

SaUCy Reference: Reliable Broadcast

1 Overview

Adaptively secure broadcast [2]. Bracha [1].

2 Ideal Functionalities

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{BC}

\mathcal{F}_{BC} interacts with an adversary \mathcal{S} and a set $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ of parties.

1. Upon receiving $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, m)$ from P_i , send $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, P_i, m)$ to all parties in \mathcal{P} and to \mathcal{S} .

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{RBC}

\mathcal{F}_{RBC} interacts with an adversary \mathcal{S} and a set $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ of parties.

1. Upon receiving $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, m)$ from P_i , leak $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, P_i, m)$ to \mathcal{S} .
2. Upon receiving m' from \mathcal{S} , do:
 - If P_i is corrupted, send $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, P_i, m')$ to all parties in \mathcal{P} .
 - If P_i is not corrupted, send $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, P_i, m)$ to all parties in \mathcal{P} .

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ACAST}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{ACAST}}$ interacts with an adversary \mathcal{S} and a set $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ of parties.

1. Upon receiving $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, m)$ from P_i , leak $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, P_i, m)$ to \mathcal{S} .
2. Upon receiving m' from \mathcal{S} , do:
 - If P_i is corrupted, send $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, P_i, m')$ to all parties in \mathcal{P} .
 - If P_i is not corrupted, send $(\text{Bcast}, \text{sid}, P_i, m)$ to all parties in \mathcal{P} .

3 Protocol Definition

Protocol Π_{Bracha}

Π_{Bracha} interacts with a set $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$ of parties.

1. Upon receiving (Value, v) from P_i , send $(\text{Initial}, v)$ to all parties in \mathcal{P} .
2. Upon receiving an $(\text{Initial}, v)$ message or $\left\lceil \frac{n+f}{2} \right\rceil$ (Echo, v) messages or $\left\lceil \frac{f+1}{2} \right\rceil$ (Ready, v) messages, send (Echo, v) to all parties in \mathcal{P} .
3. Upon receiving $\left\lceil \frac{n+f}{2} \right\rceil$ (Echo, v) messages or $\left\lceil \frac{f+1}{2} \right\rceil$ (Ready, v) messages, send (Ready, v) to all parties in \mathcal{P} .
4. Upon receiving $\left\lceil \frac{f+1}{2} \right\rceil$ (Ready, v) messages, accept v .

4 Protocol Emulation

Simulator S_{BC}

PROOF SKETCH Sketch simulation proof here.

□

References

1. Gabriel Bracha. Asynchronous byzantine agreement protocols. *Information and Computation*, 75(2):130–143, 1987.
2. Juan A Garay, Jonathan Katz, Ranjit Kumaresan, and Hong-Sheng Zhou. Adaptively secure broadcast, revisited. In *Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing*, pages 179–186. ACM, 2011.