

# Thunderbird/Enigmail SOS Fund Audit Fix Log

## Identified Vulnerabilities

### TBE-01-002 Enigmail: Weak Parsing causes Confidentiality Compromise (Critical)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1412631](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1412631).

Patch:

<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/927ddf0223f796f34040125f97e5b423f6573c9c/>

Released as part of Enigmail 2.0.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *EnigmailFuncs.stripEmail()* reliably errors out when emails contain an additional pair of <>. Manually verified.

**VERIFIED**

### TBE-01-005 Enigmail: Replay of encrypted Contents leads to Plaintext Leak (High)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1412632](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1412632).

Patches:

<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/945a5f36c0817cad8bdf1c70112205a22502ee32>

<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/8d3afec4f1c3c8faf4a6a93bf38cb508d17e6b7a>

Released as part of Enigmail 2.0.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Behaviour got changed completely. Embedded encrypted messages are not decrypted automatically but left as is if the encrypted part's sender does not match the current sender. Steps to reproduce fail.*

**VERIFIED**

### TBE-01-011 Thunderbird: RSS Feed vulnerable against Email Injection (High)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411699](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411699).

Patch: <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8927143>.

Released as part of Thunderbird 59.0.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Not authorized to view the patch! However, manually testing shows behaviour is different. Newlines are not interpreted and the injected email structure is not expanded.*

**VERIFIED**

### TBE-01-012 Thunderbird: RSS Local Path Leak via @-moz-document (Medium)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411708](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411708)

Patches:

<https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/37e0bd919af0>

<https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/b556432c990b>

Fixed in Thunderbird 59

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Cannot reproduce original bug on TB 58.0b1, but patch is missing.*

Mario Heiderich (Cure53): *Patch is now present, fix is verified*

**VERIFIED**

### TBE-01-013 Thunderbird: RSS Local Path Leak via cid: Parsing Bug (Medium)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411713](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411713)

No patch so far.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Cannot reproduce original bug on TB 58.0b1, unable to import the feed containing the PoC, feed fails to validate. Patch is missing.*

**VERIFIED**

### TBE-01-014 Thunderbird: JavaScript Execution via RSS in mailbox:// Origin (High)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411716](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411716).

Patches:

<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8926442>

<https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8927088>

Fixed in Thunderbird 58.0.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Not authorized to view the patch! However, JS is not executed, href in resulting base-tag is emptied:*

`<base href="">` (fixed)

Vs

`<base href="data:text/html,%3ch1%3..."` (vuln)

**VERIFIED**

### TBE-01-015 Thunderbird: Decrypted PGP Blocks exposed via RSS Feeds (Critical)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411718](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411718).

The way TBE-01-011 and TBE-01-014 were fixed, there was nothing more to fix for the issue here.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *015 depends on previous issues to be valid, however they are fixed.*

**VERIFIED**

### **TBE-01-017 Thunderbird: Multiple Hangs via malformed Headers (Medium)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411720](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411720)

**VERIFIED**

Mario Heiderich (Cure53): *Added regex as well as the test-cases look good, verified!*

### **TBE-01-021 Enigmail: Flawed parsing allows faked Signature Display (Critical)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1412633](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1412633).

Patches:

<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/698cc370b5094937b63aacb07e407f42f38542ca/>  
<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/284e9408145126e55db8e2c4a37111c9dd5ef0e2/>

Released as part of Enigmail 2.0.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Behaviour upon receiving attached files that are signed is changed and the enigmail message for a good signature is not displayed any more.*

**VERIFIED**

## **Miscellaneous Issues**

### **TBE-01-001 Enigmail: Insecure Random Secret Generation (Low)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1412636](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1412636).

Patch:

<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/f221d4d92f5d06c7d33c3a57d815b5a7d147a220>

Release as part of Enigmail 2.0.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *As advised, `Math.random()` is replaced with `crypto.getRandomValues()`.*

**VERIFIED**

### **TBE-01-003 Enigmail: Regular Expressions Exploitable for Denial of Service (Low)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1412637](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1412637).

Patch:

<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/eeb340604663e2a15459831af1acd2b97787b547/>

Release as part of Enigmail 2.0.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *All mentioned regexes are now length restricted.*

## VERIFIED

### TBE-01-004 Enigmail: Autocrypt Automatic Key Import (Info)

(no concrete action to take)

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Autocrypt is in still developement, future will tell if the recommendations were taken into consideration.*

## NO ACTION TO TAKE

### TBE-01-007 Thunderbird: JavaScript Execution via Reload Page Dialog (Low)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411748](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411748)

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *No change, PoC works and XSS is triggered.*

## UNFIXED

### TBE-01-008 Enigmail: Default Keyserver configured without SSL (Info)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1412638](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1412638).

Patch:

<https://sourceforge.net/p/enigmail/source/ci/a14c50b1da9ecd39ceded7e34f7137778102a625>

Part of Enigmail 2.0

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Uses hkps:// now.*

## VERIFIED

### TBE-01-009 Thunderbird: Filename Spoofing for external Attachments (Info)

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411732](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411732).

Fixed as part of TBE-01-014.

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *The GUI still displays the filename that is outlined in the content-type header. Considering unfixed.*

## UNFIXED (Update: Fixed on 2018-04-27)

### This is the response of the Thunderbird developers:

*For the record, it is completely legitimate to have a display name. This is no different from a web page text link where the text could be some spoofy wording to evilsite.com url. Since only http links are accepted now, a click will open the url in a default browser whose infrastructure for handling malicious sites takes over.*

*The enhancement needed is to enable the user to at least see the url link, like in Firefox.*

#### **TBE-01-010 Thunderbird: DoS via invalid X-Mozilla-Draft-Info header (Low)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411734](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411734).

Patch: <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8922686>

Fixed in Thunderbird 57.0, foreseen for Thunderbird 52.5.0

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Code is fine now null deref is prevented with the correct branch. Manually verified, crash does not happen.*

**VERIFIED**

#### **TBE-01-006 Thunderbird: Denial of Service via Link to .eml Attachment (Low)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411735](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411735).

**VERIFIED**

Mario Heiderich (Cure53): *The diff was reviewed, the cause of the crash was removed.*

#### **TBE-01-016 Thunderbird: DoS via proprietary X-Mozilla-Cloud-Part Header (Low)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411737](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411737).

Patch: <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8923076>

Fixed in Thunderbird 58.0, foreseen for Thunderbird 52.5.0

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Code is fine now, and manually verified, crash does not happen.*

**VERIFIED**

#### **TBE-01-018 Thunderbird: Integer and Heap-Overflow in MIME-Body-Parsing (High)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411741](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411741).

Fixed as part of bug [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1392052](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1392052).

Patch: <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8900023>

Fixed in Thunderbird 57.0

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Code received a complete overhaul.*

**VERIFIED**

#### **TBE-01-019 Thunderbird: Integer Overflow in Attachment Code (High)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411744](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411744).

Patch: <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8922364>

Fixed in Thunderbird 58.0

Nikolai Krein (Cure53): *Not authorized to view the patch! Checked via GIT: bodyLen is now limited to < UINT32\_MAX, so wrapping to 0 should not happen.*

**VERIFIED**

**TBE-01-020 Thunderbird: Null Pointer Exception via SVG and Mailbox URI (Info)**

Filed as [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show\\_bug.cgi?id=1411745](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411745)

Patch: <https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8933938>

Fixed in Thunderbird 59

**VERIFIED**