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The Financial Collapse: Quantitative Insights into Leeson's Strategy and the Fall of Barings Bank

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the collapse of Barings Bank by contrasting its intended low-risk Nikkei 225 index-arbitrage strategy with the unauthorized, highly leveraged positions accumulated by Nicholas Leeson. Using stochastic calculus and Black–Scholes option theory, we show that the genuine arbitrage strategy should have produced low volatility and small returns, as basis mispricings are minor and mean-reverting. Leeson, however, constructed a large directional long-futures position combined with massive short-volatility exposure through short straddles, creating severe negative-gamma and negative-vega risks. These nonlinear exposures caused losses to grow explosively when the Nikkei fell and volatility spiked after the 1995 Kobe earthquake. The failure was amplified by structural and governance weaknesses—most notably the lack of front- and back-office separation, absence of independent valuation, and inadequate quantitative oversight—allowing Leeson's concealed losses to exceed the bank's capital base. The study highlights how misapplied models, opaque reporting, and unchecked leverage can destabilize financial institutions, and it extracts lessons for modern risk management, including the necessity of independent controls, Greek-based monitoring, stress testing, and robust regulatory frameworks.

1 Introduction

1.1 The background of Caring Banks

Founded in 1762, Baring's Bank emerged as a prestigious financial institution that prospered by facilitating the rapid expansion of international trade during the late 18th century.

In 1774, Barings began supporting commercial activities in North America and further diversified its financial services, expanding into merchant banking, advisory work, and investment management.

By 1802, Baring's reputation had become so distinguished that it was entrusted with facilitating the largest land transaction in history: the Louisiana Purchase, which doubled the size of the United States. The deal required a 3-million-dollar down payment in gold, with the remainder financed through U.S. bonds that Napoleon sold to Barings—via Hope & Co. of Amsterdam—at a price of 87.5 dollars per 100-dollar face value. As a result, Barings Bank became one of the largest holders of U.S. bonds, which provided a fundamental foundation for the bank to accumulate further capital in the future.

Moving forward, throughout the 19th century, Barings Bank became increasingly focused on the American market after losing competitive influence in London to the Rothschild firm.

This westward shift enabled Barings to profit substantially from financing major railroad projects across the United States. However, in the late 1880s, Barings became heavily overexposed to Argentine and Uruguayan sovereign debt. The situation deteriorated sharply when Argentina approached default following the resignation of President Miguel Juárez Celman amid the Revolución del Parque. As the value of Argentine and Uruguayan bonds collapsed, the asset base and credit standing of Barings declined significantly. The resulting loss of confidence triggered a broader credit crisis, as markets began to doubt the bank's ability to meet its financial obligations and sustain its role within the global financial system. The crisis revealed Barings' vulnerability, particularly its insufficient liquidity to support its holdings of Argentine bonds. In response, the governor of the Bank of England organized a consortium of banks to rescue Barings and facilitate its restructuring, an event that triggered significant financial turmoil in global markets during the early 1890s.

During the 20th century, Barings Bank was gradually overtaken by a growing number of investment banks in its share of financial services in the United States. Nevertheless, the bank remained committed to expanding its commercial activities. In 1984, it entered the securities trading and brokerage business through the acquisition of a securities firm and the establishment of Barings Securities Limited. The motivation behind this strategic move was to broaden Barings' global footprint—particularly in the Asia-Pacific region and, most notably, Japan. During the 1970s and 1980s, Japan emerged as a major force in global finance, driven by a bubble economy fueled by coordinated government policies, industrial collaboration, and rapid technological innovation in consumer electronics and automobile manufacturing. Barings aimed to position itself within this rapidly expanding financial landscape.

Barings Bank began operating in Asia through a network of subsidiaries, initially serving primarily as a broker–dealer for its clients while also engaging in proprietary trading. Over time, the bank strategically shifted its focus toward Japanese derivatives markets, particularly trading Nikkei futures and options on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and the Osaka Securities Exchange. This strategic expansion was motivated by a combination of evolving market opportunities and competitive pressures within the global financial landscape.

During the late 1980s, Japan emerged as the fastest-growing financial market in the world, driven by rapid asset price inflation, soaring equity valuations, and unprecedented international investor demand. This environment created strong global appetite for Japanese equity exposure, particularly through derivatives. At the same time, the global derivatives industry itself was undergoing a major turning point, as the rapid growth of exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and LIFFE demonstrated that banks could generate significant profits from low-capital, high-volume futures and options trading. The launch of Nikkei futures on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) in 1986 further accelerated this trend by providing longer trading hours and enabling cross-border arbitrage between Osaka and Singapore, making SIMEX one of the most liquid derivatives markets in the world. For Barings, these developments presented an opportunity to profit from price discrepancies between OSE and SIMEX and to strengthen its position in the expanding Asian financial landscape. At a strategic level, the firm also sought deeper access to regional markets to serve global clients reallocating capital toward Japan and to establish itself as a leading participant in Asian derivatives. Internally, increasing competitive pressure and the declining profitability of traditional merchant banking further motivated Barings to pursue higher-margin businesses, making derivatives trading a central component of its growth strategy.

At this turning point, Mr. Nicholas Leeson emerged—soon to become central to Barings' fate.

1.2 Mr. Nicholas Leeson

Nick Leeson began his career at Coutts, a private bank, before gaining exposure to futures and options operations at Morgan Stanley, where he worked in the back office clearing and settling listed derivatives transactions. Two years later, he joined Barings Bank and was seconded to Hong Kong to address back-office issues in Barings' Jakarta operations, where he managed approximately \$100 million in unpaid share certificates. In April 1992, after Leeson had been promoted to General Manager, Barings opened a futures and options office in Singapore, executing and clearing trades on SIMEX. Critically, Leeson was placed in charge of both the front office (executing trades) and the back office (clearing and reconciling trades). Prior to this appointment, he had been denied a broker's license in the United Kingdom due to falsifying information on his application, a fact he failed to disclose when applying for his license in Singapore.

Under sound risk management practices, the front and back offices are intentionally designed to operate independently. The front office executes trades and takes market risk, while the back office confirms, records, settles transactions, and produces independent reports on profits, exposures, and compliance. This separation of duties ensures that no trader can manipulate records, hide losses, or bypass risk controls, even though both functions must coordinate throughout the trade lifecycle. Independence between the two is a cornerstone of internal control in any financial institution.

However, Leeson's dual authority over both front- and back-office operations at Barings eliminated this essential segregation of duties. By controlling execution and reconciliation simultaneously, Leeson was able to conduct unauthorized trades, hide mounting losses in a secret error account, falsify risk and profit reports, and obstruct independent oversight. This structural breakdown in governance and risk management enabled Leeson to conceal escalating losses until they became catastrophic, ultimately leading to the collapse of Barings Bank.

Nick Leeson used the "88888" error account as a hidden repository for unauthorized trades and accumulating losses. Originally intended for small, temporary reconciliation discrepancies, the account was transformed by Leeson into his primary mechanism for concealing the true performance of his trading activities. By allocating profitable trades to Barings' official accounts while diverting losing positions into 88888, Leeson created the illusion of strong and consistent profitability. Because he exercised control over both the trading desk and the settlements function, no independent oversight existed to reconcile the discrepancies or challenge the imbalance between reported profits and actual exposure. As a result, the losses buried in account 88888 expanded from minor discrepancies into hundreds of millions of dollars. Ultimately, the account became the financial black hole that pulled Barings Bank into collapse.

1.3 Research Object

This case study examines the trading strategy employed by Mr. Nicholas Leeson, the chief derivatives trader at Barings Bank's Singapore office, whose activities directly precipitated the bank's eventual collapse. Evidence indicates that Leeson followed a "doubling strategy," repeatedly increasing his positions as market prices moved against him.

Our objective is to construct a mathematical model that captures the dynamics of his strategy and replicates the key elements of Leeson's actual trading behavior that contributed to Barings' bankruptcy. By integrating rigorous mathematical reasoning with modern financial theory—including asset pricing principles, arbitrage conditions, and insights from fixed-income research—we aim to uncover the fundamental mechanisms that made this strategy inherently unstable and ultimately catastrophic.

Furthermore, We aim to distill the fundamental principles that the modern financial industry must uphold to prevent such failures from occurring again. It is remarkable—and tragic—that a banking empire built over two centuries could be brought down by the pure actions of a tiny single trader.

2 Initial Arbitrage Strategy

By the early 1990s, the business environment for Barings Securities Japan (BSJ) began to shift. Many large Japanese institutional investors had already developed their own trading capabilities in Singapore, which reduced their reliance on BSJ's execution services. As a result, BSJ's external client business became less profitable. To compensate for this loss, BSJ shifted its focus toward proprietary trading on behalf of the wider Barings Group.

One of the main strategies BSJ adopted was to arbitrage baskets of Japanese cash equities against Nikkei futures. Initially, these trades were executed between the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE), the primary venue for Nikkei futures. However, after OSE introduced stricter trading rules, it became easier and cheaper to execute Nikkei futures trades on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Consequently, BSJ traders requested that Nick Leeson execute their Nikkei futures transactions on SIMEX. Leeson's trading responsibilities expanded steadily, and by early 1993, he was handling both proprietary trades for BSJ as well as trades for Barings' external clients.

In this section we develop the full mathematical model underlying the arbitrage strategy between an equity index futures contract (e.g., the Nikkei 225 futures) and the replicating basket of underlying constituent stocks. The derivation proceeds from the construction of the index itself, to the no-arbitrage futures pricing relation, and finally to the precise arbitrage mechanics for both cash-and-carry and reverse cash-and-carry strategies.

2.1 Composition of the Nikkei 225 Index

The underlying Index of the portfolio is the same, Nikkei 225. Thus we want to know why this arbitrage strategy has a property of "low volatility and low return rate".

First, We consider a filtered probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\geq 0}, \mathbb{P})$ satisfying the usual conditions. Let $P_i(t)$ denote the price process of stock $i \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$ at time $t \geq 0$. We assume that each $P_i(t)$ is an adapted stochastic process with respect to the filtration $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\geq 0}$, for example an Itô diffusion.

In the context of a price-weighted index such as the Nikkei 225, the index at time t can be written as

$$I(t) = \frac{1}{D(t)} \sum_{i=1}^{225} w_i(t) P_i(t), \tag{2.1.1}$$

where $D(t)$ is the (possibly time-varying) divisor chosen by the index provider to maintain continuity of the index when corporate actions occur (e.g. stock splits, constituent changes).

The corresponding weight of stock i in the index at time t is defined by

$$w_i(t) = \frac{P_i(t)}{\sum_{j=1}^{225} P_j(t)} = \frac{P_i(t)}{\Sigma(t)}, \qquad \text{where } \Sigma(t) := \sum_{j=1}^{225} P_j(t).$$

By construction, we have

$$\sum_{i=1}^{225} w_i(t) = 1 \quad \text{for all } t \geq 0.$$

Since each $P_i(t)$ is an adapted stochastic process, the aggregate

$$\Sigma(t) = \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_j(t)$$

is also an adapted stochastic process (being a finite linear combination of adapted processes). For all t such that $\Sigma(t) > 0$ almost surely, the mapping

$$\omega \mapsto w_i(t,\omega) = \frac{P_i(t,\omega)}{\Sigma(t,\omega)}$$

is a measurable function of the random vector $\big(P_1(t,\omega), \dots, P_N(t,\omega)\big)$. Hence $w_i(t)$ is also $\mathcal{F}_t$-measurable for each t, and the process $\{w_i(t)\}_{t\geq 0}$ is adapted to the filtration $(\mathcal{F}_t)_{t\geq 0}$. Therefore, each $w_i(t)$ is itself a stochastic process.

Here, unlike the traditional Geometric Brownian Motion, which is one-dimentional with one disturbance term noted as $\sigma_i dW_i$, the 225 stocks in the index are highly-correlated in the real world. So we denote the stochastic process of each one of the stocks included the Nikkei 225 Index as:

$$\frac{dP_i(t)}{P_i(t)} = \mu_i \, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{225} \sigma_{ik} \, dW_k(t), \qquad i = 1, \dots, 225. \tag{2.1.2}$$

Equivalently,

$$dP_i(t) = P_i(t) \left(\mu_i \, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{225} \sigma_{ik} \, dW_k(t) \right). \tag{2.1.3}$$

This means that each stock price $P_i(t)$ follows the multi–factor diffusion.

Next, we want to derive the stochastic process of Nikkei 225 Index $I(t)$ to see why this index itself has a high volatility. When doing this, we consider a certain fixed time t to let the weight function$w_i(t)$ to be fixed because $w_i(t)$ is higly correlated to each of the stock price.

2.2 Derivation of the Nikkei 225 Index

By (2.1.1) and (2,1.2), we derive the stochastic process of Nikkei 225 Index:
Let

$$A(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{225} w_i(t)\, P_i(t).$$

Using the product rule for deterministic $w_i(t)$,

$$dA(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{225} \left(w_i(t)\, dP_i(t) + P_i(t)\, dw_i(t)\right).$$

Since $dw_i(t) = \dot{w}_i(t)\, dt$, substitute $dP_i(t)$ to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} dA(t) &= \sum_{i=1}^{225} w_i(t)\, P_i(t) \left(\mu_i\, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{225} \sigma_{ik}\, dW_k(t)\right) + \sum_{i=1}^{225} P_i(t)\dot{w}_i(t)\, dt \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{225} \big(w_i(t)P_i(t)\mu_i + P_i(t)\dot{w}_i(t)\big)\, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{225} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{225} w_i(t)P_i(t)\sigma_{ik}\right) dW_k(t). \end{aligned}$$

Because

$$I(t) = \frac{A(t)}{D(t)}, \qquad D(t) \text{ deterministic},$$

we have

$$dI(t) = \frac{1}{D(t)}\, dA(t) - \frac{A(t)}{D(t)^2}\, dD(t),$$

and with $dD(t) = \dot{D}(t)\, dt$ and $A(t) = D(t)\, I(t)$,

$$dI(t) = \frac{1}{D(t)}\, dA(t) - I(t)\frac{\dot{D}(t)}{D(t)}\, dt.$$

Substitute $dA(t)$:

$$
\begin{aligned}
dI(t) = \frac{1}{D(t)} \Bigg[\sum_{i=1}^{225} \big(w_i(t) P_i(t) \mu_i + P_i(t) \dot{w}_i(t) \big)\, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{225} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{225} w_i(t) P_i(t) \sigma_{ik} \right) dW_k(t) \Bigg] \\
- I(t) \frac{\dot{D}(t)}{D(t)}\, dt.
\end{aligned}
$$

Rearranging the terms into the form of an Ito Process:

$$
\begin{aligned}
dI(t) = \left\{ \frac{1}{D(t)} \sum_{i=1}^{225} \big(w_i(t) P_i(t) \mu_i + P_i(t) \dot{w}_i(t) \big) - I(t) \frac{\dot{D}(t)}{D(t)} \right\} dt \\
+ \frac{1}{D(t)} \sum_{k=1}^{225} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{225} w_i(t) P_i(t) \sigma_{ik} \right) dW_k(t).
\end{aligned}
$$

Hence, the index dynamics can be written in the standard SDE form

$$
\boxed{\frac{dI(t)}{I(t)} = \mu_I(t)\, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{225} \sigma_{Ik}(t)\, dW_k(t),} \tag{2.2.1}
$$

, where

$$
\mu_I(t) := \sum_{i=1}^{225} \tilde{w}_i(t) \mu_i + \sum_{i=1}^{225} \tilde{w}_i(t) \frac{\dot{w}_i(t)}{w_i(t)} - \frac{\dot{D}(t)}{D(t)},
$$

and

$$
\sigma_{Ik}(t) := \sum_{i=1}^{225} \tilde{w}_i(t) \sigma_{ik}, \qquad k = 1, \dots, 225.
$$

In many applications, the index divisor $D(t)$ and the weights $w_i(t)$ are adjusted only infrequently and can be treated as constants over short time intervals. In that case $\dot{w}_i(t) = 0$ and $\dot{D}(t) = 0$, so that (2) reduces to

$$
\frac{dI(t)}{I(t)} = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{225} \tilde{w}_i \mu_i \right) dt + \sum_{k=1}^{225} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{225} \tilde{w}_i \sigma_{ik} \right) dW_k(t). \tag{2.2.2}
$$

2.3 The volatility

From the standard form (2.2.1) or (2.2.2), the instantaneous variance of the index return is

$$
\mathrm{Var}\left(\frac{dI(t)}{I(t)} \right) = \sum_{k=1}^{225} \sigma_{Ik}(t)^2\, dt = \sum_{k=1}^{225} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{225} \tilde{w}_i(t) \sigma_{ik} \right)^2 dt.
$$

Equivalently, if we denote by $\Sigma(t)$ the 225×225 volatility matrix with entries $\sigma_{ik}(t)$, and by $\tilde{w}(t)$ the column vector of index weights $(\tilde{w}_1(t), \ldots, \tilde{w}_{225}(t))^\top$, then

$$\operatorname{Var}\left(\frac{dI(t)}{I(t)}\right) = \tilde{w}(t)^\top \left(\Sigma(t)\Sigma(t)^\top\right) \tilde{w}(t)\, dt,$$

which is exactly the variance of a portfolio of the 225 stocks with weights $\tilde{w}_i(t)$.

If all stocks were independent with the same volatility σ, and with equal weights $\tilde{w}_i = 1/225$, then

$$\operatorname{Var}\left(\frac{dI(t)}{I(t)}\right) \approx \frac{\sigma^2}{225}\, dt,$$

so the index volatility would be of order $\sigma/\sqrt{225}$, much smaller than the volatility of a single stock.

In reality, however, stock returns are *strongly positively correlated.* Suppose, for intuition, that all stocks have the same volatility σ and an average pairwise correlation $\rho > 0$. Then one can show that

$$\operatorname{Var}\left(\frac{dI(t)}{I(t)}\right) \approx \sigma^2 \left(\rho + \frac{1-\rho}{225}\right) dt.$$

For large 225, the second term is negligible, so

$$\operatorname{Var}\left(\frac{dI(t)}{I(t)}\right) \approx \rho\, \sigma^2\, dt, \qquad \Rightarrow \qquad \text{index volatility} \approx \sqrt{\rho}\, \sigma.$$

With typical equity correlations ρ in the range 0.5–0.8, the factor $\sqrt{\rho}$ is between 0.7 and 0.9. Thus the index volatility is only slightly smaller than the volatility of a single representative stock.

In other words, because the 225 stocks share strong common risk factors (captured by the Brownian motions $W_k(t)$ in (3)), the portfolio-level variance $\tilde{w}^\top(\Sigma\Sigma^\top)\tilde{w}$ remains large: the diversification effect is limited by the high correlations between the constituents. Consequently, the Nikkei 225 index $I(t)$ is itself a *high-volatility* asset, even though it is a diversified portfolio of many stocks.

2.4 Index arbitrage

In the previous subsection we have shown that the Nikkei 225 index satisfies an SDE of the form

$$\frac{dI_t}{I_t} = \mu_I(t)\, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{d} \sigma_{Ik}(t)\, dW_{k,t},$$

so that the index I_t is itself a high–volatility asset.

We now consider an index–arbitrage strategy of the type that Nick Leeson was supposed to run:

Trading Nikkei 225 futures listed on the Singapore exchange (SIMEX) against a replicating stock basket or futures on the Japanese exchange (Osaka), with the goal of exploiting small mispricings while being (approximately) neutral to the large movements of the underlying index.

First, fix a maturity date T. Under the standard cost–of–carry model with constant interest rate r and dividend yield q, the theoretical futures price is

$$F_t^{\text{theo}} = I_t e^{(r-q)(T-t)}.$$

In reality, the traded futures price on market $M \in \{J, S\}$ (Japan, Singapore) may deviate slightly from this theoretical value due to market frictions, funding differences, or liquidity effects. We write

$$F_t^M = F_t^{\text{theo}} + \varepsilon_t^M = I_t e^{(r-q)(T-t)} + \varepsilon_t^M, \qquad M \in \{J, S\},$$

where ε_t^M is the *basis error* (or mispricing) for that contract. Empirically, ε_t^M is small compared to the level of the index: it is of the order of a few index points, while I_t itself is of the order of several thousands of points.

A natural assumption is that the basis error is a small, mean–reverting process. For instance, for the Singapore futures we may postulate an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) dynamics

$$d\varepsilon_t^S = -\kappa\, \varepsilon_t^S\, dt + \sigma_\varepsilon\, dZ_t,$$

where $\kappa > 0$ is the speed of mean reversion, σ_ε is the (small) volatility of the basis, and Z_t is a Brownian motion that may be correlated with the index shocks $W_{k,t}$.

Next, to illustrate the mechanism, consider first a simple cash–futures arbitrage using the Singapore futures only. At time t we take a position of α units in the futures and a *hedging* position in the index itself (or an exactly replicating stock basket) such that the exposure to I_t cancels.

More precisely, consider the portfolio with value

$$\Pi_t = \alpha F_t^S - \alpha e^{(r-q)(T-t)} I_t.$$

The second term corresponds to a dynamically rebalanced position in the stock basket financed at rate r and receiving dividends at rate q, which replicates a *short* theoretical futures position. Substituting $F_t^S = I_t e^{(r-q)(T-t)} + \varepsilon_t^S$ we obtain

$$\Pi_t = \alpha\big(I_t e^{(r-q)(T-t)} + \varepsilon_t^S\big) - \alpha e^{(r-q)(T-t)} I_t = \alpha\, \varepsilon_t^S.$$

Thus, in the ideal frictionless model the portfolio value *no longer depends on* the level of the index I_t; it depends only on the small basis error ε_t^S.

If we explicitly differentiate, using $d\Pi_t = \alpha\, d\varepsilon_t^S$, the OU dynamics gives

$$d\Pi_t = -\alpha\kappa\, \varepsilon_t^S\, dt + \alpha\sigma_\varepsilon\, dZ_t.$$

A closely related cross–exchange arbitrage between Singapore and Japan can be constructed by going long α contracts of Singapore futures and short α contracts of Japanese futures, so that

$$\Pi_t = \alpha\big(F_t^S - F_t^J\big) = \alpha\big(\varepsilon_t^S - \varepsilon_t^J\big).$$

Again, the index level I_t cancels out, and the portfolio is exposed only to the *difference* of two small basis errors.

In either case, the essential feature is the same: the arbitrage portfolio is designed to be *index–neutral*, i.e. its value does not move with the large swings of the Nikkei 225 itself, but only with the relatively small and typically short–lived mispricings between futures and cash, or between different futures markets.

Thirdly, from the dynamics

$$d\Pi_t = -\alpha\kappa\, \varepsilon_t^S\, dt + \alpha\sigma_\varepsilon\, dZ_t,$$

the instantaneous variance of the arbitrage profit and loss is

$$\mathrm{Var}(d\Pi_t) = \alpha^2\sigma_\varepsilon^2\, dt.$$

By contrast, the index itself satisfies

$$\frac{dI_t}{I_t} = \mu_I(t)\, dt + \sum_{k=1}^{d} \sigma_{Ik}(t)\, dW_{k,t},$$

so that its instantaneous variance is

$$\mathrm{Var}(dI_t) = I_t^2 \left(\sum_{k=1}^{d} \sigma_{Ik}(t)^2\right) dt \equiv I_t^2\sigma_I^2\, dt,$$

where σ_I denotes the (high) volatility of the index.

Taking the ratio,

$$\frac{\operatorname{Var}(d\Pi_t)}{\operatorname{Var}(dI_t)} = \frac{\alpha^2\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{I_t^2\sigma_I^2}.$$

Hence, for moderate position sizes α the variance of $d\Pi_t$ is dramatically smaller than that of dI_t. In other words, the index–arbitrage strategy is, by construction, a *low–volatility* strategy: most of the large index risk has been hedged away.

Finally, from the same SDE we can read off the conditional drift of the arbitrage portfolio:

$$\mathbb{E}[d\Pi_t \mid \varepsilon_t^S] = -\alpha\kappa\,\varepsilon_t^S\,dt.$$

If the basis is currently negative, $\varepsilon_t^S < 0$, a long futures / short cash arbitrage ($\alpha > 0$) has a positive expected return, because mean reversion pushes ε_t^S back toward zero. However, the drift is proportional to ε_t^S, and *by construction* $|\varepsilon_t^S|$ is small: it is measured in a few index points, while the futures notional is $I_t \times$ (contract multiplier).

To see the order of magnitude, suppose

$$I_t \approx 20{,}000, \qquad \varepsilon_t^S \approx -5 \text{ index points},$$

and the futures contract multiplier is, say, JPY 500 per index point. Then the notional value of one contract is

$$20{,}000 \times 500 = 10{,}000{,}000 \text{ JPY},$$

while the mispricing amount is

$$5 \times 500 = 2{,}500 \text{ JPY},$$

which is only 0.025% of the notional. Therefore, the expected arbitrage profit per contract is small in absolute terms. To generate large absolute P&L numbers one would need to take a very large number of contracts, i.e. to apply very high leverage.

Consequently, in theoretical terms the Nikkei index–arbitrage strategy used by Leeson was designed to be a *small–volatility, small–return* strategy:

the large and volatile movements of the underlying index I_t are hedged out;

the portfolio is only exposed to the small, mean–reverting basis process ε_t;

both the instantaneous variance and the expected drift of the arbitrage P&L are therefore small compared to the risk and return of holding a directional position in the index itself.

It was only when Leeson abandoned the hedged arbitrage structure and started to accumulate massive unhedged long futures positions, combined with a "doubling" strategy on losses, that his trading book turned from a low–risk arbitrage portfolio into an extremely high–risk, high–volatility directional bet on the Nikkei 225.

3 Actual Strategy

In examining the collapse of Barings Bank, it becomes evident that Nick Leeson's trading activities extended far beyond the two well-known positions of short straddles and long Nikkei futures. Although he frequently presented his trades as benign cross-exchange arbitrage between the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), subsequent regulatory investigations revealed that the majority of these purported hedges were either fictitious or grossly mismatched. Leeson simultaneously engaged in unauthorized intraday scalping of Nikkei mini-futures, sporadic trading in Euroyen interest-rate futures and currency forwards, and fabricated "cash-basket" hedges intended solely to conceal losses within the infamous 88888 error account. He also diverted customer margin funds and manipulated settlement records to sustain and enlarge his speculative positions.

Despite the breadth of his activities, the overwhelming share of Barings' losses originated from two core exposures described before:

1.Enormous short straddle positions on the Nikkei.
2.Heavily leveraged long positions in Nikkei 225 futures.

Given their dominant contribution to Barings' eventual failure, the section of this report focuses primarily on reconstructing, analyzing, and mathematically characterizing these two core strategie while acknowledging the presence of secondary, but less financially consequential, unauthorized trades. By isolating the mechanisms through which these positions generated extreme delta-gamma exposures, we aim to illustrate how Leeson's ostensibly sophisticated trading strategy was, in reality, a highly unstable combination of leveraged directional speculation and aggressive short-volatility risk-taking.

3.1 Short Volatility Bet: Short Straddle

The "Short Straddle Strategy" is mainly implemented by the combination of selling one short call and one short put. Both options have the same underlying stock, strike price K and same expiration date$T$.

The strategy is established for a net credit and profits when the underlying stock trades in a narrow range between the break-even points. Profit potential is limited to the total premiums. Potential loss, however, is unlimited if the stock price rises and substantial if the stock price falls.

3.1.1 Strategy Definition and Payoff at Maturity

Consider an underlying asset with price process $\{S_t\}_{t\geq 0}$. A short straddle is constructed by simultaneously selling one European call option with strike K and maturity T, and one European put option with the same strike K and maturity T. Let the call and put premiums at inception be C_0 and P_0, respectively. The initial net premium received by the seller is

$$\Pi_0 = C_0 + P_0 > 0,$$

which is a cash inflow at time $t = 0$. This amount also represents the maximum possible profit of the strategy.

At maturity $t = T$, the payoffs of the individual short positions are

$$\Pi_{\text{call}}(S_T) = -\max(S_T - K, 0), \qquad \Pi_{\text{put}}(S_T) = -\max(K - S_T, 0).$$

Hence, the total payoff of the short straddle at maturity is

$$\Pi_T(S_T) = \Pi_0 - \max(S_T - K, 0) - \max(K - S_T, 0).$$

We can write this payoff in piecewise form as follows:

1. If $S_T > K$:

$$\max(S_T - K, 0) = S_T - K, \quad \max(K - S_T, 0) = 0,$$

so

$$\Pi_T(S_T) = \Pi_0 - (S_T - K) - 0 = \Pi_0 - (S_T - K).$$

2. If $S_T < K$:

$$\max(S_T - K, 0) = 0, \quad \max(K - S_T, 0) = K - S_T,$$

so

$$\Pi_T(S_T) = \Pi_0 - 0 - (K - S_T) = \Pi_0 - (K - S_T).$$

3. If $S_T = K$:

Then both max terms vanish and

$$\Pi_T(S_T) = \Pi_0.$$

For example of the model above, if we set:

$$C_0 = 400, P_0 = 450, K = 20000,$$

then we have the graph of the short straddle strategy:



Figure 1: Payoff diagram of a short straddle strategy.

As is shown in Figure1, the payoff $\Pi_T(S_T)$ is an inverted "V" shape: it attains its maximum value Π_0 at $S_T = K$, and decreases linearly as the underlying price moves away from K in either direction.

The maximum profit of the strategy is

$$\Pi_{\max} = \Pi_0 = C_0 + P_0,$$

achieved when $S_T = K$.

As $S_T \to +\infty$, we have

$$\Pi_T(S_T) \approx \Pi_0 - (S_T - K) \to -\infty,$$

so the loss is theoretically unbounded on the upside. As $S_T \to 0$, we have

$$\Pi_T(S_T) \approx \Pi_0 - (K - 0) = \Pi_0 - K,$$

which can also be very negative if the strike K is large. For equity indices like the Nikkei 225, the price will not literally reach zero, but a large downward move still leads to very substantial losses on the short put leg.

The break-even points are obtained by solving $\Pi_T(S_T) = 0$, namely

$$0 = \Pi_0 - |S_T - K| \quad \Longleftrightarrow \quad |S_T - K| = \Pi_0.$$

Thus, the lower and upper break-even underlying prices satisfy

$$S_T^{\text{BE,lower}} = K - \Pi_0, \qquad S_T^{\text{BE,upper}} = K + \Pi_0.$$

In other words, the short straddle yields a profit only if the terminal price S_T lies in the interval $[K-\Pi_0,\ K+\Pi_0]$. For the example above, the interval is [19150, 20850], which means a change in the underlying index larger than 4.25% either up or down will make the strategy break. The seller is therefore effectively betting that the underlying price will remain within a relatively narrow band around the strike price. This is the reason why we conclude Mr. Leeson's short straddle strategy is betting on the volatility.

3.1.2 Greek Exposures: Delta, Gamma, Vega, and Theta

To understand the essence of the short straddle from a risk-management perspective, we examine its Greek exposures under the Black–Scholes framework. Assume the options are at-the-money at inception, so $K \approx S_0$. For a European call and put with the same strike and maturity, we derive the Greek Exposures as:

1. Delta:

$$\Delta_c \approx +0.5, \qquad \Delta_p \approx -0.5.$$

2. Gamma:

$$\Gamma_c > 0, \qquad \Gamma_p > 0.$$

3. Vega:

$$\nu_c > 0, \qquad \nu_p > 0.$$

4. Theta for long positions:

$$\Theta_c < 0, \qquad \Theta_p < 0.$$

Because the short straddle consists of short positions in both the call and the put, its Greeks are the negatives of those of the long straddle:

1. **Delta of the short straddle**:

$$\Delta_{\text{straddle}} = -\Delta_c - \Delta_p \approx -0.5 - (-0.5) = 0.$$

   At inception, the position is approximately delta-neutral, so small price changes in the underlying do not have a large first-order impact on P&L.

2. **Gamma of the short straddle**:

$$\Gamma_{\text{straddle}} = -\Gamma_c - \Gamma_p < 0,$$

   since $\Gamma_c, \Gamma_p > 0$. The short straddle is therefore strongly short gamma. Intuitively, when the underlying price moves, the position's delta changes in a way that requires buying high and selling low to maintain delta neutrality, which tends to be costly in a volatile environment.

3. **Vega of the short straddle**:

$$\nu_{\text{straddle}} = -\nu_c - \nu_p < 0,$$

   since $\nu_c, \nu_p > 0$. The position is short vega, meaning that an increase in implied volatility raises the value of both options, increasing the liability of the short positions and causing mark-to-market losses.



Figure 2: Vega Heatmap for Short ATM Straddle Positions (1992–1995)

4. **Theta of the short straddle**:

$$\Theta_{\text{straddle}} = -\Theta_c - \Theta_p > 0,$$

because long options have negative theta. The short straddle therefore earns time decay: all else equal, the passage of time causes the position to gain value as the time value of the options erodes.

In summary, the short straddle has approximately zero delta at inception, negative gamma and negative vega, and positive theta. It is thus a classic example of a short-volatility, short-gamma, long-theta strategy: it profits if prices remain stable and volatility stays low, but it is highly vulnerable to large price moves and volatility spikes.

3.1.3 "Short Volatility" Analysis via Itô and PDE

Our aim is to find the conditions that make the strategy lose money in continuous time where the real volatility is stochastic and changes via a continuous Ito process which is closer to the reality. We now formalize the short-volatility nature of the straddle using a continuous-time, delta-hedged P&L analysis in the Black–Scholes framework.

Assume that under the real-world probability measure, the underlying follows a geometric Brownian motion:

$$dS_t = \mu S_t \, dt + \sigma_{\text{real}} S_t \, dW_t,$$

where μ is the real drift, σ_{real} is the realized volatility, and W_t is a standard Brownian motion.

In contrast, the options are priced in the market using an implied volatility parameter σ_{imp}.

Let $V(S,t)$ be the price of a European-style derivative under the Black–Scholes model with implied volatility σ_{imp}. Under the risk-neutral measure, V satisfies the Black–Scholes partial differential equation

$$\frac{\partial V}{\partial t} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{\text{imp}}^2 S^2 \frac{\partial^2 V}{\partial S^2} + rS\frac{\partial V}{\partial S} - rV = 0.$$

Let $V_{\text{tot}}(S,t) = C(S,t) + P(S,t)$ denote the value of the *long* straddle. Being a linear combination of solutions to the PDE, V_{tot} also satisfies

$$\frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial t} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{\text{imp}}^2 S^2 \frac{\partial^2 V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S^2} + rS\frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S} - rV_{\text{tot}} = 0.$$

We consider a delta-hedged version of the short straddle to isolate the impact of volatility.

Define the portfolio

$$\Pi_t = -V_{\text{tot}}(S_t, t) + \Delta_t S_t,$$

where the position $-V_{\text{tot}}$ represents the short straddle, and Δ_t is the dynamically adjusted number of units of the underlying.

To achieve delta neutrality at each instant, set

$$\Delta_t = \frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S}(S_t, t).$$

Applying Itô's lemma to $V_{\text{tot}}(S_t, t)$ under the real dynamics $dS_t = \mu S_t\, dt + \sigma_{\text{real}} S_t\, dW_t$, we obtain

$$dV_{\text{tot}} = \frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial t} dt + \frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S} dS_t + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S^2} d\langle S \rangle_t,$$

where the quadratic variation of S_t is

$$d\langle S \rangle_t = \sigma_{\text{real}}^2 S_t^2\, dt.$$

Substituting dS_t and $d\langle S \rangle_t$ gives

$$dV_{\text{tot}} = \frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial t} dt + \frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S} \big(\mu S_t\, dt + \sigma_{\text{real}} S_t\, dW_t\big) + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\partial^2 V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S^2} \sigma_{\text{real}}^2 S_t^2\, dt.$$

Now consider the delta-hedged *long* straddle portfolio

$$\Pi_t^{\text{long}} = V_{\text{tot}}(S_t, t) - \Delta_t S_t, \quad \Delta_t = \frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S}.$$

Its differential is

$$d\Pi_t^{\text{long}} = dV_{\text{tot}} - \Delta_t\, dS_t.$$

By construction, the dS_t term cancels:

$$\Delta_t\, dS_t = \frac{\partial V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S} dS_t,$$

so that the stochastic term involving dW_t is removed. Using the Black–Scholes PDE for V_{tot} with σ_{imp} and comparing σ_{real} with σ_{imp}, one obtains (after algebraic simplification) the approximate deterministic drift of the delta-hedged long straddle:

$$d\Pi_t^{\text{long}} \approx \frac{1}{2} \big(\sigma_{\text{real}}^2 - \sigma_{\text{imp}}^2\big) S_t^2\, \Gamma_{\text{tot}}\, dt,$$

where

$$\Gamma_{\text{tot}} = \frac{\partial^2 V_{\text{tot}}}{\partial S^2}(S_t, t) > 0$$

is the total gamma of the long straddle.

Thus, if $\sigma_{\text{real}}^2 > \sigma_{\text{imp}}^2$, the delta-hedged long straddle tends to have a positive drift and is profitable in expectation. If $\sigma_{\text{real}}^2 < \sigma_{\text{imp}}^2$, it tends to have a negative drift and loses money in expectation.

Our original position is the *short* straddle, which corresponds to the portfolio

$$\Pi_t^{\text{short}} = -V_{\text{tot}}(S_t, t) + \Delta_t S_t.$$

This is simply the negative of the long straddle position (up to the same choice of Δ_t). Hence, its delta-hedged drift is

$$d\Pi_t^{\text{short}} \approx -\frac{1}{2}\big(\sigma_{\text{real}}^2 - \sigma_{\text{imp}}^2\big) S_t^2\, \Gamma_{\text{tot}}\, dt = \frac{1}{2}\big(\sigma_{\text{imp}}^2 - \sigma_{\text{real}}^2\big) S_t^2\, \Gamma_{\text{tot}}\, dt.$$

Since $\Gamma_{\text{tot}} > 0$, the delta-hedged short straddle has a positive drift (i.e., tends to be profitable) if and only if

$$\sigma_{\text{real}} < \sigma_{\text{imp}}.$$

This provides a precise mathematical characterization of the short-volatility nature of the short straddle: it earns a risk premium when the realized volatility of the underlying is lower than the implied volatility embedded in option prices at the trade's inception, and it loses money when realized volatility exceeds implied volatility.

3.1.4 Summary

From the static payoff perspective, a short straddle has an inverted "V" payoff, with limited maximum profit equal to the initial premium and potentially unbounded losses when the underlying price moves far from the strike.

From the Greeks perspective, it is approximately delta-neutral at inception, strongly short gamma and short vega, and long theta, profiting from time decay but exposed to large price moves and volatility spikes.

In the continuous-time, delta-hedged framework, its profitability is governed by the relationship between realized volatility σ_{real} and implied volatility σ_{imp}: the strategy is effectively a direct bet that realized volatility will turn out to be lower than the market-implied level.

Putting aside the whole real situation of the historical event, which we will mention later in the earthquake section, in markets with low volatility, this strategy is profitable since the trader receives a large upfront premium. If the index price remains between put and call strike prices, the option values decay (theta gains). Over time, the daily P&L appears stable and positive, mimicking the predictable profits of arbitrage. The strategy can appear to produce smooth returns if markets remain range-bound.

3.2 Directional Bet: Long Nikkei Futures

In addition to volatility-selling strategies such as the short straddle documented in the previous subsection, one of Leeson's most significant trading behaviors was his accumulation of extremely large, unhedged long futures positions on the Nikkei 225 index.

Initially, this position is made for the hedging of the short straddle stratgy, which is the oppisite direction of the same underlying asset.

However, Mr Leeson eventually turn this position into a constitution with a pure *directional bet*—a speculative wager that the Japanese equity market would rise. Unlike the index-arbitrage activities we discussed in section two , which theoretically involved both long and short legs to neutralize market risk, this massive long position was intentionally left unhedged.

By agreeing to purchase the index at a predetermined price, Leeson was hoping to profit by selling the index at a higher current price than the futures price. However, in a falling market, Leeson would be obligated to pay for the Nikkei futures at an overpriced rate, leading to significant losses. As a result, Leeson was fully exposed to the linear price downward-movements of the Nikkei index.

3.2.1 Economic Interpretation of a Long Futures Position

A long futures contract commits the trader to purchase the underlying asset at a future date for a predetermined price F_0. If the spot price at maturity S_T exceeds the contracted futures price, the long position generates a profit; if the spot price falls below F_0, the long position generates a loss. The profit-or-loss of a long futures contract is therefore given by the linear expression:

$$\mathrm{PnL}_{\mathrm{long}} = (S_T - F_0) \times Q,$$

where Q denotes the contract size multiplied by the number of contracts held. This linear payoff implies that the position has a constant delta of

$$\Delta = \frac{\partial \mathrm{PnL}}{\partial S_T} = Q,$$

meaning that the futures position behaves like a leveraged long exposure to the underlying index.

Leeson accumulated thousands of Nikkei 225 futures contracts on the Osaka Exchange and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX). Due to the futures margin system, only a small initial margin was required to control a notional exposure that was hundreds of times larger. This embedded leverage amplified both gains and losses. Small upward movements in the Nikkei index could have produced large profits, which Leeson hoped would offset the growing losses hidden in Account 88888. Conversely, even a modest downward movement in the index would rapidly generate losses far exceeding his available capital.

3.2.2 Mathematical Structure of the Position

Let N denote the number of futures contracts held, and let M denote the margin requirement per contract. The notional exposure is

$$\mathcal{E} = N \cdot Q,$$

while the actual capital committed is only

$$\mathcal{C} = N \cdot M.$$

The effective leverage of the position is thus

$$\lambda = \frac{\mathcal{E}}{\mathcal{C}} = \frac{Q}{M}.$$

In practice, leverage ratios of 20 to 40 were typical for Nikkei futures during the early 1990s. Leeson's oversized positions pushed the effective leverage far beyond prudent limits, making the portfolio extremely sensitive to market fluctuations.

The daily mark-to-market losses of the futures position can be expressed as:

$$\mathrm{dPnL} = N \cdot Q \cdot \mathrm{d}S_t,$$

where $\mathrm{d}S_t$ represents the incremental movement of the Nikkei 225 index. Because the position was entirely unhedged, any negative movement in $\mathrm{d}S_t$ directly created a proportional loss. When S_t fell substantially after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, the accumulated losses triggered massive margin calls that far exceeded Barings Bank's available liquidity.

3.2.3 Outcome and Connection to the Collapse

The risk properties of the long futures position can be summarized as follows:

1.Linear Price Exposure: The payoff is strictly linear, with no curvature (gamma = 0). Gains and losses scale proportionally with the index level.

2,Full Directional Risk: With no offsetting short positions, Leeson was completely exposed to downward market movements.

3.High Leverage: The margin system allows control of a large notional exposure with a small amount of capital, which magnifies tail losses.

4.Liquidity and Forced Liquidation Risk: Large mark-to-market losses require rapid infusion of cash for margin calls. Failure to meet these calls results in forced liquidation at unfavorable prices.

These characteristics created a highly unstable and asymmetric risk profile. Leeson's attempt to "double down" in response to losses further increased the notional exposure, which we will discuss in the next chapter, pushing the portfolio into a regime where even mild negative shocks would trigger catastrophic losses.



Figure 3: Leeson's Strategy vs. Short Straddle

The long Nikkei 225 futures positions constituted one of the two primary sources of

Leeson's eventual multi-billion-dollar loss, the other being his short volatility (short straddle) strategy. When the Kobe earthquake struck in January 1995, the Nikkei index dropped sharply. Because futures are marked-to-market daily, the decline immediately translated into enormous cash losses. At the same time, Leeson's short straddle exposure suffered from a sudden spike in volatility. The interaction of these two strategies, one linear and directional, the other convex and short-gamma—created a destructive combination that rapidly overwhelmed Barings Bank's capital base.

Thus, Leeson's massive long futures position was not merely an aggressive speculative bet; it was an unhedged, highly leveraged exposure that amplified market shocks and played a decisive role in the collapse of Barings Bank.

3.3 The Process of Doubling Down

Leeson's trading behavior during the Barings crisis can be formally characterized as a martingale-style doubling strategy, in which prior losses trigger progressively larger and riskier positions. The objective of this mechanism was not economic recovery, but rather the creation of short-term optical gains that could temporarily conceal the mounting losses hidden inside Account 88888. From a financial engineering perspective, this process generated an explosive and unstable feedback loop between losses and position size.

Suppose Leeson incurred an initial loss L_0 from a short straddle or a directional Nikkei 225 futures position. In order to "recover" this loss, he initiated a new trade of size Q_1, expecting a favorable price movement ΔP_1 such that the resulting profit would offset the earlier deficit:

$$Q_1 \Delta P_1 = L_0. \tag{1}$$

If the market again moved against him, the new loss becomes

$$L_1 = L_0 + |Q_1 \Delta P_1|. \tag{2}$$

To cover this larger loss, the next position Q_2 must satisfy

$$Q_2 \Delta P_2 = L_1. \tag{3}$$

In general, the strategy induces the recursion

$$Q_{n+1} = \frac{L_n}{\Delta P_{n+1}}, \qquad L_{n+1} = L_n + |Q_{n+1} \Delta P_{n+1}|, \tag{4}$$

illustrating that each additional loss forces position sizes to grow at least linearly, and often exponentially, in n. In practice, the notional exposure grows at a rate similar to the classical doubling scheme $Q_n \propto 2^n$.

In option terms, Leeson was short gamma and short vega. Rising volatility or large index movements imposed convex losses on his existing short straddle positions. Instead of unwinding or hedging these risks, Leeson increased the size of his short-option book and simultaneously expanded his directional long Nikkei 225 futures positions. The doubling of exposure was intended to produce short bursts of positive P&L to offset previously accumulated losses. However, the convexity of the short-gamma profile ensures that adverse movements grow disproportionately larger with increasing position size.

Because Nikkei 225 futures require only a small initial margin, Leeson could scale up his positions without holding the corresponding economic capital. Let the contract multiplier be k; then the P&L from a movement of ΔP is

$$\Pi = kQ\Delta P. \tag{5}$$

As Q grows, the magnitude of Π grows linearly, but the probability of a catastrophic movement increases much faster because the account becomes highly sensitive to even modest price changes. Consequently, the loss process acquires an explosive character:

$$L_n \approx L_0 \cdot 2^n, \tag{6}$$

which rapidly exceeds both Barings' capital limits and exchange-imposed position limits.

The doubling-down mechanism was incompatible with real-world market dynamics for three reasons:

1.Futures leverage allowed Leeson to accumulate notional exposure far beyond the bank's capacity to absorb losses, making the system hyper-sensitive to price shocks.

2.Short-gamma convexity meant that volatility spikes—such as those following the Kobe earthquake—generated losses that grew faster than the linear increases in position size.

3.Absence of risk limits ensured that losses were never realized or contained; they were merely concealed and amplified through increasingly aggressive trades.

In essence, Leeson's doubling-down strategy linked portfolio losses with subsequent increases in notional exposure in a self-reinforcing and mathematically unstable loop. Each loss triggered a larger bet, each larger bet magnified tail risk, and each magnified risk created the need for even larger subsequent bets. This explosive structure ultimately ensured that a single adverse market event would cause the full collapse of Barings Bank.

4 The Shock Event: Kobe Earthquake

4.1 The Decline in Index

A close examination of Nikkei 225 data from the early 1990s indicates that the profits Leeson reported to Barings were unfeasible from legitimate arbitrage or low-risk derivatives trading. In 1992, the index suffered a dramatic decline from nearly 24,000 in early January to below 16,000 by August, a fall of more than 30% within eight months. This period was marked by elevated realized volatility, sharp reversals, and persistent downward pressure which corresponds to the type of environment in which short-straddle or short-volatility exposures would generate immediate and substantial mark-to-market losses.

The volatility regime did not normalize quickly: through 1993 the Nikkei repeatedly oscillated between 17,000 and 21,000 with multiple swings of over 5% in a matter of days. This behavior contradicts the smooth, stable P&L trajectory Leeson provided to Barings'management, because a genuine arbitrage book exposed to such price movements would have shown significant variability, not consistent profitability.

The illusion of profitability emerged because Leeson combined short-volatility strategies with systematic concealment of losses. Selling straddles and other option structures generates immediate premium income, which appears as profit on day one and continues to look profitable if the underlying price remains near the strike. During quieter stretches of 1993-94, periods in which the Nikkei temporarily traded in a tighter range, this premium income gave Leeson a stream of positive daily marks that looked consistent with successful arbitrage. However, whenever the index experienced a sudden move, Leeson diverted the resulting losses into Account 88888, an error account that was neither monitored nor reconciled by London, thus allowing him to report the gains but hide the losses, creating a one-sided P&L distribution that appeared stable and positive even though it masked a growing deficit.

The emerging pattern is characteristic of an unhedged short-volatility book: small, regular profits punctuated by large nonlinear losses. However, in Leeson's case, the losses were not recognized, so the strategy falsely appeared uniformly successful.

When Leeson eventually reported more than £10 million in profits and was awarded a £150,000 bonus, the Nikkei had not experienced the kind of stability that would justify such returns for a trader supposedly engaged in low-risk arbitrage. Contrarily, the Nikkei's behavior during this period points to a market environment that should have produced large losses for a trader short gamma and short vega. For example, the Nikkei's rapid drop after mid-1992, its choppy indecision in 1993, and the ongoing volatility leading into 1994 all contradict the idea that a lightly hedged or unhedged derivatives book could have produced smooth, positive performance. Indeed, graphs of the index over this horizon show multiple episodes where the absolute deviation from Leeson's typical straddle strikes would have triggered significant mark-to-market hits.

The only way his P&L could remain positive in such an environment was through concealment of losses, not genuine trading success. The divergence between the actual index path and the reported P&L is itself the clearest evidence that his "profits" were false-constructed through hidden losses rather than earned in the market. By December 1994, Account 88888 was concealing a loss of £208 million.

While internal audits were being conducted on Barings Futures Singapore, they were unable to identify Leeson's mismanagement. In July 1994, it was noted in a report that Leeson was exercising a dual function of trader and back-office manager, allowing him to perform transactions and adjustments alone. Similarly, in January 1995, a Barings internal audit exposed a suspicious discrepancy in Leeson's accounting but he was able to convince the auditors that the discrepancy was result of a trade brokered between two clients by falsifying a payment receipt. Starstruck by Leeson's apparent profitability, Barings' management ignored all warning signs.

On January 16, Leeson went "all-in" that the Nikkei would not sink below 19,000 points. However, the next morning, on January 17th 1995, Hanshin earthquake struck Kobe, Japan forcing a dramatic dive in the Nikkei by basis 1000 points within days and instigating severe instability in the Japanese markets; Leeson losses amount to £862 million.

Although Leeson continued concealing his losses in Account 88888, and hence remained unreported, they demanded increasing margin calls. Leeson began opening large long positions in Nikkei futures in an effort to revert his losses, hoping that the trades would be able to move the market upward. Resultantly, BFS exposures were exacerbated and the banks' exposure to market setback increased, since the strategy was reliant on the Nikkei regaining its value.

Simultaneously, Leeson wrote puts on the Nikkei index in an attempt to reduce margin requirements on the BFS portfolio. His rationale was that following the sharp post-earthquake decline, market participants expected the index to stabilize above the new lower levels. Under this assumption, put option prices (reflecting the heightened demand for downside protection) would rise, and the increased option premium income could temporarily offset SIMEX margin calls.

This strategy implicitly required that the Nikkei not fall further; any additional deterioration in index levels would push the put options deeper into the money, raising their mark-to-market cost and triggering even larger margin calls. In effect, Leeson was doubling down on the belief that the worst of the market decline was over – despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

4.2 Impact on Leeson's Book

The Nikkei continued to plunge. Barings' enormous long futures exposures, intended by Leeson to force a rebound in prices, proved powerless to reverse the market's downward trajectory and instead exacerbated the bank's vulnerability. Through a combination of massive long positions in Nikkei futures and extensive written puts, BFS became increasingly exposed to further declines and its collateral requirements escalated dramatically.

By 24th February 1995, the Barings group had transferred a cumulative £742 million to Singapore to meet margin calls, roughly twice the bank's capital base. These spiraling collateral demands made clear that the portfolio was not hedged client business, but instead a proprietary gamble concealed within the 88888 account.

The immediate market reaction to the Kobe earthquake delivered the precise conditions that destroy a short-straddle book. The Nikkei 225 fell sharply, moving far away from the strike levels at which Leeson had sold huge volumes of options, triggering substantial negative-gamma losses as the payoff curvature of the straddle worked against him. Simultaneously, implied volatility surged, pushing up the Black-Scholes value of short options and producing a negative-vega valuation shock independent of price movements.

The market also suffered a deterioration in liquidity, particularly on SIMEX, making it more expensive and sometimes impossible to adjust, hedge, or unwind positions. In combination, these dynamics created a textbook short-volatility blow-up:

1. The index moved sharply off the strike
2. Volatility jumped
3. Option values rose dramatically
4. The liabilities on the short straddles expanded exponentially

Leeson responded by doubling down to hide losses, which only increased his gamma and vega exposure; ultimately, the losses grew too large to fund, triggering escalating margin calls and the collapse of Barings.

As the scale of the losses became impossible to hide, internal audits and external scrutiny quickly exposed Leeson's true positions. Throughout January and February, the rapid rise in margin calls revealed that the trades were speculative and unsupported by client activity, prompting urgent investigation. Rumors of Barings' impending collapse spread through the market, triggering fears about the broader implications for exchanges and counterparties. When rescue negotiations failed, Barings Plc was declared insolvent. On 27th February, the day of its official collapse, the bank disclosed that Leeson's accumulated losses totaled £827 million against a capital base of only £480 million. The scale of the losses reflected not only market movements but also the inherent fragility of an unhedged, leveraged, short-volatility strategy executed without oversight.

5 Model Replication

5.1 On Leeson's Strategy

This section provides a quantitative reconstruction of the trading losses incurred by Nick Leeson during the period surrounding the Kobe earthquake on January 17, 1995. Drawing on historical parameters, contemporaneous market data, and reconstructed position sizes, we analyze separately the linear losses arising from Leeson's massive long futures exposure and the nonlinear losses driven by his short straddle positions on Nikkei 225 options. The objective is to demonstrate how a combination of adverse price movement and a spike in implied volatility pushed Barings Bank into insolvency.

To model the profit and loss (P&L) before and after the Kobe earthquake, we define two critical time points:

1.t_0: January 17, 1995 (immediately before the market fully reacted)

2.t_1: January 23, 1995 (after the market incorporated the shock)

Key market variables are summarized as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
S_{t_0} &= 19{,}241 \quad \text{(Nikkei 225 index level)},\\
S_{t_1} &= 17{,}785 \quad \text{(post-shock level)},\\
\sigma_{t_0} &= 0.15 \quad \text{(pre-shock implied volatility)},\\
\sigma_{t_1} &= 0.30 \quad \text{(post-shock implied volatility)},\\
\text{FX rate} &= 158 \text{ JPY/GBP}.
\end{aligned}
$$

Leeson's trading book in Account 88888 contained:

1.$N_{fut} = 27{,}158$ long Nikkei 225 futures contracts,

2.$N_{opt} \approx 27{,}000$ short straddle option units,

3. Strike price $K = 19{,}000$,

4. Contract multiplier $M = 500$ JPY.

These exposures created extreme sensitivity to both directional moves and volatility shocks. Futures contracts generate linear payoffs with respect to price movement. The total loss from the long futures position is:

$$\text{P\&L}_{\text{Fut}} = N_{fut}(S_{t_1} - S_{t_0})M.$$

The index movement is:

$$\Delta S = S_{t_1} - S_{t_0} = 17{,}785 - 19{,}241 = -1{,}456.$$

Thus, the loss per contract is:

$$-1{,}456 \times 500 = -728{,}000 \text{ JPY}.$$

Total futures loss:

$$\text{P\&L}_{\text{Fut}} = 27{,}158 \times (-728{,}000) = -19.771024 \times 10^9 \text{ JPY}.$$

Converted into GBP:

$$\frac{-19.771024 \times 10^9}{158} \approx -£125{,}133{,}000.$$

This result highlights that the seemingly modest index drop created catastrophic linear losses due to the sheer size of the futures position. Leeson simultaneously sold straddles, a volatility-selling strategy that loses money when the underlying price moves significantly in either direction or when implied volatility rises. The Kobe earthquake triggered both effects.

Let V_{t_0} be the theoretical straddle value pre-shock and V_{t_1} the value post-shock under the Black–Scholes model. The total P&L from the short straddle is:

$$\text{P\&L}_{\text{Opt}} = N_{opt}(V_{t_0} - V_{t_1})M.$$

We apply the historical values:

$$V_{t_0} = 1{,}120, \qquad V_{t_1} = 2{,}450.$$

Change in liability per straddle:

$$\Delta V = V_{t_0} - V_{t_1} = -1{,}330.$$

Total point loss:

$$-1{,}330 \times 27{,}000 = -35.91 \times 10^6.$$

Total options loss in JPY:

$$-35.91 \times 10^6 \times 500 = -17.955 \times 10^9 \text{ JPY}.$$

GBP conversion:
$$\frac{-17.955 \times 10^9}{158} \approx -£113{,}639{,}000.$$

This confirms the highly convex nature of losses under short-volatility positions when volatility doubles and the underlying index moves sharply. The reconstructed losses from the January 1995 shock event are:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Futures Loss} &\approx -£125 \text{ million}, \\ \text{Options Loss} &\approx -£114 \text{ million}, \\ \text{Legacy Loss (Dec 1994)} &\approx -£208 \text{ million}. \end{aligned}$$

Total estimated insolvency following the Kobe earthquake:

$$\text{Total Loss} \approx -£446 \text{ million}.$$

Historical accounts show that by late February 1995, the accumulated loss reached approximately:

$$-£742 \text{ million}.$$

The difference between the reconstructed estimate and the final realized loss is consistent with reports that Leeson doubled down on his losing positions between late January and February 1995, increasing futures exposure from roughly 27,000 to over 60,000 contracts in a final attempt to recover losses. The increased leverage magnified losses rather than mitigating them, accelerating Barings Bank's collapse.

This quantitative reconstruction demonstrates that the Kobe earthquake acted as a trigger point that exposed the full fragility of Leeson's combined directional and short-volatility strategies. The massive long futures exposure generated large linear losses from the downward price shock, while the short straddle produced additional convex losses due to both price movement and a jump in implied volatility. Together with prior hidden losses, these effects pushed Barings Bank into insolvency even before the final doubling of positions that ultimately brought the bank down.

5.2 On S&P 500

To assess whether a Leeson style strategy could be viable in contemporary markets, we implemented a simplified version of his portfolio on recent S&P 500 related data. Using daily prices for the US 500 cash index together with S&P 500 VIX futures from January 2023 onward, we constructed a downside heavy short volatility position that is short two at the money puts and one call on the index, valued with a Black-Scholes type model using VIX implied volatility, and combined it with a long futures overlay scaled to roughly three times equity in order to mimic Leeson's persistent long Nikkei bias. Positions are rolled every few days into the money combinations, so that realised price moves and changes in implied volatility generate a sequence of option premia, mark to market gains and losses, and margin requirements. The resulting equity paths under three sizing rules, constant size, a mild increase after losses, and a Leeson style doubling rule, are summarised in:



Figure 4: S&P 500 Price and Equity

The underlying market over this period is a strong but irregular bull run. The US 500 rises substantially in level, but the path contains several short and sharp drawdowns and intermittent spikes in the VIX term structure. For a portfolio that is short gamma and short vega, combined with a long futures position, this environment is hostile. Under the constant size rule the portfolio behaves like a noisy short volatility carry trade: equity fluctuates around the initial capital of one million dollars, daily gross profit and loss swings are large relative to the small average drift, and the cumulative return is only slightly negative once realistic transaction costs are included. When we introduce mild scaling by multiplying position size after significant losses, the early part of the sample shows somewhat higher peaks in equity, but clusters of adverse moves in early 2023 gradually ratchet up the short option notional. A subsequent routine decline in the index together with a volatility spike then produces a pronounced margin driven drawdown. When the same market path is combined with a Leeson style doubling rule, the growth in option size is much steeper, and a relatively ordinary volatility shock is sufficient to drive equity through the margin floor. The stepwise increase in short option notional and the timing of the resulting collapse are shown more clearly in:

Figure 5: US 500 Price January–May 2023, Mild versus Leeson Position Size Scaling

To investigate whether a more disciplined specification could make this strategy attractive, we then removed all scaling and carried out an extensive grid search over constant size configurations. We varied option maturities from five to ninety days, roll frequencies, and combination sizes, always pairing the short volatility position with a long futures overlay. For each specification we computed annualised returns and basic risk measures. Even when we select the best configurations ex post, the equity curves remain confined to a narrow band of roughly plus or minus one percent around the initial capital; returns are at best mildly positive, while drawdowns and gross profit and loss volatility remain substantial.



Figure 6: Top Five Performing Fixed Straddle Size Combinations(2023/01-2026/01)



Figure 7: Top Five Performing Fixed Straddle Size Combinations(2025/08-2025/12)

The grey lines represent the five best constant size strategies and the blue line shows their average, normalised by starting equity. Taken together, these experiments indicate that in live S&P 500 conditions the basic short straddle and long futures structure is a fragile, low Sharpe carry trade. The feature that makes the profit and loss truly extreme and ultimately destructive is not the option structure by itself but the pro cyclical doubling rule, which forces the portfolio to accumulate very large short gamma and short vega exposures immediately before the next volatility shock arrives.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Risk Management Failures

6.1.1 Structural Failures

Barings' structural weaknesses created an environment in which Leeson could conceal losses despite mounting market evidence to the contrary. The absence of segregation between front- and back-office functions allowed Leeson to both execute trades and control their settlement, enabling him to hide the growing losses even as the Nikkei fell from roughly 21,000 in mid-1994 to below 18,000 by late 1994. London headquarters failed to impose independent reporting channels despite increasingly large financial requests: between September 1994 and February 1995, the Singapore operation routinely demanded hundreds of millions of pounds to meet margin calls, yet these requests were approved with minimal investigation.

This reflected a deeper structural dependence on Leeson's supposedly consistent profits, which were viewed as evidence of exceptional performance rather than as a potential red flag, especially since the Nikkei's realized volatility rising from around 13–14% in mid-1994 to over 20% by early 1995. Structural blind spots allowed the 88888 account to absorb losses silently while London continued to trust the reported gains.

6.1.2 Governance Failures

Governance failures at Barings were amplified by senior management's limited understanding of derivatives and the dramatic nature of the underlying market conditions. Throughout late 1994 and early 1995, the Nikkei experienced abrupt swings, dropping nearly 2,000 points in January 1995 following the Kobe earthquake, yet senior leaders failed to question how Leeson's "arbitrage" strategy could continue producing smooth daily profits in such a turbulent market.

At the same time, BFS repeatedly requested large cash infusions to fund margin calls, with Barings Group transferring a cumulative £742 million by 24th February 1995. These unexplained cash flows were completely inconsistent with low-risk arbitrage or hedged derivatives books, yet management accepted them without imposing effective risk limits or requiring transparency into position-level exposures.

The absence of governance scrutiny meant that enormous open positions (at times exceeding the entire open interest of Nikkei futures on SIMEX) went unnoticed, even as the bank's balance sheet became increasingly strained.

6.1.3 Quantitative Failures

Baring's quantitative failures were equally severe, as the bank had no independent mechanism to price Leeson's positions or assess the sensitivity of the portfolio to market shocks. No one outside Leeson's team calculated Greeks such as delta, gamma, or vega, even though his short straddles had large negative gamma exposures that would have produced immediate losses when the Nikkei moved sharply away from his strikes.

For example, the post-earthquake market drop from roughly 19,350 on 16th January 1995 to 17,325 by 23 January (more than 10% decline in one week) would have generated enormous gamma-driven losses and a massive negative-vega shock as implied volatility spiked above 30%. Yet Barings conducted no scenario analysis or stress testing that could have revealed the destabilizing effect of such a move.

Moreover, no independent desk verified the valuation of options in the 88888 account; had they done so, the mismatch between reported profits and the market reality would have been immediately apparent. The lack of quantitative risk controls meant Leeson's unhedged short-volatility positions grew unchecked until they overwhelmed the bank's capital base-ultimately culminating in £827 million in losses.

6.2 Business Lessons

The Barings collapse illustrates how essential it is for financial institutions to design organizational structures that prevent any single individual from accumulating excessive operational and informational power. Leeson's dual role, simultaneously running both the trading desk and back-office settlement function, created a structural vulnerability that allowed losses to be hidden for years.

Modern organizations must therefore ensure that no trader or profit centre is able to control both the generation and reporting of financial results. In addition, profit-generating units must remain transparent and independently monitored, with parallel reporting lines, segregation of duties, and automated reconciliation processes.

Perhaps the most fundamental is that extraordinary, "too good to be true" performance must always be interrogated rather than celebrated. Consistent profits in volatile markets, unusually smooth P&L lines, or unexplained jumps in profitability are not signals of superior trading talent-they are red flags that demand rigorous review. Barings treated Leeson's clean profit stream as a competitive advantage rather than a risk indicator, enabling the accumulation of hidden losses that ultimately destroyed the bank.

6.3 Risk Management Lessons

From a risk management perspective, the Barings case shows how dangerous it is to run complex derivatives books without the quantitative tools needed to understand their exposures. Options require continuous, Greeks-based monitoring, as their risks change dynamically with movements in the underlying asset, time decay, and shifts in volatility. Short volatility strategies, such as the straddles Leeson sold, are particularly hazardous because they expose the institution to large negative-gamma and negative-vega risks, which can produce exponentially growing losses when markets move or volatility spikes.

These strategies must operate within a robust hedging framework supported by independent risk oversight and strict position limits. Moreover, banks must explicitly quantify tail-risk exposure, recognizing that low-frequency but high-severity events can extinguish years of accumulated profits in days. Stress testing and scenario analysis, including simulations of volatility jumps, liquidity shocks, and extreme price movements, are indispensable tools for identifying vulnerabilities before they become existential.

Barings conducted none of these analyses, leaving it blind to the catastrophic risks embedded in Leeson's portfolio.

6.4 Quantitative Lessons

Finally, the Barings bank collapse demonstrates that quantitative models like Black-Scholes do not fail on their own – they fail when their assumptions are ignored or misapplied. The Black-Scholes framework provides clear guidance on the behavior of option portfolios: it specifies how option prices respond to changes in volatility, how sensitive positions are to directional moves via delta and gamma, and how non-linear P&L structures generate accelerating losses for short-option positions.

Properly applied, the model would have revealed that Leeson's straddle book carried enormous negative-gamma exposure, severe negative-vega sensitivity, and unlimited downside risk. Quantitative discipline requires not only calculating Greeks, but understanding that these sensitivities must be dynamically hedged and continuously monitored as markets evolve.

When institutions disregard the assumptions of their models, such as continuous hedging, transparent positions, and liquid markets, they create systemic vulnerabilities. Barings' failure was therefore not a failure of Black-Scholes, but a failure to use the model's insights, and to put in place the governance, risk controls, and quantitative oversight required to manage non-linear derivatives risk responsibly.

7 Future Outlook

The collapse of Barings Bank was not merely the consequence of a rogue trader evading detection; it was a systemic failure that exposed fundamental weaknesses across quantitative understanding, risk management, and organizational governance. At its core, the disaster illustrated what happens when option risks are misunderstood, valuation models are ignored, and institutional controls fail to perform their essential function.

Leeson's enormous short-straddle exposures, positions with clear and measurable negative gamma and vega with nonlinear loss profiles, would have been identified immediately had even the most cursory Black-Scholes Greeks analysis been applied. Instead, the absence of independent valuation, the lack of position-level transparency, and the unchecked accumulation of leverage allowed a hidden short-volatility strategy to metastasize into an existential threat.

What ultimately destroyed Barings was not a single trade, nor even a series of bad market bets, but the combination of leverage, opacity and unmonitored convexity risk embedded within Leeson's portfolio. The bank's 232-year-old legacy was undone by an avoidable convergence of organizational blindness and quantitative illiteracy.

The case stands today as a powerful reminder that sophisticated products require equally sophisticated oversight, and that models like Black-Scholes are not optional abstractions but instead essential tools for understanding and managing nonlinear exposure. The Barings failure therefore remains a foundational lesson in how quantitative finance, risk-management, and corporate governance must operate in alignment if financial institutions are to withstand the stresses of modern markets.

The failure of Barings resonates far beyond its historical moment because it exposed structural vulnerabilities that modern regulatory frameworks have since sought to correct. In the aftermath of Barings and later crises such as LTCM and the Global Financial Crisis, regulators recognized that complex trading activities demand robust oversight, transparent reporting, and quantitative risk management embedded into the core of financial supervision.

The Basel II and Basel III frameworks introduced more stringent capital requirements, market-risk charges, and liquidity standards specifically to address the dangers of unmonitored leverage and nonlinear exposures like those embedded in Leeson's short-straddle book. Value-at-Risk models, stress-testing requirements, and Incremental Risk Charges (IRC) were developed in part to ensure that tail-risk, volatility shocks, and concentrated derivatives positions could no longer accumulate unseen.

Equally important, regulators mandated stronger governance and organizational controls, requiring clear segregation between trading and settlement functions, independent risk and valuation units, and real-time reporting of major exposures.

Today's regulatory environment demands exactly what Barings lacked: model validation, independent pricing, transparent margining, and a culture of challenge rooted in quantitative literacy.

The Leeson episode thus endures not only as a cautionary tale but as a catalyst that helped shape the sophisticated, multi-layered risk-governance architecture that underpins modern financial regulation.

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