ExercisesMalware

2. [2 points] A new malware just broke out, causing a world-wide infection and a huge amount of damages. Unfortunately, all the anti-malware systems are not able to detect this malware. You were able to retrieve a couple of samples.

Consider the code snippets reported below, extracted from the two malware samples you retrieved:

Sample 1	Sample 2				
1 pop ebx	1 pop ebx				
2 lea ecx, [ebx + 42h]	2 lea ecx, [ebx + 42h]				
3 push ecx	3 push ecx				
4 push eax	4 push eax				
5 push eax	5 nop				
6 sdt [esp - 02h]	6 push eax				
7 pop ebx	7 inc eax				
8 add ebx, 1Ch	8 sdt [esp - 02h]				
9 cli	9 dec eax				
10 mov ebp, [ebx]	10 pop ebx				
	11 add ebx, 1Ch				
	12 cli				
	13 mov ebp, [ebx]				

Metamorphism. See slides.

2. [2 points] A new malware just broke out, causing a world-wide infection and a huge amount of damages. Unfortunately, all the anti-malware systems are not able to detect this malware. You were able to retrieve a couple of samples.

We made a binary diff of the two samples in order to evaluate the difference in their layout and reported only the differences here:

	Sample 1					Sample 2		
000000	0000000675 < decrypt >:			0000000	000000675	<decrypt>:</decrypt>		
	[]					[]		
6a3:	83 f1 42	xor	ecx,0x42	6a3:	83 f1 42		xor	ecx,0x12
	[]					[]		
0000000000007b0 <payload>:</payload>			00000000000007b0 <payload>:</payload>					
7b0:	28 00	sub	BYTE PTR	7b0:	78 50		js	802
[rax],	al			<gnu_eh_frame_hdr+0x32></gnu_eh_frame_hdr+0x32>				
7b2:	1a bc 86 0a db 10 0a	sbb	bh,BYTE PTR	7b2:	4a ec		rex.WX	in al,dx
[rsi+ra	ax*4+0xa10db0a]			7b4:	d6		(bad)	
7b9:	fd	std		7b5:	5a		рор	rdx
7ba:	6d	ins	DWORD PTR	7b6:	8b 40 5a		mov	eax,DWORD PTR
es:[rd:	es:[rdi],dx			[rax+0x	к5а]			
7bb:	20 2b	and	BYTE PTR	7b9:	ad		lods	eax,DWORD PTR
[rbx],ch			ds:[rsi]					
7bd:	2c 6d	sub	al,0x6d	7ba:	3d 70 7b	7c 3d	cmp	eax,0x3d7c7b70
7bf:	6d	ins	DWORD PTR	7bf:	3d 61 7a	45 46	cmp	eax,0x46457a61
es:[rd:	i],dx			7c4:	4c 5b		rex.WR	pop rbx
7c0:	31 2a	xor	DWORD PTR	7c6:	9b		fwait	
[rdx],	ebp			7c7:	c2 5b 9b		ret	0x9b5b
7c2:	15 16 1c 0b cb	adc	eax,0xcb0b1c16	7ca:	с0		.byte	0xc0
7c7:	92	xchg	edx,eax	7cb:	1d		.byte	0x1d
7c8:	0b cb	or	ecx,ebx	7cc:	17		(bad)	
7ca:	90	nop						
7cb:	4d	rex.WF	RB					
7cc:	47	rex.R>	(B					

Additionally, we executed the samples and collected the syscalls in order to evaluate their behaviour (i.e., semantics).

```
Sample 1 Trace
execve("./sample1", ["./sample1"], 0x7ffe4fc39080 /* 60
vars */) = 0
brk(NULL = 0x558154aa3000
access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R OK)
                                      = -1 ENOENT (No
such file or directory)
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) =
fstat(3, {st mode=S IFREG|0644, st size=232207, ...}) = 0
mmap(NULL, 232207, PROT READ, MAP PRIVATE, 3, 0) =
0x7f0157a64000
close(3)
openat(AT FDCWD, "/usr/lib/libc.so.6", O RDONLY|O CLOEXEC)
= 3
read(3,
"\177ELF\2\1\1\3\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0>\0\1\0\0\0\2001\2\0\0
0000..., 832 = 832
fstat(3, {st mode=S IFREG|0755, st size=2105608, ...}) = 0
mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT READ|PROT WRITE,
close(3)
arch prctl(ARCH SET FS, 0x7f0157a634c0) = 0
mprotect(0x7f015786f000, 16384, PROT READ) = 0
                     [...]
munmap(0x7f0157a64000, 232207)
mmap(NULL, 4, PROT_READ|PROT WRITE|PROT EXEC,
MAP SHARED | MAP ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7f0157a9c000
execveat(1852400175, "/bin//sh", NULL, NULL, 0) =0
```

```
Sample 2 Trace
execve("./sample2", ["./sample2"], 0x7ffe4fc39080 /* 60
vars */) = 0
brk(NULL) = 0x5575cc15d000
access("/etc/ld.so.preload", R OK)
                                        = -1 ENOENT (No
such file or directory)
openat(AT FDCWD, "/etc/ld.so.cache", O RDONLY|O CLOEXEC) =
fstat(3, {st mode=S IFREG|0644, st_size=232207, ...}) = 0
mmap(NULL, 232207, PROT READ, MAP PRIVATE, 3, 0) =
0x7fbb4f1f2000
close(3)
openat(AT FDCWD, "/usr/lib/libc.so.6", O RDONLY|O CLOEXEC)
= 3
read(3,
"\177ELF\2\1\1\3\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0>\0\1\0\0\0\2001\2\0\0
0000..., 832 = 832
fstat(3, {st mode=S IFREG | 0755, st size=2105608, ...}) = 0
mmap(NULL, 8192, PROT READ|PROT WRITE,
MAP PRIVATE MAP ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7fbb4f1f0000
close(3)
                                        = 0
arch prctl(ARCH SET FS, 0x7fbb4f1f14c0) = 0
mprotect(0x7fbb4effd000, 16384, PROT READ) = 0
munmap(0x7fbb4f1f2000, 232207)
mmap(NULL, 4, PROT READ|PROT WRITE|PROT EXEC,
MAP SHARED MAP ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0x7fbb4f22a000
execveat(1852400175, "/bin//sh", NULL, NULL, 0) =0
```

Polymorphism

In order to avoid signature detection, a malware sample saves his own assembly code in text format on the victim machine, and then uses a standard assembler to generate and execute the real malicious object code on the machine.

2. [2 points] How can a signature-based detection method (e.g., antivirus) detect this kind of malware?

In order to avoid the previous signature detection, a malware sample saves his own assembly code in text format on the victim machine, and then uses a standard assembler to generate and execute the real malicious object code on the machine.

2. [2 points] How can a signature-based detection method (e.g., antivirus) detect this kind of malware?

Have a signature to detect the malware in its "textual" assembly format. Note that having a signature to detect the assembler is a wrong solution, as it leads to lots of false positives (the system assembler it's a legitimate program, after all!)

3. [1 point] You suspect that your machine have been compromised with a kernel rootkit. You tried to use network traffic tools from your machine but you do not see any malicious traffic. Can you conclude that your machine is safe? If is not there are other way to prove you have been compromised?

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No you cannot conclude that the machine have not been compromised. Because the malware can hide its own traffic from tools running on the compromised machine. You could inspect network traffic using an external machine as a MitM between your machine and the router.

4. [1 point] A colleague suggests to replace the hard drive of a machine to be sure to get rid of a very sophisticated rootkit. However, after reinstalling the operating system, it seems like that the machine is infected by the same rootkit. Provide an explanation of what happened. Whatever your answer is, explain why.

4. [1 point] A colleague suggests to replace the hard drive of a machine to be sure to get rid of a very sophisticated rootkit. However, after reinstalling the operating system, it seems like that the machine is infected by the same rootkit. Provide an explanation of what happened. Whatever your answer is, explain why. If it is a BIOS rootkit then No. If it is a kernel rootkin it is ok to just replace the HD or even just reinstall the OS.