

# SaUCy

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Text of abstract ....

Additional Key Words and Phrases: keyword1, keyword2, keyword3

## 1 INTRODUCTION

UC paper [Canetti 2001]. **TODO:** Lots!

## 2 OVERVIEW

## 3 ILC

## 4 METATHEORY

## 5 IMPLEMENTATION

## 6 EXPERIMENTS

Impossibility of UC commitments using standard assumptions [Canetti and Fischlin 2001].

### Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{COM}}$  proceeds as follows, running with parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$  and an adversary  $S$ .

- (1) Upon receiving a value (Commit,  $sid, P_i, P_j, b$ ) from  $P_i$ , where  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , record the value  $b$  and send the message (Receipt,  $sid, P_i, P_j$ ) to  $P_j$  and  $S$ . Ignore any subsequent Commit messages.
- (2) Upon receiving a value (Open,  $sid, P_i, P_j$ ) from  $P_i$ , proceed as follows: If some value  $b$  was previously recorded, then send the message (Open,  $sid, P_i, P_j, b$ ) to  $P_j$  and  $S$  and halt. Otherwise halt.

let  $F_{\text{com}} = \text{lam } S .$

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let ('Commit, sid, P_i, P_j, b) = rd ?p2f in
  req mem b {0,1} in
  wr (('Receipt, sid, P_i, P_j), {P_j, S}) → ?f2p ;
  let ('Open, sid, P_i, P_j) = rd ?p2f in
  wr (('Open, sid, P_i, P_j, b), {P_j, S}) → ?f2p
in
  nu f2p, p2f .
  | ▷ (F_com S)

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## 7 RELATED WORK

EasyCrypt [Barthe et al. 2011], CertiCrypt [Barthe et al. 2009], CryptoVerif [Blanchet 2007], ProVerif [Blanchet 2005], RF\* [Barthe et al. 2014], Cryptol [Lewis and Martin 2003]

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## 8 CONCLUSION

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## A APPENDIX

Value Types	$A, B ::= x$	Value variable
	unit	Unit value
	nat	Natural number
	$A \times B$	Product
	$A + B$	Sum type
	$!A$	Intuitionistic type
	<b>Rd</b> $A$	Read channel
	<b>Wr</b> $A$	Write channel
	<b>U</b> $C$	Thunk type
Computation Types	$C, D ::= A \rightarrow C$	Value-consuming computation
	<b>F</b> $A$	Value-producing computation
Linear Typing Contexts	$\Delta ::= \cdot \mid \Delta, x : A$	
Intuitionistic Typing Contexts	$\Gamma ::= \cdot \mid \Gamma, x : A$	

Fig. 1. Syntax of types and typing contexts

99	Values	$v ::= x$	
100		$()$	Unit value
101		$n$	Natural number
102		$(v_1, v_2)$	Pair of values
103		$\text{inj}_i(v)$	Injected value
104		$\text{chan}(c)$	Channel (either read or write end)
105		$\text{thunk}(e)$	Thunk (suspended, closed expression)
106	Expressions	$e ::= \text{split}(v, x_1.x_2.e)$	Pair elimination
107		$\text{case}(v, x_1.e_1, x_2.e_2)$	Injection elimination
108		$\text{ret}(v)$	Value-producing computation
109		$\text{let}(e_1, x.e_2)$	Let-binding/sequencing
110		$e v$	Function application
111		$\lambda x. e$	Function abstraction
112		$\text{force}(v)$	Unsuspend (force) a thunk
113		$\text{wr}(v_1 \leftarrow v_2)$	Write channel $v_1$ with value $v_2$
114		$\text{rd}(v)$	Read channel $v$
115		$\text{vx}. e$	Allocate channel as $x$ in $e$
116		$e_1 \mid\triangleright e_2$	Fork $e_1$ , continue as $e_2$
117		$e_1 \oplus e_2$	External choice between $e_1$ and $e_2$

Fig. 2. Syntax of values and expressions

Modes  $m, n, p ::= W \mid R \mid V$  (Write, Read and Value)

122	$m \parallel n \Rightarrow p$	The parallel composition of modes $m$ and $n$ is mode $p$ .		
123				
124	$\frac{m \parallel n \Rightarrow p}{n \parallel m \Rightarrow p}$	$\text{sym}$	$\frac{}{W \parallel V \Rightarrow W}$	$\text{wv}$
125			$\frac{}{W \parallel R \Rightarrow W}$	$\text{wr}$
126				$\frac{}{R \parallel R \Rightarrow R}$
127	$m ; n \Rightarrow p$	The sequential composition of modes $m$ and $n$ is mode $p$ .		
128				
129				
130	$\frac{}{V ; n \Rightarrow n}$	$\text{v*}$	$\frac{}{W ; V \Rightarrow W}$	$\text{wv}$
131			$\frac{}{R ; n \Rightarrow R}$	$\text{r*}$
132				$\frac{}{W ; R \Rightarrow W}$

Note that in particular, the following mode compositions are *not derivable*:

- $W \parallel W \Rightarrow p$  is *not derivable* for any mode  $p$
- $W ; W \Rightarrow p$  is *not derivable* for any mode  $p$

Fig. 3. Syntax of modes; sequential and parallel mode composition.

$\Delta; \Gamma \vdash e : C \triangleright m$  Under  $\Delta$  and  $\Gamma$ , expression  $e$  has type  $C$  and mode  $m$ .

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash v : A}{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash \text{ret}(v) : \mathbf{F} A \triangleright V} \text{ret} \\
\frac{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash v : A}{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash \text{ret}(v) : \mathbf{F} (!A) \triangleright V} \text{ret!} \\
\frac{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash e : C \triangleright m}{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash \lambda x. e : A \rightarrow C \triangleright m} \text{lam} \\
\frac{\Delta, x : (\mathbf{Rd} A \times !(\mathbf{Wr} A)); \Gamma \vdash e : C \triangleright m}{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash vx. e : C \triangleright m} \text{nu} \\
\frac{\Delta; \Gamma \vdash v : \mathbf{Rd} A}{\Delta \vdash \text{rd}(v) : \mathbf{F} (A \times (\mathbf{Rd} A)) \triangleright R} \text{rd} \\
\frac{\Delta_1; \Gamma \vdash v_1 : \mathbf{Wr} A \quad \Delta_2; \Gamma \vdash v_2 : A}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \vdash \text{wr}(v_1 \leftarrow v_2) : \mathbf{F} \text{unit} \triangleright W} \text{wr} \\
\frac{\begin{array}{c} m_1 \parallel m_2 \Rightarrow m_3 \\ \Delta_1; \Gamma \vdash e_1 : C \triangleright m_1 \\ \Delta_2; \Gamma \vdash e_2 : D \triangleright m_2 \end{array}}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \vdash e_1 \mid e_2 : D \triangleright m_3} \text{fork} \\
\frac{\begin{array}{c} \Delta_1; \Gamma \vdash e_1 : C \triangleright R \\ \Delta_2; \Gamma \vdash e_2 : C \triangleright R \end{array}}{\Delta_1, \Delta_2 \vdash e_1 \oplus e_2 : C \triangleright R} \text{choice}
\end{array}$$

Channels	$\Sigma ::= \varepsilon \mid \Sigma, c$
Process pool	$\pi ::= \varepsilon \mid \pi, e$
Configurations	$C ::= \langle \Sigma; \pi \rangle$
Evaluation contexts	$E ::= \text{let}(E, x.e)$ $\mid E v$ $\mid \bullet$
Read contexts	$R ::= \text{rd}(\text{chan}(c)) \oplus R$ $\mid R \oplus \text{rd}(\text{chan}(c))$ $\mid \bullet$

$e \longrightarrow e'$  Expression  $e_1$  reduces to  $e_2$ .

$$\frac{}{\text{let}(\text{ret}(v), x.e) \longrightarrow [v/x]e} \text{let} \frac{}{(\lambda x. e) v \longrightarrow [v/x]e} \text{app} \frac{}{\text{force}(\text{thunk}(e)) \longrightarrow e} \text{force}$$

$$\frac{}{\text{split}((v_1, v_2), x.y.e) \longrightarrow [v_1/x][v_2/y]e} \text{split} \frac{}{\text{case}(\text{inj}_i(v), x_1.e_1, x_2.e_2) \longrightarrow e_i[v/x_i]} \text{case}$$

$C_1 \equiv C_2$  Configurations  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  are equivalent.

$$\frac{\pi_1 \equiv_{\text{perm}} \pi_2}{\langle \Sigma; \pi_1 \rangle \equiv \langle \Sigma; \pi_2 \rangle} \text{permProcs}$$

$C_1 \longrightarrow C_2$  Configuration  $C_1$  reduces to  $C_2$ .

$$\frac{e \longrightarrow e'}{\langle \Sigma; \pi, E[e] \rangle \longrightarrow \langle \Sigma; \pi, E[e'] \rangle} \text{local} \frac{}{\langle \Sigma; \pi, E[e_1 \mid \triangleright e_2] \rangle \longrightarrow \langle \Sigma; \pi, e_1, E[e_2] \rangle} \text{fork}$$

$$\frac{C_1 \equiv C'_1 \quad C'_1 \longrightarrow C_2 \quad C_2 \equiv C'_2}{C_1 \longrightarrow C'_2} \text{congr}$$

$$\frac{c \notin \Sigma}{\langle \Sigma; \pi, E[vx.e] \rangle \longrightarrow \langle \Sigma, c; \pi, E[(\text{chan}(c), \text{chan}(c))/x]e \rangle} \text{nu}$$

$$\frac{}{\langle \Sigma; \pi, E_1[R[\text{rd}(\text{chan}(c))]], E_2[\text{wr}(\text{chan}(c) \leftarrow v)] \rangle \longrightarrow \langle \Sigma; \pi, E_1[v], E_2[()] \rangle} \text{rw}$$