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DEAR COLLEAGUE,

We are pleased to send you attached a copy of the coordinated audit report prepared by the SAIs of Italy, Slovenia and Hungary, in the area of the utilisation of European Union funds allocated for the realisation of investment projects focusing on the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).

The basis for performing the audit was resolution CC-R-2008-4 of the Contact Committee of the Heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) of the European Union. According to the common audit plan developed by the participating SAIs, the scope of the audit covered the following questions:


1. whether the respective transport policies in the countries of participating SAIs are in line with the principles of the community transport policy and whether they define a demand for the modernisation of railway transport in relation to TEN-T Priority Project 6 and corridor 5;
2. whether the development of railway lines financed by European Union funds – taking into account the principles of the respective national and community transport policy – is effectively and efficiently implemented on the line of the TEN-T priority project 6 and Trans-European transport corridor 5;
3. whether the system set up for preparation and realisation of the selected projects effectively ensures the implementation of the railway network and related infrastructure developments concerning corridor 5 in the participating countries;
4. whether the selected project has achieved/ will achieve its objectives defined in the community and national strategies.

The on-site audits were carried out between autumn 2009 and spring 2010.

Following several experts' meetings, the enclosed common report was adopted by the Heads of the participating SAIs. The document consists of a synthesis of common findings of the coordinated audit activity, as well as the summaries of each SAI's national report. We are convinced that the findings presented, the exchange of audit know-how and experience will contribute to the technical cooperation amongst Supreme Audit Institutions.

The report will be presented to the 2011 Meeting of the Contact Committee of the Heads of the SAls of the European Union in Luxembourg; as well as forwarded for information to the Heads and other executives of concerned European Institutions and national authorities.

Yours sincerely,



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Encl.

Report on Auditing Investments of TEN-T Priority Project 6



March 2011



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SYNTHESIS OF COMMON FINDINGS OF THE COORDINATED AUDIT ACTIVITY

INTRODUCTION

In Paragraph 2/B of its CC-R-2008-4 resolution, the Contact Committee of the Heads of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) of the European Union endorsed the execution of a co-ordinated performance audit activity – of a cross-border nature, involving several Member States – related to the utilisation of European Union funds allocated for the realization of investment projects focusing on the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).

Considering TEN-T priority axes and investment projects, it was an audit subject in which many countries and, therefore, many SAIs were interested. The Hungarian SAI suggested auditing the railway development in the path of European priority project 6 co-financed by the European Union (the TEN-T railway network's Pan-European corridor 5). The audit started with the involvement of the SAIs of the countries bordering the line in question (France, Italy, Slovenia, Hungary). However, in the course of the audit activity, the SAI of France faced such unforeseen obstacles, that resulted in their withdrawal from the cooperation. Therefore the present synthesis is based on the experiences made by the SAIs of Italy, Slovenia and Hungary.



The estimated value of the entire TEN-T Priority Project 6 is 60.8 billion Euros and is the largest of the thirty TEN-T Priority Projects according to its value.

Table 1: The overview of the planned investment values and the implementation dynamics of TEN-T Priority Project 6 until 2023 (in million Euros)

	Value	Invested until 2007	Investments between 2007 and 2013	Investments after 2013
The entire route in the length of 1688 kilometres	60,742	7,827	10,428	42,487

Source: Implementation of the Priority Projects Progress Report, European Commission, May 2008.

The audit objective was to evaluate:

1. whether the respective transport policies in the countries of participating SAIs are in line with the principles of the community transport policy and whether they define a demand for the modernisation of railway transport in relation to TEN-T Priority Project 6 and corridor 5;
2. whether the development of railway lines financed by European Union funds – taking into account the principles of the respective national and community transport policy – is effectively and efficiently implemented on the line of the TEN-T priority project 6 and Trans-European transport corridor 5;
3. whether the system set up for preparation and realisation of the selected projects effectively ensures the implementation of the railway network and related infrastructure developments concerning corridor 5 in the participating countries;
4. whether the selected project has achieved / will achieve its objectives defined in the community and national strategies.

The audit focused on two already completed and two still running railway section investments that are/were financed by European Union funds. Within the framework of the audit, each SAI audited its own railway section. The selection of the railway section, or within this railway section, the selection of a project or projects laid with the respective SAIs.

To ensure a coherent approach, all SAIs followed the approved audit plan as close as possible, particularly with regard to the following main question: did the preparation process and the realisation of the TEN-T project selected to be audited efficiently serve the time-proportional implementation of the European Union's and national transport policy, as well as the utilisation of available resources? The audit focused on the period 2000 – 2010.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. In general, the national transport policies are in line with the Community Transport Policy.

The **Community Transport Policy** particularly considers the development of railway transportation and the gradual liberalization of railway activities as priority areas. The main objective of the common European transport policy is to promote the use of environmentally sound railway transport against the currently dominating road transport.

- In participating SAIs' countries the strategy of the railway transport development has different main focus – from the enhancement of the infrastructure's reliability, to the density of high-speed lines, to the elimination and prevention of limitations of capacity and to the achievement of a better performance – in compliance with the European Union directives on development policy.
- The main projects of the national railway policy are related to the construction of TEN-T priority axes. The railway developments are divided into three parts: modernisation of the existing lines, extending the existing lines and constructing high-speed lines.

2. The development of the priority railway network co-financed by the European Union was partly successful in the audited projects.

According to the audits, the development goals of the adopted transport policy have been partly realized.

- All audited railway projects, in the relevant period, were granted financial support from the funds of the European Union. In some cases the national budget funds were also supplemented with loans and other subsidies. Rescheduling and overrunning the expenses was typical.
- The planned and implemented railway investment expenditures show, in the period audited, a tendency for increase, while the realisation was often slower than planned in all years concerned.
- Resources for the appropriate financing of the developments were not always available in due time, they were not of the right structure or amount, which is also the reason why the projects funded by the European Union ran out of deadlines.
- Since the axes cross the borders, the synchronisation of national projects is a major concern, in order to avoid that a new line built on one side continues on the other side with an obsolete line.

3. The national institutional systems did not always ensure the successful implementation of the audited projects.

The system, set up for the preparation and implementation of the **railway development projects chosen by the national audit offices**, only partly ensured the successful implementation of the Priority Project 6 railway network connected to the Pan-European Corridor 5. Although the institutional system related to transport has become unified in some of the audited countries, the present national systems of railway development are not entirely efficient, because the organisational management does not fully ensure the transparent and concentrated utilisation of development sources. Difficulties are typical in all audited projects, but they are especially significant in the case of cross-border sections, where more united efforts are needed at national level.

- In Italy, the audited project is the quadruplication of the 24.5 km long Padua–Mestre section, alongside the existing conventional line. The overall implementation cost of the audited project was 467 million Euros of which 449.7 million Euros were funded from domestic resources. The remaining part of the costs (3.7%, 17.3 million Euros) was financed from TEN-T funds of the European Union. The new Padua–Mestre line was completed by the scheduled deadlines, and has been operating since 2007.
- In Slovenia the public railway infrastructure development programme should pay more attention to the cost and benefit analysis. For the audited Divača–Koper section, project documentation for new single-track line was prepared in 2010. The project is estimated to costs 661 million Euros. The construction works are now envisaged to start at the beginning of 2011. During the project planning, the authorities adopted decisions that were not in full supported by all necessary analyses at the time. Preparation of the investment, technical and other documentation was not carried out in the appropriate order resulting in lack of transparency and it may affect the quality of project implementation or prolonging the construction time. Better alignment of supporting documents has to be aspired.
- The State Audit Office of Hungary has audited the implementation of the rehabilitation works of the almost 80-km-long Zalaötvő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba railway section. Acquiring territories, planning and other preparation and professional works were completed only from Hungarian resources. The estimated total cost of completing the project has increased to 199 million Euros (+17.5%). The growth of the costs is generated by the uncalculated inflation effects, the changing of the technological content and the rescheduling caused by the delays in public procurements and technological needs. The development of the railway sections financed by the European Union and the connecting infrastructure was not in accordance with the principles of value for money.

4. The audit found that there is wide difference in the extent to which the selected projects have reached the objectives defined in the development strategies.

The projects reached the objectives defined in the **community and national railway development strategies**, but at different levels.

- According to the plans, the Italian Padova–Mestre project has improved capacity (500 trains/day, 220 km/h), minimising the environmental impact. This project has eliminated the major bottleneck, making the transport of passengers and freight throughout the network more functional, efficient and fast. The development results are to eliminate and prevent limitations of capacity, and to improve other technical and safety parameters of the line.
- The new Divača–Koper line was in audited period in the planning phase. The project objectives and the technical characteristics of the line have been determined in accordance with national and community transport policy. The delays during project planning also originate in subsequently combined planning with new Divača–Trieste line and because the required capacity of the line was unclear. The beginning of drawing the Cohesion Policy funds of programme period 2007–2013 was delayed for two years. Once completed, the new Divača–Koper line is expected to eliminate and prevent limitations of capacity and improve technical and safety parameters of the line.
- In Hungary, the medium-term transit cargo transportation can be dominant on the audited railway section, so the technical parameters of the line are mainly aimed to meet those needs. Beside the technical specifications and authority regulations, environmental protection was also considered when planning and realizing the project. The reconstructed rail line is going to improve Hungary's accessibility and economic competitiveness, and together with supporting the society's cohesion growth it will result a better, safer and environment friendlier transport system. The rail lines meeting AGC-AGTC¹ requirements and the configuration of the European rail traffic management system (ERTMS), which is used in TEN-T rail networks, increase the safety of transportation and also contribute to the interoperable passenger and freight transport.

¹ European Agreement on Main International Railway Lines – European Agreement on Important International Combined Transport Lines and Related Installations

CONCLUSIONS

The coordinated audit experiences related to the utilisation of the European Union allocations given for the TEN-T Corridor 5 railway network investment project implementation are the following:

- The cooperation of the SAls participating in the audits was successful. The audit has presented the utilisation of available resources, the time proportionate completion of the European Union and national transport policy objectives, and also pointed out deficiencies;
- The audit has pointed out that synchronising the construction works between the states on the two sides of the border is essential in any priority line. At the same time building new lines is not the only way to improve the situation: more efficient interoperability constitutes a new chapter in the construction of a European rail network.
- The planning of the projects underestimates too often the expenses and the time needed for the implementation.
- The strict rules on time limits concerning the utilisation of European Union funds accelerate the implementation of projects, however risks for the efficient, effective and economically sound implementation also increase accordingly.
- Shifting transportation from road to rail remains a major goal, ecologically and economically. Today, the scheduled passenger journey time from Budapest to Ljubljana is 9 hours by train, by car it takes less than 5 hours. Further efforts will have to be made for rail transport to become a competitive alternative against road transportation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Having utilised the findings of the on-site audit, we recommend for consideration the following:

- The modernisation of national railway connections that are highly in the European Union interest is often difficult to justify only on the basis of national needs and benefits. For quality and accurate planning of national railway development, particularly the scope of investments, a more active role of the European Union in elaborating the benefits for European Union and forming more detailed and advance financial positions would be welcome.
- In order to unfold the Trans-European values of TEN-T, European Union organisations responsible for implementing coordination should give more priority to finance the designated TEN-T railway project developments.
- In determining the optimum scope of railway investments, the EU and national decisions should be substantiated by taking into consideration the transport service demand and the effects due to railway modernisation.

- In order to avoid delays and growth of costs, the national institutions participating in the preparation should focus more on the examination of the completed impact studies and on the revision of the submitted plans, studies, expertises and requested subsidies; especially the decision to realise projects should not be taken before costs, benefits and time need of implementation are thoroughly estimated;
- Institutions of the participating countries responsible for transport development should take adequate measures in order to efficiently develop the railway axes being priority projects supported by the European Union.

This report has been adopted by the Heads of SAIs of Italy, Slovenia and Hungary in March 2011 and it is to be presented to the forthcoming meeting of the Contact Committee of the Heads of Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union to be held in Luxembourg in October 2011.

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Controllo sul quadruplicamento
della linea “Padova–Mestre”



Audit on the quadruplication of
Padua–Mestre railway line

Controllo sul quadruplicamento della linea “Padova–Mestre”

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Audit on the quadruplication of Padua–Mestre railway line

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2. The “Padua–Mestre” line under Priority Project 6 (PP6)
3. The allocation / breakdown of responsibilities
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1. Premessa

1. La necessità di assicurare un costante e coordinato sviluppo del mercato interno ha indotto il Consiglio della Comunità europea agli inizi degli anni '90 a ritenere essenziale una maggiore integrazione del settore comunitario dei trasporti, nel cui ambito le ferrovie rappresentano un segmento di vitale rilevanza¹.

Il miglioramento dell'efficienza della rete ferroviaria, secondo il Consiglio, doveva passare attraverso modalità organizzative basate sulla distinzione (anche contabile) fra attività di "esercizio dei servizi di trasporto" e attività di "gestione dell'infrastruttura".

Il Consiglio reputava altresì conveniente che gli Stati membri mantenessero la responsabilità generale dello sviluppo della infrastruttura ferroviaria, con l'obiettivo di garantire il miglior servizio agli utenti.

2. La definizione del tracciato dell'infrastruttura ferroviaria europea TEN-T (Trans-European Network – Transport) e, nel

¹ Cfr. Direttiva del Consiglio n. 91/440/CE del 29 luglio 1991, relativa allo sviluppo delle ferrovie comunitarie, modificata da: direttiva 2001/12/EC del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 26 febbraio 2001; direttiva 2004/51/EC del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 29 aprile 2004; direttiva 2006/103/EC del Consiglio del 20 novembre 2006; direttiva 2007/58/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 23 ottobre 2007.

1. Introduction

1. In view of the need to guarantee the constant and coordinated development of the internal market, at the beginning of the 1990s the Council of the European Union ruled that it was essential to more closely integrate the Community transport sector, of which the railways constitute a crucially important segment¹.

Improving the efficiency of the network, according to the Council, entailed adopting organisational arrangements drawing a distinction (also in accounting terms) between "the provision of transport services" and "infrastructure management".

The Council also considered it appropriate for the member states to retain overall responsibility for developing the rail infrastructure to guarantee the best service to rail users.

2. The Essen European Council (1994) defined the routing of the TEN-T (Trans-European Network – Transport)

¹ Cf. Council directive No. 91/440/EC of 29 July 1991 on the development of the Community's Railways, amended by: directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001; directive 2004/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004; directive 2006/103/EC of the Council of 20 November 2006; directive 2007/58/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 October 2007.

suo ambito, dei cosiddetti Progetti Prioritari, è stata poi operata dal Consiglio europeo di Essen (1994) e riconfermata dal Consiglio di Cardiff (1998). Decisioni che costituiscono la base del Libro Bianco sulla politica dei trasporti pubblicato nel 2001 della Commissione.

3. In particolare, l'Italia è attraversata dalle infrastrutture ferroviarie, identificate come Progetti Prioritari (PP): TEN-T PP1 (Berlino–Verona–Milano–Bologna–Napoli–Messina–Palermo); TEN-T PP6 (Lione–Torino–Milano–Venezia–Trieste–Lubiana–Budapest–confine ucraino); TEN-T PP5 (Lione–Genova); TEN-T PP24 (Rotterdam–Genova).

Il Progetto Padova–Mestre, oggetto della presente analisi valutativa, è parte del Progetto Prioritario 6.

European railway infrastructure, and within it, the so-called Priority Projects; this was confirmed by the Cardiff Council (1998). These decisions formed the basis of the Commission's European Transport Policy White Paper published in 2001.

3. Italy's rail infrastructure identified as Priority Projects (PP) are: TEN-T PP I (Berlin–Verona–Milan–Bologna–Naples–Messina–Palermo); TEN-T PP6 (Lyon–Turin–Milan–Venice–Trieste–Ljubljana–Budapest–Ukrainian Border); TEN-T PP5 (Lyon–Genoa); and TEN-T PP24 (Rotterdam–Genoa).

The Padua–Mestre (Venice) Project, examined here, forms part of Priority Project 6.

2. La “Padova–Mestre” nell’ambito del Progetto Prioritario 6 (PP6)

1. Nell’ambito della politica europea di potenziamento, omogeneizzazione e coordinamento della rete infrastrutturale ferroviaria il cosiddetto Corridoio 5 assume notevole rilevanza nell’ottica di sviluppo dei collegamenti terrestri fra l’Unione europea, l’Europa centrale e l’Asia.

Il corridoio, in effetti, si propone di collegare il Portogallo all’Ungheria ed all’Ucraina passando attraverso Spagna, Francia, Italia e Slovenia, lungo una direttrice dell’infrastruttura ferroviaria che interesserà i nodi di Lisbona, Valladolid, Madrid, Saragozza, Barcellona, Montpellier, Lione, Torino, Milano, Verona, Venezia, Trieste, Lubiana, Budapest, Leopoli, Kiev (Fig 1).

Figura 1.



Figure 1.

2. The “Padua–Mestre” line under Priority Project 6 (PP6)

1. Under European policy for the upgrading, standardisation and coordination of the railway infrastructure network, Corridor 5 is particularly important in relation to the development of overland links between the European Union, Central Europe and Asia.

This Corridor is designed to link Portugal to Hungary and Ukraine, passing through Spain, France, Italy and Slovenia, on a network comprising the Lisbon, Valladolid, Madrid, Saragozza, Barcelona, Montpellier, Lyon, Turin, Milan, Verona, Venice, Trieste, Ljubljana, Budapest, Lviv and Kiev hubs (Fig 1).

Nel complesso la rete ferroviaria del Corridoio 5 coprirà una distanza di circa 4.000 Km con l'obiettivo di ridurre i tempi di percorrenza, aumentare i livelli di sicurezza, favorire il trasferimento del trasporto mezzi dalla strada alla ferrovia ("trasferimento modale"), diminuire le emissioni inquinanti e aumentare la qualità del servizio per i passeggeri.

2. All'interno del Corridoio 5, l'asse ferroviario Lione-Budapest (Progetto Prioritario 6-PP6) interessa l'Italia settentrionale tra il confine francese (Bardonecchia) e quello sloveno (Trieste) ed incrocia le linee ad alta velocità Nord-Sud: Verona-Napoli, Milano-Bologna, e Milano-Genova.

In Italia, quindi, l'asse attraversa da Ovest a Est, a Sud delle Alpi, un territorio sensibile sotto il profilo ambientale, densamente popolato, con un'alta concentrazione di attività industriali ed agricole ed elevati livelli di traffico merci su strada. L'attesa è che, a conclusione degli interventi previsti dal progetto, possano conseguirsi vantaggi non solo prettamente economici, ma anche vantaggi ambientali attraverso un sostanziale riequilibrio "modale" del traffico merci dalla strada verso la ferrovia e la realizzazione di un effettivo servizio di "autostrada viaggiante" tra Lione e Trieste (Fig 2).

Taken as a whole, the Corridor 5 railway network will cover a distance of about 4.000 km, with the aim of reducing travelling times, increasing safety, encouraging road haulage vehicles to use the railways ("modal transfer"), reducing pollution emissions and improving the quality of services to passengers.

2. Within Corridor 5, the Lyon-Budapest line (Priority Project 6-PP6) runs across Northern Italy between the French border (Bardonecchia) and the Slovenian border (Trieste), crossing with the North-South High-Speed lines: Verona-Naples, Milan-Bologna, and Milan-Genoa.

In Italy the line therefore runs West to East, south of the Alps, in an environmentally sensitive, and densely populated area with a heavy concentration of industrial and agricultural activities, and high levels of goods traffic by road. It is therefore expected that once the project has been completed, benefits will accrue not only in purely economic terms alone, but also to the environment, through a substantial "modal" rebalancing of freight traffic from road to rail, and the creation of an effective "travelling motorway" service between Lyon and Trieste (Fig 2).



Figura 2.

Figure 2.

3. L'infrastruttura ferroviaria interessata dal PP6 in Italia ha una lunghezza di circa 650 km e prevede progetti d'investimento per circa 40,3 miliardi di euro, dei quali finora reperiti 11,8 (9,9 provvisti dallo Stato Italiano, 0,9 da fonte privata, 0,3 dalla BEI e 0,7 dall'UE, a valere sui finanziamenti approntati dal bilancio comunitario per il progetto TEN "1986–2006" e "2007–2013"). Restano quindi da reperire ancora 28,5 miliardi di euro per l'attuazione dei progetti.

Nella tabella che segue sono indicati per i principali progetti di investimento i costi complessivi e le coperture finanziarie.

3. The rail infrastructure forming part of PP6 in Italy is about 650 km in length with investment projects worth some 40.3 billion euro, of which 11.8 billion (9.9 bn provided by the Italian government and 0.9 bn by private sources, 0.3 bn by the EIB and 0.7 bn by the EU appropriated in the Community budget for allocation to the "1986–2006" and "2007–2013" TEN project), has so far been found.

This leaves a further 28.5 billion euro to be found to implement the projects. The following table 1 shows the aggregate costs and financial coverage for the main investment projects.

Tabella 1. Corridoio V – progetti di investimento: finanziamenti e costi
(milioni di euro)

Table 1. Corridor 5 – Priority project 6 (PP6) in Italy. Investment projects:
cost and financial coverage (billion euro)

Progetto Project	Legge Obiettivo Objective Law (setting funding procedures)	CVI Planned costs	Nazionale Government	Fonte Privata Private	BEI BEI	FESR ERDF 1994-1999	FESR ERDF 2000-2006	FESR ERDF 2007-2013	TEN 1986-2006	TEN 2007-2013	Da reperire To be found
Adeguamento linea Storica Torino-Lione Adjustment of existing line Turin-Lyon		103	103	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
ALPETUNNEL GEIE - Nuova linea Torino-Lione ALPSTUNNEL - New line Turin-Lyon		46	29	–	–	–	–	–	17	–	
Tunnel du Mont-Cenis Mont-Cenis Tunnel	si yes	9.866	390	–	–	–	–	–	89	437	8.95
Bussoleno-Torino Bussoleno-Turin	si yes	2.375	58	–	–	–	–	–	8	–	8.950
Passante P.ta Susa Lingotto e collegamento P.ta Susa bivio P.ta Nuova Underground tunnel P.ta Susa - Lingotto station		103	103	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Nodo di Torino: passante lingotto - Porta Susa-Stura Turin hub		955	932	–	–	–	–	–	23	–	
Torino-Novara Turin-Novara		7.705	6.409	986	280	–	–	–	30	–	
Novara-Milano Novara-Milan											
Quadruplicamento Lambrate - Treviglio e interventi tecnologici Milano-Venezia Quadruplication Lambrate - Treviglio and technological works Milan-Venice	si yes	598	565	–	–	–	–	–	33	–	
Linea Milano-Venezia (Progettazione) Milan-Verona Line (Design)		50	50	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Treviglio-Brescia Treviglio-Brescia		2.000	175	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.825
Brescia-Verona Brescia-Verona		2.800	62	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.738
Corridoio Europeo n° 5 collegamenti (Potenziamento tratta Bergamo-Seregno) European Corridor n° 5 (Enhancement of the Bergamo-Seregno line)	si yes	1.000	83	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	917
Potenziamento Infrastrutturale e Tecnologico del Nodod di Verona Infrastructural and Technological enhancement of Verona hub		55	51	–	–	–	–	–	4	–	
Nodo di Verona Verona hub		670	17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	653
Verona-Padova AV/AC Verona-Padova HS/HC line	si yes	5.196	168	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	5.025
Quadruplicamento Padova-Mestre Quadruplication of Padua-Mestre line		467	460	–	–	–	–	–	7	–	–
Nodo di Mestre Mestre hub		107	97	–	–	–	–	–	10	–	–
AV/AC Venezia-Trieste tratta Venezia Mestre-Ronchi HS/HC Venice-Ronchi		4.200	6	–	–	–	–	–	5	–	4.189
AV/AC Venezia-Trieste tratta Ronchi-Trieste HS/HC Venice-Ronchi-Trieste	si yes	1.929	33	–	–	–	–	–	1	24	1.871
Nouva Linea TS-VE Lubiana (Valico orientale) / Trieste Divaca (Progettazione) New line Lubiana-Trieste Divaca (Design)		5	4	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	
Trieste-Divaca (solo quota IT) Trieste-Divaca (Italian share)		44	22	–	–	–	–	–	–	22	
ERMITS Corridoio D (Valencia-Budapest) ERMITS Corridor D (Valencia-Budapest)		70	66	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	
TOTALI TOTALS	(MIO €) (Billion €)	40.344	9.883	986	280	0	0	0	231	487	28.477

3.1 La Figura che segue, concernente le tratte in cui viene suddivisa l'infrastruttura ferroviaria del PP6 in territorio italiano, evidenzia lo stato di attuazione dei principali interventi pianificati di potenziamento ed ammodernamento della linea ferroviaria.

3.1. The following Figure 3, showing the lines comprising the PP6 rail infrastructure inside Italy, underlines the progress made with implementing the main line upgrading and modernisation projects.

Figura 3. Corridoio V: situazione degli investimenti

Figure 3. Corridor V: PP6 in Italy. Main line implementation



4. La tratta Padova-Mestre, come si evince dai grafici in precedenza riportati, è stata interessata da un progetto di quadruplicamento della linea ferroviaria per complessivi 24,5 chilometri.

4. The Padua-Mestre line is subject to a project to quadruple the railway line over a total of 24.5 km.

Le caratteristiche di tale progetto e le fasi di attuazione vengono esaminate nel successivo paragrafo 5.

The characteristics of the project and the implementation phases are examined below on paragraph 5.

3. L'attribuzione / ripartizione delle competenze

1. L'attribuzione delle competenze tra i soggetti istituzionali coinvolti nella pianificazione, progettazione e realizzazione dei progetti di sviluppo ed ammodernamento delle infrastrutture ferroviarie italiane, realizza la ripartizione tra competenze politiche e competenze tecniche attuative.

- Il Ministero delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti è il soggetto “politico” che, cura i rapporti relativi sia alle intese ed accordi internazionali sia alle direttive europee. In ambito nazionale, il Ministero cura la programmazione degli interventi e dei connessi finanziamenti, svolge l'azione di coordinamento e di propulsione necessaria all'attuazione tecnica dei citati interventi e la correlata azione di monitoraggio.
- Il Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze provvede ai finanziamenti annuali per l'attuazione degli interventi.
- “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” cura l'attività realizzativa dei vari progetti di sviluppo e ammodernamento della rete ferroviaria.
“Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” è una società per azioni di diritto privato, con capitale interamente sottoscritto dal Ministero dell'economia e delle finanze, che assicura il servizio collettivo di trasporto ferroviario a livello nazionale.

3. The allocation / breakdown of responsibilities

1. The allocation of responsibilities between the institutional parties involved in planning, designing and implementing projects for the development and modernisation of Italy's rail infrastructure projects entails a separation between policy-making and technical/implementation responsibilities.

- The Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport is the “political” party responsible for relations under international agreements and European directives. At the national level, the ministry is responsible for planning and financing the operations, and coordinating and fostering the necessary technical implementation and monitoring of these operations.
- The Ministry of the Economy and Finance provides annual funding for implementing the measures.
- “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” is responsible for implementing railway development and modernisation projects.
“Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” is a joint stock company incorporated under private law, wholly-owned by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and provides public rail transport services nationwide.

“Ferrovie dello Stato” è capogruppo (“Holding”) di un insieme di società operative di cui detiene l’intero pacchetto azionario. Tra queste, due società per azioni hanno rilevanza:

- “ITALFERR S.p.A.” cura l’attività progettuale dallo Studio di Fattibilità al Progetto Esecutivo e la Direzione dei Lavori quale responsabile dei servizi di ingegneria preposto al presidio dell’area tecnologica ed ingegneristica nonché dell’area di gestione e controllo dell’esecuzione degli interventi.
- “Rete Ferroviaria italiana – RFI S.p.A.” cura, come committente, la realizzazione dei progetti ed è il gestore dell’infrastruttura ferroviaria nazionale. E’ quindi la società specificamente preposta all’esecuzione dell’insieme di attività di progettazione, costruzione, messa in esercizio, gestione e manutenzione sia della citata infrastruttura sia dei sistemi di controllo e di sicurezza approntati a garanzia della circolazione dei treni.

2. In particolare a “RFI S.p.A.” è stata affidata nel 2001 la realizzazione del progetto “Padova–Mestre” oggetto della presente indagine valutativa a conclusione di un iter autorizzativo e progettuale avviato nel 1991.

It is the holding company of a series of operating companies which it wholly owns. Two of these joint stock companies are of relevance here:

- “ITALFERR S.p.A.” which is responsible for the design, from the feasibility study to the final working drawings, and works supervision, as well as for oversight of engineering services and the supervision of the technological and engineering area and managing and overseeing the implementation of all the projects.
- “Rete Ferroviaria Italiana – RFI S.p.A.”; as the contractor, which is responsible for implementing the projects and managing the national railway infrastructure network. It is therefore this company which has the specific responsibility for implementing all the design, construction, commissioning, management and maintenance work, in relation to both the infrastructure and the control and security systems put in place to guarantee the circulation of the trains.

2. In 2001, “RFI S.p.A.” was entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the “Padua–Mestre” project, which is the subject matter of this present evaluation, at the end of the authorisation and design procedure that began in 1991.

4. Quadruplicamento linea Padova–Mestre: iter autorizzativo progettuale

La nuova linea muove i primi passi in epoca relativamente recente, anche se il tempo trascorso – misurato con la necessità di rispondere efficacemente e rapidamente alle esigenze di sviluppo economico e di qualità della vita – è difficile considerarlo breve.

Questi sono stati i passaggi procedurali propedeutici all'avvio dei lavori:

- 15 ottobre 1991: è stata stipulata la convenzione tra la TAV (Gruppo F.S.) e il consorzio IRICAV.2 per la concessione di prestazioni integrate della progettazione e della realizzazione della nuova linea ferroviaria AV Verona–Venezia;
- 20 ottobre 1997: il gruppo tecnico istituito congiuntamente dal Ministero dei Trasporti e della Navigazione e dal Ministero dell'Ambiente per la verifica governativa del progetto AV (ex Legge 23 dicembre 1996 n. 662), nel confermare l'unitarietà del progetto della tratta Verona–Mestre, riconosce il quadruplicamento della tratta funzionale Padova–Mestre come prioritario ed urgente, potendosi rinviare la realizzazione della linea AV tra Verona e Padova ad una fase successiva, dopo il completamento degli approfondimenti sui tracciati, prescritti dalla verifica governativa;
- 30 luglio 1998: si apre la Conferenza di Servizi della tratta funzionale AV/AC Padova–Mestre, che si chiude il 21 dicembre

4. The quadruplication of the Padua–Mestre line: Design authorisation procedure

Work began on this new line comparatively recently, even though it is difficult to consider the time that has elapsed so far as brief, in terms of the need to respond effectively and rapidly to the demands of economic development and the quality of life.

These were the main preparatory procedures before work could begin:

- 15 October 1991: the contract was concluded between TAV (FS Group) and the IRICAV.2 consortium, awarding the license to provide integrated services for the design and construction of the new Verona–Venice High-Speed line;
- 20 October 1997: the technical group set up jointly by the Ministry of Transport and Shipping, and the Ministry for the Environment to enable the government to verify the High-Speed project (under law No. 662 of 23 December 1996), confirmed the unitary character of the project for the Verona–Mestre line and acknowledged that the quadruplication of the Padua–Mestre functional section was an urgent priority, and that the High-Speed line between Verona and Padua could be postponed to a later date following the completion of the studies on the route for the line, as prescribed during the government inspection;
- 30 July 1998: the Services Conference for

- 1998 con parere favorevole, anche del Ministero dell'Ambiente;
- 31 marzo 2000: la TAV, in accordo con le Ferrovie dello Stato, risolve il contratto di affidamento delle prestazioni integrate al consorzio IRICAV.2;
 - 10 maggio 2001: l'Amministratore delegato di F.S. autorizza la pubblicizzazione del progetto dell'opera ai sensi della Legge 865/71, che viene effettuata il 25 maggio 2001;
 - 15 maggio 2001: il Consiglio di Amministrazione di F.S. approva l'Atto Modificativo alla convenzione con TAV del 1991 prevedendo l'esclusione, tra l'altro, della tratta funzionale AV/AC Padova–Mestre e l'affidamento a RFI della realizzazione dell'opera in qualità di committente;
 - 28 dicembre 2001: viene dichiarata la pubblica utilità dell'opera;
 - 25 febbraio e 11 marzo 2002: sono emessi i D.O.T. della provincia di Venezia e della Provincia di Padova.
- the Padua–Mestre High-Speed / High-Capacity functional line was convened, and concluded on 21 December 1998 with a favourable opinion issued by the Ministry for the Environment;
- 31 March 2000: the TAV, by agreement with Ferrovie dello Stato, decided to cancel the contract previously concluded with the IRICAV.2 consortium;
 - 10 May 2001: the managing director of FS authorised the publication of the project design which was done on 25 May 2001;
 - 15 May 2001: the F.S. Board of Directors approved the document amending the 1991 agreement with TAV, excluding, among other things, High-Speed / High-Capacity Padua–Mestre functional section, and entrusting to RFI the construction work as contractor;
 - 28 December 2001: the project was declared to be a “public utility project”;
 - 25 February and 11 March 2002: the DOTs were issued by the Venice and Padua Provincial authorities.

5. Il “Progetto”: Quadruplicamento Alta velocità (AV) / Alta capacità (AC) della linea Padova–Mestre

5.1. Descrizione

La nuova linea Padova–Mestre è il tratto terminale della futura linea AV/AC Milano–Venezia e costituisce un segmento del Corridoio V che collegherà Lisbona a Kiev attraverso la pianura padana.

Il progetto prevede sulla tratta di 24,5 chilometri che unisce Padova e Mestre le seguenti realizzazioni:

- quadruplicamento della tratta, in affiancamento alla linea storica (esistente);
- costruzione della galleria artificiale di Maerne, per consentire il sovrappasso, senza interferenze, della Linea ferroviaria Mestre–Bassano sulle Linee Padova–Mestre;
- nuovo Apparato di Sicurezza nella stazione di Dolo;
- adeguamento degli Apparati di Sicurezza nelle stazioni di Mestre e Padova;
- potenziamento del sistema di distanziamento automatico dei treni;
- attività di integrazione con gli altri interventi pianificati nella stessa area;
- compatibilità tecnico/gestionale degli impianti a servizio della nuova linea AV/AC e di quella esistente.

5. The “Project”: quadruplication of the Padua–Mestre High-Speed / High-Capacity line

5.1. Description

The new Padua–Mestre line is the final section of the future Milan–Venice High-Speed/High-Capacity line, and is a segment of Corridor 5 linking Lisbon to Kiev through the Po Valley.

The project comprises the following works along a 24.5 km section linking Padua and Mestre:

- The quadruplication of the section, alongside the “existing” conventional line;
- The construction of an artificial tunnel at Maerne, to enable the Mestre–Bassano line to cross over the Padua–Mestre lines without interference;
- New safety apparatus at Dolo station;
- Upgrading the safety apparatus at Mestre and Padua stations;
- Upgrading the Automatic Train Spacing system;
- Integrating with the other operations planned in the same area;
- Ensuring the technical/managerial compatibility of the technical facilities serving the new High-Speed/High-Capacity line and the existing line.

5.2. Motivi

Il “Progetto” aveva l’obiettivo di eliminare la strozzatura della rete ferroviaria che si riscontrava nella linea “storica” a doppio binario Padova–Mestre in quanto nelle due stazioni terminali (Padova e Mestre) convergevano due importanti direttrici di traffico, anch’esse a doppio binario:

- la trasversale Milano–Trieste (che collega con la Slovenia)
- la longitudinale Bologna–Udine (che collega con l’Austria)

Una volta eliminata la strozzatura citata il progetto prevede una capacità di traffico sulla tratta Padova–Mestre di 500 treni al giorno, nettamente superiore a quella della

5.2. Rationale


The “Project” was designed to remove the bottleneck in the “conventional” dual track line between Padua and Mestre, because there were two major traffic routes, also dual track, converging on the two terminal stations (Padua and Mestre):

- The Milan–Trieste West–East line (linking with Slovenia)
- The South–North Bologna–Udine line (linking with Austria).

Once the bottleneck has been eliminated, the project is scheduled to have a capacity of 500 trains a day on the Padua–Mestre line which is substantially higher than the traffic on the conventional line by about 200 trains

Figura 4. Traffico ferroviario / potenzialità delle linee

Figure 4. Railway traffic / railway lines potential




linea storica di circa 200 treni/giorno.
La velocità massima prevista del progetto è di 220 km/h, mentre sulla linea “storica” la velocità massima è di 180 km/h (Fig. 4).

5.3. Caratteristiche del progetto

Le caratteristiche prestazionali del progetto sono coerenti con quelle previste per la Rete TEN-T con l’eccezione della Tensione di alimentazione (3 kw cc anziché 25 kw ca) e del sistema di segnalamento (BACC 3/3 a 5 codici anziché ERMTS livello 2) conseguenti all’affiancamento stretto tra nuova linea AV/AC e linea storica.

La nuova linea si affianca a quella “storica” (mantenendo di norma un interbinario di 7,6 metri) e questa scelta progettuale ha di fatto ridotto al minimo l’impatto ambientale connesso con l’inserimento paesaggistico della nuova infrastruttura.

Figura 5. Schema funzionale delle linee Padova-Mestre AV/AC storica



a day. The maximum project speed is planned to be 220 km/hour compared with the maximum speed of 180 km/hour on the conventional line (Fig 4).

5.3. Project specifications

The project’s typical performance specifications are all consistent with those provided for the TEN-T Network except for the voltage (3 Kw DC instead of 25 Kw AC) and the signalling system (BACC 3/3 with 5 codes instead of ERMTS level 2) because of the close proximity of the new High-Speed / High-Capacity line to the conventional line.

The new line runs alongside the conventional line (normally maintaining a 7.6 m space between the lines – figure 5), and this design decision reduced to the minimum the environmental impact of incorporating the new infrastructure into the landscape.

Figure 5. Functional framework of the railway Padua-Mestre HS/HC line and existing Railway line

Sul paesaggio ha però inciso la necessità di realizzare circa 30 chilometri di barriere antirumore per mitigare il rumore prodotto dal passaggio, peraltro incrementato, dei treni (Foto 1).



Foto 1. Barriere antirumore

But the landscape has been affected by the need to build 30 km of noise-abatement barriers to reduce the noise caused by the passing of the trains, which have increased in number (Picture 1).

Picture 1. Noise-abatement barriers

La realizzazione del progetto ha reso necessari interventi sia sulla sede sia sulla impiantistica della linea “storica” ed ha inoltre comportato significativi interventi complementari sulle opere di viabilità ordinaria, mediante una riqualificazione dell’assetto viario dell’area interessata dal tracciato della nuova linea.

La sicurezza nella circolazione dei treni è stata potenziata su entrambe le linee ed è regolata dall’impianto di distanziamento realizzato, con il “Blocco Automatico Banalizzato a correnti codificate” (BABcc), e dal Sistema di controllo della marcia dei treni – SCMT (European Train Control System – ETCS), in linea con quanto previsto dagli accordi internazionali e dalle direttive comunitarie.

The implementation of the project has also made it necessary to work on the plant on the conventional line, entailing significant complementary work on the road system which has had to be upgraded in the area affected by the route of the new line.

Train safety has also been enhanced on both lines, governed by the “Coded Current Automatic Block (BABcc)” spacing system and the ETCS (European Train Control System) consistently with the provisions of international agreements and Community directives.

5.4. Quadro economico

L'importo globale dei vari interventi necessari per la realizzazione del progetto è pari a 467 milioni di euro, di cui 284 milioni relativi ad appalti di opere ed i restanti 183 milioni assorbiti da spese per espropri, progettazione, direzione lavori, materiali vari in fornitura, imprevisti ed oneri diversi.

Nel seguente prospetto viene presentato il quadro economico del progetto.

Tabella 2: Progetto Padova-Mestre. Quadro economico (milioni euro)

A) Appalti di lavori Works tendered	Importo Amount
1. Bonifica di ordigni bellici Clearing of World War II ordnance	3.7
2. Demolizione di fabbricati Buildings demolitions	0.8
3. S.S.E. di Vigonza, Padova e Spinea Vigonza, Padua and Spinea electric plants	15.3
4. Opere civili principali da Km 232+270 (79+072) a Km 254+992 (101+834) Main civil engineering works	134.0
5. Opere multidisciplinari da eseguire per fasi tra i Km 230 + 518 e 233+089 Multidisciplinary works	11.6
6. Impianto di BAB cc. Tipo SBA15 3/3 linea "storica" e linea AV/AC Coded current automatic block	37.0
7. Impianti di armamento, TE e LFM da Km 230+518 (77+338) a Km 256+450 Track works	42.1
8. ACC della stazione Mestre (quota parte intervento a carico del Progetto) Mestre station central computerized system	15.2
9. ACC della stazione di Padova (quota parte intervento a carico del Progetto) Padua station central computerized system	5.8
10. ACC della stazione di Dolo Dolo station central computerized system	0.2
11. Barriere antirumore (Fasi 1, 2 e 3) Noise-abatement barriers	11.3
12. Risoluzione interferenze (accordi diretti con Enti Gestori) Technical agreement	7.1
TOTALE A) TOTAL A)	284.1

5.4. The financial framework

The overall value of the various measures needed to implement the project is 467 million euro, of which 284 million for contracting out the work, and the remaining 183 million for the costs of land expropriation and the design and works management, miscellaneous materials supplies, contingencies and sundry charges.

The following table 2 shows the project's financial package.

Table 2: Padova-Mestre project. Financial package (million euro)

Tabella 2: Progetto Padova-Mestre. Quadro economico (milioni euro)

B) Altri capitoli di spesa Other expenses	Importo Amount
13 Espropri Expropriations	33.1
14. Servizi di ingegneria (progettazione, direzione lavori) Engineering services (design, supervision of works)	54.2
15. Materiali (pietrisco, armamento e TE) Materials	15.9
16. Accordi Procedimentali in Conferenza dei Servizi Public agreements	26.1
17. Imprevisti Unexpected events	11.4
18. Oneri diversi (Oneri TAV, collaudi, Capitalizzazioni, spese generali) Other costs	42.2
TOTALE B) TOTAL B)	182.9
C.V.I. (Costo a Vita Intera) del PROGETTO PROJECT COST	467.0

Table 2: Padova-Mestre project. Financial package (million euro)

5.5 Finanziamento

Il finanziamento del progetto è stato assicurato per la quasi totalità attraverso fonti nazionali (449 milioni di euro). La quota di finanziamento UE è stata di soli 17,3 milioni di euro (3,7% circa) imputati sui fondi TEN-T della programmazione 2000–2006.

5.5.1 In ambito nazionale, il progetto è stato di fatto finanziato a carico del bilancio dello Stato, anche se l'erogatore finale delle somme risulta essere RFI S.p.A., nella sua qualità di committente delle opere progettuali.

In effetti, per lo sviluppo della infrastruttura ferroviaria italiana le relazioni tra l'autorità decisionale politica (il Ministero delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti) e l'autorità concessionaria dell'esecuzione dei lavori (Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.) sono regolate da

5.5. Funding

Virtually all the funding needed for the project comes from domestic sources (449.7 million Euro). The EU's share of the financing is only 17.3 million euro (about 3.7%) charged to the TEN-T funds for the 2000–2006 programme.

5.5.1. At the domestic level, the project has been financed from central government budget even though the final paying authority is RFI S.p.A. in its capacity as the awardee of the design work.

For the development of Italy's railway infrastructure, relations between the policy-making authority (the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport) and the contractor (Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.) are governed by "Programme Contracts".

“Contratti di Programma”. In particolare, il progetto Padova–Mestre rientra tra i progetti previsti dai contratti di programma 1994–2000, 2001–2005 (poi prorogato al 2006) e 2007–2010².

Il fabbisogno finanziario per l’attuazione del progetto in esame è stato assicurato dai primi due contratti di programma, attraverso due differenti modalità:

- il contratto 1994–2000, prevedeva uno stanziamento di risorse pubbliche per l’esecuzione degli investimenti programmati; nell’ambito di questo stanziamento globale, sono stati reperiti 103,3 milioni destinati al quadruplicamento della linea Padova–Mestre;
- il contratto 2000–2006 prevedeva, invece, che gli obblighi di finanziamento assunti dallo Stato trovassero copertura nelle annuali leggi finanziarie sotto forma di aumento del capitale di “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” sottoscritto dall’azionista unico Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze. A sua volta poi, “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” ogni anno trasferisce i finanziamenti ricevuti alla controllata “Rete Ferroviaria Italiana”, anche in tal caso sotto forma di aumento di capitale. Con questa modalità sono stati trasferiti a RFI S.p.A. 363,7 milioni di euro, i cui 335,7 inseriti nelle leggi finanziarie del 2001 e 2002 e 28,00 in quella del 2005.

² I “contratti di programma” in argomento sono stati sottoscritti dal Ministro e dall’Amministratore delegato di “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” rispettivamente in data: 25 marzo 1996 (1994–2000), 2 maggio 2001 (2000–2006). Il terzo “contratto di programma” relativo al 2007–2010 è stato sottoscritto quando i lavori della tratta Padova–Mestre erano praticamente conclusi.

In particular, the Padua–Mestre project is one of the projects falling under the programme contracts 1994–2000, 2001–2005 (subsequently extended to 2006) and 2007–2010².

The financial requirements for the implementation of this project was guaranteed under the first two programme contracts in two different ways:

- The 1994–2000 contract provided for public funding to implement the scheduled investments; within this global funding allocation, 103.3 million euro were found for the quadruplication of the Padua–Mestre line;
- conversely, the 2000–2006 contract provided that the financing obligations undertaken by central government should be covered in the annual Budget Laws by a share capital increase in “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” by the sole shareholder, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. Every year, “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” transfers the funding received to its subsidiary company “Rete Ferroviaria Italiana”, once again by raising its share capital. With this procedure 363.7 million euro were transferred to RFI S.p.A., of which 335.7 euro were allocated under the Budget Laws for 2001 and 2002, and 28.00 million euro in the 2005 Budget Law.

² The “programme contracts” referred to here were signed by the Ministry and the Managing Director of “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” on 25 March 1996 (1994–2000) and 22 May 2001 (2000–2006), respectively. The third “programme contract” relating to 2007–2010 was signed when work on the Padua–Mestre line was practically completed.

5.5.2 Per quanto concerne il finanziamento UE di 17.3 milioni di euro, esso costituisce parte dei finanziamenti (140 milioni di euro) ottenuti dall'Italia (Ministero delle infrastrutture) per il Progetto Prioritario 6 (PP6) a valere sulla programmazione comunitaria 2000–2006.

5.6. L'appalto delle opere del progetto

Le opere previste dal progetto sono state appaltate da "RFI S.p.A." a diverse imprese esecutrici tra il novembre 2001 (pubblicazione dell' "avviso di gara" per l'appalto delle opere civili principali) e il settembre 2004 (appalto dell'armamento e della trazione elettrica). Nel complesso sono stati affidati otto appalti principali e cinque appalti minori³ (oltre a due appalti in precedenza già assegnati per la realizzazione degli apparati centrali computerizzati delle stazioni di Padova e Mestre). Le imprese che hanno ottenuto gli appalti (società singole o associazioni temporanee d'impresa) sono tutte italiane.

Le attività di cantiere sono iniziate il 30 settembre 2002 con la bonifica di ordigni bellici delle aree interessate al progetto. I lavori sono stati ultimati dalle imprese appaltatrici il 21 febbraio 2008, ad esclusione degli Appalti di completamento e del pagamento della rata finale degli espropri, nei tempi previsti dai singoli contratti d'appalto.

³ L'affidamento dei lavori relativi alla tratta Padova–Mestre è stato effettuato applicando le norme contenute nella legge 11 febbraio 1994, n.109 (cosiddetta "Legge Merloni"), come disposto dall'art.131 della legge 23 dicembre 2000, n. 388 (legge finanziaria 2001).

5.5.2 The EU 17.3 million euro financial contribution forms part of the 140 million euro funding obtained by Italy (Ministry of Infrastructure) for Priority Project 6 (PP6) from the 2000–2006 Community programming.

5.6. The tendering of the project works

The work under the project was awarded by "RFI S.p.A." to several operating companies between November 2001 (publication of the "invitation to tender" for the supply of the main civil engineering works) and September 2004 (the tender for the track equipment and electric traction). Altogether, eight major tenders and five minor tenders were awarded³ (in addition to 2 tenders previously awarded for the construction of the computerised control centres in Padua and Mestre stations). The companies awarded the tenders (individual companies or temporary consortia) are all Italian companies.

Work began on the sites on 30 September 2002 with the clearing of World War 2 ordnance from the project area. This work was completed by the awardees on 21 February 2008, (except for the completion tenders and the payment of the final expropriation instalment), within the deadlines provided in the individual tender contracts.

³ The work on the Padua–Mestre section was awarded by applying Law No. 109 of 11 February 1994 (the "Merloni Law", as provided by article 131 of Law No. 388 of 23 December 2000 (The 2001 Budget Law).

Il prospetto che segue evidenzia gli appalti in argomento ed alcune informazioni ad essi correlate (Appalto, Importo, Appaltatore, data di Aggiudicazione).

The following table 3 shows the contracts referred to here, and related information (tender, value, tenderer, date of adjudication).

Tabella 3: "Quadruplicamento AV/AC tratta Padova-Mestre" appalti delle opere in progetto (migliaio di euro)

Table 3: Project: "Quadruplication Padova-Mestre HS/HC line" tenders for the work (million euro)

Elenco Appalti Tenders	Importo Amount	Appaltatore Tenderer	Aggiudicazione Appalto Date of adjudication
Bonifica di ordigni bellici Clearing of World War II ordnance	3.677	ABC Mela	17/09/2002
Demolizione di fabbricati Buildings demolitions	0.870	Demolscavi	26/09/2002
S.S.E. di Vigonza, Padova e Spinea Vigonza, Padova and Spinea electric plants	15.126	ATI Gemmo - Bonciani	28/10/2002
Opere civili principali da Km 232+270 (79+072) a Km 254+992 (101+834) Main civil engineering works	134.565	ATI Baldassini Tognozzi Pontello-Matarrese	29/11/2002
Opere multidisciplinari da eseguire per fasi tra i Km 230 + 518 e 233+089 Multidisciplinary works	11.742	ATI Mattioli-CoracFer	16/06/2004
Impianto di BAB cc. Tipo SBA15 3/3 linea "storica" e linea AV/AC Coded current automatic block	37.066	Alstom	22/03/2004
Impianti di armamento, TE e LFM da Km 230+518 (77+338) a Km 256+450 Tracks works	42.172	Salcef	29/09/2004
ACC della stazione Mestre (quota parte intervento a carico del Progetto) Mestre station central computerized system	15.225	ATI Ansaldo-Sirti-Site	16/06/2004
ACC della stazione di Padova (quota parte intervento a carico del Progetto) Padova station central computerized system	5.876	Alstom	12/09/2001
ACC della stazione di Dolo Dolo station central computerized system	0.193	Alstom	06/10/2004
Barriere antirumore (Fasi 1, 2 e 3) Noise-abatement barriers	11.030	ATI Energiambiente spa- GeoCostruzioni Srl	22/06/2007
Risoluzione interferenze (accordi diretti con Enti Gestori) Technical agreement	7.105		
TOTALE appalti di lavori TOTAL tendered works	284.647		
Altri capitoli di spesa (Espropri, Progettazione, Direzione Lavori, Accordi Procedimentali, Oneri Diversi, Spese Generali) Other expenses (expropriations, design, supervision of works, procedure agreements, charges, overheads)	182.353		
TOTALE Costo a Vita Intera TOTAL	467.000		

5.7. I principali appalti e la realizzazione delle opere

La realizzazione di una infrastruttura ferroviaria è un intervento normalmente complesso che a lato dell'armamento dei binari e degli impianti tecnologici (alimentazione elettrica, segnalamento, telecomunicazione, trasmissione dati, ecc.) sovente comporta la realizzazione di ulteriori opere per un efficiente ed efficace insediamento dell'infrastruttura sul territorio.

Il progetto "Padova-Mestre" costituisce esempio paradigmatico della citata complessità. La realizzazione di soli 24,5 chilometri di linea ferroviaria in un contesto territoriale essenzialmente pianeggiante ha comunque comportato la costruzione di due gallerie artificiali e di un ponte, nonché interventi di riqualificazione della viabilità ordinaria esistente interessata dal tracciato della nuova linea e sostanziali modifiche delle stazioni di Padova e Mestre.

L'appalto economicamente più rilevante (134,5 milioni di euro) è stato proprio quello che ha avuto ad oggetto le "opere civili", cioè le due gallerie ed il ponte.

In particolare:

- la galleria artificiale per il passaggio della nuova linea sotto l'autostrada Padova-Brescia (lunga 47,50 metri, larga 11,70 e alta 8,20) è stata iniziata nel 2003 e ultimata nel 2004, con una modalità di realizzazione innovativa che ha consentito di completare la posa della soletta di ciascun impalcato sotto la carreggiata in 36 ore con minime soggezioni alla circolazione autostradale e ferroviaria;

5.7. The main contracts and the construction work

Railway infrastructure construction is normally complex and, in relation to the construction of the track and the technological plant (electric power supply, signalling, telecommunications, data transmission etc) often entails additional construction work to efficiently and effectively incorporate the infrastructure into the local area.

The "Padua-Mestre" project is a prime example of this complexity. The construction of only 24.5 km of railway line in what is essentially a plainland environment nevertheless required the construction of two artificial tunnels and one bridge, together with operations to develop the roads in the area affected by the route of the new railway line, and substantial modifications to the Padua and Mestre stations.

The most costly contract (134.5 million) was for the "civil works" tender, referring to the two tunnels and the bridge.

More specifically:

- Work on the artificial tunnel to enable the line to pass underneath the Padua-Brescia motorway (47.50 m long, 11.70 m wide and 8.20 m high) began in 2003 and was completed in 2004, using an innovative procedure which made it possible to complete laying the slabs for each support structure in 36 hours, with minimum interruption to the motorway and rail traffic;

- la galleria artificiale nota come “scavalco di Maerne” (lunghezza di 80 metri larghezza di 30 metri) è stata iniziata nel 2005 e ultimata nel 2006 Tale galleria è al servizio della linea Mestre–Trento e consente di “scavalcare” ambedue le linee (quella storica e quella nuova) della Padova–Mestre;
- il ponte sul fiume Brenta ha una lunghezza di 109 metri: la sua costruzione è iniziata nel 2004 e ultimata nel 2006 (Foto 2).
- Work on the artificial tunnel known as the “Maerne flyover” (80 m long, 30 m wide) began in 2005 and was completed in 2006. This tunnel serves the Mestre–Trent line and makes it possible to pass over both Padua–Mestre lines (the conventional line and the new one);
- The bridge over the River Brenta is 109 m long: work began on its construction in 2004 and was completed in 2006 (picture 2).



Foto 2. Il ponte sul fiume Brenta

Picture 2. The bridge over the river Brenta

Per quanto concerne le altre “opere civili”, come in precedenza osservato, sono state potenziate le stazioni di Padova e di Mestre attraverso il totale ridisegno dell’assetto dei binari e il rinnovo degli impianti tecnologici di regolazione della circolazione dei treni. Tali lavori hanno comportato, in particolare, l’interessamento di buona parte della radice Est della stazione di Padova e la profonda riorganizzazione di tutto l’assetto dell’ingresso a Mestre da Padova per la necessità di inserire 8 binari in luogo dei 3 esistenti.

With regard to the other “civil works”, as already indicated, the Padua and Mestre stations have been upgraded by completely redesigning the layout of the tracks and renewing the technological devices regulating train circulation. This work entailed much of the eastern section of Padua Station and the radical reorganisation of the whole of the entry to Mestre from Padua because of the need to incorporate eight lines in place of the three existing ones.

Al riguardo, la struttura operativa di RFI – Direzione Infrastrutture del compartimento di Venezia – che ha curato l’esecuzione dei lavori lungo la linea Padova–Mestre sottolinea che i lavori in argomento hanno comportato un “impegno estremamente intenso e prolungato, senza che si siano verificati inconvenienti di particolare rilievo” nonostante che i lavori fossero stati eseguiti in prevalenza in orario notturno nel corso di circa 700 interruzioni programmate della circolazione dei treni.

Tra gli interventi tecnologici, occorre evidenziare l’attivazione nel novembre 2005 di un nuovo Apparato Centrale Computerizzato (ACC) nella stazione di Padova che può gestire un volume di traffico di 500 treni al giorno, di gran lunga superiore all’attuale (giugno 2010) traffico giornaliero di 350 treni.

In this connection, RFI’s operational arm – Venice Department Infrastructure Directorate – which was responsible for implementing the work on the Padua–Mestre line has emphasised that these works entailed “an extremely intense and lengthy commitment, without any particularly important incidents or drawbacks”, despite the fact that the work had mainly been implemented during the night, in the course of about 700 scheduled track possessions.

One of the noteworthy technological operations was the activation of a new ACC (“Central Computerised System”) in 2005 in Padua Station which has the capacity to manage 500 trains a day, a considerable increase in the present 350 trains (June 2010).

L’ACC è frutto della ricerca e dello sviluppo compiuti dai tecnici di RFI S.p.A. con il supporto di “Italferr S.p.A.”, società di ingegneria del gruppo “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.”. La sua particolarità consiste nella possibilità di poter gestire i segnali e gli scambi attraverso un “nucleo di sicurezza” costituito da diversi elaboratori che, a mezzo di una serie di controlli incrociati, consente all’operatore di ricevere, attraverso il monitor di controllo, tutte le informazioni necessarie all’esecuzione dei comandi per la regolazione della circolazione.

The ACC is the product of R&D performed by RFI’s engineers with the support of Italferr S.p.A., two engineering companies belonging to the “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” group. What is special about it is that it makes it possible to manage signalling and switching via a “security core” made up of several linked computers through a series of cross-checked operations which enable the operator to see all the information needed to operate the commands to govern train traffic on the control monitor.

5.8 I collaudi finali

I collaudi finali amministrativi delle opere appaltate sono tuttora in corso in attesa della ultimazione di alcuni lavori di completamento, lavori comunque marginali e ininfluenti per la completa operatività dell'infrastruttura.

In effetti, tutte le opere connesse con tale operatività sono state collaudate sotto i profili tecnico-funzionali e della sicurezza.

Sulla definitiva chiusura dei collaudi tecnico-amministrativi incidono anche controversie in materia amministrativa essenzialmente relative ad interpretazione di clausole contrattuali o a incompletezza della documentazione.

5.8. Sign-off

Work is still in progress on the final administrative sign-off of the tendered works while awaiting the completion of a number of operations of marginal importance with no impact on the full operation of the infrastructure.

All the work of relevance to the full operational effectiveness of the project has already successfully passed all the technical/ functional and safety inspections and checks.

The final completion of the technical and administrative sign-off operations is also subject to the settlement of administrative disputes regarding the interpretation of the contractual clauses and to incomplete documentation.

6. Finanziamento comunitario

6. Community financial aid

6.1. La regolamentazione comunitaria

Il finanziamento comunitario a favore del progetto “Padova–Mestre” (circa 17,3 milioni di euro) è stato erogato nel quadro della regolamentazione che dispone la concessione di un contributo finanziario della Comunità nel settore delle reti transeuropee⁴.

6.1. The EU Regulations

Community funding for the “Padua–Mestre” project (approximately 17.3 million euro) was granted on the basis of the Regulation providing Community financial aid for trans-European networks.⁴

In particolare, per quanto in questa sede interessa, il regolamento fissa/prevede:

- **Dotazione finanziaria:** 4875 milioni di euro nel periodo 2000–2006
- **Forma di contributo:** studi relativi a progetti; agevolazioni in conto interessi sui prestiti concessi dalla Banca europea per gli investimenti; contributi alle Commissioni a garanzia; sovvenzioni dirette agli investimenti; partecipazioni al capitale di rischio;
- **Condizioni:** l'importo totale del contributo non può superare il 10% del costo totale dell'investimento (salvo eccezioni previste), ed, in tale ambito, gli studi possono essere finanziati fino al 50% del loro costo
- **Beneficiari:** progetti d'interesse comune e/o gruppi coerenti di progetti d'interesse comune
- **Domande di contributo,** presentate dallo Stato membro (salvo eccezioni)
- **Pagamenti** effettuati in forma di anticipi/prefinanziamenti (al massimo 50% della prima quota annua), versamenti intermedi e versamento finale
- **Programmazione,** sulla base di un “programma indicativo pluriennale comunitario” elaborato dalla Commissione in relazione alle domande presentate. Il “programma” serve da riferimento per le decisioni annuali dell'Autorità di bilancio comunitario che assegnano contributi comunitari ai progetti entro i limiti degli stanziamenti di bilancio annuali

⁴ Cfr. regolamento (CE) n. 2236/1995 (Consiglio) del 18 settembre 1995 che stabilisce i “principi generali per la concessione di un contributo finanziario della Comunità nel settore delle reti transeuropee”; modificato dai regolamenti n. 1655/1999 (19 luglio 1999), n. 788/04 (21 aprile 2004), n. 807/2004 (21 aprile 2004) e n. 1159/2005 (6 luglio 2005).

⁴ Cf. Council Regulation No 2236/1995/EC of 18 September 1995 laying down “general rules for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks”, amended by Regulations No 1655/1999 (19 July 1999), No. 788/04 (21 April 2004), No 807/2004 (21 April 2004) and No 1159/2005 (6 July 2005).

In particular: as far as we are concerned here, the Regulation makes the following provisions:

- **Total funding:** 4875 million euro in the period 2000–2006
- **Form of aid:** project studies and surveys; interest aid on loans granted by the European Investment Bank; aid for guarantee commission; direct subsidies for investments; participation in risk capital;
- **Conditions:** the total amount of the aid may not exceed 10% of the total investment cost (with some specific exceptions), and the studies may be financed up to 50% of their total cost
- **Recipients:** common interest projects and/or coherent groups of common interest projects
- **Aid applications,** submitted by the member State (with some exceptions)
- **Payments** in the form of advances/pre-financing (up to a maximum of 50% of the first annual instalment), intermediate payments and final payment
- **Programming,** on the basis of a “Community indicative multiannual programme” drawn up by the Commission in respect of the applications submitted. The “programme” is the benchmark for the annual decisions taken by the Community budget authority allocating Community financial aid for projects within the annual budgetary allocation limits.

6.2. Il “Programma indicativo pluriennale 2001–2006”

Il “Programma indicativo pluriennale per il periodo 2001–2006”, elaborato dalla Commissione in attuazione delle ricordata normativa comunitaria, ha poi definito le assegnazioni di contributi concessi allo Stato Italiano. “Ferrovie dello Stato s.p.a” per l’attuazione del Progetto Prioritario 6 (PP6): nel complesso 374 milioni di euro, di cui 17,3 milioni destinati al finanziamento del progetto “Padova–Mestre”, come evidenziato nel prospetto seguente⁵:

⁵ Nel periodo 2000–2006, la Commissione ha adottato una “decisione quadro” di programma indicativo pluriennale n. C/2001/2654 del 19 febbraio 2001 successivamente modificata con decisioni n. C/2004/3242 del 26 agosto 2004, n. C/2005/213 del 3 febbraio 2005 e n. C/2006/3010 del 4 luglio 2006. Il finanziamento totale a favore dell’Italia previsto nella decisione quadro era 309 milioni di euro (di cui 5 milioni per il progetto “Padova-Mestre”), poi aumentato a 374 milioni, di cui 17,3 per il progetto in esame.

6.2. The Community indicative multiannual programme for the period 2001–2006

The “Community indicative multiannual programme for the period 2001–2006” produced by the Commission in implementation of the aforementioned Community regulation established the amounts of aid granted to the Italian State – “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” – to implement Priority Project 6 (PP6): a total of 374 million euro, of which 17.3 millions to finance the “Padua–Mestre” project, as indicated in the following table 4⁵.

⁵ In the period 2000–2006 the Commission adopted the indicative multiannual programme (C/2001/2654 of 19 February 2001 “framework decision”), subsequently modified by decisions C/2004/3242 of 26 August 2004, C/2005/213 of 3 February 2005, and C/2006/3010 of 4 July 2006. The total financial aid for Italy according to this framework decision was 309 million euro (of which 5 millions for the “Padua-Mestre” project) which was subsequently raised to 374 millions, of which 17.3 was for this particular project.

Tabella 4: Quadro riepilogativo assegnazione fondi TEN-T al Gruppo F.S. - Anni 2001-2006 (milioni di euro)

Table 4: Summed up situation of TEN-T funds allocated to "Ferrovie dello Stato" Holding - Years 2001-2006 (million euro)

Programma multiennale 2001-2006 2001-2006 Community multiannual programme - Map								
Progetto Project	Finanziamento iniziale (Decisione quadro 2001) Initial funding (2001 framework Decision)	Decisione Decision 2001	Decisione Decision 2002	Decisione Decision 2003	Decisione Decision 2004	Decisione Decision 2005	Decisione Decision 2006	Finanziamento finale mip Final funding map
Tunnel base Brennero (solo quota IT) Brennero tunnel (Italian share)	22.5	1.4	0.0	1.1	1.5	11.8	17.5	33.3
Tratta internazionale Lione-Torino (solo quota IT) International line Lyon-Turin (Italian share)	50.0	5.0	23.7	18.0	8.0	24.0	10.0	88.7
Nodo di Torino: Susa-Dora Turin HUB: Susa-Dora	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Torino-Modane e cintura merci di Torino Turin-Modane and good's belt around Turin	20.0	0.0	2.0	4.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	8.0
Potenziamento tratte Pioltello-Treviglio e Rovato-Padova Upgrading Pioltello-Treviglio and Rovato-Padova lines	23.0	0.0	0.7	8.0	5.0	4.0	9.0	26.7
Nodo di Venezia Mestre e quadruplicamento Venezia Mestre HUB and line quadruplication	5.0	1.0	0.0	0.3	3.0	7.0	6.0	17.3
Nodo di Firenze Florence HUB	17.5	3.0	3.0	3.6	5.0	2.0	1.5	18.1
Nuova linea AV/AC Bologna-Firenze HS/HC new line Bologna-Florence	85.0	15.0	20.0	20.0	12.0	18.0	6.7	91.7
Nodo di Milano Milan HUB	18.5	0.3	0.0	0.8	1.0	2.5	7.0	11.6
Nodo di Roma Rome HUB	20.0	3.0	2.5	5.0	4.5	5.0	0.0	20.0
TOTALE TOTAL	270.5	28.7	51.9	60.8	40.0	76.3	57.7	315.4
Programma annuale extra MIP Annual programme extra MAP								
Anno concessione fondi Year of fund grant	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	TOTALE EXTRA MIP Extra total MIP
Importo concesso Granted amount	38.6	2.0	0.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	6.0	58.6
TOTALE fondi TEN-T concessi al gruppo FS dal 2000 al 2006 (Importi in milioni di Euro) TOTAL (million euro)								374.0

Tenuto conto delle indicazioni del programma pluriennale, la Commissione con cinque decisioni “ad hoc” ha, quindi, annualmente disposto il finanziamento di differenti successive fasi del progetto “Padova–Mestre”⁶.

Bearing in mind the multiannual programme indications, the Commission issued five “ad hoc” decisions, for several successive phases in the Padua–Mestre project⁶.

Le fasi progettuali finanziate dalle decisioni “ad hoc” sono qui di seguito sintetizzate:

- **Decisione 2001:** progettazione definitiva dell’adeguamento del nodo di Venezia/Mestre – finanziamento 1 milione di euro – inizio progetto 2001, conclusione giugno 2002
- **Decisione 2003:** studi per sistemazione nodo di Venezia/Mestre in vista attivazione nuova linea Padova–Mestre e futura connessione alta velocità Mestre–Trieste – finanziamento 0,335 milioni di euro – inizio 1 gennaio 2003, conclusione 31 dicembre 2004
- **Decisione 2004:** posa di due nuovi binari e realizzazione connesse opere civili – finanziamento 3 milioni di euro – inizio 1 gennaio 2004, conclusione 31 dicembre 2005
- **Decisione 2005:** lavori di armamento, trazione elettrica e sistemazione opere civili, espropri, gallerie artificiali – finanziamento 7 milioni di euro – inizio 1 gennaio 2005, conclusione 31 dicembre 2007
- **Decisione 2006:** prosecuzione lavori potenziamento nodo di Venezia/Mestre e quadruplicamento Padova–Mestre – finanziamento 6 milioni di euro – inizio 1 gennaio 2006, conclusione 31 dicembre 2007

Le decisioni citate indicano come beneficiario dell’aiuto comunitario la Repubblica Italiana – Ministero delle infrastrutture e trasporti e come attuatore del progetto “Rete Ferroviaria Italiana s.p.a.”.

I finanziamenti concessi dalla Commissione sono stati pari al 50 per cento dei costi per studi e al 10 per cento dei costi ammissibili per le attività.

The project phases financed under these ad hoc decisions were the following:

- **Decision 2001:** final design to upgrade the Venice/Mestre hub – 1 million euro – project start date 2001, completion date June 2002.
- **Decision 2003:** study for the development of the Venice/Mestre hub to prepare for the implementation of the new Padua-Mestre line and future Mestre-Trieste high-speed link – 0.335 million – start date 1 January 2003, completion date 31 December 2004.
- **Decision 2004:** new track laying work and construction of the allied civil engineering works – 3 million – start date 1 January 2004, completion date 31 December 2005.
- **Decision 2005:** track development, electric traction and civil engineering works, expropriations, artificial tunnels – 7 million – start date 1 January 2006, completion date 31 December 2007.
- **Decision 2006:** continuation of work to upgrade the Venice/Mestre hub and on the quadruplication of the Padua–Mestre line – 6 million – start date 1 January 2006, completion date 31 December 2007.

The aforementioned decisions indicate the recipient of the Community financial aid as the Italian Republic-Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, and as the project implementing partner, “Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A.”.

The financial aid granted by the Commission was equivalent to 50% of the costs of the studies and 10% of the eligible costs for the operations.

⁶ Cfr. decisione Commissione n. C/2001/2654 (a valere su bilancio 2001); n. C/2003/5376 (bilancio 2003); n. C/2004/5820 (bilancio 2004); n. C/2005/3350 (2005); n. C/2006/5394 (2006).

⁶ Cf. Commission decision No.C/2001/2654 (against the 2001 budget), C/2003/5376 (2003 budget); C/2004/5820 (2004 budget); C/2005/3350 (2005 budget); C/2006/5394 (2006 budget).

6.3. Il versamento dei contributi comunitari

I lavori – condotti sotto la responsabilità di Rete Ferroviaria Italiana quale ente incaricato dell’attuazione del progetto e destinatario degli aiuti comunitari – sono stati eseguiti nei tempi programmati (31 dicembre 2007) sicchè la Commissione ha liquidato entro tale data le domande di pagamento a saldo presentate dall’Italia⁷, come risulta dal seguente prospetto:

Tabella 5: Versamenti dei contributi comunitari al progetto Padova-Mestre effettuati dalla commissione (importi in milioni di euro)

Decisioni Commissione Commission Decisions	Contributo concesso (importo) Granted aid (amount)	Versamenti Payments			
		Acconto / Prefinanziamento Advance		Saldo Balance	
		Importo Amount	Data Date	Importo Amount	Data Date
2001	1.000	0.500	15-01-2002	0.500	04-11-2004
2003	0.335	0.167	28-10-2004	0.168	10-12-2004
2004	3.000	1.200	04-01-2005	1.800	02-05-2006
2005	7.000	2.800	22-09-2005	4.200	11-06-2007
2006	6.000	2.400	19-12-2006	3.600	27-12-2007
Total	17.335	7.067		10.268	

6.3. The payment of the Community financial aid

The work was implemented under the responsibility of Rete Ferroviaria Italiana as the party responsible for project implementation and the recipient of the Community financial aid, and was completed to schedule (31 December 2007) so that the Commission effected the final payments requested by Italy by that date,⁷ as the following table 5 shows:

Table 5: Community aid to Padua-Mestre project paid by the Commission (amounts expressed in million euro)

⁷ La domanda di pagamento a saldo deve essere presentata entro dodici mesi dalla conclusione del progetto e deve essere accompagnata (cfr. “condizioni particolari” allegate alle decisioni di finanziamento “ad hoc”):

- dalla relazione finale di esecuzione tecnica e finanziaria, che comprende una sintesi tecnica della realizzazione finale del progetto ed il rendiconto delle spese;
- da un attestato che certifichi che le spese sostenute e i pagamenti effettuati sono effettivi e conformi allo studio o ai lavori, attestato presentato dallo Stato membro, se beneficiario del contributo;
- dalla scheda di valutazione del progetto, compilata dallo Stato membro, se beneficiario.

⁷ The final payment application was to be submitted within 12 months of project completion and be accompanied by (cf. “Particular Conditions” annexed to the ad hoc funding Decisions):

- the final technical and financial implementation report comprising a technical summary of the completion of the project and the expenditure report;
- a certificate certifying that the actual expenses incurred and payments effected were true and consistent with the study or the works, to be submitted by the member State in the event that the State is the beneficiary of the financial aid;
- the project evaluation report compiled by the member State, if the beneficiary.

6.4. L'attestazione di effettività e conformità

Ai fini del pagamento del saldo, le decisioni di concessione dell'aiuto dispongono che lo Stato membro (o l'ente pubblico beneficiario) rilasci un'attestazione che certifichi la effettività e la conformità al progetto delle spese sostenute e dei pagamenti effettuati⁸.

Questa attestazione (rilasciata dal Ministero delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti) si basa anche sulle risultanze emerse da apposite verifiche documentali effettuate in Italia da funzionari di "Ferrovie dello Stato s.p.a.", quale organismo di controllo⁹.

L'esame del rapporto di verifica "2006", che dà conto del risultato delle indagini pianificate per acquisire una ragionevole certezza circa la sussistenza delle condizioni per il versamento del saldo finale del

8 In Italia questa attestazione è rilasciata dal Ministero delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti e si basa, in conformità a quanto richiesto dalle decisioni di concessione del contributo comunitario:

- a) sulla rendicontazione contabile elaborato da RFI s.p.a. e, al suo interno, dal "referente di progetto";
- b) sul "rapporto di verifica" presentato da Ferrovie dello Stato s.p.a. (v. più avanti sul testo);
- c) si basa sull'autocertificazione sottoscritta dal "referente di progetto".

9 Le funzioni di controllo sulle società partecipate (tale è RFI, attuatore del progetto, beneficiario del contributo comunitario e obbligato a produrre la rendicontazione contabile) rientrano di norma tra i compiti istituzionali delle società capofila (la "holding" "Ferrovie dello Stato s.p.a."). Nel caso in esame tali compiti sono stati assegnati alla "Unità organizzativa finanza agevolata" della "Direzione finanza", una struttura di controllo "esterna" al soggetto attuatore che, secondo il Ministero, unisce alla autorevolezza ed indipendenza "la necessaria esperienza e conoscenza dei progetti co-finanziati, nonché delle relative procedure contabili, tale da garantire un buon grado di affidabilità ed efficacia all'attività di verifica" (Cfr. nota Ministero dei trasporti-Gabinetto n. 42 del 31 ottobre 2007, "modulo parte E")

6.4. The certification of effectiveness and compliance

For the purposes of paying the balance, the decisions granting the aid require a member State (or the beneficiary public agency) to issue certification attesting to the fact that the expenditure was actually incurred and the payments were actually made in compliance with the project.⁸

This certification (issued by the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport) is also based on the documentary evidence acquired in Italy by officials of Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A., in its capacity as the audit body.⁹

It transpired, among other things, from the "2006" verification report on the results of the scheduled investigations to acquire reasonable certainty that the prescribed conditions had been met for the final balance

8 In Italy, this certificate is issued by the Ministry for Infrastructure and Transport, and is based, consistently with the requirements of the decisions granting the Community aid, on:

- a) accounts submitted by RFI S.p.A. and, within the company, by the "project reference person";
- b) the "verification report" submitted by Ferrovie dello Stato s.p.a. (see below);
- c) the self certification issued by the "project reference person".

9 The auditing functions over the subsidiary company (RFI as the project executing body, the recipient of the Community contribution, with the obligation to submit the project accounts) normally fall within the institutional duties entrusted to the parent or holding company ("Ferrovie dello Stato s.p.a."). In this particular case these tasks were assigned to the "subsidised finance organisational unit" at the "Finance directorate" as an "external" auditing body to the executing body which, according to the ministry, combined its authority and independence with "the necessary experience and familiarity with cofinanced projects and the related accounting procedures, to be able to guarantee a high level of reliability and effectiveness in its auditing work" (Cf. Cabinet office, Ministry of Transport note, no. 42 of 31 October 2007, "form part E")

contributo 2006, preso come campione, evidenzia tra l'altro¹⁰:

- l'ammissibilità dei costi rendicontati
- il rispetto della normativa nazionale e comunitaria in materia di appalti, sottolineando che l'affidamento diretto delle attività di progettazione e direzione dei lavori alla società "ITALFERR s.p.a." è consentito, poichè tra detta società e la committente RFI esiste un rapporto di collegamento infra-gruppo
- il rispetto della normativa nazionale e comunitaria in materia di ambiente
- l'adempimento dell'obbligo di pubblicizzare il sostegno comunitario
- la regolarità dei versamenti dei contributi previdenziali e assistenziali e delle ritenute fiscali.

of the 2006 contribution to be paid, taken as a sample, that:¹⁰

- the costs as reported were admissible
- public tenders had been complied with, and that the direct commissioning of the design and work supervision to Italferr S.p.A. without a public tender was lawful, because an infra-Group relationship existed between that company and the principal, RFI
- domestic and Community environmental law had been complied with
- the requirement to publicise Community support had been met
- all the Social Security and pension contributions, and tax withholdings, had been regularly paid.

10 Cfr. Ferrovie dello Stato, "Rapporto di verifica" 30 ottobre 2007.

10 Cf. Ferrovie dello Stato, "Rapporto di verifica" ("Financial audit report") 30 October 2007

7. Considerazioni conclusive

La nuova linea Padova–Mestre è stata realizzata entro i tempi programmati – circostanza questa di non comune riscontro nella realizzazione di opere infrastrutturali – ed è in pieno esercizio dal 2007. E' quindi possibile trarre delle prime valutazioni sul perseguimento degli obiettivi propri del progetto.

- Le diverse direttrici di traffico che confluivano nella stazione di Mestre sono state separate e rese indipendenti facendo così fronte a possibili congestioni.
- La separazione di flussi di treni a lunga distanza (passeggeri/merci) e di treni regionali/metropolitani, attuata attraverso la realizzazione dei due nuovi binari veloci (una velocità massima di 220 Km/h) ha aumentato le potenzialità della linea portandola dai 240 treni/giorno preesistenti agli attuali (giugno 2010) 350 treni/giorno, con una previsione di poter gestire sulla linea 500 treni/giorno.
- Di scarsa rilevanza – comunque in linea con le attese “ex ante” – risulta invece la riduzione dei tempi di percorrenza, essenzialmente da correlare alla breve sezione (meno di 25 chilometri) della linea ferroviaria interessata dal progetto.

7. Concluding considerations

The new Padua–Mestre line was completed by the scheduled deadlines – which is not a common event when implementing large-scale infrastructure projects – and has been working at full development since 2007. It is now possible to make the first assessments in terms of the specific objectives of the project.

- The various traffic routes meeting at Mestre station have been separated and rendered independent in order to avoid possible congestion.
- The separation of long haul trains (passenger/freight) and regional/metropolitan trains effected by building two new high-speed lines (a maximum speed of 220 km/h) has increased the prior potential of the line of 240 trains/day to the present 350 trains per day (June 2010) which is forecast to eventually reach 500 trains per day on that line.
- Conversely, the reduction in travelling times has been slight – but at all events consistent with the ex ante expectations – mainly because of the short length of the section (under 25 km) of the line forming the subject matter of the project.


- Sotto il profilo della solidità della configurazione finanziaria, il progetto, finanziato essenzialmente a carico del bilancio statale, non ha presentato problematiche.
- L'acquisizione dei finanziamenti pubblici è stata conforme alle necessità del progetto, sotto l'aspetto sia temporale sia quantitativo.
- Lo Stato italiano e la società che ha attuato il progetto hanno eseguito in maniera puntuale, tempestiva ed efficiente gli adempimenti previsti dalla normativa comunitaria.
- L'acquisizione e la rendicontazione dei finanziamenti concessi dalla Commissione nell'ambito del "programma indicativo pluriennale" non hanno sollevato problemi né contestazioni.
- Le verifiche in loco hanno preso atto dell'esecuzione dei lavori programmati, nei limiti delle competenze tecniche dell'auditor.
- E', infine, di netta evidenza che non è possibile isolare e valutare singolarmente l'apporto, il valore aggiunto della realizzazione del progetto "Padova-Mestre" in relazione all'intera infrastruttura ferroviaria Lione-Kiev. Certo è che il progetto in esame ha eliminato una "strozzatura" che creava gravi problemi alla funzionalità del trasporto ferroviario nel Nord dell'Italia rendendo quindi, nel complesso, più funzionale, efficiente e veloce il trasporto merci/persone sull'intera rete europea. E questo costituisce l'obiettivo essenziale di quella maggiore integrazione del settore comunitario di trasporti auspicata dal Consiglio europeo sin dall'inizio degli anni '90.

- From the point of view of the solidity of its financial configuration, the project, mainly financed from the Italian central government budget, created no problems.
- The acquisition of public funding was consistent with the project requirements in terms of both timing and quantity.
- The Italian government and the company implementing the project complied in a punctual, timely and efficient manner with Community regulations.
- The acquisition of and the accounts on the financial aid from the Commission under the "indicative multiannual programme" raised no problems or objections.
- On the spot inspections took note that the work as scheduled had been implemented, within the scope of the technical skills of the auditor.
- Lastly, it is quite clear that the contribution and added-value of the Padua-Mestre project cannot be isolated and evaluated separately from the whole Lyon-Kiev railway network infrastructure. This project has certainly eliminated the major bottleneck that caused serious problems to the operation of the Northern Italian rail network and has therefore made the transport of passengers and freight throughout the whole of the European network more functional, efficient and fast. And that was precisely the main objective of the increased integration of transport within the Community advocated by the European Council since the beginning of the 1990s.

Sotto questo profilo, il progetto “Padova–Mestre” va considerato come una tessera essenziale, una tessera d’oro, di quel lungo mosaico infrastrutturale programmato per unire efficientemente ed efficacemente l’Ovest e l’Est dell’Europa.

From this point of view the “Padua–Mestre” project must be considered as an essential tessera part, a key tessera in that huge infrastructure mosaic intended to link Western and Eastern Europe effectively and efficiently.

Revizija načrtovanja nove železniške povezave Divača–Koper



Audit of planning of the new
Divača–Koper railway line

Revizija načrtovanja nove železniške povezave Divača–Koper

1. Uvod
2. Ureditev področja in stanje javne
železniške infrastrukture
3. Organizacijska struktura
4. Dolgoročno načrtovanje razvoja javne
železniške infrastrukture
5. Investicijski projekti
6. Načrtovanje nove proge Divača–Koper
7. Ugotovitve
8. Priporočila

Audit of planning of the new Divača–Koper railway line

1. The Introduction
2. Regulation of the field and the condition of
the public railway infrastructure
3. Organisational structure
4. The long-term planning of public railway
infrastructure development
5. Investment projects
6. Planning of the new Divača–Koper line
7. Conclusions
8. Recommendations

1. Uvod

Na podlagi dogovora med vrhovnimi revizijskimi inštitucijami Francije, Italije, Madžarske in Slovenije, da izvedemo skupno revizijo smotrnosti poslovanja pri načrtovanju in izvedbi projektov na trasi 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T in izhodiščih, postavljenih s skupnim revizijskim načrtom¹ smo revidirali kako *Ministrstvo za promet* načrtuje razvoj javne železniške infrastrukture v Republiki Sloveniji in kako *Direkcija Republike Slovenije za vodenje investicij v javno železniško infrastrukturo*, organ v sestavi Ministrstva za promet, vodi postopke priprave nove proge Divača–Koper.

To poročilo, ki obravnava stanje v Republiki Sloveniji, je pripravljen na podlagi samostojnega revizijskega poročila Računskega Sodišča Republike Slovenije². Obdobje, na katerega se nanaša nacionalno poročilo, je 1. 5. 2004 do 31. 5. 2009.

1 Audit plan for the coordinated (performance) audit work relevant to the Lyon–Trieste–Koper–Ljubljana–Budapest railway development projects; 7. 7. 2009.

2 Revizijsko poročilo: Razvoj javne železniške infrastrukture, št. 1208-2/2009.

1. The Introduction

Based on the agreement between the supreme audit institutions of France, Italy, Hungary and Slovenia to perform a joint performance audit in planning and implementing the projects on the route of TEN-T Priority Project 6 and the framework set in the joint audit plan¹, an audit was conducted on how *the Ministry of Transport* is planning the development of the public railway infrastructure in the Republic of Slovenia and how *the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for the Management of Public Railway Infrastructure Investment*, the body affiliated to the Ministry of Transport, is managing the preparation procedures of the new Divača–Koper line.

This Report which considers the situation in Slovenia was prepared based on an independent audit report by the Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia². The period to which the national report refers is from 1 May 2004 to 31 May 2009.

1 Audit plan for the coordinated (performance) audit work relevant to the Lyon–Trieste–Koper–Ljubljana–Budapest railway development projects; 7 July 2009.

2 Revizijsko poročilo: Razvoj javne železniške infrastrukture, št. 1208-2/2009/48, Računsko sodišče Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana, November 2010.

2. Ureditev področja in stanje javne železniške infrastrukture

Nacionalna zakonodaja³ definira javno železniško infrastrukturo kot objekte in naprave, potrebne za nemoteno odvijanje javnega železniškega prometa, ter pripadajoča zemljišča, ki funkcionalno služijo njihovi namenski rabi (v nadaljevanju: JŽI). JŽI je grajeno javno dobro v lasti Republike Slovenije. Investicija v JŽI je vsaka graditev nove in

2. Regulation of the field and the condition of the public railway infrastructure

According to the national legislation³, public railway infrastructure (hereinafter, PRI) is defined as buildings and facilities required for smooth functioning of public railway transport and the accompanying land, which, according to its functionality, serves its intended use. The PRI is constructed public assets owned by the Republic of Slovenia. Investments in the PRI mean every construction of new PRI and

Slika 1: Omrežje prog JŽI po stanju leta 2009

Figure 1: The PRI line network in 2009

Vir: spletna stran družbe Slovenske Železnice d. o. o.

Source: Slovenske Železnice d. o. o. website



³ Zakon o železniškem prometu, Uradni list RS, št. 11/01, 33/01, 110/02, 56/03, 86/04, 15/07 in 58/09.

³ The Railway Transport Act, Official Gazette of RS, No. 11/01, 33/01, 110/02, 56/03, 86/04, 15/07 and 58/09.

nadgradnja obstoječe JŽI, s katero se izboljša prometno-tehnične in varnostne lastnosti JŽI.

Propustnost in izkoriščenost obstoječih prog na trasi 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T v Sloveniji sta predstavljeni v Programu omrežja Republike Slovenije 2009 kot kaže Tabela 1.

Tabela 1: Propustnost in izkoriščenost odsekov na relaciji od Kopra in državne meje z Italijo do državne meje z Madžarsko (Hodoš) po stanju na dan 30. 6. 2009

Odsek proge Line section	Število tirov Number of tracks	Propustnost (možno število vlakov na dan) Capacity (possible number of trains per day)	Izkoriščenost (v odstotkih) Utilisation (in per-cent)
Koper-Divača	1	66	88
Sežana-Divača-Ljubljana	2	135	62
Ljubljana-Zidani Most	2	300	51
Zidani Most-Pragersko-Maribor	2	185	65
Pragersko-Ormož-Središče	1	55	89
Ormož-Hodoš	1	34	88
Vir: Program omrežja Republike Slovenije 2009; verzija 3, ki je veljavna od 30. 6. 2009, Slovenske železnice d. o. o. Source: The Network Statement of the Republic of Slovenia 2009; version 3 valid from 30 June 2009, Slovenske železnice d. o. o.			

V letu 2009 so bile dovoljene maksimalne hitrosti vlakov na pododsekih trase 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T od 40 km/h do 160 km/h. Odseki Divača-Koper in Pragersko-Ormož-Ljutomer-Hodoš pa so bili ocenjeni kot stalna ozka grla, na katerih prevladuje dolgoročno zagotovljen tovorni oziroma potniški promet.

V reviziji smo podrobneje obravnavali železniško povezavo Divača-Koper, kjer obstoječa enotirna proga predstavlja ozko grlo z vidika kapacitete, saj naj bi naraščajoči tovorni promet iz Luke Koper v naslednjih letih presegal kapaciteto proge.

upgrading the existing PRI, which improves the transport-technical and safety characteristics of the PRI.

The capacity and utilisation of the existing lines along the TEN-T Priority Project 6 route in Slovenia are presented in the Network Statement of the Republic of Slovenia 2009 as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The capacity and utilisation of the sections on the line from Koper and the state border with Italy to the state border with Hungary (Hodoš) on 30 June 2009

In 2009, the maximum allowed speed of trains on subsections of the TEN-T Priority Project 6 route were between 40 km/h and 160 km/h. The sections of Divača-Koper and Pragersko-Ormož-Ljutomer-Hodoš were assessed to be permanent bottlenecks, at which the long-term freight or passenger transport is pre-dominant.

In the audit, the Divača-Koper railway connection was considered in detail where the existing single-track line represents the bottleneck from the viewpoint of capacity, because the increasing freight transport from Luka Koper is expected to exceed the line's capacity in the following years.

Investicije povezane z železniško povezavo med Divačo in Koper, ki so v fazi načrtovanja ali v začetni fazi izvajanja, so naslednje:

- modernizacija obstoječe enotirne proge Divača–Koper (v letu 2009 je bil izbran izvajalec del za prvo fazo gradbenih del),
- gradnja nove proge Divača–Koper (v letu 2009 je bilo objavljeno javno naročilo za pripravo projektne dokumentacije za pridobitev gradbenega dovoljenja) in
- gradnja nove proge Divača–Trst (v letu 2008 je medvladna komisija Republike Slovenije in Republike Italija potrdila študijo, ki opredeli potek optimizirane variante, ki delno poteka po trasi nove proge Divača–Koper).

The investments associated with the railway connection between Divača and Koper, which are in the planning phase or in the initial implementation phase, are the following:

- modernisation of the existing single-track line Divača–Koper (the first phase construction works contractor was selected in 2009),
- construction of the new Divača–Koper line (the public contract for the preparation of project documentation for acquiring the building permit was published in 2009) and
- construction of the new Divača–Trieste line (in 2008, the Intergovernmental Commission of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Italy confirmed the study that defines the course of the optimised variant that partly runs on the route of the new Divača–Koper line).

3. Organizacijska struktura

Razvoj JŽI sodi v pristojnost *Ministrstva za promet*, ki opravlja naloge na področjih železniškega, zračnega in pomorskega prometa, prometa po celinskih vodah in cestnega prometa, razen nadzora varnosti cestnega prometa, ter naloge na področju prometne infrastrukture in žičniških naprav. Operativne naloge izvajajo organi v sestavi ministrstva, kontrolne pa inšpekcijske službe. *Direkcija Republike Slovenije za vodenje investicij v javno železniško infrastrukturo* od 1. 8. 2007 pripravlja, organizira in vodi investicije v javno železniško infrastrukturo v vseh fazah investicijskega procesa ter organizira in izvaja nadzor nad pripravo projektne dokumentacije.

3. Organisational structure


The Ministry of Transport is responsible for the development of the PRI which performs tasks in the fields of railway, air and maritime transport, inland waterway transport and road traffic safety, and the tasks in the field of transport infrastructure and cableway installations. The operational tasks are implemented by the bodies affiliated to the Ministry, while the control tasks are performed by the inspection services. Since 1 August 2007, *the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for the Management of Public Railway Infrastructure Investment* has been preparing, organising and managing the investments into the public railway infrastructure at all phases of the investment process and supervising the preparation of project documentation.

Slika 2: Organizacijska struktura pri ravnanju z JŽI⁴

Vir: Računsko sodišče Republike Slovenije na podlagi Zakona o vladi, Zakona o državni upravi, Zakona o železniškem prometu in Zakona o varnosti v železniškem prometu.

Figure 2: Organisational structure in handling the PRI⁴

Source: The Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia based on the Government of the Republic of Slovenia Act, the Public Administration Act, the Railway Transport Act and the Safety of Railway Transport Act.



⁴ Stanje po uveljavitvi sprememb Zakona o železniškem prometu v letu 2007 (Uradni list RS, št. 15/07).

⁴ Situation after the entry into force of the amendments to the Railway Transport Act in 2007 (Official Gazette of RS, No. 15/07).

4. Dolgoročno načrtovanje razvoja javne železniške infrastrukture

Nacionalni program razvoja Slovenske železniške infrastrukture je leta 1995 sprejel Državni zbor Republike Slovenije. Nacionalni program je opredelil razvoj JŽI v obdobju od leta 1996 do 2005 in potrebna finančna sredstva⁵. Razvoj JŽI je v programu predstavljen v treh sklopih: obnova obstoječih prog, dograditev obstoječih prog in gradnja prog za visoke hitrosti. Kot osrednja os nacionalnega železniškega omrežja je navedena trasa, ki poteka po V. vse-evropskem prometnem koridorju, ki je tudi trasa 6. prioritetnega projekta TEN-T. V programu je navedeno, da morajo biti načrtovane posodobitve skladne s standardi, opredeljenimi v veljavnih evropskih dokumentih in predpisih Mednarodne železniške zveze. Navedeno je, da je hitrost 160 km/h tehnična karakteristika, ki jo mora Republika Slovenija upoštevati pri večjih rekonstrukcijah in novogradnjah glavnih železniških prog. Poročilo o obsegu realizacije programa ni bilo pripravljeno.

Novejši dokument dolgoročnega razvojnega načrtovanja je *Resolucija o nacionalnih razvojnih projektih 2007–2023*, ki ga je Vlada

⁵ Vrednost investicij v obdobju od 1994 do 2005 je bila ocenjena na 213.018 milijonov tolarjev po cenah 30. 9. 1993.

4. The long-term planning of public railway infrastructure development

The National Programme of the Slovenian Railway Infrastructure Development was adopted by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in 1995. The National Programme defined the PRI development in the period between 1996 and 2005 as well as the required financial resources⁵. The PRI development was presented in three parts in the Programme: reconstruction of the existing lines, extending the existing lines and constructing high-speed lines. As the main axis of the national railway network, the route running along the Pan-European Transport Corridor V, which is also the TEN-T Priority Project 6 route, was stated. The Programme indicates that the planned modernisations must be in compliance with the standards defined in the valid European documents and the regulations of the International Union of Railways (UIC). It is stated that the speed of 160 km/h is a technical characteristic that Slovenia must observe in large reconstructions and new constructions of main railway lines. The report on the extent of the Programme implementation was not prepared.

The more recent long-term development planning document is *the Resolution on the National Development Projects for the Period*

⁵ The value of investments in the period between 1994 and 2005 was estimated to 213,018 million tolar according to the estimates on 30 September 1993.

Republike Slovenije potrdila leta 2006. Resolucija je predvidevala, da bo Slovenija v obdobju od leta 2007 do leta 2023 za investicije v JŽI namenila 8,9 milijarde evrov. Navedena ocena vlaganj je bila podana na izhodišču, da bo letna gospodarska rast v Republiki Sloveniji v obdobju 2009–2013 znašala 5,3 odstotkov. Resolucija je predvidevala, da bo polovica sredstev zagotovljena iz javnih virov, polovica pa iz zasebnih.

Vrednost celotnega 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T je 60,8 milijarde evrov⁶ in je po vrednosti največji med tridesetimi prednostnimi projekti TEN-T. Slovenski del je ocenjen na 6,8 milijarde evrov⁷, kar je 11 odstotkov celotne vrednosti.

Tabela 2: Pregled načrtovanih vrednosti investicij in dinamike izvajanja 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T do leta 2023 (v milijonih evrov)

	Vrednost Value	Investirano do leta 2007 Invested until 2007	Investicije od leta 2007 do 2013 Investments between 2007 and 2013	Investicije po letu 2013 Investments after 2013
Celotna trasa v dolžini 1688 km The entire route in the length of 1688 kilometres	60.742	7.827	10.428	41.487
Slovenski del v dolžini približno 350 km The Slovenian part in the length of around 350 kilometres	6.821	112	983	5.735
Vir: Implementation of the Priority Projects Progress Report, European Commission, maj 2008, in podatki Ministrstva za promet (Poročilo implementacija PP6, 11. 5. 2009). Source: Implementation of the Priority Projects Progress Report, European Commission, May 2008, and the data of the Ministry of Transport (PP6 Implementation Report, 11 May 2009).				

Iz tabele 2 je razvidno, da naj bi v Sloveniji investicije v vrednosti 983 milijona evrov na trasi V. vse-evropskega prometnega koridorja izvedli v obdobju od leta 2007

⁶ Trans-European transport network, Report May 2008, European Commission.

⁷ Podatki ministrstva, ki jih je pripravilo za Evropsko komisijo (Poročilo implementacija PP6 11. 5. 2009).

2007–2023 adopted by the Slovenian Government in 2006. The Resolution envisaged that Slovenia devote 8.9 billion euros for the PRI investments in the period between 2007 and 2023. The mentioned investment estimate was based on the premise that the annual economic growth in Slovenia in the period of 2009–2013 would amount to 5.3 percent. The Resolution envisaged that half of the funds would be provided from the public and half from the private resources.

The value of the entire TEN-T Priority Project 6 is 60.8 billion euros⁶ and is the largest of the thirty TEN-T Priority Projects according to its value. The Slovenian part was estimated to 6.8 billion euros⁷, which is 11 percent of the total amount.

Table 2: The overview of the planned investment values and the implementation dynamics of TEN-T Priority Project 6 until 2023 (in million euros)

Table 2 shows that the investments, amounting to 983 million euros, for the route of the Pan-European Transport Corridor V in Slovenia should be implemented in the period between

⁶ Trans-European Transport Network, Report May 2008, European Commission.

⁷ The data of the Ministry prepared for the European Commission (PP6 Implementation Report, 11 May 2009).

do 2013. Izvedba preostalih načrtovanih investicij v vrednosti 5.735 milijona evrov pa je predvidena po letu 2013.

Državni zbor Republike Slovenije je spomladi leta 2010 sprejel zakon o zagotavljanju namenskih javnih sredstev za investicije v JŽI in vzdrževanje JŽI. S tem naj bi postalo zagotavljanje sredstev bolj predvidljivo. Ministrstvo za promet je pojasnilo, da je v pripravi tudi predlog novega Nacionalnega programa razvoja JŽI za obdobje 2010–2023.

2007 and 2013. The implementation of the other planned investments, amounting to 5,735 million euros, is planned after 2013.

In the spring of 2010, the National assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the act on providing earmarked public funds for PRI investments and maintenance. Thus, the provision of funds should become more foreseeable. The Ministry of Transport explained that the proposal of a new National Programme for PRI Development for the period 2010–2023 was being prepared.

5. Investicijski projekti

Pogoj za izvajanje javnih investicij je, da so uvrščene v letni državni proračun in so zanje zagotovljena finančna sredstva. Postopek uvrstitve investicij v državni proračun je urejen z Zakonom o javnih financah⁸, ki določa, da se pri pripravi predloga načrta razvojnih programov, ki je sestavni del državnega proračuna, upošteva naslednje:

- posamezen program ali projekt mora biti usklajen z dokumenti dolgoročnega razvojnega načrtovanja,
- posamezen program ali investicijski projekt mora biti pripravljen v skladu s predpisano metodologijo za izdelavo investicijske dokumentacije in
- za izbiro med konkurenčnimi programi ali projekti morajo biti določena merila in način njihove uporabe.

V tabeli 3 prikazujemo pregled načrtovanih in porabljenih proračunskih sredstev po letih za investicijske dejavnosti na JŽI v Republiki Sloveniji. Proračunska sredstva predstavljenih letnih proračunov Republike Slovenije vključujejo tudi sredstva evropske kohezijske politike.

⁸ Uradni list RS, št. 79/99, 124/00, 79/01, 30/02, 109/08 in 49/09.

5. Investment projects

The condition for implementing public investments is that they be classified in the annual state budget and that financial resources be provided for them. The procedure of classifying investment in the state budget is regulated by the Public Finance Act⁸, which determines that the following be observed in preparing the proposal of the development programme plan, which is an integral part of the state budget:

- a particular programme or project must be in compliance with the long-term development planning documents;
- a particular programme or investment project must be prepared in accordance with the prescribed methodology for preparing the investment documentation;
- the criteria and the method of application for selecting among the competitive programmes or projects must be determined.

Table 3 shows the overview of the planned and utilised budgetary funds by years for investment activities in the PRI in Slovenia. The budgetary funds of the presented annual budgets of Slovenia also include the European Cohesion Policy funds.

⁸ Official Gazette of RS, No. 79/99, 124/00, 79/01, 30/02, 109/08 and 49/09.

Tabela 3: Investicijske dejavnosti na javni železniški infrastrukturi v proračunih in zaključnih računih Republike Slovenije med leti 2004 in 2009 (v evrih)

Table 3: The investment activities in the public railway infrastructure in the budgets and financial statements of Slovenia between 2004 and 2009 (in euros)

Leto Year	Prvi sprejeti proračun The first adopted budget	Zadnji rebalans proračuna The final supplementary budget	Realizirani proračun The realised budget
2004	/*	16.871.749	1.036.405
2005	28.610.491	11.566.370	9.453.722
2006	16.857.566	16.857.566	1.698.610
2007	3.619.840	94.434.931	52.478.432
2008	109.758.469	178.436.789	128.664.373
2009	146.537.965	109.566.463	100.114.725
2010	275.545.545		
2011	314.156.217		
<p>*V prvem sprejetem proračunu za leto 2004 obravnavane postavke ni bilo. *The relevant item was not included in the first adopted budget for 2004. Vir: proračuni in zaključni računi proračunov Republike Slovenije. Source: The budgets and final statements of Slovenia.</p>			

Iz tabele 3 je razviden trend povečevanja odhodkov za investicije v JŽI v revidiranem obdobju. Realizacija pa je v vseh obravnavanih letih nižja od načrtovane, kar pomeni, da so se projekti na letni ravni izvajali počasneje kot je bilo načrtovano.

Table 3 shows the trend of increasing expenditures for PRI investments in the revised period. The realisation was lower than planned in all considered years, which means that the projects were implemented slower than planned at an annual level.

Vsi večji železniški projekti v obravnavanem obdobju so bili podprti s finančnimi sredstvi iz skladov Evropske unije. Slovenija je v letih pred vstopom v EU črpala sredstva iz programa predpristopne pomoči ISPA⁹ iz katerega ji je Evropska komisija od leta 2000 do 2004 odobrila sofinanciranje štirih železniških projektov na V. vse-evropskem prometnem koridorju s skupno ocenjeno vrednostjo 91 milijonov evrov (znesek odobrenih sredstev ISPA je znašal 37,9 milijona evrov). V obdobju od leta 2004

All major railway projects in the relevant period were supported with financial resources from European Union funds. In the years prior to joining the EU, Slovenia utilised the funds from the ISPA pre-accession aid programme⁹, from which the European Commission approved the co-financing of four railway projects between 2000 and 2004 on the Pan-European Transport Corridor V in the total estimated amount of 91 million euros (the amount of approved ISPA funds was 37.9 million euros). In the period between 2004 and 2006, two

⁹ Instrument EU za predpristopno pomoč pri strukturnih politikah, angl. Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession

⁹ Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession

do 2006 sta bila v okviru Kohezijskega sklada potrjena dva železniška projekta v vrednosti 55,7 milijona evrov (znesek odobrenih sredstev Kohezijske sklada je znašal 38,0 milijonov evrov), prav tako na trasi V. vse-evropskega prometnega koridorja oziroma trasi 6. prioritetenega projekta TEN-T. Od skupaj šestih projektov so bila do pomladi 2010 gradbena dela zaključena pri štirih, dva projekta pa sta bila še v izvajanju.

V obdobju od leta 2007 do 2013 je načrtovano sofinanciranje petih železniških projektov s sredstvi Kohezijskega sklada in Evropskega sklada za regionalni razvoj. Vsi železniški projekti se nanašajo na traso 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T, so navedeni v Operativnem programu razvoja okoljske in prometne infrastrukture za obdobje 2007–2013, ki ga je Evropska komisija potrdila dne 27. 8. 2007.

Tabela 4: Prioritetni železniški projekti Operativnega programa razvoja okoljske in prometne infrastrukture za obdobje 2007–2013

Projekt Project	Vrednost (v milijonih evrov) Value (in million euros)
Modernizacija obstoječe železniške proge Divača–Koper Modernisation of the existing railway line Divača–Koper	105,64
Rekonstrukcija, elektrifikacija in nadgradnja proge Pragersko–Hodoš za 160 km/h Reconstruction, electrification and upgrading of the Pragersko–Hodoš line to accommodate 160 km/h	173,42
Modernizacija nivojskih prehodov in izvedba podhodov na postajah Modernisation of level transitions and execution of underpasses at stations	240,69
Uvedba sistema GSM-R na slovenskem železniškem omrežju Introduction of the GSM-R system to the Slovenian railway network	72,36
Gradnja nove železniške povezave Divača–Koper* Construction of a new Divača–Koper railway line*	799,43
<p>* Predviden zaključek po letu 2013. * Completion estimated after the year 2013. Vir: Operativni program razvoja okoljske in prometne infrastrukture za obdobje 2007–2013. Source: The Operational Programme 'Development of Environment and Transport Infrastructure' for 2007–2013.</p>	

railway projects within the framework of the Cohesion Fund amounting to 55.7 million euros (the amount of approved Cohesion Fund assets was 38.0 million euros) were confirmed, as well on the route of the Pan-European Transport Corridor V or TEN-T Priority Project 6. Out of six projects, construction of four projects was completed, while construction of two projects is still being carried out in 2010.

In the period between 2007 and 2013, co-financing of five railway projects with the assets from the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund is planned. All railway projects relating to the route of TEN-T Priority Project 6 are listed in the Operational Programme 'Development of Environment and Transport Infrastructure' for the 2007–2013 period confirmed by the European Commission on 27 August 2007.

Table 4: Priority railway projects of the Operational Programme 'Development of Environment and Transport Infrastructure' for 2007–2013

Za projekte navedene v tabeli 4 je predvidenih 450 milijonov evrov evropskih sredstev kohezijske politike. Projekt Modernizacija obstoječe železniške proge Divača–Koper je v fazi gradnje in je bil v septembru 2010 potrjen z odločbo Evropske komisije o sofinanciranju. Projekt Modernizacija obstoječe železniške proge Divača–Koper je v fazi gradnje. Priprava projektov ne poteka v skladu s prvotno načrtovanimi časovnicami. Vlada Republike Slovenije načrtuje s spremembo predpisov uvesti poenostavitve na področju prostorskega umeščanja večjih infrastrukturnih projektov v prostor, kar naj bi pospešilo tudi pripravo železniških projektov.

Evropska komisija je od leta 2004 do konca prve polovice leta 2009 izdala tudi odločbe o sofinanciranju priprave železniških projektov iz TEN-T politike v skupnem znesku 43,3 milijona evrov. Odločbe se nanašajo na sofinanciranje priprave investicijske, projektne dokumentacije in drugih študij ter izgradnjo sistema ERTMS v Republiki Sloveniji. Tudi v teh primerih so bili roki črpanja sredstev na prošnjo Republike Slovenije podaljšani.

For the projects listed in the above table, 450 million euros from the European Cohesion Policy funds were envisaged. Project Modernisation of the existing railway line Divača–Koper is in construction phase and co-financing was confirmed with a European Commission decision in September 2010. The preparation of the projects is not carried out in accordance with the originally planned schedule. The Slovenian Government plans to implement simplifications in the field of placing facilities in physical space by changing the regulations, which should also accelerate the preparation of the railway projects.

Between 2004 and the first half of 2009, the European Commission also issued the decisions on co-financing the preparation of the TEN-T policy railway projects in the total amount of 43.3 million euros. The decisions refer to the co-financing of the preparation of investment and project documentation and other studies as well as the construction of the ERTMS system in Slovenia. In these cases, too, the time limits of utilising the funds were extended on request of Slovenia.

6. Načrtovanje nove proge Divača–Koper

6. Planning of the new Divača–Koper line

Na območju med Divačo, Koprom in državno mejo z Italijo so načrtovani trije investicijski projekti JŽI. Podrobneje smo obravnavali načrtovanje nove proge Divača–Koper.

Three PRI investment projects are planned in the area between Divača, Koper and the state border with Italy. The planning of the new Divača–Koper line was considered in detail.

Slika 3: Prikaz načrtovane nove proge Divača–Koper*

Vir: Strategija razvoja Slovenskega železniškega omrežja V. in X. Pan-Evropskega koridorja, vmesno poročilo, februar 2004, Ministrstvo za promet.

Figure 3: Presentation of the new Divača–Koper line*

Source: The development Strategy of the Slovenian Railway Network of the Pan-European Corridors V and X, interim report, February 2004, Ministry of Transport.



* Z modro barvo je označen potek nove proge Divača–Koper, s črno barvo pa potek obstoječe proge Divača–Koper.

* The course of the new Divača–Koper line is marked with blue and the course of the existing Divača–Koper line with black.

Evropska komisija je 29. 12. 2004 izdala Odločbo o dodelitvi finančne pomoči TEN-T sklada v znesku 5,47 milijona evrov projektu skupnega interesa „Tehnične študije za graditev drugega tira železniške proge Divača–Koper“. Prvotni rok za izdelavo tehničnih študij je bil 30. 9. 2005. Na prošnjo Republike Slovenije je bil rok črpanja sredstev večkrat podaljšan, vendar študije do konca leta 2009 še niso bile zaključene.

Za novo progo Divača–Koper je bil v letu 2005 izdelan in potrjen investicijski dokument: Dokument identifikacije investicijskega projekta za II. tir Divača–Koper. Investicija v novo enotirno progo je bila ocenjena na 661,13 milijona evrov. Iz dokumenta je razvidno, da je namen investicije povečati zmogljivost in zanesljivost železniških povezav med Koprom in Divačo zaradi pričakovanega povečanega obsega pretovora v Luki Koper.

V letu 2005 je bil sprejet državni lokacijski načrt za novo enotirno progo s katerim je bila proga umeščena v prostor. Tehnične karakteristike proge so prikazane v tabeli 5.

On 29 December 2004, the European Commission issued a Decision on allocating the TEN-T fund financial assistance in the amount of 5.47 million euros for the project of common interest “Technical Studies for Constructing the Second Rail of the Divača– Koper Railway Line”. The initial time limit for preparing the technical studies was 30 September 2005. On request by Slovenia, the time limit for utilising the funds was extended several times, however, the studies were not yet completed by the end of 2009.

In 2005, the investment document for the new Divača–Koper line was prepared and confirmed: Investment Project Identification Document for the 2nd Divača–Koper Line. The investment in the new single-track line was estimated to be 661.13 million euros. From the document it is evident that the purpose of the investment is to increase the capacity and reliability of the railway connections between Koper and Divača due to the expected increased volume of transshipment at Luka Koper.

The national spatial plan for the new single-track line, which placed the line in physical space, was adopted in 2005. The technical characteristics of the line are presented in Table 5.

Tabela 5: Karakteristike načrtovane nove proge Divača–Koper

Table 5: The characteristics of the planned new Divača–Koper line

Karakteristika Characteristic	Vrednost Value
Dolžina trase / The route length	27,224 km
Dolžina trase v predorih / The route length in the tunnels	20,320 km
Delež predorov / The share of tunnels	74,64 odstotkov / percent
Največji gradbeni vzpon / The highest construction rise	17 promilov / per mil
Maksimalna hitrost / Maximum speed	160 km/h
Vir: Dokument identifikacije investicijskega projekta za novo dvotirno progo Divača–Koper. Source: Investment Project Identification Document for the new double-track Divača–Koper Line.	

Projekt izgradnje nove proge Divača–Koper je kot prednostni naveden tudi v Operativnem programu razvoja okoljske in prometne infrastrukture za obdobje 2007–2013. Predvideno je sofinanciranje iz kohezijskih sredstev v vrednosti 248 milijonov evrov. Prijava Evropski komisiji še ni bila posredovana.

V letu 2008 je Ministrstvo za promet pričelo z aktivnostmi načrtovanja nove dvotirne proge namesto do takrat načrtovane nove enotirne proge. Izdelan in potrjen je bil investicijski dokument: Dokument identifikacije investicijskega projekta za novo dvotirno progo Divača–Koper. Investicija v novo dvotirno progo je bila ocenjena na 1.204,0 milijona evrov.

V marcu leta 2009 je bila izdelana študija z naslovom: Izdelava prometne tehnologije za progo med Divačo, Koperom in Trstom, v kateri so bile ocenjene zmogljivosti povezav med Divačo in Koperom kakor prikazuje tabela 6.

The project of constructing the new Divača–Koper line is also listed as a priority in the Operational Programme 'Development of Environment and Transport Infrastructure' for the 2007–2013 period. Co-financing from the Cohesion Funds is envisaged in the amount of 248 million euros. The application to the European Commission has not been yet submitted.

In 2008, the Ministry of Transport began planning the new double-track line instead of the single-track line that had been in the plans until then. The following investment document was prepared and confirmed: Investment Project Identification Document for the new double-track Divača–Koper Line. The investment in the new double-track line was estimated to be 1,204.0 million euros.

In March 2009, a study titled: Preparation of transport technology for the line between Divača, Koper and Trieste was prepared, in which the capacities of the connections between Divača and Koper as shown in Table 6 were estimated.

Tabela 6: Obstoječe in načrtovane zmogljivosti na povezavi Divača–Koper

Table 6: The existing and planned capacities of the Divača–Koper connection

Proge Lines	Propustnost (št. vlakov na dan) Capacity (no. of trains per day)	Zmogljivost (v milijonih ton letno) Capacity (in million tons annually)
Obstoječa proga / The existing line	72	9,2
Modernizirana obstoječa proga / Modernised existing line	82	14,3
Nova enotirna proga / New single-track line	95*	14,4*
Nova dvotirna proga / New double-track line	197*	33,1*
<p>* podatek se nanaša na pododsek med Črnim Kalom in Koperom. * The data refers to the subsection between Črni Kal and Koper. Vir: Izdelava prometne tehnologije za progo med Divačo, Koperom in Trstom, Prometni inštitut Ljubljana d. o. o., marec 2009. Source: Preparation of transport technology for the line between Divača, Koper and Trieste, Prometni inštitut Ljubljana d. o. o., March 2009.</p>		

Ministrstvo za promet je aprila 2009 podalo predlog, da se izgradi nova enotirna proga Divača–Koper. Temu je sledila priprava dokumentacije za pridobitev gradbenega dovoljenja za novo enotirno progo Divača–Koper na odseku Črni Kal–Koper, ki do konca leta 2009 še ni bila izdelana.

Pri načrtovanju projekta je prihajalo do zastojev tudi zaradi nejasnosti o potrebni zmogljivosti proge in preučevanju priključka nove proga Divača–Trst. Ocena potrebne zmogljivosti je ključna za odločitev o številu tirov nove proge Divača–Koper. Odločitev o umestitvi priključka nove proge Divača–Trst pa je potrebna za dobro in smotno načrtovanje celotne prometne rešitve na območju. Zamude pri načrtovanju so vplivale tudi na časovni potek črpanja sredstev kohezijske politike. Načrtovan začetek črpanja sredstev se je zamaknil za dve leti in obdobje črpanja podaljšalo iz treh na štiri leta (tabela 7).

Tabela 7: Načrtovana dinamika črpanja sredstev kohezijske politike programskega obdobja 2007–2013 za projekt nove proge Divača–Koper

Leto Year	Načrtovano v letu 2007 Planned in 2007	Načrtovano v letu 2009 Planned in 2009
2008	0	/
2009	0	0
2010	9.180.000	0
2011	59.130.000	0
2012	179.710.000	46.162.700
2013	0	46.162.700
2014	0	46.162.700
2015	/	46.162.700
Skupaj Total	248.020.000	184.650.797
Vir: podatki Ministrstva za promet na podlagi zadnjih rebransov proračuna za leti 2007 in 2009. Source: The data of the Ministry of Transport based on the last supplementary budget for the years 2007 and 2009.		

In April 2009, the Ministry of Transport submitted a proposal that a new single-track Divača–Koper line be constructed.

The preparation of documentation for acquiring a building permit for the new single-track Divača–Koper line on the Črni Kal–Koper section followed, which had not yet been completed at the end of 2009.

There were delays during project planning due to studies of the junction with the new Divača–Trieste line and because the required capacity of the line was unclear. The assessment of the required capacity is of key importance for the decision on the number of tracks of the new Divača–Koper line. A decision on placing the junction with the new Divača–Trieste line is required for good and efficient planning of the entire transport solution in the area. The delays during planning also affected the timeline of utilising the Cohesion Policy funds. The planned beginning of utilising the funds was delayed for two years and the utilisation period was extended from three to four years (Table 7).

Table 7: The planned dynamics of utilising the Cohesion Policy funds for the Programming Period 2007–2013 for the new Divača–Koper line project

Iz investicijske dokumentacije je razvidno, da bodo z izgradnjo nove enotirne proge povečane kapaciteta, zanesljivost in varnost povezave ter skrajšan prevozni čas. V tabeli 8 prikazujemo razliko med karakteristikami obstoječe proge in načrtovane nove enotirne proge.

It is evident from the investment documentation that with the construction of the new single-track line, the capacity, reliability and safety will be increased and the transport time will be shortened. Table 8 shows the difference between the characteristics of the existing line and the planned new single-track line.

Tabela 8: Primerjava obstoječe in načrtovane nove proge Divača-Koper (razcep tovarna/potniška)

Table 8: The comparison of the existing and the planned new Divača-Koper line (freight/passenger division)

Karakteristika Characteristic	Obstoječa proga The existing line	Nova proga The new line
Dolžina trase / The route length	45,5 km	27,224 km
Maksimalna hitrost / Maximum speed	60-90 km/h	160 km/h
Oсна obremenitev / Axle load	D3	D4
Vir: Dokument identifikacije investicijskega projekta za novo dvotirno progo Divača-Koper. Source: Investment Project Identification Document for the new double-track Divača-Koper Line.		

Strategija razvoja JŽI v Sloveniji:

- V Republiki Sloveniji je dolgoročni razvoj JŽI od leta 1996 do leta 2005 celovito obravnaval Nacionalni program razvoja JŽI. Od leta 2005 naprej so bili sprejeti posamezni programi, ki posredno ali parcialno obravnavajo razvoj JŽI. Zdaj je v pripravi nov program razvoja JŽI za obdobje od leta 2010 do 2023.
- Obstoječi programi in študije predvidevajo modernizacijo JŽI v Sloveniji skladno z usmeritvami evropske prometne politike, vendar pa finančna sredstva niso bila v celoti zagotovljena. Državni zbor Republike Slovenije je spomladi leta 2010 potrdil zakon o zagotavljanju namenskih javnih sredstev za investicije v JŽI in vzdrževanje JŽI.
- Izpolnjevanje mednarodnih zavez je pogosto navedeno kot pomemben razlog za modernizacijo JŽI. Pri utemeljitvi razvoja JŽI v Sloveniji bi bilo potrebno poleg teh več pozornosti nameniti tudi nacionalnim in regionalnim analizam povpraševanja po transportnih storitvah ter analizi učinkov, ki jih modernizacija JŽI prinese.
- Razvoj JŽI v Sloveniji je prednostno usmerjen na razvoj tistih prog, ki so

The PRI development strategy in Slovenia:

- In Slovenia, PRI long-term development between 1996 and 2005 was fully considered by the National PRI Development Programme. From 2005 onwards, particular programmes were adopted that indirectly or partially consider PRI development. At present, a new PRI development programme for the period between 2010 and 2023 is being prepared.
- The existing programmes and studies foresee modernisation of PRI in Slovenia in accordance with European transport policy guidelines; however, the financial resources have not been assured in full. In the spring of 2010, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia adopted the act on providing earmarked public funds for PRI investments and maintenance.
- Fulfilling international commitments is often stated as an important reason for modernising the PRI. In substantiating the PRI development in Slovenia, more attention should be paid to the national and regional analyses of transport service demand and the effects analysis due to PRI modernisation.
- The priority of PRI development in Slovenia is to develop the lines that are

del glavnih evropskih prog (6. prednostni projekt TEN-T in V. vse-evropski koridor). Zaradi dolgotrajne priprave projektov in nezagotovljenih zadostnih finančnih virov bo realizacija počasnejša od prvotnih časovnic. Prioritetno se načrtujejo in izvajajo projekti, ki so oziroma bodo sofinancirani s sredstvi kohezijske politike.

part of the main European lines (TEN-T Priority Project 6 and the Pan-European Corridor V). Due to the longer preparation period of projects and insufficient financial sources, the implementation is slower than the initial schedules suggested. The projects that are or will be co-financed with Cohesion Policy funds are being planned and implemented with priority.

Programi in investicije podprti s sredstvi EU

- V programskem obdobju od leta 2000 do 2006 so bili sofinancirani s sredstvi ISPA štirje in s sredstvi kohezijske politike dva projekta JŽI. Vseh šest projektov se nanaša na traso V. vse-evropskega prometnega koridorja in 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T. Pri izvajanju projektov je prihajalo do zamud, vendar bodo vsi projekti zaključeni.
- V programskem obdobju od leta 2007 do 2013 je 11 odstotkov vseh sredstev kohezijske politike do katerih je upravičena Republika Slovenija, namenjeno investicijam v JŽI. Za sofinanciranje je predvidenih pet projektov, ki se vsi nanašajo na traso 6. prednostnega projekta TEN-T. Pri načrtovanju investicij prihaja do zastojev in posledično do zamikov rokov izvedb. Načrtovano obdobje črpanja sredstev kohezijske politike je zaenkrat znotraj upravičenih rokov za črpanje.
- Pravila izvrševanja Evropske kohezijske politike, predvsem finančnega upravljanja s sredstvi

The programmes and investments supported with EU funds

- In the programming period between 2000 and 2006, four PRI projects were co-financed with the ISPA funds and two PRI projects with the Cohesion Policy funds. All six projects refer to the route of the Pan-European Transport Corridor V and TEN-T Priority Project 6. There were delays in implementing the projects; however, all projects will be completed.
- In the programming period between 2007 and 2013, 11 percent of all Cohesion Policy funds to which Slovenia is entitled is intended for PRI investments. Five projects referring to the TEN-T Priority Project 6 route are envisaged for Cohesion Policy co-financing. There are delays in investment planning and, consequently, in implementation. The planned utilisation period of the Cohesion Policy funds is, for now, within the eligible utilisation time limits.
- The implementation rules of European Cohesion Policy, particularly the financial management of Cohesion Policy funds

kohezijske politike in stroga pravila o časovnih mejah upravičenosti do črpanja teh sredstev pospešujejo izvajanje projektov, vendar se ob tem povečujejo tudi tveganja za smotrno izvedbo projektov.

and the strict rules on time limits of eligibility for utilising these funds accelerate the implementation of projects; however, the risks for efficient, effective and economically sound implementation of projects increase accordingly.

Načrtovanje nove proge Divača–Koper

- Projekt je v fazi načrtovanja, začetek gradbenih del je predviden za leto 2011. Cilji projekta in tehnične karakteristike proge so usklajene z nacionalnimi in evropskimi strategijami. Glavni cilj projekta je odprava oziroma preprečitev nastanka omejitev v kapacitetah in izboljšanje ostalih tehnično varnostnih karakteristik povezave. V fazi načrtovanja je bila dilema odločitev o tem ali je potrebna eno ali dvotirna proga. Sedaj se načrtuje enotirna proga z možnostjo kasnejše nadgradnje v dvotirno progo.
- Stroški projekta so bili ocenjeni v investicijski dokumentaciji, ki jo je potrdilo Ministrstvo za promet. Finančni viri so določeni (državni proračun in kohezijska sredstva), vendar ne še zagotovljeni. Finančna in ekonomska analiza sta bili izvedeni le delno, saj ključni investicijski program projekta še ni izdelan. Kljub temu je v teku pridobivanje dokumentacije za izdajo gradbenega dovoljenja.

Planning of the new Divača–Koper line

- The project is in the planning phase and the beginning of the construction works is envisaged for 2011. The project objectives and the technical characteristics of the line have been harmonised with the national and European strategies. The main objective of the project is to eliminate or prevent limitations of capacity and to improve the other technical and safety characteristics of the connection. In the planning phase, the dilemma was whether a single-track or double-track line was required. Now, a single-track line is being planned with the option of subsequent upgrading to a double-track line.
- The project costs were estimated in the investment documentation approved by the Ministry of Transport. The financial sources have been determined (the state budget and the cohesion funds), but are still not ensured. The financial and economic analyses were performed only partially, because the key investment programme of the project has not yet been prepared. Regardless, the document acquisition for issuing a building permit is in progress.

- Pri načrtovanju projekta nove proge Divača–Koper smo zaznali predvsem naslednje slabosti:
 - priprava investicijske, tehnične in druge dokumentacije je neusklajena oziroma ne poteka v ustreznem vrstnem redu, kar prinaša nepreglednost in lahko vpliva na kvaliteto izvedbe projekta,
 - pristojni so pri načrtovanju projekta sprejeli tudi odločitve, ki v času odločitve še niso bile v popolnosti preverjene z ustreznimi analizami.
- In planning the project of the new Divača–Koper line, particularly the following weaknesses were identified:
 - preparation of the investment, technical and other documentation was not harmonised or was not carried out in the appropriate order resulting in lack of transparency and it may affect the quality of project implementation;
 - during planning of the project, the competent authorities also adopted decisions that were not fully verified with appropriate analyses at the time.

8. Priporočila

8. Recommendations

Ministrstvu za promet in Direkciji:

- Pri določanju optimalnega obsega investicij v JŽI naj bodo odločitve utemeljene z upoštevanjem celotne trase V. vse-evropskega koridorja v Sloveniji, povpraševanjem po transportnih storitvah in učinki, ki jih modernizacija JŽI prinese.
- Predlog novega nacionalnega program razvoja JŽI naj vsebuje jasne učinke programa, ciljne tehnične parametre za glavne evropske proge v Sloveniji in realne finančne vire.

Pristojni organi naj oblikujejo postopke in/ali navodila za pripravo investicijske dokumentacije, ki bodo zagotavljali časovno in vsebinsko usklajenost potrebnih aktivnosti v procesu pridobivanja potrebnih dokumentov, vključno z morebitnimi poenostavitvami postopkov (investicijska dokumentacija, prostorska dokumentacija, gradbena dokumentacija in prijava projekta Evropski komisiji). V teh navodilih naj bodo predvideni tudi postopki in načini naročanja in vrednotenja analiz oziroma študij.

To the Ministry of Transport and the Agency:

- In determining the optimum scope of PRI investments, the decisions should be substantiated by taking into consideration the entire Pan-European Corridor V in Slovenia, the transport service demand and the effects due to PRI modernisation.
- The proposal of the new national PRI development programme should contain clear effects of the programme foreseen, target technical parameters for the main European lines in Slovenia and real financial sources.

The competent authorities should create procedures and/or instructions for preparing the investment documentation that will provide for the harmonisation of activities in relation to time and content in the process of acquiring the necessary documents, including any simplifications of the procedures (investment documentation, spatial documentation, construction documentation and the application of the project to the European Commission). These instructions should also include the procedures and methods of commissioning and evaluating the analyses or studies.

Evropski komisiji:

Modernizacijo in/ali gradnjo železniških povezav, ki so izrazito v skupnem evropskem interesu, je pogosto težko upravičiti zgolj na podlagi nacionalnih potreb in koristi. Evropska unija bi morala za časovno usklajeno ter kakovostno uresničevanje TEN-T politike pravočasno zagotoviti informacijo o deležu sofinanciranja posameznih odsekov glede na koristi, ki jih modernizacija prinaša tudi za Evropsko unijo. Za kvalitetno načrtovanje nacionalnega razvoja JŽI, predvsem obsega investicij, bi bila zato smiselna bolj aktivna vloga Evropske komisije pri oblikovanju finančnih izhodišč za podrobnejše načrtovanje modernizacije nacionalnih železniških koridorjev.

To the European Commission:

The modernisation and/or construction of railway connections that are highly in the common European interest is often difficult to justify only on the basis of national needs and benefits. For timely, harmonised and quality implementation of TEN-T policy, the European Union should provide in due time information on the TEN-T policy co-financing share of particular sections with regard to the benefits of the modernisation for the European Union. Therefore, for quality planning of national PRI development, particularly the scope of investments, a more active role of the European Union in forming the financial positions for detailed planning of modernising the national railway corridors would be welcome.

A Zalalövő–Boba vasútvonal felújításának ellenőrzése



Audit on the rehabilitation of the
Zalalövő–Boba railway line

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1. Bevezetés

Az EU Számvevőszékek Kapcsolattartó Bizottsága CC-R-2008-4. sz. határozatának 2/B pontjában javasolta a Transzeurópai Közlekedési Hálózat (TEN-T) V. korridor vasúthálózatát érintő beruházási projektek megvalósítása érdekében kapott EU-s támogatások felhasználására párhuzamos – több tagállamot érintő, határon átnyúló – teljesítmény-ellenőrzés végrehajtását. A jelenlegi TEN-T prioritási tengelyek és beruházási projektek tekintetében számos ország, így több számvevőszék érintett a párhuzamos ellenőrzésben. Magyarország a TEN-T pályahálózat V. páneurópai korridor 6. sz. kiemelt európai projekt vonalán EU támogatással megvalósuló vasútvonal fejlesztések ellenőrzését javasolta a pályaszakaszt érintő országok bevonásával (Olaszország, Szlovénia, Franciaország).

Az ellenőrzés célja annak értékelése volt, hogy

- a párhuzamos ellenőrzésben részt vevő tagországok saját közlekedési politikája illeszkedik-e a közösségi közlekedés-politika elveihez, meghatároz-e korszerűsítési igényt az V. korridor fejlesztéséhez kapcsolódóan;
- az EU által támogatott vasúti útvonalak fejlesztése – a meghatározott nemzeti

1. Introduction

In Paragraph 2/B of its CC-R-2008-4 resolution the Contact Committee of the EU Supreme Audit Institutions recommended carrying out a co-ordinated – cross-border, various Member States involved – performance audit on the utilisation of the EU funds granted for the realization of the investment projects related to the Trans-European Transport Network's (TEN-T) corridor 5 railway network. Considering the recent TEN-T priority axes and investment projects, it is an audit subject where many countries and therefore many SAIs are interested in the coordinated audit work. Hungary recommended the audit of the EU co-financed railway development projects in the path of priority European project N° 6 (TEN-T railway network's 5th Pan-European corridor) involving the countries which are concerned in that line (Italy, Slovenia, France).

The audit objective was to evaluate:

- whether the respective transport policy in the participating countries are in line with the principles of the community transport policy and whether it defines a demand for the modernisation of railway transport in relation to corridor 5;
- whether the development of railway network financed by EU funds – taking

és közösségi közlekedéspolitikai elveinek figyelembevételével – célszerűen és eredményesen valósul-e meg a TEN-T pályahálózat V. páneurópai korridor 6. sz. kiemelt európai projekt vonalán (V. korridor);

- a kiválasztott projektek előkészítésére és megvalósítására létrehozott rendszer eredményesen biztosítja-e az V. korridor érintő vasúti pályahálózat és a kapcsolódó infrastrukturális fejlesztések megvalósítását a részt vevő országokban;
- a kiválasztott projekt elérte-e, illetve várhatóan el fogja érni a közösségi és nemzeti stratégiában meghatározott célokat.

Az ellenőrzés tárgya olyan folyamatban lévő/ befejezett vasúti vonalszakasz beruházás, amely uniós támogatással valósul(t) meg. Az ellenőrzés keretében egy-egy ország a saját vonalszakaszát vizsgálta. Az ellenőrzött vonalszakasz, illetve azon belüli projekt(ek) kiválasztása a részt vevő országok önálló hatáskörébe tartozott.

A konzisztens megközelítés érdekében minden számvevőszék – amennyire csak lehetett – követte az elfogadott ellenőrzési programot, különösen tekintettel arra a fő kérdésre, hogy az ellenőrzés alá vont TEN-T projekt előkészítési folyamata és megvalósítása eredményesen szolgálta-e az uniós és nemzeti közlekedéspolitikai célok időarányos teljesítését és a rendelkezésre álló források hasznosulását. Az ellenőrzés a 2000–2010. évekre irányult.

Az ellenőrzés jogszabályi alapját az Állami Számvevőszékről szóló 1989. évi XXXVIII. törvény 2. § (5)–(6) bekezdésében foglaltak képezték.

into account the principles of the respective national and community transport policy – is effectively and efficiently implemented on the line of the priority project 6 of the trans-European transport corridor 5;

- whether the system set up for preparation and realisation of the selected projects effectively ensures the implementation of the railway network and related infrastructure developments concerning corridor 5 in the participating countries;
- whether the selected project has achieved/will achieve its objectives defined in the community and national strategy.

The audit focuses on an already completed or still running railway section investment that is (was) financed by EU funds. Within the confines of the audit each SAI audited its own railway section. The selection of the respective railway section, or within this railway section the selection of a respective project or projects lay with the respective SAIs.

To ensure a coherent approach, all SAIs followed the audit plan approved as close as possible, particularly with regard to the following main question: did the preparation process and the realisation of the TEN-T project selected to be audited efficiently served the time-proportional implementation of the EU's and national transport policy goals, as well as the utilisation of available resources? The audit focused on the period 2000–2010.

Items (5)–(6) of § 2 of the Act XXXVIII of 1989 on the State Audit Office serve as legal basis for the audit activity.

2. Összegző megállapítások

2. Concluding statements

A Magyar Köztársaság az Európai Unióhoz történt csatlakozását követően részesévé vált az európai közös közlekedéspolitikának is, amelynek fontos célkitűzése a környezet-kímélő vasúti közlekedés igénybevételének ösztönzése a jelenleg domináns közúti szállítással szemben. A közösségi közlekedéspolitika kiemelt területként kezeli a vasúti közlekedés fejlesztését, illetve a vasúti tevékenységek fokozatos liberalizációját.

A vasútról szóló 1993. évi törvény¹ 2001–2004. években történt módosításaival, valamint a részletes szabályokat megállapító miniszteri rendeletek megalkotásával a közösségi jog első vasúti csomagját képező közlekedés-fejlesztési irányelvek hazai jogszabályokba való átültetése döntően² megvalósult. A közlekedéssel összefüggő intézményrendszer kiépítése a 2004. évig csak részben történt meg, az intézményrendszer a vasúti közlekedésről szóló 2005. évi törvény megalkotásával vált egységessé. A vasúti korszerűsítést az Országgyűlés határozatával 2004-ben elfogadott **általános közlekedéspolitikai elveken** és fejlesztési irányokon

Having joined the European Union, the Republic of Hungary has become the member of the common European transport policy as well, where urging the use of environmentally sound railway transport against the currently dominating road transport is a main objective. The Community Transport Policy particularly considers the development of railway transportation and the gradual liberalization of railway activities as priority areas.

After several amendments of the 1993 Railway Act¹ between 2001–2004 and the issuance of the ministerial decrees which laid down detailed regulations, the incorporation of the *Acquis Communautaire's* first transport development directives (including railways) into the national legislation was essentially completed². The set-up of the transport related institutional system was only partly successful until 2004. The institutional system became homogeneous after enacting the Railway Transportation Act in 2005. Beyond the **general transport policy principles** approved by a parliamentary decree in 2004

1 A vasútról szóló 1993. évi XCV. törvényt 2006. január 1. napjával a vasúti közlekedésről szóló, 2005. évi CLXXXIII. törvény 86. § (1) bekezdése hatályon kívül helyezte.

2 A Magyar Vasúti Hivatal jogszabáylelemzése alapján a közösségi jog átültetése még nem valósult meg teljes körűen (pl. pályahasználati díj).

1 Act XCV of 1993 on the Railway was overruled by section 1 of article 86 of Act CLXXXIII of 2005 on Railway transportation as of 1 January 2006.

2 According to the interpretation of law by the Hungarian Rail Office, the adoption of the *Acquis Communautaire* has not yet been realised in full measure (e.g. infrastructure fees).

túl több „átfogó” fejlesztési koncepció is érintette, amelyek közös jellemzője az volt, hogy forrásokkal nem voltak megfelelően alátámasztva. A csökkenő költségvetési forrásokat a hitelek és az EU-s támogatások egészítették ki, amelyek felhasználását az átütemezés és költség túllépés jellemezte. A vasúti közlekedés-fejlesztés rövid távú (2008–2013) stratégiája az infrastruktúra megbízhatóságának fokozására koncentrált, a legfontosabb feladatként az átlagos EU teljesítmény elérését jelölte meg, amely illeszkedik az EU irányelvekben meghatározott fejlesztési politikához. A fejlesztések elsősorban a TEN-T 22. és 6. számú kiemelt vasúti tengellyel (azaz a IV. és V. páneurópai folyosóval) kapcsolatos projektekre koncentráltak.

A vasút működésének és **fejlesztésének finanszírozására** bonyolult, sokszereplős döntési mechanizmus alakult ki. A beruházási javaslatokat a megvalósító szervezetek állították össze, azok megvalósításával kapcsolatos döntésekben a különböző pénzforrások gazdái, a tulajdonosi jogokat gyakorló GKM és a PM, valamint az uniós támogatások odaítélését elbíráló NFÜ közvetlenül, vagy közvetve vett részt. A fejlesztések finanszírozásához 2000–2005 között a források – megfelelő összegben, összetételben, vagy időben – nem álltak rendelkezésre. Nem finanszírozták a beruházások előkészítését, az esetleg előkészített, de a csúszások miatt részben túlhaladott projektek aktualizálását. A vasútfejlesztés finanszírozásának jelenlegi rendszere nem hatékony, mivel a túl bonyolított szervezeti irányítás nem biztosítja a fejlesztési források átlátható és koncentrált felhasználását. Az első EU-s támogatások előkészítési rendje és

and development trends, the modernisation of the railway system was affected by many ‘comprehensive’ development concepts that equally lacked the necessary resources. The decreasing budget funds were complemented with loans and EU supports where rescheduling and overrunning the expenses were typical. The short-term (2008–2013) strategy of the railway transport development focuses on the enhancement of the infrastructure’s reliability, its main task being the achievement of the EU average performance, in compliance with the EU directives on development policy. The developments mainly focused on projects connected to TEN-T 22 and 6 priority railway axes (4th and 5th Pan-European corridor).

An intricate and multi-person decision-making mechanism was set up to **finance the development** and the operation of the railways. Investment recommendations were made by the implementing organisations. The owners of the different financial resources, the Ministry of Economy and Transport (GKM) and the Ministry of Finance (PM) as the possessors of the right of ownership, and the National Development Agency (NFÜ) responsible for the EU grant award procedure made implementation decisions in direct or indirect ways. Necessary resources for financing the developments between 2000–2005 were not available in due time, structure or amount. The preparation of the investments, just like the actualisation of the prepared but in the meantime outdated projects was not financed. The present system of railway development financing is inefficient because the overintricated organisational control does not ensure the clear and concentrated utilisation of the development funds. The preparation

követelményei ismeretlenek,³ a kedvezményezettek pedig felkészületlenek voltak a támogatások igénylésére és azok fogadására. Nem állt rendelkezésre az EU követelményeinek is megfelelő fejlesztési stratégia. A rendelkezésre álló pénzügyi források behatárolták a projekteket, a tervezett ráfordítások nem tartalmaztak inflációkövetést, a 2000–2001. években csak a MÁV Zrt. kerete állt rendelkezésre az előkészítésre, az állami költségvetésben nem szerepelt fedezet az előkészítési munkák végrehajtására. A támogatások igénybevételét 2000–2005 között nehezítette a magyar költségvetés helyzete, ami miatt a támogatást élvező EU-s projektek határidőcsúszása következett be. A döntéseket befolyásolták a forráshiányos környezet, a műszaki állapot, a nemzetközi elkötelezettségek, a MÁV szolgáltatási prioritásai és a változó közlekedéspolitikai koncepciók. Az EU-ból érkező források fogadásához, illetve a projektek lebonyolításához szükséges **intézményrendszert** Magyarország az EU előírásai alapján, a hazai jogszabályokat is figyelembe véve alakította ki. A szükséges átszervezések is késedelemhez vezettek, így például 2007-ben a MÁV beruházások lebonyolításának átszervezése a Nemzeti Infrastruktúra Fejlesztő Zrt.-be több hónapos kiesést jelentett a támogatások igénybevételénél.

Az ellenőrzött időszak **legfontosabb vasúthálózat-fejlesztései** a különféle uniós támogatásokkal (ISPA, Kohéziós Alap és KIOP forrásokból, valamint az EIB I/A és I/B, valamint IV. hitelek felhasználásával) megvalósuló vasúti infrastruktúrafejlesztések voltak. Az eleve egy éves késéssel elfogadott

³ Megállapította az ISPA támogatásokról szóló 530. sz. ÁSZ jelentés.

process for the first EU grants and the eligibility criteria thereof are unknown³ and the beneficiaries were unprepared for applying for and receiving funds. There was no development strategy available that complied with the EU requirements. The available financial resources restricted the projects and the proposed expenditures did not contain inflation correction. Only the resources of the Hungarian State Railways Co. Ltd. (hereinafter: MÁV Zrt.) were available for preparation works in 2000–2001, there was no reserve in the national budget to carry out the preparation work. The state of the Hungarian budget made the drawing of the funds more difficult in 2000–2005, that is why the EU-funded projects ran out of deadlines. The decisions were influenced by the lack of resources, the technical conditions, the international commitments, the service priorities of MÁV and the changing transport policy concepts. Hungary has created the necessary **institutional background** for receiving EU funds and completing projects in compliance with both EU regulations and the national legislation. The necessary re-structuring also led to delays, just like in 2007 in case of the merge of the implementation of MÁV investments into the National Infrastructure Developing Zrt. that resulted in a several-month delay in the utilisation of funds.

The most important **railway network developments** in the audited period were railway infrastructure developments with different EU supports (ISPA, Cohesion Fund and KIOP (Environment Protection and Infrastructure Operational Programme), using EIB I/A and I/B, and also IV. loans).

³ As stated in the SAO report on the audit of improving transportation infrastructure implemented in the framework of ISPA Programmes (0530).

Magyar Közlekedéspolitiká 2003–2015. évi fejlesztéseinek legfontosabb célkitűzései csak részben valósultak meg. Az ISPA csak a Helsinki folyosók mentén elhelyezkedő vasútvonalak fejlesztéséhez járult hozzá. Magyarország az **ISPA programban** 2004-ig 243,4 M euró támogatásra nyújtott be vasútfejlesztési projekteket. A 2000–2004 közötti programozási időszakban rendelkezésre álló közlekedési célú ISPA forrásból több mint 200 M euró támogatást az ország nem tudott időben felhasználni. A program elsődlegesen 2006-ban, majd a szerződésmódosítások miatt 2010. december 31-én zárul, de a finanszírozott fejlesztések teljes egészében még nem valósultak meg. A vasúti fejlesztések 363,2 M euró tervezett támogatási összegéből a 2009. december 31-ei zárásig 346 M euró kifizetése valósult meg. A vasúti infrastruktúra-fejlesztésre jutó **EU-s források** (ISPA maximum 50%, KA maximum 85%) költségvetési kiegészítést igényeltek, amelyekre vonatkozóan a hazai programok nem kellő időben és mértékben biztosítottak forrásokat. Magyarországon a fentiek figyelembevételével a 2000–2006 években nem volt eredményes az EU által támogatott kiemelt vasúti útvonalak fejlesztése.

Az **V. páneurópai közlekedési folyosó** (6. sz. kiemelt projekt) részét képező pálya a **Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba** útirányon át kapcsolódik a magyarországi vasúti fővonalakhoz. Ez a megközelítőleg 80 km hosszú vonalszakasz nagyon rossz műszaki állapotban volt, 80 km/h üzemi sebességgel, és a vonalkapacitást állandó sebességkorlátozásokkal jelentősen lecsökkentve „fogadta” a nemzetközi személyszállító- és tehervonatokat. Magyarország többek között e **vasút-vonalszakasz rehabilitációs** (korszerűsítés és felújítás keveréke)

The development goals of the Hungarian Transport Policy for 2003–2015 – approved with a delay of one year – have been only partly realized. ISPA only contributed to the development of the lines along the Helsinki corridor. Until 2004 Hungary applied for €243.4 M support for railway development projects under the **ISPA programme**. In the 2000–2004 programming period more than €200 M support from the available ISPA transport funds could not be used in due time. Primarily the programme was supposed to end in 2006, then after the modifications of the contracts it will end on 31st December 2010, however the financed developments have not yet been completed. Until 31st December 2009 only €346 M was paid from the railway development funds instead of the planned €363.2 M. The **EU funds** (ISPA maximum 50%, CF maximum 85%) for railway infrastructure development needed co-financing from the national budget where the national programmes did not ensure the necessary resources in due time and amount. In light of the above, between 2000–2006 the development of the priority railway network co-financed by the EU was not successful in Hungary.

The rail line part of the **Pan-European corridor V** (priority project N° 6) is connected to the Hungarian main railway lines via the **Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba** course. This almost 80-km-long line had been in very bad technical condition, normal running speed was limited to 80 km/h. International passenger and freight trains had to face decreased line capacity due to permanent speed limitations. Among others in order to complete this **railways-sector's rehabilitation works** (a combination of modernization and reconstruction), Hungary

munkáinak elvégzéséhez nyújtott be támogatási kérelmet az EU ISPA támogatásának megszerzésére. Az EU Bizottság 2000 decemberében 83,7 M euró támogatást (50%) ítelt meg a projekt kivitelezési munkáinak finanszírozására a hazai költségvetésből történő társfinanszírozás mellett. A kivitelezési munkák 167,4 M eurót meghaladó részét szintén a magyar költségvetés biztosította, illetve biztosítja. A vasútvonal fejlesztése ISPA/KA finanszírozás keretében valósul meg, melyre a pénzügyi megállapodást 2000. december 21-én, a támogatási szerződést 2001. április 15-én írták alá. **A Pénzügyi Megállapodás módosítására** – a nem megfelelő előkészítés, a közbeszerzési folyamatok elhúzódása és a pénzügyi források nem megfelelő időben történő biztosítása miatt – három alkalommal került sor, így az eredeti 2006. december 31-ei befejezési határidő 2010. december 31-ére módosult.

A tervezési, területszerzési és egyéb előkészítő, szakértői tevékenységek tisztán hazai forrásból valósultak meg. A projekt befejezésének várható összes költsége 199 M euróra (17,5%-kal) emelkedett. A **költségnövekedést** az előre nem kalkulált inflációs hatások, a műszaki szükségességből és a közbeszerzések elhúzódásából adódó átütemezések, valamint a műszaki tartalom változása okozzák, melynek várható értéke **meghaladja a 29,6 M eurót**. A 2001-ben átadott Szlovénia–Magyarország vasúti összeköttetését biztosító 19 km hosszú, egyvágányú vonalszakasz az AGC⁴ előírások figyelembevételével 160 km/h tervezési sebességgel készült el, de a vasútvonal – meghatározóan az áruszállítás igényeihez igazodva – üzemeltetési sebességeként

handed in an application to achieve EU ISPA support. In December 2000 the European Commission granted €83.7 M support (50%) for financing the implementation of the project co-financed from the national budget. The expenses of the implementation works exceeding the total amount of €167.4 M have also been financed by the Hungarian state budget. The development of the railway line is implemented with ISPA/CF assistance. The Financing Memorandum was signed on 21 December 2000, and the subsidy contract was signed on 15 April 2001. The **Financing Memorandum** had been **amended** three times due to the inadequate preparation, the delay of the public procurement procedures and the mistiming of granting the financial resources. Thus, the original completion deadline of 31 December 2006 was postponed to 31 December 2010.

Acquiring territories, planning and other preparation and professional works were completed only from Hungarian resources. The estimated total cost of completing the project has increased to €199 M (+17.5%). The **growth of the total cost**, that is expected to **exceed €29.6 M**, is generated by the uncalculated inflation effects, the changing of the technological content and the rescheduling caused by the delay of public procurements and the technological necessity. Even if the 19 km long single track railway line – delivered in 2001 connecting Slovenia and Hungary – was constructed with a planned speed of 160 km/h according to the AGC⁴ regulations, MÁV defined an operational speed of 120 km/h in compliance with the requirements of freight

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4 Agreement on Main International Railway Lines

a MÁV 120 km/h-t határozott meg. A Bajánsenye–Zalalövő vonalszakasz folytatásaként, a Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba útirányon belül, 100-120 km/h tervezési sebességgel épült át a pálya. A projekt tervezésénél és megvalósításánál a műszaki- és hatósági előírások mellett a környezetvédelmi szempontok is érvényesültek. Az uniós támogatással megvalósuló vasúti vonalszakaszok és a hozzá kapcsolódó infrastruktúrák fejlesztése nem volt összhangban az értékarányos ráfordítások (value for money) alapelveivel.

A projekt tervezésekor a műszaki és hatósági előírások mellett a helyben lakó emberek, az őket képviselő települési önkormányzatok igényeit is figyelembe vették. Az átépítés befejezésekor a nemzetközi gyorsvonatok menetideje Boba és az országhatár között akár 50 perccel is csökkenhet. Az elkerülő- és delta vágányoknál, a nyomvonal korrekciós szakaszokon a tájba illesztve épült az új nyomvonal. Magyarország egyik kiemelt természetvédelmi területén a dízelvontatást felváltó villamosított vasútvonal mentén jelentősen csökkent a zaj- és rezgésterhelés és a mozdonyok káros anyag kibocsátása. A vonal mentén élők korszerű, az esélyegyenlőségi feltételeket is figyelembe vevő állomási és peronburkolaton juthatnak el a szerelvényekhez. A 2010. február havi indikátorok összegzése alapján az összesen 78 km-es vasúti vonalszakasz felújításának műszaki készültsége 85,1%-os volt. A rehabilitált vasúti vonalszakaszon közép-távon a tranzit áruforgalom lehet a meghatározó, így a pálya műszaki paraméterei is elsősorban ezen igények kielégítését szolgálják. A 225 kN tengelyterhelés, a villamos vontatás, a 120 km/h sebességű közlekedés kielégíti a tehervonati közlekedés elvárásait. A kedvező eljutási sebességnek

transportation. Within the direction Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba (as a continuation of the Bajánsenye–Zalalövő railway section) the line was constructed with a planned speed of 100-120 km/h. Besides the technical specifications and official regulations, the aspects of environmental protection were also considered when planning and realizing the project. The development of the EU financed railway sections and the connecting infrastructure was not in accordance with the principles of value for money.

Besides the technical specifications and official regulations, requests of local inhabitants and the local governments were also considered when planning the project. After completing the reconstruction, the running time of international express trains between Boba and the country border may decrease by 50 minutes. In case of bypass and delta rails, in trace correction sections new traces were built in harmony with the landscape. The diesel haulage has been changed to electrically powered railway along one of Hungary's prime nature conservation areas, where the noise and vibration seriously decreased just like the pollution emitted by engines. Those living along the line can get to the trains through modern stations and platforms that respect the criteria of equal opportunities as well. Summarizing the indicators of February 2010, the technical readiness of the 78 km long railway section reconstruction was 85.1%. In the medium run transit freight transportation can be dominant on the rehabilitated railway section, so the technological parameters of the line mainly tend to meet those requirements. The 225 kN axle-loads, the electrically powered haulage and the 120 km/h fast transportation suffice for the freight trains' transport purposes. The favourable access speed

köszönhetően a helyi és helyközi vasúti személyszállítás versenyképes alternatívája lehet a közúti közlekedésnek.

Az AGC-AGTC⁵ előírásoknak megfelelő **vasúti pálya**, a XXI. század fejlett technikáját alkalmazó, számítógép vezérelt vasúti jelző- és biztosítóberendezések, utastájékoztató és utasításadó hangrendszerek, a korszerű, sorompóval biztosított útkeresztezések mind a közlekedés, mind a közlekedők biztonságát növelik, valamint hozzájárulnak az áru-fuvarozás és a személyszállítás területén az interoperábilis közlekedés feltételeihez.

can make the local and interurban passenger transportation a competitive alternative against road transportation.

The **rail line meeting AGC-AGTC⁵ requirements** is making use of the improved technology of the 21st century like computer controlled railway signalling and safety installations, audio devices for informing passengers and giving instructions and modern level-crossings guarded by barriers. These devices increase the safety of both the transportation and the passengers, and they also contribute to the interoperable passenger and freight transport.

⁵ European Agreement on Important International Combined Transport Lines and Related Installations – Európai Egyezmény a Fontos Nemzetközi Kombinált Fuvarozási Vonalakról és ezek Létesítményeiről

⁵ European Agreement on Important International Combined Transport Lines and Related Installations

3. Javaslatok

A helyszíni ellenőrzés megállapításainak hasznosítása mellett **javasoljuk**⁶:

a Kormánynak

1. intézkedjen a közlekedés korszerűsítésével kapcsolatos döntések összhangjáról, időben biztosítsa a szükséges költségvetési forrásokat a Magyar Közlekedéspolitikában 2015-ig meghatározott célok megvalósítása érdekében,
2. gondoskodjon arról, hogy a jelentős határidő túllépések elkerülése érdekében, az EU által is finanszírozott projektek előkészítése, lebonyolítása és a projektek ellenőrzése az előírt pénzügyi- és intézményrendszer biztosítása mellett zökkenőmentes legyen,
3. kezdeményezze a vasúti közlekedésre vonatkozó jogszabályi környezetben még fennálló harmonizátlanságok megszüntetését a közlekedésfejlesztésekhez rendelkezésre álló EU-s források hatékonyabb felhasználása érdekében.

⁶ A párhuzamos ellenőrzésben részt vevő számvevőszékekkel egyeztetve, a koordináció végrehajtásáért felelős EU szervezetnek megfontolásra javasoljuk, hogy biztosítson elsőbbséget a kijelölt TEN-T projektek – különösen a határokon átnyúló vonalszakaszok – finanszírozásának, amelyek befejezése szükséges ahhoz, hogy a TEN-T transzeurópai értéke kibontakozhasson.

3. Recommendations

Besides making use of the findings of the on-site audit we **recommend**⁶:

The Government

1. to take actions in harmonizing the decisions about the modernization of transportation and to ensure the necessary budgetary resources in due time in order to achieve the goals defined in the Hungarian Transport Policy until 2015,
2. to provide for the smooth preparation, implementation and monitoring of the projects co-financed by the EU in order to avoid major running out of deadlines, while ensuring the required financial and institutional system,
3. to initiate the elimination of the still existing legal discrepancies in the field of railway transportation in order to use the EU funds available for transportation development more efficiently.

⁶ In accordance with the SAIs participating in the coordinated audit, for consideration we recommend the the EU organisation responsible for implementing coordination to give priority to the funding of the TEN-T projects indicated – especially to those of a cross-border nature – whose completion is necessary to evolve the Trans-European value of TEN-T.

4. Részletes megállapítások az ellenőrzési kérdések szerint

4.1. A KÖZÖSSÉGI KÖZLEKEDÉSPOLITIKA ELVEI ÉS AZOK HAZAI ÁTÜLTETÉSE

Az Európai Unió a – vasutak piaci térvesztésében jelentkező – kedvezőtlen tendenciák megállítása érdekében meghatározta fő célkitűzéseit: a személyszállításban gyors eljutási idő biztosítása, nagysebességű hálózat kialakítása; a közúti/vasúti kombinált fuvarozás előnyben részesítése; a vasúti műszaki szabványok egységesítése és kompatibilissé tétele; és a határállomásokon az adminisztráció minimálisra csökkentése.

A 90-es években kidolgozták a közösség vasútpolitikáját. Az elvek elsősorban a vasúti szervezetek átalakítására, a vasúti infrastruktúra használatára és a szolgáltatások meghatározására vonatkoztak. A Tanács megállapította, hogy a vasúti közlekedés fejlődését hátráltatja az egyes vasutak merev nemzeti jellege, továbbá a hagyományos állam–vasút kapcsolat. Ennek megfelelően 1991. július 29-én elfogadták a közösségi vasutak fejlesztéséről szóló **91/440/EGK irányelvet**, amely a vasutak versenyképességének fokozására alapelveket rögzített.

Az elvi deklarációk nem hozták meg a kívánt eredményt. A közösségi vasúti szabályozás

4. Detailed findings per audit questions

4.1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE COMMUNITY TRANSPORT POLICY AND THEIR DOMESTIC ADAPTATION

With the aim of stopping the unfavourable tendencies manifested in the decreasing market share of railway, the European Union defined its main objectives as follows: ensuring quick access in passenger transportation, setting up a high-speed network, supporting the railway/road combined transport, unifying the railway technological standards and making them compatible, decreasing the administration at borders as much as possible.

The Community's railway policy was worked out in the '90s. The principles were mostly about restructuring the railway organisations, using railway infrastructures and defining services. The Council concluded that the development of railway transport is set back by the inflexible national structure of certain railways, and the traditional state–railways relation. Accordingly, on 29 July 1991 the **Directive 91/440/EEC** on the development of the Community's railways was accepted which laid down the principles of enhancing competitiveness of railway undertakings.

The theoretical declarations did not obtain the expected results. The so-called first rail

területén alapvető jelentőségű az ún. első vasúti csomag. Az Európai Parlament és a Tanács közösségi vasutak fejlesztéséről szóló irányelve módosításáról szóló **2001/12/EK** (2001. február 26.), valamint **2004/51/EK** irányelvei (2004. április 29.) (a továbbiakban együtt: vasútfejlesztési irányelvek) követelményként rögzítik a vállalkozó vasúti (árufuvarozás és személyszállítás) tevékenységet végző szervezetek pályahálózathoz történő hozzáféréseinek átlátható, megkülönböztetéstől mentes és tisztességes biztosítását annak érdekében, hogy a vasúti közlekedés területén hatékony verseny alakuljon ki.

Az első vasúti csomag a versenypiaci alapon működő vasúti közlekedés kereteinek megteremtése mellett az árufuvarozás területén – legkésőbb 2007. január 1. napjáig – teljes, míg a nemzetközi személyszállítás esetében korlátozott piacnyitást írt elő. A 2004. év során fogadták el az ún. második vasúti csomag részét képező irányelveket, amelyek elsősorban a vasúti közlekedés biztonságával, valamint a különböző típusú vasúti pályahálózatok közötti átjárhatóság biztosításával kapcsolatosan állapítanak meg jogharmonizációs kötelezettséget a tagállamok számára, az integrált európai vasúti térségnek az első vasúti csomag által megteremtett alapokon történő továbbfejlesztése érdekében. Előírja továbbá, hogy a vasúti balesetek kivizsgálására a vasúti szervezetektől független szervezetet kell létrehozni.

A transzeurópai közlekedési hálózat fejlesztésére vonatkozó 1692/96/EK számú határozat módosításáról szóló **884/2004/EK határozat** megjelöli azokat az európai érdekű, kiemelt fontosságú projekteket, amelyeken 2010

infrastructure package was of utmost importance in the field of Community railway legislation. **Directive 2001/12/EC** (26 February 2001) amending Council Directive on the development of the Community's railways and **Directive 2004/51/EC** (29 April 2004) of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter referred to as: railway development directives) laid down as a requirement that freight terminals should be open for fair, equal and non-discriminatory access to all train (both passenger and freight transport) operators in order to create efficient competition in the field of rail transportation.

Besides creating the frameworks for a competition-based railway transport, the first rail infrastructure package stipulated limited market opening in the field of international passenger transport and full market opening – until 1 January 2007 – in the field of freight transport. During 2004 the directives being part of the so-called second railway package were accepted. These directives mainly deal with the safety of rail transport but also stipulate obligations as regards legal harmonisation for the Member States in the field of providing interoperability between different types of railway network in order to further develop the integrated European railway area on the basis of the first rail infrastructure package. It was also stipulated that for investigating railway accidents, an organisation must be set up which is independent from the railway organisations.

Decision 884/2004/EC amending Decision 1692/96/EC on the development of the trans-European transport network indicates those priority projects in the interest of Europe where the works must be

előtt meg kell kezdeni a munkálatokat. A határozat III. sz. mellékletében szerepel többek között a 6. sz. kiemelt projekt, amelynek szakaszai megfelelnek az V. páneurópai folyosónak. Amennyiben az európai érdekűnek nyilvánított projekt munkálatainak megkezdése a 2010-es határidőhöz képest jelentősen késik, úgy az érintett tagállamnak legfeljebb 3 hónapon belül értesítenie kell a Bizottságot a késést okozó problémákról.

A Magyar Köztársaság az Európai Unióhoz történt csatlakozását követően részesévé vált az **európai közös közlekedéspolitikának** is. Ennek megfelelően az EU közlekedéspolitikája kiemelt területként kezeli a vasúti közlekedés fejlesztését, illetve a vasúti tevékenységek fokozatos liberalizációját, amit a Magyar Közlekedéspolitika 2003–2015. évekre szóló koncepciója is rögzít. A vasútról szóló 1993. évi XCV. törvény 2001–2004. években történt módosításával, valamint a részletes szabályokat megállapító miniszteri rendeletek megalkotásával a közösségi jog első vasúti csomagját képező irányelvek átültetésre kerültek a magyar jogrendszerbe. A vasúti közlekedésre is vonatkozó egyes korábbi jogszabályok még nincsenek összhangban az új vasúti törvénnyel.

A 91/440/EGK és az azt módosító irányelvek megvalósítása érdekében a következő főbb intézkedések történtek:

- Infrastruktúra és üzemeltetés szétválasztása. 1996. január 1-jén a MÁV Rt.-n belül az átalakítás első ütemeként létrejött az elkülönült pályavasút és vállalkozóvasút. Lezárult a vasúti reform végrehajtása, amely biztosítja a 2001/12/EK irányelv szerinti elkülönülést a létrejött üzletágak

started before 2010. Among others the priority project N° 6 whose sections correspond to the 5th Pan-European corridor can be found in Annex 3 of the Decision. If the beginning of the works in case of projects of European interests shows serious delay according to the original 2010 deadline, the Member State must inform the Commission about the reasons of the delay no later than 3 months.

Having joined the European Union, the Republic of Hungary has also become the member of the **common European transport policy**. The EU transport policy deals with the rail transport development and the gradual railway liberalization activities as priority areas, which have been also set in the concept of the Hungarian Transport Policy 2003–2015. With the amendments of the Act XCV of 1993 between 2001–2004, and the issuance of ministerial decrees which laid down detailed regulations, the incorporation of the directives of the Acquis Communautaire's first rail infrastructure package into the national legislation was completed. Some former legal instruments related to rail transport as well have not yet been harmonized with the new Railway Act.

In order to realise the Directive 91/440/EEC and the amendments thereof, the following actions have been done:

- As of 1 January 1996 railway undertakings and infrastructure managers have been separated within MÁV Zrt., which meant the first step towards reorganisation. The railway reforms have been completed, ensuring the separation of branches in compliance with the Directive 2001/12/EC (railway, passenger

(pálya-, személyszállítás-, árufuvarozás-, gépészet) között.

- A 2005. évi CLXXXIII. törvény (Vtv.) előírja harmadik fél hozzájárulásának biztosítását illetve ennek feltételeit a vasúti infrastruktúrához. A törvény rendelkezik a pályakapacitásokat elosztó és pályahasználati díjat megállapító Vasúti Pályakapacitás-elosztó Szervezet felállításáról. Kiadásra került a 45/2006. (VII. 11.) GKM sz. rendelet a vasúti társaságok engedélyezéséről.
- Interoperabilitás (a kölcsönös átjárhatóság elvének) lehetővé tétele. A 37/2006. (VI. 21.) és a 36/2006. (VI. 21.) GKM számú rendelet biztosítja a nagysebességű és hagyományos vasúti rendszerek átjárhatóságának feltételeit. A Vtv. a 2004/49/EK irányelvnek megfelelően szabályozza a vasúti biztonsággal kapcsolatos alapvető kötelezettségeket.

A GKM az úgynevezett Fehér Könyv félidős (2007. évi) felülvizsgálatát követően a **Magyar Közlekedéspolitiká** 2003–2015 dokumentum kiegészítésére a 2008–2020 közötti időszakra elkészítette az „Egységes Közlekedésfejlesztési Stratégia I. Zöld Könyv” (EKFS) című dokumentumot, amelyben a vasúti közlekedés főbb fejlesztési irányait mutatja be, amelyek az alábbiak:

- A rövid távú (2008–2013) stratégia az infrastruktúra megbízhatóságának fokozását határozza meg, a célként az átlagos EU teljesítmény elérését jelöli meg. A rövid távú fejlesztéseket elsősorban a TEN-T 22. és 6. vasúti kiemelt vasúti tengellyel (azaz a IV. és V. páneurópai folyosóval) kapcsolatos projektekre fókuszálja.

carrying, cargo, mechanical engineering).

- Ensuring access to the railway infrastructure for a third party and the criteria thereof is stipulated in the second Railway Act. The Act disposes of the establishment of a Rail Capacity Allocation Office that distributes line capacity and charges the infrastructure fees. The Decree 45/2006. (VII.11.) GKM of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Transport about the licensing of railway companies was also issued.
- Allowing of interoperability (the principle of mutual cross-connections). Decrees 37/2006. (VI. 21.) and 36/2006. (VI. 21.) GKM of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Transport ensure the conditions of interoperability between the conventional and high-speed rail networks. Basic safety duties are regulated by the Railway Act in harmony with the Directive 2004/49/EC.

After the mid-term review of the so-called White Paper (in 2007) the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Transport prepared the document titled “Green Paper on Uniform Transport Development Strategy I.” (EKFS) for the period 2008–2020, as a complement to the **Hungarian Transport Policy** 2003–2015. The document shows the main orientations of railway transport developments which are the following:

- Strengthening the reliability of the infrastructure is described in the short-term strategy (2008–2013), aiming to reach the performances of the EU average. Short-term developments are mainly focused on projects related to the priority axes TEN-T 22 and 6 (that is, the 4th and 5th Pan-European corridors).

- A középtávú (2014–2020) stratégia kiterjeszti az infrastruktúra megbízhatóságának célját és egyre inkább az osztályukban legjobb szolgáltatási szinteket határozza meg. A TEN-T vasúti folyosók jellemző tervezett sebessége szakaszonként eléri a 160 km/h értéket.
- A hosszú távú (2020–2030) stratégia a kapacitás fokozását, valamint a TEN-T vasúti hálózaton alkalmazott új technológiák bevezetését célozza, mint az egységes vonatbefolyásoló rendszer (ERTMS).
- The medium-term (2014–2020) strategy extends the aim of infrastructure reliability and rather describes the best possible service levels within the certain categories. The typical planned speed for TEN-T railway corridors reaches 160 km/h per section.
- The long-term strategy (2020–2030) is aiming at the improvement of capacities and introducing new technologies used in TEN-T rail networks, such as the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS).

4.2. A NEMZETKÖZI VASÚTI FOLYOSÓK FEJLESZTÉSÉNEK FELTÉTELRENDSZERE

4.2. TERMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RAIL CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT

4.2.1. A vasúti közlekedés fejlesztésének pénzügyi forrásai

4.2.1. The financial resources of developing rail transportation

Az Európai Uniótól érkező források az ellenőrzött időszakban folyamatosan növekvő mértékűek. A PHARE előcsatlakozási támogatást 1990 óta biztosítja hazánk részére, az **Előcsatlakozási Alapokból (ISPA, SAPARD)** a 2000. évtől részesültünk. Ezek a csatlakozás évétől a Strukturális Alapokból és a Kohéziós Alapból, valamint egyéb forrásokból érkező támogatásokkal (Schengen Alap, EGT és Norvég Finanszírozási Mechanizmus, Svájci–Magyar Együttműködési Program) egészültek ki. A 2007–2013 közötti programozási időszakban a korábbi támogatási szint jelentősen emelkedett. Az Előcsatlakozási Alapokon keresztül az Unió általában 50%-ban támogatta a megvalósítandó projekteket. A csatlakozást követően 2004–2006. évek között a Kohéziós

The resources coming from the European Union are continuously increasing in the audited period. **PHARE** pre-accession assistance had been granted to Hungary since 1990, and **Pre-Accession Funds (ISPA, SAPARD)** were available since 2000. As from the year of the accession these funds have been supplemented with supports from the Structural Fund, the Cohesion Fund and other funds (Schengen Facility, EEA and Norway Grants, Swiss–Hungarian Cooperation Programme). In the programming period 2007–2013 the former level of support increased significantly. Through Pre-Accession Funds the EU granted in average a support of 50% of the projects to be implemented. Following the accession,

Alap által biztosított fejlesztési források esetében a támogatások aránya – projektenként eltérően – 80-85%-ra nőtt. 2004-től ezek a támogatások részben vagy egészben megjelennek a Magyar Köztársaság költségvetésében. Az ISPA csak a transzeurópai hálózat és a helsinki folyósok mentén elhelyezkedő vasútvonalak fejlesztéséhez járult hozzá. A pénzügyi források trendjének 1990–2013 közötti alakulását a 1. sz. ábra mutatja be.

between 2004–2006 the grant rate provided by the Cohesion Fund reached 80-85%, varying per projects. After 2004 these supports partly or fully appear in the budget of the Republic of Hungary. ISPA has only contributed to the development of rail lines along the Trans-European Network and the Helsinki Corridors. The trend of financial resources between 1990–2013 is shown in Figure 1.


1. ábra: EU támogatások 1990–2013

Forrás: NFÜ (Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség)

Figure 1: EU supports 1990–2013

Source: NFÜ (National Development Agency)

millió EUR / million EUR



A **projektek kedvezményezettje** 2007. június 30-áig a MÁV Zrt. volt, 2007. július 1-jétől a támogatás új címzettje a Nemzeti Infrastruktúra Fejlesztő (NIF) Zrt. lett. A **projektek előkészítésére** 2005-ig csak a MÁV Zrt. saját forrásai álltak rendelkezésre. A 2000. évi támogatási kérelem elküldését és EU általi elfogadását követően a 2001–2002. évi

Until 30 June 2007 **the beneficiary of the projects** was MÁV Zrt. As from 1 July 2007 the National Infrastructure Developing Co. Ltd. (NIF Zrt.) became entitled to the supports. Until 2005 only the own resources of MÁV Zrt. were available for **preparing the projects**. Having sent the grant application for 2000 and following the acceptance thereof

költségvetésbe sem az előkészítés, sem a kivitelezés hazai forrását nem tervezték be. Az előkészítés és finanszírozás hiánya két év csúszást okozott a projektek megvalósításában. A projektekre vonatkozó Application Form benyújtásakor csak előzetes tanulmányok álltak rendelkezésre, amelyekben a műszaki tartalom meghatározása nem volt pontos. Mindezek következményeként tervezett ráfordítások csak becslések alapján kerültek meghatározásra.

A 19 vasúti beruházási projektből 7 kivitelezési, és 3 tervezői/konzulensi projekt finanszírozási megállapodásában rögzített ütemezést módosították. A projektek **előrehaladásában tapasztalt csúszások okai** a beruházási projekteket érintő stratégiai döntések, a tervezői kapacitáshiány, a finanszírozási körülmények változása, a projektekben meghatározott alprojektek egymásra épülése; közbeszerzési eljárás lebonyolításában bekövetkezett késedelem (eredménytelen eljárás, eljárás eredményének megtámadása), valamint az intézményrendszer változása. Az EU támogatások előkészítési rendje és követelményei ismeretlenek⁷, a **kedvezményezettek** felkészületlenek voltak a támogatások igénylésére és azok fogadására. 2000–2005 között került kialakításra az EU elvárásainak megfelelő **intézményi rendszer** a támogatások előkészítésére, fogadására, a projektek lebonyolítására és ellenőrzésére. Az első pillanattól kezdve nehezítette az igénybevételt az, hogy a **költségvetés** az önrészt nem finanszírozta ütemesen, ami miatt a támogatást élvező EU projektek határidő csúsztatására kényszerültek.

⁷ Megállapította az ISPA támogatásokról szóló 530. sz. ÁSZ jelentés

by the EU, the own resources of neither the preparation nor the implementation were included in the 2001–2002 budget.


The lack of preparation and financing resulted in a two-year delay in the implementations of the projects. When handing in the Application Form, only pre-studies were available whose technical specifications were not accurate. In consequence of the above, only an estimate of the expenditures could be given.

Out of the 19 railway investment projects, the schedules fixed in the financing memorandums were amended in case of 7 implementation and 3 planning / consultancy projects. The **reasons for the delays in the progress** of the projects are strategic decisions related to investment projects, lack of planning capacity, changing of financial conditions, correlation of the sub-projects, delay in completing public procurement procedures (unsuccessful procedures, attacking the results) and changing of the institutional system. The preparation methods and requirements of the EU supports were unknown⁷ and the **beneficiaries** were unprepared both for claiming and receiving supports. In 2000–2005 an **institutional system** which met the EU requirements was set up for preparing for and receiving supports and for the implementation and monitoring of the projects. From the very beginning, drawing of the funds was hindered by the fact that the **state budget** did not provide the own contribution at the necessary pace, so the deadlines of EU-funded projects had to be extended.

⁷ As stated in the SAO report on the audit of improving transportation infrastructure implemented in the framework of ISPA Programmes (0530).

2. ábra: EU támogatások (ISPA / Kohéziós Alap) összesített felhasználási üteme (363,2 millió EUR)

Figure 2: Overall utilisation rate of EU Funds (ISPA / Cohesion Fund) (EUR 363.2 million)



A 2000–2004 közötti programozási időszakban rendelkezésre álló összes közlekedési célú ISPA forrásból – 363,2 M euró – több mint 200 M euró támogatást (55%) az ország nem tudott időben felhasználni (2. sz. ábra). Az ISPA Programban be nem fejezett projektek költségei a Kohéziós Alap keretéből kerülnek kifizetésre. A szerződésmódosítások következtében a kifizetési lehetőségek 2010. december 31-éig kitolódtak. 2009. december 31-éig a rendelkezésre álló források 95,3%-a került kifizetésre.

Out of the total amount of ISPA funds available for transportation purposes in the programming period 2000–2004 (€363.2 M) Hungary could not use more than €200 M (55%) in due time (Figure 2.). The costs of the projects not having been finished under the ISPA are covered by the resources of the Cohesion Fund. Due to the modifications in the contracts, costs arising until the extended deadline of 31 December 2010 are eligible for financing. Until 31 December 2009, 95.3% of the available resources was paid.

4.2.2. Az intézményrendszer kialakítása

Magyarország kialakította az EU-ból érkező források fogadásához szükséges intézményrendszert. A Kormány 2006. július 1-jével a Nemzeti Fejlesztési Hivatal jogutódjaként létrehozta a **Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökséget**

4.2.2. Institutional set-up

Hungary has set up the required institution system for receiving supports from the EU. On 1 July 2006, the government set up the **National Development Agency (NFÜ)** as the successor of National Development Office,

(NFÜ), amelynek keretében látták el az új és korábbi programozási időszak Operatív Programjainak Irányító Hatóságai a feladataikat. Az NFÜ felelőssége kiterjedt – a PHARE programokkal és a Schengen Alappal, az Átmeneti Támogatással, a Norvég Finanszírozási Mechanizmussal, illetve az EGT Finanszírozási Mechanizmussal, Svájci–Magyar Együttműködési Programmal kapcsolatos – az előkészítési, szervezési és koordinációs feladatokra is. Az NFÜ szervezetében kiemelt szerepet kapott a Koordinációs IH, amely figyelemmel kíséri a Község Támogatási Keret végrehajtását és az irányító hatóságok tevékenységét, irányítja a programok értékelését. **Az Irányító Hatóságok feladataik egy részét Közreműködő Szervezetekre delegálták.** Az ÚMFT OP-k végrehajtására 15 közreműködő szervezet került kijelölésre. **A PM Nemzeti Programengedélyező Iroda** (a továbbiakban Kifizető/Igazoló Hatóság) látja el a kifizető és az igazoló hatósági feladatköröket.

Az intézményi felkészülést és ezen belül az irányítási és ellenőrzési rendszerek kialakításának megfelelőségét az uniós és hazai szabályozással összhangban a KEHI, mint Ellenőrzési Hatóság vizsgálja. A megfelelőségi vizsgálatokról szóló **akkreditációs jelentéseket** az EU Bizottság 2008. év folyamán, a KÖZOP és a KMOP 2. prioritás tekintetében 2009. június 12-én jóváhagyta és a KEHI által benyújtott „nem minősített” véleményt elfogadta. 2008-ban az NFÜ és az uniós támogatások lebonyolításában érintett intézményrendszer feladatai jelentősen megnövekedtek. Az intézményrendszer folyamatos átalakulása, a kapacitáshiány, illetve a magas fluktuáció a feladatellátásban fenn-

that has taken up the tasks of Managing Authorities as regards the Operational Programmes of the current and former programming periods. NFÜ was also responsible for the preparation, organisation and coordination tasks related to PHARE programmes and Schengen Facility, Transition Facility, EEA and the Norwegian Financing Mechanism and the Swiss–Hungarian Cooperation Programme. Within NFÜ the Coordination Managing Authority plays an important role that monitors the implementation of the Community Support Framework and the Managing Authority’s activities, as well as manages the evaluation of the programmes.

Some of the Managing Authorities’ tasks were delegated to Intermediary Bodies.

15 Intermediary Bodies were appointed to implement the Operational Programmes of the New Hungary Development Plan (ÚMFT). **The National Authorising Officers’ Office of the Ministry of Finance** (hereafter: Paying / Certifying Authority) takes up the tasks of the paying and certifying authority.

The preparedness of institutions, specifically the compliance of managing and monitoring systems with national and EU requirements is audited by the Government Audit Office (KEHI) as an Auditing Authority. **Accreditation reports** about the compliance audits were approved by the European Commission during 2008, in case of the Transport OP and the 2nd priority of the Central Hungary OP on 12 June 2009. The Commission accepted the “unqualified” opinion submitted by KEHI as well. In 2008 the tasks of NFÜ and the institutional system dealing with the tendering for EU supports increased significantly. The continuous transformation of the institutional system, the lack of capacity

akadásokat okozott, amelyek hatásai a pénzügyi feladatok ellátása terén is érezhetőek voltak.

4.2.3. Az uniós támogatások hazai ellenőrzési rendszere

A támogatások pénzügyi ellenőrzéséért – az Európai Bizottság felelőssége sérelme nélkül – elsődlegesen a tagállamok vállalnak felelősséget. A feladatok ellátásához kapcsolódóan a tagállamoknak az ellenőrzések három szintjét kell ellátniuk. Az ellenőrzési funkciók hiányos működésére vonatkozó megállapítások – a 2005. évi tapasztalatokhoz hasonlóan – a 2008. évben lefolytatott ellenőrzések során is megfogalmazódtak, amely arra utal, hogy az ellenőrzési rendszer további erősítése szükséges az Irányító Hatóságok (IH) és a Közreműködő Szervezetek (KSZ) vonatkozásában. A KSZ-ek első szintű és az IH által elvégzendő felülvizsgálati ellenőrzésének nem kielégítő volta magas kockázatot hordoz a programok szabályszerű és a támogatási célnak megfelelő **végrehajtása/megvalósulása tekintetében**. Az ellenőrzések hangsúlyozták az első szintű ellenőrzések IH általi felülvizsgálatának fontosságát.

and the high fluctuation in the field of task performance resulted in bottlenecks effecting the completion of financial tasks as well.

4.2.3. National audit system of EU funds

In the first place, the financial audit of the funds is the responsibility of the Member States – without prejudice to the European Commission's responsibility. The Member States have to ensure three audit levels to complete their tasks. Similarly to the experiences of 2005, findings about the insufficient operation of the audit function were made also in the course of the 2008 audits, which refers to the necessity of further enhancement of the audit system as regards the Managing Authorities (IH) and Intermediary Bodies (KSZ). The inadequate IH and first level KSZ review pose high risk to the proper **implementation/ realization** of the programmes in harmony with the aim of the supports. The audits emphasised the importance of the revision of first level reviews by the IH.

4.3. A PÁNEURÓPAI HÁLÓZAT 6. SZÁMÚ KIEMELT PROJEKT HAZAI FEJLESZTÉSÉNEK MEGVALÓSÍTÁSA

4.3.1. A páneurópai közlekedési korridorok kijelölése

Az 1994-ben Krétán, majd 1997-ben Helsinkiben tartott 2., ill. 3. Összeurópai Közlekedési Értekezlet fogadta el a legfontosabb európai közlekedési útvonalakat, mely a TEN hálózathoz illeszkedve egységes európai törzshálózat létrehozását tűzte ki célul. Az EU által kialakított Kelet-Közép-Európát érintő tíz ún. helsinki folyosó közül hat folyosó – ebből öt vasúti – halad át Magyarországon, így az EU által támogatott szállítási útvonalak fejlesztése az ország vasúthálózatának jelentős hányadát érinti. Geopolitikai helyzetünket a nyugati-keleti irányú árukapcsolatok feltételeinek fejlesztésével tudjuk a legjobban kamatoztatni. Magyarország az észak-dél irányú forgalomban is szinte kihagyhatatlan, alternatív útvonalat csak az Unión kívül haladó, a tőlünk keletre elhelyezkedő 9. folyosó jelent.

A magyar vasúti hálózat Záhonyon keresztül csatlakozik a Független Államok Közösségének (FÁK) széles nyomtávú hálózatahoz, ami az orosz és ázsiai piacok irányába biztosít kulcsfontosságú kapcsolatot. Az európai-ázsiai áruszállítási folyosók négy útvonalából három érinti hazánkat. A magyarországi vasúti pályahálózat hossza 7727 vonalkm ebből a TEN-T hálózat 2727 km. A kétvágányú vonalak aránya 17,5%. Vasúti hálózatunk 85,4 km/1000 km² sűrűsége meghaladja az EU átlagot, de a minőségi jellemzők jelentősen elmaradnak attól. A villamosított vasúti pálya hossza 2627,6 km (34,5%) nem éri el az EU

4.3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAN-EUROPEAN NETWORK'S PRIORITY PROJECT 6

4.3.1. Selection of the Pan-European transport corridors

The second Pan-European Transport Conference held in Crete in 1994, then the third one held in Helsinki in 1997 approved of the most important European transport corridors which aimed to create a unified European core network harmonized with the TEN network. The EU defined ten so-called Helsinki Corridors crossing East-Central Europe. Six of them (including five rail lines) cross Hungary, so the transport network developments supported by the EU concern a significant proportion of Hungary's railway network. Developing the conditions of the East-West bundles is the best way we can benefit from our geopolitical location. Hungary cannot be ignored considering the North-South transit way either, only the corridor N° 9 lying north of the country – outside the EU – can be an alternative path.

The Hungarian rail network connects with the wide track network of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) through Záhony which provides a strategic point of connection towards Russian and Asian markets. Out of the four European-Asian freight corridors three cross Hungary. The length of the Hungarian railway network is 7727 line km, out of which the TEN-T network covers 2727 km. The proportion of double track lines is 17.5%. Hungary's rail network density of 85.4 km/1000 km² is above the EU average, however the characteristics of quality lag far behind. The length of the electrically powered rail network is 2627.6 km (34.5%) which does not

átlagot (46,4%). A páneurópai folyosókhöz tartozó vonalakon a vasútfejlesztési célkitűzés az AGC paraméterek távlati biztosítása.

A nemzetközi törzshálózat fejlesztésében abszolút **elsődlegessége** van a legnagyobb forgalmú hazai folyosónak, a **TEN-T 22. számú kiemelt tengelynek, a IV. páneurópai korridornak**. Ez az Észak–Nyugat / Dél–Kelet irányú vasúti folyosó kapcsolatot teremt a nyugat-európai országok és a Balkán térsége között. Jelentőségét fokozzák a magyar vasúthálózaton kívüli fejlesztések, a Calafat és Vidin között épülő új Duna-híd, mely a korábban hagyományosnak számító Bécs–Budapest–Belgrád–Nis–Szófia–Thessaloniki/Isztambul útirányt váltja fel az EU tagországok vasúthálózatán keresztül. **Második helyen kiemelt** – a főleg keleti szakaszán nagyforgalmú – folyosó, a **TEN-T 6. számú kiemelt tengely, az V. páneurópai korridor**. Szlovénia és Magyarország között újjáépített vasútvonalon 2001. május 16-án indult meg a közlekedés, amely Hodos–Muraszombat irányába 56 év után létesített országhatáron átnyúló vasúti kapcsolatot, 20 év után visszaállítva a Zalalövő–Bajánsenye között felszedett sínpárt. A beruházás eredményesen szolgálta a vasúti közlekedési stratégiát, mert közvetlen összeköttetést biztosított két NATO tagállam között.

Az V. TEN-T közlekedési folyosó részét képező, 2001-ben átadott Szlovénia–Magyarország összeköttetését biztosító 19 km hosszú, egyvágányú vonalszakasz az AGC előírások figyelembevételével 160 km/h tervezési sebességgel készült el, de a vasútvonal meghatározóan áruszállítási igényeihez igazodva üzemeltetési sebességként a 120 km/h-t határoztak meg. Az UIC 60 rendszerű hézag-

reach the EU average (46.4%). In the long run, the aim of railway development along the Pan-European corridors is the insurance of the AGC parameters.

Within the development of the international core network the **TEN-T 22 priority axis, the IV Pan-European Corridor** – which is the busiest corridor of Hungary – has absolute **priority**. This North–West / South–East railway corridor connects Western European countries with the Balkan area. Railway developments outside Hungary, like the new bridge over the River Danube between Calafat and Vidin, make the line – which replaces the traditional Vienna–Budapest–Belgrade–Nis–Sofia–Thessaloniki/Istanbul route via the railway network of EU countries – more important. **The second most important corridor is the TEN-T 6 priority axe, the V Pan-European Corridor** that has frequent traffic mainly on its eastern section. Traffic began on the renewed rail line between Slovenia and Hungary on 16 May 2001. This line created a cross-border railway connection in the Hodos–Muraszombat direction after 56 years, restoring the track previously picked up between Zalalövő and Bajánsenye after 20 years. The investment has effectively served the rail transport strategy as it has created direct connection between two NATO member states.

Even if the 19 km long single track railway line – delivered in 2001 as part of the TEN-T corridor 5 connecting Slovenia and Hungary – was constructed with a planned speed of 160 km/h according to the AGC regulations, MÁV defined an operational speed of 120 km/h in compliance with the requirements of freight transportation. The railway line elaborated in compliance with the UIC 60 rail profile with

mentes felépítménnyel, 225 kN tengelyterheléssel kialakított – az első ütemben még nem villamosított – pálya a Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba útirányon át kapcsolódott a magyarországi vasúti fővonalakhoz. Ez a 80 km hosszú vonalszakasz nagyon rossz műszaki állapotban, 80 km/h üzemi sebességgel, de a vonalkapacitást állandó sebességkorlátozásokkal jelentősen lecsökkentve „fogadta” a nemzetközi személyszállító- és tehervonatokat. A projekt tervezésénél és megvalósításánál a műszaki- és hatósági előírások mellett környezetvédelmi szempontok is érvényesültek. Az elkerülő- és delta vágányoknál, a nyomvonal korrekciós szakaszokon a tájba illesztve épült az új nyomvonal. Magyarország egyik kiemelt természetvédelmi területén a dízelvontatást felváltó villamosított vasútvonal mentén jelentősen csökken a zaj- és rezgésterhelés és a mozdonyok káros anyag kibocsátása. A helyben lakó emberek, és az őket képviselő települési önkormányzatok igényeit is figyelembe vették.

4.3.2. A 2000/HU/16/P/PT/PT003 szerződés számú Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba vasútvonal rehabilitációs munkáinak folyamata

A vasútvonal átépítése ISPA/KA finanszírozás keretében valósul meg, melyre a pénzügyi megállapodás 2000. december 21-én, a támogatási szerződés 2001. április 15-én került aláírásra, amely 167,39 millió EUR forrást biztosított a munkák elvégzésére 50% EU támogatással a 89/2002. (IV. 20.) Korm. rendelet 15. sz. mellékletében meghatározott megvalósíthatósági feltételek szerint. A Pénzügyi Memorandumot eddig három alkalommal módosították,

225 kN axle-load capacity and gapless body (not electrically powered in the first phase) was connected to the main Hungarian railway network via the Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba line. This 80 km long line had been in very bad technical condition, normal running speed was limited to 80 km/h. International passenger and freight trains had to face decreased line capacity due to permanent speed limitations. Besides the technical specifications and official regulations, the aspects of environmental protection were also considered when planning and realizing the project. In case of bypass and delta rails, in trace correction sections new traces were built in harmony with the landscape. The diesel haulage has been changed to electrically powered railway along one of Hungary's prime nature conservation areas, where the noise and vibration seriously decreased just like the pollution emitted by engines. Requests of local inhabitants and the local governments were also considered.

4.3.2. Process of the rehabilitation works at the Zalalövő–Zalaegerszeg–Boba rail line (2000/HU/16/P/PT/PT003)

The reconstruction of the rail line is being completed within the framework of ISPA/CF assistance. The Financing Memorandum was signed 21 December 2000, the subsidy contract, which granted a €167.39 M support, 15 April 2001. In compliance with the feasibility criteria defined in Annex 15 of the government decree 89/2002. (IV. 20.), an EU support of 50% was granted for the completion of works. The Financing Memorandum has been amended three

a jelenlegi befejezési határidő 2010. december 31.

A 2000/HU/16/P/PT/003 Pénzügyi Memorandum által finanszírozott projektben eredetileg 6 db vasúti pályaépítési (78 km), 1 db biztosítóberendezési, 1 db vonatbefolyásolás kiépítési (ETCS L1) és 1 db vasút villamosítási (96 km) alprojekt volt, amelyből a VI. Zalaörs–Zalaegerszeg–Boba vasútvonalon az ETCS 1 telepítését törölték.

Az ETCS 1-es szint kiépítése Zalaörs–Boba között (a Pénzügyi Memorandum 2009. évi 3. sz. módosítása alapján) törlésre került, mivel ETCS2+GSM-R rendszer telepítésére történt kötelezettség-vállalás, amelynek forrása a 2007–2013-as Kohéziós Alap.

Az engedélyezési **tervek**, majd a kiviteli tervek elkészítése, amelyek a mennyiségeket és a műszaki tartalmat pontosították, csak a Támogatási Kérelem befogadását követően indultak meg. A Zalaegerszeg–Ukk–Boba szakaszra 2003-ban kötötték meg a tervezői szerződést. Az előkészítési tevékenység és a tervezési munka előrehaladását nagyban befolyásolta a források időszakos pénzügyi bizonytalansága, valamint az intézményrendszer változása miatti szabályozás-változás. A tervezői kapacitáshiány miatt a tervezési munkában jelentkező lemaradás a projekttel kapcsolatban folyamatosan gondot jelentett.

A **közbeszerzési folyamatok** úgy a közösségi, mint a nemzeti beszerzésekre irányuló eljárásoknál is több esetben megváltoztak. Az EU csatlakozást megelőző időszakban

times, the current completion deadline is 31 December 2010.

The project 2000/HU/16/P/PT/003 supported by the Financing Memorandum originally contained 6 railway line construction (78 km), 1 safety installation, 1 train control system (ETCS L1) and 1 railway electrification (96 km) sub-projects, out of which the 6th Zalaörs–Zalaegerszeg–Boba rail line ETCS 1 installation was deleted.

The installation of the ETCS 1 level between Zalaörs and Boba was cancelled (in line with the 3rd amendment of the Financing Memorandum in 2009) as commitments were made to install an ETCS2+GSM-R system with the assistance of the Cohesion Fund 2007–2013.

The preparation of the authorization and implementation **plans** that specified the quantities and technical aspects started only after the acceptance of the Grant Application. The planning agreement for the Zalaegerszeg–Ukk–Boba section was signed in 2003. The preparation activities and the progress of the planning works were highly influenced by the periodical uncertainty of financial resources and the changing of the regulation due to the changing institutional system. Because of the lack of planning capacity the delays in the planning work caused continuous problems within the project.

The **public procurement procedures** have changed several times both in case of community and national procurements. Before the EU accession (1 May 2004) in case of

(2004. május 1. előtt) a PRAG⁸ szerint történt a kivitelezői munkák közbeszerzése. Az átmeneti időszakban a közbeszerzés indítása még szintén a PRAG-os eljárás szerint történt. Az EU csatlakozást követően a Kbt. alkalmazásával a vasúti tenderek kiírása és az eredményhirdetéseket követően jogorvoslati eljárások sora jelentkezett.

A jogorvoslati eljárások 2-3 hónappal növelték a tenderértékelést, számos esetben oda vezettek, hogy új közbeszerzési eljárást kellett kiírni, ami 2-3 éves késést is okozott egy-egy alprojekt esetében.

Sikertelenül zárult a Zalaegerszeg–Ukk vonal első közbeszerzési eljárása a 2006. évben. A kivitelezői szerződést a tervezett 2006 májusához képest 2007 júliusában sikerült megkötni. Sikertelenül zárult a Bajánsenye–Boba vonalszakasz villamosítására kiírt pályázat is, a tényleges szerződéskötésre a harmadik közbeszerzési eljárást követően, 2007-ben kerülhetett sor. Jelentős késedellel indult az Ukk–Boba vonalszakasz közbeszerzési kiírása. Ennek oka a terület-szerzés elhúzódása volt.

A Pénzügyi Megállapodás módosítására három alkalommal került sor. A 2001. december 20-án jóváhagyott **1. sz. módosítás** a pénzügyi ütemtervet és a közbeszerzési tervet változtatta meg. A **2. sz. módosítással**, 2004. április 30-án a projekt befejezési határideje változott meg 2006. december 31-éről 2008. június 30-ára. A műszaki

implementation works the public procurement procedures were carried out according to the PRAG⁸. During the transition period public procurement procedures were still launched in harmony with the PRAG. Upon accessing the EU, the application of Public Procurement Act (Kbt.) resulted in numerous judicial appeals following the publications of railway tenders and the announcements of results.

Lodging of appeals extended the evaluation of tenders by an additional 2-3 months, which meant that in certain cases new public procurement procedures had to be launched, causing a 2-3 year delay regarding some sub-projects.

The first public procurement procedure of the Zalaegerszeg–Ukk line was not successful in 2006. The implementation contract could only be signed in July 2007 instead of May 2006. The tender about the electrification of the Bajánsenye–Boba line was also unsuccessful, the actual contract was signed in 2007, following the third public procurement procedure. The launching of the call for the Ukk–Boba public procurement tender started with significant delay due to the lengthy procedure of acquiring territories.

The **Financing Memorandum** has been **amended** three times. The **first amendment** – approved 20 December **2001** – modified the financial schedule and the public procurement plan. The **second amendment** – approved 30 April 2004 – modified the completion deadline of the project from 31 December 2006 to 30 June 2008. The technical specification had

⁸ Practical guide to contract procedures for EC external actions – Gyakorlati útmutató az Európai Bizottság külső akcióinak szerződési eljárásaihoz


⁸ Practical guide to contract procedures for EC external actions

tartalom bővült: új feladatként került be Zalaegerszeg elkerülő megépítése. A 2009. március 11-én jóváhagyott 3. sz. módosítás ismét módosította a projekt befejezési határidejét 2008. június 30-áról 2010. december 31-ére. A műszaki tartalom változása: elmaradó feladat az ETCS 1 telepítése a projekten, a költségek átcsoportosítása egyéb alprojekteken jelentkező többlet feladatokra, amelyeket hatóságok, önkormányzatok rendeltek el az építési engedély megadásakor. A projekt eredeti összes költsége 169,4 M euróról várhatóan 199 M euróra, azaz 17,5%-kal emelkedik, ami a támogatások tervezett értékéhez viszonyított eredeti 49,5%-os szintjének 42,05%-ra történő csökkenését hozta magával. A várható költségnövekedést az előre nem kalkulált inflációs hatások, a műszaki szükségességből és a közbeszerzések elhúzódásából adódó átütemezések, valamint a műszaki tartalom változása okozzák, melynek várható értéke meghaladja a 29,6 M eurót (7,4 Mrd forintot). A rendelkezésre álló ISPA források tervezett és tényleges időbeli felhasználását 2000–2010. években a 3. sz. ábra mutatja be.

been expanded: the construction of the Zalaegerszeg bypass way was included as a new task. The **third amendment** – approved 11 March 2009 – extended the deadline again from 30 June 2008 to 31 December 2010. Changes in the technical specification included: the cancellation of ETCS 1 within the project, the reallocation of resources for additional sub-project tasks ordered by authorities or municipalities when granting the building licences. The total expenditure of the project is expected to increase from €169.4 M to €199 M (+17.5%). That also means that the original rate of the support has decreased from 49.5% to 42.05%. The **estimated growth** of expenditures is caused by: the uncalculated inflation effects, rescheduling due to technical requirements and the delays of public procurements, as well as the changing of the technical specifications. The total cost of the above is likely to exceed **€29.6 M** (7.4 billion HUF). The planned and the actual utilisation of the available ISPA resources in 2000–2010 is shown in Figure 3.

3. ábra: Az EU-ISPA források felhasználási üteme a Zalaötvő-Zalaegerszeg-Boba vasútvonal rehabilitációs munkáin (167,4 millió EUR)

Figure 3: Utilisation rate of EU-ISPA resources spent on the rehabilitation works of the Zalaötvő-Zalaegerszeg-Boba railway line (EUR 167,4 million)



A fenti ábra bemutatja az előkészítés (ingatlan kisajátítás, régészet, környezetvédelmi előírások, engedélyeztetési eljárások), pályáztatási rendszer, a beruházás lebonyolítása (műszaki kivitelezés, tervmódosítás, többlet- és pótmunka, műszaki tartalomváltozás) során kialakult határidőcsúszások miatt jelentkező finanszírozás jelentős elhúzódtását, amely csak a 2006. évektől kezdődően gyorsult fel. Az ISPA támogatás aránya az eredeti 50%-a helyett a projekt befejezéséig (2010. december végéig) mindössze 42%-ot képvisel. Az eredeti 2006. december 31-ei befejezési határidőhöz képest a projekt **négy éves késésben** van. Félévente az ISPA Végrehajtó Szervezet (IVSZ) Monitoring Bizottsági ülésre a támogatási szerződésben szereplő feltételek szerint monitoring beszámoló készül. A beszámolók tartalmazzák az alprojektekre vonatkozó műszaki előrehaladás helyzetét, a környezetvédelmi hatóság határozatait, a projekt karbantartási programját, a közbeszerzési eljárások alkalmával kiválasztott alvállalkozók körét a szerződések legfontosabb adataival, a pénzügyi elszámolást, valamint a műszaki és pénzügyi indikátorok aktuális teljesítési fokát. A 2009. december 31-ei indikátorok összegzése szerint a 78 km-es vasúti vonalszakasz felújításának műszaki készültsége 85,2%, míg a pénzügyi előrehaladás állapota 85,1%. A kialakított jelentéstételi rendszer folyamatosan nyomon kíséri a projekt helyzetét, de több mint negyedéves késéssel tájékoztatja az EU Bizottság illetékes szervezeteit a felmerült problémákról.

The figure above demonstrates the significant delay in financing caused by the extension of deadlines during preparation (expropriation of land, archaeology, regulations regarding environmental protection, authorization), tendering, investments (technical implementation, modification of plans, extra works, changing in the technical specification), which speeded up only from 2006. By the end of the project (end of December 2010,) the rate of the ISPA support is decreasing from 50% to 42%. In comparison to the original deadline of 31 December 2006 the project is in a **4-year delay**. Every half year a monitoring report is written for the Monitoring Committee meeting of the ISPA Executive Committee (IVSZ) in compliance with the requirements indicated in the subsidy contract. The reports contain the technical progress of the sub-projects, the decisions of the environmental protection authority, the maintenance programme of the project, the list of subcontractors chosen by public procurement procedures and the main points of their contracts, the financial account, as well as the technical and financial indicators' actual performance level. Summing up the indicators of 31 December 2009, the technical readiness of the 78 km long rail line section development is 85.2% and the rate of financial progress is 85.1%. The reporting system continuously monitors the state of the project, but informs the competent organisations of the European Committee about problems detected with a delay of more than three months.

4.4. A VASÚTVONAL FEJLESZTÉSÉNEK EREDMÉNYE

Az AGC-AGTC előírásoknak megfelelő **vasúti pálya**, a XXI. század fejlett technikáját alkalmazó számítógép vezérelt vasúti jelző- és biztosítóberendezések, utastájékoztató- és utasításadó hangrendszerek, a korszerű, sorompóval biztosított útkeresztezések mind a közlekedés, a közlekedők biztonságát növelik, valamint hozzájárulnak az interoperábilis közlekedéshez mind az árufuvarozás, mind a személyszállítás tekintetében. A vonal mentén élők korszerű, az esélyegyenlőségi feltételeket is figyelembe vevő állomási- és peronburkolaton juthatnak el a szerelvényekhez.

A vasútvonalon az állomások távvezérlésével központi forgalomirányítás valósul meg zalaszentiváni központtal, melynek köszönhetően javul a forgalom menetrendszerűsége, valamint az üzemeltető csökkentheti az élőmunka ráfordítás nagyságát, ezzel is elősegítve az állami vasúttársaság reorganizációját. A 2013-ig megvalósuló ERTMS rendszerrel (ETCS-2 és a GSM-R) válik teljessé a vasútvonal EU által előírt interoperabilitása. Az átépített vasútvonal Magyarország elérhetőségének, gazdasági versenyképességének és a társadalom kohéziójának növelését elősegítve jobb, biztonságosabb és környezetbarát közlekedési rendszert eredményez. Az elérhetőség javulása kedvezően befolyásolhatja az érintett régió gazdaságának növekedését, nagyobb teret adva a munkaerő mobilitásának. Az új, környezetbarát vasúti infrastruktúra elősegíti a régióközpontok elérhetőségének javítását, a vidéki esetenként hátrányos helyzetű térségek felzárkózását és a gazdasági fejlettség térbeli kiegyenlítését.

4.4. THE RESULT OF THE RAILWAY LINE DEVELOPMENT

The rail line meeting AGC-AGTC requirements, the improved technology of the 21st century like computer controlled railway signalling and safety installations, audio devices for informing passengers and giving instructions and modern level-crossings guarded by barriers not only increase the safety of both the transportation and the passengers but also contribute to the interoperable passenger and freight transport. Those living along the line can get to the trains through modern stations and platforms that respect the criteria of equal opportunities as well.

Central traffic control (headquarters in Zalaszentiván) is in operation along the rail line with remote control of the stations, which significantly improves the scheduled traffic, so that the operators can decrease the rate of labour helping the reorganisation of the national railway company. The ERTMS system (ETCS-2 and GSM-R) – which will have been realised by 2013 – is going to complete the interoperability of the rail line, fulfilling the EU requirements. The reconstructed rail line is going to improve Hungary's accessibility, economic competitiveness and social cohesion, thus it will result in a better, safer and environmentally friendly transport system. The improvement of the accessibility may have positive influence on the concerned region's economic growth, providing more flexibility for the mobility of workforce. The new, environmentally friendly railway infrastructure helps improving both the accessibility of the regional centres, and the catching up of the rural, sometimes disadvantaged areas as well as reaching an economic balance.

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