarchs in the world, the Queen is sovereign by birth, having inherited her status as a matter of custom that predates modern times. The idea of monarchy is ancient, going back to the earliest historic records of human life. Those countries that have retained their monarchy owe their constitution to their ancient history, but it still helps to decide the shape of their society, in terms of class prestige if not of political power.

事实上,她并非如此。愿女王长寿,她幸运地超越了成为公民的关心。她是主权者,统治她的臣民。与世界上其他少数君主一样,女王是由出生继承而来的主权者,这一地位可以追溯到现代时期之前的习俗。君主制的概念是古老的,可以追溯到人类历史最早的记录。那些保留君主制的国家,他们的宪法根源于古老的历史,但它仍有助于决定他们社会的形态,这种形态不仅体现在阶级地位上,也体现在政治力量上。

Postmodern individuals, without the Queen's head start, will be obliged to invent new legal rationales upon which to base the de facto sovereignty that information technology will hand them.

后现代个体,没有女王的起步优势,将被迫发明新的法律论证依据,以此为信息技术赋予他们的实际主权建立基础。

Sovereign Individuals will also have to cope with the corrosive consequences of envy-a difficulty that sometimes detains monarchs, but which will be more intensely felt by persons who are not traditionally venerated but invent their own sovereignty. As Helmut Schoeck wrote in his comprehensive survey, Envy, "Where there is only one king, one

president of the United States-in other words, one member only of a particular status-he can live with relative impunity the kind of life which, even on a much smaller scale, would arouse indignation in the same society were it to be adopted by successful members of larger professional or social groups." 85 Monarchs, as embodiments of the nation, enjoy a certain immunity to envy that will not carry over to Sovereign Individuals.

个人主权者也必须应对嫉妒的腐蚀性后果——这是有时会困扰君主的一个难题,但对于那些未被传统崇敬但自创主权的人来说,这种感受会更加强烈。正如赫尔穆特·舒克在其全面调查《嫉妒》中所写的,"只有一个国王、一个美国总统——换句话说,只有某个特定地位中的一个成员,他可以安全地过上即使在小规模情况下也会在同一个社会引起愤慨的生活。"君主作为国家的化身,享有一定免于嫉妒的豁免权,但这种豁免权不会转移到个人主权者身上。

The "losers and leftbehinds" in the Information Society will surely envy and resent the success of winners, especially as the deepening of markets implies that this will be increasingly a "winners take all" world.

Increasingly, rewards are already coming to be based upon relative performance, rather than absolute performance as was the case in industrial production. A factory worker was paid either on the basis of hours in attendance as measured by the time clock, or according to some criterion of output, such as pieces made, units assembled, or some similar measure. 86 Standardized pay was made possible by the fact that output was similar for everyone using the same tools. But the creation of conceptual wealth, like artistic performance, varies dramatically among persons using the same tools. In this respect, the whole of the economy is becoming increasingly like opera, where the highest rewards go to those with the best voices, and those who sing out of tune, however earnestly, do not normally attract large rewards. As many fields are opened to truly global competition, the return for ordinary performance is bound to fall. Middle talents will be in vast supply, some originating with persons who can rent their time for a fraction of the rates that prevail in the leading industrial countries. The losers will be the minor-league outfielders with "slider speed bats" whose 230

在信息社会中,"失败者和被遗忘者"肯定会嫉妒和怨恨那些获胜者的成功,特别是随着市场的进一步深化,这将越来越成为一个"胜者通吃"的世界。回报越来越多地基于相对表现,而不是像工业生产时期那样的绝

对表现。一个工厂工人要么按出勤时间支付工资,要么按某种产出标准,如制作件数、装配单元等类似指标支付。标准化工资是因为每个人使用相同工具的输出都相似。但是创造概念财富,如艺术表演,在使用相同工具的人之间差异巨大。从这方面来看,整个经济越来越像歌剧,最高的回报属于拥有最佳嗓音的人,而那些唱不上调的人,无论多么认真,通常也无法获得丰厚的回报。随着许多领域面临真正的全球竞争,普通表现的回报肯定会下降。中等水平的人将大量出现,其中一些来自可以以低于领先工业国家普遍水平的报酬出租自己时间的人。失败者将是那些"击球速度滑板球"的二线外野手,他们的数据不足以获得丰厚的回报。

reflexes are half a second shy of hitting a major league fastball. Instead of making a million dollars a year banging out home runs, they will make \$25,000, with no supplementary income from celebrity endorsements. Others will strike out altogether.

反射速度比击中大联盟快球要慢半秒。他们无法靠敲出全垒打赚取百万年薪,只能赚取 2.5 万美元,也没有明星代言等补充收入。另一些人则无法打中球。

"Once a country opens itself up to the global market those of its citizens with the skills to take advantage of it become the winners, and those without become losers or leftbehinds. Usually one party. . . claims to be able to defy globalization or ease its pain. That is Pat Buchanan in America, the Communists in Russia and now the Islamic Welfare Party here in Turkey. So what is happening in Turkey is much more complicated than just a fundamentalist takeover. It is what happens when widening globalization spins off more and more losers, when widening democratization gives them all a vote, while religious parties effectively exploit this coincidence to take power"⁸⁷ THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

一个国家一旦向全球市场开放,那些能够利用它的技能的公民就成为赢家,而没有这种能力的人则成为输家或被抛在后面。通常,一个政党声称能够挑战全球化或缓解其痛苦。这在美国就是帕特·布坎南,在俄罗斯是共产党,而现在在土耳其则是伊斯兰福利党。因此,土耳其发生的事情要比仅仅是一次基要主义政变复杂得多。这是当不断扩大的全球化产生

越来越多的输家时,不断扩大的民主化使他们都有表决权,而宗教政党则有效地利用这种巧合来夺取权力所发生的情况。

Who will the losers be in the Information Age? In general terms, the tax consumers will be losers. It is usually they who could not increase their wealth by moving to another jurisdiction. Much of their income is lodged in the rules of a national political jurisdiction rather than conveyed by market valuations. Therefore, eliminating or sharply reducing the taxes that are negatively compounding against their net worths may not appear to make them much better off-the price of lower taxation is a diminished stream of transfer payments. They will lose income because they will no longer be able to depend upon political compulsion to pick the pockets of persons more productive than themselves. Those without savings who rely upon government to pay their retirement benefits and medical care will in all probability suffer a fall in living standards. This loss of income translates into a depreciation of what financial writer Scott Burns has dubbed "transcendental" or political capital.⁸⁸ This "transcendental" or imaginary capital is based not upon the economic ownership of assets but upon the de facto claim to the income stream established by political rules and regulations. For example, the expected income from government transfer programs could be converted into a bond capitalized at prevailing interest rates. This imaginary bond funded by the imagined community is transcendental capital. It will be suddenly depreciated by the "great transformation" that is destined to reduce the grip of political authorities upon the cash flow required to redeem their promises.

在信息时代,输家会是谁?一般而言,税收消费者将会是输家。通常他们无法通过迁移到另一个司法管辖区来增加自己的财富。他们的大部分收入都是由国家政治管辖规则而非市场估值所决定的。因此,消除或大幅减少对他们净资产造成负面复合的税收,可能并不会使他们生活状况明显改善-税率下降的代价是转移支付收入减少。他们将失去收入,因为他们将不再能依赖政治强制手段从比自己更有生产力的人那里获得利益。那些依赖政府支付退休福利和医疗保健的无储蓄人群,很可能生活水平下降。这种收入损失转化为金融作家斯科特·伯恩斯所描述的"超越"或政治资本的贬值。这种"超越"或虚拟资本,并非基于对资产的经济所有权,而是建立在政治规则和法规设定的事实性收入主张之上。例如,政府转移支付项目的预期收入,可以转换为以当前利率资本化

的债券。这种由想象共同体提供资金的虚拟债券就是超越资本。它将因即将到来的"大转型"而遭到突然贬值,这种转型必将削弱政治当局对所需现金流的控制,从而无法履行其承诺。

"On frontiers and on the high seas, where no one had an enduring monopoly in the use of violence, merchants avoided payment of exactions which were so high that protection could be obtained more cheaply by other means."

FREDERIC C. LANE

商人们避免支付过高的赋税,因为通过其他方式获得保护会更加便宜,在边境和公海上,没有人能长期垄断使用暴力的权力。

It does not take a giant stretch of the imagination to see that the information elite are likely to take advantage of the opportunities for liberation and personal sovereignty offered by the new cybereconomy. Equally, it is to be expected that the "leftbehinds"

信息精英很可能利用新型网络经济所带来的自由和个人主权的机会,这并不难想象。同样,我们也可以预期"被落下的人"

will become increasingly jingoistic and unpleasant as the impact of information technology grows in the new millennium. It is difficult to guess at precisely what point the reaction will turn ugly. Our guess is that the recriminations will intensify when Western nations begin to unambiguously crack apart in the manner of the former Soviet Union.

随着新千年信息技术的影响不断增加,政治民族主义和不愉快情绪将日益增长。很难猜测反应会在哪个时点变得令人不快。我们的猜测是,当西方国家开始像前苏联那样明确地分崩离析时,谴责将会加剧。

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Equally, every time a nationstate cracks up, it will facilitate further devolution and encourage the autonomy of Sovereign Individuals. We expect to see a significant multiplication of sovereign entities, as scores of enclaves and jurisdictions more akin to city-states emerge from the rubble of nations. These new entities will include many that will offer highly competitive pricing of protection services, imposing low taxes or none at all on income and capital. The new entities are almost bound to price their

protection services more attractively than do the leading OECD nationstates. Seen simply as a matter of market segmentation, the area of the market that is most poorly served is the high-efficiency, low-cost end. Anyone who wishes to pay high taxes in exchange for a complicated array of state spending has ample opportunity to do so. Therefore, the most advantageous and profitable strategy for a new minisovereignty is almost bound to lie with a high-efficiency, low-price alternative. Such a minisovereignty could only with great difficulty expect to provide a more complete array of services than those on offer from the surviving nationstates. Since all nationstates will certainly not collapse at once, the statist alternative is likely to be well supplied, especially early in the transition.

同样地,每当一个国家国家崩溃,它都会促进进一步的分权并鼓励主权个人的自治。我们预计会看到主权实体的数量显著增加,因为许多类似于城邦的内陆和管辖区将从国家的废墟中出现。这些新实体将包括许多提供高度具有竞争力的保护服务定价的实体,对收入和资本征收低税或根本不征税。新实体几乎必然会以更有吸引力的价格提供其保护服务,相比于领先的经合组织国家。从市场细分的角度来看,最不受服务的领域是高效、低成本的终端。任何希望以高税收换取复杂的国家支出的人都有充足的机会这样做。因此,新的微型主权国家的最有利可图的策略几乎无可避免地将是高效、低价的替代方案。这种微型主权国家很难期望提供比现存国家更完备的服务。由于并非所有国家国家会同时崩溃,国家主义的替代方案很可能会供应充足,尤其是在过渡期初期。

On the other hand, a no-frills regime of tolerable law and order can be provided relatively cheaply. If social unrest and crime spread in the old core industrial countries to the degree that we expect, tolerable law and order will be far more appealing in a jurisdiction than a national space program, a state-sponsored women's museum, or subsidized retraining schemes for displaced executives.

另一方面,可以相对便宜地提供一个不带装饰的可容忍的法律和秩序体制。如果社会动荡和犯罪在老工业核心国家蔓延到我们所预期的程度,在一个管辖区内,可容忍的法律和秩序将比国家航天计划、国家赞助的女性博物馆或为受影响高管提供的补贴培训计划更有吸引力。

THE DENATIONALIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

个人去国家化

Citizenship will become less attractive and tenable as new institutions emerge to facilitate choice in the services governments now engross, beginning with protection.

公民身份将变得不那么有吸引力和可行,因为新的机构正在出现,以促进政府目前垄断的服务的选择,从保护开始。

This will make it practical for individuals to cease to identify themselves in national terms. Yet the demystification of citizenship will be a slow process. You are constantly exposed to a barrage of banal messages in the routines of daily life designed to reinforce your identification with your local nationstate. These messages make it highly unlikely for you to forget "your nationality." For many people, nationality is a crucial badge of identity. "We" are taught to see the world in terms of nationality. It is our country, "our"

这将使个人实现不再以国家身份认同自己成为可能。然而,公民身份的去神秘化将是一个缓慢的过程。在日常生活的常规中,您不断接触旨在强化您对当地国家的认同的平凡信息。这些信息使您几乎不会遗忘"您的国籍"。对许多人来说,国籍是身份的重要标志。我们被教导从国籍的角度来看待世界。这是我们的国家,"我们的"

athletes compete in the Olympics. When they win, it is "our" flag that waves in the ceremony. "Our" anthem brings the judges and other competitors to attention in the awards ceremony. "We" are led to believe that it is "our" victory, although it is never quite clear how "we" participated, other than by being within the same territory as a citizen.

运动员参加奥运会。当他们获胜时,在庆祝仪式上飘扬的是"我们"的旗帜。"我们"的国歌让裁判和其他选手在颁奖仪式上肃立。"我们"被引导相信这是"我们"的胜利,尽管从未明确说明"我们"是如何参与的,除了作为公民居住在同一领土内。

From First Person Plural to Singular 从第一人称复数到单数

As information technology comes to the fore, it will help facilitate a global perspective, as well as create ways by which Sovereign Individuals can harness the latent possibilities of information technology to escape from the nationalist burden of taxation.

随着信息技术的兴起,它将有助于培养全球视野,同时也为主权个人创造利用信息技术逃离税收国家主义负担的方式。

Within the next few decades, for example, narrow-casting will replace broadcasting as 232

在未来的几十年内,例如,窄播将取代广播

the method by which individuals obtain their news. This has significant implications. It amounts to a change in the imaginations of millions from first personal plural to singular.

个人获取新闻的方式。这有重大影响。这相当于数百万人从第一人称复数转变为单数。

As individuals themselves begin to serve as their own news editors, selecting what topics and news stories are of interest, it is far less likely that they will choose to indoctrinate themselves in the urgencies of sacrifice for the nationstate. Much the same effect will arise from the privatization of education, again facilitated by technology. In the medieval period, education was firmly under the control of the Church. In the modern age, education has been under the control of the state. In the words of Eric Hobsbawm, "state education transformed people into citizens of a specific country: 'peasants into Frenchmen.'" 90 In the Information Age, education will be privatized and individualized. It will no longer be lumbered with the heavy political baggage that characterized education during the industrial period. Nationalism will not be constantly massaged into every corner of the mind's life.

随着个人自身开始充当自己的新闻编辑,选择感兴趣的主题和新闻报道,他们很可能不太会选择使自己沉浸于为民族国家牺牲的紧迫性之中。同样的效果也会出现在教育私有化中,这再次得益于技术的发展。在中

世纪,教育完全掌握在教会手中。在现代社会,教育则受国家的控制。正如埃里克·霍布斯鲍姆所说,"国家教育将人们转变成一个特定国家的公民:'农民变成法国人'。"在信息时代,教育将私有化和个性化。它将不再受制于工业时代教育所带有的沉重政治包袱。民族主义将不会被不断地注入大脑生活的各个角落。

The move to the Internet and the World Wide Web will also reduce the importance of location in commerce. It will create individual addresses that are not bounded territorially. Satellite-based digital telephone services will evolve beyond location-based land-line systems sharing a common international dialing code. The individual will have his own, unique global telephone address, like an Internet address, that will reach him wherever he happens to be. In due course, national postal monopolies will collapse, allowing privatized mail delivery by worldwide services with no particular ties to any existing nationstate.

网络和互联网的发展将降低位置在商业中的重要性。它将创造不受地理位限制的个人地址。基于卫星的数字电话服务将超越基于地点的有线电话系统,共享一个通用的国际拨号编码。每个个人都将拥有自己独特的全球电话地址,就像互联网地址一样,无论他在哪里都能联系到他。最终,国家邮政垄断将崩溃,让私营的全球服务提供邮递服务,不再受任何现有国家的束缚。

These and other apparently small steps will help free the ordinary consumer, as well as the cognitive elite, from rote identification with the nationstate. The demystification of citizenship will be most dramatically accelerated by the emergence of practical alternatives to dealing within bounded territories monopolized by states. The building blocks of the cybereconomy-cybermoney, cyberbanking, and an unregulated global cybermarket in securities-are almost bound to come into existence on a large scale.

这些看似微小的步骤以及其他步骤将帮助普通消费者以及认知精英摆脱与民族国家的刻板认同。随着处理被国家垄断的有界领土的实际替代方案的出现,公民身份的去神秘化将得到最大程度的加速。网络经济的建设模块 - 网络货币、网络银行和一个不受监管的全球性证券网络市场 - 很可能会大规模出现。

As they do, the capacity of greedy governments to confiscate the wealth of "citizens" will shrivel.

正如他们所做的那样,贪婪政府剥夺"公民"财富的能力将会减弱。

While the leading states will no doubt attempt to enforce a cartel to preserve high taxes and fiat money by cooperating to limit encryption and prevent citizens from escaping their domains, the states will ultimately fail. The most productive people on the planet will find their way to economic freedom. It is unlikely that the state will even be effective at keeping people penned up where they can be physically held to ransom. The ineffectiveness of efforts to bar illegal immigrants convincingly shows that nationstates will be unable to seal their borders to prevent successful people from escaping. The rich will be at least as enterprising in getting out as would-be taxi drivers and waiters are at getting in.

尽管领先的国家无疑会试图通过合作限制加密和阻止公民逃离其领域来维护高税收和法定货币的垄断,但这些国家最终都会失败。地球上最有生产力的人将找到通往经济自由的道路。国家即使有效地将人关在可以人质赎金的地方,这种做法也不太可能奏效。阻止非法移民的效果令人信服地表明,国家将无法密封其边境,以阻止成功人士逃离。富人在逃离时将至少与想当出租车司机和服务员进入国家时一样有创业心。

For the first time since the medieval period of fragmented sovereignty, borders will not be clearly demarcated. As we explored earlier, there will be no distinct territory in which many future financial transactions will occur. Instead of accepting an inheritance of liabilities on the basis of an accident of birth, increasing numbers of Sovereign Individuals will take advantage of this ambiguity to desert their tax liabilities, moving beyond citizenship to become customers. They will negotiate private tax treaties ²³³

自中世纪主权分散以来,边界将不再明确划分。正如我们之前探讨的,将不会有明确的领土用于许多未来的金融交易。与其接受出生意外带来的债务,越来越多的主权个人将利用这种模糊性逃避纳税责任,超越公民身份成为客户。他们将谈判私人税收协议。

as customers, along the lines now available in Switzerland, as analyzed in Chapter 8. A typical private tax treaty negotiated with the French-speaking Swiss cantons allows an individual or family to reside in exchange for a

fixed annual tax payment of 50,000 Swiss francs (currently about \$45,000). Note that this is not a flat-rate tax, but a fiat amount of tax fixed without respect to income. If your annual income is 50,000 Swiss francs, (\$45,000) you should not enter into such a private tax treaty because your tax rate would be 100 percent. At an income of 500,000 Swiss francs, your rate is 10 percent. At SF5,000,000, the rate is just 1 percent. At SF50 million, your tax rate is just 1/10th of percent. If this seems an incredibly good deal compared to a marginal rate of 58 percent in New York City, that is merely a measure of how predatory and monopolistic the pricing of government services generally became during the industrial period.

根据第 8 章的分析,就如同在瑞士目前可用的模式,作为客户可以以固定的年税款 50,000 瑞士法郎(当前约 45,000 美元)来换取居留权。请注意,这不是单一税率,而是固定税款金额,与收入无关。如果你的年收入是 50,000 瑞士法郎(45,000 美元),那么你不应该签订这样的私人税收协议,因为你的税率将为 100%。如果年收入为 500,000 瑞士法郎,税率为 10%;如果是 5,000,000 瑞士法郎,税率仅为 1%;如果是 5,000 万瑞士法郎,税率仅为 0.1%。与纽约市 58%的边际税率相比,这似乎是一笔非常不错的交易,这仅仅反映了在工业时期,政府服务定价的剥削性和垄断性质。

In fact, 50,000 Swiss francs is an ample annual payment for the necessary and useful services of government. The Swiss surely make a large profit from serving every millionaire who moves in and pays them 50,000 Swiss francs annually for the privilege.

事实上,5 万瑞士法郎是政府必要和有益服务的充足年度付款。瑞士人一定能从服务每一位搬入并每年为此支付 5 万瑞士法郎的百万富翁那里获得巨大利润。

In many cases, the government's marginal cost to have another millionaire living in the jurisdiction is approximately zero. Therefore, its annual profit on the transaction will approach 50,000 Swiss francs. Any service that can be undercut and still allow the low-cost provider approximately a 100 percent profit is monopolized and overpriced to an extreme. What is remarkable is not that the rate of tax charged should fall as a percentage of income in this particular case, but that it should ever have seemed "fair"

在许多情况下,政府在其管辖区内再增加一位百万富翁的边际成本约为

零。因此,该交易的年度利润将接近 5 万瑞士法郎。任何能被低成本供应商以大约 100%的利润提供的服务,都会被垄断并被严重定价过高。令人惊讶的不是在这种特殊情况下,征收的税率应该随收入下降,而是这种税率曾被视为"公平"。

that different persons should pay wildly different amounts for the services of government during the twentieth century. This is particularly odd in that those who use government services the most pay the least, and those who use them least pay the most. All of them will provide an advantage as a domicile over the United States worth tens of millions over a lifetime to any high-income American. Unless U.S. taxes are reformed to become more competitive with those of other jurisdictions, and are no longer levied on the basis of nationality, thinking persons will renounce U.S. citizenship, notwithstanding the obstacles imposed by Clinton's exit tax, to take up passports that entail less onerous liabilities.

20 世纪,不同人支付政府服务的金额应该大不相同。这很奇怪,因为使用政府服务最多的人支付最少,而使用最少的人支付最多。对于任何高收入美国人来说,作为居所而提供的优势可以在一生中为他们带来数以百万计的收益。除非美国税收改革,与其他管辖区更具竞争力,且不再以国籍为征税依据,否则有考虑的人将放弃美国公民身份,尽管要经受克林顿政府设置的退税障碍,而选择负担更轻的护照。

Governments in the industrial era priced their services on the basis of the success of the taxpayer, rather than in relation to the costs or value of any services provided. The movement to commercial pricing of government service will lead to more satisfactory protection at a far lower price than that imposed by conventional nationstates.

工业时代的政府根据纳税人的成功来定价服务,而不是根据所提供服务的成本或价值。向政府服务的商业定价转移将导致提供更满意的保护,而价格远低于传统国家强加的价格。

Citizenship Goes the Way of Chivalry
公民身份如骑士精神般式微

In short, citizenship is destined to go the way of chivalry. As the basis upon which protection is provided is reorganized once again, the rationalizations

and motivating ideologies that complement the system will also inevitably change. Half a millennium ago, at the close of the Middle Ages, when the provision of protection in return for personal service generally ceased to be a paying proposition, people responded in the predictable way. They abandoned chivalry. Sworn oaths and personal fealty ceased to be taken as seriously as they had been for the previous five centuries. Now 234

总而言之，公民身份注定要走向骑士精神的未来。随着提供保护的基础再次重组,补充这一体系的理性化和激励性意识形态也必然会发生变化。在中世纪末期的半个世纪前,当个人服务换取保护这种做法不再是一项有利可图的提议时,人们做出了可预测的反应。他们放弃了骑士精神。宣誓的誓言和个人忠诚不再像过去五个世纪那样受到重视。

information technology promises to be equally subversive of citizenship. The nationstate and the claims of nationalism will be demystified just as the claims of the monopoly Church were demystified five centuries ago.

信息技术也将同样颠覆公民身份。民族国家和民族主义的主张将像五个世纪前教会垄断权力的主张一样被去神秘化。

While reactionaries will respond by attempting to vilify innovators and revive nationalist sentiment, we doubt that the megapolitically defunct nationstate can exert a sufficiently strong tug of loyalties to withstand the Competitive pressures unleashed by information technology. Most thinking individuals in a world of bankrupt governments will prefer to be well treated as customers of protection services, rather than be plundered as citizens of nationstates.

尽管反动分子会试图诽谤创新者并唤起民族主义情绪,但我们怀疑那些在大政治层面已经失去作用的民族国家,无法产生足够强大的忠诚感,以抵御信息技术释放的竞争压力。在破产政府的世界里,大多数人思想个体都会宁愿作为保护服务的客户受到良好对待,而不愿被视为民族国家公民而遭到掠夺。

The wealthy OECD countries impose heavy tax and regulatory burdens upon individuals doing business within their borders. These costs may have been tolerable when the OECD nationstates were the only jurisdictions in which one could do business and reside at a reasonable level of comfort. That day has passed. The premium paid to be taxed and regulated as a

resident of the richest nationstates no longer repays its cost.

富裕的经合组织国家对在其境内经商的个人施加沉重的税收和监管负担。当经合组织国家是可以合理舒适地从事商业和居住的唯一司法管辖区时,这些成本或许还可以接受。但这一天已经过去了。作为富裕国家的居民而接受繁重的税收和监管已不再能弥补其成本。

It will be ever less tolerable as competition between jurisdictions intensifies. Those with the earnings ability and capital to meet the competitive challenges of the Information Age will be able to locate anywhere and do business anywhere. With a choice of domiciles, only the most patriotic or stupid will continue to reside in high-tax countries.

随着司法管辖区之间竞争的加剧,这种情况将变得越来越难以容忍。那些具有谋生能力和资本来应对信息时代竞争挑战的人,可以在任何地方定居并开展业务。有了选择居住地的机会,只有最有爱国精神或最愚蠢的人才会继续居住在高税收国家。

For this reason, it is to be expected that one or more nationstates will undertake covert action to subvert the appeal of transience. Travel could be effectively discouraged by biological warfare, such as the outbreak of a deadly epidemic. This could not only discourage the desire to travel, it could also give jurisdictions throughout the globe an excuse to seal their borders and limit immigration.

出于这个原因,有一个或多个民族国家很可能会采取隐秘行动来破坏短暂性的吸引力。生物战争,如致命流行病的爆发,可能会有效地阻止人们的旅行欲望。这不仅会减少人们的旅行愿望,还可能为全球各地的管辖区提供理由关闭边境并限制移民。

The Drawback of Nationality Taxation

国籍税的缺点

Unless there is an astonishing and almost miraculous change in policies, the successful investor or entrepreneur in the Information Age will pay a lifetime penalty of tens of millions, hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars to reside in the countries with fiscal policies like those that have enjoyed the highest living standards during the twentieth century.

除非在政策上出现令人惊讶且几乎是奇迹般的变化,否则在信息时代成

功的投资者或企业家将支付终生数千万、数亿甚至数十亿美元的代价,才能在拥有 20 世纪最高生活水平的国家居住。

Absent a radical change, the penalty will be highest for Americans. The United States is one of just three jurisdictions on the planet that impose taxes based upon nationality rather than residence. The other two are the Philippines, a former U.S.

如果没有根本性的改变,美国人将承受最大的惩罚。美国是地球上仅有的三个根据国籍而非居住地征税的司法管辖区之一。其他两个是前美国属地菲律宾。

colony, and Eritrea, one of whose exiled leaders fell under the spell of the IRS during its long rebellion against Ethiopian rule. Eritrea now imposes a nationality tax of 3 percent.

殖民地,以及厄立特里亚,其流亡领导人之一在对埃塞俄比亚统治的漫长反叛中受到了国税局的迷惑。厄立特里亚现在征收 3%的国籍税。

While that is a pale imitation of the U.S. rates, even that burden makes Eritrean citizenship a liability in the Information Age. Current law makes U.S. citizenship even a larger liability. The IRS has become one of America's leading exports. More than any other country, the United States reaches to the corners of the earth to extract income from its nationals.

虽然这与美国的税率相去甚远,但即使如此,埃里特里亚公民身份在信息时代也会成为一种负担。现行法律使美国公民身份成为一种更大的负担。美国国税局已成为美国最主要的出口之一。在任何其他国家之前,美国都在地球的各个角落寻找其公民的收入。

If a 747 jetliner filled with one investor from each jurisdiction on earth touched down in a newly independent country, and each investor risked \$1,000 in a start-up 235

如果一架波音 747 客机上填满了来自地球上每个管辖区的一位投资者,并降落在一个新独立的国家,而每位投资者在一家初创企业中冒险投资 1,000 美元,

venture in the new economy, the American would face a far higher tax than anyone else on any gains. Special, penal taxation of foreign investment,

exemplified by the so-called PFIC taxation, plus the U.S. nationality tax, can result in tax liabilities of 200 percent or more on long-term assets held outside the United States. A successful American could reduce his total lifetime tax burden as a citizen of any of more than 280 other jurisdictions on the globe.

在新经济中冒险,美国人在任何收益上面临的税收都远远高于他人。以所谓的 PFIC 税收和美国国籍税为例的特殊惩罚性税收,可能会导致持有在美国以外的长期资产的税收负担高达 200%或更多。一个成功的美国人可以通过成为 280 多个其他司法管辖区的公民来减轻其终生的总税收负担。

The United States has the globe's most predatory, soak-the-rich tax system. 美国拥有全球最掠食性的、榨取富人的税收体系。

Americans living in the United States or abroad are treated more like assets and less like customers than citizens of any other country. The American tax regime is therefore more anachronistic and less compatible with success in the Information Age than those of even the notoriously high-tax welfare states of Scandinavia. Citizens of Denmark or Sweden face few legal obstacles in realizing their growing technological autonomy as individuals. 居住在美国或海外的美国人比其他任何国家的公民都更像资产而不是客户。因此,相比于臭名昭著的高税收福利国家斯堪的纳维亚,美国的税收制度更加过时,不太符合信息时代的成功需求。丹麦或瑞典的公民在实现他们作为个人不断增长的技术自主权方面也很少面临法律障碍。

Should they wish to negotiate their own tax rates, they are free to elect to pay taxes in Switzerland by private treaty, or move to Bermuda and pay no income taxes at all. A Swede or a Dane who wishes to pay high taxes because he believes the Scandinavian welfare state is worth what it costs is actually making a choice. He can elect to be taxed at any rate that prevails in any other jurisdiction in the civilized or uncivilized world. To change his tax rate, he need only move. Technology makes such a choice easier by the moment. Yet that option is denied to Americans.

如果他们希望自行协商税率,他们可以自由选择在瑞士通过私人条约纳税,或搬到百慕大而不需缴纳任何所得税。一个认为北欧福利国家值得支付其代价的瑞典人或丹麦人实际上在做出选择。他可以选择适用于

任何其他文明或野蛮世界管辖区的任何税率。要改变他的税率,他只需搬家。技术使这种选择一刻也不停地变得更轻松。然而,这一选择却被否定给了美国人。

Holding a U.S. passport is destined to become a major drawback to realizing the opportunities for individual autonomy made possible by the Information Revolution.

持有美国护照必将成为阻碍个人自主权机会实现的一大障碍,这一机会正是由信息革命带来的。

Being born an American during the industrial period was a lucky accident. Even in the early stages of the Information Age, it has become a multimillion-dollar liability.

作为工业时期的美国人出生是一次幸运的意外。即使在信息时代的早期阶段,它已成为一项价值数百万美元的负债。

To see how great a liability, consider this comparison. Under reasonable assumptions, a New Zealander with the same pretax performance as the average of the top 1 percent of American taxpayers would pay so much less in taxes that the compounding of his tax savings alone would make him richer than the American would ever be. At the end of a lifetime, the New Zealander would have \$73 million more to leave to his children or grandchildren. And New Zealand is not even a recognized tax haven. More than forty other jurisdictions impose lower income and capital taxation than New Zealand. If our argument is right, the number of low-tax jurisdictions is likely to rise rather than fall. All of them will provide an advantage as a domicile over the United States, worth tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, over a lifetime. Unless U.S.

根据合理假设,一位和美国纳税人前 1% 平均水平一样的纳税人,在新西兰缴纳的税款会少得多,这种税收节省的复利效应使他比美国人更富有。一生结束时,这位新西兰人可以留给子孙的财富会多出 7,300 万美元。新西兰并不是公认的税收天堂,超过 40 个其他司法管辖区的所得税和资本税都比新西兰低。如果我们的论点成立,低税管辖区的数量很可能会增加而不是减少。它们都相对于美国提供了价值数千万甚至数亿美元的居住优势。除非美国政府采取行动,否则这种情况将继续下去。

taxes are reformed to become more competitive with those of other jurisdictions, and are no longer levied on the basis of nationality, thinking persons will renounce U.S.

税收改革以更好地与其他司法管辖区的税收竞争,不再根据国籍征税,理性人会放弃美国国籍。

citizenship, notwithstanding the obstacles imposed by Clinton's exit tax.
公民身份,尽管受到克林顿退税法的障碍。

The competitive conditions of the Information Age will render it possible to earn high incomes almost anywhere. In effect, the locational monopolies that nationstates exploited to impose extremely high taxes will be broken by technology. They are already breaking down, As they erode further, competitive pressures are almost bound to drive the most enterprising and able to flee countries that tax too much. As former Economist editor Norman Macrae put it, such countries "will be inhabited residually, mainly by dummies."

信息时代的竞争条件将使在几乎任何地方赚取高收入成为可能。实际上,国家利用地域垄断来征收极高税收的情况将被技术打破。这些垄断已经开始瓦解,随着进一步瓦解,竞争压力也几乎必然会驱使最富创业精神和能力的人逃离税收过高的国家。正如前《经济学人》杂志编辑诺曼·麦克雷所说,这些国家"将主要由愚蠢的人居住"。

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"[B]y the year 2012, projected outlays for entitlements and interest on the national debt will consume all tax revenues collected by the federal government. ... There will not be one cent left over for education, children's programs, highways, national defense, or any other discretionary program.
BIPARTISAN U.S. COMMISSION ON ENTITLEMENT AND TAX REFORM

到 2012 年,预计用于权利和国家债务利息的支出将占联邦政府收取的所有税收。...不会剩下一分钱用于教育、儿童计划、公路、国防或任何其他自由裁量性计划。

The flight of the wealthy from advanced welfare states will happen at just the wrong time demographically. Early in the twenty-first century, large aging populations in Europe and North America will find themselves with insufficient savings to meet medical expenses and finance their lifestyles in retirement. For example, fully 65 percent of Americans have no savings for retirement at all. None. And those who do save far too little. The average American will reach sixty-five facing expected medical bills of more than \$200,000 before death and with a net worth of less than \$75,000. Even the minority with private pensions are unlikely to be comfortable. The average pension will replace only 20 percent of pre-retirement income. Most of the assets of the typical retiree are not real wealth but "transcendental capital," the expected value of transfer payments. Most people have been conditioned to rely upon these transfer payments to make up the gap in their private resources. The catch is that they are unlikely to be forthcoming. Pay-as-you-go systems will lack the cash flow or resources to make good on them. A study conducted by Neil Howe showed that even if pretax incomes in the United States were to rise faster than they have over the past twenty years, average after-tax incomes in America would have to be pushed down by 59 percent by 2040 in order to finance Social Security and government medical programs at current levels.

富裕人群从发达福利国家的逃离将在人口统计学上的不利时机发生。21 世纪初,欧洲和北美洲的大规模老龄人口将发现自己的储蓄不足以支付医疗费用和维持退休生活。例如,高达 65%的美国人根本没有退休储蓄。而那些有储蓄的人也储蓄太少。平均美国人在 65 岁时,预计在去世前的医疗费用将超过 20 万美元,而净资产不到 7.5 万美元。即使是少数有私人养老金的人,也很难感到安逸。平均养老金只能替代退休前收入的 20%。典型退休人员的大部分资产不是真正的财富,而是"超越资本",即转移支付的预期价值。大多数人已被调教成依赖这些转移支付来弥补自己的私人资源缺口。问题在于,这些转移支付很可能无法兑现。按照目前的方式支付的体系将缺乏现金流或资源来兑现这些承诺。尼尔·豪伊(Neil Howe)的一项研究显示,即使美国的税前收入增长速度超过过去 20 年,到 2040 年美国的平均税后收入也必须下降 59%,才能维持目前水平的社会保障和政府医疗计划。

This is not a problem that can be manipulated around the margins. The welfare state faces insolvency. Its financing predicament is even more acute

in Europe than in North America. Italy is perhaps the worst case, followed closely by Sweden and the other Nordic welfare states that set the standard for generous terms in income-support programs. The Financial Times estimates that if "the present value of Italian state pensions is included, the country's public sector debt would rise to more than 200 percent of GDP" 91

这不是一个可以在边缘操纵的问题。福利国家面临破产。其融资困境在欧洲比在北美更加严峻。也许意大利是最糟糕的情况,其次是瑞典和其他北欧福利国家,它们为收入支持计划设定了慷慨的标准。《金融时报》估计,如果"包括意大利国家养老金的现值,该国公共部门债务将升至 GDP 的 200%以上"。

Indebtedness at such levels is all but mathematically hopeless. A comprehensive study of commercial indebtedness of Toronto Stock Exchange companies undertaken a few years ago showed that few survive debt ratios one-quarter as extreme as those facing the leading welfare states today. 92 Put simply, they are broke. As this reality is faced, grudgingly but inevitably, literally trillions in unfunded entitlement obligations will be written off.

在如此高的债务水平下,几乎是数学上没有希望。几年前对多伦多证券交易所公司商业债务进行的一项综合研究显示,很少有公司能够承受当今主要福利国家所面临的四分之一那么极端的债务比率。简单地说,他们已经破产了。当这一现实不可避免地被承认时,数万亿美元的未偿付的权利义务将被注销。

Such is the logic of the cybereconomy. One possible hitch may be simple inertia, the nesting instinct that makes humans reluctant to pick up stakes and move. If there are other hitches, they may be hardwired into human nature. The economic logic of deploying assets in cyberspace could run counter to the biologic expressed in the ingrained suspicions of outsiders. Children in every culture show an aversion to strangers. Opponents of the commercialization of sovereignty will do their best to inflame doubts about the new global culture of the Information Age and the demise of the nationstate that it implies. Another possible hitch arising from epigenesis, or genetically influenced motivational factors, is the prospect that the "losers and leftbehinds" will respond to developments that undermine the

nationstate with the fury of hunter-gatherers 237

此即网络经济的逻辑。可能存在的一个问题是惯性,人们不愿意离开安全的老巢。如果还有其他问题,可能源于人性的基因。将资产部署在网络空间的经济逻辑,可能与对外来者的偏见相悖。每种文化的儿童都表现出对陌生人的厌恶。主权商业化的反对者将尽力煽动对信息时代新全球文化及其意味着的民族国家衰亡的怀疑。另一个可能的问题源自表现遗传或遗传影响的动机因素,即"失利者和被抛弃者"将以狩猎采集者的愤怒方式对压制民族国家的发展作出回应。

protecting their families. In an environment where disoriented and alienated individuals will have increased power to disrupt and destroy, a backlash against the information economy could prove to be violent and unpleasant. 保护他们的家人。在一个迷失和被边缘化的个人拥有破坏和摧毁的增强力量的环境中,对信息经济的反弹可能会变得暴力和不愉快。

"Historically collective violence has flowed regularly out of the central political processes of Western countries. People seeking to seize, hold, or realign the levers of power have continually engaged in collective violence as part of their struggles. The oppressed have struck in the name of justice, the privileged in the name of order those between in the name of fear Great shifts in the arrangements of power have ordinarily produced-and have often depended on-exceptional moments of collective violence."93

CHARLES TILLY

在历史上,集体暴力常常源于西方国家的中央政治过程。寻求掌握、保持或重新调整权力杠杆的人们一直把集体暴力作为他们斗争的一部分。被压迫者以正义的名义发起攻击,特权阶层以秩序的名义行动,中间阶层则以恐惧的名义行事。权力格局的重大变革通常会产生,有时还需要依赖于,集体暴力的特殊时刻。

VIOLENCE IN PERSPECTIVE

暴力的角度

There are at least two contending theories about what precipitates violence in conditions of change. Historian Charles Tilly summarizes one theory: "[T]he stimulus to collective violence comes largely from the anxieties people experience when established institutions fall apart. If misery or danger compounds the anxiety, runs the theory, the reaction becomes all the more violent." In Tilly's view, however, violence is not so much a product of anxiety as it is a far more rational attempt to bully authorities into meeting their responsibilities" motivated by a "sense of justice denied." According to Tilly's interpretation, "large structural changes" tend to stimulate collective violence of a "political" nature. "Instead of constituting a sharp break from 'normal' political life, furthermore, violent struggles tend to accompany, complement, and extend organized, peaceful attempts by the same people to accomplish their objectives. They belong to the same world as nonviolent contention." 94

至少有两种主要理论解释在变革条件下什么导致了暴力。历史学家蒂利总结了一种理论："集体暴力的刺激很大程度上来自于人们在既定机构瓦解时所经历的焦虑。如果贫困或危险加剧了焦虑,理论认为,反应将变得更加暴力。"但蒂利认为,暴力不那么是焦虑的产物,而是一种更加理性的尝试,想要恐吓当局履行他们的责任,这是出于"被否认的正义感"。根据蒂利的解释,"大的结构性变革"往往会刺激具有"政治"性质的集体暴力。"此外,暴力斗争不构成与'正常'政治生活的尖锐断裂,相反,它往往伴随、补充和延续由同样人以非暴力方式进行的有组织的努力来实现他们的目标。它属于与非暴力抗争同一个世界。"

Whichever theory of violence is more correct, prospects for social peace during the Great Transformation would appear to be limited. The collapse of the nationstate surely counts as a conspicuous example of an "established institution falling apart."

不管什么暴力理论更正确,在大转型期间实现社会和平的前景似乎是有限的。国家的崩溃无疑可以被视为一个"既定制度分崩离析"的突出例子。

Therefore, anxieties are likely to be in full flower, as will the political inspiration for violence. This could be especially true in the leading welfare states, where populations are accustomed to relative income equality. Given that populations in the early stages of the information economy will have come of age during the industrial period, when political authorities did have the capacity to answer grievances with material benefits, it is reasonable to expect the "leftbehinds" to continue to demand material benefits. It will probably take a slow, painful tutorial in the realities of the cybereconomy before OECD

因此,焦虑可能会全面爆发,暴力的政治动机也会如此。这在领先的福利国家可能特别如此,因为那里的人口习惯于相对收入平等。鉴于信息经济早期的人口是在工业时期成长起来的,当时政治当局有能力用物质利益来回应不满,可以合理地预期"被抛弃者"将继续要求物质利益。在经历 OECD

populations are weaned away from expectations of being able to compel income redistribution on a large scale. In either case, whether violence arises from "anxiety" or as a more calculating effort to harness the benefits of systematic compulsion, conditions would appear to make violence likely. 人口被引导远离能够大规模强制进行收入再分配的预期。无论暴力源于"焦虑"还是更具计算性地利用系统性强制措施的利益,条件似乎都会导致暴力行为的发生。

Constituencies of Losers
选民中众失利者

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The collapse of coerced income redistribution is bound to upset those who expect to be on the receiving end of the trillions in transfer programs. Mostly, these will be "the losers or leftbehinds," persons without the skills to compete in global markets. Like the pensioners of the former Soviet Union who formed the core of Zupanov's Communist support, the disappointed pensioners of the dying welfare states will form a reactionary constituency keen to prevent the sovereignty of the nationstates from being privatized, thereby depriving the state of its license to steal. As they realize

that governments they formerly controlled are losing their sovereignty over resources and the ability to compel large-scale income transfers, they will become as adamant as French civil servants in fighting arithmetic.

被剥夺的收入重分配必将令那些指望从万亿美元转移支付中获益的人感到不快。这些人通常是"失败者或被遗弃者",缺乏在全球市场中竞争的技能。正如前苏联退休人员构成了兹戈诺夫共产党支持的核心,垂死福利国家的失望退休人员将形成一个反动群体,热衷于阻止民族国家的主权被私有化,从而剥夺国家偷窃的许可。随着他们意识到他们过去控制的政府正在失去对资源的主权和进行大规模收入转移的能力,他们将像法国公务员一样顽强地与算术作斗争。

You may remember the violent reaction that greeted Prime Minister Alain Juppe's quite modest proposals to scale back "demographically unsustainable" retirement benefits of state workers and economize the operations of the nationalized railroad system.

你可能还记得作为法国总理的阿兰·朱佩提出适度缩减"人口失衡"的公务员退休福利和国有铁路系统经营的建议遭到的强烈反应。

Symbolic of the absurdity of the Etat Providence, as the French call their social welfare system, is the rule that allows "engineers on the computerized, high-speed TGV trains to retire at age fifty, just like their predecessors who toiled on the coal-fired locomotive" 95

法国人称之为"福利国家"的荒谬象征,就是允许高速列车 TGV 的计算机工程师在 50 岁就像前辈在煤火机车上劳作一样退休的规定

A rowdy reaction to cutbacks of unsustainable benefits is a distinct possibility in any OECD country. And even where populations respond less angrily, you can expect the probable losers to do whatever is within their power to forestall the erosion of state compulsion.

对不可持续福利的削减可能会引发粗暴反应,这在任何经合组织国家都是有可能发生的。即使某些人的反应不那么愤怒,你也可以预料到那些可能遭受损失的人会尽其所能来阻止国家强制的侵蚀。

This will lead to some surprising twists. In the United States, for example, nativist sentiment has historically been tinged with more than a slight tincture of racism.

这将导致一些意想不到的转折。例如,在美国,乡土主义情绪历来掺杂着不少种族主义的成分。

This is a tradition that began with the nineteenth-century "White Caps" and Ku Klux Klan. Yet blacks, as a group, are major beneficiaries of income transfers, affirmative action, and other fruits of political compulsion. They are also disproportionately represented in the U.S. military. Therefore, they are likely to emerge, along with blue-collar whites, as among the most fervent partisans of American nationalism.

这是一项始于 19 世纪"白帽子"和库克斯兰的传统。然而,作为一个群体,黑人是收入转移、积极行动和政治强制的其他成果的主要受益者。他们在美国军队中也是过度代表。因此,他们很可能会与蓝领白人一起成为美国民族主义的最殷切支持者。

Politicians willing to cater to the insecurities of those whose relative talents fall well down on Ammon's turnip will come noisily to the fore in almost every country.

愿意迎合那些相对才能在阿蒙辉火焰中榜上无名者焦虑的政客,将在几乎每个国家大肆出现。

From Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia to Pat Buchanan in the United States to Winston Peters in New Zealand, to Necmettin Erbakan of Turkey's fundamentalist Islamic Welfare Party, demagogues will rail against the globalization of markets, immigration, and freedom of investment.

从塞尔维亚的斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇到美国的帕特·布坎南,再到新西兰的温斯顿·彼得斯,再到土耳其基进伊斯兰福祉党的内杰米丁·埃尔巴坎,煽动家们会抨击市场全球化、移民以及投资自由。

Particular animus will be directed toward the rich and immigrants by those who imagine themselves to be the "global economy's casualties." In the words of Andrew Heal, they will "despise the entry of immigrants whose main entry criterion appears to be their wealth or their lack of it, which, the specious logic goes, makes them welfare burdens." 96

特定的敌意将针对富人和移民,这些人认为自己是"全球经济的牺牲品"。正如安德鲁·希尔所说,他们会"鄙视那些主要以财富或缺乏财富为入境标准的移民,这种虚伪的逻辑认为他们是福利负担"。

Fear of Freedom 自由的恐惧

The prospect of the disappearance of the nationstate early in the new millennium seems timed to effect the maximum disruption in the lives of suggestible people. This 239

新千年伊始国家的消失前景似乎是为了影响容易受影响的人的生活产生最大程度的破坏。这 239

will lead to widespread unpleasantness. More than a few observers have recognized a pattern of reaction that is common among those who feel left out by the prospect of a borderless world. As the larger, more inclusive national grouping begins to break down, with the more mobile "information elite" globalizing their affairs, the "losers and leftbehinds" fall back upon membership in an ethnic subgroup, a tribe, a gang, a religious or linguistic minority. Partly, this is a practical and pragmatic reaction to the collapse of services, including law and order, formerly provided by the state. For persons with few marketable resources, it often proves difficult to purchase access to market alternatives to failed public services.

这将导致广泛的不愉快。不少观察者已经认识到,那些对无边界世界前景感到被边缘化的人中存在一种普遍的反应模式。随着更大更包容的国家群体开始瓦解,更加流动的"信息精英"将他们的事务全球化,"失败者和被抛弃者"重新依附于一个族裔亚群体、部落、帮派或宗教/语言少数群体。这部分是对国家曾经提供的包括法律秩序在内的服务体系崩溃的务实和务实的反应。对于缺乏可销售资源的个人来说,要购买替代失败的公共服务的市场选择往往很困难。

The transformation of what were formerly treated as public goods, such as education, provision of clean water, and neighborhood policing, into private goods is obviously easier to manage for those with sufficient resources to purchase high-quality private alternatives. For those wanting cash, however, the most practical alternative is often to depend upon kin, or join a mutual-aid group organized along ethnic lines, like the old ethnic Chinese "Hokkien" of Southeast Asia, or through a religious congregation. In those parts of the world where dynamic, proselytizing religions are active, part of the popularity of their programs depends on the fact that they tend to hark

back to premodern mechanisms for providing social welfare and public goods. For example, Moslem-led vigilante groups have played a leading role in combating violent gangs in Cape Town, South Africa.⁹⁷ But as practical and pragmatic as such ethnic and religious organization of help can be, more is involved in the reactionary response to the withering of the state.

以前被视为公共物品的东西,如教育、提供干净的水和社区警务,如今被转变为私人商品,这显然更容易被拥有足够资源购买优质私人替代品的人管理。然而,对于需要现金的人来说,最实际的替代方案往往是依靠亲属,或加入沿种族界线组织的互助小组,如东南亚的"福建"华人,或通过宗教团体。在那些积极传教的宗教活跃的地方,他们项目的部分受欢迎程度在于它们往往会回归提供社会福利和公共物品的前现代机制。例如,穆斯林领导的义勇警队在南非开普敦与暴力团伙作斗争中发挥了重要作用。但是,尽管这种基于种族和宗教的帮助组织很实用、很务实,但对于国家衰落的反应中包含的东西要更多。

There also seems to be a strong psychological component in the reaction against globalization.

反全球化的反应中似乎也有很强的心理因素。

The argument is not dissimilar to the psychological explanation for the appeal of fascism developed by Erich Fromm in his famous work *Fear of Freedom*, first published in 1942. According to Fromm, social mobility introduced by capitalism had destroyed the fixed identities of traditional village life. The son of a farmer no longer knew that he would inevitably be a farmer, or even that he would be bound to live scrabbling to harvest a crop on the same poor ground that his father tilled. He now had a broad choice of occupation. He could become a schoolteacher, a merchant, a soldier; study medicine or take to the sea. Even as a farmer, he could emigrate to the United States, Canada, or Argentina and make a life far from the home of his forebears. This freedom that capitalism provided to people "to create their own identities" proved scary to those who were not prepared to make creative use of it. As Billig said, they yearned "for the security of a solid identity," and were "drawn towards the simplicities of nationalist and fascist propaganda."⁹⁹ Equally as Billig writes of the twilight of the industrial era, "There is a global psychology, which strikes the nation from above,

withering loyalties with a free play of identities. And then, there is the hot psychology of caste or tribe, which hits at the soft underbelly of the state with a powerfully intolerant commitment and emotional ferocity." 100

资本主义所带来的社会流动性摧毁了传统乡村生活中固有的身份认同。人们"创造自己的身份"的自由反而令一些人感到害怕,因为他们无法创造性地利用这种自由。这些人渴望"拥有一个确定的身份认同",因此被民族主义和法西斯主义宣传的简单论调所吸引。随着工业时代的暮色降临,出现了两种相互矛盾的心理状态:一个是"自由流动的全球性心理",正在侵蚀人们的国家忠诚;另一个则是"种姓或部落的炽热心理",在国家内部激发着强烈的偏执和情感狂热。

Andrew Heal views the same phenomenon from another perspective. He sees two great "global political and economic trends. . . . Trend one is the growth of the global economy. . . . The second is the rise of nationalist, ethnic and regionalist sentiment, whether it be Maori, Scottish, Welsh or from anti-immigrant factions, who even as their 240

全球性政治和经济趋势:一是全球经济的增长,二是民族主义、种族主义和地区主义情绪的抬头,如毛利人、苏格兰人、威尔士人或反移民派别,他们虽然 240

governments push them towards new, borderless horizons, pull themselves ever so hard the opposite way." 101 However you choose to look at them, whether as major "trends"

政府将他们推向新的无边界的地平线,而自己则急切地向相反的方向拉扯。不管你如何看待它们,无论是作为主要"趋势"

or "psychological themes," it is clear that a strong reactionary sentiment in favor of nationalism and against the fall of borders and the deepening of markets is gathering its voice worldwide.

或者"心理主题",很明显,一种强烈的反动情绪,支持民族主义,反对国界的下降和市场的深化,正在全球范围内汇集自己的声音。

MULTICULTURALISM AND VICTIMIZATION

多元文化主义和受害者化

In its twilight, with a faltering capacity to redeem promises of something for nothing from an empty pocket, the welfare state found it expedient to foster new myths of discrimination. Many categories of officially "oppressed" people were designated, especially in North America.

Individuals in groups with designated status as "victims"

在暮色中,福利国家发现它的兑现一分钱换一分货的承诺的能力不断下降,于是它觉得培养新的歧视 myths 很合适。在北美,许多被正式划分为"受压迫"的群体都被确立了。那些被指定为"受害者"的个人

were informed that they were not responsible for shortcomings in their own lives.

他们被告知,他们不应该为自己生活中的缺陷承担责任。

Rather, the fault was said to lie with "dead white males" of European descent, and the oppressive power structure allegedly rigged to the disadvantage of the excluded groups.

问题的原因据说在于"欧洲白人男性"以及据称压迫弱势群体的权力结构。

To be black, female, homosexual, Latino, francophone, disabled, *etc.* was to be entitled to recompense for past repression and discrimination.

作为黑人、女性、同性恋者、拉丁裔、法语人士、残疾人等,意味着可以获得过去压迫和歧视的补偿。

If Lasch's argument is to be believed, the purpose of heightening a sense of victimization was to undermine nations, making it easier for the new, footloose information elite to escape the commitments and duties of citizenship. We are not entirely convinced that the new elite, especially most of those in the mass media, are cunning enough to reason to such a posture. It would almost be reassuring to feel that they were. We see the growth of victimization as mainly an attempt to buy social peace by not only widening membership in the meritocracy as Lasch argues, but also by

reconstituting the rationalizations for income redistribution. The new sport of victimology emerged in its most exaggerated form in North America because information technology penetrated more deeply there. We suspect, however, that new myths of discrimination will be common, to one degree or another, in all industrial societies in their senile state. The multiethnic welfare states in North America were simply more vulnerable to the temptation to foist the costs of income redistribution on the private sector. They were able to do this, while inflaming a sense of grievance and entitlement, by blaming the structure of society as a whole, and white men in general, for the economic shortcomings of various subcultures within society.

如果拉施的论点可信,增强受害感的目的是要削弱国家,让无拘无束的信息精英更容易逃脱公民的承诺和义务。我们并不完全确信新的精英,尤其是大多数大众传媒从业人员,有足够的机智来推崇这种立场。相信他们如此还让人感到安慰。我们认为受害意识的增长主要是一种试图通过扩大精英阶层的成员来购买社会和平,正如拉施所说,也是通过重塑收入再分配的合理性。受害论在北美地区最夸张的形式出现,是因为信息技术在那里渗透得更深。不过,我们怀疑新的歧视神话在所有工业社会的衰老阶段将是普遍存在的,程度或多或少不等。北美的多民族福利国家更容易受到诱惑,将收入再分配的成本强加到私营部门。他们能够这样做,同时通过将社会整体结构以及白人男性作为各种次文化经济短板的罪魁祸首来挑起不满感和特权意识。

The Megapolitics of Innovation 创新的大政治

Even before information technology began to threaten "creative destruction" of the industrial economy, it had clearly antiquated much of the cherished myth of Marxists and socialists. We examined the megapolitics of innovation in a previous chapter. The point we emphasized there is of importance in placing the social impact of the Information Revolution into perspective. The precedent of technology expanding employment opportunities in recent centuries seems like a dependable rule of economic

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即使在信息技术开始危及工业经济"创造性破坏"之前,它已明确使马克思主义者和社会主义者所珍视的许多神话过时。我们在前一章中研究

了创新的大政治。我们在那里强调的要点在于将信息革命的社会影响置于适当的视角中。近几个世纪技术扩大就业机会的先例似乎是一条可靠的经济定律。

life, but it need not be. It is possible for earnings to be concentrated in the hands of a prosperous minority.

生活并非必然如此。收入有可能集中在富裕少数人手中。

REAL WAGES DROP BY 50 PERCENT

实际工资下降 50%

That is indeed what happened during the first two centuries or more of the modern period. From the time of the Gunpowder Revolution around 1500 until 1700, real incomes for the bottom 60-80 percent of the population in most of Western Europe fell by 50 percent or more. 102 In many places, real income continued to fall until 1750, and did not recover to 1500 levels until 1850.

从 1500 年左右的火药革命时期到 1700 年,大部分西欧地区底层 60%到 80%人口的实际收入下降了 50%或以上。在许多地方,实际收入一直持续下降到 1750 年,直到 1850 年才恢复到 1500 年的水平。

Unlike the experience of the past 250 years, the income gains of the first half of the modern period, a time of dramatic expansion of Western European economies, were concentrated among a small minority. The current innovation of information technologies is quite different from the innovation of industrial technologies that the world experienced in recent centuries. The difference lies in the fact that most current technological innovations with labor-saving characteristics tend to create skilled tasks and reduce scale economies. This is the opposite of the experience since about 1750.

与过去 250 年的经验不同,现代时期前半期收入增长集中在少数群体中。当前的信息技术创新与近几个世纪世界经历的工业技术创新大不相同。这种差异在于,当前大多数具有节约劳动力特点的技术创新倾向于创造熟练任务,并减少规模经济。这与大约 1750 年以来的经验恰恰相反。

Industrial innovation tended to open job opportunities for the unskilled and increase the scale economies of enterprise. This not only raised the earnings of the poor without any effort on their part, it also tended to increase the power of political systems, making them more capable of withstanding unrest. Those who were displaced by mechanization and automation in the early phases of the Industrial Revolution tended to be skilled artisans, craftsmen and journeymen, rather than unskilled labor. This was certainly true in the textile industry, the first to employ mechanization and power equipment on a large scale, which led to a violent reaction by Luddites, who destroyed textile machinery and murdered factory owners during a rampage in the early nineteenth century. On the other hand, the followers of Captain Swing, the mythical leader of an 1830 rebellion in southeastern England, were day laborers. Their demands included imposing a levy on the local rich to provide them with money or beer, imposing a wage increase upon the local employers of day labor, and "destroying, or demanding the destruction of; new farm machinery, especially threshers" that reduced the call among farmers for rural day labor. 103

工业创新往往会为非技能劳动者开创就业机会,并提高企业规模经济。这不仅提高了贫困人口的收入,而且还倾向于增强政治体系的实力,使其更能够应对动荡。在工业革命早期阶段,被机械化和自动化所取代的往往是有技能的工匠、手工艺人和学徒,而不是非技能劳动者。这在纺织工业中尤其如此,纺织工业首先大规模采用机械化和动力设备,导致卢德赛特人暴力反应,他们在 19 世纪初期摧毁纺织机械,并谋杀工厂老板。另一方面,"机械之王"的追随者是日工,他们的要求包括对当地富人征收税收以提供给他们钱或啤酒,要求当地日工雇主提高工资,以及"破坏或要求破坏;新的农业机械,尤其是脱谷机",因为这减少了农民对农村日工的需求。

Contrary to the romantic jabberings of Marxists and others who have transformed the violent opponents of labor-saving technology into heroes, they were an unpleasant and violent lot who opposed the introduction of technology that raised living standards worldwide for purely selfish reasons.

与那些把反劳动技术的暴力分子塑造成英雄的马克思主义者和其他人的浪漫辞藻相反,他们是一群不愉快且暴力的人,纯粹出于自私的原因反对引入这些提高全球生活水平的技术。

While the violent followers of Ned Ludd and Captain Swing jeopardized public order for many months in England, once suppressed by central authority their movements were bound to miscarry. The poor, unskilled majority were unlikely to be long attracted to a cause that promised to destroy machinery that offered them jobs and also raised their living standards by lowering the cost of items they needed, such as warm clothing and bread.

纳德·拉德和斯温船长的暴力追随者在英格兰危及了公共秩序达数月之久,但一旦被中央当局镇压,他们的运动注定失败。这些贫穷、无技能的多数人不太可能长期支持一个旨在毁坏给他们带来工作和提升生活水平(通过降低所需物品如保暖衣物和面包价格)的机器的事业。

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Higher Incomes for the Unskilled 提高未受过培训人员的收入

Over time, industrial and agricultural automation was attractive to the have-nots because it created earnings opportunities for them and lowered their cost of living. New tools allowed those without skills to produce goods of quality equal to those made by persons of high skills. A genius and a moron on the assembly line would both produce the same product, and earn the same wage.

随着时间的推移,工业和农业自动化对无产阶层具有吸引力,因为它为他们创造了收入机会,并降低了他们的生活成本。新工具使那些无技能的人能够生产出与高技能人员生产的同等质量的商品。装配线上的天才和白痴都能生产出相同的产品,并获得相同的工资。

Over the past two centuries, industrial automation dramatically raised wages for unskilled work, especially in the small part of the world where conditions first allowed capitalism to flourish. The large scale of advanced industrial enterprise not only rewarded unskilled labor with unprecedented wages, it also facilitated income redistribution.

过去两个世纪里,工业自动化显著提高了非技术性工作的工资,特别是在最早允许资本主义兴起的那小片地区。先进工业企业的大规模不仅用前所未有的工资回报了非技术性劳动,也促进了收入再分配。

The welfare state arose as a logical consequence of the technology of industrialism. Because of their large scale and high capital costs, the leading industrial employers were the easiest targets to tax. And they could be relied upon to keep records and enforce the garnishment of wages that made the income tax technologically feasible as it had not been in previous centuries when economies were more decentralized. The net effect was that the growth of scale economies promoted by industrial innovation made governments richer, and presumably better able to maintain order.

福利国家的出现是工业主义技术的必然结果。由于它们的大规模和高资本成本,主要工业雇主是最容易征税的对象。而且,他们可以依赖保持记录和执行工资扣缴,这使得所得税在以前更加分散的经济中无法实现成为技术上可行。其结果是,由工业创新推动的规模经济的增长使政府更加富裕,并且可能更好地维持秩序。

The Process Is Reversed 过程被反转

In our judgment, the opposite is happening today. Information technology is raising earnings opportunities for the skilled and undermining institutions that operate at a large scale, including the nationstate.

我们认为,如今正好相反的情况在发生。信息技术正在为技能娴熟的人提高收入机会,并且正在削弱大规模运作的机构,包括国家。

This points to another irony of the Information Age-namely, the schizoid and fundamentally obstructionist attitude of critics of the free market toward the rise and fall of industrial jobs. In the early stages of industrialism, they were choked up about the supposed evil of industrial jobs, which lured landless peasants away from "the world we have lost." To hear the critics tell it, the advent of factory jobs was an unprecedented evil and "exploitation" of the working class. But now it appears that the only thing worse than the advent of factory jobs is their disappearance. The great-grandchildren of those who wailed about the introduction of factory jobs are now wailing about the shortage of factory jobs that offer high pay for low-skilled work.

这指向了信息时代另一个讽刺之处,即对自由市场的评论者对工业就业的崛起和消失持有分裂和根本阻碍的态度。在工业主义的早期阶段,他

们对所谓工业就业的邪恶感到梗塞,这种工作将无地无产农民从"我们已失去的世界"中吸引出来。从评论者的说法来听,工厂工作的出现是前所未有的邪恶和对工人阶级的"剥削"。但现在看来,工厂工作消失比它的出现更糟糕。那些曾为工厂工作的引入而哀嚎的人的曾曾孙子现在也为提供低技能工作的高工资工厂工作短缺而哀嚎。

The one coherent thread that runs through these complaints is a steadfast resistance to technological innovation and market change. In the early stages of the factory system, this resistance led to violence. It may again. 这些投诉的一贯线索是对技术创新和市场变革的坚定抵制。在工厂制度的早期阶段,这种抵制导致了暴力。它可能会再次发生。

And not because capitalists are "exploiting the workers." The advent of the computer as a paradigm technology revealed the absurdity of that claim. It might have been half-credible for the inattentive to suppose that a barely literate auto worker had somehow been "exploited" in the production of an automobile by owners who conceived and financed the businesses that employed workers. The crucial role of conceptual

243 并非因为资本家正在"剥削工人"。计算机作为一种范式技术的出现揭示了这一主张的荒谬性。对于注意力不集中的人来说,也许可以勉强相信一个识字不多的汽车工人在汽车生产过程中被"剥削"了,因为企业所有者设计和出资建立了雇用工人的企业。概念性知识的关键作用

capital in the production and marketing of tangible products was less obvious than it is in the output of the Information Age, which clearly involves mental work. Therefore, the plausibility of the assumption that entrepreneurs had somehow seized the value of information products actually created by workers was much diminished. Where the value was clearly created through mental work, as in the production of consumer software, it was little short of preposterous to suppose that it was actually the product of anyone other than the skilled persons who conceived it. In fact, far from assuming that the workers created all value, as Marxists and socialists did through most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the obvious and growing trend away from unskilled employment gave rise to a spreading worry about quite the opposite problem -whether unskilled laborers still had any economic contribution to make.'04

信息时代的产出明显涉及脑力劳动,这与有形产品的生产和营销中的资本投入来源不太明显。因此,假定企业家已经掌握了由工人实际创造的信息产品的价值这一假设的可信度大大降低。在以脑力劳动生产消费类软件等情况下,认为这些价值并非由其设计的熟练人员创造,而是由其他人创造,这实在是荒谬的。事实上,与 19 世纪和 20 世纪大部分时期马克思主义者和社会主义者所认为的工人创造了所有价值截然相反,非熟练就业的明显和不断增长的趋势产生了另一个普遍担忧:未经培训的劳动者是否仍然有任何经济贡献可言。

Hence the migration of the rationale for income redistribution away from exploitation," which assumed a productive competence for those with low incomes, to "discrimination," which did not. "Discrimination," however, was alleged to account for the failure of those with low skills to develop more valuable ones.

因此,收入再分配的理由从"剥削"转移到了"歧视"上,后者并未假定低收入者具有生产能力。然而,据称"歧视"是导致缺乏技能的人无法发展更有价值技能的原因。

This discrimination was also said to justify imposition of nonoptimal hiring criteria and other standards for opening "opportunity," or, more precisely, redistributing income to the lagging groups. In the United States, for example, race-based norming of achievement and aptitude tests allowed blacks to outscore white and Asian applicants while registering lower objective scores. Through this method and others, governments obliged employers to hire more blacks and other officially "victimized" groups at higher wages than might otherwise have been the case. Anyone who failed to comply faced costly court actions, including lawsuits involving large punitive damages.

这种歧视也被用来证明强加不利的招聘标准和其他标准,以"机会"或更准确地说,将收入重新分配给落后群体。例如,在美国,根据种族对成就和才能测试进行标准化,允许黑人比白人和亚洲申请人获得更高的分数,而客观分数较低。通过这种方法和其他方法,政府要求雇主以高于正常情况的工资雇用更多的黑人和其他官方认定的"受害"群体。任何未能遵守的人都将面临高额的法庭诉讼,包括涉及巨额惩罚性损害赔偿的诉讼。

The point of designating victims was not to incubate paranoid delusions of persecution among important subgroups of industrial society, or to subsidize the spread of counterproductive values. It was to relieve the bankrupt state of the fiscal pressures of redistributing income. Inculcating delusions of persecution was merely an unfortunate side effect. Ironically, the surge in concern about "discrimination" coincided with the early stages of a technological revolution that is bound to make actual arbitrary discrimination far less of a problem than it has ever been before. No one on the Internet knows or cares whether the author of a new software program is black, white, male, female, homosexual, or a vegetarian dwarf.

指定受害者的目的不是在于培养工业社会中重要群体的被迫害妄想,也不是为了资助反生产性价值观的传播。它的目的是减轻国家财政重担,重新分配收入。培养被迫害妄想只是一种不幸的副作用。令人讽刺的是,对"歧视"的关注激增恰逢了一场技术革命的初期阶段,这场革命必将使实际的任意性歧视远远小于以往任何时候。在互联网上,没有人知道或在乎一个新软件程序的作者是黑人、白人、男性、女性、同性恋还是素食矮人。

While the reality of discrimination is bound to be less oppressive in the future, that will not necessarily relieve the pressure for "reparations" to compensate various real or imagined wrongs. Every society, whatever its objective circumstances, gives rise to one or more rationalizations for income redistribution. They range from the subtle to the absurd, from the biblical injunction to love your neighbor as yourself, to the invocations of black magic. Sorcery, witchcraft, and the evil eye are the flip side of religious feeling, the spiritual equivalent of the Inland Revenue or the IRS. When people cannot be moved by love to subsidize the poor, the poor themselves will try to see that they are moved by fear. Sometimes this takes the form of an outright shakedown, a knife to the throat, a gun to the head. At other times, the threat is disguised or fanciful. It is no coincidence that most of the "witches" of the early modern period were widows or unmarried women with few resources. They terrorized their neighbors with curses that not infrequently moved 244

尽管未来的歧视现实可能会不那么压迫,但这并不会一定减轻对各种真实或想象中错误的"赔偿"的压力。无论客观环境如何,每个社会都会产生一种或多种合理化的收入重分配。它们从微妙到荒谬不等,从圣经中

要求爱人如己的诫命,到巫术的呼吁。巫术、邪术和恶魔之眼是宗教情感的另一面,相当于内陆税务部门或国税局。当人们不能通过爱心来资助穷人时,穷人自己也会试图通过恐惧来激动人心。有时这采取赤裸裸的敲诈的形式,有刀抵住喉咙,有枪抵住头部。在其他时候,威胁是隐藏或幻想的。这并非偶然,大多数早期现代时期的"女巫"都是寡妇或资源匮乏的未婚女性。她们用诅咒恐吓她们的邻居,这些诅咒往往能引发244。

those neighbors to pay up. It is by no means obvious that those who did so were only the superstitious. The malevolent intent of the evil eye was not a superstition but a fact.

那些邻居要付款。并不明显那些这样做的人只是迷信。邪眼的恶意意图不是迷信,而是事实。

Even a poor woman could loose cattle or set someone's house ablaze. In that sense, the witchcraft trials of the early modern period were not altogether so preposterous as they seem. While the punishments were cruel and no doubt many innocents suffered from the hallucinations of neighbors under the influence of ergot poisoning, the prosecution of witches can be understood as an indirect way of prosecuting extortion.

即使一个贫穷的女人也可能失去牲畜或放火烧毁他人的房屋。从这个意义上说,早期现代时期的女巫审判并非完全如此荒诞。虽然处罚手段残酷,无疑也有许多无辜者遭受了麦角中毒下邻居的幻觉的折磨,但女巫的起诉可以被理解为起诉敲诈勒索的一种间接方式。

We expect a return of extortion motivated by a desire to share in the rewards of achievement as the Information Age unfolds. Groups that feel aggrieved over past discrimination are unlikely to quickly relinquish their apparently valuable status as victims simply because their claims on society become less justified or harder to enforce.

我们预计会出现由对成就果实分享的愿望所驱动的勒索行为,伴随着信息时代的到来。过去遭受歧视的群体不太可能仅仅因为他们对社会的诉求变得不太合理或难以执行就快速放弃他们作为受害者的看似有价值的地位。

They will continue to press their claims until evidence in the local environment leaves no doubt that they will no longer be rewarded. 他们将继续坚持自己的主张,直到当地环境的证据无疑地表明他们将不再受到奖赏。

The growth of sociopathic behavior among Afro-Americans and Afro-Canadians tells you that. It says that there is little balance between black anger and a realistic appraisal of the extent to which black problems are self-inflicted consequences of antisocial behavior. Black anger has risen, even as black lifestyles have grown more dysfunctional. Out-of-wedlock births have soared. Educational attainment has fallen.

非洲裔美国人和非洲裔加拿大人之间社会病理行为的增长告诉你这一点。这意味着黑人愤怒与黑人问题自身造成的反社会行为后果之间缺乏平衡。黑人愤怒不断上升,而黑人生活方式却变得更加失衡。非婚生育率飙升,教育成就下降。

Growing percentages of young blacks are implicated in criminal activities, to the point where there are now more black men in penitentiaries than in colleges.

越来越多的年轻黑人参与犯罪活动,以至于现在监狱里的黑人男性比上大学的还要多。

These perverse results may have had the temporary effect of increasing the flow of resources to underclass communities during the twilight of industrialism by raising the shakedown threat against society as a whole. But the effect could be only temporary. By eliminating the beneficial impact of competition in challenging underachievers to conform to productive norms, the welfare state has helped to create legions of dysfunctional, paranoid, and poorly acculturated people, the social equivalent of a powder keg. The death of the nationstate and the disappearance of income redistribution on a large scale will no doubt lead some among the more psychopathic of these unhappy souls to strike out against anyone who appears more prosperous than they. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that social peace will be in jeopardy as the Information Age unfolds, especially in North America and in multiethnic enclaves in Western Europe. 这些畸形的结果可能在工业主义黄昏时期暂时增加了向下层社区输送

资源的流量,因为对整个社会构成敲诈勒索的威胁。但这种效果只能是暂时的。通过消除在挑战欠发达者遵循有生产力的规范中的竞争带来的好处,福利国家已经帮助创造了成群的功能失调、偏执和文化适应不良的人,这种社会等同于火药桶。民族国家的消亡和大规模收入再分配消失无疑会导致在这些不快乐的灵魂中最偏执的人攻击任何看起来比他们更富裕的人。因此,可以合理推测,随着信息时代的到来,特别是在北美和西欧的多元文化社区,社会和平将面临危险。

"We will never lay down Arms [till] The House of Commons passes an Act to put down all Machinery hurtful to Commonality, and repeal that to hang Frame Breakers. But We. We petition no more-that won't do-fighting must. "Signed by the General of the Army of Redressers Ned Ludd Clerk
"Redresser-forever Amen"

"我们永不放下武器,直到下议院通过一项法案,禁止所有有害于公众利益的机械,并废除那些处置打碎机器的人的条例。但我们不再请愿-那是无用的-必须作出抗争。"由整补军团的将军 Ned Ludd 书记签署"整补永远万岁 阿门"

Neo-Luddite
新卢德分子

Given past experience of antitechnological rebellion in the early nineteenth century and the long tradition of collective violence in both Europe and North America, no one should be surprised to see a neo-Luddite attack upon information technology and those who use it. The Luddites, referred to earlier, were cloth workers concentrated in West Yorkshire, England, who launched a terrorist campaign against automated cropping machines and the factory owners who adopted them in 1811-12. 106 With blackened 245
鉴于 19 世纪初期反科技叛乱的过往经验以及欧洲和北美集体暴力的悠久传统,人们不应对信息技术和使用它的人遭到新卢德分子的攻击感到惊讶。之前提到的卢德分子是集中在英格兰西约克郡的织布工人,他们在 1811-1812 年期间对自动剪裁机和采用它们的工厂主发动了恐怖主义运动。

faces, the Luddites raged through West Yorkshire, burning factories and murdering factory owners who dared to adopt the new technology. Most of the violence was the work of "croppers," highly skilled artisans whose labor in wielding gigantic scissors weighing up to fifty pounds was previously a crucial part of the production of woolen cloth. But the finishing work that the croppers performed, "raising the nap by teasels and cropping the cloth by shears," was, as Robert Reid, author of the best and most comprehensive discussion of the Luddite rising, *Land of Lost Content: The Luddite Revolt 1812*, observed, "too simple not to be mechanized." 107 The design of one such mechanized cropping machine had been sketched out by Leonardo da Vinci. Yet Leonardo's design for automatic cropping languished for centuries. Finally, by 1787, a device like Leonardo's was reinvented and brought into production in England. As Reid notes, "so long had all the constituent parts of the technology been known that the surprise is that it had not been introduced earlier. . . . The new equipment of the Industrial Revolution required so little strength and skill to use that many job openings were taken by women and young children, initially at low wages. One of these new machines, even operated by the relatively unskilled, could now crop in eighteen hours what a skilled cropper using hand shears took eighty-eight hours to do." 108

面对新机械的出现,卢德赖特运动者在西约克郡肆虐,焚毁工厂,杀害敢于采用新技术的工厂主。大部分暴力行为是由"剪毛工"所为,他们是高度熟练的工匠,之前用重达 50 磅的巨型剪刀进行毛织物加工是极为关键的一环。但正如罗伯特·里德在其著作《失落内容之地:1812 年卢德赖特起义》中所述,剪毛工所进行的收针工序"用刺猬草收毛、用剪刀修剪织物"实在"太简单,不能不被机械取代"。达·芬奇早已设计出了一种此类机械化剪毛机。然而,达·芬奇的自动剪毛机设计长达数世纪未能实现。直到 1787 年,一种类似达·芬奇设计的设备才在英国投入生产。如里德所言,"技术的各个组成部分早已被发现,令人惊讶的是它竟未能更早推出。工业革命中的新设备使用所需的力量和技能甚少,许多工作机会被妇女和儿童所占据,工资也较低。即使操作相对不熟练,这种新机器在 18 小时内也能完成手持剪刀需要 88 小时才能做完的剪毛作业。"

Note that the workers who railed at mechanization were quite discriminating in their opposition to new technology. They only attacked and fought those technologies that displaced their own jobs or reduced the

demand for skilled labor. When an entrepreneur named William Cooke introduced carpet-weaving machinery into the West Yorkshire district, this sparked no violence whatever. No attempts were made to burn Cooke's mill, or destroy his machinery, much less murder him. As Robert Reid explains in his history of the Luddite uprisings, Cooke's new technology excited no opposition because carpets were a product "in which no one in the valley had until then specialized."

工人反对机械化的做法是有区别的。他们只攻击和反对那些取代自己工作或降低对熟练劳动力需求的新技术。当一位名叫威廉·库克的企业家在西约克郡引入地毯机器设备时,却没有引发任何暴力事件。没有人试图烧毁库克的工厂或破坏他的机器,更不会杀害他。罗伯特·里德在他的"勒德分子起义"一书中指出,库克的新技术没有引起反对,因为在该地区,此前没有人专门从事地毯生产。

109 Reid continues, "Because Cooke introduced a new product and created employment founded on no traditional practices whatever, his mill flourished. " 110 This is an example with important application for the future. It suggests that thinking entrepreneurs in the next millennium will first introduce dramatic labor-saving automation in regions without a tradition of producing whatever product or service is in question.

109 柯克继续说:"因为库克引入了一种新产品,并创造了完全没有传统实践基础的就业,所以他的工厂蒸蒸日上。" 110 这是一个很有重要应用价值的例子。它表明,下个千年的思考型企业家首先会在没有传统生产该产品或服务的地区引入大幅节省人工的自动化。

If the past is a guide, the most violent of the terrorists of the early decades of the new millennium will not be homeless paupers but displaced workers who formerly enjoyed middle-class incomes and status. This was certainly the case in the Luddite uprising of 1812, in which the bulk of the Luddites were not an impoverished proletariat but skilled artisans who were accustomed to earning incomes five times or more greater than those of an average worker. The equivalent group today would probably be displaced factory workers. Unfortunately, scanning the demographics of most OECD 如果过去是指引,新千年初期最暴力的恐怖分子不会是无家可归的赤贫者,而是曾享有中产阶级收入和地位的被置换的工人。这在 1812 年的机械破坏者起义中确实如此,当时大多数机械破坏者并非贫困的无产阶

级,而是习惯于获得比普通工人高五倍或更多的收入的熟练工人。如今相当于这个群体的可能是被置换的工厂工人。不幸的是,对大多数经合组织国家人口结构的扫描

countries, one finds more areas than not that could be highlighted as potential sites of violent reaction.

在各个国家,都可以找到比较容易引发暴力反应的潜在地区。

The world's nationstates will seek to counteract the cybereconomy and Sovereign Individuals who are able to take advantage of it to accumulate wealth. A furious nationalist reaction will sweep the world. Part and parcel of it will be an antitechnological reaction equivalent to the Luddite and other antitechnology rebellions in Britain during the Industrial Revolution. This should be considered closely, because it 246

各国家国家将寻求遏制网络经济和能够利用其积累财富的主权个人。一场愤怒的民族主义反应将席卷全球。其中一部分将是与英国工业革命期间的卢德派和其他反技术叛乱相当的反技术反应。这应该被仔细考虑,因为它 246.

could be a key to the evolution of governance in the new millennium. One of the crucial challenges of the great transformation ahead will be maintaining order in the face of escalating violence, or alternatively escaping its brunt. Individuals and firms that are particularly associated with the advent of the Information Age, including those in Silicon Valley, and even the suppliers of electricity required to power the new technology, will have to maintain a special diligence against freelance, neo-Luddite terrorism.

这可能是新千年政府演变的关键。未来伟大转型的关键挑战之一将是在面临不断升级的暴力中保持秩序,或者可以逃脱其伤害。与信息时代的兴起密切相关的个人和企业,包括硅谷以及供电新技术所需的供应商,将不得不保持特殊警惕,防范自由职业者和新卢德分子的恐怖主义。

A lunatic like the Unabomber is unfortunately likely to stimulate brigades of imitators as frustration with falling incomes and resentment against achievement mount.

一个像火车邮差炸弹狂一样的疯子很可能会激发一大批模仿者,因为人们对不断下降的收入感到沮丧,并对成就产生愤恨。

We suspect much of the violence to come will involve bombings. As reported in the New York Times, domestic terrorism across the United States soared during the 1990s.

我们怀疑未来很多暴力事件将涉及爆炸。正如《纽约时报》报道的,在1990年代,美国国内恐怖主义急剧上升。

"They increased by more than 50 percent in the last five years, and have nearly tripled over the last decade. The number of criminal explosions and attempts went from 1,103 in 1985 to 3,163 in 1994.... [I]n small towns and suburban neighborhoods, as well [as]

在过去五年里,它们增加了 50%以上,在过去十年里几乎翻了三倍。刑事爆炸和企图的数量从 1985 年的 1,103 起增加到 1994 年的 3,163 起.....在小城镇和郊区也是如此。

among inner-city street gangs, there has been a proliferation of a sort of garden variety bomber." 111

在城市内部街头帮派中,出现了一种普通的爆炸物制造者。

Defense Becomes a Private Good

防务成为私人物品

Notwithstanding the penal taxes imposed by nationstates as a price of protection, they are unlikely to provide it effectively in the years to come. The falling scale of violence implied by the new information technology makes the provision of a massive military establishment far less useful. This implies not only a declining decisiveness in warfare, meaning that states will be less able to actually protect citizens, it also implies that the apparent extraterritorial hegemony of the United States as the world's superpower will be less effective in the next century than the hegemony of Great Britain was in the nineteenth century. Until the onset of World War I, power could be effectively and decisively projected from the core to the periphery at relatively low cost. In the twenty-first century, the threats that

major powers pose to the safety of life and property will necessarily diminish with the return to violence. Falling returns to violence suggest that nationstates or empires capable of exercising military power on a large scale are unlikely to survive or come into being in the Information Age.

尽管各国家实施惩罚性税收以保护本国,但在未来几年内,他们很难有效提供此种保护。新信息技术所带来的暴力规模降低,使得建立庞大的军事体系远不如从前有用。这不仅意味着战争的决定性会下降,即各国将无法真正保护公民,也意味着美国作为世界超级大国的表面域外统治,在下一个世纪将不如 19 世纪英国的统治那样有效。直到第一次世界大战的爆发,强国还能以相对较低的成本从核心地区向外围有效和决定性地施加影响力。在 21 世纪,主要大国对生命财产安全的威胁将随着暴力的减少而必然减弱。暴力收益的减少表明,在信息时代,能够大规模行使军事力量的国家或帝国很难生存或产生。

As the fiscal requirement for provision of an adequate defense falls, it will become ever more credible to treat protection services as if they were private goods.

随着国防开支要求的减少,将保护服务视为私人商品变得越来越可信。

After all, security threats on a diminished scale will be increasingly defensible by security forces of the kind that can be engaged commercially, such as by employing walls, fences, and security perimeters to screen out troublemakers. Further, a wealthy individual or firm may be able to afford to hire protection against most threats that would be likely to arise in the Information Age. At the margin, the diminished scale of military threats will increase the danger of anarchy, or competitive violence within a single territory. But it will also intensify competition among jurisdictions in the provision of protection on competitive terms. This will mean intensified shopping among jurisdictions for protection services, passport and consular services, and the provision of justice.

毕竟,规模降低的安全威胁将更容易被商业性质的安保力量防御,如使用墙壁、栅栏和安全防护区筛选麻烦制造者。此外,富人或公司可能能够聘请保护措施以防大多数在信息时代可能出现的威胁。在边缘地带,军事威胁规模的减小将增加无政府状态或单一领土内的竞争性暴力的危

险。但这也将加剧各管辖区以竞争条件提供保护服务、护照和领事服务以及司法服务的竞争。

In the long run, of course, Sovereign Individuals will probably be able to travel on nongovernmental documents, issued like letters of credit by private agencies and affinity 247

在长远来看,当然,主权个人很可能能够使用非政府发行的文件进行旅行,这些文件由私人机构和同好团体发行,就像信用证一样

groups. It is not farfetched to suppose that a group will emerge as a kind of merchant republic of cyberspace, organized like the medieval Hanseatic League, to facilitate negotiation of private treaties and contracts among jurisdictions as well as to provide protection for its members. Imagine a special passport issued by the League of Sovereign Individuals, identifying the holder as a person under the protection of the league.

商业共和国 想象一下由主权个人联盟发放的特殊护照,将持有人标识为该联盟的受保护人员。

Such a document, if it comes into existence, will be only a temporary artifact of the transition away from the nationstate and the bureaucratic age it fostered. Before the modern period, passports were generally unnecessary to pass frontiers, which were loosely defined in most cases. While letters of safe conduct were sometimes employed in medieval frontier societies, they were normally issued by the authorities whose realm was to be visited, rather than the jurisdiction from which the traveler originated. More important than a passport were letters of introduction and credit, which allowed a traveler to find lodging and negotiate business. That day will come again. Ultimately, persons of substance will be able to travel without documents at all. They will be able to identify themselves on a foolproof biometric basis through voice-recognition systems or retinal scanning that recognizes them uniquely.

这样的文件,如果真的出现,只会是从国家和官僚时代过渡的一时性产物。在现代之前,通常不需要护照就可以通过边境,因为大多数情况下边界是模糊的。虽然在中世纪的边疆社会有时会使用安全通行证,但通常是由将要访问的管辖区发放的,而不是旅行者所在的管辖区。比护照更重要的是介绍信和信用证,可以让旅行者找到住处并进行商务谈判。那

一天将再次到来。最终,有地位的人将能够完全不需要文件进行旅行。他们将能够通过语音识别系统或虹膜扫描等无法伪造的生物识别来证明自己的身份。

In short, we expect that sometime in the first half of the next century the world will experience the genuine privatization of sovereignty. This will accompany conditions that could be expected to shrivel the realm of compulsion to its logical minimum. Yet to the secular inquisitors and reactionaries of the next millennium, the placing of the once "sacred" attributes of nationality onto a market footing to be bought and sold as a matter of cost-benefit calculation will be both infuriating and threatening. 总而言之,我们预计在下个世纪的前半叶,世界将经历主权的真正私有化。这将伴随着可能把强制力的范围缩小到其逻辑最小值的条件。然而,对于下一个千年纪的世俗查究者和反动分子来说,将曾经"神圣"的民族属性置于市场环境中,作为成本效益计算的对象来买卖,这将是令人愤怒和威胁的。

We argue in this book that it will no longer take a nationstate to fight an Information War. Such wars could be undertaken by computer programmers deploying large numbers of "bots" or digital servants. Bill Gates already possesses a greater capacity to detonate logic bombs in vulnerable systems globally than most of the world's nationstates. In the age of the Information War, any software company, or even the Church of Scientology, would be a more formidable antagonist than the accumulated threat posed by the majority of the states with seats in the United Nations.

我们在本书中主张,参与信息战的不再是国家,而可能是部署大量"机器人"或数字仆从的计算机程序员。比尔·盖茨已经拥有比世界上大多数国家更强的在全球易受攻击系统中引爆逻辑炸弹的能力。在信息战时代,任何软件公司,甚至是山达基教会,都将比大多数联合国成员国构成的威胁更加强大。

This loss of power by nationstates is a logical consequence of the advent of low-cost, advanced computational capacity. Microprocessing both reduces returns to violence and creates for the first time a competitive market for the protection services for which governments charged monopoly prices in the industrial period.

国家国家权力的这一丢失是低成本先进计算能力出现的必然结果。微处理器既降低了暴力收益,又首次为工业时代政府垄断定价的保护服务创造了竞争性市场。

In the new world of commercialized sovereignty, people will choose their jurisdictions, much as many now choose their insurance carriers or their religions.*

在新的商业主权世界中,人们将选择自己的管辖权,就像现在许多人选择自己的保险公司或宗教信仰一样。

Jurisdictions that fail to provide a suitable mix of services, whatever those may be, will face bankruptcy and liquidation, just as incompetent commercial enterprises or failed religious congregations do. Competition will therefore mobilize the efforts of local jurisdictions to improve their capacity to provide services economically and effectively.

不能提供合适的服务组合的管辖区将面临破产和清算,就像无能的商业企业或失败的宗教团体一样。因此,竞争将调动地方管辖区提高提供经济有效服务的能力。

In this respect, competition between jurisdictions in providing public goods will have a similar impact to that observed in other sectors of life.

Competition usually improves customer satisfaction.

在这方面,各地区在提供公共产品方面的竞争将产生与生活中其他领域观察到的类似影响。竞争通常可提高客户满意度。

COMPETITION AND ANARCHY

竞争与无政府状态

It is important to bear in mind that the competition between jurisdictions that we anticipate is not mainly competition among organizations employing violence in the same territory. As indicated earlier, competitive organizations using violence tend to increase the penetration of violence in life, reducing economic opportunity. As Lane put it, In the use of violence there were obviously great advantages of scale when competing with rival violence-using enterprises or establishing a territorial monopoly. This fact is basic for the economic analysis of one aspect of government: the violence-using, violence-controlling industry was a natural monopoly, at least on land. Within territorial limits the service it rendered could be produced much more cheaply by a monopoly. To be sure, there have been times when violence-using enterprises competed in demanding payments for protection in almost the same territory, for example, during the Thirty Years' War in Germany. But such a situation was even more uneconomic than would be competition in the same territories between rival telephone systems. 112 *

必须牢记,我们所预期的司法管辖区之间的竞争,主要不是同一领土上使用暴力的组织之间的竞争。正如早前所指出的,使用暴力的竞争性组织往往会增加生活中暴力的渗透,减少经济机会。正如 Lane 所说,在使用暴力时,与竞争对手企业或建立领土垄断相比,有明显的规模优势。这一事实是政府的一个方面的经济分析的基础:使用暴力、控制暴力的行业是一种自然垄断,至少在陆地上是如此。在领土限制内,它提供的服务由一家垄断企业生产要便宜得多。当然,也有一些时候,使用暴力的企业在几乎相同的领土上争夺保护费,例如在德国三十年战争期间。但是,这种情况比在同一领土上的电话系统之间的竞争更加不经济。

See Stephen J. Duhner, 'Choosing My Religion,' New York Times Magazine, March 31, 1996, p. 36f.

见史蒂芬·J·杜纳,《选择我的宗教》,《纽约时报》杂志,1996年3月31日,第36页。

Lane's comment is informative in two respects. Firstly, we agree with his general conclusion that sovereignties will tend to exercise territorial monopolies because doing so will allow them to offer cheaper and more effective protection services. The second interesting aspect of Lane's comment is his dated comparison with monopoly telephone service. Obviously, we now know that telephone systems need not be monopolies. This introduces a caution into the analysis. Changes in technological conditions may to some extent obviate the general conclusion that anarchy within territorial limits is nonviable.

蕾恩的评论从两个方面都很有见地。首先,我们同意他的总体结论,即主权国家将倾向于行使领土垄断,因为这将使它们能够提供更便宜更有效的保护服务。蕾恩评论的第二个有趣方面是他与垄断电话服务的过时比较。很显然,我们现在知道电话系统不必是垄断的。这给分析带来了一些谨慎。技术条件的变化可能在一定程度上消除了领土范围内无政府状态是不可行的这一普遍结论。

For example, if cyberassets grow to large scale in a realm that puts them outside the reach of compulsion, the pricing of protection services may be much less a matter of "demand"

例如,如果网络资产在一个领域内达到了规模,使之超出了强制的范围,那么保护服务的定价可能就不再是"需求"的问题了

and more a matter of market negotiation.

而且更多是市场谈判的问题。

Nonetheless, what we refer to here is something different from generalized anarchy-namely, competition among jurisdictions, each enjoying a monopoly of violence in its own territory. We see such jurisdictions competing to offer the greatest value possible in the cost-effective provision of protection services that appeal to their "customers." Admittedly, there will no doubt be greater ambiguities in the provision of protection services in the Information Age, with more complete private provision of policing and defense services than we have been accustomed to seeing before. Yet the competition we envision is different from a clash of multiple protection agencies battling on a large scale to provide service to different customers in the same territory, which is anarchy

尽管如此，我们在这里指的是与普遍无政府状态不同的东西，即各管辖区域内享有暴力垄断的竞争。我们看到这些管辖区域都在努力提供最有价值、最具成本效益的保护服务，以吸引他们的“客户”。不可否认，在信息时代，保护服务的提供会出现更多的模糊地带，私人提供的警务和防务服务将比以往更加普遍。然而，我们设想的竞争不同于多家保护机构在同一领域内大规模争夺客户的无政府状态。

Nonetheless, in strict logic, the multiplication of sovereignties, with individuals assuming more of the role of sovereigns in cases when they accumulate sufficient resources, inevitably implies that there will be an increase in the scope for anarchy in the world. The relations between sovereignties are always anarchic. There is not and never has been a world government regulating the behavior of individual sovereignties, whether ministates, nationstates, or empires. As Jack Hirshleifer writes, "[W]hile associations ranging from primitive tribes to modern nationstates are all governed internally by some 249

虽然如此，从严格的逻辑来看，主权的增加，个人在积累足够资源时越来越扮演主权者的角色，这不可避免地意味着世界上无政府主义的范围会扩大。主权之间的关系始终是无政府主义的。世界上从未有过一个政府来规范个别主权体的行为，无论是小型国家、民族国家还是帝国。正如杰克·希尔施莱弗所写的：“从最初的部落到现代民族国家，内部都由某种形式的政府管理，但这些政府之间并没有更高层级的政府来统治它们。”

form of law, their external relations with one another remain mainly anarchic." "3 When there are more sovereign entities in the world, inevitably more relations transpire in more than one jurisdiction and are therefore anarchic.

法律形式，它们之间的外部关系仍然主要是无政府状态。“当世界上有更多主权实体时，必然会发生超越一个管辖区的更多关系，因此是无政府状态。

It is important to note that anarchy, or the lack of an overwhelming power to arbitrate disputes, is not synonymous with total chaos or the absence of form or organization. Hirshleifer notes that anarchy can be analyzed:

"intertribal or international systems also have their regularities and systematic analyzable patterns." "4 In other words, just as "chaos" in mathematics can entail an intricate and highly ordered form of organization, so "anarchy" is not entirely formless or disordered.

重要的是要注意,无政府主义或缺乏强大的仲裁权力并不等同于完全混乱或缺乏形式或组织。赫希莱弗指出,无政府状态可以被分析:"部落间或国际体系也有其规律和可分析的系统模式"。换句话说,就像数学中的"混沌"可能包含复杂而高度有序的组织形式,无政府状态也并非完全无形或无序。

Hirshleifer analyzes a number of anarchic settings. These include, in addition to relations among sovereignties, gang warfare in Prohibition-era Chicago and "miners versus claim jumpers in the California gold rush." Note that even though California was part of the United States by the onset of the gold rush in 1849, conditions in the goldfields were properly described as anarchy. As Hirshleifer notes, "[T]he official organs of law were impotent." " He argues that topographical conditions in the mountainous camps, plus effective vigilante organization by miners to combat claim jumpers, made it difficult for gangs of outsiders to seize gold mines, in spite of the lack of effective law enforcement. In other words, under certain conditions, valuable property can be effectively protected even under anarchy.

广泛分析了一些无政府状态的情况。除了主权关系外,还包括禁酒时代芝加哥的帮派斗争和"1849年加州淘金热期间矿工与夺矿者之间的冲突"。值得注意的是,尽管加州在1849年淘金热开始时已是美国的一部分,但当时矿区的状况可被视为无政府状态。正如广泛所述,"正式的法律机构无能为力。"他认为,山区矿区的地形条件,加上矿工有效组织的自卫机制,即使缺乏有效的执法,也使外来帮派难以攫取金矿。换言之,在某些条件下,即使在无政府状态下,也可以有效保护有价值的财产。

The question is whether Hirshleifer's theoretical analysis of the dynamics of the spontaneous order of the Darwinian "natural economy" is of any relevance to the economy of the Information Age. We suspect it is. While we do not anticipate generalized anarchy, or goldfield conditions everywhere, we do anticipate an increase in the number of anarchic relations in the world system. In light of this expectation, Hirshleifer's

argument about conditions under which "two or more anarchic contestants" 希尔什莱弗的达尔文式"自然经济"自发秩序动态理论分析对信息时代经济的相关性是个值得探讨的问题。我们怀疑这种相关性是存在的。虽然我们并不预期会出现普遍性的无政府状态或遍布黄金热条件,但我们预期世界体系中无政府关系的数量会有所增加。鉴于这一预期,希尔什莱弗关于"两个或多个无政府参与者"条件下的论点

can "retain viable shares of the socially available resources in equilibrium" is suggestive.!

可以"在平衡中保持社会可用资源的有效份额"是有启示性的。

16 In particular, he explores when anarchy is prone to "break down" into tyranny or dominance hierarchies, which happens when the anarchic parties can be subdued by an overwhelming authority.

在特殊情况下,他探讨了无政府状态容易"崩溃"为暴政或统治等级制度的时候,这种情况发生当无政府的各方可被压倒性权威所制服。

These issues may be more important to understand in the Information Age than they were in the Industrial Age. Part of the reason that the finer distinctions about the dynamics of anarchy were less crucial in recent centuries than they may be in the new millennium is precisely because the returns to violence were rising through the modern period. This meant that massing larger and larger military forces, as nationstates did in recent centuries, tended to make for decisive warfare. Decisive warfare, almost by definition, subdues anarchy by placing contestants for the control of resources under the domination of a more powerful authority. On the other hand, declining decisiveness in battle, which corresponds to the superiority of the defense in military technology, contributes to the dynamic stability of anarchy. Therefore, the apparent impact of information technology in reducing the decisiveness of military action should make the anarchy between minisovereignties more stable and less prone to be replaced through conquest by a large government. Less decisiveness in battle also implies less fighting, which is an encouraging deduction for the world in the Information Age.

这些问题可能比工业时代更重要。近几个世纪里,暴力回报增加意味着更大规模的军事力量可以带来决定性战争。决定性战争往往使弱小国

家臣服于强大政权。另一方面,战斗决定性的下降导致无政府状态更加稳定,不太可能被大政府通过征服取代。战斗决定性的下降也意味着更少的战争,这对信息时代的世界来说是个鼓舞人心的推论。

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Viability

可行性

Another important condition for anarchy to be sustained is viability or income adequacy. Individuals who lack a sufficient income to sustain life are likely either to (1) devote a great deal of effort to fighting in order to seize enough resources to survive, or (2) capitulate to another contestant in exchange for food and sustenance. Something similar to this occurred with the rise of feudalism during the transformation of the year 1000. We expect increasing numbers of low-income persons in Western countries who previously would have depended upon transfer payments from the state to affiliate with wealthy households as retainers. Nonetheless, the mere fact of inviability by some contenders in a Hobbesian melee (or war of all against all) is inconclusive. As Hirshleifer says, "[T]he mere fact of low income under anarchy, . . . of itself provides no clear indication as to what is likely to happen next."

另一个重要条件是无政府状态的可持续性,即收入是否足够。个人如果缺乏维持生活的充足收入,可能会(1)努力争夺足够的资源生存,或(2)交换食物和养助以投靠其他参与者。这种情况类似于 1000 年转型时出现的封建主义兴起。我们预计西方国家会出现越来越多低收入人群,他们过去依赖国家的转移支付,现在将以佣仆的身份隶属于富裕家庭。然而,霍布斯伯格混战(或者"万人对万人"的战争)中,某些竞争者的不可持续性本身并不能下定论。正如希希勒夫所说:"在无政府状态下,低收入本身并不能清楚地表明下一步会发生什么"。

The Character of Assets

资产的性质

Still another interesting condition for the sustainability of anarchy is that resources be "predictable and defendable." In Hirshleifer's analysis, "

[A]narchy is a social arrangement in which contenders struggle to conquer and defend durable resources." 118

无政府状态的可持续性的另一个有趣条件是,资源必须是"可预测和可防御的"。在赫什莱弗的分析中,"无政府状态是一种社会体系,其中竞争者努力征服和捍卫持久的资源"。

He defines "durable resources" to include "land territories or movable capital goods." 119

他将"耐用资源"定义为包括"土地领土或可移动的资本货物"。

In the Information Age, digital resources may prove to be predictable, but they will not be "durable resources" of the kind that Hirshleifer identifies with territoriality and anarchy. Indeed, if digital money can be transferred anywhere on the planet at the speed of light, conquest of the territory in which a cyberbank is incorporated may be a waste of time. Nationstates wishing to suppress Sovereign Individuals would have to seize simultaneously both the world's banking havens and its data havens. Even then, if encrypted systems are designed properly, nationstates would merely be able to sabotage or destroy certain sums of digital money, not seize it. 在信息时代,数字资源可能会成为可预测的,但它们不会是 Hirshleifer 所认定的领土性和无政府状态的"持久资源"。事实上,如果数字货币能以光速在全球任何地方转账,对控制公司总部所在的领土就可能是浪费时间。希望打压主权个体的国家,不得不同时掌控全球的银行避税港和数据避风港。即使如此,如果加密系统设计得当,这些国家也只能破坏或销毁某些数字货币,无法掌控它。

The conclusion is that the most predictable and vulnerable assets of the rich in the coming Information Age may be their physical persons-in other words, their lives.

结论是,在即将到来的信息时代,富人最可预测和脆弱的资产可能是他们的本人,换句话说就是他们的生命。

Which is why we fear Luddite-style terrorism in the coming decades, some of it perhaps covertly encouraged by agents provocateurs in the employ of nationstates.

在未来几十年内,我们担心会出现卢德主义式的恐怖主义,其中一些可能是由国家雇佣的代理商煽动的。

Over the long term, however, we doubt that the leading nationstates will succeed in suppressing Sovereign Individuals. For one thing, existing states, especially in capital-poor regions, will find that they have more to gain by harboring Sovereign Individuals than by maintaining solidarity with the North Atlantic nationstates and upholding the sanctity of the "international" system. The fact that bankrupt, high-tax welfare states want to keep "their citizens" and "their capital" in "their country" will not be a compelling motive to be observed by hundreds of fragmenting sovereignties elsewhere. 然而从长远来看,我们怀疑统治国家最终无法压制主权个人。一方面,特别是在资本匮乏的地区,现有的国家会发现,纵容主权个人比维护与北大西洋国家的团结和维护"国际"体系的神圣性更有利可图。破产、高税收福利国家想要留住"自己的公民"和"自己的资本"在"自己的国家",这样的动机对其他不断分裂的主权来说都无法动弹。

We say this, notwithstanding the fact that there are thousands of multinational organizations designed to condition the behavior of the world's various sovereignties.

尽管有成千上万个跨国组织设计来影响世界各主权国家的行为,但我们还是说这话。

There can be little doubt that some of these organizations, like the European Union and the World Bank, are influential. But remember that the jurisdictions that make Sovereign 251

欧盟和世界银行这类组织确实有一定影响力,但请牢记制定《主权251》的管辖区域。

Individuals welcome stand to benefit significantly from their presence. Even a pigheaded power like the United States, which is bound by current trends to work vigorously to prevent the emergence of a cybereconomy outside the control of the U.S. government, will ultimately not wish to exclude those residents of the globe with positive bank balances who do not wish to be Americans. This is especially likely inasmuch as shopping is now a major fascination of travelers. Ultimately, although well after others,

the United States, or fragments thereof, will join in the commercialization of sovereignty because of competitive pressures.

个人将从其存在中获得重大利益。即使像美国这样固执己见的强大国家,也被当前趋势束缚,必须努力防止网络经济在美国政府控制之外出现,最终也不会排斥那些不希望成为美国人的全球居民,并且银行余额有正数的人。这种情况尤其可能出现,因为现在购物是旅行者的主要兴趣爱好。最终,虽然要比其他国家晚一些,但美国或其片段最终会由于竞争压力而参与主权商业化。

Demand Creates Supply 需求创造供给

Those pressures will be felt more vigorously early on in nationstates with the weakest balance sheets. Among the new "offshore" centers will be fragments and enclaves of current nationstates, like Canada and Italy, which will almost surely disintegrate well before the end of the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The birth of a global market for high-quality, cost-efficient jurisdictions will help bring such jurisdictions into being. As in ordinary commerce, small-scale competitors will be more nimble and better able to compete. The thinly populated jurisdiction can more easily structure itself to operate efficiently.

这些压力在财政状况最弱的国家会在早期更为强烈地感受到。新兴的"离岸"中心将包括现有国家的碎片和飞地,如加拿大和意大利,它们几乎可以肯定会在 21 世纪的第一个季度之前瓦解。一个高质量、成本高效管辖区的全球市场的诞生将有助于这些管辖区的形成。与日常商业一样,小规模竞争对手将更灵活,更能够竞争。人口稀少的管辖区更容易采取高效的运作方式。

The information elite will seek high-quality protection on contract for a reasonable fee. While this fee will fall well short of what would be required to redistribute a noticeable benefit to the whole populations of nationstates as they are now structured, with tens of millions to hundreds of millions of citizens, it would not be trivial in a jurisdiction with a population in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands. The tax payments and other economic advantages accruing from the presence of a small number of exceedingly rich individuals imply a far higher per capita benefit to a

jurisdiction with a small rather than a huge population.

信息精英将以合理的费用寻求高质量的合同保护。虽然这一费用远远低于重新分配整个国家人口的可察觉利益所需的费用,但对于拥有数万或数十万公民的司法管辖区来说,这并非微不足道。极少数极其富有个人带来的税收和其他经济优势,意味着对于人口较小的司法管辖区来说,每 capita 收益要远高于人口众多的地区。

Since it will be practically immaterial where one domiciles his businesses, except in the purely negative sense that some addresses will imply higher liabilities than others, small jurisdictions will find it easier to set commercially successful terms for protection.

由于无论选择何种居住地开展业务,除了某些地址会意味着更高的负债之外,其他方面基本无关紧要,因此小型管辖区会更容易制定出商业成功的保护条款。

Therefore, jurisdictions with small populations will enjoy a decided advantage in formulating a fiscal policy attractive to Sovereign Individuals. 因此,人口较少的管辖区将在制定吸引主权个人的财政政策方面享有明显优势。

We believe that the age of the nationstate is over, but this is not to say that the attraction of nationalism as a tug on human emotions will be immediately quieted. As an ideology, nationalism is well placed to draw upon universal emotional needs. We have all had the experience of awe, such as one might feel on first seeing a giant waterfall, or first standing at the entrance to a great cathedral. We have all had the experience of belonging, such as we might feel at a family Christmas party, or as a member of a successful team in some sport. Human culture calls for a response to both of these powerful emotions. We are illuminated by the historic culture of our own country, which is itself part of the larger culture of humanity. We are comforted by the knowledge that we belong to a cultural group, which gives us both a sense of participation and of identity. 我们认为民族国家时代已经结束,但这并不意味着民族主义作为对人类情感的吸引力将立即平息。作为一种意识形态,民族主义很好地利用了普遍的情感需求。我们都经历过敬畏,比如第一次看到巨大的瀑布,或第一次站在一座大教堂的入口处。我们都体验过归属感,比如在家人聚会

的圣诞派对上,或是作为某个运动队的成员。人类文化需要对这两种强烈情感作出回应。我们被自己国家的历史文化所启迪,而这本身又是人类更广泛文化的一部分。我们被知道自己属于一个文化群体所安慰,这给了我们参与和认同的感觉。

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The impact of these cultural symbols can have the strongest emotional effect. The American associations of the Flag, the National Anthem, or the family feast at Thanksgiving Day, the English associations of the monarchy or cricket-all have a real hold on the imaginations of American and English people, respectively, a hold that is reinforced by repetition and goes deep into the subconscious mind. Such symbols help to tell us what sort of people we are, and remind us of a national culture. When anti-Vietnam War demonstrators wanted to shock the rest of the United States, they burned the flag. Alienated English attack the monarchy, and have even been known to dig holes in cricket pitches.

这些文化符号的影响可以产生最强烈的情感效果。美国人对国旗、国歌或感恩节家庭聚会的联系,英国人对君主制或板球的联系,都在他们各自的心中深深扎根,通过不断重复得到加强,深入潜意识。这些符号帮助我们认识自己,提醒我们民族文化。当反越战示威者想要震惊美国其他地区时,他们烧毁了国旗。被疏离的英国人攻击君主制,甚至挖掘板球场。

These trigger points are superficial, but not unimportant. They are the associations we were taught to bleed for. Whatever the change in megapolitical conditions or resulting change in institutions, they will probably remain important in the imaginations of persons who came of age, as we did, in the twentieth century.

这些触发点是表面的,但并非无关紧要。它们是我们被教导要为之流血的联系。无论大政治条件的变化或导致的制度变革,它们在 20 世纪成长起来的人的想象中可能仍然重要。

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Chapter 10

第 10 章

THE TWILIGHT OF DEMOCRACY

民主的暮色

"Democratic political Systems are a recent affair in historical terms. They had a brief existence in Greece and Rome, afterward reemerging in the 18th century, fewer than 200 years ago. . . .

民主政治体系在历史上是一个较新的事务。它们在希腊和罗马短暂存在过,后来在 18 世纪重新出现,不到 200 年的历史。

A cycle of repudiation may now have begun again." WILLIAM PFAFF
"现在可能再次开始了一个否定的循环。"WILLIAM PFAFF

It is no secret that democracy has been relatively rare and fleeting in the history of governments. In those times, ancient and modern, where democracy has prevailed, it has depended for its success upon megapolitical conditions that reinforced the military power and importance of the masses. Historian Carroll Quigley explored these characteristics in Weapons Systems and Political Stability.² They have included: 1.

民主政体在政府历史上是相对罕见且短暂的这并不是什么秘密。在那些时期,无论是古代还是现代,当民主取得成功时,这都要依赖于增强群众军事力量和重要性的大政治条件。历史学家卡罗尔·奎格利在《武器系统与政治稳定》中探讨了这些特征。其中包括:1.

Cheap and widely dispersed weaponry. Democracy tends to flourish when the cost to purchase useful weapons is low.

廉价且广泛散布的武器。当购买实用武器的成本较低时,民主往往会蓬勃发展。

2.

Weapons that can be used effectively by amateurs. Democracy is more likely when anyone can use effective weapons without extended training. 任何人都可以使用的有效武器。没有长期培训,任何人都能使用有效武器,民主更有可能实现。

3.

A military advantage for a large number of participants on foot in battle. 步战中大量参与者的军事优势。

As Quigley points out, "[P]eriods of infantry dominance have been periods in which political power has been more widely dispersed within the community and democracy has had a better chance to prevail."³ 正如奎格利所指出的,"步兵主导的时期也是政治权力在社区中更广泛地分散,民主有更好机会取得胜利的时期。"³

This is hardly a comprehensive catalogue of the conditions under which democracy can exist. If it were, democracy would not have become a triumphant system at the end of the twentieth century. Weapons were arguably more expensive in the twilight of the industrial era than ever. And many of the most effective weapons definitely required specialists to be used effectively. Furthermore, the Gulf War between the United States, its allies, and Iraq proved how vulnerable large contingents of infantry are, even when nestled in trenches and dug-in fortifications. So why has democracy appeared to flourish under these conditions as the twentieth century winds down?

这并非全面描述了民主存在的条件。否则民主不会在 20 世纪末成为一个颇受推崇的体系。工业时代黄昏时期,武器或许比以往更加昂贵。而且许多最有效的武器确实需要专业人员来使用。此外,美国及其盟国与伊拉克的海湾战争证明,即便是隐藏在壕沟和坑道中的大规模步兵部队也很容易受到攻击。那么为什么民主在这种情况下似乎在 20 世纪末期蓬勃发展呢?

DEMOCRACY, THE FRATERNAL TWIN OF COMMUNISM?

民主主义,共产主义的兄弟孪生?

We offered a paradoxical explanation in Chapter 5, namely that democracy flourished as a fraternal twin of Communism precisely because it facilitated unimpeded control of resources by the state.

我们在第 5 章提供了一种自相矛盾的解释,即民主之所以繁荣,正是因为它正是共产主义的孪生兄弟,因为它便利了国家对资源的无阻碍控制。

This conclusion may seem silly to the 'common sense' of the industrial era. We do not deny that within the terms of industrial society, democratic systems and Communism were stark opposites. But seen from a megapolitical perspective, as they may more likely be seen from the vantage of the Information Age, the two systems had more in common than you would have been led to suspect.

这一结论在工业时代的"常识"看来可能似乎很愚蠢。我们并不否认,在工业社会的范畴内,民主制度和共产主义确实是截然相反的。但从大政治的角度来看,正如在信息时代中更有可能被看到的那样,这两种制度在某些方面有着更多的共同点,而不是你想象中的那样。

In a setting where weaponry was grotesquely expensive, democracy became the decision mechanism that maximized control of resources by the state. Like state socialism, democratic systems made available huge sums to fund a massive military establishment. The difference was that the democratic welfare state placed even greater resources in the hands of the state than could the state socialist systems. That is saying something, because the state socialist or Communist systems laid claim to practically every asset worth having.

在武器昂贵的背景下,民主成为了最大化国家对资源控制的决策机制。与国家社会主义一样,民主制度也提供了大量资金来支持庞大的军事机构。不同的是,民主福利国家将更多的资源置于国家手中,这一点比国家社会主义或共产主义体系还要夸张,因为后者几乎要占据所有有价值的资产。

Seen dispassionately as merely a resource-gathering mechanism, the democratic state was superior to state socialism as a recipe for enriching the state. As we explained earlier, democracy made substantially more money

available to the military because democracy was compatible with private ownership and capitalist productivity.

从客观的角度来看,民主国家作为一种资源获取机制,比国家社会主义更适合充实国家。如前所述,民主国家可以让军事获得更多资金,因为民主与私有制和资本主义生产力相容。

The state socialist system was predicated upon the doctrine that the state owned everything. The democratic welfare state, by contrast, made more limited initial claims.

国家社会主义体系建立在国家拥有一切的教义之上。相比之下,民主福利国家提出的初步要求更有限。

It pretended to allow private ownership, although of a contingent kind, and thereby harnessed superior incentives to mobilize output. Instead of mismanaging everything from the start, democratic governments in the West allowed individuals to own property and accumulate wealth. Only after the wealth had been created did the democratic nationstates step in to tax a large fraction of it away.

它假装允许私有所有权,尽管是有条件的,从而利用了更好的激励措施来调动产出。与其从一开始就糟糕地管理一切,西方民主政府允许个人拥有财产和积累财富。只有在财富创造之后,民主国家才会介入,征收其中的大部分。

The word "large" should be capitalized. For example, in 1996 the lifetime federal tax rate in the United States stood at seventy-three cents on the dollar. For owners of corporations, who received their income through dividends, the rate was eighty-three cents on the dollar. And for anyone who sought to leave or give money to grandchildren, the federal tax rate was ninety-three cents on the dollar. When state and local taxes are considered as well, democratic government at all levels confiscates the lion's share of each dollar earned in the United States. Predatory tax rates made the democratic state a de facto partner with a three-quarters to nine-tenths share in all earnings. This was not the same thing as state socialism, to be sure. But it was a close relation.

大 一九九六年,美国的终身联邦税率为每美元七十三美分。对于通过股息获得收入的公司所有者来说,税率为每美元八十三美分。对于任何想

要离开或给孙子女钱的人来说,联邦税率为每美元九十三美分。考虑到州和地方税,民主政府的各个层面都对美国每赚取的一美元征收了大部分税款。掠夺性的税率使民主国家成为事实上拥有三四到九十的收入份额的合作伙伴。这当然不同于国家社会主义,但却非常接近。

The democratic state survived longer because it was more flexible and collected more prodigious quantities of resources compared to those available in Moscow or East Berlin.

民主国家存在时间更长,因为它更灵活,收集的资源比莫斯科或东柏林可获得的资源更为丰富。

"Inefficiency, Where It Counted"

低效率,在关键时刻

We have described the megapolitical advantages of democracy as a decision rule for a powerful government as "inefficiency, where it counted."

Compared to 255

我们将民主作为一种强大政府决策规则的"低效率"优势描述为"在需要时是低效的"。与 255 相比

Communism, the welfare state was indeed a far more efficient system. But compared to a genuine laissez-faire enclave like Hong Kong, the welfare state was inefficient. Growth rates in Hong Kong were fabulous, but their superiority lay precisely in the fact that the resident of Hong Kong, not the government, was able to pocket 85 percent of the benefits of faster growth. 共产主义,福利国家确实是一个更有效的体系。但与香港这样的真正自由放任式的封关一比,福利国家反而效率低下。香港的经济增长率惊人,但他们的优越性恰恰在于香港居民,而不是政府,能够把 85%的高速增长红利收入囊中。

Hong Kong, of course, is not a democracy. Indeed, it is a mental model of the kind of jurisdiction that we expect to see flourish in the Information Age. In the Industrial Age, Hong Kong had no need to be a democracy, as it was spared the unpleasant necessity of gathering resources to support a formidable military establishment. Hong Kong was defended from the outside, so it could afford to maintain a really free economy.

香港当然不是民主国家。实际上,它是我们期望在信息时代繁荣发展的司法管辖区的心理模型。在工业时代,香港不需要成为一个民主国家,因为它免于承担强大军事机构所需资源的不愉快必要性。香港受到外部防御,所以它可以维持一个真正自由的经济。

It was precisely the capacity to rake in resources that made democracy supreme during the megapolitical conditions of the Industrial Age. 正是在工业时代的大政治条件下,能够收集资源的能力使民主主义成为至高无上。

Mass democracy went hand in hand with industrialism. As Alvin Toffler has said, mass democracy "is the political expression of mass production, mass distribution, mass consumption, mass education, mass media, mass entertainment, and all the rest."⁴

群众民主与工业主义并进。正如阿尔文·托夫勒所说,群众民主"是大规模生产、大规模分配、大规模消费、大规模教育、大规模媒体、大规模娱乐以及其他所有方面的政治表达"。

Now that information technology is displacing mass production, it is logical to expect the twilight of mass democracy. The crucial megapolitical imperative that made mass democracy triumph during the Industrial Age has disappeared. It is therefore only a matter of time until mass democracy goes the way of its fraternal twin, Communism.

现在信息技术正在取代大规模生产,因此可以合理地预期大众民主主义的黄昏。使大众民主主义在工业时代取得胜利的关键大政治命令已经消失。因此,大众民主主义只是时间问题,最终将与其孪生兄弟共产主义一样衰落。

Mass Democracy Incompatible with the Information Age A moment's reflection shows that the technology of the Information Age is not inherently a mass technology. In military terms, as we have indicated, it opens the potential for "smart weapons" and "Information War," in which "logic bombs" could sabotage centralized command and control systems. Not only does information technology clearly point toward the perfection of weapons operated by specialists; it also reduces the decisiveness of warfare, improving the relative position of the defense. Microtechnology makes

possible dramatic gains in the military power of individuals, while reducing the importance of massed infantry formations.

信息时代的大众民主是不相容的 信息时代的技术并非天生就是大众技术。在军事领域,它开启了"智能武器"和"信息战"的潜力,信息"逻辑炸弹"可以破坏集中指挥控制系统。信息技术不仅明确指向专家操作武器的完善,而且还降低了战争的决定性,提高了防御的相对地位。微观技术使个人的军事实力获得了巨大提升,降低了集结步兵的重要性。

Ultimately, this means the end of mass democracy, especially in its predominant form, representative misgovernment, either of the congressional or parliamentary type.

从根本上说,这意味着大众民主,特别是其主导形式——代表性的误治,无论是国会制还是议会制,都将走向终结。

THE MEGAPOLITICS OF MISREPRESENTATION

误解的大国政治

When megapolitical conditions change in a big way, as they are changing now, the organization of government inevitably changes as well. In fact, the form of representative government has traditionally been an artifact of the distribution of raw power. This is shown by the very fact that representatives are chosen on a geographic basis, rather than in some other way.

当巨大政治条件发生重大变化时,就像现在正在发生的那样,政府的组织结构也必然会随之发生改变。事实上,代议制政府的形式一直都是原始力量分配的产物。这就能解释为什么代表是按照地域划分的,而非其他方式。

Think about it. In principle, a legislature would be just as democratic if its members were chosen according to any arbitrary division of the population. 想一想。原则上,如果立法机构的成员是根据人口的任意划分选出的,它也会同样民主。

Parliamentary ridings or congressional districts could be based on birthdays, or even alphabetical constituencies. Everyone born on January 1 could vote from one list of 256

选区或国会选区可以以出生日期为基础,甚至以字母顺序排列的选区。1月1日出生的所有人可以从256个选项中投票。

candidates. Those born on January 2 from another. Or every person whose name began with "Aa" to "Af" could choose among one list of candidates. Those whose names began with "Ag" would chose among another. And so on.

根据姓名首字母分组,每组选择不同的候选人。

No such system exists now for several reasons. A first and sufficient reason is that it was technologically impractical in the eighteenth century. But even

more important is the fact that birthday or alphabetical constituencies would not have reflected or even approximated the distribution of raw power that the vote had to manifest at that time. Persons who shared no more than birthdays or the first few letters of their names in common would have been and still would be extremely hard to organize into any coherent power base. 现在还没有这样的系统,理由有几个。第一个充分的理由是这在 18 世纪在技术上还很不可行。但更重要的是,出生日期或字母选区并不能反映或接近当时选票所需体现的原始权力分布。那些除了生日或名字前几个字母之外没有其他共同点的人,要组织他们成为一个有凝聚力的权力基础是极其困难的。

Why Do Geographic Cross Sections Count More?
地理横断面为什么更重要?

The vote really did begin as a proxy for a military contest. And so it remains, if only in a veiled way. Such contests can be organized along geographical lines, and more rarely, along kinship or religious lines. 这次投票确实从一开始就是对军事竞争的代理。它一直如此,只不过是隐藏的方式。这种竞争可以沿地理线划分,也可以但更少见地沿亲缘或宗教线划分。

They cannot be organized on the basis of birthdays or first initials.
他们不能根据出生日期或首字母组织。

Nor can they be organized effectively according to occupations, except where occupations are confined within hereditary guilds, like the castes in India, or cluster locally the way farmers do in Iowa. 除非职业像印度的种姓一样局限于世袭行会,或者像爱荷华州的农民一样在当地聚集,否则很难按照职业有效地进行组织。

The whole point of current formulas of representation is that they represent interests that are vested geographically, rather than along some other dimension. 当前代表制公式的全部意义在于,它们代表地理上的既得利益,而非其他维度的既得利益。

Historically, the key to military success was to control territory. All military threats have formed locally.

从历史上看，控制领土是军事成功的关键。所有的军事威胁都是在当地形成的。

Representative systems are geared to provide a different venue for the expression of that power. The fact that they inevitably tend to promote local vested interests is an artifact of the formula of representation. Geographic constituencies induce representatives to target favors for special groups at the expense of the common interests that all residents of a country share. 代表制度旨在为表达这种权力提供不同的场所。不可避免地倾向于促进地方利益集团的事实,是代表制公式的产物。地理选区使代表倾向于为特殊群体提供优惠,牺牲了所有国民共享的共同利益。

New Possibilities Ahead As analysis by Public Choice economists has shown, apparently minor shifts in the form in which an election is structured, or the way the vote is calculated, have large and predictable consequences in altering the outcome.⁵ This is why serious students of politics today have to be serious students of constitutions. And it is one of the considerations that led us to look beyond constitutions to the ultimate metaconstitution as determined by the prevailing megapolitical factors of a given environment.

新的可能性在前

Technological change has already swept away some of the foundations for confining the vote to geographic constituencies. When modern representative systems emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, almost all communications were local. Most people lived and died within a few miles of where they were born, and the whole of their commerce and communication was conducted locally. Today there is instantaneous communication worldwide. You can do business with someone five thousand miles away almost as easily as with a neighbor.

技术变革已经消除了将投票局限在地理选区内的一些基础。当代表制度在 18 和 19 世纪出现时,几乎所有的通讯都是本地的。大多数人生于斯、死于斯,他们的商业往来和交流都局限在本地范围内。如今,全球通

讯无一不是即时的。你可以像和邻居做生意一样轻松地与 5000 英里外的人进行交易。

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To an increasing extent, the economy is transcending geographic limitations.

经济在逐步超越地理局限性。

Society is far more mobile.

社会更加流动。

And so is wealth in the Information Age. Unlike a steel mill, a computer program cannot easily be held hostage to the local political process. A steel mill can scarcely be moved when legislators determine to tax it or regulate its owners. A computer program can be transmitted by modem at the speed of light anywhere in the world. The owner can pack his laptop computer and fly away. This, too, undermines the megapolitical foundations of geographic constituencies.

在信息时代,财富也是如此。与钢铁厂不同,计算机程序很难被地方政治过程所困扰。当立法者决定对钢厂征税或对其所有者进行监管时,很难将其转移。计算机程序可以通过调制解调器以光速传输到世界任何地方。所有者可以带着笔记本电脑起飞逃离。这也削弱了地理选区的大政治基础。

A major difficulty that all representative democratic systems share in light of our analysis is that their geographic constituencies are bound to overrepresent the vested interests of industrial-era enterprises. The "losers" or "leftbehinds" are perfect constituents, geographically concentrated and politically needy. The history of industrial democracy confirms this.

"Winners" from new industries were chronically underrepresented in legislative deliberations even in the high tide of the Industrial Age in the 1930s. 6 The tendency of politicians to represent the existing, established competitors, not the new enterprises that might come into being or the potential customers of new enterprises, is probably an inherent feature of representative government. As Mancur Olson argued in *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, long-lived industries tend to develop more effective

"distributional coalitions" to lobby and struggle over political booty. 7 This problem is magnified immeasurably when it comes to the economy of the Information Age. The more creative participants in the new economy are geographically distributed. Therefore, they are unlikely to form a sufficient concentration to gain the attention of legislators, the way that salmon fishers in Scotland or wheat farmers in Saskatchewan do.

所有代表性民主制度面临的主要困难是,其地理选区必然会高度代表工业时代企业的固有利益。"输家"或"被遗忘者"正是完美的选区,他们地域集中且政治需求迫切。工业民主的历史证实了这一点。即使在 20 世纪 30 年代工业时代的高峰期,来自新兴行业的"赢家"在立法讨论中也长期被边缘化。政客倾向于代表现存的、已建立的竞争对手,而不是可能出现的新企业或新企业的潜在客户,这可能是代表制政府的固有特征。正如曼瑟尔·奥尔森在《国家兴衰》中所论述的,长期存在的行业往往会形成更有效的"分配联盟",以游说和争夺政治利益。当涉及到信息时代的经济时,这一问题更加严峻。新经济中的创新参与者地域分散,因此不太可能形成足够集中的力量引起立法者的关注,就像苏格兰的鲑鱼渔民或萨斯卡彻温的小麦种植者那样。

Indeed, many of the dynamic personalities of the new economy are unlikely to be citizens of even the most encompassing jurisdiction. Thus they will have little "voice in the legislative deliberations of representative democracies. As a telling example, consider the disreputable efforts of American math PhDs to block foreign mathematicians from taking jobs in the United States. Their xenophobic representations to Congress to block employers from hiring on the basis of merit are all too likely to be heeded. The antiquated geographic representation left over from the Industrial Age takes no heed of the foreign mathematicians, or any other crucial contributors to prosperity who are not voters.

事实上,新经济的许多活跃人物都不太可能是任何管辖区的公民。因此,他们在代表民主制度的立法辩论中几乎没有任何"声音"。一个很恰当的例子就是美国数学博士们阻挠外国数学家在美国就业的卑劣行为。他们对国会提出的排斥外籍人士的愚蠢理由很可能会得到重视。工业时代遗留下来的过时的地理代表制根本不会关注这些外国数学家,或任何其他对繁荣至关重要但不是选民的贡献者。

“Why do people believe in the legitimacy of democratic institutions? Answering that question is almost as difficult as explaining why people believe in particular religious dogmas, for as is the case with religious beliefs, the degree of understanding, of skepticism and faith, varies widely across the society and over time.”⁹ JUAN J. LINZ

为什么人们相信民主制度的合法性?回答这个问题几乎和解释为什么人们相信特定的宗教教义一样困难,因为与宗教信仰的情况一样,对其的理解、怀疑和信仰在社会中和随时间的变化而有广泛差异。

Few have begun to think in a concerted way about the consequences of technological change in undermining industrialism and altering income distributions.

少有人开始有意识地思考技术变革在削弱工业主义和改变收入分配方面的后果。

Obviously, democracy is not likely to be much more than a recipe for legalized parasitism if incomes diverge as widely as they may in the information economy. Fewer still have noticed the implied incompatibility between some of the institutions of industrial government and the megapolitics of postindustrial society. Whether these 258

显然,如果收入差距像信息经济中那样广泛,民主制很可能只是一个合法寄生的配方。更少人注意到了工业政府的一些制度与后工业社会的大政治之间的隐含不相容性。无论这 258

contradictions are explicitly acknowledged or not, however, their consequences will become increasingly obvious as examples of political failure compound around the world. Institutions of government that emerged in the modern period reflect the megapolitical conditions of one or more centuries ago. They survived the transition from agrarian society to urban industrialism. But the Information Age may require new mechanisms of representation to avoid chronic dysfunction and even Soviet-style collapse.

矛盾是否明确承认,其后果将随着世界各地政治失败的例子不断增加而变得越来越明显。现代政府机构反映了一个或多个世纪前的大政治条件。它们经历了从农业社会到城市工业化的转型。但是,信息时代可能需要新的代表机制来避免长期性的功能失调,甚至苏联式的崩溃。

You can expect to see crises of misgovernment in many countries as political promises are deflated and governments run out of credit and institutional support.

可以预期在许多国家会出现治理不善的危机,因为政治承诺被打败,政府耗尽了信贷和制度支持。

Ultimately, new institutional forms will have to emerge that are capable of preserving freedom in the new technological conditions, while at the same time giving expression and life to the common interests that individuals share.

最终,新的制度形式将会出现,它们能够在新的技术条件下保护自由,同时也能体现和实现个人所共有的共同利益。

All this points to the end of mass democracy as we have known it in the twentieth century. The question is, What will take its place? If the only alternative to mass democracy were dictatorship in which the individual has no say in his destiny, then one might be tempted to join the neo-Luddites' "revolt against the future." New Institutions Happily, however, dictatorship is not the sole alternative to mass democracy. We believe that the technology of the Information Age will give rise to new forms of governance-just as the Agricultural Revolution and, later, the industrial era brought forth their own distinctive forms of social organization.

这一切都指向了我们在 20 世纪所知的大众民主的终结。问题是,它会被什么取代?如果大众民主的唯一替代方案是个人在自己命运中无发言权的独裁,那么人们可能会被诱惑加入新卢德分子对"未来的叛乱"。幸运的是,独裁并不是大众民主的唯一替代方案。我们相信信息时代的技术将孕育出新的治理形式,就如农业革命和后来的工业时代带来了自己独特的社会组织形式。

What might such new institutions be? Somewhere, in some jurisdiction, sometime before the crack of doom, someone will realize the potential that computer technology offers to make possible truly representative government. The supposed problem of excessive campaign expenditures and the undoubted annoyance of chronic political campaigning could be resolved in an instant. Rather than being elected, representatives could be selected by sortition entirely at random, with a high statistical probability

that their talents and views would match those of the population at large. 这种新的机构可能会是什么样的?在某个地方、某个管辖区域、在毁灭到来之前的某个时刻,总会有人意识到计算机技术为实现真正代表性政府所提供的潜力。过度的竞选开支问题 and 无休止的政治竞选造成的烦扰,一下子就能解决。代表不需要通过选举产生,而是完全随机选择,这样就有很高的统计概率使他们的才能和观点与整个人口的相匹配。

This would be merely a modern version of the ancient Greek system of selection by lot. As E. S. Staveley details in his authoritative history , Greek and Roman Voting and Elections, numerous positions in Athens, from the magistrates to the archons, were selected by sortition as a substitute for elections. This was cleverly accomplished, in spite of mechanical limitations on the randomization of chances, through use of an allotment machine, "or, as it was called by the Athenians, the cleroterion."¹⁰ A series of black and white beans were used as random counters to determine who would be selected to fill various offices, as well as "to determine the order in which the tribal sections in the Council were to take their turns as *plytaneis*." ¹¹ The classic provenance of this idea may give it an extra measure of credibility. But its main appeal is precisely that it would avoid the drawbacks of self-selection in politics. It would statistically assure that fewer lawyers and egomaniacs engrossed the public's business.

这只不过是古希腊随机选择系统的现代版本。正如 E. S. Staveley 在其权威历史著作《希腊和罗马的投票与选举》中详细介绍的那样,从阿尔空到执政官,雅典有许多职位都是通过抽签选出,而不是选举产生。这是通过使用抽签机"或者正如雅典人所称的克雷托里翁"巧妙实现的,尽管在机会随机化方面存在机械限制。使用一系列黑白豆粒作为随机计数器来确定哪些人将被选中担任各种职务,以及"决定议会各部落代表的轮值顺序"。这个想法的经典出处可能会使其更有可信度。但它的主要吸引力正在于它可以避免政治中的自我选择弊端。从统计学上来说,它可以确保较少的律师和自负者占据公众的事务。

Legislatures could be composed of true representatives. Since they would not be brought together by the pursuit of power, and would have a negligible chance of being selected again by sortition in any event, they would be free to conduct the affairs of government and formulate policy on the basis of a rational analysis of the issues.

立法机构可以由真正的代表组成。由于他们不会为了追求权力而被聚集在一起,并且即使再次抽签当选的机会也很小,他们就可以自由地处理政府事务,并根据对各种问题的合理分析制定政策。

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Straight Commission

直接佣金

Today, politicians bent on optimizing votes have little incentive to analyze problems coherently. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that their records in actually solving problems are so pathetic as compared to entrepreneurs, business executives, and coaches of sports teams, who are rewarded according to performance. Performance-based compensation for legislators would not make everyone chosen at random as effective as Lee Kuan Yew. But there is every reason to believe that performance would be greatly enhanced if the pay of legislators were keyed to some objective measure of performance, such as the growth of after-tax per capita income. Pay them on the basis of performance, and the chance that they would perform would increase a thousandfold.

今天,专注于优化选票的政客们缺乏系统分析问题的动力。因此,他们解决问题的记录与企业家、商业高管和运动队教练相比是如此可悲,这并不令人惊讶,因为后者都是根据表现而得到酬劳。如果立法者的酬劳与一些客观的绩效指标挂钩,如人均税后收入的增长,这并不会让所有被随机选中的人都像李光耀那样有效。但有充分理由相信,如果他们的酬劳与绩效挂钩,他们的表现会大大提高。

The gain to society from policies that improve real income net of taxes could be huge. Why not pay prime ministers and presidents even a tiny share of the gain that their policies promote? The funding for such payments could be collected by a small, unobtrusive tax. Such an arrangement would free society from the threat it now faces from ambitious men with specialized political talent like Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton. 从税后实际收入提高的政策中,社会可能获得巨大收益。为什么不支付首相和总统这些政策带来的利益的一小部分呢?这样的支付可以通过一

小笔不显眼的税收来筹集资金。这种安排将使社会免于像理查德·尼克松和比尔·克林顿这样有特殊政治才能的野心家带来的威胁。

"They brought him gold, silver and clothing; but the 'Christ' distributed all these things to the poor. When gifts were offered he and his female companion would prostrate themselves and offer up prayers; but then rising to his feet, he would order the assembly to worship him. Later he organized an armed band, which he led through the countryside, waylaying and robbing travelers they met on the way But here too his ambition was not to become rich but to be worshipped.

他们给他黄金、白银和衣服;但"基督"把这些都分给了穷人。当有礼物被献上时,他和他的女性伴侣会俯伏下拜并祈祷;但随后站起身来,他会命令集会的人崇拜他。后来他组织了一支武装部队,带领他们穿越乡间,伏击并抢劫遇到的行人。但在这里,他的野心并不是要变得富有,而是要被崇拜。

He distributed all the booty to those who had nothing-including, one may assume, his own followers." 12 NORMAN COHN

他将所有战利品分发给那些一无所有的人,可以假定包括他自己的追随者在内。

Messianic Personalities

弥赛亚人物

Too little attention has been paid to the fact that electoral politics lures disordered, messianic personalities into positions of power.

选举政治把失控的、有救世主情结的人拉进权力中心,这个事实受到的关注实在太少。

Such persons existed, and often posed serious threats to social order even in agrarian societies before the emergence of democratic political systems.

Reviewing the careers of Eudo de Stell, the Breton Christ, Adelbert in the eighth century, Eon in the eleventh, Tanchelm of Antwerp, Melchior Hoffman, and Bernt Rothmann and their ilk, several points stand out. The more immediately obvious their political talents seem to be, the greater the damage they appear to have inflicted. Because the state was not yet engaged

in organizing widespread systematic coercion, these early protopoliticians frequently took it upon themselves to rob and loot in order to obtain cash to distribute to their followers among the poor.

这样的人确实存在,即使在民主政治体系出现之前的农业社会中,他们也常常对社会秩序构成严重威胁。回顾布列塔尼的克里斯特,第八世纪的艾德伯特,第十一世纪的艾翁,安特卫普的唐修伦,梅尔希奥·霍夫曼和贝尔纳特·罗特曼等人的事迹,几个要点很明显:他们的政治才能越突出,他们所造成的伤害就越大。由于国家尚未参与广泛系统的强迫,这些早期的准政客经常自己掠劫和抢劫,以获得现金分发给贫穷的追随者。

Protopoliticians in action

政治家在行动

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The stories of their antics give one the impression of talents out of time, like reading about seven-foot men running up and down a court before the invention of basketball. Today, thanks to the NBA, freakishly tall men are making millions dribbling and dunking. If basketball disappeared, they would recede again into the crevices of society, probably appearing mostly as circus attractions and in sideshows.

他们的捣蛋故事给人一种时代错位的才能印象,就像在篮球发明之前读到有七英尺高的人在球场上上下下奔跑一样。今天,感谢 NBA,身材极高的男子通过运球和扣篮赚到了数百万。如果篮球消失了,他们很可能会再次隐没在社会的缝隙中,主要出现在马戏团和小杂耍中。

Demagogues before politics was invented were drawn to the nearest approximation of politics the agrarian world had to offer: itinerant preaching. They harangued crowds and, like politicians, eloquently promised a better life to those who would follow them. Then as now, the poor were the chief targets of demagogues.

煽动者在政治尚未出现之前,被吸引到农业世界中最接近政治的东西:流浪的传教。他们训斥人群,就像政客一样,雄辩地向追随他们的人承诺更美好的生活。那时和现在一样,穷人都是煽动者的主要目标。

Norman Cohn's great history of millenarian movements, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, recounts the careers of numerous messianic leaders before polling. It is easy to recognize in his descriptions the strong similarities in personality type with the charismatic politician of the modern period.

诺曼·科恩的著名历史著作《千年追求》叙述了许多弥赛亚领袖的事迹。在这些描述中,人们很容易识别出与现代政治家的个性类型之间存在着许多相似之处。

[T]he leader has-like pharaoh and many another "divine king"-all the attributes of an ideal father: he is perfectly wise, he is perfectly just, he protects the weak. But on the other hand, he is also the son whose task is to transform the world, the Messiah who is to establish a new heaven and a new earth and who can say of himself: "Behold, I make all things new!" And both as father and as son this figure is colossal, superhuman, Omnipotent. He is credited with such abundance of supernatural powers that it is imagined as streaming forth as light. . . .

领袖就像法老和许多其他"神圣的国王"一样,拥有理想父亲的所有属性:他完全睿智,完全公正,保护弱者。但另一方面,他也是有使命改变世界的儿子,建立新天新地的弥赛亚,他可以说:"看,我创造了一切新的事物!"这个形象作为父亲和儿子都是巍峨的、超人的、全能的。他被赋予如此丰富的超自然力量,以至于被想象为散发出光芒。

Moreover being thus filled with this divine spirit the eschatological leader possesses unique miracle-working powers. His armies will be invariably and triumphantly victorious. his presence will make the earth yield crops, his reign will be an age of such perfect harmony as the old, corrupt world has never known.

因此充满了这种神圣的精神,末世领袖拥有独特的神奇力量。他的军队将永远胜利。他的存在将使大地出产作物,他的统治将是如此完美和谐,古老的腐败世界从未见过。

This image was of course a purely fantastic one, in the sense that it bore no relation to the real nature and capacity of any human being who ever existed or ever could exist. It was nevertheless an image which could be projected on to a living man; and there were always men about who were more than willing to accept such a projection, who in fact passionately

desired to be seen as infallible, wonder-working saviours. . . . And the secret of the ascendancy which they exercised never lay in their birth nor to any great extent in their education, but always in their personalities. Contemporary accounts of these messiahs of the poor commonly stress their eloquence, their commanding bearing and their personal magnetism. Above all one gets the impression that even if some of these men may perhaps have been conscious impostors, most of them really saw themselves as incarnate gods. . . . And this total conviction would communicate itself easily enough to the multitudes whose deepest desire was precisely for an eschatological saviour. 13

这个形象当然是纯粹幻想的,在这个意义上,它与任何曾经存在或可能存在的人类的真实性质和能力无关。然而,这是一个可以投射到活人身上的形象;总有一些人非常愿意接受这种投射,事实上,他们热切地渴望被视为不可错的、神奇的救世主。他们获得的统治地位的秘密,从来都不在于他们的出身,也不在于他们的教育水平,而总是在于他们的个性。这些穷人的救世主的当代记述,通常强调他们的口才、他们的独特风度和他们的个人魅力。最重要的是,我们会得到这样的印象,即使这些人中可能有一些是有意识的骗子,他们中的大多数人确实把自己视为化身的神灵。这种彻底的信念很容易就传达给那些最深切地渴望得到一位末世救世主的众生。

While this passage is marvelously concise in describing the would-be millenarian saviors who frequently unsettled medieval society, it cannot give the full flavor of Cohn's magisterial survey. One cannot read the whole work without recognizing in the antics of these prophetae the familiar characteristics of the modern demagogue: the eloquence, 261

尽管这一段话对于描述经常扰乱中世纪社会的那些企图成为千年王国救世主的人是简洁有力的,但它无法完全呈现科恩的大师级调查报告的全部特色。如果不认识到这些先知在其行为中体现的与现代煽动家如出一辙的特点,如口才、

"the personal magneticism," the "messianic pretensions," and the recurring desire to be worshiped as tribune of the poor.

"个人魅力"、"弥赛亚般的自负"以及不断渴望被崇拜为贫困者的代表。

The main difference that one discerns between the reception of medieval society to these impostors and that afforded by democracy at the end of the twentieth century is that in the Middle Ages such persons were normally executed, whereas, at the end of the twentieth century, modern democratic politics provides them with an open channel by which to legitimately seize power in the nationstate. A system that routinely submits control over the largest, most deadly enterprises on earth to the winner of popularity contests between charismatic demagogues is bound to suffer for it in the long run. 这一差异在于,在中世纪,这些冒名顶替者通常会被处决,而在二十世纪末,现代民主政治为他们合法地掌权提供了公开渠道。一个系统常常将地球上最大、最致命的企业的控制权提交给具有魅力的煽动者之间的人气竞赛的赢家,从长远来看必定会遭殃。

Pay Leaders to Do a Good Job 给领导支付好的酬劳

A rational selection process, combined with a constructive incentive structure to reward positive leadership, would bring able people to the helm of government. It would also mobilize new types of talent who otherwise would not normally take an interest in the problems of governance. 一个合理的选拔过程,结合激励正面领导力的建设性激励结构,将能够把有能力的人带到政府的领导地位。这也将动员新类型的人才,他们通常不会对治理问题产生兴趣。

The most talented executives in the world could be attracted to run faltering governments if they could be paid on the basis of results they actually achieve for society. 如果最有才华的高管能够根据他们为社会实际取得的成果获得报酬,他们或许可以被吸引来经营陷入困境的政府。

A leader who could significantly boost real income in any leading Western nation could justly be paid far more than Michael Eisner. In a better world, every successful head of government would be a multimillionaire. 任何主导西方国家的领导者如果能显著提高实际收入,他们的报酬应该远远超过迈克尔·艾斯纳。在一个更好的世界里,每一个成功的政府首脑都应该是百万富翁。

Electronic Plebiscites 电子全民投票

Another obvious alternative to representative misgovernment would be electronic plebiscites whereby citizens, perhaps a representative fraction selected by tamper-proof sortition, could cast their ballots directly on legislative proposals. Computer technology allows decisions to be determined democratically, with electronic plebiscites. Plebiscites could be easily combined with allotment to narrow the numbers voting on specific issues.

另一个明显的替代代表性不善治理的方案是电子全民公决,通过这种方式,公民,也许是经过防篡改抽签选出的代表性样本,可以直接就立法提案进行投票。计算机技术允许以民主方式做出决策,通过电子全民公决。全民公决可以与按选举方式产生代表相结合,缩小参与特定问题投票的人数。

In any event, in principle, it is far less challenging for would-be voters to understand political issues than to attempt to fathom politicians and evaluate these politicians'

无论如何,原则上而言,潜在选民要理解政治问题比试图了解政客并评估这些政客要简单得多

evaluations of the same issues, much less know what those politicians would actually do upon assuming office.

对同一问题的评估,更不要说那些政客上任后真正会做什么。

This is particularly difficult in that politicians and their handlers are becoming increasingly proficient packaging and manipulating the images they present to the public.

这在于政客及其幕后人正变得越来越擅长包装和操纵他们呈现给公众的形象。

COMMERCIALIZED SOVEREIGNTY

商业化的主权

We expect to see something new emerge to replace politics. While any of the possibilities we canvass above might be tried with some advantage, our expectation is not that politics will be reformed or improved, but that it will be antiquated and, in most 262

我们期望看到有新的东西出现来取代政治。虽然我们上面提到的任何可能性都可能会带来一些优势,但我们的期望并不是政治会得到改革或改善,而是它会变得过时,在大部分情况下已经过时。

respects, abandoned. By this we do not mean to say that we expect to see dictatorship, but rather entrepreneurial government - the commercialization of sovereignty.

应该尊重,不被放弃。这并不意味着我们期望看到独裁,而是企业家式的政府——主权的商业化。

Unlike dictatorship, or even democracy, commercialized sovereignty will not foreclose choice. It will afford every individual greater scope for expressing his views.

商业化主权并不会阻碍选择,反而会为每个个人提供更大的表达自己观点的空间。

And for those with the talent to take advantage of it, commercialized sovereignty will permit more practical scope for decision-making and self-determination than any form of social organization that has heretofore existed.

对于有才能利用这一点的人来说,商业化的主权将为决策和自我决定提供比迄今为止任何形式的社会组织更实际的范围。

Customized Government
定制政府

Lest this sound millenarian, consider that microtechnology miniaturizes and disaggregates. It facilitates customization rather than mass production. You can now go into a store and purchase blue jeans that will be cut from a pattern customized to your measurements and sewn up half a world away. When new institutions at last evolve to fit the new megapolitical realities of the Information Age, you will be able to obtain governance at least as well customized to meet your personal needs and tastes as blue jeans.

这并不是千禧年思维,要考虑到微型技术的缩小和分散性。它促进个性化定制而非大规模生产。现在您可以到商店购买定制尺寸并在世界另一边缝制的牛仔裤。当新的机构最终演化适应信息时代的新的政治现实时,您将能够获得至少与牛仔裤一样符合您个人需求和品味的治理。

Alvin Toffler, of all people, has criticized the idea that information technology could make citizens into customers. Toffler says, wrongly we believe, "That is far too narrow of a model. Whether we like it or not, there is a world of religion and feeling out there that cannot be simply reduced to contractual relationships." For reasons we explored earlier, we would agree that it will be difficult to "reduce the world of nationalist feeling" to "contractual relationships." But to say that is not to argue that it is impossible, much less that it would be a bad arrangement. A little less irrational gusto in nationalism could save millions of lives.

阿尔文·托夫勒批评了信息技术可以将公民转变为客户的想法。托夫勒错误地认为,"这个模型过于狭隘。不管我们喜欢与否,存在着一个宗教和情感的世界,不能简单地归结为合同关系。"我们之前探讨的原因,我们同意"将民族主义情怀"归结为"合同关系"将是困难的。但这并不意味着这是不可能的,更不意味着这将是一种糟糕的安排。适当减少民族主义中的无理狂热可以挽救数百万生命。

"Entry, Exit" and "Voice"

"入境,出境"和"声音"

Of course, the commercialization of sovereignty is an unfamiliar concept, apparently even to Alvin Toffler. But its central idea-the economic mode of expression-is commonplace in the lives of people living at the end of the twentieth century. In any marginally free economy, consumers can act to

express their desires directly by purchasing services and products. Or by withdrawing their custom. When you become dissatisfied with one version of a product or a provider of a service, you can directly express your dissatisfaction by means of "exit." In other words, you can shift your business elsewhere.

当然,主权商业化对阿尔文·托夫勒来说似乎是一个陌生的概念。但是它的核心思想——经济表达模式——在 20 世纪末人们的生活中很普遍。在任何边际自由的经济中,消费者都可以通过购买服务和产品来直接表达他们的需求。或者通过退出来表达。当你对某个产品或服务的供应商感到不满意时,你可以通过"退出"直接表达你的不满。换句话说,你可以把你的生意转移到别处。

In the last chapter, we analyzed how the advance of information technology will soon make it feasible for you to create assets in cyberspace that will be all but immune from predatory invasion by nationstates. This will create a de facto metaconstitutional requirement that governments actually provide you with satisfactory service before you pay their bills. Why? Because income taxation will become almost as voluntary in fact as it is supposed to be in theory.

在上一章中,我们分析了信息技术的进步很快就会使你在网络空间创造的资产几乎免于遭受国家的掠夺性侵犯。这将创造一种事实上的元宪法要求,即政府必须在你支付账单之前向你提供令人满意的服务。为什么?因为事实上的所得税将像理论上应该如此一样变得几乎自愿。

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Avoiding "Cumbersome Political Channels" 避免"笨重的政治渠道"

In effect, if information technology evolves as it may, it will assure that governments are actually controlled by their customers. As a customer, you will first have hundreds, then thousands of options to reduce your protection costs directly by contracting a private tax treaty with a nationstate or by defecting from nationstates altogether to emerging minisovereignties. These contract "entry" and defection or "exit"
如果信息技术的发展如预期,它将确保政府被其顾客实际控制。作为一

个顾客,您首先会拥有数百种,然后是数千种选择,通过与一个国家签订私人税收条约或完全脱离国家,转而加入新兴的迷你主权实体来直接减少您的保护成本。这些合同"入境"和脱离或"退出"

options are economic expressions of your desires as a customer. Voting with your feet and your money has the great advantage that it leads to results that you desire.

作为顾客,您的选择就是对您的愿望的经济表达。用您的双脚和金钱进行投票,这一方法的巨大优势在于可以达到您所期望的结果。

How do your "entry" and exit options as a customer compare with the political mode of expression in democracy? Persons who become dissatisfied with some product or service, especially one provided by or heavily regulated by the government, can give "voice" to their views by writing letters to the president in the United States, or seeking a meeting with their member of Parliament or another appropriate elected official elsewhere. Sometimes, such love letters work. But not always. Not usually. Failing success, at first, persons seeking to employ their "voice" for change can then organize a demonstration, take out a full-page advertisement in a newspaper, or even seek elective office themselves.

您作为客户,如何比较您的"进入"和退出选择与民主政治中的表达方式?对于某些产品或服务,尤其是由政府提供或严格管制的产品或服务感到不满的人,可以通过向美国总统写信或与所在国的议员或其他适当的当选官员会面来表达自己的观点。有时这种"爱的心语"会奏效,但并非总是如此。不成功的话,寻求利用"声音"促进变革的人可以组织示威游行、在报纸上刊登整版广告,甚至可以自己竞选公职。

The political mode of expression does provide a channel for articulate statements and oratory. But it entails the drawback that you can seldom obtain satisfaction or improve your position by your own action. When faced with a substandard product or service of government, you are obliged to continue paying for it until you can persuade the whole political process to accede to your request for a change.

政治表达方式确实为准确陈述和雄辩演说提供了渠道。但其弊端是你很难通过自己的行动获得满足或改善自己的处境。当面对政府提供的

劣质产品或服务时,你必须继续支付费用,直到你能说服整个政治过程接受你要求改变的请求。

In Western countries, and now in practically the entire earth, this has come to mean the necessity of securing majority support of a democratic political system. The requirement to involve a majority imposes massive transaction costs between you and achieving what in all likelihood is a relatively straightforward and rational goal.

在西方国家,以及现在几乎整个地球上,这意味着必须获得民主政治体系的多数支持。需要获得多数支持会产生大量的交易成本,而这与您要实现的目标,很可能是相对简单明确的目标,形成了很大的矛盾。

Milton Friedman discussed the merits of the economic, as opposed to the political, mode of expression in advancing his proposal for school vouchers in *Capitalism and Freedom*:

米尔顿·弗里德曼在《资本主义与自由》中讨论了经济模式与政治模式在推进学校代金券提议中的优缺点

Parents could express their views about schools directly, by withdrawing their children from one school and sending them to another, to a much greater extent than is now possible. In general they can now take this step only by changing their place of residence.

家长可以通过将孩子从一所学校转到另一所学校的方式,直接表达对学校的看法,这种方式比现在可能的更广泛。一般而言,家长现在只能通过改变居住地来采取这一步骤。

For the rest, they can express their views only through cumbrous political channels.⁵ Albert O. Hirschman, speaking as a partisan of politics, took exception to Friedman's preference for "exit as the 'direct' way of expressing one's unfavorable views of an organization. A person less well trained in economics might naively suggest that the direct way of expressing one's views is to express them!"¹⁶ Whether it is more direct or effective to express your opinions through market mechanisms, such as providing or withdrawing your support as a customer, or through "cumbrous political channels" is a

对于其他人来说,他们只能通过笨重的政治渠道来表达自己的观点。阿

尔伯特·O·赫希曼作为政治的支持者,反对弗里德曼对"退出"作为表达不满观点的"直接"方式的偏好。一个不太了解经济的人可能会天真地认为,表达观点的直接方式就是直接表达!通过市场机制(如作为顾客提供或撤回支持)还是通过"笨重的政治渠道"表达您的观点,更直接或有效,这是一个复杂的问题。

complex and contentious question. Different persons will answer it in different ways.

复杂且争议的问题。不同的人会有不同的答复。

For those whose primary engagement with political expression is to demand benefits at the expense of others, shifting to the economic mode of expression may indeed seem a dismal substitute to writing to a politician and demanding more.

对于那些主要从事政治表达来要求从他人那里获得利益的人来说,转向经济表达方式可能确实像是一种沮丧的替代品,与向政客写信要求更多相比。

Economic Expression and "Reciprocal Sociality"
经济表述与"互惠社会性"

For those who intend to engage their fellows in "reciprocal" rather than "coercive"

对于那些打算与他人建立"互惠"而非"强制"关系的人来说

or parasitic sociality, the economic mode of expression opens the prospect of achieving far greater satisfaction at a lower cost in time and trouble.

Professor Hirschfield notwithstanding, this is easily demonstrated.

或寄生性社交,经济表达方式为以较少的时间和麻烦获得更大满足感提供了前景。尽管有希尔斯菲尔德教授的意见,这一点很容易说明。

Any set of economic expressions, comprising entry, ongoing contracts, and exits, could be converted into an expression of political "voice" simply by involving multitudes of people in the decision-making. Try it as an experiment. All you would require for the experiment are a few hundred people who feel there is not enough politics in their lives.

通过让成千上万的人参与决策过程,任何一组包括进入、正在进行的合同和退出的经济表达都可以简单地转化为政治"表达"。作为一个实验,你只需要几百个觉得生活中缺少政治参与的人。

Instead of spending their disposable income in thousands of discrete purchases over a year's time, they would convert this multitude of economic decisions into a handful of political ones.

他们宁愿把可支配收入转换成为数年期间的数千笔离散购买,而不是将这众多的经济决策转换成为少数的政治决策。

To start, all would agree to pool their disposable income and thereafter forgo purchases on an individual basis. Instead of thousands of dollars to spend individually in thousands of ways, everyone would get one vote or perhaps a few votes depending upon the number of offices to be filled. Rather than spending money directly to obtain what you want at any time you wished, you would spend your vote or votes on the handful of occasions when elections were held to select representatives who would then decide how the now gigantic collective purse would be spent.

首先,所有人都同意将可支配收入池在一起,之后避免个人购买。与其个人支配数千美元,以数千种方式消费,不如每个人获得一票,或根据需要填补的职位数获得数票。不是随时随地花钱买想要的东西,而是在选举时投票选出代表,由他们决定如何使用这笔巨额集体资金。

You, along with the others, would then share in the consumption of those items, and only those items that the ruling committee approved in the name of the majority.

你和其他人将分享那些获得统治委员会以多数名义批准的物品的消费。

Does that seem like a "cumbrous political channel" for expression yet? Just wait.

这听起来是否像一个"笨重的政治渠道"来表达?再等等吧。

This model holds all the potential for oratory and persuasion that one finds in politics at the national level. And most of the potential for frustration.

这个模型包含政治领域国家级别演讲和说服力的全部潜力。同时也包含了全部挫折感。

For example, if you like fresh broccoli, and the group has an ordinary distribution of tastes in food, you are in trouble. Chances are that some or most of the others in your group would prefer to spend more of the common food allowance on red meat than on fresh vegetables. To prevent the canteen committee from going to a warehouse store and squandering the whole annual vegetable budget on canned peas and corn, you might have to step forward and give "voice" to your views. You could draw the group's attention to the relative merits of ingesting more vitamins and phytonutrients like sulforaphane in broccoli, as compared to more saturated fats and cholesterol from red meat.

例如,如果你喜欢新鲜的西兰花,而该群体在饮食品味方面有一般分布,那你就麻烦了。很可能你群中的一些或大多数人更愿意将更多的公共食品津贴用于红肉,而不是新鲜蔬菜。为了防止食堂委员会前往仓储店,将全年蔬菜预算浪费在罐头豌豆和玉米上,你可能需要站出来表达你的观点。你可以让该群体注意到摄入更多维生素和植物营养素(如西兰花中的芦丁)相比更多饱和脂肪和胆固醇的红肉的相对优点。

Just exactly how you make this or any point understood, of course, would be as much of a puzzle in this constructed political model as it is to advocates of any political cause or candidacy. You could give a speech, but that, of course, requires that a good fraction of the group whom you need to persuade is already assembled somewhere and prepared to listen. You could print up flyers, provided that such a "campaign 265

只是您如何在这个构建的政治模型中使任何观点得到理解,这当然和支持任何政治事业或候选人一样复杂。您可以发表演讲,但这当然需要您需要说服的群体中有很大部分已经在某个地方集合并准备好倾听。您可以印制传单,前提是您拥有这样一个 "竞选 265"。

expenditure" were permitted by the house rules of your political game. You could write letters. But both of these options depend upon the other participants being literate enough to read.

您的政治游戏中,允许使用"开支"。您可以写信。但这两种选择都需要其他参与者具备阅读能力。

“It paints a picture of a society in which the vast majority of Americans do not know that they do not have the skill they need to earn a living in our increasingly technological society and international marketplace.”

RICHARD RILEY;

"它描绘了一幅社会图景,在这个社会中,绝大多数美国人并不知道他们缺乏在我们不断发展的技术社会和国际市场中谋生所需的技能。"理查德·赖利;

U.S. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, IN "ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA”

美国教育部长的"美国成人识字"报告

Ninety Million Alzheimer's Patients?

九千万阿尔兹海默症患者?

If your group in this model political exercise happened to be Americans, you would be hard-pressed to get any persuasive message to sink in, particularly if the members of the group were similar to the U.S. electorate as a whole. The perception that disproportionately large numbers of citizens of the world's most powerful nationstate are underachievers has been bleakly confirmed by the most thorough survey ever undertaken of the competence of American adults. The study, "Adult Literacy in America," shows that finding a literate audience for any political argument is by no means easy. A large fraction, perhaps a majority of Americans over the age of fifteen, lack basic skills essential to evaluating ideas and formulating judgments. According to the U.S.

如果您所在的小组在此政治演习中恰好是美国人,您将很难说服他们接受您的观点,尤其是如果小组成员与美国选民群体整体相似的话。关于世界最强国家公民普遍缺乏学习能力的印象,已经在最全面的成人识字能力调查中得到了沮丧的确认。这项名为"美国成人识字能力"的研究表明,找到一个能评估思想并做出判断的受众,并非易事。也许有大部分15 岁以上的美国人缺乏基本的技能。根据美国

Education Department, 90 million Americans cannot write a letter, fathom a bus schedule, or even do addition and subtraction on a calculator. This is about what you would expect if 90 million Americans were progressing

through various stages of Alzheimer's Disease. Thirty million were judged so incompetent that they could not even respond to questions.

教育部,9 千万美国人无法写信、理解公交时刻表,或仅仅在计算器上完成加减法。如果 9 千万美国人正处于阿尔茨海默症的不同阶段,这个结果也在预料之中。3 千万人被评判为如此无能,以至于无法回答问题。

So if your health message did not turn the tide, which is otherwise finding its own level, then you could call for help from animal rights activists.

Perhaps you could get them to picket your opponents in the canteen committee or make a fuss about the evil of killing cows at the homes of influential members.

如果你的健康信息无法改变局势,那么你可以寻求动物权利活动人士的帮助。也许你可以让他们在食堂委员会抗议你的对手,或者在有影响力的成员家中大吵大闹,指责杀害奶牛的罪恶。

This example could be extended indefinitely, which is probably far longer than the patience of rational people would permit. It clearly demonstrates that (1) any economic expression of entry or exit can be converted into a political expression of voice by making it a collective decision; and (2) that collective decisions, in spite of the invitation they offer to eloquence, are, indeed, cumbrous and often intractable.

这个例子可以无限扩展,这可能远远超出理性人的耐心所能承受的范围。这清楚地表明:(1)任何经济上的进入或退出表达都可以转化为集体决定的表达;(2)集体决策,尽管给人以口才的邀请,确实是笨拙的,往往难以处理。

This is exactly what experience has shown. It is far from easy to mobilize the effort required to change the course of a democracy. To reiterate, that may well be the reason that democratic welfare states survived centuries of competition with alternative methods of government to predominate at the end of the industrial era. Democracy succeeded as a political system precisely because its operation made it difficult for customers to control the government or limit the state's claims on resources.

这正是经验所显示的。调动所需的努力来改变民主政体的方向绝非易事。重申一下,这可能就是民主福利国家在与其他政府形式的长期竞争

中最终占上风的原因。民主之所以成功成为一种政治体系,正是因为它的运作使人们难以控制政府或限制国家对资源的索取。

However, since an unlimited partnership by the state in your affairs will no longer convey a military advantage in the Information Age, ingenious people will find superior ways to obtain the few valuable services that governments actually provide. It is likely that actual power will be contracted out from collective mechanisms that no longer pay 266 政府提供的真正有价值的服务越来越少,有创造力的人会找到更好的方式来获得这些服务。实际上,权力可能会从不再有利可图的集体机制中外包出去。

their way. We expect to see efficiency predominate over massed power. As Neil Munro succinctly put it, "[I]t is computerized information, not manpower or mass production that increasingly drives the U.S. economy and that will win wars in a world wired for 500

他们的道路。我们预计会看到效率主导过硬件实力。正如尼尔·蒙罗简洁地说, "[I]t is computerized information, not manpower or mass production that increasingly drives the U.S. economy and that will win wars in a world wired for 500".

TV channels. The computerized information exists in cyberspace-the new dimension created by endless reproduction of computer networks, satellites, modems, databases and the public Internet." 17 Massed armies will mean little in such a world. Efficiency will mean more than ever before. Because microtechnology creates a new dimension in protection, as we explored in Chapter 6 and elsewhere, individuals for the first time in human existence will be able to create and protect assets that lie entirely outside the realm of any individual government's territorial monopoly on violence. These assets, therefore, will be highly susceptible to individual control. It will be perfectly reasonable for you and significant numbers of other future Sovereign Individuals to "vote with your feet" in opting out of leading nationstates to contract for personal protection with an outlying nationstate or a new minisovereignty that will only charge a commercially tolerable amount, rather than the greater part of your net worth. In short, you would probably accept \$50 million to move to Bermuda.

电视频道。计算机化的信息存在于网络空间中——这是由计算机网络、卫星、调制解调器、数据库和公共互联网的无休止复制创造的新维度。"在这样一个世界中,庞大的军队将意义不大。效率将比以往任何时候都更加重要。因为微型技术创造了一个新的保护维度,正如我们在第 6 章和其他地方探讨的那样,在人类历史上第一次,个人将能够创造和保护完全位于任何个别政府领土暴力垄断之外的资产。因此,这些资产将非常容易受到个人控制。您和未来许多其他主权个人完全可以通过选择远离主导国家,而是与边缘国家或新的迷你主权国家签订个人保护合同的方式"以脚投票",后者只会收取您能承受的商业价格,而不是您净资产的绝大部分。简而言之,您可能会接受 5000 万美元的报价搬到百慕大。

Exit First, Contract Later 先退出,后签约

The early stimulus to commercialization of sovereignty will have to come from persons expressing themselves economically by exit. This option will be most difficult in the United States, where it will also be most valuable. The "Berlin Wall" for capitalists imposed by President Bill Clinton and the Republican Congress contradicts the slogan so confidently expressed by American nationalists in the 1960s, "Love it or leave it." By imposing penal taxes on those who leave, the exit tax is meant to compel loyalty. Yet this vindictive legislation, reminiscent of the penalties imposed on fleeing property owners in the last days of the Roman Empire, may inadvertently set the framework for a more rational policy later in the Information Age. 早期推动主权商业化的刺激将不得不来自以退出的方式表达经济诉求的人们。这种选择在美国将是最困难的,但同时也将是最有价值的。比尔·克林顿总统和共和党国会为资本家设置的"柏林墙"与 1960 年代美国民族主义者如此自信地表达的口号"要么热爱,要么离开"相抵触。通过对离开者征收惩罚性税收,退税旨在迫使人们保持忠诚。然而,这种带有报复性质的立法,让人想起罗马帝国末期对逃亡地产所有者施加的惩罚,可能会在信息时代后期无意中为更合理的政策奠定基础。

At some point, when enough able persons have left and compounded sufficiently large fortunes offshore, it will become appealing to U.S.

authorities to allow citizens or green card holders to buy their way out of future tax liabilities by paying an exit tax but not exiting.

当有足够多的合格者离开并在海外积攒了足够大的财富时,美国当局允许公民或绿卡持有者通过缴纳退税金而不必离境来逃避未来税收责任变得很有诱惑力。

In other words, the exit tax could become the model for a lump-sum buyout. The government imposing an exit tax would realize far higher benefits by allowing those exiting to resume residence under terms of a private treaty like those currently available in Switzerland and elsewhere.

换句话说,退税可能成为一次性回购的模式。政府对实施退税的人员,通过与目前在瑞士和其他地方可获得的私人条约类似的条款来允许他们恢复居留,将获得更高的收益。

Such moves on the part of the United States or other governments would be rational income-optimizing gestures. Eventually, competition in protection services will force down tax rates and adjust the terms of taxation to more civilized standards. Rather than depending upon legislatures to enact acceptable tax regimes, Sovereign Individuals in the future will be able to negotiate acceptable, customized policy packages by private treaty.

美国或其他政府的这些举措将是理性的收入优化手势。最终,保护服务的竞争将迫使税率下降,并将税收条件调整到更文明的标准。未来,主权个人不需要依赖立法机构颁布可接受的税收制度,而是能够通过私人条约协商可接受的、定制的政策包。

OFFENDING THE TRUE BELIEVERS

得罪真信徒

Of course, we do not contend for a moment that much of this will be popular.

当然,我们并不认为这其中的大部分会受欢迎。

The denationalization of the individual and the commercialization of sovereignty it implies will offend remaining true believers in the clichés of twentieth-century politics.

个人去民族化和主权的商业化将冒犯对 20 世纪政治陈词滥调仍抱有真挚信仰的人。

Like the late Christopher Lasch, they see the atrophy of politics as a threat to the wellbeing of a majority of the population. In their view, a revival of industrial-era politics, with its commitment to redistribute income, could be a solution to the distresses so many feel with the competitive pressures brought to bear by information technology.

像已故的克里斯托弗·拉什一样,他们认为政治的萎缩是对大多数人福祉的威胁。在他们看来,复兴工业时代的政治,以及其对收入再分配的承诺,可能是缓解这么多人感受到的由信息技术带来的竞争压力的解决方案。

E. J. Dionne, Jr., is a political reporter for the Washington Post. Like Lasch, he harks back, nostalgically, to politics. He also speaks for a social democratic leveling impulse that is bound to find louder voice in the decades to come as the new megapolitical realities of the Information Age more decisively undermine institutions left over from the modern world. Dionne sees the material improvements in living standards that were widely shared within rich jurisdictions in the twentieth century as owing mainly to democratic politics rather than to technological or economic development. His message is that hope for the future requires extending the dominion of politics over the technologies of the Information Age: The overriding need in the United States and throughout the democratic world is for a new engagement with democratic reform, the political engine that made the

industrial era as successful as it was. The technologies of the information age will not on their own construct a successful society, any more than industrialism left to itself would have made the world better. ... Even the most extraordinary breakthroughs in technology and the most ingenious applications of the Internet will not save us from social breakdown, crime or injustice.

E. J. 迪恩尼尔是华盛顿邮报的政治记者。和拉什一样,他也怀着一种怀旧的心情追溯政治。他也代表了一种社会民主的平等冲动,这种冲动在未来几十年必将变得更加响亮,因为信息时代新的"大政治"现实将更加有力地破坏现代世界遗留下来的那些制度。迪恩尼尔认为,在 20 世纪,富裕国家普遍共享的生活水平改善主要归功于民主政治,而不是技术或经济发展。他的观点是,对未来的希望需要扩大政治对信息时代技术的控制范围:美国 and 整个民主世界最紧迫的需求就是重新投入到民主改革中去,因为这个政治引擎使工业时代取得了巨大成功。信息时代的技术本身并不能构建一个成功的社会,正如工业主义自身也无法让这个世界变得更美好。即使是科技方面最为出色的突破和互联网应用中最为聪明的创意,也无法拯救我们免于社会崩溃、犯罪或不公正。

Only politics, which is the art of how we organize ourselves, can even begin to take on such tasks." Dionne and others like him fail to understand that the conditions that made twentiethcentury life particularly conducive to systematic compulsion were not chosen by any human agency. The "art of how we organize ourselves" is a statement that would not have been intelligible prior to the modern period. Societies are too complex to be rightly considered the fruit of any willful effort of self-organization. The nationstates of the modern period emerged spontaneously as a coincidental by-product of industrial technology that raised returns to violence. Now information technology is reducing the returns to violence. This makes politics anachronistic and irretrievable, no matter how earnestly people might wish to preserve it into the next millennium.

只有政治,这是我们如何组织自己的艺术,才能开始承担这样的任务。"戴恩和其他像他一样的人无法理解,使 20 世纪生活特别有利于系统性强制的条件,并不是任何人类机构选择的。"我们如何组织自己"这一说法在现代之前是无法理解的。社会太复杂,不能正确地被认为是任何自愿自我组织努力的结果。现代时期的民族国家自发地出现,作为工

业技术提高暴力收益的偶然副产品。现在信息技术正在降低暴力的收益。这使得政治过时和无法挽回,不管人们多么诚挚地希望将其保留到下一个千年。

"Not of today nor yesterday the same Throughout all time they live; and whence they came None knoweth." SOPHOCLES, Antigone "THEY DON'T MAKE THEM LIKE THEY USED TO"

非今日非昨日同一 它们存在于所有时间; 它们从何而来 无人知晓。苏霍克利斯,《安提戈涅》 "他们已经不是当初那样了"

The fervent desire to "make laws," which seems so much a part of the common sense" of twentiethcentury politics, is by no means universal to all cultures. Its disappearance in the future could be seen as part of a cycle that has waxed and waned 268

让人羡慕的想要"制定法律"的欲望,这似乎是二十世纪政治常识的一部分,但却并不是所有文化都普遍存在的。在未来,这种欲望的消失可被视为一个循环的一部分,这种循环已经历过兴衰。

with the centuries. For example, early Greeks, among others, believed that laws could not be made. In the words of philosopher Ernst Cassirer, the Greeks believed "the 'unwritten laws,' the laws of justice, have no beginning in time." 'Like other prepolitical peoples, they felt that no one could improve upon the natural, "geometrical" laws of justice that had not been created by any human power.

随着世纪的推移,早期的希腊人等人认为法律无法制定。哲学家恩斯特·卡西尔的话:希腊人相信"无所谓法律始于何时,正义之法均非人造"。像其他未进入政治时期的民族,他们觉得无人能改善超自然"几何学"般的正义法则,这是没有任何人力创造的。

They did not believe in a "lawgiver." As Cassirer put it, "It is by rational thought that we are to find the standards of moral conduct, and it is reason, and reason alone, that can give them their authority." In this sense, any attempt to impose laws upon society through legislation would be like trying to alter geometry by legislation.

他们不相信"立法者"。正如卡西尔所说,"我们要通过理性思维来寻找道德行为的标准,而且只有理性才能给予它们权威。"从这个意义上说,任

何试图通过立法对社会强加法律的企图都像试图通过立法改变几何一样。

Legislation as Sacrilege 立法即是亵渎

For very different reasons, a similar resistance to "lawmaking" prevailed through much of the medieval period. As John B. Morrall writes, "[F]or the Germans, law was something which had existed from time immemorial." It was "a guarantee of the rights"

出于完全不同的原因,在整个中世纪时期,对"制定法律"的类似抵制普遍存在。正如约翰·B·莫拉爾所写,"对于德国人来说,法律是自古就存在的东西。"它是"权利的保证"。

of individual members of the tribe.²⁰ Kings and councils had as yet no intention of creating new law. Such an intention would have been, from the point of view of these early medieval times, not only superfluous, but even semi-blasphemous, for law, like kingship, possessed its own sacrosanct aura. Instead, king and councillors thought of themselves as merely explaining or clarifying the true meaning of the already existing and complete body of law.

部落成员个人的²⁰。国王和议会还没有打算创造新的法律。从这些早期中世纪的观点来看,这种意图不仅是多余的,而且甚至是半亵渎的,因为法律,就像王权一样,都有自己神圣不可侵犯的光环。相反,国王和谋士们认为自己只是在解释或阐明已经存在且完整的法律体系的真正含义。

Germanic custom handed on to the medieval mind an idea which it was never able to forget, even when in practice it behaved otherwise. This idea was that good laws were rediscovered or restated but never remade.²¹ After the excesses of twentieth century legislation, there is something quaint about that ancient attitude. The desire to put the coercive power of the state to work for private ends, particularly the redistribution of income, became almost second nature.

日耳曼习俗传给中世纪思想一个它永远无法忘记的思想,即使在实践中它表现得恰恰相反。这个思想就是,好的法律是被重新发现或重申的,而

不是被重新制定的。在二十世纪立法的过度行为之后,这种古老的态度显得很可爱。将国家的强制力用于私人目的,特别是收入再分配,几乎成为第二天性。

Regrets 后悔

Little wonder, then, that there are sad songs for politics in its last days. They are entirely predictable. And not only because they reflect the blindness of most thinkers to the imperatives of megapolitics. Few political reporters, like Dionne, are prepared to accept the apparent atrophy and demise of politics, when doing so might put them back on the crime beat. At the end of the Middle Ages, voices were raised in support of reviving chivalry. Consider *Il Libro del Cortegiano*, or *The Book of the Courtier*, written by Count Baldassare Castiglione in 1514, and published at Venice in 1528 by Aldus.

政治在其最后几天出现悲伤的歌曲并不奇怪。它们是完全可以预见的。不仅因为它们反映了大多数思想家对大政治必然趋势的视而不见。像狄翁这样的政治记者很少准备接受政治明显萎缩和衰亡的事实,因为这可能会让他们重回犯罪新闻报道的岗位。在中世纪末期,有人提出恢复骑士精神。比如 1514 年伯爵巴尔达萨雷·卡斯蒂利奥尼撰写的《庭臣论》,1528 年在威尼斯由阿尔德斯出版。

Castiglione's longing for a return to virtues of chivalry was deeply felt, but longing for a defunct way of life could not bring it back in the sixteenth century. Nor will it in the twenty-first century.

卡斯提廖内的对骑士精神美德的向往是深切的,但在 16 世纪无法重拾已经消失的生活方式。在 21 世纪也同样如此。

As we have attempted to convey in explaining our theory of megapolitics, technological imperatives, not popular opinion, are the most important sources of change.

正如我们在解释我们的大政治理论时所尝试传达的那样,技术必然性,而不是民意,是变革最重要的源泉。

If our theory of megapolitics is valid, the reason the modern age, with its concept of

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citizenship and politics organized around the state, supplanted the feudal system and chivalry organized around personal oaths and relationships was not a matter of ideas, but shifts in costs and benefits arising from new technology. Chivalry did not die because Castiglione or others failed to convince a disinterested populace who had any control over the matter that there was no need for honor or morality in the affairs of state. To the contrary, Castiglione's *Courtier* is critical of princes and the kind of behavior his contemporary, Niccolo Machiavelli, commended in his *Il Principe*, or *The Prince*. But so what? Machiavelli ultimately reached a larger audience with his book, not because his argument in *The Prince* was more eloquent but because his advice better suited the megapolitical conditions of the modern age.

以国家为基础组织的公民身份和政治,取代了以个人誓言和关系为基础的封建制度和骑士精神,这并非源于思想,而是源于新技术带来的成本和收益的变化。骑士精神之所以消亡,并非因为卡斯蒂利翁或其他人未能说服对国家事务中的荣誉和道德无需关心的无动于衷的大众。相反,卡斯蒂利翁的《君主论》批评了普立斯,以及尼科洛·马基雅维利在其著作《君主论》中赞同的行为。但是这又如何呢?马基雅维利的著作最终吸引了更广泛的读者,不是因为其论点更具雄辩,而是因为他的建议更适合现代大政治环境的需求。

As the distinguished twentiethcentury philosopher Ernst Cassirer said in discussing "The Moral Problem in Machiavelli,"

正如著名的 20 世纪哲学家恩斯特·卡西尔在讨论"马基雅维利的道德问题"时所说的,

The book describes, with complete indifference, the ways and means by which political power is to be acquired and maintained. About the right use of this power it does not say a word. ... No one had ever doubted that political life, as matters stand, is full of crimes, treacheries and felonies. But no thinker before Machiavelli had undertaken to teach the art of these crimes. These things were done, but they were not taught. That Machiavelli

promised to become a teacher in the art of craft, perfidy, and cruelty was a thing unheard of. 22

这本书以完全的漠然描述了获取和维持政治权力和手段。它没有说一个字关于如何正确使用这种权力。.....没有人曾怀疑过,在现状下,政治生活充满了犯罪、背叛和罪恶。但在马基雅维利之前,没有任何思想家试图教授这些犯罪的艺术。这些事情是被做了,但从未被教授。马基雅维利承诺成为一名教授诡计、背信和残酷的艺术,这在历史上前所未有。

In short, *The Prince* was a radical work that spelled out a modern recipe whereby an aspiring ruler could succeed in advancing his career at any cost to others. Machiavelli endorsed conduct that proved well suited to the nature of politics in an age of power. But the art of the double-cross, which was a shrewd policy for politicians in the modern era, was outrageous and subversive in terms of the culture of chivalry that had grown up in previous centuries.

简而言之,《君主论》是一部激进的作品,阐述了一种现代的秘诀,一个有抱负的统治者可以不惜一切代价来推进自己的事业。马基雅维利支持那些合适于权力时代政治本质的行为。但是欺骗的艺术,这对于现代政客来说是一个机警的政策,对于之前几个世纪中崛起的骑士精神来说却是令人发指和具有颠覆性的。

As we explored earlier, the virtues of chivalry included an emphasis on extreme fidelity to oaths. This was a necessity in a society where protection was organized in exchange for personal services. The bargains upon which feudal society rested were not such that they would have reemerged spontaneously among people free to determine where their best interests lay under conditions of duress. Therefore, feudal commitments that were the basis of chivalry had to be shorn up with a strong sense of honor. In that context, little could have been more subversive than Machiavelli's suggestion that the Prince should not hesitate to lie, cheat, and steal when so doing served his interests.

正如我们之前探讨的那样,骑士精神的美德包括对誓言的极度忠诚。这在一个以个人服务换取保护的社会中是必要的。在痛苦条件下,封建社会赖以存在的交易是不会自发重新出现的。因此,构成骑士精神基础

的封建承诺必须以强烈的荣誉感来支撑。在这样的背景下,马基雅维利建议君主不应犹豫撒谎、欺骗和偷窃,只要这有利于自己的利益,这是非常颠覆性的。

As the twentieth century drew to a close, Machiavelli's arguments were still being examined for their importance in understanding modern politics and various twentiethcentury crimes and tyrannies.

随着 20 世纪的接近尾声,马基雅维利的论点仍在被审视,以了解现代政治以及 20 世纪的各种罪行和暴政的重要性。

Castiglione's work, by contrast, is all but forgotten. In a year's time, *Il Libro del Cortegiano* may be read from cover to cover by a handful of literature students at the graduate level and a few connoisseurs of the history of manners.

卡斯蒂利翁的作品几乎被遗忘。一年内,《宫廷风尚指南》可能仅由少数文学研究生和几位社交史爱好者从头到尾阅读。

Sometime within the next few decades, the new megapolitics of the Information Age will antique *The Prince*. The Sovereign Individual will require a new recipe for success, one which will highly emphasize honor and rectitude in deploying resources 270

在未来的几十年内,信息时代的新兴大政治将使《君主论》过时。主权个人将需要一个新的成功配方,这将高度强调在部署资源中的荣誉和正直。

outside the grip of the state. We can predict that such advice will not be read with pleasure by E. J. Dionne, Jr., and the other living social democrats.

摆脱国家的控制。我们可以预测这样的建议不会给 E. J. Dionne, Jr. 和其他现存社民党人带来愉悦。

Policy Set by Customers

客户设定的策略

This will be especially true early in the transition, when most jurisdictions will still be lumbered with the necessity of formulating policies whose advocates can attract popular assent from a majority of the population.

Later, as democracy fades away and the market for sovereignty services deepens, the market conditions that constrain "policy"

在过渡期初期,这种情况尤其如此,届时大多数司法管辖区仍将受制于需要制定政策的必要性,而这些政策的倡导者可吸引大多数人口的普遍赞同。后来,随着民主的式微和主权服务市场的加深,限制"政策"的市场条件

will become more broadly understood.

将会更广泛地被理解。

What we now think of as "political" leadership, which is always conceived in terms of a nationstate, will become increasingly entrepreneurial rather than political in nature. In these conditions, the viable range of choice in putting together a "policy"

我们现在所认为的"政治"领导,总是以国家为单位,将变得更加企业家性质,而非政治性质。在这些条件下,制定"政策"时可供选择的范围将变得日益可行。

regime for a jurisdiction will be effectively narrowed in the same way that the range of options open to entrepreneurs in designing a first-class resort hotel or any similar product or service is defined by what people will pay for. A resort hotel, for example, would seldom attempt to operate on terms that required guests to perform hard labor to repair and extend its facilities. Even a resort hotel owned or controlled by its employees, like the typical modern democracy, would try in vain to force customers to comply with such demands, especially after better accommodations became available. If the customers would rather play golf than do heavy labor in the hot sun, then on that question, at least, the market offers little scope for imposing arbitrary alternatives. In such conditions, presently "political" issues will recede into entrepreneurial judgments, as jurisdictions seek to discover what policy bundles will attract customers.

管辖区的体制将会被有效地缩小,就像设计一流度假酒店或任何类似产品或服务时,企业家可选的范围被人们愿意支付的价格所定义一样。例如,度假酒店很少会尝试要求客人进行艰苦的劳动来修缮和扩展其设施。即使一家由员工拥有或控制的度假酒店,像典型的现代民主政体一样,也很难强迫客户遵守这种要求,特别是在更好的住宿条件出现之后。

如果客人宁愿打高尔夫球而不是在炎热的阳光下做繁重的劳动,那么至少在这个问题上,市场很难强加任意的替代方案。在这种条件下,目前被视为"政治"的问题将会退化为企业家的判断,因为管辖区将寻求发现能吸引客户的政策组合。

The Atrophy of Politics 政治的萎缩

As this becomes understood, there will be a sea change in attitudes.
随着这一点被理解,态度将发生巨大的变化。

Populations in devolving jurisdictions will no longer expect to select from the same range of wish-fulfilling policy options that engrossed political debate in the twentieth century. With income-earning capacity more highly skewed than in the industrial era, jurisdictions will tend to cater to the needs of those customers whose business is most valuable and who have the greatest choice of where to bestow it.

在衰落司法管辖区,人口将不再期望从占据二十世纪政治辩论的同一系列满足愿望的政策选择中进行选择。随着收入获取能力比工业时代更高度倾斜,管辖区将倾向于满足那些业务最有价值并拥有最大选择权的客户的需求。

Under such conditions, it may matter much less than we are accustomed to assume whether or not policies that are commercially optimal for a jurisdiction would appeal to the "median voter" in a focus group.

在这种情况下,是否采取对某一管辖区域商业最优的政策是否能吸引聚焦小组中的"中位选民"支持,可能比我们通常认为的重要性要小得多。

In short, the commercialization of sovereignty will facilitate the control of governments by their customers. This will tend to make the opinions of noncustomers irrelevant, or less relevant, just as the opinions of Big Mac eaters about foie gras are irrelevant to the success of three-star French restaurants, like L'Arpege in Paris.

简而言之,主权的商品化将便利政府被其客户控制。这将倾向于使非客户的观点无关紧要,或者不太相关,就像麦当劳顾客对三星法式餐厅,如巴黎的 L'Arpege 对鹅肝的意见一样无关紧要。

"THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY"

"民主的背叛"

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Like the late Christopher Lasch, objectors will not only complain that information technology destroys jobs; they will also complain that it negates democracy because it allows individuals to place their resources outside the reach of political compulsion. For this reason, the reactionaries of the new millennium will find the financial privacy facilitated by information technology especially threatening.

像已故的克里斯托弗·拉施一样,反对者不仅会抱怨信息技术毁坏了工作,他们还会抱怨它否定了民主,因为它让个人可以将资源置于政治强制力之外。出于这个原因,新千年的反动分子会发现信息技术所促进的金融隐私尤其具有威胁性。

They will recoil from the prospect that income and capital taxation would truly depend upon "voluntary compliance." They will support novel and even drastic means of squeezing resources out of anyone who appears to be prosperous, such as "presumptive taxation" and outright holding of wealthy persons to ransom.

他们将退缩于"自愿遵从"才决定收入和资本税的前景。他们将支持新颖的甚至激进的方法,从任何看似富裕的人那里挤出资源,比如"推定税"和公开勒索有钱人。

Community Property

共同财产

Hints of what is to come are near the surface as we write. Early evidence that the capacity of governments to control international markets is slipping away offends those who believe that individuals are, by right, assets of nationstates. They want to enforce their ability to treat the citizens of a country as assets, not as customers. The reactionaries believe that all income should be considered revenues of the community, meaning that it should be at the disposal of the state.²³ We have already discussed arguments advanced by Lasch in *Revolt of the Elites* and *The Betrayal of Democracy*. But his is not the only diatribe in support of the nationstate.

Harvard University political theorist Michael Sandel argues in *Democracy in Discontent* that "Democracy today is not possible without a politics that can control global economic forces, because without such control it won't matter who people vote for, the corporations will rule."²⁴ In other words, the state must retain its parasitic power over individuals, in order to assure that political outcomes can diverge from market outcomes. Otherwise collective decisions to compel diseconomic outcomes would be meaningless.

即将到来的信号已经在表面浮现。政府控制国际市场能力正在逐步消失,这一早期迹象冒犯了那些认为个人本质上是国家资产的人。他们希望能强制执行将国家公民作为资产而非顾客对待的能力。这些反动分子相信,所有收入都应被视为社区的收入,也就是应归属于国家的支配。我们已经讨论过拉施在《精英的反叛与民主的背叛》中提出的论点。但这并非支持国家的唯一批评。哈佛大学政治理论家迈克尔·桑德尔在《不满的民主》中论证,"如果没有对全球经济力量的控制,民主今天是不可能实现的,因为没有这种控制,无论人们投票选谁,企业都将统治。"换言之,国家必须保留对个人的寄生性控制权,以确保政治结果可以偏离市场结果。否则,强迫实现不经济的结果的集体决策就毫无意义。

In our view, Sandel's lament, like that of Lasch, is no more than half right. We concede that democracy will lose much of its importance if governments lack the power to compel individuals to behave as politicians insist. This is obvious. Indeed, democracy as it has been known in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is destined to disappear.

在我们看来,桑德尔和拉什的悲叹都只对一半。我们承认,如果政府缺乏强制个人按照政治家的要求行事的权力,民主将失去很大的重要性。这是显而易见的。事实上,十九和二十世纪的民主形式注定会消失。

But Sandel misses the real importance of the triumph of markets over compulsion. His invocation of corporate rule" as a danger attendant upon the collapse of the nationstate is strikingly anachronistic.

但桑德尔忽略了市场胜过强制的真正重要性。他所引用的"公司统治"作为民族国家崩溃的危险,明显是一种时代错误。

Corporations will hardly be in a position to rule the markets of the new global economy. Indeed, as we have suggested, it is far from obvious that corporations will even continue to exist in their familiar modern form. Far from it. Firms are almost bound to be transformed in the megapolitical revolution that comes with the introduction of the Information Age. As we have previously discussed, microprocessing will alter the "information costs" that help determine the "nexus of contracts" that define firms. As economists Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling suggest, corporations are merely one legal form that provides "a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals." 25 Whether the corporation can even survive, much less "rule" as "a domain of bureaucratic direction that is shielded from market forces," is itself likely to be 272

企业很难有能力统治新全球经济的市场。事实上,正如我们所建议的那样,企业甚至可能无法继续以其熟悉的现代形式存在。远非如此。在信息时代到来的大政治革命中,企业几乎注定要发生变革。正如我们之前讨论的,微处理器将改变"信息成本",这有助于确定定义企业的"契约总和"。正如经济学家迈克尔·C·詹森和威廉·H·麦克林所建议的,公司只是一种法律形式,为个人提供"一个契约关系总和"。25 公司是否能够生存下去,更不用说"统治"成为"远离市场力量的官僚指挥领域",这本身就值得怀疑。

determined, in the words of economists Louis Putterman and Randall S. Kroszner, by "the completeness of market forces and the ability of market forces to penetrate intrafirm relationships."26 As we argued earlier, it is doubtful that firms will be able to survive the increasing penetration of market forces into what have heretofore been "intrafirm relationships." As a result, firms will tend to dissolve as information technology makes it more rewarding to rely upon the price mechanism and the auction market to undertake tasks that need doing rather than having them internalized within a formal organization.

根据经济学家路易斯·帕特曼和兰德尔·S·克罗斯纳的话,这由"市场力量的完整性和市场力量渗透到企业内部关系的能力"决定。正如我们之前所论述的,很难确定企业是否能够在市场力量越来越渗透到企业内部关系中这一背景下生存下来。因此,随着信息技术的发展,通过价格机制和拍卖市场来执行任务变得更有吸引力,企业将倾向于解体。

As information technology increasingly automates the production process, it will take away part of the *raison d'être* of the firm, the need to employ and motivate managers to monitor individual workers.

随着信息技术越来越自动化生产过程,它将取走企业存在的一部分理由,即雇佣和激励管理者监督个人员工的需求。

"Why Are There Firms?"

为什么会有公司?

Remember, the question "Why are there firms?" is not as trivial as it may seem on casual observation. Microeconomics generally assumes that the price mechanism is the most effective means of coordinating resources for their most valued uses. As Putterman and Kroszner observe, this tends to imply that organizations like firms have no inherent "economic *raison d'être*."²⁷ In this sense, firms are mainly artifacts of information and transaction costs, which information technologies tend to reduce drastically. 为什么会有企业?这个问题似乎并不像表面上那么简单。微观经济学通常假设价格机制是协调资源以实现最高价值利用的最有效手段。正如普特南和克罗斯纳所观察的,这往往意味着诸如企业这样的组织没有固有的"经济理由"。从这个意义上说,企业主要是信息和交易成本的人为产物,而信息技术往往能大幅降低这些成本。

Therefore, the Information Age will tend to be the age of independent contractors without "jobs" with long-lasting "firms." As technology lowers transaction costs, the very process that will enable individuals to escape from domination by politicians will also prevent "rule by corporations." Corporations will compete with "virtual corporations"

因此,信息时代将趋向于没有"工作"且没有持久"公司"的独立承包商的时代。随着技术降低了交易成本,使个人能够摆脱政客统治的过程,同时也会阻止"公司统治"。公司将与"虚拟公司"竞争。

from across the globe to a degree that will disturb and threaten all but a few. Most corporations as institutions will be lucky to survive intensified competition as markets become more complete.

从全球范围来看,这种程度的干扰和威胁将影响除少数人之外的所有

人。大多数机构性企业能否幸存下来,都需要面对市场变得更加完全所带来的激烈竞争。

The consequence to be expected is not that individuals will be at the mercy of corporations. To the contrary. Corporations, per se, will have no more power to rig markets than politicians. It is rather that individuals will finally be free to determine their own destinies in a truly free market, ruled neither by big governments nor corporate hierarchies.

我们可以预期的结果不是个人会受到企业的蛮横统治。恰恰相反。企业本身将不会比政客更有操纵市场的能力。反而是,个人将最终能够在—个真正自由的市场中决定自己的命运,不会再受到大政府或企业层级的束缚。

This erosion of transaction costs will also put the lie to recently fashionable notions of "stakeholder capitalism." Such notions, dear to Tony Blair of Britain's Labour Party as well as some within Bill Clinton's entourage, are predicated upon the ability of the state to manipulate the corporation. Socialism having collapsed, interventionists now dream of achieving the ends of socialism through more market-efficient means by heavily regulating the firm. This new redistributive theory holds that the management, shareholders, employees, and "community" are all "stakeholders" of firms. The argument is that they all derive benefits from long-lasting firms, and even depend upon these benefits. Therefore, regulation ought to protect the stakes that managers, employees, and local taxing authorities have in the continuation of their historic relations with the firms.

这种交易成本的侵蚀也将否定近来流行的"利益相关者资本主义"的概念。这些概念受到英国工党领导人托尼·布莱尔以及克林顿政府中某些人的青睐,其前提是国家能够操纵企业。社会主义崩溃后,干预主义者现在梦想通过更有市场效率的方式来实现社会主义的目标,即对企业进行严格监管。这种新的再分配理论认为,管理层、股东、员工和"社区"都是企业的"利益相关者"。论点是,他们都从持久的企业中获得利益,甚至依赖于这些利益。因此,监管应该保护管理层、员工和地方税务当局与企业之间持续关系的利益。

"Stakeholder capitalism" is a doctrine that ultimately presupposes not only an ability of the state to manipulate the decision-making of corporations, but even more 273

利益相关方资本主义"是一种理念,它最终不仅假定国家能够操纵企业的决策,而且还假定国家更能 273

basically presupposes the existence of corporations as longstanding organizations capable of functioning independently of price signals in the auction market.

基本上假定公司是长期存在的组织,能够独立于拍卖市场中的价格信号而运作。

We suspect that the deepening of markets will not only diminish the taxing capacity of the nationstate, it will also erode the capacity of politicians to impose their will arbitrarily upon the owners of resources by regulation. In a world where jurisdictional advantages will be subject to market tests, and many local markets will be opened to competition from anywhere, it is hardly to be expected that local "communities" will have many effective ways of isolating favored firms from global competitive pressures.

Therefore, they will have few ways of assuring that corporations lumbered with higher costs (for example, to retain unnecessary employees and management personnel, and keep unneeded facilities open to accommodate local political pressures) will be able to offset those costs and stay in business. In the Industrial Age, politicians could close markets and restrict entry to a few favored firms to meet employment and other objectives. In the future, when information will be freely tradable anywhere on the globe, the power of governments to insulate local businesses from global competitive pressures will be minimal.

我们怀疑市场的深化不仅会削弱民族国家的税收能力,还会侵蚀政治家通过法规任意对资源所有者施加意志的能力。在一个司法优势将受到市场考验的世界中,许多地方市场都将开放给来自任何地方的竞争,很难期望地方"社区"会有许多有效的方式来隔离受青睐的公司免受来自全球的竞争压力。因此,他们将很少有办法确保负有更高成本(例如,为了保留不必要的员工和管理人员,并保持不必要的设施开放以满足地方政治压力)的公司能够抵消这些成本并保持经营。在工业时代,政治家可以关闭市场,限制少数受青睐的公司进入,以满足就业和其他目标。在未

来,当信息将可在全球任何地方自由交易时,政府隔离地方企业免受全球竞争压力的能力将是最小的。

Neither is it likely that calls for a "new social contract" focused on a so-called independent or volunteer sector to absorb the time of otherwise unemployed or marginalized workers "in the community" will prove viable.²⁸ Jeremy Ritkin imagines "a new partnership between the government and the third sector to rebuild the social economy. ... Feeding the poor, providing basic health care services, educating the nation's youth, building affordable housing and preserving the environment." ²⁹

这并不可能是一个"新的社会契约"的呼吁重点,该契约将专注于所谓的独立或志愿者部门,以吸收其他失业或边缘化工人"在社区"的时间。²⁸ 杰里米·里特金想象"一个新的政府与第三部门之间的合作关系,以重建社会经济。...喂养贫困人口、提供基本医疗保健服务、教育国家的青年、建造廉价住房和保护环境。" ²⁹

The Eclipse of Public Goods

公共产品的遮蔽

Of course, the apologists for coercion will argue that the waning of state power will lead to an inability to procure or enjoy public goods. This is unlikely, both for competitive and other reasons. For one thing, with locational advantages mostly dissipated by technology, jurisdictions that fail to provide essential public goods, such as maintenance of law and order, will rapidly lose customers. In the most extreme failures, such as those already evidenced in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, hordes of penniless refugees are likely to spill over borders seeking more satisfactory provision of law and order. But these extreme examples of desertion, or voting with one's feet, will differ only by their urgency from straightforward jurisdictional shopping.

当然,对强制手段进行辩护的人会认为,国家权力的衰落会导致无法获得或享受公共物品。这种可能性不大,原因既包括竞争因素,也包括其他原因。首先,由于技术的缘故,位置优势基本消失,未能提供基本公共物品(如维护法律和秩序)的管辖区域,将迅速失去客户。在最极端的失败案例中(如索马里、利比里亚、卢旺达和前南斯拉夫等已有的案例),大批贫困难民很可能会越过边境寻求更好的法律和秩序保障。但这种"投

票"行为或脚踏实地选择的极端案例,只是从迫切程度上有所不同,与常规的管辖区域选择并无二致。

In any event, corporations will force local jurisdictions to meet the needs of their customers.

在任何情况下,企业都会迫使当地司法管辖区满足客户的需求。

"Competitive Territorial Clubs"

竞争性领土俱乐部

This is more than merely a theory, as articulated first by economist Charles Tiebout in 1956.³⁰ As economist Fred Foldvary has documented in *Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services*, there is no essential reason that social services and many public goods must be provided by political means.

这不仅仅是一个理论,正如经济学家查尔斯·蒂伯特在 1956 年首次阐述的那样。³⁰ 正如经济学家弗雷德·福尔德瓦里在《公共产品和私人社区:社会服务的市场供给》一书中所记录的那样,社会服务和许多公共产品不必一定通过政治方式提供。

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Foldvary's examples, among others, also confirm the controversial theorem of Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase that "government intervention is not needed to resolve externality issues," such as problems of pollution.³¹ Entrepreneurs can provide collective goods by market means. Many already do so now in real world communities.

福尔德瓦里的例子以及其他例子,也证实了诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗纳德·科斯的有争议定理,"政府干预并不是解决外部性问题的必要条件",比如污染问题。³¹ 企业家可以通过市场手段提供集体物品。在现实社区中,许多人已经这样做了。

Foldvary's case studies show how the privatization of communities can result in new mechanisms for providing and financing public goods and services.³²

福尔德瓦里的案例研究显示,社区的私有化可以导致提供和资助公共物品和服务的新机制。

The Road to Prosperity 通往繁荣的道路

Microtechnology itself will facilitate new means of financing and regulating the provision of goods heretofore treated as public goods.

微技术本身将促进新的融资和监管方式,为此前被视为公共物品的商品提供服务。

In retrospect, some of these goods will prove to have been private goods in disguise. Highways represent a key example. So long as congestion was a minor problem, roads and highways could be treated as if they were public goods, albeit subject to the criticisms leveled by Adam Smith that they disproportionately benefit those living nearby at the expense of those in remote regions who are dragooned into paying for them while enjoying few of the benefits.

回顾过去,其中一些商品事实上是伪装成公共商品的私人商品。高速公路就是一个重要例子。只要拥堵问题不太严重,道路和高速公路可以被视为公共商品,但仍受到亚当·斯密的批评,即它们主要惠及附近居民,而远程地区的居民不得不为之付费,却很少享有其利益。

In the Information Age, it will be technologically feasible to impose tolls, including congestion fees, that accurately price access to highways, runways, and other infrastructure without interrupting traffic flow. Thus the provision transportation infrastructure could be discretely privatized and financed directly by those who use the service. Economist Paul Krugman estimates that market pricing of U.S. transportation infrastructure would add from \$60 billion to \$100 billion annually to GDP in the United States, while improving the efficiency of resource use and reducing pollution.³³ 在信息时代,通过征收费用(包括拥堵费用)来精确定价进出高速公路、跑道和其他基础设施,而不会中断交通流畅,这在技术上是可行的。因此,交通基础设施的提供可以被私有化,并由使用该服务的人直接融资。经济学家保罗·克鲁格曼估计,美国运输基础设施的市场定价每年将

为美国 GDP 增加 600 亿美元至 1000 亿美元,同时提高资源使用效率并减少污染。

Furthermore, it is not to be forgotten that the most costly part of what modern nationstates do-redistributing income-is not the provision of a public good at all, but the provision of private goods at public expense. "Public expense" here is a euphemism for "at the expense of those who pay the taxes." What of a genuine public good, like the provision of a military force capable of deterring attack by a great power? Such a force has traditionally been expensive. Obviously, as we have already explored, a government that lacks an unchecked ability to confiscate the incomes and property of its citizens would be unable to finance participation in another great power conflict like World War II.

此外,不能忘记当今国家所做的最昂贵的部分是收入再分配,这并非提供公共产品,而是以公共开支提供私人产品。"公共开支"只是"以纳税人负担"的委婉说法。像提供一支能够遏制强大对手攻击的军事力量这样的真正公共产品又是怎样的?这种军事力量传统上一直很昂贵。显然,正如我们之前探讨过的,一个政府如果缺乏无限收缴其公民收入和财产的能力,就无法筹资参与像二战这样的大国冲突。

Yet this fiscal limit poses less of a threat than the reactionaries will pretend, for the simple reason that there will be no more conflicts like World War II. The very technology that is liberating individuals will see to that.

然而,这个财政限制并不像反动分子所声称的那样严重,因为很简单的原因是,不会再出现像第二次世界大战那样的冲突。解放个人的正是这种技术。

Up from Politics
政治以外的事

Instead of leaving the quality and character of such services to the mercy of politics, "governments" can be run entrepreneurially and converted into what Foldvary describes as "competitive territorial clubs." We suspect that ultimately, the decision-275

不应该让政治决定这类服务的质量和性质,相反,政府可以以企业家的方

式运营,并转变成费尔瓦里所描述的"竞争性领土俱乐部"。我们怀疑,最终的决定是 275。

making process by which such "competitive territorial clubs" are organized will mean much less than their success in meeting market tests of performance.

使这种"竞争性领土俱乐部"组织起来的过程远不如它们在满足市场绩效测试方面的成功来得重要。

Today, few consumers care when they buy a product or service whether the firm that sells it is a sole proprietorship, a limited liability company, or a corporation controlled by outside directors nominated by pension plans. Equally, we doubt that the rational consumer of sovereignty services in the Information Age will care whether Singapore is a mass democracy or a proprietorship of Lee Kwan Yew.

如今,消费者很少关心他们购买产品或服务的公司是独资企业、有限责任公司还是由养老基金提名的外部董事控制的公司。同样,我们怀疑信息时代的理性消费者也不会关心新加坡是大众民主制还是李光耀的所有制。

CHAPTER 11

第 11 章

MORALITY AND CRIME IN THE "NATURAL 犯罪与道德在"自然"中

ECONOMY" OF THE INFORMATION AGE 信息时代的"经济"

"Corruption... is far more widespread and universal than previously thought. Evidence of it is everywhere, in developing countries and, with growing frequency, in industrial countries. . . . Prominent political figures, including presidents of countries and ministers, have been accused of corruption. . . . In a way this represents a privatization of the state in which its power is not shifted to the market, as privatization normally implies, but to government officials and bureaucrats." VIRO TANZI We believe that as the modern nationstate decomposes, latter-day barbarians will increasingly come to exercise real power behind the scenes. Groups like the Russian mafiyas that pick the bones of the former Soviet Union, other ethnic criminal gangs, nomenklaturas, drug lords, and renegade covert agencies will increasingly be laws unto themselves. They already are. Far more than is widely understood, the modern barbarians have already infiltrated the forms of the nationstate without greatly changing its appearances. They are microparasites feeding on a dying system. As violent and unscrupulous as a state at war, these groups employ the techniques of the state on a smaller scale. Their growing influence and power is part of the downsizing of politics.

腐败...比先前认为的更为广泛和普遍。它的证据无处不在,不仅在发展中国家,而且在工业化国家也越来越频繁出现。许多知名政治人物,包括国家元首和部长,也被指控参与腐败。这一定程度上代表了国家的私有化,其权力并未转移到市场,而是转移到了政府官员和官僚。维罗·坦兹认为,随着现代民族国家的瓦解,后现代的野蛮人将越来越能在幕后施展实际权力。如俄罗斯黑社会和其他种族犯罪团伙、旧体制精英以及毒品大亨等,这些群体已经成为自己的法律。比人们广泛认知的更甚,现代

野蛮人已经渗透到民族国家的形式中,而并未大幅改变其表面。他们就像寄生虫一样,正在蚕食一个垂死的体系。与处于战争状态的国家一样凶暴和不择手段,这些群体在较小范围内运用国家的手段。他们不断增长的影响力和实力,正是政治收缩的一部分。

Microprocessing reduces the size that groups must attain in order to be effective in the use and control of violence. As this technological revolution unfolds, predatory violence will be organized more and more outside of central control. Efforts to contain violence will also devolve in ways that depend more upon efficiency than magnitude of power.

微处理技术减小了组织需要达到的规模,以便有效利用和控制暴力。随着这一技术革命的不断推进,掠夺性暴力将越来越多地在中央控制之外进行组织。遏制暴力的努力也将逐步转向更多依赖效率而非权力规模的方式。

The surge of covert criminal activity and corruption within nationstates will form an important subplot as the world changes.

国家内部的暗中犯罪活动和腐败将成为世界变革过程中的重要情节线。

What you will see could be a covert and sinister version of a bad movie, *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*. Before most nationstates visibly collapse they will be dominated by latter-day barbarians. As often as not, as in the famous B-movie from the 1950s, they will be barbarians in disguise. The Pod People of the future, however, will not be aliens from space but criminals of various affiliations who fill official positions while owing at least partial allegiance outside the constitutional order.

你可能看到一个隐藏且阴险的坏电影版本,《异形入侵》。在大多数国家明显崩溃之前,它们将被后代野蛮人统治。与 20 世纪 50 年代著名的 B 级电影一样,他们将是伪装的野蛮人。然而,未来的豆荚人不会是来自外星的外星人,而是属于各种关系的罪犯,他们占据官方职位,但至少部分忠诚于宪政秩序之外。

The end of an era is usually a period of intense corruption. As the bonds of the old system dissolve, the social ethos dissolves with it, creating an environment in which people in high places may combine public purposes

with private criminal activity.

一个时代的终结通常都伴随着严重的腐败。当旧的秩序瓦解时,社会的道德观也跟着瓦解,这种环境使得权势人物可能将公共目标与私人犯罪活动结合起来。

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Unfortunately, you will not be able to depend upon normal information channels to give you an accurate and timely understanding of the decay of the nationstate.

很遗憾,您无法依靠正常的信息渠道来准确及时地了解国家的衰落。

"Persistent make-believe" of the kind that disguised the fall of the Roman Empire is probably a typical feature of the decomposition of large political entities. It now disguises and masks the collapse of the nationstate. For a variety of reasons, the news media cannot always be depended upon to tell you the truth. Many are conservative in the sense that they represent the party of the past. Some are blinded by anachronistic ideological commitments to socialism and the nationstate. Some will be afraid for more tangible reasons to reveal the corruption that is likely to loom ever larger in a decaying system. Some will lack physical courage that might be required for such a task. Others will fear for their jobs or be shy of other retribution for speaking up. And, of course, there is no reason to suspect that reporters and editors are any less prone to corrupt consideration than building inspectors or Italian paving contractors.

"罗马帝国衰落时虚构的持续是大型政治实体分解的典型特征。它现在掩盖并掩蔽了民族国家的崩溃。由于各种原因,新闻媒体不能总是依赖于告诉你真相。许多人保守,因为他们代表过去的政党。有些人被对社会主义和民族国家的过时意识形态承诺所蒙蔽。有些人出于更切实的原因而害怕揭露必将愈发突出的腐败。有些人可能缺乏完成此任务所需的体力勇气。还有的人将担心自己的工作或害怕为发声而受到其他报复。当然,没有理由怀疑记者和编辑不会比建筑检查员或意大利铺路承包商更容易受到腐败的影响。"

To a larger extent than you might expect, important organs of information that appear to be keen to report anything and everything may prove to be

less dependable information sources than is commonly supposed. Many will have other motivations, including shoring up support for a faltering system, that they will place ahead of honestly informing you. They will see little and explain less.

比你想象的还要大程度上,那些看起来热衷于报导任何事物的重要信息来源可能会证明不如通常所认为的那样值得依赖。许多信息提供者将把别的动机,包括支持脆弱的制度,置于如实地告知你之前。他们只会看到一些,并且很少解释。

BEYOND REALITY

超越现实

As artificial reality and computer game technologies continue to improve, you'll even be able to order a nightly news report that simulates the news you would like to hear. Want to watch a report showing yourself as the winner of the decathlon at the Olympics? No problem. It could be tomorrow's lead story. You'll see any story you wish, true or false, unfold on your television/computer with greater verisimilitude than anything that NBC or the BBC can now muster.

随着人工现实和电子游戏技术不断改进,您甚至可以订购每晚新闻报道,模拟您想要听到的新闻。想看一次报道,展示您获得奥运会十项全能的冠军吗?没问题。这可能会成为明天的头条新闻。您将在电视或电脑上观看任何您想要的故事,无论真假,真实程度都超过 NBC 或 BBC 目前能做出的任何报道。

We are rapidly moving to a world where information will be as completely liberated from the bounds of reality as human ingenuity can make it. Certainly, this will have tremendous implications for the quality and character of the information you receive. In a world of artificial reality and instantaneous transmission of everything everywhere, integrity of judgment and the ability to distinguish the true from the false will be even more important.

我们正迅速走向一个信息将被完全从现实的界限中解放出来的世界,就像人类才智所能造就的那样。无疑,这将对您收到的信息的质量和性质产生巨大的影响。在一个人工现实和一切随处瞬时传输的世界里,判断的完整性以及区分真伪的能力将变得更加重要。

But this will be less of a change from our current circumstances than many people would imagine. The distinctions between true and false are commonly blurred for reasons that have been amplified by technology. 但这对我们当前的情况的改变不会像许多人想象的那样大。由于技术的放大作用,真假之间的界限常常变得模糊不清。

We say this recognizing that many of the consequences of the Information Revolution have been liberating.

我们承认信息革命带来的许多后果是解放性的。

Technology has already begun to transcend geographic proximity and political domination. Governments can erect barriers to hinder the trade in goods, but they can do much less to halt the transmission of information. Almost every diner at any restaurant in Hong Kong is connected by cellular phone to the whole globe. The hard-line coup 278

科技已经开始超越地理接近性和政治统治。政府可以设置障碍来阻碍商品贸易,但他们无法阻止信息传输。在香港的任何餐厅,几乎每个用餐者都通过手机连接到整个全球。强硬路线政变 278

plotters in Moscow in August 1991 could not shut down Yeltsin's communications because he had cellular phones.

莫斯科 1991 年 8 月的政变分子无法切断叶利钦的通讯,因为他有手机。

More Information, Less Understanding

信息越多,越不明白

As the barriers to transmission of information have fallen, there has been more of it, which is good. But there has also been more confusion about what it means. The modern technology that helps liberate information from political controls and impediments of time and place also tends to raise the value of old-fashioned judgment.

随着信息传输障碍的消除,信息量有所增加,这是好事。但人们对信息意味着什么也变得更加困惑。现代技术帮助信息从政治控制和时间、地点障碍中解放,但也倾向于提高传统判断的价值。

The kind of insight that helps discern what is important and true from the mountain of facts and fantasies is growing in value almost daily. This is true for at least three reasons: 1. The very glut of information now available puts a premium on brevity.

能够从大量事实和幻想中辨别什么是重要和真实的洞察力正日益重要。这至少有三个原因:1.现有信息的泛滥,简洁性越来越被看重。

Brevity leads to abbreviation. Abbreviation leaves out what is unfamiliar. When you have many facts to digest and lots of phone calls to return, the natural desire is to make each information-processing event as concise as possible. Unfortunately, abbreviated information often provides a poor foundation for understanding. The deeper and richer textures of history are precisely the parts that tend to be edited out in the twenty-five-second sound-bites and misconstrued on CNN. It is much easier to convey a message that is a variation on an already understood theme than it is to explore a new paradigm of understanding. You can report a baseball or a cricket score much more easily than you can explain how baseball or cricket is played and what it means.

简洁会导致缩写。缩写会省略不熟悉的部分。当您需要消化大量事实和回复众多电话时,自然会渴望使每个信息处理事件尽可能简洁。遗憾的是,缩写后的信息往往难以建立深入理解的基础。历史的深厚细腻纹理正是那些容易在 25 秒的简易报道和 CNN 的误读中被删减的部分。传达一个已经被理解的主题的变体要比探索一个全新的理解模式容易得多。您可以轻松报告一场棒球或板球赛的比分,但要解释棒球或板球的玩法及其含义就要困难得多。

2. Rapidly changing technology is undermining the megapolitical basis of social and economic organization. As a consequence, broad paradigmatic understanding, or unspoken theories about the way the world works, are being antiquated more quickly than in the past. This increases the importance of the broad overview and diminishes the value of individual "facts" of the kind that are readily available to almost anyone with an information retrieval system.

技术的快速变革正在动摇社会和经济组织的大政治基础。因此,关于世界运作方式的广泛范式理解或默契理论正在比过去更快地过时。这增加了总体概述的重要性,并降低了几乎任何人使用信息检索系统即可获得个别"事实"的价值。

3. The growing tribalization and marginalization of life have had a stunting effect on discourse, and even on thinking. Many people have consequently gotten into the habit of shying away from conclusions that are obviously implied by the facts at their disposal.

3. 日益滋生的部落化和边缘化已经对话语和思考产生了阻碍作用。许多人因此养成了回避明显由手边事实推出的结论的习惯。

A recent psychological study disguised as a public opinion poll showed that members of individual occupational groups were almost uniformly unwilling to accept any conclusion that implied a loss of income for them, no matter how airtight the logic supporting it.

最近一项伪装成民意调查的心理研究表明,各行各业的从业者几乎一致不愿意接受任何意味着他们收入损失的结论,无论其所依据的逻辑有多么完善。

Given increased specialization, most of the interpretive information about most specialized occupational groups is designed to cater to the interests of the groups themselves. They have little interest in views that might be impolite, unprofitable, or politically incorrect. There is no better example of this general tendency than the broad drumbeat of views implying bright prospects for investing in the stock market.

鉴于专业化程度的提高,大多数专业职业群体的解释性信息都是为了迎合该群体自身的利益。他们对可能不礼貌、不赢利或政治不正确的观点没有太大兴趣。没有比暗示投资股市前景光明的观点更好的例子了。

Most of that information is generated by brokerage firms, few of which will tell you that stocks are overvalued. Their income is derived from transaction business that depends on the majority of customers being ready to buy. Independent, contrary voices are seldom heard.

大部分的信息都是由券商生成的,其中很少有人会告诉你股票被高估了。他们的收入来自于交易业务,需要大多数客户准备购买。鲜少听到独立的、反对观点。

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For these and other reasons, the Age of Information has not yet become the Age of Understanding. To the contrary, there has been a sharp drop-off in the rigor of public discourse. The world now could know more than at any time in the past. But there is almost no public voice left to assess the

meaning of events and say what is true. This is why we have been fascinated to see the tepid interest, particularly in the U.S. media, in reporting hints of sensational corruption at high levels of the U.S. government.

信息时代尚未成为理解时代。相反,公众话语的严谨性急剧下降。现在的世界比过去任何时候都可能更了解。但几乎没有公众声音来评估事件的含义并说出真相。这就是为什么我们看到,特别是在美国媒体中,对报道美国政府高层令人震惊的腐败信息兴趣缺乏的原因。

A central theme we have wrestled with in this book is how changing technology and other "megapolitical" factors alter the "natural economy. The "natural economy" is the Darwinian "state of nature" where outcomes are determined, sometimes unfairly, by physical force. In the "natural economy," an important strand of behavior is what biologists call "interference competition."

我们在这本书中一直在与之抗争的一个中心主题是,不断变化的技术和其他"超政治"因素如何改变"自然经济"。"自然经济"是达尔文主义的"自然状态",在这里的结果有时会不公平地由物理力量决定。在"自然经济"中,生物学家称之为"干扰竞争"的重要行为是一个重要方面。

Interference Competition

干扰竞争

"Interference competitors," as Jack Hirshleifer put it, "gain and maintain control over resources by directly fighting off or hampering their rivals."² However much we may wish that human behavior were always subject to the rule of law and "other socially enforced rules of the game" ("political economy"), there is ample evidence that many people "play by the rules" only when it suits them. Hirshleifer, an authority on conflict, put it this way: "[T]he persistence of crime, war and politics teaches us that actual human affairs still remain largely subject to the underlying pressures of natural economy."³ In other words, economic outcomes are determined only partly by the peaceful and law-abiding behavior of the Homo economicus described in textbooks, who honor property rights "and will not simply take what does not belong to them."⁴ Actual outcomes are also shaped by conflict, including overt violence. As economist Hirshleifer points out,

"Even under law and government, the rational, self-interested individual will strike a balance between lawful and unlawful means of acquiring resources-between production and exchange on the one hand and theft, fraud and extortion on the other." 5

根据杰克·赫斯利弗的说法,"干扰竞争对手"是"通过直接与竞争对手战斗或阻碍他们来获得和维持对资源的控制权"。尽管我们希望人类行为总是服从于法治和"其他社会强制执行的游戏规则"("政治经济"),"但有充分的证据表明,许多人只在对自己有利的时候才"按规则行事"。作为冲突权威,赫斯利弗这样说:"犯罪、战争和政治的持续存在,告诉我们实际人类事务仍然在很大程度上受制于自然经济的基本压力。"换句话说,经济结果不仅由教科书中描述的"理性经济人"和尊重财产权"不会简单地占为己有"的和平守法行为决定,也受到包括公开暴力在内的冲突的塑造。正如经济学家赫斯利弗所指出的,"即使在法律和政府的约束下,理性的自利个人也会在合法和非法的获取资源手段之间寻求平衡,在生产、交换与盗窃、欺诈和敲诈之间权衡。"

MUGGING IN THE INFORMATION AGE

信息时代的抢劫

Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas explore this in a useful book on violence, crime, and politics, *The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation*: "Individuals and groups can either produce and thus create wealth or seize the wealth created by others." 6 They quote a tale of modern interference competition originally reported by the Economist. "An American businessman, recently arrived in Moscow to open an office, was met at his hotel by five men with gold watches, pistols and a printout of his firm's net worth. They demanded 7% of future earnings. He took the first flight to New York, where muggers are less sophisticated." 7 This tale of mugging in the Information Age owes more to new technology than the simple fact that thugs in Russia now have access to financial profiles and credit reports on their victims through the Internet.

米歇尔·R·加菲尼克尔和斯特吉奥斯·斯卡珀达斯在一本关于暴力、犯罪和政治的有用书籍中探讨了这个问题,即《冲突和剥夺的政治经济》:"个人和群体可以通过生产和创造财富,或者通过剥夺他人创造的财富来获得。"他们引用了一则来自经济学家的现代资讯竞争的故事。"一位最近到莫斯科开设办事处的美国商人在酒店被 5 个戴金表、拿手枪,并拿着他公司净资产打印件的人拦截。他们要求分得 7% 的未来收益。他立即坐上前往纽约的航班,因为那里的打劫犯不那么高级。"这个信息时代的打劫故事更多地源于新技术,而不仅仅是因为俄罗斯的流氓现在可以通过互联网获取受害者的财务信息和信用报告。

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Falling Decisiveness of Military Power

军事力量的决策力下降

For good and for ill, by making large-scale military power less decisive, information technology has radically reduced the capacity of the nationstate to impose its authority in an unruly world. If once, as Voltaire said, "God was on the side of bigger battalions," there appears to be less divine support

with every day that passes for generating large returns to violence. Instead, we see the opposite-more evidence of diminishing returns to violence-which strongly implies that large conglomerations like the nationstate will no longer justify their huge overhead costs.

无论是好是坏,信息技术的发展使得大规模军事力量的决定性大大降低,从根本上削弱了国家在动荡世界中强加其权威的能力。正如伏尔泰所说,过去"上帝站在更庞大的军队一边",但如今我们日益看到,暴力带来的回报越来越递减,这意味着庞大的国家机器将无法再证明其高昂的维持成本的合理性。

The most obvious evidence of the declining decisiveness of centralized power is the rise of terrorism. High-profile bombings in the United States in the mid-nineties show that even the world's military superpower is not immune from attack.

中心集权的决策力下降最显著的证据是恐怖主义的兴起。九十年代中期美国引起广泛关注的炸弹袭击事件表明,即使是世界军事超级大国也难以免受攻击。

Another important manifestation of falling returns to violence is the worldwide growth of gangsterism and organized crime, along with its corollary, political cronyism and corruption. They reflect a generally amoral atmosphere in which the state can coerce but not protect. As its monopoly of violence frays, new competitors edge into the scene, like the bully-boys who tried to impose their own private taxes on the American businessman in Moscow.

另一个重要的暴力报酬下降的表现是全球欺诈集团和有组织犯罪的增长,以及其伴生物—政治裙带关系和腐败。它们反映了一种普遍缺乏道德的氛围,国家可以强制但不能保护。随着其对暴力的垄断日益崩溃,新的竞争者不断涌现,如那些试图在莫斯科向美国商人强征私人税收的恶霸。

Small groups, tribes, triads, gangs, gangsters, mafias, militias, and even solitary individuals have gained increasing military effectiveness. They will exercise far more real power in the "natural economy" of the next millennium than they did in the twentieth century. Weapons that employ microchips have tended to shift the balance of power toward the defense,

making decisive aggression less profitable and therefore less likely.

小型团体、部落、三合会、帮派、黑社会、民兵组织,甚至是孤立的个人,已经取得了越来越大的军事实力。他们在下一个千年的"自然经济"中将会发挥比 20 世纪更大的实际影响力。使用微芯片的武器趋于增强防御的优势,使决定性攻击的效益减少,因此出现的可能性也随之降低。

Smart weapons, like Stinger missiles, for example, effectively neutralize much of the advantage that large, wealthy states formerly enjoyed in deploying expensive air power to attack poorer, smaller groups.

像"毒刺"导弹这样的智能武器有效中和了大型富裕国家过去依靠昂贵空中力量攻击较贫困小型团体所享有的优势。

Information War Ahead

信息战在前

Looming ahead is the widely discussed but little-understood possibility of "Information War." It also points to diminishing returns to violence. "Logic bombs"

正在逼近的是广为讨论但鲜为人知的"信息战"的可能性。它也指向暴力收益递减。"逻辑炸弹"

could disable or sabotage air-traffic control systems, rail-switching mechanisms, power generators and distribution networks, water and sewage systems, telephone relays, even the military's own communications. As societies become more dependent upon computerized controls, "logic bombs" could do almost as much damage as physical explosions.

可以破坏或破坏空中交通管制系统、铁路切换机制、发电机和配电网络、供水和污水系统、电话中继器,甚至军方自己的通信系统。随着社会越来越依赖计算机化控制,"逻辑炸弹"可能造成的破坏几乎与实体爆炸一样严重。

Unlike conventional bombs, "logic bombs" could be detonated remotely, not just by hostile governments but by groups of freelance computer programmers, and even talented individual hackers. Note that an Argentine teenager was arrested in 1996 for repeatedly hacking into Pentagon

computers. While to date hackers have not tended to tamper with computer-controlled systems in destructive ways, this is not because there are truly effective ways of stopping them.

与常规炸弹不同,"逻辑炸弹"可以远程引爆,不仅是由敌对政府,而且还可能是由自由职业计算机程序员群体,甚至是才华横溢的个人黑客引爆。值得注意的是,一名阿根廷青少年在 1996 年因多次入侵五角大楼计算机而被逮捕。虽然到目前为止,黑客还没有以破坏性的方式篡改计算机控制系统,但这并不是因为有真正有效的方法来阻止他们。

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When the age of Information War finally arrives, it is unlikely that its antagonists will only be governments. A company like Microsoft certainly has a greater ability to conduct Information War than 90 percent of the world's nationstates.

当信息战时代最终到来时,其对抗者不太可能仅仅是政府。像微软这样的公司无疑拥有比世界 90% 的国家更强大的进行信息战的能力。

The Age of the Sovereign Individual 主权个人时代

This is part of the reason why we have entitled this book The Sovereign Individual. As the scale of warfare falls, defense and protection will be mounted at a smaller scale. Therefore, they will increasingly be private rather than public goods, provided on a for-profit basis by private contractors. This is already evident in the privatization of policing in North America. One of the more rapidly growing occupations in the United States is the "security guard." Projections indicate that the number of private security guards will increase 24 percent to 40 percent above 1990 levels by the year 2005.⁶ The privatization of policing is already a well-defined trend. Yet as Anglo-Irish guru Hamish McRae points out, this is hardly the result of any deliberate decision of government. He writes in *The World in 2020*: No government has made a specific decision to move out of some policing tasks, nor indeed, have any moved out; the private sector has moved in. Partly as a result of the perceived failures of the police, partly as a result of other changes in society, private security firms have gradually been taking over much of the job of protecting ordinary civilians in their

offices or shopping centres. As the gated communities of Los Angeles show, people are even moving some way back towards the medieval concept of a city, where the citizens live behind town walls patrolled by guards, and where access is possible only at controlled gates.⁹

这就是我们将本书命名为《主权个体》的部分原因。随着战争规模的缩小,防御和保护将在更小的规模上进行。因此,它们将越来越多地成为私人而非公共物品,由私营承包商以营利为目的提供。这在北美警务私有化中已经明显可见。美国增长最快的职业之一就是"保安"。预测显示,到 2005 年,私人保安的数量将增加 24%至 40%,超过 1990 年的水平。警务私有化已经是一个明确的趋势。然而,正如英爱尔兰的专家哈米什·麦克雷所指出的,这并非政府的任何明确决定的结果。他在《2020 年的世界》中写道:"没有任何政府做出过特定的决定要从某些警务任务中撤出,事实上也没有任何政府这样做过;是私营部门插足进去的。部分是由于人们对警察失望,部分是由于社会的其他变化,私人保安公司逐步接管了保护普通平民在办公室或购物中心的大部分任务。正如洛杉矶的封闭社区所显示的,人们甚至正在向中世纪城市的概念回归,那里的市民居住在由卫兵巡逻的城市墙后,只有通过受控的大门才能进入。"

We believe that this is only a foretaste of more comprehensive privatization of almost every function undertaken by governments in the twentieth century. Because information technology has undermined the capacity of centralized authority to project power and provide physical security for systems that operate at a large scale, the optimal size of almost every enterprise in the "natural economy" is falling.

我们相信,这只是 20 世纪政府承担的几乎所有职能全面私有化的前兆。由于信息技术已经削弱了集中权力的能力,无法为大规模运营的系统提供物理安全保障,"自然经济"中几乎每个企业的最佳规模都在下降。

To respond to this technological change will entail a massive investment requirement (read opportunity) to redesign vulnerable systems with distributed rather than concentrated capabilities. If vulnerabilities of large scale are not removed, the systems that retain them will be subject to catastrophic failure.

回应这一技术变革需要大规模投资(视为机遇)来重新设计分散而非集

中能力的易受攻击系统。如果不消除大规模漏洞,保留这些漏洞的系统将面临灾难性的故障。

Sooner or later, by default if not by design, services and products provided by large bureaucratic agencies and corporations will devolve into highly competitive markets, managed not from a "headquarters" but through a distributed, decentralized network.

早晚,不管是有意还是无意,由大型官僚机构和公司提供的服务和产品将演变成高度竞争的市场,管理不是由"总部"进行,而是通过分布式的分散网络进行。

The corporation with a headquarters that can be surrounded by pickets or sabotaged by terrorists will be vulnerable until it ultimately becomes a "virtual corporation" without a location, "dwelling in many places concurrently," as Kevin Kelly, executive editor of Wired magazine writes in Out Of Control" Kelly understands that 282

总部可以被劳工集会或恐怖分子破坏的公司将一直脆弱,直到它最终变成没有固定地点的"虚拟公司",如《失控》一书的作者、《连线》杂志执行编辑凯文·凯利所写的那样,它"同时存在于多处"。凯利理解,

technology has changed the imperative to bring production processes under centralized control. "For most of the industrial revolution, serious wealth was made by bringing processes under one roof. Bigger was more efficient." Now it isn't.

技术改变了将生产过程置于集中控制的必要性。"在工业革命的绝大部分时期,通过将各工序集中在同一屋檐下来获得巨大财富。规模越大,效率越高。"但现在已不再如此。

Kelly foresees the possibility that an automobile of the future, the Upstart Car, could be designed and brought to production by as few as a dozen people collaborating in a virtual corporation.

凯利预见未来的汽车"新锐汽车"可能由 12 人在虚拟公司中合作设计和生产。

In the future, excessive scale could be not only counterproductive but dangerous.

在未来,过度的规模不仅可能适得其反,还可能危险。

Larger enterprises make more tempting targets. As practitioners of the underground economy demonstrate, one of the secrets of avoiding taxation is to avoid detection. This will be much easier for small-scale, "virtual corporations" than old-line corporations operating out of a skyscraper headquarters with their names in lights. They are bound to be more vulnerable to the attentions of "men with gold watches, pistols and a printout of the firm's net worth," the gangsters who will impose their own private brand of taxation in other parts of the globe as they do in Russia. 大型企业更容易成为诱人的目标。地下经济从业者表明,逃税的秘诀之一就是逃避检查。这对于小规模"虚拟公司"来说会容易得多,而不是那些在摩天大楼总部里露出自己名字的老牌公司。它们很容易受到"戴金表、拿手枪并有公司资产负债表打印件"的黑帮分子的关注,这些黑帮成员就像在俄罗斯一样在世界其他地方强加自己的私人"税收"。

Enterprises on all scales will be vulnerable to criminal shakedowns and impositions from organized criminal gangs.

各类企业都可能遭受有组织犯罪集团的勒索和强迫。

"[Consider the definition of a racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its reduction. Governments' provision of protection, by this standard, often qualifies as racketeering." CHARLES TILLY

考虑将敲诈者定义为制造威胁并收取其减少费用的人。从这个标准来看,政府提供保护往往符合敲诈的定义。

Nature Hates Monopolies

自然不喜欢垄断

As the monopoly on violence enjoyed by the "bigger battalions" breaks down, one of the first results to be expected is increasing prosperity for organized crime. Organized crime, after all, provides the main competition to nationstates in employing violence for predatory purposes. Although it is impolite to say so, it should not be forgotten, as political scientist Charles Tilly reminds us, that governments themselves-"quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy-qualify as our largest examples of

organized crime." 2 If you knew nothing else about the world other than the fact that an important monopoly was breaking down, one of the simplest and surest predictions you could make is that its nearest competitors would stand to benefit most. It is therefore not a coincidence that drug cartels, gangs, mafias, and tri ads of various sorts are proliferating around the world.

随着"拥有更多兵力"的垄断暴力的瓦解,预期出现的第一个结果之一是有组织犯罪的日益繁荣。毕竟,有组织犯罪为掠夺目的运用暴力是国家的主要竞争对手。虽然说这种话不太得体,但我们不能忘记,正如政治学家查尔斯·蒂利提醒我们的,政府本身——"具有合法性优势的典型保护性敲诈犯罪集团"——是我们见到的最大的有组织犯罪行为。如果除了一项重要垄断正在瓦解这个事实之外,你对世界一无所知,你可以毫不犹豫地预测,它最接近的竞争对手将是最大的受益者。因此,毒品集团、帮派、黑帮以及各种三合会在世界各地蓬勃发展,这并非巧合。

Sistema del Potere 权力系统

From Russia to Japan to the United States, organized crime is a far more important factor in the operation of economies than economic textbooks would prepare you to believe. What the Sicilians call the "sistema del potere," the "system of power," of organized crime has an increasingly important role to play in determining how economies function.

从俄罗斯到日本再到美国,有组织犯罪是影响经济运行的一个比经济教科书所准备的更为重要的因素。西西里人所称的"sistema del potere"(权力体系)的有组织犯罪,在决定经济如何运转中扮演着日益重要的角色。

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European police officials report that international crime syndicates, including Russian and Italian mafias, played "a dominant role" in financing the genocidal wars that have racked the Balkans in recent years.

欧洲警方官员报告称,包括俄罗斯和意大利黑社会在内的国际犯罪集团在资助最近几年波兰半岛上的种族屠杀战争中发挥了"主导作用"。

Drug traffickers have also played a key role in financing recent civil wars and insurgencies in other parts of the globe. Julio Fernandez, chief of the Spanish national police drug squad in Catalonia, says, "From 1986 to 1988, 80 percent of the heroin in Spain was carried here by Tamil Tiger guerrillas working with Pakistani residents in Barcelona or Madrid. As soon as we destroyed that network with arrests, it was replaced with Kurds from Turkey, who completely dominated it for the next two years." '3

毒品贩运者在资助最近发生在地球其他地区的内战和叛乱中也发挥了关键作用。加泰罗尼亚西班牙国家警察毒品部门主管胡里奥·费尔南德斯说:"从 1986 年到 1988 年,80%的海洛因是由在巴塞罗那或马德里与巴基斯坦居民合作的泰米尔之虎游击队成员运送到西班牙的。一旦我们通过逮捕摧毁了这个网络,它就被来自土耳其的库尔德人所取代,他们在接下来的两年里完全主导了这个网络。"

Chances are, whenever a new civil war or insurgency gets under way, the desperately poor combatants will finance their military effort by delivering drugs and laundering drug money.

在很多情况下,当新的内战或叛乱爆发时,贫困的战斗人员会通过交付毒品和洗钱来资助他们的军事行动。

Drug-Financed Discounting

药品融资贴现

Organized criminal syndicate activities have placed downward pressures on prices of commodities other than drugs. At the micro level, crime syndicates subsidize apparently legitimate businesses from the spoils of criminal enterprise. They can launder drug profits and other illicit funds by selling ordinary goods below cost, thus undercutting the prices of their clean competitors and putting many out of business.

有组织犯罪集团活动给除毒品以外的商品价格造成下行压力。在微观层面上,犯罪集团用犯罪收益补贴表面上合法的企业。他们可以通过以低于成本价销售普通商品来洗钱和非法资金,从而压低竞争对手价格,使许多人退出商业。

Yakuza Deflation

黑帮通货紧缩

In Japan, the powerful Yakuza gangs played a key role in Japan's hyperactive real estate bubble of the late 1980s. In spite of the fact that ninety thousand Yakuza make somewhere between \$10.19 billion (official estimate) and \$71.35 billion (estimate of Professor Takatsugu Nato) annually, a high proportion of the uncollectable loans that have threatened the solvency of Japan '5 banks were made to Yakuza-backed deals.'4 The deflation pressures-"price destruction," as the Japanese call it-that have characterized Japan's economy are a consequence.

在日本,强大的黑道团伙"山口组"在 20 世纪 80 年代末日本过热的房地产泡沫中发挥了关键作用。尽管有 9 万名山口组成员每年能赚到 100 亿美元(官方估计)至 713.5 亿美元(名为"中级教授"中津宗胜估计)之间,但无法收回的贷款,威胁到日本银行的偿付能力的很大一部分,是由支持山口组的交易产生的。这种"价格破坏"式的通缩,就是构成日本经济的后果。

A Blind Eye 视而不见

Russia's mafiya, as Yeltsin himself has admitted, have merged with "commercial structures, administrative agencies, interior ministry bodies, city authorities . . ." '~

叶利钦本人承认,俄罗斯的黑帮已与"商业结构、行政机构、内政部门、市政当局"合并。

Because of the immunity the mafiya have achieved by merging with police, they are able to enforce collection of their private taxes through blatant violence.

由于黑社会通过与警察合并而获得的免疫力,他们能够通过公然的暴力手段来执行收取私人税款的行为。

Authoritative sources indicate that four of five Russian businesses now pay protection money. "According to some reports, local small businesses in Russia have to pay 30 to 50 percent of their profits to racketeers, not just the meager 7 percent demanded from the American businessman." 16 In 1993 there were 355,500 crimes in Russia officially designated as examples of "racketeering," including almost "30,000

有权威来源表明,现在俄罗斯五家中有四家企业都在支付保护费。"根据一些报告,俄罗斯的本地小企业不得不支付 30%到 50%的利润给敲诈勒索分子,而不仅仅是从美国商人那里要求的微薄的 7%。"在 1993 年,俄罗斯官方确定的"敲诈勒索"类犯罪案件达到 355,500 件,其中包括近 30,000 起

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premeditated murders," mostly gangland assassinations of businessmen. According to a former interior minister, General Viktor Yerin, "The bulk were contract killings, because of conflicts in the sphere of commercial and financial activity." In most cases, authorities turned "a blind eye." Criminal organizations "through their control over coercion and corruption," as economists Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman write in *The Economics of Organized Crime*, play a key role in the economy.⁷ In theory, this influence can sometimes be beneficial because it constrains regulation and may encourage governments to improve their delivery of public goods. The presence of a powerful mafia "constrains the monopolistic role of government authorities." ⁸

蓄意谋杀,主要是针对商人的黑帮暗杀行为。据前内政部长维克多·耶林将军称,"大部分是合同杀人,因为商业和金融领域存在冲突。"在大多数情况下,当局都视而不见。正如经济学家吉安卢卡·弗朗蒂尼和山姆·佩尔茨曼在《有组织犯罪经济学》一书中所写,"通过对威慑和腐败的控制,犯罪组织在经济中扮演着关键角色"。从理论上讲,这种影响有时可能是有利的,因为它限制了监管,可能鼓励政府改善公共物品的供给。强大的黑社会的存在"约束了政府当局的垄断角色"。

Governments in territories with powerful organized crime groups can only with great difficulty entertain policies that the mafias oppose.

政府很难在有强大的有组织犯罪集团的地区执行这些集团反对的政策。

Collusion

串谋

In fact, it is notable how infrequently most governments are willing to directly confront the mafias that are their main competitors in the use of organized coercion. In strictly economic terms this is not surprising.

事实上,大多数政府不愿意直接面对与其主要竞争者-黑社会组织的使用有组织的强制力这一点是值得注意的。从纯粹的经济角度来看,这并不令人意外。

The most profitable arrangement that "the elected members of the public administration" can strike is a "collusive agreement" with organized crime. Fiorentini and Peltzman note that "there has been evidence of large-scale agreements where organized crime ensures political support for groups of candidates, while the latter repay the favor through a favorable management of public procurements and the provision of public services or subsidies." Contrary to the impression conveyed by Hollywood, penetrating and defrauding governments now appears to be one of the main focuses of criminal organizations like the Sicilian mafia. "Most scholars think that by now the greatest business of the Sicilian mafia is precisely that of appropriating the different sources of public expenditures and of organizing frauds against the local, national and European Community schemes of subsidization." 20

当选的公共行政成员"能够达成的最有利可图的安排是与有组织犯罪集团达成"内部勾结协议"。菲奥伦蒂尼和佩尔茨曼指出,"有证据表明存在大规模的协议,有组织犯罪集团确保政治支持某些候选人群体,而后者通过有利于公共采购的管理以及提供公共服务或补贴的方式回报这一义务。"与好莱坞给人的印象相反,渗透和欺骗政府现已成为西西里黑手党等犯罪组织的主要关注点之一。"大多数学者认为,西西里黑手党目前最大的业务正是侵占各种公共开支来源,并组织对地方、国家和欧共体补贴计划的欺诈行为。"

Narco Republics

毒品共和国

As we warned in *The Great Reckoning*, many governments in the world are thoroughly corrupted by drug lords. Mexico is an indisputable example. Former Mexican federal deputy attorney general Eduardo Valle Espinosa put the Mexican system in perspective in his resignation statement:

"Nobody can outline a political project in which the heads of drug trafficking and their financiers are not included. Because if you do, you die." Valle indicated that bribes make serving as a Mexican police chief so lucrative that candidates pay up to \$2 million just to get hired. In a strict profit-and-loss accounting, buying a local police office can be a lucrative investment. Drug cartels are willing to pay fortunes to even low-ranking Mexican officials because the money buys them immunity from prosecution for their crimes.

正如我们在《大清算》中警告的那样,世界上许多政府都被毒品大亨彻底腐败。墨西哥就是一个明确的例子。前墨西哥联邦副检察长埃杜阿多·瓦列·埃斯皮诺萨在其辞职声明中阐述了墨西哥体系的现状:"没有人能够提出一个政治项目,而不包括毒品交易头目及其资助者。因为如果你这样做,你就会死。"瓦列表示,贿赂使得担任墨西哥警察局长如此丰厚,以至于候选人需支付高达 200 万美元才能获得任命。从严格的收支核算来看,购买当地警察机关可能是一种有利可图的投资。毒品集团愿意向即使是低级别的墨西哥官员支付巨额贿赂,因为这笔钱能换来他们的犯罪行为不受起诉。

Colombia is another country where the top rungs of government are dominated by drug lords. The U.S. authorities have recently revoked the U.S. visa of Colombian 285

哥伦比亚是另一个政府高层被毒品贩子主导的国家。美国当局最近撤销了 285 名哥伦比亚公民的美国签证。

president Ernesto Samper on grounds that he knowingly received political contributions from drug dealers in exchange for favors.

埃内斯托·桑佩尔总统因涉嫌从毒品交易商那里收取政治捐款并提供回报而被罢免职务。

Pot Calls the Kettle Black
锅碓锅黑的

Anyone who has followed the reports in our newsletter, Strategic Investment, during the 1990s will immediately recognize the irony in the Clinton administration's posturing about Samper. There is credible evidence that U.S. President Bill Clinton has done everything Samper is accused of

and worse. Even if you would not take our word for it, Clinton's background is highlighted in gaudy detail in two well-researched books by authors on opposite sides of the political divide.

任何关注我们时事通讯《战略投资》在 1990 年代报道的人,都会立即认识到克林顿政府对桑珀的姿态中的讽刺意味。有可靠证据表明,美国总统比尔·克林顿做了桑珀被指控的一切及更糟糕的事情。即使您不相信我们的话,但克林顿的背景在两本彻底研究的书中都有生动详细的描述,这两本书的作者代表了不同的政治立场。

Roger Morris, who takes a generally left-wing perspective, was a national security official in the Nixon administration, as well as a senior aide to Dean Acheson, President Lyndon Johnson, and Walter Mondale. Morris has a doctorate from Harvard University.

罗杰·莫里斯从一个总体上左翼的角度来看问题,曾在尼克松政府担任国家安全官员,也是迪恩·阿切森、林登·约翰逊总统和沃尔特·蒙代尔的高级助理。莫里斯拥有哈佛大学的博士学位。

His book, *Partners in Power* details a sordid past for Clinton that makes Samper seem like a Boy Scout.

他的书《权力合伙人》详述了克林顿肮脏的过去,让萨姆珀看起来像个小朋友一样。

Morris recounts Clinton's fatherless childhood in Hot Springs, Arkansas, a center of gambling, prostitution, and organized crime to which most of his family had some connection. Clinton's step-uncle, Raymond Clinton, to whom Bill Clinton referred as a "father figure," was reputedly a leading "Godfather" figure in the Dixie mafia.

莫里斯回忆了克林顿在阿肯色州温泉城度过的无父亲的童年,那里是赌博、卖淫和有组织犯罪的中心,他的大部分家人都与之有某种联系。克林顿的继叔叔雷蒙德·克林顿,克林顿称他为"父亲般的人物",据称是南方黑手党的一位主要"教父"。

Morris alleges that Bill Clinton became a CIA recruit and spent his student days at Oxford monitoring anti-Vietnam War activists. As Morris sees things, Clinton remained a CIA asset through his period as governor, facilitating a CIA drug-and gun-running operation centered in Mena,

Arkansas. Morris seems to indict the CIA as a whole for drug trafficking, rather than entertaining the possibility that Clinton threw in with a corrupt faction of the agency, which seems more probable to us. Either interpretation, however, still suggests that the main covert intelligence agency of the U.S. government either directly or indirectly participates in organized drug running on a large scale. If the CIA is not an adjunct of organized crime, it is tripping dangerously close to being so.²¹

莫里斯指称,比尔·克林顿成为中情局的招募对象,并在牛津大学的学生时代监视反越战活动人士。根据莫里斯的看法,克林顿一直作为中情局的资产在担任州长期间,协助了一个以阿肯色州美纳市为中心的中情局毒品和军火走私行动。莫里斯似乎指控整个中情局参与毒品交易,而不是考虑克林顿可能与该机构内部腐败集团勾结的可能性,这似乎更为可能。不过,无论哪种解释,都仍然表明美国政府的主要情报机构要么直接,要么间接地参与了大规模的有组织的毒品走私活动。如果中情局不是有组织犯罪的附属机构,那么它也正危险地接近成为如此。

One Chance in 250,000,000
250,000,000 分之一的机会

Nonetheless, *Partners in Power* contains details that would interest any student of the corruption of modern American politics. And by no means, however, are all of Morris's fingers pointed at Bill Clinton.

尽管如此,《权力伙伴》包含了任何研究现代美国政治腐败的学生都会感兴趣的细节。不过,莫里斯并不是完全针对比尔·克林顿。

His wife comes in for some critical attention as well. For example, consider this excerpt from Morris's account of Hillary Clinton's miraculous commodity trading: "In 1995 economists at Auburn and North Florida Universities ran a sophisticated computer statistical model of the First Lady's trades for publication in the *Journal of Economics and Statistics*, using all the available records as well as market data from the *Wall Street Journal*. The probability of Hillary Rodham's having made her trades legitimately, they calculated, was less than one in 250,000,000."²² Morris musters many incriminating²⁸⁶

他的妻子也受到了一些严厉的关注。例如,考虑一下莫里斯对希拉里·克林顿神奇商品交易的描述: "1995 年,奥本大学和北佛罗里达大学的经济

学家利用《华尔街日报》的所有可用记录和市场数据,运用复杂的计算机统计模型,对第一夫人的交易进行了出版在《经济与统计学报》上。他们计算出希拉里·罗德姆合法进行这些交易的概率不到 250,000,000 分之一。"22 莫里斯提供了许多指控性的证据。

details about the drug-running and money-laundering operation that prospered in Arkansas under Clinton.

关于克林顿在阿肯色州繁荣的毒品交易和洗钱活动的细节。

"By the sheer magnitude of the drugs and money its flights generated, tiny Mena, Arkansas, became in the 1980s one of the world centers of the narcotics trade." 23

"由于其航班产生的大量毒品和金钱,小小的阿肯色州梅纳在 20 世纪 80 年代成为全球毒品贸易中心之一。"

Morris quotes an intimate as testifying about Clinton that "He knew."

Clinton not only knew of the cocaine smuggling but told state trooper L.D. Brown, a former bodyguard whom Clinton helped to land a position with the CIA, that the drug running was not a CIA operation. " 'Oh, no,' Clinton said, 'That's Lasater's deal.' "24 Dan Lasater, convicted cocaine distributor, was one of Clinton's major financial supporters, a man who made millions from Arkansas state business and once reportedly gave \$300,000 in cash in a brown paper bag to then Kentucky Governor John Y. Brown. According to Morris, Lasater "was never merely another big donor to be paid special deference, but an extraordinary intimate whom Clinton visited regularly at his brokerage and who came to the mansion whenever he pleased." 25 Morris recounts that Lasater's driver, who frequently brought him to the mansion, was "a convicted murderer who carried a gun and was widely known to deal drugs on the side."26 According to Morris's account, the President of the United States appears to have been on warmer terms with a drug dealer than the relationship alleged between Colombian president Ernesto Samper and the Cali cartel.

莫里斯引述一位亲密人士的证词,指控克林顿"他知道"。克林顿不仅知道可卡因走私,还告诉前卫队长 L.D.布朗(克林顿帮助他获得 CIA 工作)说,这不是 CIA 的行动,"不,这是拉萨特的交易。"24 被定罪的可卡因经销商丹·拉萨特是克林顿的主要经济支持者之一,曾经从阿肯色州的政府

业务中赚到数百万美元,并曾向当时的肯塔基州州长约翰·Y·布朗送过30 万美元现金。根据莫里斯的说法,拉萨特"不仅仅是另一个需要特殊照顾的大捐赠者,而是一个格外亲密的人,克林顿经常拜访他的经纪公司,他随意来到总统府。"25 莫里斯还讲述说,拉萨特的司机是一个经常把他送到总统府的已被定罪的杀手,他随身携带枪支,并广为人知地在一旁销毒品。26 根据莫里斯的说法,美国总统与毒品交易商的关系,似乎比哥伦比亚总统恩内斯托·桑佩尔与卡利毒品集团之间的关系还要亲密。

"Whew! Bob says things about Bill Clinton that even Hillary wouldn't say"
P.J. O'ROURKE

"呼! 鲍勃说的关于比尔·克林顿的话,连希拉里都不会说。" P.J. 奥鲁克

R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., editor-in-chief of The American Spectator is not a left liberal like Morris. But his account Boy Clinton contains many of the same details cited by Morris in painting a portrait of Clinton as a corrupt politician, intimately linked to drug dealing and other crimes. Indeed, the Prologue to Boy Clinton quotes L. D. Brown, Clinton's former bodyguard, making the sensational allegation that Clinton was complicit in death-squad activity designed to eliminate witnesses who were knowledgeable about drug dealing at Mena.

R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. , 《美国观察家》主编并非莫里斯那样的左翼自由主义者。但其撰写的《克林顿小子》包含了许多与莫里斯相同的细节,描绘了克林顿作为一名腐败政客,与毒品交易和其他犯罪活动有着密切联系的画像。事实上,《克林顿小子》的序言引用了克林顿前任保镖 L. D. 布朗的令人震惊的指控,称克林顿参与了旨在消除梅纳地区毒品交易知情者的死亡特遣队行动。

Specifically, Brown testifies that he was personally dispatched to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, on June 18, 1986, with a Belgian-made F.A.L. light automatic rifle. Traveling under the alias Michael Johnson, Brown was to have shot and killed Terry Reed.

具体来说,布朗作证称,他于 1986 年 6 月 18 日被派遣到墨西哥巴亚尔塔港,携带一支比利时制造的 F.A.L.轻机枪。布朗化名迈克尔·约翰逊出行,目标是对特里·里德实施射杀。

Reed, as you may remember, came to public attention in 1994 as the coauthor of *Compromised: Clinton, Bush and the CIA*. The thesis of *Compromised* is that the CIA has "co-opted the presidency," and that its "black operations, like a cancer have metastasized the organs of government." More specifically, Reed and his coauthor claim that both Clinton and Bush were deeply compromised by involvement in illegal activities in Arkansas, including drug trafficking.

里德,也许你还记得,他于 1994 年因与人合著了《被腐败:克林顿、布什与中情局》而引起公众关注。《被腐败》的论点是中情局已"操纵了总统职权",其"黑色行动如癌细胞般侵蚀政府机构"。更具体地说,里德及其合著者声称克林顿和布什都因参与阿肯色州的非法活动,包括毒品交易,而陷入严重的腐败。

Brown did not kill Reed, as instructed. He and Reed managed to survive to tell at least part of their tales, which makes them luckier than others who were involved with Clinton, then and later. Consider the late Jerry Parks, who provided security for the Clinton-Gore headquarters in 1992 and was shot dead, in a gangland-style assassination, in September 1993. In another bizarre twist to a twisted tale, London's Sunday Telegraph 287

布朗没有按指示杀死里德。他和里德设法活了下来,至少讲述了部分他们的经历,这使他们比其他与克林顿有过交集的人更幸运。考虑一下已故的杰里·帕克斯,他在 1992 年为克林顿-戈尔总部提供安保,1993 年 9 月被黑帮式刺杀身亡。在一个扭曲的故事的另一个奇怪的转折中,伦敦星期日电讯报

has revealed, on the basis of exclusive information provided by Parks's widow, that Parks was hired to spy on Bill Clinton by the late Vincent Foster.

据独家提供的 Parks 寡妇的信息,Parks 被聘请监视比尔·克林顿,这一点已经显露出来。

Why Foster wanted to compile a dossier of compromising information on Clinton is anyone's guess. (He said he was doing it for Hillary.) But in any event it belies the official depiction of Foster as a naive country boy, so shocked by the ruthless ways of Washington that he killed himself in despair. That never-plausible story becomes less plausible with each new

revelation.²⁷

福斯特想编写一份关于克林顿的有损信息的档案,这只能由他本人猜测。(他说他是为希拉里这么做的。)但无论如何,这都与福斯特被描述为一个天真的乡下小子,被华盛顿残酷的方式所震惊而自杀的官方说法相矛盾。随着每一个新的披露,这个从未可信的故事变得更加不可信。

The Mob's President 黑帮的总统

While the world as a whole draws back from the disturbing conclusion that the President of the United States is tainted by close association with organized crime and criminals, that is what the evidence suggests. Morris quotes a former U.S. Attorney who tracked organized crime figures and their interests. He claims that Clinton's election as governor in 1984 "was the election when the mob really came into Arkansas politics, the dog-track and racetrack boys, the payoff people who saw a good thing.... it went beyond our old Dixie Mafia, which was penny-ante by comparison. This was eastern and West Coast crime money that noticed the possibilities just like the legitimate corporations did."

尽管这个世界总体上回避了美国总统与有组织犯罪分子和罪犯有密切联系的令人不安的结论,但证据确实如此。莫里斯引用了一位追踪有组织犯罪分子及其利益的前美国检察官的话,他声称克林顿于 1984 年当选州长"是黑帮真正进入阿肯色州政治的一次选举,是赛狗场和赛马场的那些人,那些看到好机会的人.....这超出了我们旧的狄克西黑手党,那个相比之下只是小打小闹的。这是来自东海岸和西海岸的犯罪资金,他们也看到了这些可能性,就像合法企业一样。"

28 Apparently, others of like mind have continued to notice the possibilities with Clinton. New York magazine, following an earlier piece in Readers' Digest, reports that "the president's key allies in the trade-union movement are also men affiliated with what to all appearances are some of the dirtiest, most mobbed-up unions in America."²⁹ Of particular interest is Clinton's close relationship with Arthur Coia. Coia, who is one of Clinton's "prime fund raisers," is president of the Laborers International Union of North America, "one of the most flamboyantly corrupt unions in labor history."³⁰ Apparently, the Justice Department under Mr. Clinton struck what New

York describes as a "weirdly generous deal" with Coia "to keep his job in the face of compelling charges from that very same Justice Department that he is a long-time associate of organized-crime figures." 31 Whether or not Terry Reed's thesis is correct that "the CIA has co-opted the presidency," there is obviously a strong temptation for individuals within a covert organization authorized to undertake "black operations" to indulge in Professor Hirshleifer's rational choice of employing "unlawful means of acquiring resources."

28 显然,持有类似观点的人继续关注克林顿的可能性。《纽约杂志》继早期《读者文摘》一文后报道,"总统在工会运动中的主要盟友也是与一些最肮脏、最深陷黑帮的工会有关联的人物"。29 值得关注的是克林顿与阿瑟·科亚的密切关系。科亚是克林顿的"主要筹款人"之一,是北美建筑工人国际联盟的主席,该工会是"工会历史上最为声名狼藉的腐败工会之一"。30 显然,克林顿时期的司法部与科亚达成了《纽约杂志》描述的"奇怪慷慨的交易",允许他保住工作,尽管司法部有"充分证据证明他长期与有组织犯罪分子有联系"。31 无论特里·里德的论点是否正确,即"中情局已经收编了总统职位",明显存在一种诱惑,即一个获准进行"黑色行动"的隐秘组织中的个人可能会选择雇用"非法手段获取资源"这种赫斯利弗教授所谓的"理性选择"。

Given the technological change that is reducing the decisiveness of massed military power in the world, one should perhaps expect to see increasing corruption, if not outright takeover of governments by organized criminal enterprises.

鉴于技术变革正在减弱世界上集中军事力量的决定性,人们也许应该期望看到腐败的增加,甚至是有组织的犯罪集团直接接管政府。

Hirshleifer argues, and we agree, that "the institutions of political economy can never be so perfect as to entirely displace ... the underlying realities of natural economy."

赫希雷弗认为,我们也同意,"政治经济的制度永远无法完全取代自然经济的基本现实。"

32 Power is devolving in the "natural economy." This implies far-reaching shifts in the internal margins of power in society.

权力正在向"自然经济"分散。这意味着社会内部权力格局正发生深远的变化。

Political corruption, as Vito Tanzi shrewdly notes, "represents a privatization of the state in which its power is not shifled to the market, as privatization normally implies, but to government officials and bureaucrats."³³ In effect, this has happened to

政治腐败,正如维托·坦齐敏锐地指出的,"代表了国家的私有化,其权力并没有像通常意味着的那样转移到市场,而是转移到了政府官员和官僚。"这实际上发生在

the FBI and other police agencies under Clinton. The "rule of law" is becoming whatever Clinton and his cronies want it to be.

联邦调查局和克林顿手下的其他警察机构。"法治"正变成克林顿及其亲信想要它成为的样子。

As of now, there seems little evidence that details of these corrupt connections will carry any weight with voters, even if they were taken up and discussed in the mass media. To the contrary. There seems to be little concern about hints that the President of the United States is complicit in drug running, money laundering, and worse.

就目前所见,即使这些腐败关系的细节在大众媒体上被报导和讨论,似乎也很难对选民产生影响。相反,人们似乎对总统与毒品交易、洗钱等涉嫌行为的暗示并不关心。

This brings to mind the late Walter Lippmann's fear that voters lacked the perception to see through what he called fictitious personalities.

这让我想起了沃尔特·里普曼晚年的担忧,即选民缺乏洞察力,无法看穿他所谓的虚构人物。

He thought that voters "are ill-served by flattery and adulation. And they are betrayed by the servile hypocrisy which tells them that what is true and what is false, what is right and what is wrong, can be determined by their votes." Lippmann perceived a "breakdown in the constitutional order" that could be "the cause of the precipitate and catastrophic decline of Western society.

他认为选民"受到虚情假意和过度赞美的损害。他们也被奴性虚伪所出卖,这种虚伪告诉他们,真与假、善与恶可以由他们的投票来决定。"利普曼认为存在"宪政秩序的崩溃",这可能是"西方社会急剧和灾难性衰落的原因。"

We have fallen far in a short span of time. ... What we have seen is not only decay-though much of the old structure is dissolving-but something which can be called an historic catastrophe." 35 The problem is that political judgments seem less a response to the real world than to a pseudoreality that the general public has constructed about phenomena beyond their direct knowledge.³⁶ But it is a mistake for you to be governed by the limits of what others see.

我们在短时间内急剧下滑。.....我们所见到的不仅仅是衰败,尽管许多旧结构正在解体,但可以称之为了一场历史性的灾难。³⁶ 问题在于,政治判断似乎不是对真实世界的反应,而是公众构建的关于超越其直接知识的现象的伪现实。³⁷ 但让自己受制于他人所见的局限是一个错误。

Even if you do not give a twig whether Vincent Foster was murdered, and his murder covered up by the top police agencies and responsible officials of the U.S.

即使你不关心文森特·福斯特是否被谋杀,以及他的谋杀是否被美国顶级警察机构和负责的官员掩盖。

government, including even the current special prosecutor, Kenneth Starr, you might want to consider evidence of the broader pattern of ties between organized criminal enterprise and the White House.

政府,包括当前的特别检察官肯尼斯·斯塔尔,您可能需要考虑有组织犯罪集团与白宫之间更广泛联系的证据。

In the long run, political corruption at the highest levels makes nonsense of conventional celebration of the possibilities of democracy for the deliberate mastery of public problems. In the Information Age it will be much less important that government be large and powerful than that it be honest. Most of the services that governments historically provided are destined to devolve into the private market in the next millennium. But it is doubtful on the evidence from around the world whether you can long depend upon a

corrupted system with corrupt leaders for the security of your family and investments.

从长远来看,最高层面的政治腐败使民主制度解决公共问题的可能性蒙上了一层阴影。在信息时代,政府诚信度的重要性将超过其规模和实力。大多数政府过去提供的服务在下一个千年里都将转移到私人市场。但根据全球范围内的证据来看,人们很难长期依赖腐败的制度和腐败的领导人来确保家人和投资的安全。

As Morris says, "[T]he Clintons are not merely symptomatic, but emblematic of the larger bipartisan system at its end-of-century dead end." Vito Tanzi, in his essay on corruption, shows that "the only way to deter corruption is to reduce significantly the scale of public intervention." 38 The Information Revolution will significantly reduce "the scale of public intervention" and on that basis holds out hope for a rebirth of morality and honesty. The other obvious implication of the Information Revolution for morality is an increased vulnerability that comes with the possibility of cybercommerce and virtual corporations communicating with unbreakable encryption.

正如莫里斯所说："柯林顿夫妇不仅是症状性的,而且是世纪末双头制度死胡同的典型。"维托·坦兹在他关于腐败的论文中指出,"打击腐败的唯一办法是大幅减少公共干预的规模。"信息革命将显著减少"公共干预的规模",并基于此为道德和诚信的复兴带来希望。信息革命对道德的另一个明显影响是,随着网络商务和虚拟公司使用不可破解的加密进行通信,带来了更大的脆弱性。

Internal thieves within an organization, even a virtual organization, will be more difficult to detect and it will be all but impossible to recover money that is stolen or received covertly for selling trade secrets, patents, or other valuable economic assets.

即使在虚拟组织内部,内部盗窃分子也更难被发现,而且几乎不可能追回因出售商业机密、专利或其他有价值的经济资产而获得的秘密收益。

Crime pays, and many find it attractive to supplement lawful, productive pursuits with unlawful, predatory ones. Unlike the usual situation that

prevailed in Western societies through most of the past two centuries, criminals are not merely misfits, without social standing. When crime pays, you tend to get a better class of criminal because little social odium attaches to crime. The Sicilian Mafia, for example, along with many drug dealers who employ local labor at inflated rates, command respect and popular support on their home turf.

犯罪能获利,许多人发现将合法、有生产性的追求与非法、掠夺性的追求相结合很有吸引力。与过去两个世纪在西方社会中普遍存在的情况不同,犯罪分子不再只是社会地位低下的失足者。当犯罪能获利时,你往往会得到更好的阶层的犯罪分子,因为社会并不十分鄙视犯罪行为。例如,西西里黑手党以及许多雇佣当地劳工并给予高额报酬的毒品交易商,在他们的老家受到尊重和群众支持。

THE MORAL ORDER AND ITS ENEMIES

道德秩序及其敌人

All strong societies have a strong moral basis. Any study of the history of economic development shows the close relationship between moral and economic factors. Countries and groups that achieve successful development do so partly because they have an ethic that encourages the economic virtues of self-reliance, hard work, family and social responsibility, high savings, and honesty. This is also true of social subgroups. The business success of Jews, particularly of religious Jews, of the Puritans in New England, of the Quakers in British business in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or of the Mormons in modern America, all show the economic benefits that result from cultures with a strong moral framework.

所有强大的社会都有坚实的道德基础。对经济发展历史的研究都显示道德因素和经济因素之间的密切关系。取得成功发展的国家和群体之所以能够做到,部分是因为他们拥有鼓励自力更生、勤勉工作、家庭和社会责任、高储蓄和诚实等经济美德的道德准则。这一点也适用于社会的各个亚群体。犹太人特别是宗教犹太人、在新英格兰的清教徒、18 世纪和 19 世纪在英国商界的贵格会教徒,以及现代美国的摩门教徒的商业成功,都表明拥有坚实的道德框架的文化所带来的经济效益。

One can take the Quakers as an example. The Quakers became successful businesswise, and were particularly successful as bankers, for a number of reasons. They set themselves the highest possible standard of trustworthiness. They would not swear oaths, but regarded every business commitment as being as binding as an oath. "My word is my bond" was for them an absolute principle. They believed in a quiet style of living, decent but frugal. As a religious duty, they avoided spending money on the vanities of this world. They avoided quarrels, and thought war was always sinful. They thought that the businessman had a moral obligation to give fair value, and as merchants they developed a reputation for maintaining high quality with moderate prices. "Caveat emptor"-let the buyer beware-was not good enough for them. In an age when most merchants followed a high-price, high-margin theory of trade, the Quaker morality led them naturally to a low-margin, high-turnover policy. As Henry Ford later showed, this can be potentially far more profitable. They followed this business policy because they thought it their duty not to cheat their customer, but it turned out to be the best way to expand their businesses. The Quakers proved good people to do business with, so their customers came back; there were profits on both sides. As a high-saving community, which honored its obligations, the Quakers had an advantage as bankers, and membership in the Quakers was itself a business asset which inspired confidence.

一个很好的例子就是教友。教友在商业上非常成功,尤其是在银行业。他们给自己树立了最高的信赖标准。他们不愿意发誓,而是认为每一份商业承诺就像发誓一样有约束力。"我的话就是我的承诺"是他们的一项绝对原则。他们相信过一种平静、体面而节俭的生活方式。出于宗教责任,他们避免在世俗虚荣上花钱。他们避免争吵,认为战争总是罪恶的。他们认为商人有道德义务提供公平的价值,作为商人,他们赢得了在保持高质量的同时保持适中价格的声誉。"买家自负"这种想法对他们来说是不够的。在大多数商人奉行高价格、高利润的贸易理论的时代,教友的道德观自然导致他们采取低利润、高周转的政策。正如后来亨利·福特所展示的那样,这可能远远更有利可图。他们奉行这种商业政策,是因为他们认为有责任不欺骗顾客,但结果证明这是扩大业务的最佳方式。教友证明是很好的商业伙伴,所以他们的客户会重复光顾;双方都能获得利润。作为一个重视储蓄和履行义务的社区,教友在银行业有优势,教友的成员身份本身就是一种商业资产,能够赢得信任。

Unfortunately such business advantages can be eroded by the very success they produce. Countries go through a cycle, which formed the basis of Adam Ferguson's sociological theory in the eighteenth century, from poverty and hard work, to riches, to luxury, to decadence, and on to decline. The ancient Romans themselves looked back to the virtues of the Republican period, when the Empire was being built, and deplored the luxury and laziness that they regarded as the cause of their decline. This erosion of the 290

令人遗憾的是,这些商业优势可能会因其自身的成功而被削弱。国家经历一个循环,这形成了亚当·弗格森 18 世纪的社会学理论,从贫穷和勤劳到富裕,再到奢华,最后走向堕落和衰落。古罗马人自己回顾了共和时期的美德,当时帝国正在建立,他们谴责了他们认为导致自己衰落的奢侈和懒惰。这种优势的侵蚀

industrious virtues by prosperity can happen surprisingly quickly. The Germans are still a capable and efficient people, but they are not working anything like as hard as they did when they were rebuilding their country after the ruin of defeat in 1945. In two generations, they have gone from working long hours, almost with their bare hands, in conditions of acute poverty, to working short hours for the highest pay and the most expensive welfare on earth.

勤勉的美德可以意外地很快就伴随繁荣而来。德国人仍然是一个有能力和高效的民族,但他们的工作强度已经不如 1945 年战败后重建国家时那么卖力了。在两代人的时间里,他们从在贫困环境下长时间工作,几乎只凭双手,到现在每周工作时间缩短,获得最高报酬和世界上最昂贵的福利。

In October 1995, the Petersburg Declaration was signed by sixteen German associations of employers. It is a catalogue of well-justified complaints, which reflect the decline in Germany's industrial morale.

1995 年 10 月,16 个德国雇主协会签署了《彼得堡宣言》。这是一份详细的申诉目录,反映了德国工业士气的下降。

Germany's tax burden reached record highs in 1995, particularly due to the solidarity surcharge and payments for nursing care insurance. With total corporate taxation amounting to more than 60 per cent, Germany is far

above the comparative international level of 35 to 40 per cent.

德国的税务负担在 1995 年创下历史新高,主要是由于团结附加税和护理保险费用。德国的整体企业税收超过 60%,远远高于 35%至 40%的国际比较水平。

Public sector habits such as regulated promotions, jobs for life and higher pension payments have to be replaced by the free market rules of meritocratic promotion and compensation.

公共部门的习惯,如受管制的晋升、终生职位和更高的养老金支付,必须被精英主义晋升和报酬的自由市场规则所取代。

Due to the fact that Germany has the highest labour costs in the world, wage policies have to contribute to the reduction of unemployment by alleviating the costs for enterprises...Wage increases should be measured according to competitiveness and productivity.... The behavior of the unions has to change.

由于德国拥有全球最高的劳动力成本,工资政策必须有助于降低企业成本,从而减少失业.....工资增长应当根据竞争力和生产率而定.....工会的行为必须发生变革。

The yearly ritual of campaigns, demands, workers' mobilization, threats, and warning strikes is damaging.

年度运动、要求、工人动员、威胁和警告性罢工的仪式性活动正在造成损害。

This anxiety that the Germans, particularly the young and the heirs of prosperity, have lost the habit of work is shared by Chancellor Kohl.

这种焦虑,即德国人,特别是年轻人和昌盛的继承者,已经失去了工作习惯,是科尔总理所分享的。

The existing Volkswagen labor contract gives the highest pay for any car workers on earth, to which welfare taxes have to be added, in return for a 28-hour week-four days of seven hours each. Postwar Germany is now a massive exporter of jobs. The British were regarded in the middle of the nineteenth century as the most efficient industrial nation, a reputation they had certainly lost a hundred years later. The cycle of prosperity undoubtedly

undermines virtues of hard work and modest expectations, which exist at the early stages of successful industrial development. Nations are not able to retain their early virtues, just as individuals can become greedy and lazy with too easy a success.

现有的大众汽车劳动合同为地球上任何汽车工人提供最高工资,还要增加福利税,作为回报是每周 28 小时工作制,四天每天工作 7 小时。战后德国现已成为大规模出口工作的国家。英国在 19 世纪中期被视为最有效的工业国家,但一百年后这种声誉已不复存在。繁荣周期无疑削弱了勤劳和适度期望的美德,这些在成功的工业发展的早期阶段存在。国家无法保留最初的美德,就像个人在获得太容易的成功后会变得贪婪和懒惰。

Global investment undoubtedly rewards these industrious virtues and penalizes those who become greedy and lazy, as it should. Indeed, one could say that sound investment has to be based on a moral as well as a purely financial assessment. The Englishman in the eighteenth century who subscribed to the capital of a Quaker bank was likely to do very well. In the nineteenth century, the Quakers invested in chocolate businesses, since they thought that cocoa was healthier than alcohol. It probably is. Yet an investment in Fry's or Cadbury's was certainly a good investment. Investors should be concerned to avoid the periods of decadence. Even if Germany retains a strong position in the European market, and high industrial skills, high labor costs and short working hours have already reduced Germany's future potential.

全球投资无疑奖励这些勤勉的美德,惩罚那些变得贪婪和懒惰的人,这是应该的。事实上,可以说,健全的投资必须基于道德以及纯粹的财务评估。18 世纪的英国人订阅了一家贵格会银行的资本,很可能做得很好。在 19 世纪,贵格会人投资于巧克力企业,因为他们认为可可比酒精更健康。这可能是事实。然而,投资于 Fry's 或 Cadbury's 无疑是一个好的投资。投资者应该注意避免衰落的时期。即使德国在欧洲市场保持强势地位,高劳动成本和短工时也已经降低了德国的未来潜力。

Social morality and economic success are insolubly linked. But what factors help to maintain, or tend to undermine, the social morality? Arnold

Toynbee, the great philosophic historian of the first half of the twentieth century, formulated the theory of the challenge and response. Societies are invigorated by challenges, and develop virtue they did not even know they possessed.

社会道德和经济成功密不可分。但是哪些因素有助于维护,或倾向于破坏社会道德?20 世纪上半叶,著名哲学史学家阿诺德·汤因比提出了挑战与应对的理论。社会在面临挑战时会被激发,并发展出它们原本不知道自己拥有的美德。

There has always been a human recognition that hard times may develop, and normally do develop, healthier responses than those of periods of prosperity. In our individual lives, we all try to make ourselves comfortable, we hope to live in a house that we enjoy, have a job that we like, have enough money in the bank, and so on. The struggle to achieve these objectives is a rewarding one. We study at school, we train ourselves, we work hard at our wage policies have to contribute to the reduction of unemployment by alleviating the costs for enterprises. - .. Wage increases should be measured according to competitiveness and productivity. ... The behaviour of the unions has to change. The yearly ritual of campaigns, demands, workers' mobilization, threats, and warning strikes is damaging. 经常会有一种认识,即艰难时期可能会产生比繁荣时期更健康的反应。在我们个人的生活中,我们都试图让自己感到舒适,希望居住在一所令人愉悦的房子里,有一份喜欢的工作,银行里有足够的钱等等。实现这些目标的努力是值得的。我们在学校学习,训练自己,努力工作。工资政策必须有助于减轻企业成本,缓解失业问题。工资增长应该根据竞争力和生产力来确定。工会的行为需要改变。每年的运动、诉求、工人动员、威胁和警告罢工都是有害的。

In far too many people the achievement of these objectives creates something of a trap. The struggle is better than the achievement. The great Swiss psychologist Carl Jung had an American businessman as his patient early in this century. The businessman had these very ambitions as a young man. He had worked to establish his own business, and to make enough money to retire by the age of forty. He married a young and attractive woman, he bought a beautiful home, he had a young family, his business was highly successful, and by the age of forty he had indeed been able to

sell out and retire, a rich and independent man with nothing apparently to worry about. At first he enjoyed his freedom, was able to do things he had long promised himself. He took his family to Europe. They visited art galleries and so on. Gradually these interests, and his sense of freedom itself, began to pale. He started to look back at the time when he was not free, when he was working all hours at his business and had all the usual business worries, as the happy period of his life. He fell into a depression, which led his wife to bring him to Jung as a patient. Jung diagnosed him, in effect, as having no outlet for his creative energy, which had turned in on him, and was destroying him. The diagnosis may well have been correct, but it did not lead to a cure. The businessman never recovered from his nervous breakdown.

对于许多人来说,实现这些目标反而成了一种陷阱。奋斗过程比成就本身更重要。著名瑞士心理学家卡尔·荣格曾在本世纪初接诊了一位美国商人。这位商人年轻时就有这些野心,他努力建立自己的企业,并在 40 岁前退休。他娶了一位年轻漂亮的妻子,买了一幢美丽的房子,并有了一个年轻的家庭。他的事业非常成功,到 40 岁时果然就卖掉公司退休了,成为一个富有而独立的人,没什么好操心的。起初他享受自由,能做自己许诺过的事。他带家人去了欧洲,参观了各种艺术馆等。但渐渐地,这些兴趣以及他自身的自由感都开始消退了。他开始怀念以前不自由的时光,当时他全心投入自己的事业,担忧种种商业问题。他陷入了抑郁,最后妻子把他送到荣格那里就诊。荣格诊断他实际上没有合适的出口来释放创造力,这种创造力内向并正在毁灭着他。这一诊断可能是正确的,但并未带来治愈。这位商人最终未能从神经衰弱中恢复过来。

For human beings it is the struggle rather than the achievement that matters; we are made for action, and the achievement can prove to be a great disappointment. The ambition, whatever it may be, sets the struggle in motion, but the struggle is more enjoyable than its own result, even when the objective is fully achieved. And, of course, for most people, the objectives can be achieved only partially. Most of us do not have as much money as we would like, and do not live in our dream house. We have to settle for something less.

对于人类而言,是奋斗而非成就最重要;我们是为行动而生的,成就往往令人失望。无论目标如何,奋斗的过程更令人愉悦,即使最终实现了目

标。当然,对大多数人而言,目标只能部分实现。我们的财富和居所都无法完全如愿。我们只能接受稍逊一筹的结果。

This sense that virtue is dynamic, that it consists in the effort rather than the result, developed strongly in the nineteenth century, and in different ways. There is a well-known poem by Arthur Hugh Clough that brought comfort to many people in the life-and-death struggle of the Second World War. It is worth noting that suicide rates in 1942

这种一种德性是动态的,它在于努力而不是结果的观念在 19 世纪有了强烈的发展,体现了不同的方式。亚瑟·休·克洛夫写了一首著名的诗歌,在第二次世界大战生死搏斗中给许多人带来了安慰。值得注意的是,第二次世界大战期间,自杀率有所上升。

the warring countries fell in the Second World War; even the struggle of war can be better than the depression of inactivity.

交战国在第二次世界大战中陷落;即使战争的艰辛也可能比不活动的绝望要好。

Say not, the struggle nought availeth, The labour and the wounds are vain,
The enemy faints not, nor faileth,

请勿说,"这场斗争没有作用,劳动和伤痛都是徒然的。"敌人并未衰退,也从未失守

And as things have been they remain.
事情如何,就仍将如何。

If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars; It may be, in yon smoke concealed,
Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers, And, but for you, possess the
field.

如果希望是骗人的,恐惧也可能是骗子;也许在那缕烟雾之中,你的同伴们正追赶着逃逸的敌人,如果没有你,他们就将占领战场。

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking, Seem here no painful inch to
gain,

虽然疲惫的波浪徒劳地打破,但在这里似乎一点都无法前进

Far back, through creeks and inlets making, Comes silent, flooding in, the main.

遥远的时光里,穿过溪流和入口,无声的潮水正在涌入。

And not by eastern windows only,
且非仅由东方的窗户

When daylight comes, comes in the light, In front, the sun climbs slow, how slowly, But westward, look, the land is bright.

当日光来临时,光芒照耀而至,前方,太阳缓缓升起,多么缓慢,但向西看,大地正在明亮。

This active competition still appeals to the modern sensibility. Indeed, it is how many modern men and women lead their lives, in a continuous struggle to seize the opportunities of a potentially hostile environment. We all live in a competitive world, and most of us do not wish to contract out of it. There is, of course, the contemplative spiritual temperament, but it is quite rare.

这种主动的竞争仍然吸引着现代人的感受。事实上,许多现代男女都以此为生活方式,不断努力争取可能存在威胁的环境中的机会。我们都生活在一个竞争激烈的世界中,而且大多数人都不希望退出这个世界。当然,也有内省冥想的精神气质,但它是非常罕见的。

A similar nineteenth-century perception of this dynamic morality was developed by William James, the greatest of American philosophers, in an address to the Yale Philosophical Club in 1891:

这种十九世纪相似的动态道德观念是由美国伟大哲学家威廉·詹姆斯在1891年的耶鲁哲学俱乐部演讲中提出的

The deepest difference, practically, in the moral life of man is the difference between the easygoing and the strenuous mood. When in the easygoing mood the shrinking from present ill is our ruling consideration. The strenuous mood, on the contrary, makes us quite indifferent to present ill, if only the greater ideal be attained. The capacity for the strenuous mood probably lies slumbering in every man but it has more difficulty in some than others in waking up. It needs the wilder passions to arouse it, the big

fears, loves and indignation; or else the deeply penetrating appeal of some one of the higher fidelities, like justice, truth, and freedom. Strong relief is a necessity of its vision; and a world where all the mountains are brought down and all the valleys are exalted is no congenial place for its habitation. This is why in a solitary 293

人生道德生活中最深刻的差异,实际上在于是否有积极主动的心境。在轻松随意的心境中,我们主要考虑回避眼前的不良。而积极主动的心境则使我们对眼前的不良毫不在意,只要能实现更高的理想。这种积极主动的心境或许潜藏在每个人心中,但有的人唤醒它会更困难。它需要激烈的情感,比如大的恐惧、热爱和愤慨,或是对正义、真理和自由之类更高层次忠诚的深刻呼唤。它需要强烈的刺激才能清晰地呈现;而在一个所有山峰都降低、所有山谷都抬高的世界里,它就难以安身立命了。这就是为什么在孤独的环境中,这种心境总是更容易被唤醒。

thinker this mood might slumber on forever without waking. His various ideals, known to him to be mere preferences of his own, are too nearly of the same denominational value: he can play fast or loose with them at will. 这名思想家可能会永远沉睡而不醒。他的各种理想,他知道它们只不过是他的自己的偏好,价值几乎相同:他可以随意地快速或随意地对待它们。

This too is why, in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal stimulating power. Life, to be sure, is even in such a world a genuine ethical symphony; but it is played in the compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values fails to open up.

这也是为什么,在一个没有上帝的纯人类世界中,对我们道德能量的呼吁无法达到最大的激励力。诚然,即使在这样的世界中,生活仍然是一种真实的伦理交响乐;但它只在几个很差的八度音程内演奏,价值观的无限量表也无法展现。

William James believed that the dynamic morality, which consists in doing rather than being, in acting rather than refraining from action, can be extended into the religious sphere. There is also a powerful development of the morality of competition and survival in the work of Adam Smith (1776), moral doctrine of the present world economic order, its central theme needs careful consideration.

威廉·詹姆斯認為,動態道德包括行動而非存在,行動而非避免行動,可以擴展到宗教領域。亞當·斯密(1776年)的作品也有競爭和生存道德的強大發展,這是當前世界經濟秩序的道德教義,其核心主題需要仔細考慮。

The dominant idea of Darwinism is that species survive through adaptation to their environment, and that this process of natural selection shapes the characteristics of the species. In animals the process is the result of random mutations, which are now known to belong to a genetic process Darwin himself could only guess at. The survival of human societies depends, however, on cultural choices that are based on human intelligence. Culture changes human society as genes change other species. Change can therefore take place much faster in our societies. It does not have to work through many generations as it does when it depends on random genetic mutations. In place of the natural selection in animals, human beings have developed cultural selection, with some cultures, at some stage of human history, developing new technologies that gave them a decisive advantage in wealth creation or mustering power. The cultural edge of new technologies, such as Iron Age man had over Bronze Age man, or electronic man has over mechanical man, are decisive. Adam Smith may not have been the first writer on economic matters to reduce the welfare of nations to the action of individuals, but he put it most succinctly and with the greatest authority: 达尔文主义的主导思想是,物种通过适应其环境而生存,自然选择过程塑造了物种的特征。在动物中,这个过程是由随机突变造成的,现在我们知道这些突变属于一种遗传过程,达尔文自己只能猜测。但人类社会的生存依赖于基于人类智慧做出的文化选择。文化改变人类社会,就像基因改变其他物种一样。因此,在我们的社会中,变革可以发生得更快,不需要像依赖随机遗传突变那样需要经历多代。取代动物中的自然选择,人类发展了文化选择,在人类历史的某个阶段,某些文化发展了新的技术,这给他们在财富创造或集结力量方面带来了决定性优势。新技术的文化优势,如铁器时代人类相对于青铜时代人类,或电子时代人类相对于机械时代人类,是决定性的。亚当·斯密可能并不是第一位讨论经济问题的作者,将国家福祉归结为个人行为,但他表述得最简洁,也最有权威。

Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view

But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society. 每个个人都在不断地努力找出他所拥有的资本的最有利的运用。虽然他考虑的是自己的利益,而非社会的利益,但他自己的利益的研究自然,或者说必然地,会引导他选择最有利于社会的就业。

Thomas Malthus, the founder of population studies, saw that the Adam Smith argument could be applied not only to the development of the economy of nations but also to the survival of human populations. He is well known for his proposition that "Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second."

人口研究的创始人托马斯·马尔萨斯认为,亚当·斯密的论点不仅适用于国家经济的发展,也适用于人口的生存。他以下这句命题家喻户晓:"人口在无约束的情况下,以几何级数增长。食物供给只能以算术级数增长。对数字有一点点了解,就可以看出第一种增长力量的巨大性,与第二种相比。"

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Malthus even saw, long before Darwin, that the same principle applied throughout nature:

马尔萨斯早在达尔文之前就意识到,这一原理适用于整个自然界:

Through the animal and vegetable kingdoms, nature has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal hand~ She has been comparatively sparing in the room, and the nourishment necessary to rear them. The germs of existence contained in this spot of earth, with ample food, and ample room to expand in, would fill millions of worlds in the course of a few thousand years. Necessity, that imperious all-pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds.

自然在动物和植物王国中广撒生命的种子,施予最丰盛和慷慨的手笔。她在必要的空间和养分方面相对节约。在这片土地上蕴含的生命种子,只要有充足的食物和空间,在几千年内就可以繁衍至填满数百万个世

界。必然性,这个无处不在的自然界的至高无上的定律,将它们约束在规定的范围之内。

The way the world develops, even at this stage of Adam Smith and Malthus, had already come to be understood by the end of the eighteenth century as dynamic, which it had always been in fact. The human species, itself one among many, is forced to compete by the mismatch between its unlimited capacity for generation and its limited ability to grow food. The survival of human societies, as of animal species, depends on successful adaptation to the environment. A dynamic morality is therefore concerned with overcoming the problems of adaptation. This is best achieved by individuals who adapt their own actions to the opportunities of the environment, and therefore employ resources available in the society to the greatest advantage.

世界的发展方式,甚至在亚当·斯密和马尔萨斯时期,到了 18 世纪末就已经被理解为动态,事实上一直如此。人类这个物种也是众多物种之一,被迫要竞争,因为它无限的繁衍能力与有限的食物生产能力之间存在矛盾。人类社会以及动物物种的生存,都取决于能否成功适应环境。因此,一种动态的道德应该关注如何克服适应的问题。这最好通过个人将自己的行为调整到环境的机遇中,从而最大程度地利用社会可用的资源来实现。

Malthus already saw that Adam Smith's ideas had changed the world, and he wrote that his new argument about population was not new: "The principles on which it depends have been explained in part by Hume and in part by Dr. Adam Smith." He also saw that this constant competition for survival was a moral, not merely a practical, matter. The last paragraph of the 1798 "Essay" reads:

马尔萨斯已经看到亚当·斯密的思想改变了世界,他写道他关于人口的新论点并不新颖:"它的原理已部分由休谟和部分由亚当·斯密博士解释过。"他还认识到这种对生存的持续竞争不仅是实际问题,也是道德问题。1798 年版《论文》的最后一段是:

Evil exists in the world, not to create despair, but activities. We are not patiently to submit to it, but to exert ourselves to avoid it. It is not only the interest, but the duty of every individual, to use his utmost efforts to remove

evil from himself, and from as large a circle as he can influence; and the more he exercises himself in this duty, the more wisely he directs his efforts, and the more successful these efforts are; the more he will probably improve and exalt his own mind, and the more completely does he appear to fulfil the will of his Creator.

邪恶存在于世界上,不是为了创造绝望,而是活动。我们不是耐心地屈服于它,而是努力避免它。每个个人去尽最大努力从自己和他能影响的尽可能大的圈子里消除邪恶,这不仅是利益,也是责任;他在这项职责中越努力,越明智地指导他的努力,这些努力就越成功,他可能就越能改善和提升自己的思想,也越完全实现了创造主的意志。

Perhaps one can illustrate Darwin's sense of the importance of this argument from his summary of the contents of Chapter 3 of his epoch-making book, *On the Origin of Species*, first published in 1859.

或许可以从达尔文在 1859 年首次出版的《物种起源》第 3 章内容摘要中说明他对这一论点重要性的看法。

He called this crucial chapter "Struggle for Existence." The subject readlines are: "Bears on Natural Selection-The term used in a wide sense-Geometrical powers of increase-Rapid increase of naturalized animals and plants-Nature of the checks to increase-Competition universal-Effects of climate-Protection from the number of individuals-Complex relations of all animals and plants throughout nature-Struggle for life most severe between individuals and varieties of the same species; often severe 295

他将这个关键的章节称为"生存斗争"。主题标题如下："自然选择下的熊-广义使用的术语-增长的几何能力-自然化动物和植物的快速增长-增长的制约因素-全面竞争-气候的影响-个体数量的保护-动物和植物在自然界中的复杂关系-同一物种个体和变种之间的生存斗争往往最为激烈"。

between species of the same genus-The relation of organism to organism the most important of all relations." Since 1776, it has been evident that the best way to optimize the wealth of nations is to allow individuals to optimize their own return on capital in conditions of free competition. Since 1798, it has been evident that the relative survival of populations depended on societies having sufficient economic and political success to be able to

feed themselves, protect themselves from infectious diseases, and protect their populations in war. Since 1859, it has been evident that the whole drama of life, in the human, the animal, or the vegetable kingdom, consists of a continuous struggle for survival, in which those species or cultures that are nearest to each other may be the greatest rivals. This struggle requires a dynamic morality, which actively wards off evil and does not merely respond to it when it happens.

在同一属的物种之间-"生物与生物之间的关系是最重要的关系。"自 1776 年以来,很明显,优化国家财富的最佳方式是让个人在自由竞争的条件下优化自身的资本回报。自 1798 年以来,很明显,种群的相对生存取决于社会是否有足够的经济和政治成功,能够养活自己,防范传染病,并在战争中保护自己的入口。自 1859 年以来,很明显,生命的整个戏剧,无论是在人类、动物还是植物王国,都包括一场持续的生存斗争,其中彼此相近的物种或文化可能是最大的竞争对手。这场斗争需要一种积极抵御邪恶而不是仅被动应对的动态道德。

These ideas have been so powerful that it has been impossible for anyone to think about the nature of humanity, or the problems of morality, since the time in which they were developed, without responding to them. Karl Marx believed in the struggle for survival just as much as Charles Darwin, but he believed it was a war between social classes, themselves formed by economic forces. Adolf Hitler believed in the struggle for survival, and saw his own political career almost exclusively in those terms. But he believed that the struggle was one between different races. Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and Hitler can all be called social Darwinists, in that they saw the struggle for survival, "Mein Kampf" as Hitler called it, as the central political issue. The Marxists saw social classes as though they were separate species; the Nazis saw races in the same light.

这些想法如此强大,以至于从它们被提出以来,没有人能在思考人性的本质或道德问题时不作出回应。卡尔·马克思和查尔斯·达尔文一样相信生存斗争,但他认为这是社会阶级之间的战争,这些阶级本身是由经济力量形成的。阿道夫·希特勒也相信生存斗争,并几乎完全从这个角度看待自己的政治生涯。但是他认为这种斗争是不同种族之间的斗争。马克思、列宁、斯大林、毛泽东和希特勒都可以被称为社会达尔文主义者,因为他们把"生存斗争"(希特勒所说的"我的奋斗")视为中心政治问

题。马克思主义者把社会阶级视为不同物种;纳粹则从同样的角度看待不同种族。

This, however, makes not a dynamic morality, such as Malthus envisaged, but a dynamic immorality. Both Marxism and Nazism wished to solve the same problem, the problem of the struggle for survival, but by destroying competition. They invaded foreign territories, they promoted conflict between different classes who competed for social power, or different races who were seen either as economic exploiters (the normal charge made against Jews by anti-Semites) or as a dangerous underclass (the fear held of blacks by their white enemies).

这不是马尔萨斯所设想的动态道德,而是动态不道德。马克思主义和纳粹主义都试图解决同一个问题——生存斗争的问题,但是通过破坏竞争来实现。他们侵占外国领土,挑动不同阶层之间或不同种族之间的冲突,将后者视为经济剥削者(反犹太分子指责犹太人的常见罪名)或危险的下层阶级(白人敌人对黑人的恐惧)。

The Second World War was an attempt by Adolf Hitler, which failed, to secure an advantage in survival terms of the German people, by destroying potential competition, particularly Slavs and Jews. By an interesting paradox, defeat in war proved more advantageous to Germany than the victory of the Nazis could ever have been.

第二次世界大战是阿道夫·希特勒的一次失败尝试,他试图通过消灭潜在的竞争对手(特别是斯拉夫人和犹太人)来为德国人民的生存谋求优势。有趣的是,战争的失利反而比纳粹的胜利更有利于德国。

The alternative to destructive "interference" competition is collaborative competition, and collaborative competition is the central idea of Adam Smith, and also of Malthus and of William James.

破坏性的"干扰"竞争的替代选择是协作竞争,而协作竞争是亚当·斯密、马尔萨斯和威廉·詹姆斯的中心思想。

The archetype of destructive competition is the conqueror. He destroys his competitors in order to seize their assets, which may include taking over their countries and may involve the enslavement of their peoples. The archetype of collaborative competition is the merchant.

掠夺式竞争的典型代表是征服者。他破坏自己的竞争对手,以占据他们的资产,这可能包括接管他们的国家,并可能导致他们民众的奴役。合作性竞争的典型代表是商人。

It is in the interest of the merchant that the customer should be satisfied with the transaction, because only a satisfied customer comes back for more trade. It is also in the interest of the merchant that the customer should be prosperous, because a prosperous customer has the money to go on buying. Conquest implies the destruction of the other party; commerce implies the satisfaction of the other party. As modern technology has 296

商家的利益在于客户对交易感到满意,因为只有满意的客户才会再次光顾。商家的利益也在于客户的繁荣,因为繁荣的客户有钱继续购买。征服意味着对另一方的破坏;商业意味着满足另一方。随着现代技术的进步,

made conquest an extraordinarily dangerous policy, commerce has become the only rational approach to the problems of survival.

征服成为了一个非常危险的政策,商业已经成为解决生存问题的唯一理性方法。

This interdependence is strengthened by another central idea of Adam Smith~not new with him~which is the specialization of function. The Wealth of Nations starts with a celebrated passage in which Adam Smith observes that "the greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity and judgement with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour." He points out that "the important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands." The more complete the specialization of function, the more efficient the manufacture is likely to be, but obviously such an economy is highly interdependent. If it is to be successful, it has to be collaborative.

这种相互依存性被另一个亚当·斯密的核心思想所加强——即工作的专业化。《国富论》开篇就有一段著名的段落,亚当·斯密观察到"劳动生产力的最大改进,以及任何地方劳动所表现出的大部分技能、灵巧和判断力,似乎都是劳动分工的结果"。他指出"制造一枚大头针的重要工作,

在某些制钉厂里,被分成了大约十八个不同的操作,这些操作中的每一个都由不同的人完成”。专业化程度越完善,制造效率就越高,但很明显,这样的经济体高度依赖于各方的合作。

A successful social morality must therefore have certain characteristics. It must be strong-a weak morality will be vulnerable and ineffective. It must contribute to the struggle for survival, but in ways that are collaborative rather than murderous. Hitler had a strong morality of survival, but its destructive quality nearly destroyed his own society.

成功的社会道德必须具有某些特点。它必须是强大的-一种软弱的道德将是脆弱和无效的。它必须有助于生存斗争,但方式应该是协作而非谋杀。希特勒有一种强大的生存道德,但其破坏性差点摧毁了他自己的社会。

It must be dynamic, to match the dynamic changes of modern technology, and indeed of all modern social systems.

它必须具有动态性,以匹配现代技术以及所有现代社会系统的动态变化。

It must be economically efficient. The mixture of egalitarian and authoritarian ideas in the Leninist system simply did not work. Yet these are not all the characteristics that such a social morality might be expected to possess. It has a broader purpose of making the society a good one to live in, and of binding people together. Also, moralities have to adapt and survive; a brittle morality may be acceptable in our generation only to be rejected in the next. A traditional social morality may be too inflexible to adapt to successive changes in social structure. On the other hand a purely relativist system is not a morality at all; it gives no clear signals on how to behave.

它必须在经济上有效率。列宁主义系统中平等主义和专制主义思想的混合根本行不通。然而,这些并非该社会道德预期具备的所有特征。它有一个更广泛的目的,那就是使社会成为一个良好的居住环境,并将人们捆绑在一起。此外,道德必须适应并生存下来;一种脆弱的道德在我们这一代人可能是可接受的,但可能在下一代被摒弃。传统的社会道德可能

过于刚性,无法适应社会结构的连续变化。另一方面,一个纯粹相对主义的体系根本不是一种道德;它没有明确的行为指引。

We can first of all put all social morality inside a context. A strong community, even a virtual community, depends upon the morality being widely accepted. The most successful periods in the history of societies tend to be those in which the collective morality is fully shared. Such a morality not only performs specific functions such as reducing crime, and helping to support family and social structures, but gives citizens a sense of purpose and direction. Such a consensus on morality historically seems to depend on there being a dominant religion, whether that is a state religion of the early survival for a dispersed people; the Islamic religion with its social rules; the Catholicism of the Middle Ages; or the Protestantism of early New England. The three ideas of a people, a morality, and a religion depend upon one another, and each tends to reinforce the others.

我们首先可以将所有社会道德置于一个背景之中。一个强大的社区,即使是一个虚拟社区,也需要广泛接受的道德。社会历史上最成功的时期往往是集体道德完全共享的时期。这种道德不仅执行诸如减少犯罪、支持家庭和社会结构等具体功能,还给予公民一种目标和方向感。历史上,这种道德共识似乎取决于是否存在一种主导宗教,无论是早期分散居民的国教,还是伊斯兰教的社会规则,或中世纪天主教,抑或是早期新英格兰的新教。人民、道德和宗教这三个概念互相依存,每一个都倾向于强化其他两个。

In such a moral society, the individual citizen is able to work toward personal objectives inside a framework of social support. Admittedly the moral laws may be somewhat arbitrary, or at least may appear arbitrary to outsiders. The Orthodox Jew loses the freedom to eat pork or shellfish, or to work on the Sabbath. The loyal Catholic may lose the freedom to use artificial contraceptives, let alone to have an abortion. The Moslem may lose the freedom to drink alcohol. The pious Confucian may have the inconveniently long period of mourning for his reverend father-even Confucius himself 297

在这样一个有道德的社会中,普通公民能在社会支持的框架内追求个人目标。诚然,道德准则可能有些武断,或者至少在外人看来是武断的。正统犹太人失去了吃猪肉或海鲜,以及在安息日工作的自由。虔诚的天

主教徒可能失去了使用人工避孕药具甚至堕胎的自由。穆斯林可能失去了饮酒的自由。虔诚的儒家信徒可能被要求为他尊敬的父亲长期哀悼,即使是孔子自己也是如此。

warned that mourning rituals could be exaggerated. Yet the adherent to each of these systems of belief regards these observations as a small price to pay for a shared and coherent sense of world order, in which the individual has a settled place. An Orthodox Jew could well argue that the observance of the Sabbath is a small price to pay for the benefits of the Law or the strength of the Jewish family. A shared morality in a tolerant society was the ideal of John Locke and of early philosophers of liberty. They did not at all believe that a society, of any kind, can be maintained without rules, but they thought that the rules ought to be subject to the best of reason, and that people should be coerced to accept only the essential rules. They did recognize that coercion was inevitable in social morality, particularly in the protection of life or of property, because they considered that no society can survive if there is no security. They applied an almost absolute tolerance to variations in personal choices that did not affect the welfare of others. The Confucian, mourning his father for forty days, could live next door to the Jew, honoring the Sabbath, without either disturbing the other, or wanting to coerce him into following his own religious practices.

警告说哀悼仪式可能会被夸张。然而,每个信仰体系的信徒都认为这些观察只是获得共同和连贯的世界秩序,并有自己的固定位置的小代价。一个东正教犹太人可以很好地论证,遵守安息日只是换取犹太法律或犹太家庭力量的小代价。约翰·洛克和早期自由哲学家认为,在一个宽容的社会里共享道德是理想。他们并不相信任何形式的社会都可以没有规则维持,但他们认为规则应该服从于最佳理性,人们应该被强制接受只有最基本的规则。他们认识到在社会道德中强制是不可避免的,特别是在保护生命或财产方面,因为他们认为如果没有安全保障,任何社会都无法生存。他们对不影响他人福祉的个人选择变化采取了近乎绝对的宽容态度。虔诚的儒家人可以和选择安息日的犹太人在隔壁居住,而不会相互干扰或强迫对方遵循自己的宗教实践。

From this combined doctrine of social morality in essential matters and tolerance in personal decisions, one actually gets a core moral standard that has to be imposed on all citizens and a voluntary ethic that citizens accept

as individuals or as members of subgroups in society. When a Benedictine monk takes vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, he does so as a member of such a subgroup. He does not call on all Catholics, let alone on all his fellow citizens, to take the same vows, or to observe the same rules. 从这种在基本事项中的社会道德和在个人决策中的宽容的结合理论来看,我们实际上得到了一个必须对所有公民强制实施的核心道德标准,以及公民作为个人或作为社会中的某个群体成员自愿接受的道德准则。当一位本笃会修士发下贫困、贞洁和服从的誓愿时,他是以该小群体的成员的身份这样做的。他并没有要求所有天主教徒,更不要说他的所有同胞,都要发下相同的誓愿,或遵守相同的规则。

He will be obedient to the orders of his abbot, but he does not expect anyone outside his abbey to pay any attention to them. The adherence to these optional parts of social morality does not need to be universal, but the core morality does have to be shared, and people who will not accept the core morality damage society as well as themselves. In the extreme example, a society overrun with robbers who do not hesitate to murder, as large parts of Europe were after the fall of the Roman Empire, offers nobody a satisfactory life, not even the robbers themselves; they are always particularly threatened by other murderers. This is equally true of some inner-city areas of the United States today. Anarchy is not the ideal society, because without the enforcement of law there is no human security. 他将服从他的院长的命令,但他不期望修道院外的任何人会注意到这些命令。对这些社会道德中的可选部分的遵守并不需要是普遍的,但核心道德必须得到共享,那些不接受核心道德的人也会损害社会和他们自己。在极端的例子中,一个被强盗统治、不 hesitate 杀人的社会,就像欧洲在罗马帝国崩溃后的某些地区,没有人能过上令人满意的生活,即使是强盗本人;他们也随时面临着其他杀手的威胁。这在今天美国的一些市区也同样适用。无政府状态不是理想的社会,因为没有法律的执行,人们就没有安全感。

When one looks at the forces that are hostile to the morality of society, one needs to consider this core morality, which is broadly similar in most modern religious belief systems. Two, at least, of the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, for Christians, or the Torah, for Jews, can be regarded as universal for anything one could recognize as a religion: "Thou shalt not

kill" and "Thou shalt not steal." One can even go beyond that.

当看到那些敌对于社会道德的力量时, 需要考虑这个基本的道德,这在大多数现代宗教信仰体系中都有广泛的相似性。对于基督教的十诫或犹太教的律法来说, 至少有两条是任何可以被认为是宗教的事物所共有的:"不可杀人"和"不可偷盗"。甚至可以更进一步。

Almost all serious agnostics would regard both murder and theft - the ultimate threat to life and the ultimate threat to property - as forbidden, and would accept that society has the right to punish people who kill or rob. They might disagree about the appropriate punishment for a particular crime, but not about the right of society to punish as such.

几乎所有的严肃无神论者都认为谋杀和盗窃是被禁止的,因为这是对生命和财产的最大威胁。他们也接受社会有权惩罚那些杀人或抢劫的人。他们可能会在具体的惩罚方式上存在分歧,但不会反对社会有权惩罚这样的行为。

The original phrase of John Locke has it precisely. Everyone has a right to "life, liberty and estate." In 1776 Thomas Jefferson added another of John Locke's phrases, "the pursuit of happiness." That makes a very fine phrase, and a very fine aspiration, but "life, liberty and estate" is more down to earth than "life, liberty, and the pursuit of 298

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happiness." Society depends absolutely on the right to life and the right to property. In practice history shows that these rights can be protected only when there is liberty. If the state is all-powerful, then the state becomes the great enemy of life, as in wars of aggression, and of individual property, by taking an inordinate share of the national wealth for its own often undesirable and always wasteful purposes.

幸福。社会绝对依赖生命权和财产权。实践历史表明,只有在自由存在的情况下,这些权利才能得到保护。如果国家拥有绝对权力,那么国家就会成为生命和个人财产的最大敌人,通过战争侵略和过度占用国民财富来满足其自身通常不合需要且往往浪费的目的。

The core morality is, however, under attack in the most advanced nations, partly by the very forces of modernity that give these nations their technical

edge. The United States is the world's leading technological power. Many people, including most Americans, would have regarded the United States as a moral example to the rest of the world at any time up to the early 1960s. Now that view is seldom expressed, even by Americans who are proud of their country. One could not listen, as the world did, to the O.J. Simpson trial and regard the United States as the simple virtuous Republic it began by being.

然而,核心道德在世界上最发达的国家中正受到攻击,部分原因是赋予这些国家技术优势的现代化力量。美国是世界领先的技术强国。包括大多数美国人在内的许多人,在上世纪 60 年代初之前,都会将美国视为向世界其他国家学习的道德典范。而现在,即使是那些为自己的国家感到自豪的美国人,也很少再表达这种观点。正如全世界所听到的 O.J.Simpson 的审讯,人们再也无法将美国看作最初建立时的简单美德共和国。

If one looks back at the labels of the old America, they reflected the needs of a frontier society, which colored the attitudes of its citizens even in the big cities. Frontiers are democratic places.

如果回顾美国过去的标签,它们反映了边疆社会的需求,这也影响了即使在大城市里公民的态度。边疆是民主的地方。

People feel themselves to be equal, and the early Americans threw off the class hierarchies of Europe. Even indentured laborers, sent over from England as prisoners, established themselves as independent tradesmen, farmers, or free laborers once their indenture period was over. Wages were higher than in Europe, and the cost of essentials was low, though imported manufactures were expensive. On the frontier itself people depended very much on one another, but the living, if hard, was a good one by European standards. Immigrants might start as low wage earners in the slums of Boston and New York, but they usually escaped from the slums quite soon, and generation after generation found prosperity. After the Civil War, the blacks saw themselves as though they were another immigrant group, and many of them shared these American values and objectives. From these the black middle class developed.

人们觉得自己是平等的,而早期美国人摆脱了欧洲的等级制度。即使是被派遣来自英国的契约工人,在服满合约期后也会成为独立的工匠、农

民或自由劳工。工资高于欧洲水平,基本生活用品价格低廉,但进口制造品价格昂贵。在边疆地区,人们非常依赖彼此,但生活虽艰辛,但对于欧洲标准而言已算不错。移民可能开始在波士顿和纽约的贫民窟中工资微薄,但通常很快就摆脱了贫民窟,世代累积财富。内战后,黑人也视自己为另一个移民群体,许多人都秉持这些美国的价值观和目标。就此发展出了黑人中产阶级。

This aspiration, strengthened by the actual experience of the frontier, and by the influence of the churches, both Protestant and Catholic, framed the patriotism of Americans. They believed that they lived in God's own country, a notion uniquely guided by democratic ideals and Christian faith, the first and most successful of the world's democracies. The picture is familiar enough; it is personified in the image we all, or almost all, have of Abraham Lincoln, though one can still find some Americans in the South who see Lincoln as the man who unleashed the horrors of the first modern war to prevent free states from leaving a Union they no longer trusted.

这种愿景,由边疆实际经历和新教和天主教会的影响强化,构成了美国人的爱国主义。他们相信自己生活在上帝的国度,这一观念是由民主理想和基督教信仰所独特指引的,是世界上第一个也是最成功的民主国家。这幅画面已非常熟悉;在我们几乎所有人心中都有亚伯拉罕·林肯的形象,尽管在南部仍有一些美国人视林肯为导致第一次现代战争恐怖事件的人,他释放了自由州从不再信任的联盟中脱离的力量。

Nevertheless, the image of Lincoln, craggy, simple, honest, and eloquent, is still the supreme American image, and it is essentially a moral one. Many Americans still feel the vivid original contrast between the democratic energy of the new country and the tired hierarchies of Europe. This ideal of an essentially dynamic meritocracy is hard for the foreigner to recognize in present-day Los Angeles, New York, Houston, or Washington, even though its traces, and something more than traces, can still be found in the great suburban belts or in the rural areas. The American Puritan ethic, with all its historic importance, survives best north of the snowline, but the entrepreneurial dynamism is more widespread.

然而,林肯的形象,崎岖、简单、诚实和富于口才,仍然是至高无上的美国形象,而且它从本质上来说是一种道德形象。许多美国人仍然感受到,

新国家的民主活力与欧洲陈旧的等级制度之间鲜明的原始对比。这种本质上充满活力的精英主义理想,在当今的洛杉矶、纽约、休斯顿或华盛顿很难被外国人所认识,尽管它的痕迹,甚至超越痕迹的东西,仍然可以在广阔的郊区地带或农村地区找到。美国清教徒的伦理,尽管历史上很重要,但最好保存在雪线以北,而企业家的活力则更为广泛。

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Americans would point to the decay of the big cities, which have become breeding grounds for crime, especially the narco-business, as the worst symptom of the decline of a communal sense of morality. Most Americans also recognize that there is a clash of several different moral cultures, all competing in their claims and their authority.

美国人会指出大城市的衰败,这些城市已成为犯罪的温床,尤其是毒品交易,这是道德共同体衰落的最糟糕症状。大多数美国人也认识到有几种不同的道德文化在竞争主导地位。

The 'politically correct' culture rejects many, but not all, of the moral principles that upheld the old culture. It aggressively emphasizes the role and the rights of groups who are seen as having been historically exploited by a dominant white male culture, and rejects that culture, despite its being the founding culture of the United States.

这种"政治正确"文化拒绝了许多,但并非全部,曾经维系老文化的道德原则。它积极强调被视为历来被压榨的群体的角色和权利,拒绝了这种文化,尽管它是美国创建文化。

The dominant male culture of the first half of the twentieth century centered on the survival of the nuclear family. This historically gave the husband-father at least a nominal dominance in the home, though in practice the home was often run by the wife-mother with the often meek acceptance of the nominal master. It gave the male boss a real dominance in the workplace, a dominance that the feminist movement has so far challenged but not reversed. The interest of the family, and historic Christian teaching, outlawed abortion. The old morality thought abortion was unlawful killing, was never allowable, and the adherents of the traditional morality still think that. Adherents of the new morality think the opposite. In *Roe v. Wade* the

Supreme Court based the constitutional right to abortion, which had hitherto been regarded as a question for the individual states, on the doctrine of a right to privacy, itself remote from any language actually to be found in the Constitution or its amendments.

二十世纪前半叶主导的男性文化围绕着核心家庭的生存为中心。这在历史上赋予了丈夫-父亲至少在家庭中名义上的主导权,尽管在实际操作中家庭通常由妻子-母亲主持,而名义上的主人往往默默接受。这也赋予了男性老板在工作场所的真正主导地位,这种主导地位迄今为止一直受到女权主义运动的挑战但尚未逆转。家庭利益和基督教的历史教义禁止堕胎。旧有的道德观认为堕胎是非法杀人,从未被允许,传统道德的支持者仍然持有这种观点。新的道德观持有相反的观点。在"罗诉韦德"一案中,最高法院将堕胎的宪法权利,此前被视为各州自行决定的问题,建立在隐私权原则之上,这一原则与宪法及其修正案的实际情况相去甚远。

A woman's privacy was held to include the right to have or not to have children, whatever the consequences to the embryo might be. The Supreme Court did not regard the embryo as enjoying any constitutional rights-embryos being the same extraconstitutional entities in the late twentieth century that slaves had been in the first half of the nineteenth. "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" did not apply to slaves, and the language of the Declaration of Independence was not applied to embryos by the justices in *Roe v. Wade*.

一个女性的隐私包括拥有或者不拥有孩子的权利,不管这对胚胎可能造成的后果如何。最高法院并不认为胚胎享有任何宪法权利——正如在19世纪上半叶奴隶没有权利一样,20世纪末的胚胎也是这种超越宪法的实体。《独立宣言》中的"生命、自由和追求幸福"并不适用于奴隶,法官在《罗伊诉韦德案》中也没有将这些措辞应用于胚胎。

The abortion debate is the extreme example of the conflict between the old and new morality, though there are equally remarkable conflicts in other areas where the old social organization with its morality has been challenged by the new. Traditional Christian morality, in Protestant and Catholic churches alike, laid great emphasis on sexual roles: No heterosexual intercourse outside or before marriage. No genital homosexual

relationships. Lesbianism was less emphasized, because society hardly recognized its existence. When Queen Victoria was first told of it, she stoutly refused to believe that such things happened between women. Political correctness is the morality of supposedly oppressed groups. The homosexuals claimed an equal validity for their lifestyle, and challenged the traditional opposition to their sexual conduct.

堕胎辩论是老道德与新道德冲突的极端例子,虽然在其他领域也存在同样引人注目的冲突,即旧的社会组织及其道德遭到新事物的挑战。传统的基督教道德,无论是新教还是天主教,都非常强调性角色:婚姻之外或之前的异性性行为,不允许。不允许有男同性性关系。女同性恋性行为受到的重视较少,因为社会几乎不承认它的存在。当维多利亚女王首次听说这种事时,她坚决不相信女性之间会发生这样的事情。政治正确是所谓被压迫群体的道德。同性恋者声称他们的生活方式同样有效,并挑战了传统对其性行为的反对。

"Homophobia" was regarded as being itself an outrageous form of prejudice, like racial discrimination. To be critical of gays is regarded by the new morality as being as unacceptable as being critical of blacks, Jews, or women.

"恐同症"被视为一种令人不齿的偏见形式,就像种族歧视一样。新道德观里,批评同性恋者和批评黑人、犹太人或女性一样不可接受。

At the same time other sexual taboos were being eroded or abolished. In the 1960s there was a new wave of free love, partly based on the apparent security of the female contraceptive pill, but also promoted by mood-changing drugs and pop music. It led to an increasing amount of nonmarital cohabitation. By the 1990s it was thought 300

与此同时,其他的性禁忌也被逐渐削弱或废除。20 世纪 60 年代出现了新一波的自由恋爱潮,部分源于女性避孕药的普及,也与改变情绪的药物和流行音乐有关。这导致非婚同居的现象不断增加。到 90 年代,据估计有 300 万对夫妻选择了非婚同居。

absolutely normal in Britain, a rather more old-fashioned society than most of the United States, for Prince Edward to sleep with his girlfriend at Buckingham Palace, in the same stable but unmarried intimacy that students were sleeping with each other in their 1960s lodgings. Few people thought

it odd that Queen Elizabeth II, the head of the Church of England, condoned her youngest son's conduct, her three elder children's marriages having already broken down. Those few who complained were regarded as hopelessly out of date and priggish. Yet there were still many people who regarded the old morality as preferable, even if they did not practice it themselves, or seriously expect their children to do so, beyond a fairly early age.

在英国绝对正常,这是一个比大多数美国更保守的社会,爱德华王子在白金汉宫与女朋友同住,拥有和 60 年代学生在宿舍中一样未婚的亲密关系。很少有人认为,作为英格兰教会的元首,伊丽莎白二世王后纵容她最年轻儿子的行为,而她三个年长子女的婚姻已经破裂,是奇怪的。那些抱怨的人被视为过时和自以为是。但仍有很多人认为,尽管他们自己不这样做,或者不指望自己的孩子在相当年轻的年纪这样做,但旧有的道德观是更好的。

The politically correct movement has had its own puritanical side. Because it sprang from the perceived interests of women, seen as the largest of the oppressed groups, it had a certain hostility to male sexuality, both in aggressive and in what would previously have been regarded as harmless forms. Some women took the view that all men were by nature rapists, and the natural horror at rape was exaggerated into a general denunciation of the male gender. Others concentrated on sexual harassment, a real grievance-many men have very crude sexual manners-which became ludicrous in some trivial cases. Sexual harassment was even alleged in mere looks, without any word being uttered, let alone physical contact. As a result the new morality could be very censorious.

政治正确运动也有其自身的纯洁主义一面。因为它源自人们认为妇女是最大的被压迫群体的利益,所以它对男性性行为呈现出一定的敌意,包括攻击性的以及以前被视为无害的形式。有些妇女认为所有男性都本性强奸犯,对强奸的天然恐惧被夸大成对男性群体的一般谴责。另一些人集中于性骚扰,这确实是一个合理的不满 - 许多男性的性行为非常粗鲁 - 但在某些微不足道的情况下也变得荒谬可笑。甚至仅凭眼神就被指控为性骚扰,更不用说语言或身体接触了。结果是,新的道德标准变得非常严厉。

White people could be accused of racial prejudices, not because they were prejudiced but because they were white. Men could be accused of sexual harassment because their expressions showed that they found a woman attractive, something that in an earlier generation had been regarded as a compliment rather than an insult.

白人可能会被指责有种族偏见,不是因为他们有偏见,而是因为他们是白人。男性可能会被指责性骚扰,因为他们的表情表现出对一名女子的吸引,这在上一代人看来是一种称赞而不是侮辱。

The politically correct and the fundamentalist Christian groups are bitterly critical of each other, yet in the modern world they look rather alike. They both assume the authority of a particular moral doctrine as though it were universal, even though their moral doctrines are different. Both indeed can be criticized for the same defect, for an exaggerated and overconfident moralism, lacking in depth, in historic sense, or in tolerance. Both are attacked for their supposed resemblance to seventeenth-century Puritanism, to the self-confident moralists like Oliver Cromwell in England-he nearly emigrated to New England-or the Salem witch hunters. Neither the women's movement, in its more dogmatic form, nor the conservative preachers of the Bible belt can be accused of any lack of morality, but of its overdevelopment and rigidity. The heart of these moralities sometimes seems to have turned to stone. This sort of hardening of the moral arteries is as damaging to the consensual morality of society as the "anything goes" political correctness and conservative Christian groups are bitterly critical of each other, yet in the modern world they look rather alike. 它们都假定某种特定的道德学说具有普遍性,尽管它们的道德学说不同。这两者确实都可因同一缺陷而受批评,即过度和自信满满的道德主义,缺乏深度、历史意识或容忍。它们都因被指与 17 世纪清教徒主义、如英格兰的奥利弗·克伦威尔这样的自负道德主义者或塞勒姆女巫猎人有所相似而受到攻击。无论是女性运动的较教条形式,还是圣经地带的保守教士,都不能被指缺乏道德,而是其过度发展与僵化。这种道德动脉硬化,与"任何事都可以"一样,对社会的共识性道德同样有害。

anarchy against which it protests.

反对它所抗议的无政府状态。

It is a distortion of moral forces, a coarsening into self-righteousness. Pharisaism, the conviction that one is uniquely virtuous, is as old as humankind, and was particularly offensive to Jesus Christ. The erosion of morality, the belief that ethical choices are purely a matter of private preference, as much a matter for the individual as the choice of clothes, is a more recent phenomenon. This belief reflects the absence of any shared morality at all. It takes to a quite new stage the classical doctrine of liberty, and turns "the pursuit of happiness" from what John Locke originally meant by the phrase, and Jefferson understood by it in 1776, into a hedonism that is reckless of consequences.

这是道德力量的扭曲,一种自我正义的粗俗化。法利赛主义,即认为自己是独一无二的善良的信念,和耶稣基督所反对的一样古老。道德的崩解,认为道德选择纯属个人偏好,和选择衣服一样,是一种更新近的现象。这种信念反映了完全缺乏共同的道德。它将古典的自由主义学说推向了一个全新的阶段,并将"追求幸福"从约翰·洛克最初的意义和杰斐逊在1776年所理解的意义,转变为一种不顾后果的享乐主义。

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The phrase "the pursuit of happiness" is taken from John Locke's Essay on Human Understanding (1691). "the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful pursuit of true and solid happiness, so the care of ourselves that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty." He does go on to say that "everyone does not place his happiness in the same thing.... the mind has a different relish as well as the palate.... Men may choose different things, yet all choose right, supposing them only like a company of poor insects, whereof some are bees, delighted with flowers and their sweetness, others beetles delighted with other kinds of viands." Yet he goes on to argue that to prefer vice to virtue is "manifestly a wrong judgement." He puts particular weight on the religious argument, but considers also that "wicked men have the worse part here." He believes that "morality, established upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in anyone who will consider." The Lockean doctrine of liberty undoubtedly gives a wider range to human preferences than more authoritarian moral systems that seek to treat all people alike, and impose uniformity of conduct. Yet soon the classic doctrine of liberty recognizes the need for collective moral imperatives, including respect for

other people in society, particularly their lives and the peaceful ownership of their possessions under the law. A general erosion of the collective morality threatens liberty, both directly, in that it introduces an element of anarchy, and indirectly, by encouraging the most authoritarian forces of society. We can see the history of public morality as a cycle between disorder and authoritarianism; the modern authoritarian moralities, both feminism and fundamentalism, have emerged as a cyclical response to the hedonism of the 1960s.

追求幸福的说法源自约翰·洛克的《人类理解论》(1691 年)。“理性存在的最高完美在于对真正稳固的幸福的谨慎追求,所以不会将想象中的幸福误认为是真正的幸福,这是我们自由的必要基础。”他进一步说:“每个人并不把幸福寄托在同一事物上.... 心智的品位正如味觉的分歧.... 人们可能选择不同的事物,但既然都像一群可怜的小虫,有些是蜜蜂,喜欢花朵和它们的甜蜜,有些则是甲虫,喜欢其他类型的食物,那么他们都是正确的。”然而,他继续论证,把邪恶选择于美德之上,这是“明显的错误判断”。他特别强调了宗教论点,但也认为“邪恶的人在现世就已经得到了报应”。他认为,“建立在真正基础之上的道德,必然会影响任何愿意考虑的人的选择。”洛克的自由主义理论无疑给人的偏好留下了更广阔的空间,而不是那些试图一视同仁地对待所有人,并强加统一行为的更专制的道德体系。然而,自由主义经典理论很快就认识到,需要集体的道德命令,包括尊重社会中其他人,特别是他们的生命和根据法律对自身财物的和平占有。集体道德的普遍式微,直接威胁自由,因为它引入了无政府状态的因素,间接地鼓励社会中最专制的力量。我们可以将公共道德的历史视为在无序和专制之间不断循环的过程;现代权威主义道德,包括女权主义和原教旨主义,都是对 20 世纪 60 年代放纵享乐主义的循环性反应。

We have already described some of the attributes of the new world of the next century. It will be shaped by two main forces, the shift of technology that is opening up the economies of Asia and the new global electronic communications that are making the citizen progressively less dependent on his or her local government. The new technology will replace, or has already replaced, many of the middle human skills-the production line worker, the office clerk, now increasingly the middle manager. But it has rewarded the rarer skills, creating an international cognitive elite of highly

skilled people for whom the new communications open up the widest possible market for their skills. Like most elites, the cognitive elite tend to be a bit above themselves, are rather arrogant, and think they can set their own standards. They are alienated from society as a result.

我们已经描述了下一个世纪新世界的一些属性。它将由两大力量塑造,一是正在开放亚洲经济的技术转变,二是使公民越来越不依赖于地方政府的新全球电子通信。新技术将取代或已经取代了许多中层人类技能,如生产线工人、办公室文员,现在越来越多的是中层管理人员。但它也回报了更稀缺的技能,创造了一个由高技能人才组成的国际认知精英阶层,新的通信为他们的技能开辟了最广阔的市场。与大多数精英一样,认知精英也往往有些自负,相当傲慢,认为可以自己制定标准。因此,他们与社会疏离。

During the first half of the next century there will be a massive transfer of wealth from the Old West to the New East. Political failures-and China is still a politically backward country-may delay this transfer of wealth and strategic power, but are most unlikely to prevent it. They cannot reverse it. 在下一个世纪的前半叶,财富将从旧西方大规模转移到新东方。政治失败——中国仍然是一个政治落后的国家——可能会延缓这种财富和战略权力的转移,但不太可能阻止它。它们不能逆转这一转变。

This process of the shift in wealth would in any case put the greatest possible pressure on the white-dominated countries of the Northern Hemisphere, on Europe and North America. At present about 750 million people belong to the advanced countries of this area; until very recently Japan was the only Asian, nonwhite country to have reached the Euro-American standard of living, though there were ethnically European populations in New Zealand, in Australia, and in the white population of southern Africa. Even in 1990, the total population of the advanced industrial countries was only about 15 percent of the world population of 5 billion. The shape of the distribution of the world's wealth 302

这一财富转移过程无论如何都会给北半球白人主导的国家,即欧洲和北美带来巨大的压力。目前这一地区约有 7.5 亿人口属于发达国家;直到很近的时期,日本是亚洲唯一一个达到欧美生活水平的非白人国家,尽管在新西兰、澳大利亚和南非的白人人口中也有种族上欧洲人的社区。

即便到 1990 年,全球 5 亿人口中,发达工业国家的总人口还只占 15%左右。世界财富的分布趋势

was 15 percent rich, 85 percent poor, very like the income distribution in advanced industrial societies a hundred years ago. By 2050, in an accelerating process, the expectation is that the advanced economies will include about 3 billion people out of a world population that may have risen to 7 billion, or a wealth distribution of 40 percent rich, 60 percent poor. By the end of the century these figures could well be reversed, and the distribution could be 60 percent rich and 40 percent poor, with poverty particularly concentrated in Africa. The shift between nations will be toward a greater equality of wealth, but inside nations it will probably be toward greater inequality. The efficient users of talent and capital will have a decisive advantage over those with moderate skills or little capital. This wealth will be highly mobile. The poor in the advanced world will not be able to tax the rich on the twentieth-century scale; those countries that try to do so will fall back in an intensely competitive race.

15%富裕,85%贫穷,非常类似于 100 年前先进工业社会的收入分配情况。到 2050 年,在加速的过程中,预期先进经济体将包括世界人口 70 亿中的 30 亿人,即财富分配为 40%富裕,60%贫穷。到本世纪末,这些数字可能会逆转,分配可能为 60%富裕,40%贫穷,贫困特别集中在非洲。国家之间的财富差距将向更大的平等发展,但在国家内部可能会向更大的不平等发展。才能和资本的高效使用者将比中等技能或资本较少的人具有决定性优势。这种财富将高度流动。先进世界的穷人将无法像 20 世纪那样对富人征税;那些试图这样做的国家将在激烈的竞争中落后。

Of course, the total productivity of the world economy will continue to rise, perhaps by an average of 3 percent over the whole world, if there are no world wars. If that proves correct, the total world product will double every twenty-five years, making it more than four times as large as it is now by 2050, and sixteen to twenty times as large by 2100. Even if the world population has increased to 8 billion by 2100, that will give the world GDP per head by the end of the century ten times its present level. Such an increase in wealth can take care of the rise in the new industrial societies, and the multimillion-dollar incomes of the cognitive elite, and still provides a decent and rising standard of living for the rest of the advanced

workforce. But the differentials will be very different from those of the twentieth century. In world terms the poor nations will see their incomes grow much faster than those of the rich nations; in national terms, the incomes of the rich, as in the America of the 1990s, will grow much faster than middle or low incomes. In the next century we shall witness the creation of a world superclass, perhaps of 500 million very rich people, with 100 million being rich enough to emerge as Sovereign Individuals. 当然,如果没有世界大战,全球经济总产出将继续增长,也许平均每年增长 3%。如果这一预测准确,到 2050 年全球产品总值将超过现在的 4 倍,到 2100 年将增加 16-20 倍。即使到 2100 年世界人口增加到 80 亿,人均 GDP 也将达到现有水平的 10 倍。这种财富的增加足以应对新兴工业社会的崛起和认知精英阶层的百万富翁收入,同时也为其他先进劳动力提供体面且日益提高的生活水平。但差距将与 20 世纪大不相同。从全球角度来看,贫穷国家的收入增长将大大快于富裕国家;从国内来看,富人的收入增长,如 20 世纪 90 年代的美国,将大大快于中低收入阶层。在下个世纪,我们将目睹一个由 5 亿至 1 亿非常富有的人组成的全球超级阶层的形成,他们将成为主权个人。

This process will have an inevitable consequence. Societies will become much less homogeneous; the nationstate will become weaker, or crumble altogether; the cognitive elite will see itself as cosmopolitan. Already people who work in the same global functions are developing a culture that is much closer to that of their fellow workers in other parts of the world than to their fellow citizens in the old nationstates. A London investment banker will probably feel more at home in Seoul than he will in Glasgow; a Washington civil servant may feel more at home in Bonn than in black areas of Washington itself. We can already see the splintering effect that this process has on moral values. The morality of the individual is partly framed by education, by what the individual has been taught as a child; it is also partly framed by experience of life. Both the education and the experiences of the cognitive elite will be cosmopolitan, and will tend to divorce people from their local communities.

这个过程将有不可避免的后果。社会将变得更加不同质化;民族国家将变得更加弱化,或者彻底崩溃;认知精英将把自己视为宇宙主义者。已有许多在同一个全球功能上工作的人正在形成一种与世界其他地区的同

行更为接近的文化,而与旧有的民族国家的同胞更为疏远。一位伦敦的投资银行家可能会在首尔感到更加亲切,而不是在格拉斯哥;一位华盛顿的公务员可能会在波恩感到更加亲切,而不是在华盛顿的黑人区。我们已经能看到,这个过程对道德价值观造成了分裂的效果。个人的道德性部分是由教育形成的,由他们在童年时所学的知识形成的;也部分是由生活经历形成的。认知精英的教育和经历都是宇宙主义的,这将趋向于使人们与其当地社区疏离。

As we move toward the next century, a high proportion of people in the growing cognitive elite have been given little religious or moral education in the family. The commonest religion of the elite is an agnostic humanism. Many such families are themselves split by divorce, remarriage, and subsequent third marriages. The marriage pattern in Hollywood is not universal in the United States, but the cognitive elite in Euro-303
步入下一个世纪,大部分新兴认知精英鲜有家庭宗教或道德教育。认知精英最常见的信仰是无神论式人文主义。许多这样的家庭本身就因离婚、再婚和第三次婚姻而分裂。好莱坞婚姻模式在美国并非普遍,但欧洲认知精英中也存在类似情况。

America has a high divorce rate, probably averaging a third or more. The children of these divorced parents seldom have a basic religious education, and are aware of the variations of moral attitude between parents, stepparents, and step-siblings. If one compares the initial moral education of this group with that of an Irish or Polish village, the peasant education obviously provides much the stronger religious training of the two.
美国的离婚率很高,可能平均有三分之一或更多。这些离婚父母的孩子很少有基本的宗教教育,并且了解父母、继父母和继兄弟姐妹之间的道德态度差异。如果将这一群体的初步道德教育与爱尔兰或波兰村庄的情况进行比较,显然农民教育提供了更强大的宗教培训。

A godless, rootless, and rich elite is unlikely to be happy, or to be loved.
无神论的、失去根基的、富有的精英阶层不可能感到快乐,也不可能受到爱戴。

This inadequacy in the initial moral education of what will be the dominant economic group of the next century is likely to be reinforced by their life experience.

这种对即将成为下一个世纪主导经济集团的初步道德教育的不足,很可能会由他们的生活经历加强。

These people will have the discipline of an advanced technical education, of one sort or another, to fit themselves for their new role as the leaders of the new electronic universe.

这些人将拥有先进技术教育的纪律,无论是何种类型,以使自己适应作为新电子宇宙领导者的新角色。

But they will learn from that only some of the moral lessons that have historically been the framework for human social conduct. By the standards of Confucius, Buddha, or Plato (500 B.C.), St. Paul (A.D. 50), or Mahomet (A.D. 600), they may be moral illiterates. They will have been taught the lessons of economic efficiency, the use of resources, the pursuit of money, but not the virtues of humility or self-sacrifice, let alone chastity.

Essentially most of them will have been brought up as pagans with a set of values closer to those of the late Roman Republic than to Christianity. Even these values will be highly individualistic, rather than shared. Societies, as we have argued, can only be strong if real moral values are widely shared. The advanced nations are already moving into the situation where many people will hold weak or limited moral values, others will compensate with fierce adherence to irrational values, and few values will be held in common across the whole of society. No doubt, some of the "competitive territorial clubs" that we described earlier will impose exacting moral standards for residence.

但是他们只会从那里学到一些历史上一直构成人类社会道德框架的教训。按照孔子、佛陀或柏拉图(公元前 500 年)、保罗(公元 50 年)或穆罕默德(公元 600 年)的标准,他们可能是道德文盲。他们会被教授关于经济效率、资源利用和赚钱的课程,却不会学到谦逊或自我牺牲,更不用说贞洁的美德。实质上,他们中的大多数人都是被当作异教徒养大的,他们的价值观更接近于罗马共和国后期而不是基督教。即使这些价值观也是高度个人主义的,而不是共同的。我们已经指出,只有当真正的道德价值观被广泛共享时,社会才能变得强大。先进国家已经进入这样一种

情况:许多人将持有软弱或有限的道德价值观,其他人将以对非理性价值的狂热坚持来弥补,而整个社会中很少有共同的价值观。毫无疑问,我们之前描述的一些"竞争性领土俱乐部"将为成员制定严格的道德标准。

Differences in wealth have not in themselves historically produced fundamental differences in religious values. In dense and stable societies with strong traditions, a steep hierarchical structure, "the rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate," may conceal values that run through the hierarchy, but this depends upon the strength of the communal feeling of the rich and the poor, and the strength of the social traditions.

财富差异本身历史上并未产生根本性的宗教价值差异。在有着强大传统、严格等级结构的稳定密集型社会中,"富人在城堡里,贫人在门前"可能掩盖了贯穿等级的价值观,但这取决于富人和穷人的共同体感以及社会传统的力量。

Neither of these conditions exists now, and both community feeling and tradition are being weakened by the economic and technological revolution that is taking place. The lives of the many and the few are becoming more and more distant from each other. The technological revolution has been achieved by breaking away from the old ways of doing things. In every field it has been the radical who has won, and the conventional thinker who has fallen behind, who has literally fallen out of the race. Our politics may be led by conventional thinkers-Bill Clinton, Helmut Kohl, John Major-but our most successful businesses are led by radicals with a keen understanding of the new technological world; the archetype is Bill Gates. Conventional thinking has been discredited by its inability to deal with the rapidity and the sheer force of change.

这些条件现在都不存在了,社区意识和传统都受到了正在进行的经济和技术革命的削弱。大多数人和少数人的生活越来越疏离。技术革命是通过摆脱旧有的做事方式实现的。在各个领域,都是激进派取得胜利,而传统思维者落后了,从竞争中跌落出局。我们的政治可能由传统思维者领导,比如比尔·克林顿、赫尔穆特·科尔、约翰·梅杰,但我们最成功的企业却由深知新技术世界的激进派领导,比如比尔·盖茨。传统思维因无法应对变革的迅速性和强大力量而失去信誉。

Yet morality is not like that. If we take the science of Moses, formed about 1000

摩西的科学形成于约 1000 年前,但道德却不像那样。

B.C., it has very little to tell us. The account of the creation in the Book of Genesis may well contain a theological truth-God made the universe and humankind but it does not give a scientific account of the actual development of physical structures.

根据《创世纪》,这个宇宙和人类是由上帝创造的,但并没有给出物理结构实际发展的科学说明。

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Yet if we take the morality of Moses-the Ten Commandments-that has a great deal to tell us.

摩西的道德-十诫-确实有许多值得我们学习的地方。

Respect for parents and faithfulness in marriage are the best ways to preserve family life; family life is the best way to bring up morally healthy children. Stealing damages the thief and the people from whom things are stolen, and is a disincentive to work and saving. Social order depends on the truth of witnesses. It is wrong to murder, and so on.

尊重父母和忠诚婚姻是维护家庭生活最好的方式;家庭生活是培养道德健康儿童最好的方式。盗窃损害小偷和受害者,也是对工作和储蓄的一种威慑。社会秩序依赖于证人的诚实。谋杀是错误的,等等。

In science, three thousand years completely changed what human knowledge is; in morality, we may actually have fallen back. The average psychotherapist probably gives the patient less good moral advice on how to lead his life than the average Jew would have received from his teacher in the period of Moses. Of course, Christianity itself is still available, but it is for most of the world a pale ghost of its former self. Few people have the faith of the earlier ages, or even of the less sophisticated communities; one does not look for saints on Park Avenue.

在科学领域,三千年完全改变了人类知识的性质。在道德方面,我们可能实际上已经退步了。平均的心理治疗师可能给予病人关于如何生活的

建议,比摩西时代的犹太教老师要差得多。当然,基督教仍然存在,但对于大多数世界来说,它已经是当初自身的一个苍白的幽灵。很少有人像前代或者更简单的社区一样虔诚,在公园大道上也很难找到圣人。

The destruction of tradition has been a necessary condition of scientific progress.

传统的破坏是科学进步的必要条件。

If we all still believed that the sun revolved around the earth, then we could not have developed satellite communications. Indeed what we believe to be science itself is only a series of hypotheses, imperfect explanations due to be replaced by other explanations, stronger but still imperfect. Yet the destruction of tradition has been a disaster to the moral order of the world. 如果我们仍然相信太阳围绕地球旋转,那么我们就不可能发展卫星通讯。事实上,所谓的科学本身只是一系列假说,是有缺陷的解释,会被其他更强大但仍然不完善的解释所取代。但是,传统的破坏已经给世界的道德秩序带来了灾难。

Confucius taught that we should always behave with moderation (he called the Golden Mean chum yum, at least as it was translated by seventeenth century scholars).

孔子教导我们应该始终保持适度的行为(他将其称为"中庸"一词,至少是由 17 世纪的学者们翻译的)。

He also taught that we should respect authority and treat others as we would wish to be treated ourselves.

他也教导我们应该尊重权威,并以自己希望被对待的方式对待他人。

That teaching is twenty-five hundred years old. As a tradition it influenced China for all recorded history, but Confucianism seems an outmoded tradition to many modern Chinese, who do not value moderation, who respect force rather than authority, and certainly do not treat others as they would wish to be treated themselves. With the loss of tradition, societies can lose the whole vocabulary of their moral consensus. China, with all its advancing power, is now a morally backward country compared to Tibet, impoverished and oppressed as the Tibetans are.

那种教导有两千五百年的历史了。作为一个传统,它影响了中国长达所有可记录的历史,但儒家思想对于许多现代中国人来说已经是一种过时的传统,他们不重视中庸之道,更倾向于尊重力量而非权威,也肯定不会以自己希望被对待的方式对待他人。随着传统的丧失,社会可能会失去道德共识的全部词汇。相比于生活在贫困和压迫之中的藏人,拥有强大实力的中国如今在道德层面已经落后了。

A good social morality has certain characteristics. It should contribute to the survival of society and of individuals, in a dynamic rather than static way. It should include tolerance and avoid self-righteousness. It should be religious, rather than merely agnostic. It should not pretend to decide questions of scientific fact. It should be neither anarchic nor authoritarian. It should be widely shared and deeply held. Such a social morality is particularly important to the family and to the raising of children as independent and responsible adults. It provides the focus of a good society. 良好的社会道德具有一定的特点。它应该以动态而非静态的方式有利于社会 and 个人的生存。它应该包容并避免自以为是。它应该具有宗教性,而不仅仅是无神论。它不应该假装决定科学事实的问题。它既不该是无政府状态,也不该是权威主义。它应该广为人知且深入人心。这样的社会道德对家庭和培养独立负责的成年人特别重要。它是良好社会的焦点。

We find that any such morality is supported by the logic of interdependence that comes from commerce and fellow-feeling, but is threatened by the attacks of a facile scientism, by the alienation of a superclass and a subclass, by the loss of the rootedness of the old geographical economies. Perhaps there will be a reaction against these trends.

我们发现任何这种道德都是由来自商业和同情心的相互依赖逻辑支撑的,但受到轻率科学主义的攻击、上层阶级和下层阶级的疏离,以及旧有地理经济根基的丧失的威胁。也许会出现对这些趋势的反弹。

They must be recognized as extremely dangerous to the societies of the next century.

他们必须被认为是对下个世纪的社会极其危险的。

As what Isaiah Berlin called "the most terrible century in Western history" winds down, the age of giantism in social structure also draws to a close. The final days of the twentieth century are destined to be a time of downsizing, devolution, and reorganization.

正如伊萨亚·柏林所称的"西方历史上最可怕的世纪"即将结束,社会结构中巨无霸时代也将走向终结。二十世纪最后几天注定将是缩编、分权和重组的时期。

It will be the time of the social dinosaurs trapped in the tar pit. And a time of scavengers.

这将是困在沥青坑中的社会恐龙的时代。也是掠食者的时代。

Birds will pick the bones of dinosaurs. Governments, corporations, and unions will be obliged to adjust against their inclinations to new metaconstitutional conditions established by the penetration of microtechnology. It has profoundly shifted the boundaries within which violence is exercised. Today's world has already changed more than we commonly understand, more than CNN and the newspapers tell us. And it has changed in precisely the directions indicated by a study of megapolitical conditions. As we argued first in *Blood in the Streets* and then in *The Great Reckoning*, when change occurs in technology or the other factors that set the boundaries where violence is exercised, the character of society inevitably changes with them. Everything that is attached to the way humans interact, including morality and the common sense of the way we see the world, will change as well. After a period of slack morality, which is indicative of the end of an era, we will see the awakening of a sterner morality, with more exacting demands to meet the more exacting requirements of a world of competitive sovereignty.

鸟类将啄食恐龙的骨头。政府、企业和工会将不得不调整自己的倾向,适应微技术渗透所建立的新的元宪法条件。这已经深刻地改变了暴力行使的边界。今天的世界已经发生了比我们通常理解的更多的变化,比CNN和报纸告诉我们的更多。这种变化正是按照兆政治条件研究所指示的方向发生的。正如我们在《街头血腥》和《大清算》中首次提出的观点,当技术或其他决定暴力行使边界的因素发生变化时,社会的性质也会随之不可避免地发生变化。所有附着于人类交互方式的东西,包括道德和我们看待世界的常识,都会随之改变。在一个道德松弛的时期

(这是一个时代结束的标志)之后,我们将见证一个更严厉道德的觉醒,以满足一个富有竞争主权的世界更苛刻的要求。

Several features of the new morality can be foreseen. For one thing, it will emphasize the importance of productivity and the correctness of earnings being retained by those who generate them. Another corollary point will be the importance of efficiency in investment.

新道德的几个特点可以预见。首先,它将强调生产力的重要性以及收益应该被创造者保留的正确性。另一个衍生点将是投资中效率的重要性。

The morality of the Information Age applauds efficiency, and recognizes the advantage of resources being dedicated to their highest-value uses. In other words, the morality of the Information Age will be the morality of the market. As James Bennett has argued, the morality of the Information Age will also be a morality of trust.

信息时代的道德赞颂效率,并认识到将资源用于最有价值用途的优势。换言之,信息时代的道德将是市场的道德。正如詹姆斯·贝内特所言,信息时代的道德也将是信任的道德。

The cybereconomy will be a high-trust community. In a setting where unbreakable encryption will allow an embezzler or thief to securely place the proceeds of his crimes outside the range of recovery, there will be a very strong incentive to avoid losses by not doing business with thieves and embezzlers in the first place. Just as in the example of the Quakers cited earlier, a reputation for honesty will be an important asset in the cybereconomy. In the anonymity of cyberspace, this reputation may not always apply to a known person, but it will be reliably verifiable through identification of cryptographic keys. The possibility for radiating difficulties if encryption or certification of encrypted identities becomes corrupted by gangsters or others is daunting enough that it should strongly militate against the hiring of any person whose behavior could be indicative of a lack of trustworthiness. Bennett envisions "A Gentleman's Club of Cyberspace," protected areas that would require heightened security measures for participation, "possibly using biometric validation such as voice-print identification. The proprietors would assume the responsibility

of vouching for the identity of the participants and to some extent their trustworthiness, achieving a 'gentleman's club in cyberspace' (although ladies would be welcome these days). In these areas, people could carry on transactions with greater security and confidence than in the general realm of cyberspace. Thus the twenty-first century may see a return to a Victorian-like emphasis 306

网络经济将是一个高度信任的社区。在无法破解的加密技术允许贪污犯或窃贼将罪行所得安全地置于无法追回的范围内的环境中,最好不与这些窃贼和贪污犯做生意,以避免损失的强烈动机就会出现。正如前面提到的 Quakers 的例子,在网络经济中,诚实的声誉将是一项重要的资产。在匿名的网络空间中,这种声誉可能不总是与一个知名人物相关,但通过加密密钥的识别,它是可靠验证的。如果加密或加密身份认证证书被黑社会分子或其他人腐败,所造成的困难可能会令人胆寒,因此应该强烈反对雇佣任何行为可能表明缺乏可信度的人。Bennett 设想"网络空间绅士会所",需要更高安全措施参与的受保护区域,"可能使用生物识别验证,如语音识别。所有者将负责证明参与者的身份以及在某种程度上的可信度,从而实现'网络空间绅士会所'(尽管现在女士也受欢迎)。在这些区域内,人们可以进行比整个网络空间更有安全性和信心的交易。因此,21 世纪可能会看到对维多利亚时代的重视的回归。

on trustworthiness and character in an environment no Victorian could have envisioned."

在无法被维多利亚时代人所设想的环境中,关于可信度和品格。

The protected areas of cyberspace may also offer guarantees to reduce risk similar to the extraterritorial guarantees of protection offered by the Counts of Champagne to protect merchants traveling to and from Champagne fairs. Other jurisdictions actually "indemnified traveling merchants against any losses they might incur while passing through the territory under the jurisdiction of the given noble." "Guards of the Fair,"

网络空间中受保护的区域也可能提供类似于香槟伯爵为保护前往和离开香槟集市的商人提供的领土外保护的保证,以降低风险。其他管辖区域实际上"补偿旅行商人在所管辖领土内可能遭受的任何损失"。

officials originally appointed by the counts, provided security and a "tribunal of justice"

最初由伯爵任命的官员,提供了安全和"司法法庭"

for merchants at the fair. They ultimately evolved into more independent entities, with a separate seal, notarizing contracts and enforcing performance, with the power to "bar from future fairs any trader found guilty of not paying his debts or fulfilling his contracted promises. This was evidently so severe a penalty that few willingly risked this denial of opportunities for future profit. Short of that, however, the guards could seize the goods of a defaulting debtor and sell them for the benefit of his creditors." 39

为在集市上的商人而设。他们最终演变为更独立的实体,拥有自己的印章,公证合同并执行履约,并有权"禁止在未来的集市上买卖任何被发现欠债或未能履行承诺的交易者"。这显然是一个严重的惩罚,很少有人愿意冒这个风险失去未来的利润机会。但除此之外,卫兵还可以扣押违约债务人的货物,并将其出售以补偿其债权人。

Ostracism as means of enforcement of contracts declined in importance when the number of alternative markets rose. With the new information technology now available, however, ostracism of cheats and those defaulting on contracts could again be a potent enforcement mechanism with the fragmented sovereignties of the next stage of society.

当可选市场数量增加时,通过排斥手段来执行合同的做法也逐渐式微。然而,随着新的信息技术的出现,对违约者和欺骗者采取排斥的做法可能再次成为一种强大的执行机制,以应对未来社会碎片化主权的新阶段。

Computer linkages can police cyberspace with unforgeable information about credit and fraud. As the world will be in this sense particularly a small community, cheats and frauds will be discouraged.

计算机联系可以用关于信用和欺诈的不可伪造的信息来管控网络空间。因为在这种意义上,世界将特别是一个小型社区,骗子和骗子将被阻止。

In addition to emphasizing the morality of earnings and efficiency and placing a renewed stress on character and trustworthiness, the new morality

is also~likely to stress the evil of violence, particularly kidnapping and extortion, which will grow in importance as means of "shaking down" individuals whose resources will not otherwise be easy prey to crime.

除了强调收益的道德性和效率,并更加强调品格和可信赖性之外,新的道德观也很可能强调暴力的邪恶,尤其是绑架和勒索,这种行为将变得更为重要,因为它可以"敲诈"那些资源不易被犯罪分子盯上的个人。

Still another likely spur to sterner morality will be the end of entitlements and income redistribution. When the hope of aid for those falling behind is based primarily upon appeals to private individuals and charitable bodies, it will be more important than it has been in the twentieth century that the recipients of charity appear to be morally deserving to those voluntarily dispensing the charity.

当对落后者的救援主要取决于对私人个人和慈善机构的呼吁时,慈善赠与者会比 20 世纪更重视受助人是否在道德上值得接受救助。

"Subsidies, windfalls, and the prospect of economic opportunity remove the immediacy of needing to conserve. The mantras of democracy redistribution, and economic development raise expectations and fertility rates, fostering population growth and thereby steepening a downward environmental and economic spiral." VIRGINIA ABERNATHY

补贴、意外之财和经济机会的前景消除了保护的紧迫性。民主再分配和经济发展的口号提高了预期和生育率,促进了人口增长,从而加剧了环境和经济的恶性循环。

In some ways the new information world will be better positioned to encourage seriousness over moral issues. The promises of income redistribution that enflamed expectations among the unlucky and unsuccessful in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe have also had a perverse effect internationally. There is strong evidence suggesting that foreign aid and promises of intervention to forestall famine and increase living standards have been major factors stimulating population growth that exceeds the carrying capacities of backward economies. The startling growth of world population since World War II, with its often destructive impact on forests, soils, and water resources, can be traced to intervention on a global scale. This intervention short-307

在某些方面,新的信息世界将更好地鼓励人们重视道德问题上。美国、加拿大和西欧中的不幸和失败者之间的收入再分配承诺,也对国际产生了反常的影响。有强有力的证据表明,外国援助和预防饥荒及提高生活水平的承诺,是刺激人口增长超过落后经济承载能力的主要因素。自第二次世界大战以来,世界人口的惊人增长,以及其对森林、土壤和水资源的常常破坏性影响,可以追溯到全球范围的干预。这种干预短暂地

circuited the negative feedback consequences that had long kept local populations in balance with the resources needed to support them.
打破了长期维持当地人口与所需资源平衡的负反馈机制。

Of course, many who lived in local environments with few resources and little or no growth were only too pleased to be assured that constraining limitations of their village life could be put aside.

当然,许多生活在资源匮乏、缺乏增长的当地环境中的人很高兴被告知,他们村庄生活的限制性约束可以放下。

They eagerly adopted the optimistic message carried by international aid workers, Peace Corps volunteers, local revolutionaries, and the competing ideologues of the Cold War, who told one and all that a better day lay ahead. This was precisely the wrong message.

他们热切地采纳了由国际援助人员、和平队志愿者、当地革命分子和冷战时期的竞争意识形态分子带来的乐观信息,他们向所有人传达了一个更美好的未来正在到来。这确实是一个错误的信息。

An important consequence of redistribution among cultures has been to make those who lived in nonindustrial civilizations and adhered to nonindustrial values artificially competitive. International aid, rescue missions to counter famine and disease, and technical intervention fooled many into believing that their life prospects had sharply improved-without the necessity on their part of updating their values or significantly altering their behavior.

重新分配在文化之间的重要后果是使那些生活在非工业文明中并坚持非工业价值观的人人为地具有竞争力。国际援助、救援任务以应对饥荒和疾病以及技术干预,使许多人误以为他们的生活前景已经大大改善,而无需更新自己的价值观或显著改变行为。

International income redistribution not only encouraged an unsustainable surge in the world's population, it contributed in important ways to cultural relativism and widespread confusion over the crucial role of culture in fitting people to prosper in their local environment. Today most people believe that cultures are more matters of taste than sources of guidance for behavior that can mislead as well as inform. We are too keen to believe that all cultures are created equal, too slow to recognize the drawbacks of counterproductive cultures. This is especially true of the hybrid cultures that have begun to emerge in the hothouse of subsidy and intervention in many parts of the world in this century. Like the criminal subculture of America's inner cities, they retain incoherent bits and pieces of cultures appropriate to earlier stages of economic development, and combine them with values for informing behavior in the Information Age.

国际收入再分配不仅鼓励了世界人口的不可持续激增,而且也在很大程度上导致了文化相对主义和对文化在使人适应当地环境繁荣发展中关键作用的广泛混淆。如今,大多数人认为文化更多是一种品位问题,而不是能误导人和启迪人的行为指南。我们太急于相信所有文化地位平等,而太慢于认识到不能提高生产力的文化弊端。这种情况在本世纪许多地方出现的混合文化中尤为明显。就像美国内城的犯罪亚文化一样,它们保留了适合早期经济发展阶段的非连贯的文化碎片,并将其与信息时代行为指导的价值观结合在一起。

The Information Revolution, therefore, will not merely release the spirit of genius, it will also unleash the spirit of nemesis. Both will contest as never before in the millennium to come.

信息革命不仅会释放天才的精神,也会释放复仇的精神。在未来的千年中,这两股力量将前所未有地展开角逐。

The shift from an Industrial to an Information Society is bound to be breathtaking.

从工业社会向信息社会的转变必将令人目眩神迷。

The transition from one stage of economic life to another has always involved a revolution. We think that the Information Revolution is likely to be the most far-reaching of all.

从一种经济生活阶段向另一种阶段的过渡始终涉及一场革命。我们认为信息革命可能是所有革命中影响最广泛的。

It will reorganize life more thoroughly than either the Agricultural Revolution or the Industrial Revolution. And its impact will be felt in a fraction of the time. Fasten your seat belts.

它会比农业革命或工业革命更彻底地重塑生活。而且它的影响会在更短的时间内显现。请系好您的安全带。

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APPENDIX 1:

附录 1:

IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIES

影响和策略

"Of all 36 ways to get out of trouble, the best way is - leave."
在所有 36 种摆脱困境的方法中,最好的方式就是 - 离开。

CHINESE PROVERB

中国谚语

The argument of this book has many unorthodox implications for achieving financial independence in the Information Age. Among the more important: 1.

这本书的论点对于在信息时代实现财务独立有许多不正统的影响。其中最重要的有:1.

Citizenship is obsolete. To optimize your lifetime earnings and become a Sovereign Individual, you will need to become a customer of a government or protection service rather than a citizen. Instead of paying whatever tax burden is imposed upon you by grasping politicians, you must place yourself in a position to negotiate a private tax treaty that obliges you to pay no more for services of government than they are actually worth to you.

公民身份已经过时。要优化您的终生收益并成为主权个人,您需要成为政府或保护服务的客户,而不是公民。您必须摆脱由贪婪的政客施加的任何税收负担,将自己置于谈判私人税收条约的地位,这样您只需为政府服务支付实际价值。

2.

Of all the nationalities on the globe, U.S. citizenship conveys the greatest liabilities and places the most hindrances in the way of becoming a Sovereign Individual. The American seeking financial independence will therefore obtain other passports as a necessary step toward privatizing or denationalizing himself. If you are not an American, it is economically irrational to become a resident of the United States and thus expose yourself to predatory U.S. taxes, including exit taxes.

在地球上所有国籍中,美国公民身份带来最大的责任和障碍,阻碍个人主权化。因此,寻求财务独立的美国人需要获得其他护照,作为私有化或去国家化的必要步骤。如果您不是美国人,成为美国居民并暴露于掠夺性的美国税收(包括退税),在经济上是不合理的。

3.

Based upon the history of other dominant systems facing collapse, those who opt for the ultimum refugium and get out early will be better off in the end.

根据其他主导系统崩溃的历史,选择 ultimum refugium 并及早撤离的人最终会更好一些。

The dangers of a nationalist reaction to the crisis of the nationstate make it important not to underestimate the scope for tyranny and mischief. You should never leave your money in any jurisdiction that claims the right to conscript you, your children, or grandchildren.

国家危机下的民族主义反应的危险性使人不能低估暴政与恶意行为的范围。您不应将您的金钱留在任何声称有权征用您、您的子女或孙子女的司法管辖区。

4.

Whatever your current residence or nationality, to optimize your wealth you should primarily reside in a country other than that from which you hold your first passport, while keeping the bulk of your money in yet a third jurisdiction, preferably a tax haven.

不管你当前的居住地或国籍如何,为了优化你的财富,你应该首先在与你的第一本护照所属国不同的国家居住,同时将大部分资金保存在第三个管辖区,最好是一个避税天堂。

5.

You should travel widely to select alternative residences in attractive locales where you will have right of entry in an emergency.

您应该广泛旅行,选择有吸引力的地点作为备用住所,以便在紧急情况下入住。

6.

Violence will become more random and localized; organized crime will grow in scope. It will therefore be more important to locate in secure

physical spaces than in the twentieth century. Protection will be more technological 309

暴力将变得更加随机和局部化;有组织犯罪的范围将会扩大。因此,相比于 20 世纪,在安全的物理空间中定位将更加重要。保护将更多依赖于技术。

than juridical. Walling out troublemakers is an effective as well as traditional way of minimizing criminal violence in times of weak central authority.

阻挡麻烦制造者是在中央权力薄弱时期最有效也是传统的减少犯罪暴力的方法。

7.

If you are financially successful, you should probably hire your own retainers to guarantee your protection against criminals, protection rackets, and the covert mischief of governments. Police functions will increasingly be filled by private guards linked to merchant and community associations. 如果你在财务上取得成功,你可能应该雇佣自己的保镖来确保你免受犯罪分子、保护费和政府隐藏的恶作剧的伤害。警察功能将越来越多地由与商人和社区协会有关联的私人保安来填补。

8.

Areas of opportunity and security will shift. Economies that have been rich during the Industrial Era may well be subject to deflation of living standards and social unrest as governments prove incapable of guaranteeing prosperity and entitlement programs collapse.

发展和安全领域将发生变化。工业时代曾经富裕的经济体可能会面临生活水平下降和社会动荡,因为政府无法保证繁荣并维持福利计划。

9.

The forty-eight least-developed countries, comprising some 550 million persons with per capita income of less than \$500 per head, will have widely divergent fates in the information Age. Most will become even more marginalized and desperate, providing a venue for only the most intrepid

investors. But those that can overcome structural problems to preserve public health and order stand to benefit from rapid income growth.

这四十八个最不发达国家,包括五亿五千万人,人均收入不到 500 美元,在信息时代将会有截然不同的命运。大多数国家将变得更加边缘化和绝望,只吸引最勇敢的投资者。但那些能克服结构性问题,保持公共卫生和秩序的国家,则可能从快速的收入增长中获益。

10.

Jurisdictions of choice in which to enjoy high living standards with economic opportunity include reform areas in the Southern hemisphere, such as New Zealand, Chile, and Argentina, which boast adequate to superior infrastructure and many beautiful landscapes and are unlikely to be targets of terrorists wielding nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

有高生活水平和经济机会的首选司法管辖区包括南半球的改革地区,如新西兰、智利和阿根廷,它们拥有良好到优秀的基础设施和许多美丽的景观,不太可能成为使用核武器、化学武器或生物武器的恐怖分子的目标。

11.

The fastest-growing and most important new economy of the next century will not be China but the cybereconomy. To take full advantage of it, you will need to place your business or profession on the World Wide Web.

下一个世纪增长最快、最重要的新经济将不是中国,而是网络经济。要充分利用它,你需要将你的企业或专业放在 World Wide Web 上。

12.

Encryption will be an important feature of commerce on the Web and the realization of individual autonomy. You should acquire and begin using strong encryption immediately. Just as the church attempted to ban printing at the twilight of the Middle Ages, so the United States and other aggressive governments bent on control will seek to bar effective encryption. As happened five centuries ago, this may merely drive the taboo technology into areas where the writ of established authority is weakest, assuring that it will be put to its most subversive use in undermining state control

everywhere.

加密将是网络商务和个人自主实现的重要特征。您应该立即获取并开始使用强加密。正如教会试图在中世纪末期禁止印刷一样,美国和其他热衷于控制的政府也将寻求禁止有效的加密。正如五个世纪前发生的那样,这可能仅会将这种禁忌技术驱逐到那些现有权威最薄弱的地方,从而确保它将被用于颠覆性地破坏各地的国家控制。

13.

Where possible, all businesses should be domiciled offshore in a tax-haven jurisdiction. This is particularly important for Websites and Internet addresses, where there is virtually no advantage in locating in an onshore, high-tax jurisdiction.

所有企业都应该尽可能在避税地区注册。这对网站和互联网地址尤其重要,因为在陆上高税率管辖区注册没有任何优势。

14.

Corporations in the Information Age will increasingly become "virtual corporations" - bundles of contracting relations without any material reality, and perhaps without physical assets. The virtual corporation should be domiciled with an offshore trust to minimize tax liabilities.

信息时代的公司将越来越成为"虚拟公司" - 没有任何实际实体的合同关系捆绑体,也许没有物质资产。虚拟公司应该在离岸信托公司注册,以降低税务负担。

15.

Incomes will become more unequal within jurisdictions but more equal between them. Countries with a tradition of a very unequal distribution of incomes may be relatively more stable under these conditions than those

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收入差距将在管辖范围内变得更加不平等,但在不同司法管辖区之间变得更加平等。在这种情况下,有传统极不平等收入分配的国家可能相对更稳定,而不是那些

jurisdictions where strong expectations of income equality have developed in the Industrial period.

在工业时代里，收入平等预期强烈的司法管辖区。

16.

As a relative performance becomes more important than absolute output in determining compensation, an ever more important occupation will be that of the agent, not merely for the highly paid performer, like a football star or an opera singer, but also for persons of modest skills, who may welcome help in landing a paying position.

相对绩效比绝对产出在决定薪酬中变得更加重要,代理人的职业将变得越来越重要,不仅是针对高薪的表演者,如足球明星或歌剧歌手,也适用于有一定技能的人,他们可能欢迎获得帮助以找到一份有收入的工作。

17.

"Jobs" will increasingly become tasks or "piece work" rather than positions within an organization.

工作将更多地变成任务或"散工"而不是组织内的职位。

18.

Many members of regulated professions will be displaced by digital servants employing interactive information-retrieval systems.

许多受监管行业的从业人员将被使用互动信息检索系统的数字助手取代。

19.

Control over resources will shift away from the state to persons of superior skills and intelligence, as more wealth will be created by adding knowledge to products.

资源控制将从国家转移到拥有卓越技能和智慧的个人,因为更多的财富将通过在产品上添加知识来创造。

20.

As Professor Guy Bois observed in his history, *The Transformation of the Year One Thousand*, "in a period of increasing difficulties, the weaker elements in the social body tend to polarize around a rising star." In the transformation of the year two thousand, the rising star will be the Sovereign Individual. As the nationstate system breaks down, risk-averse persons who formerly would have sought employment with government may find an alternative in affiliating as retainers to the very rich.

正如博伊斯教授在他的著作《千年转型》中所观察到的,"在困难不断加剧的时期,社会中较弱的群体倾向于聚集在一个崛起的明星周围"。在两千年的转型中,崛起的明星将是主权个人。随着民族国家体系的解体,原本会寻求政府就业的规避风险的人可能会寻找隶属于富人的替代方案。

21.

You should expect a slowdown or decline in per capita consumption in countries such as the United States, which have been the leading consumers of the world's products in the late stages of industrialism.

您应该预期个人消费在像美国这样的国家会出现放缓或下降,这些国家一直是工业主义后期世界商品的主要消费国。

22.

Debt deflation may accompany the transition to the new millennium.
债务通缩可能伴随新千年的过渡。

23.

The death of politics will mean the end of central bank regulation and manipulation of money. Cybermoney will become the new money of the Information Age, replacing the paper money of Industrialism. This means not only a change in the fortunes of banknote printers, it implies the death of inflation as an effective means by which nationstates can commandeer resources. Real interest rates will tend to rise.

政治的死亡将意味着中央银行调节和操纵货币的终结。网络货币将成为信息时代的新货币,取代工业时代的纸币。这不仅意味着银行券印刷

商的命运发生变化,也意味着通胀作为国家-国家可以征用资源的有效手段的死亡。真实利率将趋于上升。

24.

While the experience of the nineteenth century proves that long-term growth can proceed apace even while deflation raises the value of money, business and investment strategies must be adjusted to the unfamiliar realities of deflation—that is, debt should be avoided; savings and cost reductions should be pursued with greater urgency; long-term contracts and compensation packages should probably be drawn with flexible nominal terms.

尽管 19 世纪的经验证明,即使通货紧缩提高了货币价值,长期增长也可以迅速进行,但商业和投资策略必须调整到通货紧缩的陌生现实中去——也就是说,应该避免债务;应该更加紧迫地追求储蓄和降低成本;长期合同和薪酬方案可能应该用灵活的名义条款拟定。

25.

Taxing capacity in the leading nationstates will fall away by 50 to 70 percent, while it will prove far more difficult to reduce spending in an orderly way.

领先国家的税收能力将下降 50%至 70%,而以有序的方式减少支出将更加困难。

The result to be expected is a continuation of deficits that plague most OECD

国家持续面临的赤字问题

countries, accompanied by high real-interest rates.

国家,伴随着高实际利率。

26.

Technical innovations that displace employment should probably be introduced in jurisdictions that have no tradition of producing whatever product or service is in question.

技术创新导致就业流失,应该在没有生产相关产品或服务传统的司法管辖区内引入。

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27.

Cognitive skills will be rewarded as never before. It will be more important to think clearly, as ideas will become a form of wealth.

认知技能将比以往任何时候都受到重视。清晰思考变得更加重要,因为想法将成为一种财富形式。

28.

Thinking about the end of the current system is taboo. To understand the great transformation to the Information Age, you must transcend conventional thinking and conventional information sources.

思考当前体系的终结是一个禁忌话题。要理解向信息时代的巨大转型,您必须超越传统思维 and 传统信息来源。

29.

Because incomes for the very rich will rise faster than for others in advanced economies, an area of growing demand will be services and products that cater to the needs of the very rich.

由于在发达经济体中,富人的收入增长速度将快于其他人,迎合富人需求的服务和产品将成为不断增长的市场。

30.

The growing danger of crime, particularly embezzlement and undetectable theft, will make morality and honor among associates more crucial and highly valued than it was during the Industrial Era, particularly in its waning years.

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and fits with our theories as well.

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