

Introduction to Cryptography



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Word of Warning

- This is a short, simplified introduction to cryptography
- We will only introduce what is needed for systems security discussions

What is cryptography (alt. cryptology)?


Definition

- The study of techniques to allow secure communication and data storage in presence of attackers

Features provided

- **Confidentiality:** data can be accessed only by chosen entities
- **Integrity/freshness:** detect/prevent tampering or replays
- **Authenticity:** data and their origin are certified
- **Non-repudiation:** data creator cannot repudiate created data
- **Advanced features:** proofs of knowledge/computation

The Problem to Solve: Confidentiality and Integrity



A Brief History of Cryptography

- From Greek: *kryptos*, hidden, and *graphein*, to write (i.e., “*art of secret writing*”)
- Ancient history: writing itself was already a “secret technique”.
- Cryptography born in Greek society, when writing became more common, and hidden writing became a need.

Cryptographic prehistory


As old as written communication

- Born for commercial (recipe for lacquer on clay tablets) or military (Spartans) uses
- Designed by humans, for human computers
- Algorithms computed by hand, with pen and paper



Original approach

- A battle of wits between
 - cryptographers: ideate a secret method to obfuscate a text
 - cryptanalysts: figure out the method, break the “cipher”
- Bellaso (1553) [1] separates the encryption method from the key



A Brief History of Cryptography

- Medieval and renaissance studies
 - **Gabriele de Lavinde**, who wrote a manual in 1379, copy available at the Vatican archives.
 - The mirror writing of **Leonardo da Vinci**.
- Mostly a *military interest*
 - Italian Army General **Luigi Sacco** wrote a famous “*Nozioni di crittografia*” book in 1925, one of the last “non-formalized” exercises in cryptography.


1883 - Kerchoff's six principles for a good cipher (apparatus)

- ① It must be practically, if not mathematically, unbreakable
- ② It should be possible to make it public, even to the enemy
- ③ The key must be communicable without written notes and changeable whenever the correspondants want
- ④ It must be applicable to ~~telegraphic~~ communication
- ⑤ It must be portable, and should be operable by a single person
- ⑥ Finally, given the operating environment, it should be easy to use, it shouldn't impose excessive mental load, nor require a large set of rules to be known

Cryptographic modern history


The advent of the machines

- Mechanical computation changes cryptography
 - First rotor machine in 1917 by Ed Hebern
 - Design “popularized” in WWII by German Enigma
- Cryptanalyst at Bletchley park (Turing among them) credited for a decisive effort in winning the war by Eisenhower



When Math Won a War

- During WWII, **Alan Turing** worked at Bletchley Park to **break** Axis ciphers, in particular the **Enigma cipher**.




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Foto: o. Ang. | 1936/1939 ca.



When Math Won a War

- During WWII, Alan Turing worked at Bletchley Park to **break** Axis ciphers, in particular the **Enigma cipher**.
- Birth of the first universal computers was stimulated by this effort.



THE BOMBE (replica)

An end to the battle of wits

- Shannon (1949) [4] - Proves that a mathematically unbreakable cipher exists
- Nash (1955) [2] - Argues that **computationally secure** ciphers are ok
 - Considers a cipher with a finite, λ bit long, key
 - Conjecture: if "*parts of the key interact complexly [...] in the determination of their effects on the ciphertext*", the attacker effort to break the cipher would be $\mathcal{O}(2^\lambda)$
 - The owner of the key takes $\mathcal{O}(\lambda^2)$ to compute the cipher
 - The computational gap is unsurmountable for large λ

Key Concepts in Cryptography

- First formalized by Claude Shannon in his 1949 paper “*Communication theory of secrecy systems*”.
- **Cryptosystem**: a system that takes in input a message (known as **plaintext**) and transforms it into a **ciphertext** with a **reversible function** that usually takes a **key** as a further input.
- The use of “text” is historical, and today we mean “*string of bits*”.

Kerckhoffs' Principle

- *The security of a cryptosystem relies only on the secrecy of the key, and never on the secrecy of the algorithm.*
 - Auguste Kerckhoffs, “La cryptographie militaire”, 1883
- This means that:
 - In a secure cryptosystem we cannot retrieve the plaintext from the ciphertext without the key.
 - *Also, we cannot retrieve the key from analyzing ciphertext-plaintext pairs.*
 - Algorithms must always be assumed known to the attacker, no secret sauce!

Outline of the topics

In this course

- Definitions of ciphers as components with functionalities
- How to obtain confidentiality, integrity, data/origin authentication
- An overview of protocols (combinations of ciphers)
- Goal: be able to use cryptographic components properly

In Cryptography and Architectures for Computer Security

- Design and cryptanalysis techniques for ciphers
- Cryptographic protocols and their inner workings
- Efficient, side channel attack resistant implementations
- Goal: be able to engineer cryptographic components

Before we start...

```
int getRandomNumber()
{
    return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll.
               // guaranteed to be random.
}
```

<https://xkcd.com/221/>

A word on randomness


- Randomness (in this course) characterizes a generative process
- Stating: “00101 is a random string” actually makes little sense

Data

- Plaintext space **P**: set of possible messages $\text{ptx} \in \mathbf{P}$
 - Old times: words in some human-readable alphabet, modern times $\{0, 1\}^l$
- Ciphertext space **C**: set of possible ciphertext $\text{ctx} \in \mathbf{C}$
 - Usually $\{0, 1\}^{l'}$, not necessarily $l = l'$ (ciphertexts may be larger)
- Key space **K**: set of possible keys
 - $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$, keys with special formats are derived from bitstrings

Functions

- Encryption function $\mathbb{E} : \mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{K} \rightarrow \mathbf{C}$
- Decryption function $\mathbb{D} : \mathbf{C} \times \mathbf{K} \rightarrow \mathbf{P}$
 - Correctness: for all $\text{ptx} \in \mathbf{P}$, we need $k, k' \in \mathbf{K}$ s.t. $\mathbb{D}(\mathbb{E}(\text{ptx}, k), k') = \text{ptx}$



Goal

- Prevent anyone not authorized from being able to understand data


Possible attacker models

- The attacker simply eavesdrops (ciphertext only attack)
- The attacker knows a set of possible plaintexts
 - Limit case: the attacker chooses the set of plaintexts
- The attacker may tamper with the data and observe the reactions of a decryption-capable entity
 - Limit case: the attacker sees the actual decrypted value


Symmetric Encryption

Confidentiality


Symmetric Encryption



Symmetric Encryption



Symmetric Encryption



Symmetric Encryption

- The basic idea of encryption
 - Use key K to **encrypt** plaintext in ciphertext
 - Use same key K to **decrypt** ciphertext in plaintext
- Synonyms: shared key encryption, secret key encryption
- **Issue:** how do we agree on the key?
 - Cannot send key on same channel as message!
 - Off-band transmission mechanism needed
- **Issue:** scalability
- A symmetric algorithm is a cocktail...

First ingredient: substitution

Substitution: “replacing **each byte** with another”

Toy example (Caesar cipher)

- replace each letter in a sentence with the one following it by K positions in the alphabet
- Example: “**SECURE**” becomes “**VHFXUH**” with $K = 3$

● **Many issues** (it’s a toy example!)

First ingredient: substitution

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- replace each letter in a sentence with the one following it by K positions in the alphabet
- Example: “**SECURE**” becomes “**VHFXUH**” with $K = 3$

Many issues (it’s a toy example!):

- if cipher known, with 25 attempts at most, 13 on average, we have the key: **keyspace too small**

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- replace each letter in a sentence with the one following it by K positions in the alphabet
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Many issues (it’s a toy example!):

- if cipher known, with 25 attempts at most, 13 on average, we have the key: **keyspace too small**.
- **repetitions** and **structure** “visible” in ciphertext: monoalphabetic ciphers are weak (frequency analysis - CPTX only attack) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_frequency

Polyalphabetic ciphers (Vigenere Cipher)

m=SECURE

k=SECRET

c=?

--PLAINTEXT--																										
A	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
B	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A
C	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
D	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
E	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
F	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E
G	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F
H	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
I	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
J	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
K	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
L	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
M	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
N	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
O	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
P	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
Q	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
R	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
S	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
T	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
U	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
V	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
W	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V

Polyalphabetic ciphers (Vigenere Cipher)

m=SECURE

k=SECRET

c=K

--PLAINTEXT--																										
A	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
B	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A
C	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
D	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
E	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
F	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E
G	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F
H	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
I	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
J	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
K	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
L	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
M	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
N	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
O	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
P	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
Q	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
R	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
S	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
T	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
U	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
V	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
W	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V

Polyalphabetic ciphers (Vigenere Cipher)

m=SECURE
k=SECRET
c=KIELVX

--PLAINTEXT--																										
A	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z
B	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A
C	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B
D	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C
E	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D
F	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E
G	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F
H	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
I	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
J	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
K	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
L	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K
M	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
N	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
O	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N
P	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
Q	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
R	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q
S	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R
T	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
U	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
V	V	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
W	W	X	Y	Z	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V

Second ingredient: transposition

Transposition (or diffusion) means “swapping the values of given bits”

Toy example (matrix):

- Write by rows, read by columns
- Key: $K = (R, C)$ with $R * C \sim \text{len}(\text{msg})$

plaintext					ciphertext
H	A	L	L	O	
	E	V	E	R	
Y	O	N	E	!	

Many issues (it's a toy example!)

Example - Diffusion

H	A	L	L	O
	E	V	E	R
Y	O	N	E	!

m= HALLO EVERYONE!

k=(3,5)

c=H YAEOLVNLEEOR!

Example - Diffusion

m= HALLO

k=(3,5)

c=H A L L O

H	A	L	L	O

R * C >> len(msg)

15 >> 4

Second ingredient: transposition

Transposition (or diffusion) means “swapping the values of given bits”

Toy example (matrix):

- Write by rows, read by columns
- Key: $K = (R, C)$ with $R * C \sim \text{len}(\text{msg})$

Many issues (it's a toy example!):

- Keyspace still relatively small

plaintext				
H	A	L	L	O
	E	V	E	R
Y	O	N	E	

ciphertext

Second ingredient: transposition

Transposition (or diffusion) means “swapping the values of given bits”

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Many issues (it's a toy example!):

- Keyspace still relatively small

But **repetitions** and **structure** gone

- We now really need to test all possible structures

plaintext				
H	A	L	L	O
	E	V	E	R
Y	O	N	E	

Perfectly secure cipher

Definition

- In a *perfect cipher*, for all $\text{ptx} \in \mathbf{P}$ and $\text{ctx} \in \mathbf{C}$,
 $\Pr(\text{ptx sent} = \text{ptx}) = \Pr(\text{ptx sent} = \text{ptx} \mid \text{ctx sent} = \text{ctx})$
- In other words: seeing a ciphertext $c \in \mathbf{C}$ gives us *no information* on what the plaintext corresponding to c could be

Question

- The definition is not constructive! Does a perfect cipher exist?
 - If yes, what does it look like?

Perfectly secure cipher

Theorem (Shannon 1949)

Any symmetric cipher $\langle \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{K}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbb{E}, \mathbb{D} \rangle$ with $|\mathbf{P}| = |\mathbf{K}| = |\mathbf{C}|$ is perfectly secure if and only if

- every key is used with probability $\frac{1}{|\mathbf{K}|}$
- a unique key maps a given plaintext into a given ciphertext:
$$\forall (\text{ptx}, \text{ctx}) \in \mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{C}, \exists! k \in \mathbf{K} \text{ s.t. } \mathbb{E}(\text{ptx}, k) = \text{ctx}$$

Perfectly secure cipher

Theorem (Shannon 1949)

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- every key is used with probability $\frac{1}{|\mathbf{K}|}$
- a unique key maps a given plaintext into a given ciphertext:
 $\forall (\text{ptx}, \text{ctx}) \in \mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{C}, \exists! k \in \mathbf{K} \text{ s.t. } \mathbb{E}(\text{ptx}, k) = \text{ctx}$


A simple working example

- Assume $\mathbf{P}, \mathbf{K}, \mathbf{C}$ to be set of binary strings. The encryption function draws a *uniformly random, fresh* key k out of \mathbf{K} each time it is called and computes
 $\text{ctx} = \text{ptx} \oplus k$

Anticausal implementations

A concrete apparatus

- Gilbert Vernam actually patented a telegraphic machine implementing $ptx \oplus k$ on Baudot code in 1919
- Joseph Mauborgne suggested the use of a random tape containing k
- Using Vernam's encrypting machine with Mauborgne's suggestion implements a perfect cipher



The One Time Pad: Perfect Cipher

- XOR of a message m and a random key k of the same size of m : $\text{len}(k) = \text{len}(m)$
 - The key is pre-shared and consumed while writing.
Can never be re-used again!
- The OTP is a **minimal perfect cipher**
 - Minimal because $|K| = |M|$

Plain text: THIS IS SECRET
OTP-Key : XVHE UW NOPGDZ

Ciphertext: Q C P W C O F S R X H S

In groups : QCPWC OFSRX HS

Key storage/management

- storing key material and changing keys is a nightmare
- perfect cipher broken in practice due to key theft/reuse
- generating random keys was also an issue (and caused breaks)



Photo courtesy of Cryptomuseum.com

Imperfections and Brute Force

- Real-world algorithms are not perfect ($|K| < |M|$), and so can be broken
 - each ciphertext-plaintext pair leaks a small amount of information (because the key is re-used)
- Only thing unknown is the key (Kerckhoffs)
 - Remember: the algorithm itself is known!
- Brute forcing is possible for any real world cipher
 - Try all possible keys, until **one** produces an output that “makes sense”.
- Perfect ciphers (one time pads) are not vulnerable to Brute Force
 - because trying all the (random) keys will yield all the (possible) plaintexts, which are all equally likely (= no clue)

Non Perfect Cipher Example

M = UGO (21 7 15)

K=+3

C = XJR (24 10 18)

Bruteforcing: k=-1-2-3.....-26 For each k, he/she shifts all letters...

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K=-2 ... M2 = VHP

K=-3 ... M3 = UGO

“Toy” Perfect Cipher Example

M = UGO (21 7 15)

K=+1+2+3

C = VIR (22 9 18)

Bruteforcing...For each letter try all k=-1-1-1,
-1-1-2,.....-26-26-26

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C = VIR (22 9 18)

Bruteforcing... For each letter try all k=-1-1-1,
-1-1-2,.....-26-26-26

M1=ADA

M2=XKR

M3=ELM

M4=UGO



Cryptanalysis: Breaking Ciphers

A real (non perfect) cryptosystem is **broken** if there is a way to break it that is **faster** than brute forcing.

Types of attacks:

- **Ciphertext attack**: analyst has only ciphertexts
- **Known plaintext attack**: analyst has a set of pairs plain-ciphertext
- **Chosen plaintext attack**: analyst can choose plaintexts and obtain their respective ciphertexts

Example: can you break this?

The Zip Example

Algorithm: $C = K \text{ xor } M$

- $K(\text{hex}) = \text{AA } \text{BB } \text{CC } \text{DD } \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots$ (repeat the key)
 - $M(\text{hex}) = \text{50 } \text{4B } \text{03 } \text{04 } \text{BA } \text{DA } \text{55 } \text{55 } \dots \dots \dots$ (and so on)

XOR

 - $C(\text{hex}) = \text{FA } \text{F0 } \text{CF } \text{D9 } \text{10 } \text{61 } \text{99 } \text{88 } \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots \dots$

PERFECT OR NOT ?

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NOT PERFECT -> $\text{len}(k) < \text{len}(M)$ -> k is reused

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- $C = K \text{ xor } M$
 - $K = M \text{ xor } C$
 - $K = \text{XXXX...} \text{ xor } FA\ F0\ CF\ D9\ ...$

```
michele@starkiller ~/Desktop
└─➤ xxd test.zip | head
00000000: 504b 0304 1400 0808 0800 bb74 3150 0000 PK.....t1P..
00000010: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 1400 0000 6974 .....it
00000020: 2d36 3931 3439 3678 3038 3931 3635 2e70 -691496x089165.p
00000030: 6466 cccb 6554 5ccb ba36 8abb bbbb 5be3 df..eT\..6...[.
00000040: eeee ee6e 8dbb bb6b 20b8 8510 9ce0 ee2e ...n...k .....
00000050: 0182 bb3b c125tb806 bb49 d65e 7baf 7dce ...;%...I.^{.}.
00000060: face ddf7 8cef c71d 73d4 acaa 77be 56d2 .....s...w.V.
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00000080: 9dc9 5938 0e12 6612 4753 1b12 387e 7e38 ..Y8..f.GS..8~~8
00000090: 80ba b713 9004 20e1 e526 a5e6 66e2 0684 ..... .&..f...
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 - KNOWN PLAINTEXT ATTACK

Computationally secure cryptography

A more practical assumption

- Build a cipher so that a successful attack is also able to solve a hard computational problem efficiently
 - Solve a generic nonlinear Boolean simultaneous equation set
 - Factor large integers / find discrete logarithms
 - Decode a random code/find shortest lattice vector

Can we avoid assumptions?

- Open question: prove an exponential lower bound for the time taken to solve a hard problem, which has efficiently verifiable solution
 - it would shift from a computational security assumption to a theorem
 - ... and prove $P \neq NP$ as a corollary

Factor Large Integers (hints)

If p and q are two *large primes*:

- computing $n = p * q$ is **easy**
- but given n it is painfully **slow** to get p and q
 - quadratic sieve field, basically “try all primes until you get to the smaller between p and q ”

Here “slow/difficult” means “computationally very intensive”, for all practical purposes the problem requires bruteforce over all possible values of x

Discrete logarithm (hints)

- If $y = a^x$ then $x = \log_a y$ (Math 101)
- given $x, a, p,$
 - it is **easy** to compute $y = a^x \bmod p,$
 - but knowing y , it is **difficult** to compute x

Different problem than factorization, but it can be shown that they are related

Outline of the method

- 
- ① Define the ideal attacker behaviour
 - ② Assume a given computational problem is hard
 - ③ Prove that any non ideal attacker solves the hard problem

How to represent attacker and properties?

- Attacker represented as a program able to call given libraries
- Libraries implement the cipher at hand
- Define the security property as answering to a given question
- The attacker wins the game if it breaks the security property more often than what is possible through a random guess

Cryptographically Safe Pseudorandom Number Generators



Motivation and assumption

- We want to use a finite-length key and a Vernam cipher
 - We somehow need to “expand” the key
- We assume that the attacker can only perform $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ computations

Definition

A CSPRNG is a deterministic function $\text{PRNG}: \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+I}$ whose output cannot be distinguished from an uniform random sampling of $\{0, 1\}^{\lambda+I}$ in $\mathcal{O}(\text{poly}(\lambda))$. I is the CSPRNG **stretch**.



Existence

- In practice, we have only candidate CSPRNGs
 - We have no **proof** that a function PRNG exists
 - Proving that a CSPRNG exists implies directly $P \neq NP$

Practical constructions

- Building a CSPRNG “from scratch” is possible, but it is not the way they are commonly built (not efficient)
- Practically built with another building block: PseudoRandom Permutations (PRPs)
 - defined starting from PseudoRandom Functions (PRFs)

Random Functions (RFs)

Randomly drawing a function

- Consider the set $\mathbf{F} = \{f : \{0, 1\}^{in} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{out}; in, out \in \mathbb{N}\}$
- A uniformly randomly sampled $f \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{F}$ can be encoded by a 2^{in} entries table, each entry out bit wide. $|\mathbf{F}| = (2^{out})^{2^{in}}$


Toy example $in = 2, out = 1$

- $\mathbf{F} = \{f : \{0, 1\}^2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^1\}$ is the set of the 16 Boolean functions w/ two inputs
- Each one is represented by a 4-entry truth table
- Intuitively, the functions are 16 as there are $2^4 = 16 = (2^1)^{2^2}$ tables

Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs)

Definition

- A function $\text{prf}_{\text{seed}} : \{0, 1\}^{\text{in}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{out}}$ taking an input and a λ bits seed.
- The entire prf_{seed} is described by the value of the seed
- It cannot be told apart from a random $f \in \{f : \{0, 1\}^{\text{in}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{out}}\}$ in $\text{poly}(\lambda)$
- That is, if they give you $a \in \{f : \{0, 1\}^{\text{in}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{out}}\}$, you can't tell which one of the following is true
 - $a = \text{prf}_{\text{seed}}(\cdot)$ with seed $\xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$
 - $b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbf{F}$, where $\mathbf{F} = \{f : \{0, 1\}^{\text{in}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{out}}\}$



Pseudorandom Permutations (PRPs)



Pseudorandom Permutation definition


- A **bijective** PRF: $prf_{seed} : \{0, 1\}^{len} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{len}$

Wrapping your mind around it

- It is uniquely identified by the value of the seed
- It is not possible to tell apart in $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ from a RF
- It's a permutation of all the possible $\{0, 1\}^{len}$ strings

Operatively speaking

- acts on a **block** of bits outputs another one of the same size
- the output “looks unrelated” to the input
- its action is fully identified by the seed
 - Useful to think of the seed as a key



The issue

- No formally proven PRP exists, yet
 - again, its existence would imply $P \neq NP$

Typical construction

- ① Compute a small bijective Boolean function f of input and key
- ② Compute f again between the previous output and the key
- ③ Repeat 2 until you're satisfied

In the real world...

Practical solution: public scrutiny

- Modern PRPs are the outcome of public contests
- Cryptanalytic techniques provide ways ($=\text{poly}(\lambda)$ tests) to detect biases in their outputs: good designs are immune

PRPs a.k.a. Block ciphers

- Concrete PRPs go by the historical name of **block ciphers**
- Considered broken if, with less than 2^λ operations, they can be told apart from a ~~PRP~~, e.g., via:
 - Deriving the input corresponding to an output without the key
 - Deriving the key identifying the PRP, or reducing the amount of plausible ones
 - Identifying non-uniformities in their outputs
- The key length λ is chosen to be large enough so that computing 2^λ guesses is not **practically feasible**

Keyspace and Brute Forcing

Keyspace generally measured in bits

- Attack time exponential on the number of bits (i.e., 33 bits need twice the time of 32)

Basic Solution ?




Keyspace and Brute Forcing

Keyspace generally measured in bits

- Attack time exponential on the number of bits (i.e., 33 bits need twice the time of 32)
- Need to balance computational power vs key length.

Keyspace vs. Time for Brute Forcing



Quantifying computational unfeasibility

Boolean operations vs. energy to bring from 20 °C → 100 °C

- 2^{65} op.s ≈ an Olympic swimming pool
- 2^{80} op.s ≈ the annual rainfall on the Netherlands
- 2^{114} op.s ≈ all water on Earth

Practically acceptable unfeasibility

- Legacy level security: at least 2^{80} Boolean operations
- 5 to 10 years security: at least 2^{128} Boolean operations
- Long term security: at least 2^{256} Boolean operations

Widespread block ciphers

C Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- 128 bit block, three key lengths: 128, 192 and 256 bits
- Selected after a 3 years public contest in 2000-10-2 by NIST out of 15 candidates, re-standardized by ISO/IEC
- ARMv8 and AMD64 include dedicated instructions accelerating its computation (hitting 3+ GB/s)

D Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA, a.k.a. DES)

- Legacy standard by NIST (1977), the key is too short (56b)
- Patch via triple encryption, $\lambda = 112$ equivalent security
- Still found in some legacy systems, officially deprecated

Case Study: DES

Originally designed by IBM (1973-1974)

Its core function is an S-box (a key-dependent substitution)

It uses a 56 bit key (2^{56} keyspace)

Case Study: DES vs. NSA


In 1976 it becomes a US standard; its S-boxes are "redesigned" by the NSA

- **Late 1980s:** *differential cryptanalysis* discovered
- **1993:** shown that the original S-boxes would have made DES vulnerable to the differential cryptanalysis, whereas the NSA-designed S-boxes were specifically immune to that.
- **Wait!** Wasn't differential cryptanalysis unknown until late 1980s? *Mmmmmmmaybe* the NSA knew about differential crypto in the 70s.

An Electronic CodeBook (ECB)

A first attempt to encryption with PRPs


- It's ok to encrypt a plaintext \leq block size with a block cipher



An Electronic CodeBook (ECB)

A first attempt to encryption with PRPs


- It's ok to encrypt a plaintext \leq block size with a block cipher
- An extension to multiple blocks could be split-and-encrypt
 - Is it good (equivalent to Vernam fed with a CSPRNG)?



Counter (CTR) mode

Getting it right

- The boxed construction is provably a PRNG if Enc is a PRP
- There is nothing special in the starting point of the counters





Confidentiality achieved ... for CoA

- Up to now, the attacker knew only ciphertext material

Confidentiality against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPAs)

- Our attacker knows a set of plaintexts which can be encrypted
- He wants to understand **which** one is being encrypted
- Ideal attacker: cannot tell which plaintext was encrypted out of two *he chose* (having the same length)
- Feels strange, but it happens with:
 - management data packets in network protocols (e.g., ICMP)
 - telling apart encrypted commands to a remote host

No deterministic encryption

- The CTR mode of operation is insecure against CPA
 - The encryption is deterministic: same ptxs → same ctx

Decryptable nondeterministic encryption



- ① Rekeying: change the key for each block with a ratchet
- ② ~~Randomize the encryption: add (removable) randomness to the encryption
(change mode of employing PRP)~~
- ③ Numbers used **ONCE** (NONCEs): in the CTR case, pick a NONCE as the counter starting point. NONCE is public



Symmetric ratcheting

Getting it right


- The construction takes the name from the mechanical component: it is not possible to roll-back the procedure once you delete the value carried by green arrows




CPA-Secure Counter (CTR) mode

Getting it right

- Picking the counter start as a NONCE generates different bitstreams to be xor-ed with the ptx each time
- The same plaintext encrypted twice is turned into two different, random-looking, ciphertexts



A good point to remember...



Malleability and active attackers

Malleability

- Making changes to the ciphertext (not knowing the key) maps to predictable changes in the plaintext
 - Think about AES-CTR and AES-ECB
- Can be creatively abused to build decryption attacks
- Can be turned into a feature (homomorphic encryption)

How to avoid malleability

- Design an intrinsically non malleable scheme (non trivial)
- Add a mechanism ensuring data integrity (against attackers)

Providing data integrity

Confidentiality $\not\Rightarrow$ Integrity

- Up to now our encryption schemes provide confidentiality
- Changes in the ciphertext are undetected (at best)


Message Authentication Codes (MAC)

- Add a small piece of information (tag) allowing us to test for the message **integrity** of the encrypted message itself
 - Adding it to the plaintext and then encrypting is not good
- Nomenclature misleads: MACs do not provide data authentication

Definition

- A MAC is constituted by a pair of functions:
 - COMPUTE_TAG(string,key): returns the tag for the input string
 - VERIFY_TAG(string,tag,key): returns true or false
- Ideal attacker model:
 - knows as many message-tag pairs as he wants
 - cannot forge a valid tag for a message for which he does not know it already
 - forgery also includes tag splicing from valid messages
- N.B. the tag creating entity and the verifying entity must both know the same secret key
 - The tag verifier is able to create a valid tag too
 - ... and there goes the non-repudiation property

How to build a MAC? the CBC-MAC



Building a MAC with a PRP (block cipher)

- The CBC-MAC is secure for prefix free messages (why?)
- Encrypting the tag once more fixes (provably) the issue

Browser cookies

- HTTP cookies are a “note to self” for the HTTP server^a
- The note should not be tampered between server reads
- Solution: server runs $\text{COMPUTE_TAG(cookie, } k)$ and stores both the (cookie,tag)

^aYou can find a two slides cookies refresher at slides 40-41 of
https://polimi365-my.sharepoint.com/:b/r/personal/10032133_polimi_it/Documents/FCI/2-Livello_Applicativo_v2020.pdf

Later in the course

- Mitigating SYN-based denial of service attacks (SYN Cookies)
- Time-based two-factor authentication mechanisms (TOTP/HOTP)

Testing integrity


- Testing the integrity of a file requires us to compare it bit by bit with an intact copy or read it entirely to compute a MAC
- It would be **fantastic** to test only short, fixed length strings independently from the file size, representing the file itself
 - Major roadblock: there is a lower bound to the number of bits to encode a given content without information loss
- Can we build something close to the ideal scenario?



What is a Hash Function

A function $H()$ that maps arbitrary-length input x on fixed-length output, h (*digest*)

- Need to be **Fast**



What is a Hash Function

A function $H()$ that maps arbitrary-length input x on fixed-length output, h

- Need to be **Fast**
- **Collisions:** codomain “smaller” than domain.

Computationally infeasible to find:

- input x such that $H(x) = h$ (given a specific hash)
 - **preimage attack resistance**
- input y s.t. $y \neq x$ and $H(y) = H(x)$, with a given x
 - **second preimage attack resistance**
- couples of inputs $\{x, y\}$ s.t. $H(x) = H(y)$
 - **collision resistance**

Attacks to Hash Functions (1)

Hash functions may be *broken*.

1. Arbitrary collision or (1st or 2nd) preimage attack:

Given a specific hash h , the attacker can find

x such that $H(x) = h$

or, equivalently, given a specific input x can find

y such that $y \neq x$ and $H(y) = H(x)$

faster than brute forcing.

With a n -sized hash function, *random collisions* can happen in (2^{n-1}) cases.

Attacks to Hash Functions (2)

2. Simplified collision attack:

The attacker can generate colliding couples

$$\{x, y\} \text{ s.t. } H(x) = H(y)$$

faster than brute forcing.

Random collisions can happen in $(2^{n/2})$ cases because of the birthday paradox:

- given n randomly chosen people, some pairs will have same birthday
 - probability = 100% if $n = 367$
 - probability = 99.9% if $n = 70$ people
 - probability = 50% if $n = 23$ people, and so on...
- vs. very low chances that some of you are born on a specific date

A pseudo-unique labeling function

- A cryptographic hash is a function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ for which the following problems are computationally hard
 - ① given $d = H(s)$ find s (1st preimage)
 - ② given $s, d = H(s)$ find $r \neq s$ with $H(r) = d$ (2nd preimage)
 - ③ find $r, s; r \neq s$, with $H(s) = H(r)$ (collision)
- Ideal behaviour of a concrete cryptographic hash:
 - ① finding 1st preimage takes $\mathcal{O}(2^d)$ hash computations guessing s
 - ② finding 2nd preimage takes $\mathcal{O}(2^d)$ hash comp.s guessing r
 - ③ finding a collision takes $\approx \mathcal{O}(2^{\frac{d}{2}})$ hash computations
- The output bitstring of a hash is known as a **digest**

Concrete hash functions

What to use

- SHA-2 was privately designed (NSA), $d \in \{256, 384, 512\}$
- SHA-3 followed a public design contest (similar to AES), selected among ≈ 60 candidates, $d \in \{256, 384, 512\}$
- Both currently unbroken and widely standardized (NIST, ISO)

What not to use

- SHA-1: $d = 160$, collision-broken [6] (obtainable in $\approx 2^{61}$ op.s)
- MD-5: horribly broken [7]. Collisions in 2^{11} , public tools online [5]
 - In particular, collisions with arbitrary input prefixes in $\approx 2^{40}$

Uses for hash functions

Pseudonymized match

- Store/compare hashes instead of values (e.g., Signal contact discovery)

MACs

- Building MACs: generate tag hashing together the message and a secret string, verify tag recomputing the same hash
- A field-proven way of combining message and secret is HMAC
 - Standardized (RFC 2104, NIST FIPS 198)
 - Uses a generic hash function as a plug-in, combination denoted as HMAC-hash_name
 - HMAC-SHA1 (!), HMAC-SHA2 and HMAC-SHA3 are ok

Forensic use

- Write down only the hash of the disk image you obtained in official documents

Game changing ideas

Features we would like to have

- Agreeing on a short secret over a public channel
- Confidentially sending a message over a public authenticated channel without sharing a secret with the recipient
- Actual data authentication

Solution: asymmetric cryptosystems

- Before 1976: rely on human carriers / physical signatures
- DH key agreement (1976) / Public key encryption (1977)
- Digital signatures (1977)

Asymmetric Cryptosystems

Confidentiality (plus something more)

The Diffie-Hellman key agreement

Goal

- Make two parties share secret value w/ only public messages

Attacker model

- Can eavesdrop anything, but not tamper
- The Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption should hold

CDH Assumption

- Let $(\mathbf{G}, \cdot) \equiv \langle g \rangle$ be a finite cyclic group, and two numbers a, b sampled unif. from $\{0, \dots, |\mathbf{G}| - 1\}$ ($\lambda = \text{len}(a) \approx \log_2 |\mathbf{G}|$)
- given g^a, g^b finding g^{ab} costs more than $\text{poly}(\log |\mathbf{G}|)$
- Best current attack approach: find either b or a (discrete log problem)

Key agreement between Alice and Bob

- Alice: picks $a \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \dots, |\mathbf{G}| - 1\}$, sends g^a to Bob
- Bob: picks $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \dots, |\mathbf{G}| - 1\}$, sends g^b to Alice
- Alice: gets g^b from Bob and computes $(g^b)^a$
- Bob: gets g^a from Alice and computes $(g^a)^b$
- (\mathbf{G}, \cdot) is commutative $\rightarrow (g^b)^a = (g^a)^b$, we're done!

Groups used in practice

- A subgroup (\mathbf{G}, \cdot) of (\mathbb{Z}_n^*, \cdot) (integers mod n), breaking CDH takes
$$\min \left(\mathcal{O} \left(e^{k(\log(n))^{\frac{1}{3}} (\log(\log(n)))^{\frac{2}{3}}} \right), \mathcal{O}(2^{\frac{\lambda}{2}}) \right)$$
- EC points w/ dedicated addition, breaking CDH takes $\mathcal{O}(2^{\frac{\lambda}{2}})$

Example: Diffie-Hellman Agreement

- Used by Alice and Bob to agree on a **secret** over an **insecure channel**
 - two people talk in the middle of the classroom, everybody hears them, but at the end only those two people know a secret, and nobody else
- One-way trapdoor/hard problem: **discrete logarithm**
 - If $y = a^x$ then $x = \log_a y$ (Math 101)
 - given x, a, p , it is easy to compute $y = a^x \bmod p$, but knowing y , it is difficult to compute x
 - Here “difficult” means “*computationally very intensive*”, for all practical purposes the problem requires bruteforce over all possible values of x

How does D-H work (1) - Example

Pick p prime, a primitive root of p , public

Primitive root: a number a such that raising it to any number between 1 and $(p - 1)$, mod p , we obtain each number between 1 and $(p - 1)$

- Example: 3 is a primitive root of 7 because
 - $3^1 \text{ mod } 7 = 3$
 - $3^2 \text{ mod } 7 = 2$
 - $3^3 \text{ mod } 7 = 6$
 - $3^4 \text{ mod } 7 = 4$
 - $3^5 \text{ mod } 7 = 5$
 - $3^6 \text{ mod } 7 = 1$

So let $a = 3$, $p = 7$ known to everyone in the system

How does D-H work (2) - Keys

Secret number (undisclosed): They pick a number X in $[1, 2, \dots, (p-1)]$

Alice X_A
Bob X_B


$$X_A = 3$$
$$X_B = 1$$

Public number (disclosed to everyone): They compute:


Alice $Y_A = a^{X_A} \bmod p$
Bob $Y_B = a^{X_B} \bmod p$

$$Y_A = 3^3 \bmod 7 = 6$$
$$Y_B = 3^1 \bmod 7 = 3$$

How does D-H work (3)



How does D-H work (3)



How does D-H work (4) - Secret

At this point, they can compute a **secret K**

- Since $\frac{Y_A^{X_B} \text{ mod } p}{(a^{X_B})^{X_A} \text{ mod } p} = (a^{X_A} \text{ mod } p)^{X_B} \text{ mod } p = (a^{X_A})^{X_B} \text{ mod } p = Y_B^{X_A} \text{ mod } p$
- Alice $K_A = Y_B^{X_A} \text{ mod } p = 3^3 \text{ mod } 7 = 6$
- Bob $K_B = Y_A^{X_B} \text{ mod } p = 6^1 \text{ mod } 7 = 6$


Anybody else can listen, but cannot compute K

- Because they miss the secret.


Public key encryption

- **Concept:** a cipher that uses two keys
 - What is encrypted with **key1** can be decrypted only with **key2** (and not with key1 itself), and viceversa.
- Also called “*public key cryptography*”
 - **Idea:** one of the two keys is kept **private** by the subject, and the other can be **publicly** disclosed.
- It solves the problem of **key exchange**
- We will not describe their maths in depth
 - They use a **one-way function with a trapdoor**
 - The private key "cannot" be retrieved from the public key
 - It should be easy to compute the public from the private
 - They are usually **computational-intensive**


Public key encryption: Key Exchange



Public key encryption: Key Exchange




Public key encryption: Confidentiality




Exercise: what is this instead?

Trust assumption:
only Alice knows her private key

Everybody knows Alice's public key



Public Key Encryption



Components

- *Different keys* are employed in encryption/decryption
- It is computationally hard to:
 - Decrypt a ciphertext without the *private key*
 - Compute the *private key* given only the *public key*

Widespread Asymmetric encryption ciphers

Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA), 1977

- 2048 to 4096 bit message-and key-sizes
- Patented after the invention, patent now expired
- No ciphertext expansion
- Incidentally, the encryption with a fixed key is a PRP

Elgamal encryption scheme, 1985

- Either kbit range keys, or 100's of bits keys, depending on the variant
- Not encumbered by patents
- The ciphertext is **twice** the size of the plaintext
- Widely used as an RSA alternative where patents were a concern

The RSA Algorithm (hints) - 1

Hard problem: **factorization**

If p and q are two **large primes**:

- computing $n = p * q$ is **easy**
- but given n it is painfully **slow** to get p and q
- quadratic sieve field, basically “try all primes until you get to the smaller between p and q ”
- Different problem than mod-log (D-H), but it can be shown that they are related

The RSA Algorithm (hints) - 2

- Factoring n is exponential in the number of bits of n
- Computation time for encryption grows linearly in the number of bits of n
 - square-and-multiply algorithm in hardware
- At the moment of writing:
 - 512-bit RSA factored within 4 hours on EC2 for < \$100: <http://seclab.upenn.edu/projects/faas/faas.pdf>
 - No demonstration of practical factoring of anything larger than 700 bits
 - key sizes > 1024 are safe
 - 2048 or 4096 typical choices

Computational hardness

- Up to now, enumeration of the secret parameter was the best possible attack
- This is ok for modern block ciphers → best attack: $\mathcal{O}(2^\lambda)$
- Asymmetric cryptosystems rely on hard problems for which bruteforcing the secret parameter is **not** the best attack
 - Factoring a λ bit number takes $\mathcal{O}\left(e^{k(\lambda)^{\frac{1}{3}}(\log(\lambda))^{\frac{2}{3}}}\right)$
- Comparing bit-sizes of the security parameters instead of actual complexities is **really** wrong
- Concrete bit-sizes for λ depending on the cipher: www.keylength.org

Key Lengths: caveat

- Key length measured in bits both in **symmetric** and **asymmetric** algorithms
- However, they measure different things
 - Symmetric: number of **decryption attempts**
 - Asymmetric: number of **key-breaking attempts**
- Therefore:
 - You can compare symmetric algorithms based on the key (e.g., CAST-128 bit “weaker” than AES-256)
 - You cannot directly compare asymmetric algorithms based on key length.
 - More importantly, **never compare directly** asymmetric vs. symmetric key lengths!
 - <https://www.keylength.com/en/4/>



Assumption

- A public channel between Alice and Bob is available
- For the moment, the attacker model is “eavesdrop only”

Sharing a secret without agreement

- Alice: generates a keypair (k_{pri}, k_{pub}) , sends to Bob
- Bob: gets $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, encrypts it with k_{pub} , sends ctx to Alice
- Alice: decrypts ctx with k_{pri} , recovers s
- Note: Bob alone decides the value of the shared secret s
 - Repeat the procedure with swapped roles and combine the two secrets to achieve similar guarantees to a key agreement




Can't I skip a step?

- Employing an asymmetric cryptosystem Bob encrypts a text for Alice without the need of sharing a secret beforehand
- In principle, Bob and Alice could employ *only* an asymmetric cryptosystem to communicate

Can't I skip a step?

- Employing an asymmetric cryptosystem Bob encrypts a text for Alice without the need of sharing a secret beforehand
- In principle, Bob and Alice could employ *only* an asymmetric cryptosystem to communicate
- In practice this approach would be extremely inefficient
 - Asymmetric cryptosystems are from $10\times$ to $1000\times$ slower than their symmetric counterparts

Best of both worlds



Hybrid encryption schemes

- Asymmetric schemes to provide key transport/agreement
- Symmetric schemes to encrypt the bulk of the data
- All modern secure transport protocols built around this idea

Authenticating data


Motivations

- To build a secure hybrid encryption scheme we need to be sure that the public key the sender uses is the one of the recipient
- We'd like to be able to verify the authenticity of a piece of data without a pre-shared secret

Digital signatures

- Provide strong evidence that data is bound to a specific user
- No shared secret is needed to check (validate) the signature
- Proper signatures cannot be repudiated by the user
- They are **asymmetric** cryptographic algorithms
 - formally proven that you cannot get non repudiation otherwise

Digital signatures



Computationally hard problems


- Sign a message without the **signature key**
 - this includes splicing signatures from other messages
- Compute the **signature key** given only the **verification key**
- Derive the **signature key** from signed messages

Message Authentication

Trust assumption:

only Alice knows her private key

Everybody knows Alice's public key




Digital signature: Authentication and Integrity

Trust assumption:

only Alice knows her private key

Everybody knows Alice's public key



Widespread Signature schemes

Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA), 1977

- Unique case: the same hard-to-invert function to build an asymmetric encryption scheme and a signature (different message processing!)
- Signing definitely slower than verification ($\approx 300\times$)
- Standardized in NIST DSS (FIPS-184-4)

Digital Signature Standard (DSA)

- Derived from tweaking signature schemes by Schnorr and Elgamal
- Also standardized in NIST DSS (FIPS-184-4)
- Signature and verification take roughly the same time

Digital signature uses

Authenticating digital documents

- For performance reasons, sign the hash of the document instead of the document
 - Signature properties now guaranteed only if both signature and hash algorithms are not broken

Authenticating users

- Alternative to password-based login to a system
 - The server has the user's public verification key (e.g. deposited at account creation)
 - The server asks the client to sign a long randomly generated bitstring (challenge)
 - If the client returns a correctly signed challenge, it has proven its identity to the server



Cautionary note

- Both in asymmetric encryption and digital signatures, the public key must be bound to the correct user identity
- If public keys are not authentic:
 - A MITM attack is possible on asymmetric encryption
 - Anyone can produce a signature on behalf of anyone else
- The public key authenticity is guaranteed with... another signature
 - We need someone to sign the public-key/identity pair
 - We need a format to distribute signed pairs

A case of identity

- A digital signature ensures that plaintext was authored by someone.

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- Ditto for using public key for encryption!

A case of identity

- A digital signature ensures that plaintext was authored by someone.
- **Not really!** It ensures it was encrypted with a certain key...it says nothing about “who” is using that private key
- Ditto for using public key for encryption!
- Exchange of public keys **must be secured** (either out of band, or otherwise)
- PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) associates keys with identity on a wide scale

PKI


- A PKI uses a trusted third party called a **certification authority (CA)**
- The CA **digitally signs** files called **digital certificates**, which bind an identity to a public key
 - Identity = “Distinguished Name (DN)”
 - As defined in the X.509 standard (most used one)
- Now we can recognize a number of subjects...




Digital certificates

- They bind a public key to a given identity, which is:
 - for humans: an ASCII string
 - for machines: either the CNAME or IP address
- They specify the intended use for the public key contained
 - Avoids ambiguities when a key format is ok for both an encryption and a signature algorithm
- They contain a time interval in which they are valid
- Most widely deployed format is described in ITU X.509


Bob's Digital Certificate (1)




Bob's Digital Certificate (2)



Retrieving Bob's Certificate




Zoom in: Is the public key valid?




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 - As defined in the X.509 standard (most used one)
- Now we can recognize a number of subjects...provided that we can obtain the **public key** of the CA


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
Zoom in: Is the public key valid?



Zoom in: Is the public key valid?



Zoom in: Is the public key valid?



The Certificate Chain

"Quis custodiet custodes?"

The CA needs a *private key* to sign a certificate

- The *public key*...must be in a certificate.


Someone else needs to sign **that** certificate

- And so on...at some point this needs to stop!

Certification authorities

Who signs the certificates

- The certificate signer is a trusted third party, the CA
- The CA public key is authenticated... with another certificate
- Up to a self-signed certificate which has to be trusted a priori




We Need a Trusted Element: Root of trust

Top-level CA (root CA, source CA)

Uses a self-signed certificate

- cannot be verified: it's a **trusted element**
- Basically a document that says “I am myself”

Certification authorities hierarchy



How to distribute the trusted element?

An **authority** releases it

- the state
- a regulator
- the organization management

CA already (de facto standard)

Keychain Access

Click to unlock the System Roots keychain.

Keychains

- login
- PrivateEncryptedData
- PrivateEncryptedData
- Local Items
- System
- System Roots**

VeriSign Universal Root Certification Authority
Root certificate authority
Expires: Wednesday 2 December 2037 00 h 59 min 59 s Central European Standard Time
This certificate is valid


Name	Kind	Expires	Keychain
XRamp Global Certification Authority	certificate	01 Jan 2035 06:37:19	System Roots
WellsSecure...ertificate Authority	certificate	14 Dec 2022 01:07:54	System Roots
VRK Gov. Root CA	certificate	18 Dec 2023 14:51:08	System Roots
Visa Informa...Delivery Root CA	certificate	29 Jun 2025 19:42:42	System Roots
Visa eCommerce Root	certificate	24 Jun 2022 02:16:12	System Roots
VeriSign Universal Certification Authority	certificate	02 Dec 2037 00:59:59	System Roots
VeriSign Class...on Authority - G3	certificate	17 Jul 2036 01:59:59	System Roots
VeriSign Class...on Authority - G5	certificate	17 Jul 2036 01:59:59	System Roots
VeriSign Class...on Authority - G4	certificate	19 Jan 2038 00:59:59	System Roots
VeriSign Class...on Authority - G3	certificate	17 Jul 2036 01:59:59	System Roots
VeriSign Class...on Authority - G3	certificate	17 Jul 2036 01:59:59	System Roots
VeriSign Class...on Authority - G3	certificate	17 Jul 2036 01:59:59	System Roots
VAS Latvijas Pasts SSI(RCA)	certificate	13 Sep 2024 11:27:57	System Roots
UTN-USERFirst-Object	certificate	09 Jul 2019 20:40:36	System Roots
UTN-USERFir...work Applications	certificate	09 Jul 2019 20:57:49	System Roots
UTN-USERFirst-Hardware	certificate	09 Jul 2019 20:19:22	System Roots
UTN-USERFir...cation and Email	certificate	09 Jul 2019 19:36:58	System Roots
UTN - DATACorp SGC	certificate	24 Jun 2019 21:06:30	System Roots
UCA Root	certificate	31 Dec 2029 01:00:00	System Roots
UCA Global Root	certificate	31 Dec 2037 01:00:00	System Roots
TWCA Root C...fication Authority	certificate	31 Dec 2030 16:59:59	System Roots
TWCA Global Root CA	certificate	31 Dec 2030 16:59:59	System Roots
TÜRKTRUST...Hizmet Sağlayıcısı	certificate	22 Mar 2015 11:27:17	System Roots
TÜRKTRUST...Hizmet Sağlayıcısı	certificate	16 Sep 2015 12:07:57	System Roots
TÜRKTRUST...Hizmet Sağlayıcısı	certificate	22 Dec 2017 19:37:19	System Roots
TÜRKTRUST...Hizmet Sağlayıcısı	certificate	21 Aug 2017 12:27:07	System Roots

222 items

+ i Copy

Do you trust your operating system? Do you trust the list of root certificates that ship with it?

A recent browser certificate storage



How to distribute the trusted element?

An **authority** releases it


- the state
- a regulator
- the organization management

CA already (de facto standard)

Decentralizing trust (e.g., PGP web-of-trust)



Decentralizing Trust: Web of Trust



Certificate Revocation Issues

- Signatures cannot be revoked (destroyed).
- **Certificates** need to be revoked at times.
- Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)

Verification Sequence for Certificates

1. Does the **signature** validate the document?
 - Hash verification as we have seen
2. Is the **public key** the one on the certificate?
3. Is the certificate the one of the **subject**?
 - Problems with omonymous subjects, DN
4. Is the **certificate** validated by the CA?
 - Validate the entire certification chain, up to the root
5. Is the **root** certificate trusted?
 - Need to be already in possession of the root cert
6. Is the certificate in a **CRL**?
 - How do we get to the CRL if we are not **online**?

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 - How do we get to the CRL if we are not **online**?

Any missing check = vulnerability!

Case study: Italian “legal” digital signatures framework

Introduced in Italy with D.P.R. 513/97

- many modifications, in particular when implementing EU regulations

Original Italian scheme: a list of “screened” CAs

Result: each CA created their own **digital signature application** (i.e., trusted element)

Attacking Digital Signature Applications

Digital signature stronger than handwritten signature

- **Written** documents can be modified, written signatures can be copied.
- **Digital** signature value **tied to content**, and cannot be forged unless the algorithm is broken
- However, a digital signature is **brittle**: if a fake is forged, it cannot be told from real one

Crypto: *OK* – Software Design: *KO*

Italian signature standards use **strong, unbroken cryptographic algorithms!**

However, vulnerabilities did emerge

Do you remember the “bank vault door in a tent”?

Bug 1: Fields of pain

- Bug notified on 9/9/2002
- The software of several CAs (originally DiKe by Infocamere was the subject of scrutiny) allowed users to sign Word documents with **dynamic fields** or **macros** without notice
- A macro does not change the bit sequence of the document, so the **signature does not change** with the visualized content
- Examples and stuff on Prof. Zanero's home:
<http://home.deib.polimi.it/zanero/bug-firma.html>
(Italian only, sorry for that!)

Example

provaDiKe.doc - Microsoft Word

File Edit View Insert Format Tools Table Window Help

Normal Arial 11 B I U

Questo è un documento di prova scritto con MS Word 2000.
Nelle righe seguenti sono inseriti campi variabili tra asterischi:

Data e ora *17/09/2002 08.48.53*
I dati inseriti sono 17/09/2002 08.48.53

Data e ora *17/09/2002 08.48.53* (Questa non dovrebbe modificarsi)
I dati inseriti sono 17/09/2002 08.48.53

Nome del documento *provaDiKe.doc*
Data inserito provaDiKe.doc

Nome autore *Manlio Cammarata*
Data inserito Manlio Cammarata

Nome utente *Manlio Cammarata*
Data inserito Manlio Cammarata

Ora il file sarà firmato digitalmente con DiKe e dovremo controllare se la verifica va a buon fine anche dopo l'aggiornamento dei campi.

Page 1 Sec 1 1/1 At 2.5cm Ln 1 Col 1 REC TRK EXT OVR Italian (Italy)

DiKe

File Modifica Strumenti Opzioni Guida

Nr. Firmatari: 1
Firmatario: 1 CAMMARATA MANLIO; Cod. Fiscale: CMMMNLL47P04L424H; Identificativo: 2001111111812
Stato: IT; Organizzazione: Non Dichiарато; Unità Organizzativa: RA=INFOCAMERE S.C.p.A.
verifica completata correttamente

Documento: d:\test\provaDiKe18.doc.p7m Dimensioni: 21944 Data: 18/09/2002 14.20.44

Questo è un documento di prova scritto con MS Word 2000.
Nelle righe seguenti sono inseriti campi variabili tra asterischi:

Data e ora *18/09/2002 14.28.15*
I dati inseriti sono 17/09/2002 08.48.53

Data e ora *17/09/2002 08.48.53* (Questa non dovrebbe modificarsi)
I dati inseriti sono 17/09/2002 08.48.53

Nome del documento *provaDiKe.doc*
Data inserito provaDiKe.doc

Nome autore *Manlio Cammarata*
Data inserito Manlio Cammarata

Nome utente *Manlio Cammarata*
Data inserito Manlio Cammarata

Ora il file sarà firmato digitalmente con DiKe e dovremo controllare se la verifica va a buon fine anche dopo l'aggiornamento dei campi.

Reactions

- The CAs responded that this was “*intended behavior*” and that it did not violate the law
- However:
 - Microsoft, on 30/1/03, released an Office patch to allow **disabling macros** via API.
 - Nowadays, all software show a big alert when signing an Office document.
 - New legislation explicitly excludes modifiable and scriptable formats (but recommends PDF)
- The issue is actually much deeper
 - Decoders of complex formats should also be validated
 - Research field of “what you see is what you sign”

Horror story 1 overview

The importance of being static

- 2002-09-09: several pieces of software performing digital signatures with legal value in Italy allowed to sign MS Word documents *containing macros*
 - Macros allow to dynamically change the displayed text in a document according to, e.g., the current date
- Striking mismatch between what was thought to be signed (the visualized document) and the actual signed object (a program-document blend)
- Current standard for digital signatures on human-intended documents (PAdES,CAdES) target PDF and XML formats
 - n.b.: PDFs may embed Javascript, PDF/A do not

Bug 2: Firma&Cifra


- Firma&Cifra was the digital signature application by PostECom
- Bug found by anonymous on 20/03/2003:
<http://www.interlex.it/docdigit/sikur159.htm>
- **Result: creation and verification of a signature with a fake certificate**
- Also in this case: no cryptographic algorithm was broken to perform the show

Vulnerability Description


- In order to verify a signature, we need **author certificate** and the **certificate chain**
 - **Theoretically**, all available **online**
 - To allow **offline verification**, everything included with the document, in a PKCS#7 envelope
- Verification of root certificates must use preinstalled ones
 - Most **software** comes with them
 - The **root certificate storage** is a critical point!
- Firma&Cifra trusts the **root certificate** in the **PKCS#7 envelope**, and it even imports it in the secure storage area.

The Exploit: Arséne Lupin signature


1. Generate a **fake *root* certificate** with the same name as a real one (e.g., PostECom itself)
2. Use this to generate a **fake *user* certificate** (in our example Arsène Lupin)
3. Use **Arsène Lupin's certificate** to sign theft and burglary confessions.
4. Include the fake root cert to the PKCS#7 envelope.



Les jeux sont faits: Lupin's Certificate



The Exploit: Arséne Lupin signature




Best comment by Postecom: this is "*by design*"
(yep: wrong design, but still design!)

Horror story 2 overview

Trust with care

- 2003-02-20: Firma&Cifra was the digital signature application by PostECom
- When presented with any certificate bundled with a signed document, it considered the certificate authentic and added it to its trusted storage
- Signature forgery as easy as: 1) create your own CA certificate, 2) sign your target-user certificate, 3) sign the document
- Take away point: which certificates reside in your (applications') trusted storage determine **who you trust**

Putting it all together



This way of communicating is the mainstay of modern secure comm. protocols
(TLS, OpenVPN, IPSec)

Directions in modern cryptography

Issues to solve, features to realize

- What if we have a quantum computer?

- Some computationally hard problems are no longer hard
- Move away from cryptosystems based on factoring/dlog
- Alternatives available and being standardized (2022-04)



- What if we want to compute on encrypted data?

- Yes, but it's moderately-to-horribly inefficient

- What if the attacker has physical access to the device computing the cipher (or some way of remotely measure it)

- Take into account **side channel** information in the attacker model




What is Shannon's information theory?

- Shannon's [3] way to mathematically frame communication
- A way to quantify information

What do we need this for (in this course)?

- Quantitatively frame “luck” and “guessing”

Basic Definitions



Basics

- A communication takes place between two **endpoints**
 - sender: made of an information source and an encoder
 - receiver: made of an information destination and a decoder
- Information is carried by a channel in the form of a sequence of **symbols** of a finite alphabet

Transmitting and receiving

Losing uncertainty = Acquiring information

- The receiver gets information only through the channel
 - it will be **uncertain** on what the next symbol is, until the symbol arrives
 - thus we model the sender as a **random variable**
- Acquiring information is modeled as getting to know an outcome of a random variable \mathcal{X}
 - the amount of information depends on the distribution of \mathcal{X}
 - intuitively: the closer is \mathcal{X} to a uniform distribution, the higher the amount of information I get from knowing an outcome
- Encoding maps each outcome as a finite sequence of symbols
 - More symbols should be needed when more information is sent



Measuring uncertainty: Entropy




Desirable properties

- Non negative measure of uncertainty
- “combining uncertainties” should map to adding entropies

Definition

- Let \mathcal{X} be a discrete r.v. with n outcomes in $\{x_0, \dots, x_{n-1}\}$ with $\Pr(\mathcal{X} = x_i) = p_i$ for all $0 \leq i \leq n$
- The entropy of \mathcal{X} is $H(\mathcal{X}) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} -p_i \log_b(p_i)$
- The measurement unit of entropy depends on the base b of the logarithm: typical case for $b = 2$ is bits

Examples



<https://xkcd.com/1210/>

\mathcal{X} : Uniformly random 6 letters word

- \mathcal{X} is a sequence of 6 unif. random letters ($6^{26} \approx 3.1 \cdot 10^7$)
 - $H(\mathcal{X}) \approx \sum_{i=0}^{3.1 \cdot 10^7} -\frac{1}{3.1 \cdot 10^7} \log_b \left(\frac{1}{3.1 \cdot 10^7} \right) \approx 28.2b$
- \mathcal{X} is a uniform pick from 6-letters English words
 - $H(\mathcal{X}) \approx \sum_{i=0}^{6300} -\frac{1}{6300} \log_b \left(\frac{1}{6300} \right) \approx 12.6b$

Shannon's noiseless coding theorem



Statement (informal)

It is possible to encode the outcomes n of i.i.d. random variables, each one with entropy $H(\mathcal{X})$, into no less than $nH(\mathcal{X})$ bits per outcome. If $< nH(\mathcal{X})$ bits are used, some information will be lost.

Consequences

- Arbitrarily compression of bitstrings is impossible without loss
 - Cryptographic hashes must discard some information
- Guessing a piece of information (= one outcome of \mathcal{X}) is at least as hard as guessing a $H(\mathcal{X})$ bit long bitstring
 - overlooking for a moment the effort of decoding the guess





A practical mismatch

- It is possible to have distributions with the same entropies

Plucking low-hanging fruits

- We define the **min-entropy** of \mathcal{X} as $H_{\infty}(\mathcal{X}) = -\log(\max_i p_i)$
- Intuitively: it's the entropy of a r.v. with uniform distribution, where the probability of each outcome is $(\max_i p_i)$
- Guessing the most common outcome of \mathcal{X} is at least as hard as guessing a $H_{\infty}(\mathcal{X})$ bit long bitstring

Example

A very biased r.v.

Consider \mathcal{X} :
$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{X} = 0^{128} & \text{with } \Pr \frac{1}{2} \\ \mathcal{X} = a, a \in 1\{0, 1\}^{127} & \text{with } \Pr \frac{1}{2^{128}} \end{cases}$$

Intuition and quantification

- Predicting an outcome shouldn't be too hard: just say 0^{128}
- $H(\mathcal{X}) = \frac{1}{2}(-\log_2(\frac{1}{2})) + 2^{127} \frac{1}{2^{128}} (-\log_2(\frac{1}{2^{128}})) = 64.5\text{b}$
- $H_\infty(\mathcal{X}) = -\log_2(\frac{1}{2}) = 1\text{b}$
- Min-entropy tells us that guessing the most common output is as hard as guessing a single bit string

The Systems Perspective

“You have probably seen the door to a bank vault...10-inch thick, hardened steel, with large bolts...We often find the digital equivalent of such a vault door installed in a tent. The people standing around it are arguing over how thick the door should be, rather than spending their time looking at the tent.”

(Niels Ferguson & Bruce Schneier, Practical Cryptography)

Conclusions

Perfect ciphers vs. real world: brute-forcing

- Broken-unbroken ciphers: need for transparency
- Key lengths matters
- Symmetric, asymmetric algorithms and hash functions
- PKI and CAs and their complexity

We saw several case studies of attacks against crypto applications

- They had everything to do with systems security without even touching the algorithms themselves

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In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, *Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2017 - 37th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 20-24, 2017, Proceedings, Part I*, volume 10401 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 570–596. Springer, 2017.

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Further reading: a practical attack based on MD5 collisions

- It is known that MD5 allows a **chosen prefix collision** under certain constraints
 - Here the attack is used to create **two valid CA certificates with the same signature**:
<http://www.win.tue.nl/~bdeweger/CollidingCertificates/>
 - Extended to threaten CAs in 2008:
<http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/>
- An evolution of the technique was used in **Flame**, a nasty malware used against several middle-Eastern targets
 - <http://trailofbits.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/flame-md5.pdf>