

# How do Establishments Choose their Location? Taxes, Monopsony, and Productivity

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## Abstract

To better understand the distribution of economic activity across space and the effects of place-based policies, I develop a partial-equilibrium model of the location choice of new establishments incorporating tax rates, monopsonistic labor markets, and spillovers. Results of the estimating equation with German establishment data indicate that establishments have a preference for lower taxes and worker outside options in their location choice, though more productive (as measured by a higher AKM fixed effect) and larger establishments are less likely to account for reference wage levels in their decision making process. Establishments dislike taxes, though the degree of distaste varies between economic sectors. The degree to which various types of spillovers, or the benefits firms receive from other firms in a location, are an important influence on the location decision varies greatly between sectors. I quantify the effects of a theoretical place-based policy in each commuting zone in Germany. I find that commuting zones display highly heterogeneous responses to the same policy, with some areas experiencing wage and economic activity growth and others declines. The distribution of predicted effects of the place-based policy empirical estimates of spillovers from place-based policies in previous research.

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# 1 Introduction

Economic activity is distributed unevenly across geographic space - with some areas enjoying low unemployment and high wages while others have high unemployment rates and low wages. The location decisions of firms reinforce this: a large number of establishments choose to go to high wage high productivity areas, while a much smaller number of firms choose underdeveloped areas. How this location decision is undertaken by establishments is largely unknown despite being of critical interest to governments, who develop place-based policies in an attempt to revitalize underdeveloped regions. It may also be the case that establishments value different location characteristics. Some establishments may prefer to leverage monopsony power to minimize their labor costs, while others could prefer being located near specialized labor or in hubs of technological innovation. Furthermore, these incentives likely compete with one another: highly productive locations with specialized labor and technological innovation are larger labor markets where firms will be less likely to be able to exert monopsony power.

In this paper, I present evidence on the extent to which monopsony power, spillovers, and taxes influence the location decision of establishments, and test the effects of policies (in the form of tax incentives) designed to attract establishments particular areas. Previous research has demonstrated that different levels of monopsony power and spillovers across space influences the geographic distribution of economic activity (Manning 2010; Bamford 2021; Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr 2010; Gaubert 2018; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert 2020), as well as the misallocation effects of heterogeneous corporate tax rates across space (Fajgelbaum et al. 2019). The relative importance of each of these factors may differ for establishments in different industrial sectors (Hanlon and Mircio 2017), and it is important to examine them simultaneously to accurately estimate their relative effects on establishment location choice (Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé 2010). To my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine all three of these factors in a unified framework of establishment location choice.

Starting from a model of imperfect competition in segmented labor markets, I show that

there are four key inputs into the establishment location decision problem: corporate tax rates, market size, the degree of monopsony power, and the relative levels of productivity within each location. I also show that the conditional logit choice problem can be estimated tractably and easily using methods from the differentiated products models of the industrial organization literature and a model-derived estimating equation (Berry 1994).

I implement this method using establishment-level data from Germany, combined with data proxying three Marshallian agglomerating forces<sup>1</sup>, data on corporate-tax rates, and estimates of the degree of monopsony power in each commuting zone. My empirical findings point to the conclusion that establishments have heterogeneous preferences in the location characteristics they consider when they choose where to locate. In particular, three out of seven industrial sectors (agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining utilities, and construction; other services) demonstrate a preference for locations where they are close to goods suppliers and buyers, while the manufacturing sector locates away from suppliers and buyers. The remaining three sectors (trade and transportation; professional services; education and healthcare) do not take the locations of suppliers and buyers into account when choosing their location.

I also find strong heterogeneity in the valuation of reference wage levels in the establishment location choice. Three sectors (mining, utilities, and construction; trade and transportation; education and healthcare) prefer to locate in areas where reference wage levels are low, while the remaining sectors do not take reference wage levels into account in their decision process. In line with previous literature (Suarez Serrato and Zidar 2016), I find that establishments also have a distaste for taxes with the exception of the personal services sector. I see weak evidence of heterogeneous responses to taxes with the point estimates of the elasticity of the share of firms choosing a particular commuting zone with respect to the local corporate tax rate ranging from 5.35 to 13.65.

Using the estimated coefficients from my empirical specification, I simulate the effects of

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<sup>1</sup>Establishments may locate near one another to be closer to goods sellers and/or buyers, to pool labor, or to receive knowledge from other nearby establishments.

a policy designed to attract establishments to particular locations. Specifically, I examine a policy where the federal government provides rebates for local corporate tax rates above the legally mandated minimum rate of 7%. Such a policy has both primary (tax-induced) and secondary (spillovers-from-new-establishments-induced) effects. Due to the model allowing these secondary effects, the model is not prescriptive about the sign or magnitude of the overall effect of the policy in terms of growth in establishments or wages. I find that in the counterfactual world, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the overall response to the place-based policy.

In terms of the difference in the number of establishments compared to the actual policy, the estimated effects of leaving the place-based policy in place for 18 years ranges from -47 to 70%. In terms of the difference in wages, the effects range from -4.4 to 10%. These estimated wage differences closely match the distribution of reduced-form estimates of total factor productivity spillovers from million dollar plant openings in Greenstone et al. (2010). I find that the degree of monopsony power in a commuting zone is a strong predictive factor in the percent change in establishments from the place-based policy. Less competitive areas receive more benefit, in terms of establishment growth, compared to more competitive areas. There are no clear explanatory factors to predict wages.

This paper relates to a number of literatures in labor, urban, and public economics. First, a body of work has attempted to explain the spatial sorting of establishments (Behrens et al. 2014, Gaubert 2018, Fajgelbaum et al. 2019, Bilal 2022), which has traditionally focused on establishments entering perfectly-competitive labor markets. However, economists know from the recent literature on monopsony power (Ashenfelter et al. 2010; Falch 2010, 2011; Schmieder 2013; Azar et al. 2018) that markets are not perfectly competitive in-practice. Two papers have examined the location choices of establishments in the context of imperfectly competitive labor markets (Manning 2010, Bamford 2021), but both of these papers assume homogeneous firms. Gaubert (2018) assumes perfectly competitive labor markets and heterogeneous firms to examine the location choice of firms, but concentrates on whether

more productive firms are better able to take advantage of a single generic type of spillover with no structure. In contrast, this paper concentrates on heterogeneous valuation of different types of spillovers and how that contributes to differences in productivity of individual industrial sectors across geographic space.

Existing literature examining spillovers directly has concentrated on empirical measurement of the magnitude of spillovers or the three types of spillovers which may exist theoretically and how to distinguish between them empirically (Moretti 2004; Rosenthal and Strange 2004; Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009; Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr 2010; Hanlon and Misco 2017). This paper confirms that establishments value spillovers in their location choice, and provides evidence that the heterogeneous valuation and utilization of spillovers has implications for the overall effects of place-based policies. In particular, spillovers explain why the same place-based policy may have different effects in different locations, as seen empirically in Greenstone et al. 2010 and Devereaux et al. 2007.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model of establishment location choice, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 discusses the results, Section 5 examines the effects of a theoretical place-based policy, and Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Model

I model firms' location choice as a partial-equilibrium monopsonistic model where establishments choose wages to maximize their profits subject to the workers labor supply equations. As in Card, Cardoso, Heining, and Kline (2018), I use a static industrial-organization style differentiated products framework to describe how heterogeneous workers value jobs at different establishments. Within this framework, I model the location decision of a new establishment choosing which labor market to enter using a differentiated-products framework, where "products" are locations with different characteristics. Establishments solve their problem by backwards induction. First, they determine their optimal wage subject to the labor supply

equation from the workers' utility maximization problem. New establishments choose which location to enter based on which market offers the establishment the highest level of profit.

## 2.1 Allocation of Workers to Establishments Within Labor Markets

In a particular labor market  $c$  and time  $t$ , each establishment indexed by  $j$  in industrial sector  $m$  posts a wage offer  $w_{cjt}$  which is fully and costlessly observed by all workers living in that market. Establishments are willing to hire any worker who will accept the job at the posted wage.

Workers have heterogeneous preferences over establishments, the utility function of worker  $i$  at firm  $j$  is given by:

$$u_{icjt} = \mu_c \ln(w_{cjt} - b_{ct}) + a_m + v_{icjt} \quad (1)$$

where  $b_{ct}$  is the outside option of workers living in location  $c$ ,  $a_m$  are sector-specific amenities valued equally by all workers, and  $v_{icjt}$  is an idiosyncratic preference shock of workers for working at establishment  $j$  drawn independently from a type I extreme value distribution. Such preference shocks could be, for example, interactions with co-workers. Workers supply inelastic labor hours normalized to one. By the standard arguments of the McFadden choice model (McFadden 1973) this leads to the logit choice equation of workers.

$$p_{icjt} = P(\argmax_{k \in 1, \dots, J} = j) = \frac{\exp(\mu_c \ln(w_{cjt} - b_{ct}) + a_m)}{\sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\mu_c \ln(w_{ckt} - b_{ct}) + a_m)} \quad (2)$$

Assuming the number of establishments is sufficiently large in each location that firms are not strategically interacting in their wage setting, this logit-choice equation may be approximated by the exponential probability.

$$p_{icjt} \approx \lambda_{ct} \exp(\mu_c \ln(w_{cjt} - b_{ct}) + a_m) \quad (3)$$

where  $\lambda_{ct}$  is constant for all establishments in market  $c$ . Since an establishment's number of employees is the available pool of workers in the location times the probability a worker chooses the establishment, the labor supply equation of the establishment directly follows.

$$L_{cjt}(w_{cjt}) = \mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}\exp(\mu_c \ln(w_{cjt} - b_{ct}) + a_m) \quad (4)$$

where  $\mathcal{L}_{ct}$  is the size of the labor force in market  $c$ .

## 2.2 Optimal Establishment Behavior Within a Market

Individual establishments maximize their profits conditional on the market they operate within by posting an optimal wage subject to the labor supply behavior of workers outlined above. An individual establishment's profit equation for market  $c$  is given by:

$$Y_{jc} = (1 - \tau_{ct})(\beta_{ctm}L_{cjt}(w_{cjt}) - L_{cjt}(w_{cjt})w_{cjt}) \quad (5)$$

Establishments have a marginal product of labor  $\beta_{ctm}$  which differs by industrial sector and location. I remain agnostic about the exact form of this productivity, but it may be thought of as a function of agglomeration, spillovers, natural advantage, and worker characteristics available to the establishment in a given location. These benefits are allowed to differ by industrial sector since it is plausible that different types of establishments value different types of agglomeration and spillovers differently (i.e. tech companies likely value intellectual knowledge spillovers more highly than retail trade establishments). Corporate taxes for each market are denoted by  $\tau_{ct}$ .

Establishments cannot observe workers' idiosyncratic preference shocks  $v_{icjt}$ , so they post a single optimal wage by maximizing their profit equation subject to the labor supply equation (4). Using the first order condition of the profit equation and the labor supply equation, the optimal wage posted by the establishment is:

$$w_{cjt} = \frac{\mu_c}{1 + \mu_c} \beta_{ctm} + \frac{1}{1 + \mu_c} b_{ct} \quad (6)$$

This wage equation takes the form of a weighted average of the marginal product of labor and the outside option available to workers in the establishments' location. The form of the equation demonstrates the manner in which monopsony power is exerted by firms, as  $\mu_c \rightarrow \infty$  markets become perfectly competitive. Furthermore, as worker outside options increase, wage levels must also increase, with the relative importance of productivity and outside option in wage setting determined by the elasticity of labor supply to the establishment  $\mu_c$ . Of note, since productivity  $\beta_{ct,sec}$  varies at the sector and commuting-zone level and  $b_{ct}$  varies at the commuting-zone level, wages are sector and commuting-zone specific rather than establishment specific.

Substituting labor supply and wage equations and log-linearizing leads to the log-profit equation.

$$y_{ctj} = \ln(1 - \tau_{ct}) + \ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}) + (1 + \mu_c) \ln \left[ \frac{1}{1 + \mu_c} (\beta_{ctm} - b_{ct}) \right] + a_m + \mu_c \ln(\mu_c) + u_{ctj} \quad (7)$$

Where  $u_{ctj}$  is an idiosyncratic log-profit shock with a type I extreme value distribution.

This log-profit equation has several key components. The first is taxes  $\ln(1 - \tau_{ct})$ , the second is a market size term  $\ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct})$ , and the third is the relative productivity of workers compared to the outside option  $(1 + \mu_c) \ln \left[ \frac{1}{1 + \mu_c} (\beta_{ctm} - b_{ct}) \right]$ .

## 2.3 Modeling Location Choice

Within this framework, I model the location choice of new establishments entering the labor market<sup>2</sup>. Establishments solve their location choice problem by first solving for the optimal

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<sup>2</sup>I concentrate on new establishments because it's extremely rare for establishments to change location (in my data, 1.60% of establishments do so in their lifetime), while new establishments are by definition choosing a location.



wage they would pay in each individual market, then choosing the location where log profit is highest. Since the idiosyncratic shocks to profit in equation (7) are drawn from a type I extreme value distribution, establishments have the standard logit probability of locating in location  $c$ . Since establishments in the same industrial sector have the same preferences over locations, this logit probability approximates the share of establishments of a particular industrial sector which locate in location  $c$ .

$$s_{ctm} \approx p_{ctm} = \frac{\exp \left[ \ln(1 - \tau_{ct}) + \ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}) + (1 + \mu_c)\ln\left[\frac{1}{1+\mu_c}(\beta_{ctm} - b_{ct})\right] + a_m + \mu_c\ln(\mu_c) \right]}{\sum_{k=1}^C \exp \left[ \ln(1 - \tau_{kt}) + \ln(\mathcal{L}_{kt}\lambda_{kt}) + (1 + \mu_k)\ln\left[\frac{1}{1+\mu_k}(\beta_{ktm} - b_{kt})\right] + a_m + \mu_k\ln(\mu_k) \right]} \quad (8)$$

Dividing this share equation by the share of establishments choosing a base location  $s_{0tm}$  and taking logs leads to the structural share-ratio equation (Berry 1994).

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_{ctm}}{s_{0tm}}\right) = \ln(1 - \tau_{ct}) + \ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}) + (1 + \mu_c)\ln\left[\frac{1}{1 + \mu_c}(\beta_{ctm} - b_{ct})\right] + \mu_c\ln(\mu_c) - \ln(1 - \tau_{0t}) - \ln(\mathcal{L}_{0t}\lambda_{0t}) - (1 + \mu_0)\ln\left[\frac{1}{1 + \mu_0}(\beta_{0tm} - b_{0t})\right] - \mu_0\ln(\mu_0) \quad (9)$$

The log share of establishments of sector  $m$  choosing location  $c$  in time  $t$  compared to a benchmark location  $\theta$  is a function of the taxes in both locations, the market sizes of both locations, and two terms comprising market power and the relative productivity of labor compared to their outside option.

Guimaraes et al. (2003) demonstrates the equivalence of estimation of the conditional logit Equation (8) and a poisson regression under certain circumstances. Appendix A explains this method in more detail and its assumptions. I also show that the distributional assumptions necessary for the equivalence of poisson and conditional logit are not met. As the share-ratio regression does not require these additional assumptions, it is more appropriate for this analysis.

## 2.4 Estimating Equation

I run the following two-way-fixed-effects specification separately for each industrial sector:

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_{ctm}}{s_{0tm}}\right) - \mu_c \ln(\mu_c) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(1 - \tau_{ct}) + \beta_2 \ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct} \lambda_{ct}) + \beta_3 \textit{Spillovers}_{ctm} + \beta_4 b_{ct} + \beta_5 X_{ctm} + \gamma_c + \zeta_t + u_{ctm} \quad (10)$$

The latter four terms of equation (9), the base-location utilities, are cleanly captured by the time-fixed effect  $\zeta_t$ . In order to control for the market-size term  $\ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct} \lambda_{ct})$  directly, I pre-estimate it in a first step, which I outline in Appendix C. I also estimate  $\mu_c$  separately using the method of Bassier, Dube, and Naidu (2022), also described in Appendix C.

Given data on corporate tax rates,  $\tau_{ct}$ , the only remaining term of the structural equation is  $(1 + \mu_c) \ln \left[ \frac{1}{1 + \mu_c} (\beta_{ctm} - b_{ct}) \right]$ . This term incorporates two forces which vary across locations and time within sector: the productivity of an establishment in sector  $m$  and the outside option available to workers. For the empirical specification, I construct an empirical proxy for outside option  $b_{ct}$  which will be explained in detail in Section 3. I also construct empirical proxies for three types of agglomerating forces, which will also be discussed in detail in Section 3.

I additionally control for commuting zone characteristics which may be correlated with productivity, such as share of highly educated workers in the commuting zone<sup>3</sup>. Natural advantage is captured by the location fixed effect  $\gamma_c$ . After estimation, I back out estimated values for the sector-location level productivity using the structural equation.

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<sup>3</sup>Specifically, all empirical specifications include controls for share highly/medium qualified workers, share women, share full-time workers, share prime aged workers, and share German workers.

### 3 Data and Summary Statistics

In this section, I outline the various data sources I use to estimate my model. In this section, I first describe my main source of data on individual firms, then the empirical proxies I use for three types of spillovers, and finally additional necessary data. Once all of these sources of data are combined, I have a panel spanning the years 1999 to 2017.

#### 3.1 Establishment Data

The core source of data for this project is the Establishment History Panel (BHP) of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the Federal Employment Agency (BA) of Germany. The data are a random 50% sample of all establishments<sup>4</sup> in West Germany from 1975 onward and East Germany from 1992 onward on an annual basis. Appendix B describes adjustments to the structural equations and bounding exercises to account for the fact that I cannot link establishments to parent firms. The data covers all establishments with at least one employee eligible for social security. The data consists of information about the establishments themselves such as industry as well as information about employee characteristics such as number of highly-qualified workers at the firm and median daily wages. Critically, the data also includes information on establishment location. My preferred location definition is the commuting zone, of which there are 141 in Germany.

Table 1 shows summary statistics concerning the size of establishments and industrial sector of establishments over the sample period. The majority of establishments have fewer than five employees over the entire period, though the average size is growing larger over time. The number of overall entrants has also declined over time, accounting for some of the change in composition. There are fewer small businesses being started, but more similar number of very large establishments. The largest industrial sectors are, broadly defined, the

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<sup>4</sup>Establishments cannot be linked across locations to a parent firm, but all establishments of the same firm in one location are combined. For example, all of the McDonald's in Berlin are combined into one line in the data, but I cannot link McDonald's in Berlin and McDonald's in Munich as being associated with the same firm.

trade and service sectors (other comprises mostly personal services).

There are a number of other data sources merged to the BHP for analysis. An overview of the variables and their sources is shown in Table 2. I will discuss the construction of key variables in detail below.

### **3.2 Proxies for Agglomerating Forces**

I incorporate empirical measures of the Marshallian agglomerative forces in my analysis. In constructing these empirical proxies, I follow Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010, hereafter EGK). EGK develop empirical proxies for the strength of these three forces between two industries. Establishments may locate close to one another to reduce the costs of sourcing inputs from suppliers or the costs of shipping outputs to customers. This efficient moving of goods is proxied by the strength of input-output relationships between a pair of industries. Establishments may also locate close to one another if they use similar types of labor to ensure that workers they need to hire are located nearby. Efficient moving of labor is proxied by a vector correlation of occupational shares between two industries. Establishments may also locate near one another to share ideas and innovations. Efficient moving of ideas is proxied by the strength of patent citation relationships between two industries.

The key difference between my own measure and those in EGK is that their paper develops a set of pairwise-industry-level measures of agglomeration which is used to assess how important each factor is to the coagglomeration of various industries. However, I require a location-level measure of agglomerative forces as my analysis concerns locations rather than pairwise industries. To convert pairwise-sector-level measures of coagglomeration to an sector- and location-level measure I use a weighted average of the pairwise-sector measures weighted by industrial sector establishment shares in a particular location. As a simple example, imagine there are two sectors 1 and 2. Sector 1 has a pairwise-level agglomeration relationship of .75 with sector 1, and .25 with sector 2. Then, for a establishment in sector 1

in a location with an equal share of establishments from sector 1 and 2 their establishment-level agglomeration is  $.5*.75 + .5*.25 = .5$ . Below I describe the construction of these proxies formally.

### 3.3 Goods Agglomeration

To proxy efficient moving of goods, I first construct a measure of the strength of input-output linkages between sectors.  $Input_{m \leftarrow m'}$  is the share of sector  $m$ 's inputs which come from sector  $m'$ , and  $Output_{m \rightarrow m'}$  is the share of sector  $m$ 's output which goes to sector  $m'$ . For an establishment in sector  $m$ , their input-output relationship with sector  $m'$  is defined as the maximum of these two values. Then the weighted average is calculated as described above to obtain the input-output agglomeration benefits for locating in each possible location. For an establishment in sector  $sec$  in location  $c$  and time  $t$  their input-output agglomeration benefits are therefore:

$$IO \text{ Agglom}_{ctm} = \sum_{m'=1}^M \frac{N_{ctm'}}{\mathcal{N}_{ct}} \max(Input_{m \leftarrow m't}, Output_{m \rightarrow m'}) \quad (11)$$

Thus, the measure of input-output agglomeration benefits is measured for a particular sector, location and year cell. Figure ?? shows the strength of input-output linkages by industrial sector and commuting zone for the year 1999. The figure shows that the strength of input-output linkages varies across space, with different areas providing stronger potential input-output linkages for different sectors.

### 3.4 Labor Agglomeration

To proxy efficient pooling of labor, I first construct a measure of the similarity of labor used by a sector pair. For each sector, I construct a vector of the shares of industrial employment of each three-digit occupation. Then, for sector  $sec$  and  $m$  the vector correlation is the labor correlation of industry pair  $sec, m$ ,  $LC_{m,m'}$ . Then the weighted average is calculated

to obtain the labor correlation agglomeration benefits for locating in each possible location. For a firm in sector  $m$  in location  $c$  and time  $t$  their labor correlation agglomeration benefits are therefore:

$$\text{LC Agglom}_{ctm} = \sum_{m'=1}^M \frac{N_{m'ct}}{\mathcal{N}_{ct}} LC_{m,m't} \quad (12)$$

As with input-output agglomeration above, this measure of agglomeration benefits varies by sector, location and year. Figure 2 shows the strength of labor linkages by industrial sector and commuting zone for the year 1999. The figure shows that the strength of labor linkages varies across space, with different areas providing stronger potential labor linkages for different sectors.

### 3.5 Knowledge Agglomeration

My measure of knowledge spillovers in a location comes from Jaffe et al. (1993). For each patent, I define a control patent as the patent with the closest publication date in the same 3-digit IPC patent class as the main patent. For each patent I also identify the commuting zone where the patent originates, as well as the region where each cited patent introduced by the applicant originates, both excluding and including self-citations. Then, for each location I define the knowledge agglomeration as the probability a cited patent comes from the same region ( $pr_{cite}$ ) minus the probability that the control patent comes from the same region ( $pr_{cntrl}$ ). This proxy measures knowledge spillovers since it measures the percentage of citations in a patent that are from the same location over-and-above the level that you would expect from the distribution of patents.

### 3.6 Construction of Additional Variables for Analysis

In addition to agglomeration, taxes also play a role in establishment location choice (Fajgelbaum et al. 2019). Corporate tax rates in Germany are set at a base level by the federal

government, but individual municipalities are permitted to set their own corporate tax rates in the form of a multiplier on the federal rate of 3.5%. Changes in these rates are frequent, and are largely exogenous to local economic conditions (Fuest, Peichl, and Siegloch 2018). I have obtained data on these municipal tax rates and aggregated them to the average commuting zone level using a weighted-average with municipal population as the weight.

Figure 3 shows the average corporate tax rates for the years 2000, 2010, and 2017. Tax rates are generally increasing throughout the time period of my panel, and are highest in northwestern Germany, while the lowest in the south and parts of the east.

I also construct an empirical proxy for the outside option of workers within a commuting zone. I follow the approach of Card, Deviciente, and Maida (2013) and construct the average outside option as an employment-share weighted average of sectoral union minimum wage rates. I approximate the union minimum wage rate with the 20th percentile of the establishment-level distribution of low-qualification employees' mean wages.

Union minimum wages rates are not straightforward to obtain for Germany, so I have developed a data-based method to approximate the union minimum wage rate. There is no central repository of union contracts available for Germany, but I obtained the 2019 union contracts for the state of North-Rhine Westfalia. In the contracts, the minimum wage rate and the effective date is specified, typically as a monthly rate. There are different rates for different skill levels, I concentrate on the low-skill level for my analysis. Union contracts oftentimes do not map cleanly into a single industry code in the BHP data. I chose four two-digit industry codes (retail trade, wholesale trade, chemical industry, and transportation/logistics) which map into a single union contract, and have large enough employment in 2019 in North-Rhine Westfalia to analyze wage distributions. I have union contracts for 2019, but my main analysis data is only available through 2017. To approximate the union rates in 2017, I average the minimum wage growth rates for 2020 and 2021 to approximate the average wage increases year-over-year. On average, the minimum wage grows around 100 Euros per year, so I use this to back out an estimated 2017 minimum

wage.

The BHP data has information about the wages of low-qualification workers (high school or less, no vocational qualification) at the establishment. For establishments with twenty or more employees, I plot the wage distribution of these low-qualification employees in Figure 4 along with the estimated minimum wage rates described above. As can be seen in Figure 4, with the exception of wholesale trade the union minimum wage rate falls at approximately the 20th percentile of the low-qualification wage distribution. Thus, I proxy the union minimum wage rate as the 20th percentile of the low-qualification wage distribution in a particular two-digit industry-state-year cell. These union minimum wage rates are aggregated to the location-level using establishment-sector-share weights as with the agglomerating forces described above. Figure 5 shows the geographic distribution of the outside option proxy across space. There is a clear delineation between former East- and West-Germany, with former East Germany having persistently lower outside option compared to former West Germany.

## 4 Empirical Strategy and Results

### 4.1 Empirical Strategy

Revisiting the estimating equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln\left(\frac{s_{ct,sec}}{s_{0t,sec}}\right) - \mu_c \ln(\mu_c) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(1 - \tau_{ct}) + \beta_2 \ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct} \lambda_{ct}) + \beta_3 \text{Spillover}_{s_{ct,sec}} + \beta_4 b_{ct} \\ & + \beta_5 X_{ct,sec} + \gamma_c + \zeta_t + \mathbf{u}_{ct,sec} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

There may be bias in the estimates of  $\beta_3$ . Specifically, there may be unobserved demand or productivity shocks which impact the distribution of incumbent establishments in the commuting zones used as weights in the spillover proxies. These unobserved demand or productivity shocks may also make the location more attractive to new establishments,



affecting the share-ratio.

In order to correct for this, I construct a shift-share instrument. Specifically, I instrument the weights in the spillover proxy weighted averages with:

$$\hat{N}_{mct} = N_{mc,1998} * growth_{mt,-c} \quad (13)$$

where  $N_{mc,1998}$  is the number of incumbent establishments in sector  $m$  and commuting zone  $c$  in the pre-period 1998, and  $growth_{mt,-c}$  is the leave-out growth rate in sector  $m$  in similarly sized<sup>5</sup> commuting zones between 1998 and  $t$ .

## 4.2 Results

Figure 6 shows the results of the main specification. Each panel shows point estimates of a coefficient of interest as well as 95% confidence intervals. Appendix figure *F.1* shows the corresponding OLS results. Table 3 shows the exact point estimates and F statistics for each specification.

Establishments in all economic sectors have a distaste for taxes, though the degree to which this distaste influences the location decision varies<sup>6</sup>. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing establishments display the highest aversion with a point estimate of the elasticity of 13.65, while the education and health sector, as well as the other (mostly services) sector do not demonstrate statistically significant responses to tax rates.

The results also indicate that establishments in all economic sectors either prefer lower outside-options or are indifferent. As discussed in Section 2, higher outside options force establishments to pay higher wages. Thus, a negative coefficient on outside option may be thought of as demonstrating a preference on the part of their ability to markdown wages they would pay to their workforce. Sectors which display such a preference are the mining, utilities, and construction sector, the trade and transportation sector, and the education and

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<sup>5</sup>Specifically, I split the 141 commuting zones into quartiles (35 commuting zones each) and construct the growth rates as the leave-out growth rates within these quartiles.

<sup>6</sup>Estimated coefficients are positive because the independent variable is  $\ln(1 - \tau_c)$

health sector.

Utilization of spillovers differs substantially by economic sector, particularly the valuation by establishments of locating near establishments that either supply their inputs or buy their outputs. Four sectors (Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining utilities, and construction; professional services; and the other, mostly personal services, sector) prefer to be located nearly to establishments which supply their inputs or buy their output, with the other services sector displaying the strongest response to this spillover.

Preferences for locating close to firms which utilize similar types of labor displays less heterogeneity. The only sector which displays a preference for locating near to or away from establishments using similar types of labor is the other services sector. This sector prefers to locate away from establishments using similar types of labor, which suggests that this sector may find wages being big up in the presence of competitors or experience congestion effects in relation to locating nearby one another.

Though preferences surrounding labor pooling are largely irrelevant in the main specifications, this may be because my definition of economic sector is overly broad to capture dynamics surrounding the use of specialized labor. For example, though manufacturing is a single sector the skills used in auto manufacturing may be very different from those used in pharmaceutical manufacturing. Table 4 shows the results of the main IV regression for a more disaggregated definition of industrial sector. These results are suggestive that this may be the case, with much more heterogeneity in the sign and size of the coefficient on the labor correlation measure in comparison to the main results in Table 3. However, the results for the finer industry disaggregation have smaller sample sizes and the instrument is weaker. Furthermore, the underlying data is more sparse<sup>7</sup>, so results should be taken as suggestive.

Knowledge spillovers are only statistically significant in the case of the manufacturing sector. It is possible that this is because the measure of knowledge is not relevant for non-manufacturing firms. I cannot match patent technology to a sector in the BHP data, so the

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<sup>7</sup>I.E. there is a larger proportion of commuting zones with only one establishment in the sector-year pair picking it, so results are less stable.

measure if only at the commuting-zone level. The measure is also relatively sparse, with roughly 15% of patents being filed in Munich each year, and more than 40% of those patents being filed by Siemens, a manufacturing conglomerate. This is suggestive that the coefficient is significant only for the manufacturing sector because the measure is the most relevant for this sector.

### 4.3 Tradability

One might expect that there would be differences in how establishments producing tradable goods value a location’s characteristics. Table 5 shows the share of establishments in the data which are classified as tradable using the definition of Dauth et al. (2017), based on the two-digit-industry-level import penetration and export opportunities using UN Comtrade data.

As the table shows, for the purposes of analysis, two sectors may be thought of as tradable (agriculture, forestry and fishing; manufacturing). Both of these sectors have all establishments in the underlying data in industries classified as medium or high tradability in the data. Three sectors may be thought of as non- or low-tradable (mining, utilities, and construction; trade and transportation; and the education and health sector), with more than 90% of establishments producing non- or low-tradability goods. Two sectors (professional services and other services) are mostly non- or low-tradability with a sizable minority (roughly 20%) of establishments within-sector producing medium-tradability goods.

Comparing the relationship between the tradability index and estimated regression coefficients, there is no clear pattern with the exception that sectors that are non- or low-tradability seem to show more response to the outside option. Perhaps this is due to tradable sectors being able to move jobs to Eastern Europe or China in response to wage movements, making the local outside option less of a consideration.

## 4.4 Heterogeneity by AKM Firm-Effect and Establishment Size

I perform several extensions of my main results. The first is splitting the sample by above-median and below-median AKM effect. Although AKM effects are not a direct measure of firm productivity, the AKM firm-effect is correlated with worker value-added (Card, Cardoso, and Kline 2016). Previous research (Gaubert 2018) has demonstrated that more productive firms are able to better utilize the benefits of agglomeration economies. This leads to sorting of more productive firms to larger cities. In order to test whether firms with different levels of productivity consider different characteristics of locations when making their location decision, I repeat the specification in equation 10 separately for above- and below-median AKM effect establishments.

Figure 7 and Table 6 shows the results. There seem to be differences in how the outside option is valued between higher and lower productivity establishments, with below-median AKM establishments being more likely to place value on the outside option in their decision making process. This result makes sense, since less-productive establishments will, by definition, have a productivity closer to the outside option<sup>8</sup>. So, in order to make more profits lower outside options benefit them more than higher productivity establishments.

I also split the sample by establishment size to see if there are meaningful differences in behavior between larger and smaller employers, with results shown in Figure 8 and Table 7. The results show that smaller establishments may be more responsive to taxes in their location decision, though the results are noisy. As in the case of less productive establishments, smaller establishments also show more sensitivity to outside options in their location decisions.

Taken together, these two results suggest that policies increasing wages in low-wage regions may make the location less attractive to smaller, less productive establishments. Analyzing net welfare effects of such a change is beyond the scope of this paper, but would

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<sup>8</sup>Recalling one of the terms of the log-profit equation,  $(1 + \mu_c) \ln[\frac{1}{1 + \mu_c}(\beta_{ct, sec} - b_{ct})]$ ,  $\beta_{ct, sec}$  will be lower for the below-median AKM effect establishments

likely depend on whether phasing out such establishments would lead to workers having jobs at higher wages, or if unemployment would increase.

## 4.5 Rental Prices

Rental prices are another important factor which may influence establishment location choice (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008). In Appendix D I show changes which would be made to the model equations to account for rental prices, as well as the results of an empirical regression controlling for rental prices. Controlling for rents does not change the point estimates of the coefficients of interest, and only the mining, utilities, and construction sector demonstrates a statistically significant sensitivity to rental prices in their location choice.

## 4.6 Model Fit

I test how well the model fits the data by calculating the estimated commuting-zone-sector-year wage using Equation 6 and the backed out productivity estimates from the structural Equation 9, and regressing the actual commuting-zone-sector-year wage on the imputed wage. The results are shown in Table 8. The coefficient on imputed wage is 1.33, and the intercept is -3.52 euros/day.

# 5 Counterfactual Firm and Wage Distributions

In this section I simulate a place-based policy designed to attract establishments to a commuting zone. I simulate a policy where the federal government provides a rebate for local corporate taxes for establishments locating in a particular commuting zones, effectively setting the local tax rates to 7% (the lowest legally permitted rate) in treated areas. I first show that my model produces heterogeneous responses to an identical place-based policy in different locations within Germany. I then undertake a case study on the effects of undertaking the policy in four commuting zones to illuminate the importance of sectoral dynamics

in explaining the heterogeneous effects.

## 5.1 Effects of Tax Policy - Theory

Intuitively, a change in tax policy, or any place-based policy more generally, will have both immediate and secondary effects. Immediately, the tax policy will attract new establishments, some of which would not have otherwise gone to the treated location. Subsequently, the composition of establishments in the area has changed and spillovers available to establishments by going to the area have also changed. Figure 9 shows a simplified version of this process.

The figure illustrates the effects of a tax change implemented in time  $t=0$ . Between time 0 and 1, the taxes have decreased, so the overall share ratio increases as shown in the leftmost graph. Now, in subsequent years the new entrants have moved the input-output spillovers, shown in the second graph. In this example, the input-output spillovers have decreased, and the dashed line shows an alternative possible path. As is clear in the figure, the overall movement in the share-ratio as a result of the tax policy is unclear over multiple years. It is possible for negative spillovers to be induced by the tax change and actually make the location overall less attractive to new establishments.

More formally, the movement in the share ratio due to the tax rate between  $t=0$  and 1 is:

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_{jct}}{s_{j0t}}\right)_{CF} - \ln\left(\frac{s_{jct}}{s_{j0t}}\right)_{actual} = \beta_1[\ln(1 - \tau_{CF,t}) - \ln(1 - \tau_{ct})] \quad (14)$$

Where  $\tau_{CF,t}$  is the counterfactual tax rate of 7%. Subsequently, the number of counterfactual entrants attracted by the tax policy may be calculated directly. Since the sum of shares for each location-year must sum to one in both the actual and counterfactual world, and rearranging implies that:

$$s_{j0t,CF} = \frac{1}{\sum_{ct} \frac{s_{1t,CF}}{s_{j0t,CF}} + \dots + \frac{s_{Ct,CF}}{s_{j0t,CF}}} \quad (15)$$

Combining equations 14 and 15 leads directly to the expression for the counterfactual share of establishments choosing the treated location. I impose the additional assumption that the pool of establishments entering the entire German market each year is fixed in order to be able to calculate the counterfactual numbers of establishments going to each location. In Appendix E I relax this assumption and provide bounds for my main results.

I use this new distribution in firms to calculate the counterfactual spillovers establishments receive in the treated locations, which translates to the counterfactual productivity of firms using the structural equation.

$$(1+\mu_c)\ln\left[\frac{\beta_{ct,sec,CF} - b_{ct,CF}}{\beta_{ct,sec} - b_{ct}}\right] = \beta_3(Spillovers_{ct,sec,CF} - Spillovers_{ct,sec}) + \beta_4(b_{ct,CF} - b_{ct}) \quad (16)$$

Using this counterfactual productivity and outside option I additionally calculate counterfactual wages using model Equation 6. I continue this process iteratively to examine the dynamic secondary effects induced by the tax policy change.

## 5.2 Counterfactual Results for All Commuting Zones

Figure 10 shows the estimated effects of tax policy if implemented in each individual commuting zone beginning in 1999, both after 9 years in 2008 and 18 years in 2017. Panel A shows the percent difference in establishments under the counterfactual tax policy compared to the actual tax policy, and panel B the percent difference in wages. The figure shows that the effects of a place-based policy are extremely heterogeneous, with some locations experiencing large increases in the number of establishments and wages, while others actually experience declines in the number of establishments and wages. Furthermore, it seems counterproductive to keep the tax policy in place for a long period of time in the majority

of cases, with the exception of a few winning commuting zones, outcomes are actually worse after 18 years of tax policy compared to 9 years.

The shape of the distribution and size of these effects, particularly the wage effects, is strikingly similar to the estimated TFP spillovers found by Greenstone et al. (2010, figure 2), who examined the spillover effects of million dollar plant openings in US counties empirically. This suggests that my model estimates can reproduce and explain heterogeneity in the effects of place-based policies between different locations, and provide insight to policymakers who wish to create effective place-based policies.

It may also be of interest to policymakers to predict the effects of a place-based policy in their own location. The correlation in the predicted policy-induced change in the number of establishments and wages is shown in Figure 11. There is a very weak negative correlation between the two, suggesting that predicted changes in the number of establishments are largely orthogonal to predicted wage changes. This suggests that attempting to find individual factors predictive of the changes in establishment numbers or wages may be of use.

Figure 12 shows the relationship between the elasticity of labor supply within a commuting zone and the predicted change in establishment counts. The level of market power in a location is highly predictive of the response to a place-based policy in terms of the growth in the number of establishments. This suggests that if policymakers are interested in revitalizing underdeveloped regions, place-based policies are a possible tool in their arsenal if they are interested in growing the number of establishments. This is likely also correlated with employment effects, though this paper is not analyzing employment effects directly.

The model is not prescriptive about the relationship between  $\mu_c$  and the changes in establishment counts induced by the policy. Algebraic manipulation of the definition of the percentage change in establishments yields



$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Pct. Change in Estabs.}_c &\equiv \frac{n_{c,cf} - n_{c,actual}}{n_{c,actual}} \\
&= \frac{s_{c,cf}}{s_{c,actual}} \frac{s_{0,actual}}{s_{0,cf}} \frac{n_{0,cf}}{n_{0,actual}} - 1
\end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to  $\mu_c$  yields:

$$\frac{\partial \text{Pct. Change in Estabs.}}{\partial \mu_c} = \frac{s_{c,cf}}{s_{c,actual}} \frac{s_{0,actual}}{s_{0,cf}} \ln \left[ \frac{\beta_{c,CF} - b_{c,CF}}{\beta_{c,actual} - b_{c,actual}} \right] \tag{18}$$

The first two terms of this derivative, the shares, are by definition positive. Thus, the observed pattern of the percent change in establishments decreasing in  $\mu_c$  must be coming from the final term of the derivative  $\ln \left[ \frac{\beta_{c,CF} - b_{c,CF}}{\beta_{c,actual} - b_{c,actual}} \right]$ . Since this term is negative, it must be the case that in the counterfactuals, the difference between productivity and the outside option is narrowing. Either because spillovers decreasing or increasing outside options compared to the actual policy.

There are no variables which predict the changes in wages as clearly as market power predicts the changes in the number of establishments. There are a number of factors such as outside option in the pre-period and initial industrial sector shares which are weakly correlated with the wage changes, but prediction of the policy-induced changes in wages would likely require complex analysis.

### 5.3 Case Study: Four Commuting Zones

In order to more deeply examine the sources of the heterogeneity shown in Figure 10, I will now examine the dynamic effects of a the theoretical place-based policy in four locations. Specifically, I examine the commuting zones at the 10th, 40th, 60th, and 90th percentile of the wage effects distribution. The four commuting zones are Bautzen, Gera, Regensburg, and Ravensburg. Appendix figure F.2 shows the location of these commuting zones. Regensburg and Ravensburg are in the south in former West Germany, while Bautzen and Gera are located in former East Germany.

Figure 13 shows the time-series change in the number of establishments in these four areas. The overall patterns are fairly smooth between commuting zones, with two of the areas experiencing overall growth in the number of establishments and two experiencing declines. Figure 14 shows the growth in sectors within each commuting zone. The figures reveal that overall growth in the commuting zone is often driven by growth in a small number of sectors, in the case of Bautzen and Gera, the mining, utilities, and construction sector is driving the growth. In the case of Gera, if this sector wasn't growing the overall number of establishments would actually be in decline.

In order to understand these effects, recall that this sector had a coefficient of  $\beta_{outop} = -.044$  and a coefficient of  $\beta_{IO} = .$ . This suggests that for the mining sector to grow at such a rate in Bautzen, it is likely that the establishments attracted by the tax policy either decreased the outside option or increased the presence of goods buyers and sellers a great deal. For Bautzen, this is likely reinforced by Bautzen being an ex-ante attractive location for this sector. Appendix Table 0.0 shows the initial conditions in the area, and Bautzen already had a high prevalence of this sector initially.

Figure 15 shows the changes in wages brought about by the tax policy. The figure shows that predicted wage changes are overall noisy, with Bautzen experiencing a cyclical decline, and Ravensburg a wage increase as the Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sector grew beginning around 2010 as seen in Figure 13. These results reinforce the results seen in the previous Section 5.2 that the overall change in wages is very difficult to predict.

## 6 Conclusions

I develop a partial-equilibrium model of establishment-location choice incorporating corporate taxes, monopsonistic labor markets, and differential location productivity. I show that establishments in different economic sectors display different sensitivities to taxes, and differently value spillovers in their location decision. Most types of establishments prefer to

pay lower wages as measured by the outside option, but some types of establishments are indifferent. All types of establishments have a distaste for taxes, though the strength of distaste varies between firm types. Different types of spillovers are also valued differently by different types of establishments.

The effects of place-based policies are highly heterogeneous across space due to the secondary impact of spillovers. The distribution of effects in the wage changes induced by a tax policy predicted by my model closely matches the empirical findings of Greenstone et al. (2010). As demonstrated by the counterfactuals, small differences in initial conditions can lead to very different effects of the same place-based policy in different locations, making effective policy challenging.

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Figures





Figure 1: Input-Output Linkages Across Space, 1999

Notes: See Section 3 for data sources and variable definitions. Figure shows quantiles of spillovers within a commuting zone. Darker colors are higher spillovers.




Figure 2: Labor Linkages Across Space, 1999


Ag., Forest., and Fish.




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
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
Trade and Transport



Professional Services



Education and Health



Other




Figure 3: Average Corporate Tax Rates




Figure 4: Imputing Union Minimum Wage Rates






Figure 5: Geographic Distribution of Outside Option




Notes: Figure shows quantiles of outside option within a commuting zone. Darker colors are higher outside options.


Figure 6: Coefficients by Sector



Notes: These figures show the point estimates of coefficients of the variables of interest for each industrial sector in the instrumental variable regression 10, as well as the 95% confidence intervals. See Section 3 for data sources and variable definitions.


Figure 7: Coefficients: Splitting Sample by AKM Firm-Effect






Notes: These figures show the point estimates of coefficients of the variables of interest for each industrial sector in the instrumental variable regression 10, as well as the 95% confidence intervals for establishments with below- and above-median AKM firm effects. See Section 3 for data sources and variable definitions.

Figure 8: Coefficients: Splitting Sample by AKM Firm-Effect









Notes: These figures show the point estimates of coefficients of the variables of interest for each industrial sector in the instrumental variable regression 10, as well as the 95% confidence intervals for establishments with below- and above-median sizes. Size is number of employees. See Section 3 for data sources and variable definitions.

Figure 9: Illustration of Primary and Secondary Tax Policy Effects




Notes: Time since a tax policy was enacted in  $t=0$ . When the tax rate decreases, the share ratio increases directly between time 0 and 1. Between time 1 and 2 the subsequent composition of establishments has changed, which leads to changes in the input-output spillovers. The solid and dashed lines show two possible paths, one of which leads to an overall decline in the share ratio despite the tax policy remaining in place.

Figure 10: Effects of Counterfactual Tax Policy on Commuting Zones




Notes: Each dot is a commuting zone. Panel A shows the percent difference in establishments under the counterfactual tax policy compared to the actual tax policy, and panel B the percent difference in wages. See Section 5 for details on calculations. Bottom and top 2.5% of commuting zones were trimmed for readability.

Figure 11: Correlation of Counterfactual Establishment and Wage Effects




Notes: Each dot is a commuting zone.

Figure 12: Correlation of Counterfactual Establishment Growth and Market Power




Notes: Each dot is a commuting zone.

Figure 13: Case Study: Change in Establishment Counts




Notes: See Section 5 for details on calculations.

Figure 14: Case Study: Change in Establishment Counts by Industrial Sector



Notes: Each panel shows the establishment growth for each industrial sector within a commuting zone when treated by a tax policy. See Section 5 for details on calculations.

Figure 15: Case Study: Change in Wages



Notes: Each panel shows the wage growth for each industrial sector within a commuting zone when treated by a tax policy. See Section 5 for details on calculations.

# Tables

Table 1: BHP Summary Statistics

<b>Summary Statistics: New Establishments</b>				
<b>Sector</b>	1999	2008	2017	
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	1.83	1.85	1.8	
Mining, Utilities, and Construction	14.44	11.25	14.22	
Manufacturing	5.64	5.13	4.15	
Trade and Transport	38.03	36.26	34.44	
Professional Services	19.46	19.91	19.23	
Education and Health	6.56	7.68	8.17	
Other	14.05	17.92	17.98	
<b>Number of Employees</b>				
1-4	82.15	76.86	69.96	
5-9	10.72	13.73	16.84	
10-19	4.44	5.75	7.98	
20-49	1.96	2.63	3.94	
50-99	0.51	0.72	0.94	
100-199	0.16	0.22	0.23	
200+	0.06	0.09	0.11	
<b>Total Entrants</b>	<b>94,537</b>	<b>61,888</b>	<b>37,972</b>	

Table 2: Overview of data

<b>Additional variables merged to the establishment data</b>		
<b>Target Variable</b>	<b>Proxied Using</b>	<b>Source</b>
Spillovers	Follows Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010)	
Goods	Input-Output Tables	German statistical library
Labor	Vector correlation of occupational shares between two industries	Linked employer-employee data (SIAB)
Knowledge	Measure from Jaffe et al. (1993)	OECD Patent Database
Taxes	Weighted average of municipal corporate tax rates within the commuting zone. A multiplier of the federal tax rate.	German statistical library
Outside Option - Estimated Average Union Contract Minimum	20th percentile of establishment-median low-skill workers wages in an industry-state cell in the BHP	Derived using the BHP, union contracts obtained from Tarifregister Nordrhein-Westfalen



Table 3: Response of the Share Ratio to Taxes, Spillovers, and Outside Option

	Ag. For. Fish.	Mine., Util., Constr.	Manu.	Trade, Transport	Prof. Serv.	Edu., Health.	Other
Tax	13.65***	10.97***	7.197**	5.353***	8.069***	8.434	-7.097
Outside Option	0.00214	-0.0444***	0.0153	-0.0378***	-0.0224	-0.0167**	-0.0129
Input-Output	6.550***	3.375***	-2.819**	6.646	4.052*	1.427	11.56***
Labor Correlation	9.400	2.479	0.673	-6.542	-0.390	0.223	-35.72***
Knowledge	-0.00552	0.0316	0.0747**	0.00504	0.00867	0.00941	0.0379
N	2561	2660	2637	2660	2657	2654	2660
F	26.40	226.4	125.1	395.3	222.7	147.0	96.30

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Notes: Results of the reduced-form specification in equation 10

Table 4: Response of the Share Ratio to Taxes, Spillovers, and Outside Option: Alternative Sector Definition

	Ag. For. Fish.	Mine., Util., Constr.	Goods Manu.	Chem., Pharm. Manu.	Metal. Manu.	Elec. Manu.	Mach. Manu.	Other Manu.
Tax	5.245	10.73***	11.34**	10.63	6.418*	-6.543	10.65**	-14.62
Outside Option	-0.0737	-0.0483***	-0.0724**	0.0126	-0.0516**	0.0673**	0.0137	0.149
Input-Output	-14.55*	4.866***	4.475**	-3.977	1.093	3.698***	1.108	-17.92
Labor Correlation	-22.89	0.0672	-24.28	46.79	51.30***	-258.7***	-6.115	187.4
Knowledge	-0.0227	0.0319	0.0297	0.0201	0.0682	0.0895	0.0184	0.141
N	2561	2660	2381	1978	2390	1624	2001	2004
F	7.899	200.0	42.23	35.57	34.05	20.24	35.11	7.089

	Trade	Trans., Logis.	Arts, Rec.	Media, Comm.	Tech. Serv.	Bus. Serv.	Edu., Health	Other
Tax	5.938**	6.085*	29.73**	1.134	5.480	-6.569	25.95*	-74.77
Outside Option	-0.0236	-0.0445***	-0.194**	0.0353*	-0.171*	0.0812	-0.0188	0.0485
Input-Output	22.57**	-15.42*	-3.838*	-1.057	-6.102	11.21	8.209	51.29
Labor Correlation	-25.05**	199.1**	365.1**	23.71	-142.1	13.86	-68.32	-88.74
Knowledge	-0.0281	-0.147**	0.0887	-0.0109	0.0565	0.0167	0.0371	0.162
N	2660	2615	2423	2098	2636	2645	2654	2659
F	94.56	47.94	33.87	51.71	34.99	38.06	68.97	6.361

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

Notes: Results of the reduced-form specification in equation 10

Table 5: Share of Establishments Within Sector by Tradability Group

	Non Tradable	Low Tradability	Medium Tradability	High Tradability
Ag. For. Fish.	0.00	0.00	10.55	89.45
Mine., Util., Constr.	15.06	77.86	7.03	0.05
Manufacturing	0.00	0.00	55.93	44.07
Trade, Transport	86.55	13.45	0.00	0.00
Prof. Serv.	69.07	12.53	18.40	0.00
Edu., Health.	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other	70.18	7.42	22.39	0.00

Notes: Tradability definitions from Dauth et al. (2017). The tradability index is level of import penetration and export opportunities at the two-digit-industry level. Non-tradable industries are those below the 10th percentile, low tradable those between the 10th and 40th percentile, medium tradable those between the 40th and 70th, and highly tradable those above the 70th percentile.

Table 6: Heterogeneity of Results by AKM Firm Effect

## Panel A: Above-Median AKM Effect

	Ag. For. Fish.	Mine., Util., Constr.	Manu.	Trade, Transport	Prof. Serv.	Edu., Health.	Other
Tax	8.414	10.49***	4.248	7.234***	5.067	-15.61**	2.603
Outside Option	0.0152	-0.0108	0.0206	-0.0212*	-0.0332	0.00831	0.0419**
Input-Output	7.815***	3.472*	1.401	2.895	-3.370	-7.895**	7.739**
Labor Correlation	4.077	-0.248	5.722	-4.987	-2.282	43.48***	-28.10**
Knowledge	0.0748	0.0148	-0.0516	-0.0470	0.0386	-0.0493	0.0276
N	1426	2590	2179	2641	2456	2302	2551
F	14.43	65.97	44.15	137.3	80.18	49.19	63.72

## Panel B: Below-Median AKM Effect

Tax	2.062	7.383**	14.48***	3.072	11.10***	12.16	-5.339
Outside Option	-0.0561***	-0.0802***	-0.0352	-0.0540***	-0.0410	0.0135	-0.0446***
Input-Output	1.594	7.708***	1.794	23.71*	4.628	-0.0615	7.044*
Labor Correlation	7.416	-5.016	-2.951	-18.97	5.443	15.45	-32.38***
Knowledge	-0.0462	0.0526	0.0840	0.0312	-0.0234	0.0838*	0.0127
N	1479	2547	2332	2656	2569	2424	2550
F	36.18	80.07	53.55	68.04	85.83	62.82	76.04

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

Notes: Results of the reduced-form specification in equation 10, splitting the sample by AKM firm-effect.

Table 7: Heterogeneity of Results by Establishment Size

## Panel A: Above-Median Size

	Ag. For. Fish.	Mine., Util., Constr.	Manu.	Trade, Transport	Prof. Serv.	Edu., Health.	Other
Tax	7.759	13.14***	8.486**	2.822*	5.826**	-7.549	-10.80
Outside Option	-0.00213	-0.0616***	-0.000687	-0.0313***	-0.00883	-0.00721	0.00495
Input-Output	5.147***	4.137**	0.500	2.912	5.309*	-6.631	12.80***
Labor Correlation	28.04**	10.77**	-0.223	-2.581	3.871	25.44	-42.73***
Knowledge	-0.0560	0.0101	0.0665	0.00958	0.00949	-0.0313	0.0410
N	2143	2634	2535	2659	2619	2586	2634
F	23.98	89.09	71.56	262.3	113.5	72.24	68.40

## Panel B: Below-Median Size

Tax	7.308	10.37***	4.629	6.679***	11.50***	14.62**	-2.196
Outside Option	0.0226	-0.0326***	0.0315	-0.0405***	-0.0364	-0.00715	-0.0215
Input-Output	6.575***	2.845**	-3.427*	6.068	2.342	3.128	10.49***
Labor Correlation	-4.739	-1.418	0.615	-7.371	-1.174	-0.873	-31.88***
Knowledge	0.0560	0.0422	0.0358	0.0163	0.0167	0.00632	0.0487
N	2385	2659	2575	2658	2653	2631	2653
F	22.80	179.0	76.37	304.5	173.0	97.75	89.70

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

Notes: Results of the reduced-form specification in equation 10, splitting the sample by establishment size, measured by the number of employees at the establishment.

Table 8: Model Fit - Comparing Imputed and Actual Wages

	Average Wage
Imputed Wage	1.37***
constant	-5.72
N	18,622
R2	.397

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Notes: Outcome variable is the average daily wage in the sector-commuting zone-year cell

## A Conditional Equivalence Between Logit and Poisson

Guimaraes et al. (2003) propose an alternative computationally tractable approach to estimating a firm location decision problem. Starting from the log-likelihood of the traditional maximum likelihood estimation of the logit choice problem:

$$\log(L_{cmt}) = \sum_{c=1}^C n_{cmt} \log(p_{cmt}) \quad (1)$$

Starting with the assumption that the distribution of counts of establishments picking a certain location is distributed poisson:

$$E(n_{cmt}) = \lambda_{ctm} = \exp(\alpha + y_{ctm}) \quad (2)$$

where  $y_{ctm}$  is the log-profit offered by a location as in Equation 7. Given the probability mass function of the poisson distribution  $Pr(n = n_{cmt}) = \frac{\lambda_{cmt}^{n_{cmt}} \exp(-\lambda_{cmt})}{n_{cmt}!}$ , the poisson log-likelihood is:

$$\log(L_p) = \sum_{c=1}^C (-\lambda_{cmt} + n_{cmt} \log(\lambda_{cmt}) - \log(n_{cmt}!)) \quad (3)$$

After taking the first order condition with respect to  $\alpha$  and rearranging Guimaraes et al. (2003) shows that the poisson log likelihood is:

$$\log(L_p) = \sum_{c=1}^C n_{cmt} \log(p_{cmt}) - N + N \log(N) - \sum_{c=1}^C \log(n_{cmt}!) \quad (4)$$

The first term of this equation is the log-likelihood of the logit problem, and the other terms are constants. Thus, if the distributional assumptions are met the coefficient estimates will be the same in both models.

However, this model is unsuited for my data. Table 4.4 shows the means and variances of my establishments counts for each industrial sector, as well as the post-estimation goodness-of-fit statistics for a poisson distribution fitting my model. As is plain from the table, the count data are not distributed poisson. Since the distributional assumptions are not met, poisson and conditional logit are not equivalent in this case.

Table 4.4: Poisson Goodness of Fit Tests

	Mean	Variance	Deviance	GOF	Pearson	GOF
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	7.79	46.46	0.00		0.00	
Mining, Utilities, and Construction	55.88	4914.79	0.00		0.00	
Manufacturing	21.23	499.57	0.00		0.00	
Trade and Transport	156.40	42666.01	0.00		0.00	
Professional Services	78.45	18783.35	0.00		0.00	
Education and Health	31.33	1698.82	0.00		0.00	
Other	70.36	10775.22	0.00		0.00	

## B Adjustment for Establishment Observation

As discussed in Section 3, my unit of observation is an establishment rather than a firm. More precisely, I observe all of the branch offices in a particular municipality as a single line of data (hereafter “establishment”), and I cannot link establishments across municipalities. A simple application of Bayes rule shows how this could potentially bias my empirical result. In my data, a unit of observation is a new establishment that is observed in my dataset, where observed means that a new establishment that is not located in a municipality where the expanding firm is already operating. Therefore, my expression for the share of establishments in sector  $sec$  picking a particular location  $C$  may be more precisely written as:

$$\text{share}_{sec}(\text{pick } C | \text{observed in data}) \approx \text{pr}_{sec}(\text{pick } C | \text{observed in data}) \quad (5)$$

Bayes’ rule implies

$$\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{pick } C | \text{observed in data}) = \frac{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{pick } C) \text{pr}_{sec}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } C)}{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{observed in data})} \quad (6)$$

Combining the two expressions and taking the ratio of shares for a base location 0 as in the main analysis

$$\frac{\text{share}_{sec}(\text{pick } C | \text{observed in data})}{\text{share}_{sec}(\text{pick } 0 | \text{observed in data})} \approx \frac{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{pick } C)}{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{pick } 0)} \frac{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } C)}{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } 0)} \quad (7)$$

The first term  $\frac{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{pick } C)}{\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{pick } 0)}$  leads to the same unconditional logit share ratio equation as in the main specification. The second term is what could potentially bias my results. After substituting my functional forms of the logit into the share ratio equation and taking logs, I obtain the following structural equation:

$$\ln\left(\frac{s_{ct,sec}}{s_{0,sec}}\right) = y_{ct,sec} - y_{0t,sec} + \ln(\text{pr}_{sec,t}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } C)) - \ln(\text{pr}_{sec,t}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } 0)) \quad (8)$$


In my reduced-form analysis, the term  $\ln(\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } 0))$  is cleanly captured by the time fixed effect, and the term  $\ln(\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } C))$  is at least partially absorbed by the location fixed effect. To bias the coefficients of interest spillovers or taxes would need to be correlated with  $\ln(\text{pr}_{sec}(\text{observed in data} | \text{pick } C))$ , but not in a way correlated within commuting zone or year.

Of greater concern is the fact that I am using the location fixed effect in order to back out the sector-location productivity for my counterfactual exercises, the inability to observe the location choices of the universe of new establishments could affect these estimates. I cannot directly control for this since, as discussed, there is no way to calculate the probability of observing a new establishment in the data conditionally or unconditionally. In order to test whether this is a problem in practice, I repeat my main counterfactual exercises without including the location fixed effect when I back out my measure of productivity.

The results of this bounding exercise are shown in Figure ???. As is clear from the figure, the main results are similar whether or not I include the location fixed effect in my measure of




Figure B.1: Bounding Exercise: Adjustment for Establishment Observation and Establishment Counts



productivity, though the implications of the tax policy for some individual commuting zones with respect to wages may be slightly different in any particular time period. In particular, the distribution of wage effects is overall slightly more negative in the bounding exercise. Thus, the main results for wages should be thought of as an upper bound of the true effects on wages. In the main results, I choose to include the fixed effect because it includes factors other than the adjustment for establishment observation, such as natural advantage.

Figure B.2: Bounding Exercise: Adjustment for Establishment Observation and Wages



## C Pre-estimation of $\mu_c$ and $\mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}$

### C.1 Estimation of $\mu_c$

I estimate the elasticity of labor supply to the firm using the method of Bassier, Dube, and Naidu (2022). The estimating equation is a regression of an indicator for separating from an establishment:

$$s_{ijt} = \sum_j -\left(\frac{1}{2}\mu_c\right)\phi_j f_{jt}^i + X_{it} + v_{ijt}$$

Where  $s_{ijt}$  is an indicator for separation of individual  $i$  from establishment  $j$  at time  $t$ ,  $\phi_j$  is the AKM fixed effect of the establishment, and  $f_{jt}^i$  is an indicator variable for individual  $i$  working at establishment  $j$  in time  $t$ . Put simply. the coefficient of interest is on the AKM establishment effect. Figure C.1

### C.2 Estimation of $\mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}$

With the estimate of  $\mu_c$  in hand, I turn to estimation of the market size. Recall the labor supply equation of an establishment:

$$L_{ctj}(w_{ctj}) = \mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}\exp(\mu_c \ln(w_{ctj} - b_{ct}) + a_{sec}) \quad (4)$$

In a log regression, with the pre-estimate of  $\mu_c$ , the market size may be estimated using a simple fixed-effects regression:

$$\ln(L_{ct,sec}(w_{ct,sec})) - \hat{\mu}_c \ln(w_{ctj} - b_{ct}) = \ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct}\lambda_{ct}) + a_{sec} + \epsilon_{cjt} \quad (1)$$

## D Including Rental Prices


Rental prices are a key component of classic spatial equilibrium models. Since I make the assumption that workers are immobile, the inclusion of rental prices does not change the workers' labor supply decision since rental prices they pay do not differ no matter which firm they choose to work at in their commuting zone. However, rental prices will enter the establishment's profit equation. Assume that establishments pay a fixed price  $r_c$  per square meter of space they rent. Each worker requires a fixed amount of space  $k$  that does not differ between locations. This leads to the profit equation:

$$Y_{jc} = (1 - \tau_{ct})[\beta_{ct,sec}L_{ct,sec}(w_{cjt}) - L_{cjt}(w_{cjt})w_{cjt} - kr_c L_{ct,sec}(w_{cjt})] \quad (1)$$

Taking first order conditions leads to the wage equation:

$$w_{ct,sec} = \frac{\mu_c}{1 + \mu_c}(\beta_{ct,sec} - r_c k) + \frac{1}{1 + \mu_c}b_{ct} \quad (2)$$

Figure C.1: Elasticity of Labor Supply Across Space



Notes: These figures show the point estimates of coefficients of the elasticity of labor supply for each commuting zone in Germany calculated using the method from Bassier, Dube, and Naidu (2022). Each color is a quartile, and darker colors are higher values, or more competitive labor markets.

This wage equation is very similar to the wage in the main specification, but the productivity portion of the wage is marked down by the price that the establishment needs to pay in rental prices. When functional forms are substituted back into the wage equation and I log-linearize, the log-profits are:

$$y_{cjt} = \mu_c \ln(\mu_c) + \ln(\mathcal{L}_{ct} \lambda_{ct}) + (1 + \mu_c) \ln\left[\frac{1}{1 + \mu_c} (\beta_{ct,sec} - r_c k - b_{ct})\right] + \ln(1 - \tau_{ct}) + u_{ctj} \quad (3)$$

The difference between this specification is that now rents appear in the productivity term of the equation. I can control for this directly in my reduced form with data on rental prices. I obtained data on rental prices for Germany from the RWI-GEO-REDX dataset maintained by RWI-Essen. Unfortunately, this data is only for residential housing prices rather than commercial real estate prices, but data on commercial prices is not available for Germany.

The dataset provides information on relative housing prices within each district (Klick and Schaffner 2020). I combine the reported fixed effects from the first cross-sectional regression 2 and the housing price growth rates from regression 3 of their paper to create a panel dataset of relative housing prices over time which is merged with my main dataset. I report the results of the main regression specification controlling for rents in Appendix Table 3.3. As this data is only available from 2008 forward, so including it as a control necessitates cutting my panel in half. Therefore, I additionally report the results of the main specification without controlling for rents for the same set of years 2008 to 2017.

The coefficient estimates are not significantly different when controlling for rental prices compared to not, and the only sector with a significant coefficient on rental prices is the Mining, Utilities, and Construction sector. This coefficient is actually positive, likely reflecting the construction industry being able to sell new buildings for more in areas where real estate is expensive.

Table 3.3: Affect of Rental Prices

## Panel A: Rental Price Controls

	Ag. For. Fish.	Mine., Util., Constr.	Manu.	Trade, Transport	Prof. Serv.	Edu., Health.	Other
Tax	-0.875	6.747**	7.715	2.691	5.505*	-3.551	-3.321
Outside Option	0.0330	-0.0472***	0.00198	-0.0171	0.0305	-0.0121	-0.0268**
Input-Output	5.038**	5.543*	-1.468	11.03	6.626	-7.609	8.027*
Labor Correlation	8.216	7.240*	-3.682	-3.972	-0.918	4.876	-1.939
Knowledge	0.0131	-0.0192	0.0858	-0.00812	-0.0263	-0.00226	0.0502
Rental Prices	0.00688	0.00718**	0.00180	0.00276	-0.00107	-0.00825	-0.00316
N	1345	1400	1380	1400	1397	1396	1400
F	23.40	89.84	59.31	146.5	93.58	62.73	73.34

## Panel B: No Rental Price Controls

Tax	2.863	8.789***	8.919	3.144	5.129	-7.867	-4.016
Outside Option	0.0224	-0.0453***	-0.00255	-0.0209	0.0302	-0.00797	-0.0256**
Input-Output	4.396**	4.760*	-1.030	8.830	6.512	-8.699	7.698*
Labor Correlation	5.632	9.062**	-3.215	-3.272	-0.777	8.829	-0.609
Knowledge	0.0107	-0.0177	0.0854	-0.00817	-0.0251	-0.00468	0.0489
N	1345	1400	1380	1400	1397	1396	1400
F	25.65	94.14	59.40	175.6	95.23	60.30	75.62

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

Notes: Results of the reduced-form specification in equation 10, also controlling for rental prices.

## E Incorporating Extensive Margin Effects

In the base specifications, there is no extensive margin. There is a pool of establishments that have decided to enter the market, and they are only choosing a location. Thus, the logit model is zero-sum. If an establishment chooses one location they are by definition taking possible economic activity away from other locations. In this model, place-based policies cannot do anything other than redistribute economic activity across space. This is a strong assumption, in reality there are likely establishments that could potentially enter the market given the right circumstances, but have chosen not to. Schmidheiny and Brülhart (2011) discuss the effects of the lack of extensive margin on predicted counterfactual effects, and show that elasticities of substitution between locations implied by the poisson and conditional logit model are boundary conditions for applied research. As discussed in Appendix A poisson analysis is not appropriate for my context, so I need an alternative bounding exercise.

My method estimates the elasticities of substitution directly using methods from the industrial organization literature, which has a standard method of addressing this problem by imputing the potential market size (Hortaçsu and Joo 2019) and including the numeraire in the choice set of alternatives. In this section, I follow this approach and estimate the effects of incorporating the extensive margin by estimating the market share of the numeraire. To estimate potential market size, I calculate the ratio of establishments:residents for each commuting zone-sector-year cell. I then define the potential market size as the number of establishments that would exist if every commuting zone-sector-year cell had the number of establishments that would exist with the maximum ratio.

This should be thought of as an absolute upper bound of the potential extensive margin effects for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that every location could support the maximum ratio of establishments, particularly for every sector. As a simple example, it is highly unlikely that every location would be able to support the same number of mining establishments due to minerals not being evenly distributed across space.

Second, an individual location may exceed the maximum ratio in the counterfactual analysis since the potential market size is necessarily defined at the national level. Imposing bounds at the commuting-zone level is conceptually difficult. Since the number of residents is a parameter in the model it remains fixed in the model counterfactuals, but if a lot of economic activity was being attracted to a location it would probably attract some new residents as well. Estimating the scope of these effects is beyond the scope of this paper, but for these reasons the results shown below should be thought of as the upper bound.

Figure E.1 shows the estimated bounds on the percentage change in the number of establishments when extensive margin effects are incorporated. Panel A shows the distribution of the effects. As is clear from the figure, the prediction of the change in establishments is much more positive when extensive margin effects are incorporated, with the effect widening somewhat at the right tail of the distribution. Panel B shows the correlation between the individual commuting zone predictions with and without the extensive margin. The individual commuting zone predictions are highly correlated, though not perfectly. In sum, the predicted changes in the number of establishments is higher when extensive margin effects are incorporated, with fairly uniform predictions for all commuting zones.

Figure E.2 shows the estimated bounds on the percentage change in wages when extensive margin effects are incorporated. These effects are less uniform than the changes in the

number of establishments. As shown in Panel A, the right tail of the wage distribution is far higher in the specification incorporating extensive margin effects. The individual commuting-zone correlations in Panel B provide some amount of insight as to the dynamics. The majority of commuting zones are along the green 45 degree line, but a significant minority have predicted changes that are much larger when incorporating extensive margin effects.

Overall, the extensive margin effects probably mean that my baseline estimates of the effects of place-based policies are more negative than they would be in reality, particularly for winning areas, though how much more negative is dependent on how large the extensive margin is. I leave the question of the exact size of the extensive margin effects to future work.



Figure E.1: Bounding Exercise: Incorporating Extensive Margin Effects






Figure E.2: Bounding Exercise: Incorporating Extensive Margin Effects



## F Additional Results

Figure F.1: Coefficients by Sector - OLS



Notes: These figures show the point estimates of coefficients of the variables of interest for each industrial sector in the OLS regression 10, as well as the 95% confidence intervals. See Section 3 for data sources and variable definitions.

Figure F.2: Commuting Zones in Case Study




Table 0.0: Initial Local Conditions

	Ravensburg	Regensburg	Bautzen	Gera
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	3.13	2.54	2.68	2.46
Mining, Utilities, and Construction	13.99	13.29	18.48	17.74
Manufacturing	12.86	12.48	11.35	10.35
Trade and Transport	32.72	32.84	32.33	32.36
Professional Services	12.87	11.88	10.65	12.30
Education and Health	12.24	13.06	13.33	12.74
Other	12.20	13.91	11.18	12.04
Outside Option	49.12	48.76	36.56	37.62
Mu	2.20	2.64	1.56	2.09
Corporate Tax Rate	11.59	12.24	13.17	11.61