

TrustCam-DTN: End-to-End Technical Summary

◆ What the system does (1-line pitch)

TrustCam-DTN securely captures images at the device, encrypts them before transmission, attaches provenance proofs, and delivers them reliably using Delay-Tolerant Networking — even without internet — while maintaining tamper-evident logs.

System Flow (Step-by-Step)

1 Secure Capture at ESP32-CAM

- Camera captures an image into framebuffer
- Before storing or transmitting it, we encrypt it using **AES-GCM**
- This ensures **confidentiality + integrity (via auth-tag)**

Why AES-GCM?

It provides both encryption and authentication without needing a separate HMAC, and it's fast enough for embedded devices.

2 Provenance and Authenticity

After encryption, we generate:

- **SHA-256 hash** of encrypted file
- **ECDSA signature** over that hash
- Metadata: timestamp, device ID, firmware version

This proves:

Property	Mechanism
Who captured it	Signature w/ device private key

When it was captured Timestamp in metadata

Whether modified Hash + signature mismatch if altered

Expected viva question:

Q: Why sign after encryption instead of before?

✓ Because signing plaintext leaks info about raw data—signing ciphertext protects structure and maintains privacy.

3 Local Transparency Log

Each capture event is appended into a **hash-chained log** stored on device:

$(\text{prev_hash} + \text{event_hash}) \rightarrow \text{SHA-256} \rightarrow \text{new entry}$

It behaves like a lightweight blockchain:

- No consensus
- No mining
- Just immutability



Viva Q:

Q: Why not use a full blockchain like Ethereum?

✓ Because blockchain is overkill for an IoT device. Hash chaining gives **tamper evidence with near-zero resource cost**.

4 Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN)

Instead of assuming continuous internet connection, we use:

- ✓ **Store-carry-forward model (BPv7 Bundle Protocol)**
- ✓ Messages are queued if network unavailable
- ✓ Delivered automatically when a route appears
- ✓ Can integrate satellite (Iridium) later



Viva Q:

Q: How is this different from normal TCP/IP transmission?

- ✓ TCP requires continuous end-to-end connectivity.
 - ✓ DTN can deliver data **hours or days later**, across disconnected nodes.
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5 Proxy-Friendly, Zero-Trust Transport

Because encryption happens at the source:

- DTN nodes
- Servers
- Gateways

...cannot see or alter plaintext.

The server **stores encrypted data but cannot read it** unless authorized.

 Viva Q:

Q: Why is this better than WhatsApp-style end-to-end encryption?

✓ WhatsApp encrypts messages *during transport*, but server still controls identity, routing, and metadata.

✓ TrustCam enforces:

- Provenance
- Tamper evidence
- Secure re-sharing (PRE)
- Offline delivery

...none of which WhatsApp guarantees.

6 Backend Verification + Decryption (Flask)

When data arrives:

Step Operation

- 1 Compute new hash
- 2 Verify ECDSA signature
- 3 Verify transparency log chain
- 4 Decrypt AES-GCM
- 5 Store reconstructed image

If any step fails → backend rejects data.

 Viva Q:

Q: Can the server modify logs or images?

✓ No — modification breaks signature and hash-chain integrity.

7 Testing and Validation

We tested:

-  Raw HTTP uploads

-  Curl-based multipart uploads
-  Retrieval via /images and /images/<file>
-  Log verification via /log/verify

Everything worked end-to-end.

Key Viva Talking Points

Category	Bullet Answer
Confidentiality	AES-GCM ensures encryption + authentication
Integrity	SHA-256 hash + signature prove no tampering
Authenticity	ECDSA keypair binds image to specific device
Non-Repudiation	Device cannot deny generating signed image
Tamper Detection	Hash-chained logs detect alterations
Offline Support	DTN ensures store-and-forward resilience
Zero-Trust Architecture	Server does not need to trust devices

Expected Deep Questions & Strong Answers

Q: What happens if someone modifies a single byte in the encrypted payload?

AES-GCM authentication tag will fail, signature verification will fail, and log entry will mismatch — system rejects the bundle.

Q: How do you handle replay attacks?

Metadata includes timestamp + device ID. Backend rejects duplicates or stale entries.

Q: Why not just use HTTPS?

HTTPS protects transport *only while online*.

TrustCam protects:

- **before transmission**
 - **during storage**
 - **during routing**
 - **without internet**
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🔥 **Q: What's the biggest bottleneck?**

- Cryptographic operations on ESP32 if scaling many images.
 - DTN routing latency when no direct route exists.
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❖ **Final One-Sentence Conclusion**

TrustCam-DTN is a zero-trust secure imaging platform combining encryption-at-source, cryptographic provenance, tamper-evident logging, and delay-tolerant delivery—ensuring images remain verifiable and confidential from capture to final storage, even in disconnected environments.