

The Impact of Partisan Politics on Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India

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Abstract

Existing studies show party alignment has a positive impact on the distribution of government resources. However, this literature ignores the role of bureaucrats in the process of policy implementation. This is an important omission since bureaucratic autonomy is relatively rare. To examine how party alignment affects the behavior of bureaucrats I rely on a uniquely large and granular dataset of projects implemented under the Member of Parliament Local Development Scheme (MPLADS) in India. The evidence shows party alignment leads to lower project approval time, higher utilization of program resources and spillovers in the form of wasteful projects. Career concerns emerge as an important mechanism explaining bureaucratic behavior. The overall findings imply the power of politicians and the structure of promotions in the civil service are important factors tempering the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance.

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1 Introduction

A large number of studies show that constituencies aligned on a partisan basis with national authorities benefit from the distribution of additional resources from government programs (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2009; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Duquette-Rury et al., 2016; Fourinaies and Mutlu-Eren, 2015; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa, 2006; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). Relying on economic retrospective voting, this literature posits that as long as there is a sufficient level of credit spillover, national authorities have an incentive to distribute resources (e.g. spending) to lower-level authorities on a partisan basis. Building on these studies, recent work focuses on how alignment affects other outcomes such as economic performance (Asher and Novosad, 2017) and level of development over time (Bhavnani and Jensenius, 2016).

This literature, however, either does not consider a role for bureaucrats, or when it does, gives it minimal treatment in the theory, analysis, or both. As a result, we are left with an incomplete picture of how party alignment affects bureaucrats – the key actors in the implementation of policy. This is an important limitation since bureaucratic autonomy is relatively rare (Carpenter, 2001; Rauch and Evans, 2000). Indeed, according to data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 61 percent of countries in 2015 reported below average levels in the index of bureaucratic quality, suggesting that in these countries bureaucratic agencies often experience political interference.

Measurement problems are a reason for the absence of bureaucrats in the literature on party alignment. This is partly because existing work focuses on outcomes aggregated at levels over which it is difficult to disentangle the role of bureaucrats and politicians in the additional disbursement of resources associated with party alignment. To overcome this problem, I rely on two unique and highly granular datasets of project characteristics of more than 300,000 works implemented under the Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS). Under this program national legislators receive a fixed fund every fiscal year to implement local development projects. The implementation of projects, however, is subject to the approval of bureaucrats, whose career prospects depend

on Chief Ministers – the top political authorities at the state level (Banik, 2001; Bhavnani and Lee, Forthcoming; Das, 2013; Iyer and Mani, 2012; Krishnan and Somanthan, 2007; Wade, 1982, 1985). The granularity of the data, the fact that the funds legislators receive are exogenous, and the fact that the career of bureaucrats depends on a clear political authority, allows me to exploit variation in party alignment between national legislators and Chief Ministers (similar to US governors) to estimate the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance. This setting also allows me to exploit several features of the guidelines regulating the promotion of civil servants to identify the mechanisms affecting the behavior of bureaucrats.

The paper presents the following findings. Party alignment leads to shorter project approval time and higher usage of resources under the MPLADS. The analysis also shows party alignment leads to a modest increase in spillovers in the form of wasteful projects. To tease out the main mechanism at play, I show the effect of party alignment declines along with the power of Chief Ministers (proxied by the time an administration has been in office). In addition, the analysis shows the effect of party alignment is larger when the performance of bureaucrats in charge of project approval is subject to a promotion review. These patterns suggest career concerns are important in explaining the behavior of bureaucrats.

Together, the overall findings imply the power of politicians and the promotion structure in the civil service temper the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance. The results from the analysis also provide evidence supporting the view that bureaucrats are part of the reason why alignment leads to better economic performance (Asher and Novosad, 2017). Further, the findings in this paper contribute to the literature on the political economy of development funds (see, for example, Keefer and Khemani, 2009), which have been adopted in a large set of countries (including Mexico, Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Phillippines, Tanzania and Zambia among others), where political interference in the bureaucracy has been a key feature in the management of these programs (Hickey-Tshangana, 2010).

The paper is related to recent theoretical and empirical work highlighting different mechanisms affecting bureaucratic performance. This literature shows that electoral manipula-

tion affects bureaucratic compliance (Gehlbach and Simpser, 2015); bureaucratic turnover follows political cycles (Iyer and Mani, 2012); political competition (Nath, 2014) and increasing the number of political principals has a negative impact on the productivity of bureaucrats (Gulzar and Pasquale, 2017); and local ties make bureaucrats less amenable to corruption (Bhavnani and Lee, Forthcoming). This body of work also shows bargaining failures between politicians may affect completion rates of projects (Williams, 2016); political connections have a negative impact on the performance of bureaucrats (Gulzar, 2015); the quality of bureaucrats may counteract the negative impact of politics on policy (Dincecco and Ravanilla, 2016); and the incentives bureaucrats face within organizations matter for the performance of agencies and economic growth (Bertrand et al., 2015).

The findings in this paper also build on the vast literature in American politics on the political control of the bureaucracy. These studies show how presidential appointments (Moe, 1985; Wood and Waterman, 1991), administrative procedures (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987), and the partisan control of the executive and legislative branches of government (Acs, 2016) affect the ideological orientation of policies across different domains. Other studies focus on how presidential appointments and the presence of asymmetries of information affect the distribution of government resources (Gordon, 2011; Lewis, 2008). However, with the exception of Gulzar (2015), neither the American politics nor the comparative political economy literature sheds much light on the impact of party alignment on the behavior of bureaucrats.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background in India and the details regarding the operation of the MPLADS. Section 3 discusses the different mechanisms by which party alignment may affect bureaucratic performance under this program. Section 4 discusses the data analyzed to estimate the impact of partisan alignment on bureaucratic performance, and Section 5 presents the main findings of the paper. Section 6 concludes.

2 Institutional Setting

This section provides a brief background discussion on India’s political institutions and civil service. The section also describes the main features of the Members of Parliament Development Scheme (MPLADS), the programme examined in the paper to assess the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance.

2.1 Indian Political Institutions

India is a parliamentary democracy. General elections take place every five years, unless a sitting government calls for one before the period mandated by the law. Candidates compete in simple plurality races for a seat in the national parliament (Lok Sabha) to represent one of the 543 constituencies in the country.¹ The party system in India is fragmented (Brass, 1994; Chhibber and Kollman, 1998; Chhibber, Refsum Jensenius, and Suryanarayan, 2012), as there are two major national parties, the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) and Congress, and a relatively large number of parties with a regional base, such as the Communist Party in West Bengal and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu.

India is also a federal democracy, consisting of 29 states and 7 union territories. State political institutions mirror, with some exceptions, those at the federal-level. The constitution ordains that states must hold elections every five years. Local legislators, affiliated to either one of the national or regional parties, are elected in simple plurality races. After the election, legislators from the majority party (or coalition) select a Chief Minister (the equivalent of a governor).

Because the focus in this paper is on the partisan alignment between national legislators and Chief Ministers, it is important to consider the different scenarios under which the partisan identity of the latter changes. A change in the partisan identity of the Chief Minister may take place when: her party (or coalition) loses its majority after an election; she steps down after losing confidence from her coalition; or she steps down, but her party (or coalition) failing to agree on a replacement, brings about the declaration of President’s Rule. In the

¹Parliament has a total of 545 seats, but two of them are for nominated members.

first case, the partisanship of the Chief Minister changes if a new party (or coalition comes into power). In the second case, a change in the partisan identity of the Chief Minister comes about if the reigning coalition chooses a leader from a different party. Lastly, under President’s rule the central government administers the state until the date for the next election, thereby leaving a void in state leadership.

Another important feature of India’s institutional configuration is that since 1971 national and most state elections do not follow the same calendar. This feature stems from Indira Gandhi’s strategic decision to call for a fresh national election the year after the splintering of the Congress Party into the ruling and opposition factions (L. Rudolph, 1971; L. Rudolph and S. Rudolph, 1987; Weiner, 1971). This means that in addition to the within-state cross-sectional variation in party alignment between national legislators and a Chief Minister, individual MPs may also experience a change in their alignment status within a given national legislative period.

2.2 The Indian Administrative Services

The Indian Administrative Services (IAS) is the most important and prestigious branch of the civil service in the country. The IAS is the direct descendant of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), considered the “the ‘steel frame’ of the British Raj” before independence (Das, 2013). Entry to the service is competitive. Officers are first selected to the service through a general examination. Subsequently, accepted candidates take a further test to determine their rank within the service. Officers are assigned to state cadres, with the possibility of serving stints in the central government.

The original framers of the Indian constitution had the intention of insulating IAS members from politics. The intention at the time of the constitutional convention was to create an institutional setup guaranteeing members of the civil services implementing policies in an impartial manner (Krishnan and Somanthan, 2007). In practice, however, IAS officers are not free from political pressure. Part of the reason for this situation is the fact that there are no clear guidelines for the transfer of IAS officers, and Chief Ministers may exercise a significant amount of influence to decide their fate (Banik, 2001).

Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence showing Chief Ministers using their discretion to punish IAS officers when they are unsatisfied with a bureaucrat's performance. There are accounts, for example, involving Chief Ministers manipulating an officer's Annual Confidential Report (ACR), a key part of the evaluation determining the promotion prospects of IAS officers, when bureaucrats have fallen out of favor (Banik, 2001, p. 114). Chief ministers also rely on "encadrement" (Krishnan and Somanthan, 2007). This practice involves the creation of additional civil service posts with less prestige to which bureaucrats can later be transferred. There is also abundant evidence indicating that legislators use their influence to keep bureaucrats in line (Banik, 2001; Wade, 1982, 1985).

Political cycles in the transfer of bureaucrats across posts is a feature of the IAS (Iyer and Mani, 2012). The frequency of transfers varies by state, and is considered one of the key issues in the agenda for reform of the civil services in India (Das, 2013). Increasingly, we are learning more about when and how the discretion a Chief Minister enjoys in transferring bureaucrats affects the quality of bureaucratic performance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that frequent transfers diminish the moral of civil servants, thereby negatively affecting the implementation of development programs (Banik, 2001). Other accounts suggest that officers subvert the implementation of development programs in order to extract rents, which they subsequently use to bolster their promotion prospects (Wade, 1982, 1985). A recent study shows that officials with local ties may be less prone to corruption (Bhavnani and Lee, Forthcoming). Other studies note the partiality of officers in their favorable treatment of politicians close to ruling parties (Krishnan and Somanthan, 2007). However, there is no systematic evidence, or specific predictions on whether party alignment between politicians compromises bureaucratic performance. This paper seeks to fill this gap by analyzing the MPLADS.

2.3 The MPLAD Scheme

The MPLAD Scheme was created in 1993. As stated in the scheme's guidelines, the purpose of the program is to provide MPs with funds so that they propose and finance the construction of durable assets of a developmental nature in their constituencies. The government of India,

through the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MOSPI), has established a set of guidelines ordaining that works should be carried out in the following priority areas: drinking water, primary education, public health, sanitation, and construction of roads, among others.

The key features of the program are as follows. While in office, each member of parliament receives a fixed amount of money every fiscal year regardless of the constituency a legislator represents. At the program's inception the annual endowment was minuscule (about 80,000 USD or Rs. 5 Lakhs), but increased to 312,000 USD (Rs. 2 Crore) in the period 1998-1999, and again to approximately 780,000 USD (Rs. 5 Crore) since the the fiscal year 2011-2012. Importantly, the funds associated with the program do not lapse. That is, any funds left at the end of a fiscal year can be used in the subsequent year. This rule also applies at the end of a given parliamentary term; the incoming MP inherits any funds left unspent by her predecessor.

Under the program, MPs are responsible for identifying local needs and sponsoring eligible projects to address them. MPs submit their recommendation to a district authority, who is in charge of both sanctioning the project and choosing, following the existing rules, the agency in charge of implementing the work. The district authority can be either the district magistrate, collector, or deputy commissioner. All of these posts are prestigious and filled with officials drawn from the pool of IAS officers (Iyer and Mani, 2012).

3 Mechanisms

Figure 1 depicts the relationship between MPs, Chief Ministers, and bureaucrats under the MPLADS. District authorities work in a given state under the de facto authority of a Chief Minister. At the same time MPs, belonging to the opposition (left panel) or sharing party affiliation with the sitting Chief Minister (right panel), recommend projects subject to the approval of a district authority. Following a principal-agent approach, as is standard in the political control of the bureaucracy literature (Huber and Shipan, 2011; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987; Moe, 1985; Ting, 2012), the discussion in this section illustrates how under the setup represented in Figure 1 adverse selection and career concerns are two potential




Figure 1: **MPs, Chief Ministers, and Bureaucrats under the MPLADS.** MPs propose projects to bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are in charge of approving these proposals but Chief Ministers have the power to transfer them to different posts. Members of parliament may belong to the opposition (left panel), or they may share party affiliation with the sitting Chief Minister in a state (right panel).

mechanisms by which party alignment impacts bureaucratic performance. In particular, the discussion shows that party alignment between legislators and Chief Ministers should be associated, regardless of the specific mechanism, with a lower project approval time and higher use of program resources. However, if career concerns is the main mechanism at work, the impact of party alignment on these dimensions should decline along with the power of Chief Ministers. Similarly, in the presence of career concerns, the effect of party alignment should be larger when bureaucrats in charge of project approval are up for promotion. Finally, the discussion also establishes that party alignment may lead to an increase in corruption and spillovers in the form of wasteful projects.

Political affinity (i.e. adverse selection) may account for the relationship between party alignment and bureaucratic performance. In India, a share of IAS officers are promoted from the state cadre, and these officials may owe their promotion to powerful Chief Ministers. This is especially important in cases where Chief Ministers remain in power for long periods of time (see, for example, the case of Jayalalitha in Tamil Nadu). Similarly, Chief Ministers may use their power to transfer loyal officers to key positions across the state. In particular, it is possible that Chief Ministers assign loyal bureaucrats, perhaps because of complementarities,

to districts represented by her co-partisans (Iyer and Mani, 2012). Under either scenario we would expect loyal officials to display favoritism towards legislators who happen to belong to the same party as the Chief Minister.

However, career concerns may also affect the performance of bureaucrats. As discussed in the previous section, officers are selected through a highly competitive and meritocratic process. They take an examination that only a small share of applicants pass, and are allocated to a state cadre in a quasi-random manner (Bhavnani and Lee, Forthcoming). Politics infect the career prospects of bureaucrats only when they are assigned to a state cadre. Chief Ministers have ample discretion to transfer officials, while politicians have an input on the evaluation determining the promotion prospects of IAS officers.

In this context, bureaucrats may display favoritism toward legislators aligned with a Chief Minister to advance their career. Otherwise, co-partisan legislators may pass on their complaints on the performance of bureaucrats to a Chief Minister. Chief Ministers, in turn, may act on these complaints by punishing bureaucratic to keep legislators from his party on their side.²

The two mechanisms considered thus far (adverse selection and career concerns) have specific implications for the performance of bureaucrats under the MPLADS:

Approval Times. The adverse selection and career concerns mechanisms imply that aligned legislators will experience shorter project approval times. Crucially, however, the magnitude of the effect of party alignment on approval times should be decreasing in the power of Chief Ministers, as they may lack the political capital or time to punish bureaucrats. Similarly, in the presence of career concerns, aligned legislators should experience shorter approval times when bureaucrats in charge of project approval are up for promotion.

Use of Resources. Both adverse selection and career concerns mechanisms also imply a more intense use of program resources under party alignment. This may happen if bureaucrats display favoritism towards aligned legislators, and/or if co-partisan legislators, anticipating favorable treatment from civil servants, submit more projects for approval. How-

²This mechanism is consistent, for example, with the framework introduced in Brollo and Nannicini (2012) where a national incumbent receives a rent only when members of her party implement a policy.

ever, under career concerns the effect of party alignment on the use of program resources should decline in the power of a Chief Minister. Further, if career concerns are important, we should also expect a larger effect of party alignment when bureaucrats are up for promotion.

Corruption. Party alignment may lead to an increase in the incidence of corruption. For example, legislators may quote inputs of higher quality and price in project proposals, so that they can pocket the price difference between these inputs and the the low-quality ones they procure. Schemes of this sort are common in the construction of local infrastructure in developing countries (Olken, 2008), and in India the use of infrastructure projects is a common source of rents for politicians (Khemani, 2010; Wade, 1985). But to carry out these schemes, legislators may need the cooperation of bureaucrats. However, bureaucrats may be more amenable to help legislators (either because of adverse selection or career concerns) when they share partisan affiliation with the sitting Chief Minister.

Under career concerns, we would expect the effect of party alignment on corruption to decrease as the power of a Chief Minister erodes because co-partisan legislators lose the leverage they have over bureaucrats to extract rents. Similarly, we would expect the impact of party alignment on corruption to be greater when bureaucrats eligible for performance review are in charge of project approval.

Spillovers. Party alignment may also lead to an increase in the incidence of projects that fail. This may be the result of spillovers. A higher volume of projects under aligned legislators may stretch the attention and resources of all the actors in charge of project implementation, thereby leading to an increase in the share of failing projects. Another possibility is that co-partisan legislators submit proposals of lower quality more frequently because they anticipate a favorable treatment from bureaucrats.

If career concerns matter, the impact of alignment on spillovers may decline as the power of a Chief Minister erodes. When Chief Minister lose power, the bargaining power of legislators over civil servants falls. As a result, legislators may use less program resources, and may also be forced to submit proposals of better quality. However, the promotion eligibility of bureaucrats would not necessarily magnify the impact of party alignment. This may happen if the volume of projects under co-partisan legislators is so large as to prevent a decrease in

(1) Mechanism	(2) Career Concerns Channel	Outcome			
		(3) Approval Time	(4) Resource Usage	(5) Corruption	(6) Spillovers
Adverse Selection or Career Concerns	–	(–)	(+)	(+)	(+)
Career Concerns	Decrease in CM Power Bureaucrat Review	Decreases Increases	Decreases Increases	Decreases Increases	Decreases May Increase

Table 1: **Impact of Party Alignment on Bureaucratic Performance: Summary of Hypotheses.** The first row of columns (3)-(6) in the table report the expected direction of the effect of party alignment on each of the outcomes of interest. The second and third rows of columns (3)-(6) report the change in the magnitude of the effect of party alignment on the outcomes of interest under the two career concerns mechanisms indicated in column (2).

spillover rates despite any increase in the attention of civil servant eligible for performance review.

Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses laid out in this section. The rows in the first column display the mechanisms by which party alignment may have an impact on bureaucratic performance (adverse selection and career concerns). The rows in the second column indicate the two channels through which career concerns may operate (power of a Chief Minister and promotion eligibility of bureaucrats). The first row in columns (3)-(6) reports the direction of the overall effect of party alignment on the outcomes of interest. The second and third rows in columns (3)-(6) report the expected change in the magnitude of the effect of party alignment on the outcomes under consideration. For instance, we expect party alignment (regardless of the mechanism) to lower project approval times. However, we expect this effect to decrease when the power of a Chief Minister erodes, and to increase when the performance of bureaucrats is subject to review. The next section discusses the data used to test these hypotheses.

4 Data

This section describes the data sources and coding procedures I use to estimate the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance.

4.1 MPLADS Monitoring System

I rely on the MPLADS Monitoring System as the first data source to examine the impact of party alignment on bureaucrat performance and the strategic behavior of MPs. The system

was set up by the central government to keep a record of all the approved works associated with the scheme across parliamentary sessions. For each work the system provides the name and constituency of the sponsoring MP; the date the work was submitted for approval; the date on which the work was accepted; the cost approved by the district authority for its implementation; and the implementation status among other details. The records in the system correspond to more than 300,000 works approved and implemented during the 14th and part of the 15th Lok Sabha (May 2004 to February 2014) across India.

Figure 2 illustrates the procedure I follow to code the main predictor and outcomes of interest in the monitoring data. For illustration purposes, the figure focuses on the state of Rajasthan to show the overlap between the 14th and 15th Lok Sabha and the three state administrations coinciding with the period covered in the sample.³ The dashed vertical lines represent the timing of state elections, and the solid vertical lines demarcate the years of tenure during a given state administration. The parts of the line segment shaded in blue (orange) represent the periods during which a BJP (Congress) Chief Minister was in power. We can see, for example, that with the exception of the first four months of 2009, the BJP governed Rajasthan for most of the 14th Lok Sabha.

Using this information, I create an indicator variable for party alignment (co-partisan) for each year of tenure across administrations. The variable takes the value of 1 if an MP is aligned with the chief minister during a tenure year of a given administration and zero otherwise. I then repeat this procedure for all MPs across states and periods in the sample.

Notice that this approach yields within- and across- MP variation in the co-partisan indicator. For example, in Rajasthan during the five years of the state administration coinciding with the 14 Lok Sabha the co-partisan indicator would take a value of 1 for a Congress and 0 for a BJP legislator. However, for each of these hypothetical legislators the value of the co-partisan indicator would be the opposite for the the last months of the 14 Lok Sabha and most of the 15 Lok Sabha.

³Each administration is defined by the total amount of uninterrupted time a Chief Minister is in power. Therefore, if an election takes place, and the incumbent Chief Minister remains in office, it counts as a new administration. In the case of Rajasthan new administrations came into power as a result of state elections in December 2003, 2008, and 2013.




Figure 2: **Party Alignment and Aggregating Outcomes using MPLADS Monitoring Data.** The line segment represents the overlap between state administrations and legislative periods in Rajasthan. The dashed vertical lines indicate the timing of state elections, and the solid vertical lines demarcate years of tenure within a given state administration. Segments shaded in blue (orange) correspond to years when a BJP (Congress) Chief Minister was in power. A legislator is coded as co-partisan if during a given tenure year he is affiliated to the same party as the Chief Minister in office. Total approved cost (Y_i) is defined as the sum across the N individual cost of approved projects for MP j in administration k in a given tenure year.

To examine whether bureaucrats display favoritism toward co-partisan legislators, I examine how long it takes for bureaucrats to approve the proposals of legislators. This outcome is simply defined as the log of the difference in the length of time (weeks) between the time a district authority approved a project for implementation and the date in which an MP submitted the work for approval.

I also create two additional outcomes to examine how party alignment influences the use of resources associated with the MPLADS: the total approved cost across projects and the total number of approved projects during a given tenure year of a state administration. As Figure 2 illustrates, I created these outcomes by simply summing the total approved cost (or number of approved projects) for MP j submitted during state administration k in a given year of tenure.⁴

The final sample I analyze to assess the impact of co-partisanship on the approval time of MP work proposals consists of 320,883 works implemented across 21 states in India, which together account for close to 97 percent of the country's population in the 2011 census. This universe of works, which I refer to as the monitoring sample, is distributed across 835 MPs. A total of 51.71% of works were proposed by co-partisan legislators. To estimate the

⁴In some periods MPs register no approved works in the monitoring system. I impute those periods with zeros in the total approved cost and total number of projects. The imputation procedure I follow for such MPs is problematic in cases where they report works with a missing recommendation date for the work. Below I check the robustness of my results when including and dropping MPs of this type from the analysis.

impact of party alignment on the total amount of resources that MPs use during periods of co-partisan alignment, I aggregated the monitoring sample over years of tenure across state administrations. I refer to this sample as the monitoring aggregated sample, and consists of 5,512 state administration tenure-years. In 45.95% of this universe of tenure-years MPs were aligned with the sitting Chief Minister in their respective states.

4.2 MPLADS Evaluation

To estimate the impact of co-partisanship on corruption and spillovers, I draw on empirical evidence from a unique evaluation of works implemented across India under the MPLADS. As part of its monitoring responsibilities, MOSPI commissioned the Agricultural Financial Corporation Ltd. (AFC), through a public bid, to carry out an evaluation of works implemented under the MPLAD scheme. The period of analysis covers the years 2000-2012.

The evaluation consists of 98 districts (out of a total of 640 districts in 2012) distributed across 12 states in India.⁵ For each of these districts, the AFC had a team of 12 people in charge of auditing about 50 works approved and implemented during the period of interest. Each work was assessed along several dimensions including: the amount proposed by the MP and the amount sanctioned for implementation by the district authority, the proposal's submission and approval dates, the agency in charge of implementing the project, the usefulness of the work, the project's eligibility, and the type of procurement under which the project was implemented, among others. The AFC summarized this information in detailed district reports encompassing close to 10,000 pages, with each report devoting two pages to each work under a common format.⁶

To code the different outcomes and the main predictor of interest, I first restrict the sample to include only works sponsored by members of the Lok Sabha.⁷ I then create a co-

⁵MOSPI originally commissioned the audit of 100 districts, but I was not able to locate the reports for two of them. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows that the spatial distribution of districts in the evaluation sample is not random. However, Section F in the Appendix shows that the works in this sample are similar to those in the universe of approved works across several observed dimensions. In addition, the empirical analysis in Section 5 adjusts for potential covariates affecting the representativeness of the findings relying on the evaluation sample.

⁶Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix B display the front and back an example of a report for a work implemented in Faridkot, Punjab.

⁷The reports also include works by members of Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian parliament whose members are elected by state legislatures. The MPLADS guidelines for members of this chamber are

partisanship indicator across works following the same procedure discussed in the previous section. As before, an MP is a co-partisan if the date in which she submitted the project proposal she is affiliated to the same party as the Chief Minister in power.

I then extract the information in the reports, through an automated method (with manual verification), to code several binary outcomes. The first outcome is the indicator *wasteful*, which takes the value of one if the auditor deemed the project a waste of resources. Wasteful projects are those that were never completed years after its approval date, were not found by auditors, were completed but never used by anyone in the community, or were found in a condition as to be deemed unusable.⁸

Wasteful projects may be associated with corruption if as described in Section 3, legislators devise a scheme under which contractors overcharge the government for a given input but use one of lower quality and price at the time of implementation. This could allow legislators and contractors to pocket the surcharge, which is not an uncommon practice in India. Wasteful projects may alternatively be the result of spillovers; legislators submit several proposals, and some of these are bound to fail.

Therefore, as an additional way to assess whether party alignment is associated with corruption or spillovers I code three additional indicator variables. I create an *ngo* indicator, which takes the value of one if a “trust” (a type of NGO) was in charge of the implementation of a given work. MPs in India have used these organizations in the past to siphon funds associated with the development scheme. A way legislators have done this in the past is to assign projects to trusts headed by relatives.⁹

broadly similar to the ones that apply to members of the Lok Sabha. However, there are also important differences. For instance, whereas MPs can only sponsor works in the constituency they represent, Rajya Sabha members can do it across any districts within the state. Another difference is that unspent funds by outgoing member of the Rajya Sabha are distributed equally by the state government among all the incoming members.

⁸The following excerpt from a report of a work in Nagaur, Rajasthan provides an example of a wasteful project: “The work [rain water drainage system], if completed, would have immensely benefited the village community. Even after 9 years, no efforts were made to complete the work by dovetailing/convergence. Thus no benefit could be made of the work done in MPLAD Scheme and the money got wasted.”

⁹In one particular instance a district report notes: “The work was found ineligible under the MPLAD Scheme guidelines. Because, field researcher found that the trust under which this asset has been created is headed by the close relatives of the recommending Member of Parliament.” Still, the adoption of a trust as an implementing agency does not necessarily imply that there is corruption involved. The only claim I make is that it may be easier for legislators to embezzle funds and capture a higher level of rents when they rely

Another, indicator variable (*ineligible*) takes the value of one if auditors consider the project not permissible under the ruling guidelines at the time a project proposal was submitted for approval. Reasons for ineligibility found in the reports include: works benefitting a particular community (e.g. a religious group), projects limited to renovating existing assets, and works commissioned for implementation to entities not meeting the required criteria (e.g. a minimum number of year of existence prior the approval of a work). Ineligible projects may confer additional benefits to politicians if such works promise higher electoral returns by being popular among a specific set of key constituents. Ineligible projects may also allow politicians to extract more rents if projects not contemplated in the program’s guidelines are more profitable.

Finally, the indicator variable *tender* takes a value of one if the work was assigned to a contractor through public bidding. This variable measures the ability of politicians to capture rents. Avoiding a public bid may allow legislators to receive kickbacks from cronies when put in charge of implementing projects.

The final evaluation sample includes a total of 3,426 works sponsored by 228 MPs representing constituencies across 12 states and three parliaments. Co-partisan legislators were responsible for a total of 52.31% of works in the sample. The percentage of wasteful and ngo-implemented projects in the evaluation is 12.74% and 12.77% respectively. Ineligible projects represented 9.83% of total works in the sample, while the total share of works implemented through a public bid is 33.74%.

4.3 District Officials

As an additional way to assess the extent to which moral hazard matters in the performance of bureaucrats, I collected data on the career of IAS officers. To collect this data, I scraped the more than 10,000 Executive Record (ER) sheets of IAS officers available online.¹⁰ These forms contain the positions (with location and dates) that civil servants have held throughout their career. I use this information to assign to each project in the two datasets described

on this type of implementation agency. For instance, if instead of relying on an NGO set up through family members, legislators choose a government agency, they may be forced to share part of their rent with the official in charge of the agency.

¹⁰The ER sheets for IAS officers are available here: <https://supremo.nic.in/knowyourofficerIAs.aspx>

in the previous subsections the officer (district collectors or magistrates) in charge of project approval. After ascertaining this information I create variables measuring the seniority of officials, and following Bhavnani and Lee (Forthcoming) whether they have local ties.

Unfortunately, there is a significant amount of missing data, as I am able to determine the unique identity of the top official in a district in a given time period for about 40 percent of works in each of the samples of MPLAD projects. To avoid row-wise deletion I rely on the *R* Amelia package to impute the official information when examining whether the promotion prospects of bureaucrats amplify the effect of party alignment.

4.4 Additional Covariates

Finally, the analyses in the next section include other political and socio-economic covariates that may have an impact on the different outcomes of interest. Among the political, I include the margin of victory of MPs, a legislator’s party affiliation, the level of turnout, and an indicator variable for whether a constituency is reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes or Tribes. I also added indicator variables for whether a legislator is affiliated to a national party and whether she belongs to the national governing coalition. I obtained the information to measure all but the national coalition covariate from the statistical reports that the Electoral Commission of India published for the general elections corresponding to the 14 and 15 Lok Sabha.¹¹ In the case of earlier parliaments, I obtained the information from the dataset assembled by Jensenius (2016), which is available through the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA).¹² For the national coalition variable I rely on the accounts in Sridharan (2004) and Kailash (2009).

For the socio-economic confounders, I created an index of district “capacity.” To create this index I use the proportion of villages in a given district with a main paved road, that have a bus stop within two kilometers, and that report the presence of a primary health center in the district as reported in the 2001 census village directory. Finally, in the analyses that follow I also control for the total number of MPs under the jurisdiction of a given district for the purposes of the MPLADS. This additional covariate is necessary, as the number of

¹¹http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

¹²<http://www.electiondataarchive.org/>

legislators per district official may affect the workload and incentives that bureaucrats face (Gulzar and Pasquale, 2017).

5 Empirical Findings

In this section I present estimates of the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance. I first show that works sponsored by co-partisan legislators report shorter approval times, suggesting bureaucrats display favoritism towards MPs aligned with the Chief Minister. I then show that the total cost and number of projects approved is higher among co-partisan legislators than among those who belong to the opposition. This evidence suggests that MPs may be strategic in the use of program resources, or that bureaucrats favor co-partisan legislators by approving the projects of legislators of this type at a higher rate. The analysis also shows the effect of party alignment on these outcomes (project approval time, total cost sanctioned, and total number of projects) declines in the time a Chief Minister has been in office (a proxy of political power), and are magnified when bureaucrats in charge of project approval are up for promotion. Both patterns suggest career concerns is the main mechanism through which co-partisanship affects bureaucratic performance. Finally, the analysis shows the proportion of wasteful projects is higher among co-partisan legislators. However, the evidence suggests the higher incidence of wasteful projects among co-partisan MPs is related to spillovers and not to corruption.

5.1 Co-Partisanship and Bureaucrat Favoritism

To test the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance, I first analyze the monitoring sample and fit the following random effects model:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_i &= \beta_0 + \text{coparty}_{k[j[i]]}\beta_1 + X_{l[j[i]]}^\top\beta_2 + t_{k[i]}\beta_3 + t_{k[i]}^2\beta_4 + \alpha_j + \alpha_k + \alpha_l + \epsilon_i \\
\alpha_j &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tau_j) \\
\alpha_k &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tau_k) \\
\alpha_l &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, \tau_l)
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is the log duration of the time (in weeks) it takes for project i to be approved. The main variable of interest is $\text{coparty}_{k[j[i]]}$, a binary indicator equal to 1 if legislator j

belongs to the same party as the sitting Chief Minister at the time of project proposal i during state administration k .¹³ $X_{l[j[i]]}^\top$ denotes a vector of other covariates linked to project i through legislator j during legislature l . This vector includes the number of MPs working with the same district authority as a legislator, a legislator’s margin of victory, turnout in the race in which she was elected, an indicator variable for whether the MP represents a reserved constituency, and dummies for a legislator’s party affiliation, whether she belongs to a national party, and whether she is part of the national governing coalition.

To measure a Chief Minister’s political power, I include in the model the number of years an administration has been in office ($t_{k[i]}$) and the square of this term. This is a reasonable proxy for the declining power of Chief Ministers in India. Existing work has documented an incumbency disadvantage in state and national election in this country (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009). Further, as in parliamentary regimes in Europe, the probability of government survival may decline over time (see, for example, King, Alt, et al., 1990). As a result, legislators and bureaucrats may develop the expectation that a Chief Minister is unlikely to return to office after completing a term, and that her probability of stepping down from office increases the longer she remains in power. Both forces erode over time the ability of Chief Ministers to punish bureaucrats.

Finally, to account for the clustering of observations, the model includes legislator (α_j), state administration (α_k), and legislature (α_l) random effects. I fit a similar model to the monitoring aggregate sample. The only difference in this model is that it aggregates the outcome over state administration tenure-years, controls for the lag level of expenditure per period, and includes MP and legislature random effects.

Figure 3 displays the baseline effect of party alignment on log of project approval time, log total approved cost, and log total number of approved projects. The figure reports the point estimate (and 95% confidence interval) for the difference in the three outcomes between co-partisan and opposition legislators.¹⁴ The figure shows that legislators that belong to the

¹³The indexing notation for covariates follows the approach for grouped data introduced in Gelman and Hill (2007). Note also that the model fitted in this section does not allow for the possibility of party alignment varying over time for a given project. The reason for this choice is that less than 4% of projects in the monitoring and evaluation sample are observed across different state administrations.

¹⁴The estimates displayed in Figure 3 are based on fitting the regression Model 1. The point estimates of




Figure 3: **Baseline Effect of Co-Partisanship on Bureaucratic Performance.** The figure displays point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) for the difference in the log of project approval time, log of total cost, and log of total approved projects between co-partisan and opposition legislators. The estimates show that co-partisanship is associated with a 15% decline in project approval times. The figure also shows that party alignment leads to a 27% increase in total cost and a 22% increase in total approved projects.

same party as a Chief Minister experience a 15% decline in project approval time. The figure also shows that when legislators share partisan affiliation with Chief Ministers, they use 27% more resources and experience a 22% increase in total approved projects.¹⁵

5.1.1 Career Concerns: Chief Minister Tenure

The estimates reported in Figure 3 are consistent with both adverse selection and career concerns mechanisms. For instance, under adverse selection, bureaucrats loyal to a Chief Minister may display favoritism only towards her co-partisans. Instead, if career concerns matter, impartial bureaucrats, concerned about their career prospects, display favoritism

this regression are reported in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 1 in the Appendix.

¹⁵A potential concern with the findings reported in Figure 3 is that they are simply mechanical, and driven by the first year of administration of state governments, when MPs and bureaucrats do not have much backlog of projects pending for approval. To address this issue, Table 3 in the Appendix reports estimates for the coefficients in equation 1 based on a sample that drops all observations in the first year of a state administration. For the aggregated sample, Columns (5)-(6) and (9)-(10) in Table 3 in the Appendix also report findings when dropping legislators who reported missing values in the dates of some of the projects they submitted, and for which I could not determine the year of state administration to which they correspond. The results using these alternative samples remain unchanged.

only towards co-partisans of Chief Ministers.

Thus, to assess whether career concerns matter for the effect of party alignment on bureaucratic performance, I fit a specification that includes an interaction between *coparty* and a Chief Minister's tenure. If the ability of a Chief Minister to punish bureaucrats declines over time, then we should expect the effect of party alignment on the outcomes of interest to decrease in the number of years she has been in office.




Figure 4: **Impact of Co-Partisanship by a Chief Minister's Year in Office.** The panels in the figure plot point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) of co-partisanship's impact on the log of project approval time (left), total approved cost (middle), and total number of approved projects (right) by year of tenure of a state administration. All three panels shows that the impact of co-partisanship decreases as the tenure of state administrations progresses.

Figure 4 reports the estimates from this exercise. The figure display a panel for each of the three outcomes. Each panel reports the point estimate (and 95% confidence interval) for the effect of party alignment on the outcome of interest by a Chief Minister's year in office.¹⁶ The figure shows patterns consistent with a context in which career concerns matter. Across each of the three outcomes, the effect of co-partisanship declines over a Chief Minister's tenure. For instance, the effect of partisanship on project approval declines from about 17% in the first to 12.5% in the last year of a Chief Minister's tenure. The effect of party alignment on the log of total cost approved also declines from about 30% in a Chief Minister's first year in

¹⁶The estimates displayed in Figure 3 are based on fitting the regression Model 1 that includes an interaction between the *co-party* indicator and a Chief Minister's year of tenure. The point estimates of this regression are reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 1 in the Appendix.

office to less than 10% in her last year. A similar pattern holds for the log of total approved projects.¹⁷

5.1.2 Career Concerns: Pay Scale of Bureaucrats

As an additional way to examine whether career concerns matter for the impact of co-partisanship, I rely on information on the district officials in charge of project approval at the time they are eligible for promotion to a higher pay scale. IAS officers are eligible throughout their career for increases in salary, which are classified in scales. Eligibility to a higher scale depends on seniority and, in most cases, a review of their performance.

Following an analysis similar to that in Nath (2014), I focus on three different pay scales: Junior, Select, and Super. Officers are promoted automatically to the Junior pay scale after 9 years of service. This changes with the Select and Super pay scales, to which officers are promoted after 13 and 16 years of service respectively subject to a performance review.

In the analysis that follows, I divide the sample in three strata according to the seniority officers in charge of project approval. The three strata are as follows: officers with seniority between 8 and 10 years, between 12 and 14 years, and between 15 and 17 years. For each of these strata, I fit a regression specification similar to the one captured by Model 1 to assess the impact of party alignment and the promotion status of bureaucrats on the log of project approval time. To fit the regression, I include an indicator variable called *review*, which takes the value of 1 for officers with a seniority lower than 9, 13, and 16 years in each strata. This variable captures the idea that projects approved during the year prior to an officer's eligibility for promotion to the Select and Super pay scales will matter for their performance review. I interact this variable with the *co-party* indicator. The expectation is that the impact of co-partisanship on approval time should be larger when officers are in charge of approving projects that matter for their promotion review (i.e., in the Select and

¹⁷Extrapolation is a concern in estimating the heterogeneous impact of co-partisanship on the different outcome of interest. In particular, this could be problematic if, for example, the number of observations used to estimate the relationship between co-partisanship and the log of approval time during the last year of state administration was disproportionately smaller in relation to previous years. Figure 4 in the Appendix shows that this is not the case. The figure shows that the distribution of observations is similar across years of tenure and legislator type. For instance, 30% of the observations in the monitoring sample are found in the first year of tenure, 25% in the second year, 20% in the second year, and 20% in years four and five. This pattern holds across all samples analyzed in this section.




Figure 5: **Effect of Party Alignment by Promotion Status of Bureaucrats.** The left panel displays the difference in the effect of co-partisanship on project approval time between cases when bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are in charge of project approval and cases when bureaucrats are not eligible for a salary increase. The panel displays these differences across pay scales. The other two panels report the log of the total approved cost (middle) and the total number of approved projects (right) according to the partisan alignment status of legislators, the performance review of bureaucrats, and pay scales.

Super scales but not in the Junior strata). The regressions also control for whether officers have local ties, proxied by whether their domicile matches their state cadre, as bureaucrats of this type may more or less prone to corruption (Bhavnani and Lee, Forthcoming).

To assess the extent to which career concerns matter for the use of resources under the MPLADS, I take the log of total approved cost and the log of the total number of approved projects and aggregate them in each seniority strata across the following categories: opposition legislators and bureaucrats not under review, aligned legislators and bureaucrats not under review, opposition legislators and bureaucrats under review, and aligned legislators and bureaucrats under review. Again, the expectation is that the use of program resources should be higher when aligned legislators propose projects, and bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are responsible for approving these proposals.

Figure 5 shows the results from this analysis. The first panel reports the estimated difference (and 95% confidence interval) in the effect of party alignment on log of project approval time between bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review and bureaucrats not eligible for promotion. The panel reports this difference across each of the three pay

scales.¹⁸ The figure shows that, as expected, the effect of party alignment on project approval time is 8.7% higher among bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review in the Select strata.¹⁹ Also as expected, the placebo review does not make a difference for the impact of party alignment on project approval time among officers in the automatic promotion (Junior) strata. In the strata with the most senior officers (Super), review status seems to magnify the impact of party alignment by 2%, but the point estimate is not statistically significant.

The middle and right panels also shows that, for the Select and Super pay scales, the review status of bureaucrats amplifies the effect of party alignment on the use of MPLAD program resources. Across both panels we observe that in these pay scales the highest number of total approved projects and log of total cost correspond to the category of aligned legislators working with bureaucrats whose performance is subject review. For the Junior scale there is no difference across categories, which is expected since the promotion to the higher pay scale is automatic.²⁰

5.2 Co-Partisanship, Corruption, and Spillovers

Thus far the evidence shows party alignment has a statistically and substantially significant impact on the behavior of bureaucrats. Further, the empirical analysis suggests the career concerns of civil servants are responsible for the increased productivity of co-partisan legislators under the MPLADS. A missing piece in the analysis, however, is whether party alignment also has an impact on the quality of development projects. As discussed in Section 3, partisan alignment between legislators and Chief Ministers may lead to an increase in corruption and spillovers.

To examine this question, I analyze more than 3,000 works audited under the evaluation described in Section 4. The analysis of these works shows party alignment leads to a rise in the proportion of wasteful projects. However, the total share of wasteful projects is modest.

¹⁸Tables 4-6 in the Appendix reports the estimates for the regressions used to compute the quantities of interest displayed in Figure 5. All estimates in this subsection are based on multiple imputed datasets. I compute the point estimates and uncertainty intervals following the expression in King, Honaker, et al. (2001, p. 53).

¹⁹In other words, the review status of bureaucrats leads party alignment to decrease project approval time by an additional 8.7%.

²⁰The reason why the Junior seniority strata reports higher log of total cost and total number of projects is because officers at this level of seniority represent the largest proportion in the sample.

The overall evidence suggests the positive impact of co-partisanship on the incidence of waste reflects a form of spillover resulting the loss of leverage these legislators have over civil servants.

Before beginning the analysis, recall that the previous section finds co-partisanship leads to a decline in the average project approval time. The foreign aid literature typically assumes a shorter project approval times is a proxy for lower project quality (see, for example, Kilby, 2013). Translated to the present context this may imply that while co-partisanship increases the intensity of resources used under the MPLADS, much of it may goes to waste as bureaucrats may not pay much attention to the quality of projects that get approved. Further, some of this waste may reflect a higher level of rent extraction among aligned legislators.

The evidence in Figure 6 shows this is not the case. Party alignment increases the probability of wasteful projects by 5 percentage points.²¹ However, the baseline level of wasteful projects is modest (around 13%), indicating that the overwhelming majority of projects (independent of a legislator’s alignment status) are not a complete failure.

Still, it is important to ascertain the causes accounting for the increase in the proportion of wasteful projects under co-partisan legislators. One possibility is that wasteful projects are the result of corruption. A way to examine this possibility is to determine whether co-partisanship leads legislators to depend more on trusts (NGOs) for project implementation, opt for ineligible projects, and secure project implementation without any public bids. As described above, legislators may rely on trusts to pocket program funds, while ineligible projects and the lack of bids may allow them to help their cronies and enrich themselves.

Figure 6 shows co-partisanship is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in the probability legislators choose a trust as a project implementing agency. However, we also find a null effect when examining the impact of party alignment on the two other proxies of corruption (whether projects are ineligible and procured through a public bid).

District capacity does not seem to be responsible either for the increase in the proportion of wasteful projects. Table 8 in the Appendix fits a regression as specified in equation 1 that

²¹The estimates for the impact of co-partisanship are based on Model 1 and reported in Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 7 in the Appendix.




Figure 6: **Effect of Co-Partisanship on Project Type.** The figure reports point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of co-partisanship on the probability of a project being wasteful, implemented by an NGO, ineligible under the program’s guidelines, and procured through a public tender.

also includes an index of public goods provision as a proxy for district capacity.²² Even after accounting for this additional factor, we find that that party alignment leads to an increase in the incidence of wasteful projects.

5.2.1 Career Concerns: Chief Minister’s Tenure

The incidence of wasteful projects may also be affected by the career concerns of civil servants. To assess this possibility, the panel in the top left corner of Figure 7 reports point estimates (and 95 percent confidence intervals) for the impact of party alignment on the probability of a wasteful project by the number of years a Chief Minister has been in office.²³ Party alignment has a decreasing effect on this outcome. In particular, we find the impact of co-partisanship on wasteful projects decreases from about 8 percentage points in the first year of an administration, to just over 2 percentage points in the last. However, the varying level of waste across time does not seem to be related to corruption, as the other three panels

²²To measure district capacity I use the 2001 village directory census data, and for each district I compute the proportion of villages that report the presence of a primary health center, a main paved road, and a bus stop within 2 kilometers. I then use factor analysis to compute the principal component from these three variables, which I use as the measure of capacity.

²³To compute the quantities of interest reported in Figure 7 I rely on the regression results reported in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table 7 in the Appendix. Table 8 shows these estimates are robust to controlling for district capacity.




Figure 7: **Impact of Co-Partisanship on Project Type by State Administration Year of Tenure.** The panels in the figure report point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) for the impact of co-partisanship's on the probability that a project is wasteful (top left), implemented by an NGO (top right), ineligible under program guidelines (bottom left), and procured through public tendering (bottom right) by the number of years a Chief Minister has been in power during an administration. The effect of co-partisanship only varies by year of tenure in the case of a project's propensity to be wasteful. The difference in the share of wasteful projects between co-partisan and opposition legislators decreases from 7 percentage points during the first year of tenure to close to zero in the last year.

show that the impact of party alignment on whether projects are ineligible, implemented by trusts, or through a public tender does not vary across years in a given administration.

The evidence presented in Figure 7, allows us to make an additional inference. Recall that in Section 5.1.1 we find the effect of party alignment on project approval time and the use of resources declines in the number of years a Chief Minister has been in office. Together with the findings in this section these patterns suggest two possibilities. First, as co-partisan

legislators lose leverage over bureaucrats, civil servants devote more attention and time to approving projects. The increased attention of bureaucrats is likely to filter out projects of low quality, thereby accounting for the declining effect of party alignment on the incidence of wasteful projects.

A second related possibility is that because co-partisan legislators anticipate less favorable treatment from bureaucrats as the power of Chief Ministers declines, they decrease the degree to which they use program resources and propose projects of better quality. As a result, either because the attention and resources civil servants allocate to program implementation becomes less taxed over time, or because the overall quality of proposals is higher, the effect of party alignment on the incidence of wasteful projects falls over time. Regardless of the specific mechanism, the overall evidence suggests wasteful projects represent a form of spillover as its overall incidence is modest and do not seem to be related to corruption.

5.2.2 Career Concerns: Pay Scale of Bureaucrats

Finally, I consider whether bureaucrats, whose performance is subject to review, amplify the negative effect of party alignment on project type. For this analysis I fit regressions similar to those in section 5.1.2, where the main coefficient of interest is the interaction between the *co-party* and *review* indicator variables across the three pay scales of interest. I fit these regressions on the evaluation sample focusing on the four outcomes considered in this subsection.²⁴

Figure 8 reports the results from this analysis. The plot displays the difference in the effect of co-partisanship on all four outcomes between projects approved by bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review and those who are not eligible for promotion. The plot presents these differences across the three different pay scales: Junior (automatic promotion after 9 years of service), Select (promotion subject to review after 13 years of service), and Super (promotion subject to review after 16 years of service). The figure shows that the review status of bureaucrats does not make a difference for the impact of party alignment on project type. Across all pay scales we observe that the point estimates are centered around zero.

²⁴The regression results are reported in Tables 10-12 in the Appendix.




Figure 8: **Difference in Effect of Co-Partisanship on Project Type: Bureaucrats under Review vs. Bureaucrats not Facing Promotion.** The figure reports the difference in the effect of co-partisanship (on whether a project is wasteful, implemented by an NGO, procured through a public tender, and ineligible) between bureaucrats up for promotion and those that were not in line for a salary increase. The plot report these differences across three seniority strata: Select, Junior and Super.

This evidence provides further support to the claim that the incidence of wasteful projects represents a form of spillover. In particular, the patterns in Figure 8 suggest the amount of waste is related to the second mechanism discussed in the previous subsection. For instance, perhaps the high number of projects co-partisan legislators submit for approval prevent the promotion eligibility incentives from tempering the effect of party alignment on the incidence of wasteful projects.

5.3 Robustness Checks

5.3.1 Alternative Mechanisms Linking Party Alignment to Project Quality

One possibility not considered up to this point is that party alignment affects the strategic calculations of legislators in terms of the projects they propose for approval. Perhaps aligned legislators opt for riskier projects belonging to specific sectors, thereby accounting for the positive correlation between co-partisanship and the incidence of wasteful projects.

To account for this alternative mechanism, one could try to control for a project's sector

when fitting Model 1. The problem with this approach is that it leads to post-treatment bias in the estimates of co-partisanship. This is a well-known problem that arises when one controls for variables that are affected by the treatment (Rosenbaum, 1984). In this case, as the previous paragraph illustrates, co-partisanship potentially affects a project’s sector.

Fortunately, several techniques have been developed to address this problem. Most recently, Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016) propose a method to estimate the Average Causal Direct Effect (ACDE) of a given treatment. This quantity of interest identifies the direct effect of a treatment, while controlling for mechanisms affected by it. Appendix D reports the results from this analysis, which shows, for example, that the sector type does not account for the effect of party alignment on project quality.

5.3.2 Sources of Identification

The evidence discussed in the paper relies on observational data. Thus, in the absence of an exogenous shock to party alignment it is important to determine the source of variation driving the results reported throughout the paper. Of particular interest, is the extent to which the results rely on within- or across-MP in party alignment.

To examine this question, I implement the approach proposed in Aronow and Samii (2016). This approach involves describing the distribution of covariates in an “effective” sample. This sample is constructed by weighting observations according to how much they contribute to overall estimates of a given treatment.

Appendix E reports the distribution of MPs who experienced a change in the value of the *co-party* indicator in the effective sample across each of the datasets analyzed in the paper. MPs experienced a change in the value of *co-party* when there was a change in the administration of their home state, as it is illegal for them to “cross the floor” while in office. The analysis in the Appendix shows that the effective share of MPs in this category represents between 40 (in the monitoring data) and 60 percent (in the evaluation data) of observations in the effective sample. This suggests that the cross-sectional variation in the *co-party* indicator is an important source of identification in estimating the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance.

5.3.3 Representativeness of Evaluation Survey

Another concern relates to the representativeness of the works included in the evaluation survey vis-a-vis those found in the monitoring sample. One comforting findings is that the magnitude of the impact of party alignment on the log of project approval time is similar across the monitoring and evaluation samples (see Column (1) in Table 1 and Column (9) in Table 7 in the Appendix). In addition, Appendix F provides further evidence showing that, with the exception project cost, the works in the evaluation are fairly similar across several observable dimensions.

6 Conclusion

This paper focuses on India and the MPLADS to estimate the impact of party alignment on bureaucratic performance. Under this program, bureaucrats approve legislator-sponsored development projects. However, bureaucrats depend on Chief Ministers for their career advancement. In this context, partisan alignment between legislators and Chief Ministers may affect the performance of bureaucrats either through adverse selection or career concerns.

The paper presents evidence from the analyses of two unique databases of works implemented under the MPLAD scheme. Using this data, I show party alignment leads to a decline in program approval time and a higher use of program resources. The analysis also shows party alignment causes a moderate increase in the amount of spillovers. Further, the effect of party alignment declines in the number of years an administration has been in office, and increases when the performance of bureaucrats in charge of project approval is subject to review. These patterns suggest career concerns is the mechanism through which co-partisanship affects the behavior of bureaucrats.

Overall, the evidence from the paper shows that party alignment not only distorts the provision of government resources (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006; Arulampalam et al., 2009; Brollo and Nannicini, 2012; Duquette-Rury et al., 2016; Fourniaies and Mutlu-Eren, 2015; Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa, 2006; Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008); it also affects the incentives under which bureaucrats operate. The empirical analysis, however, suggests that the power of politicians and the promotion structure of officers in the civil services

temper the effect of party alignment on bureaucratic performance.

The findings in this paper have implications for other countries such as Mexico, Ghana, Honduras, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Phillippines, Tanzania and Zambia. All of these countries have adopted constituency development programs similar to the MPLADS. But this set of countries also exhibits significant variation in the strength of party institutions, and the degree of professionalization and autonomy of its bureaucratic corps (Rauch and Evans, 2000). To the extent that this is the case, future research could examine the varying degree of partisan influence on bureaucratic performance.

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This is a supplementary appendix to Carlos Velasco Rivera, “The Impact of Partisan Politics on Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India.” All sections, figures, and tables are referenced in the paper.

A Spatial Distribution of Evaluation Districts

Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of districts (represented by red dots) that took part in the evaluation. The map shows a pronounced bias towards the north. With the exception of Karnataka, no southern state is represented in the study. Further, within each state some regions were more likely to see districts included in the sample. For instance, in Uttar Pradesh one can see that most of the districts included in the sample are clustered along a north-south corridor in the eastern part of the state. However, Section F below shows that the works in this sample are similar to those in the universe of approved works across several observed dimensions. In addition, the empirical analysis in Section 5 of the paper adjusts for potential covariates affecting the representativeness of the findings relying on the evaluation sample.




Figure 1: **Sample of Districts in the MPLADS Evaluation.** The red dots represent the 98 districts included in the evaluation of works implemented as part of the Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme in the period 2000-2012. In each district approximately 50 works were assessed along several dimensions including the overall usefulness of a work, the work’s eligibility, and the type of agency in charge of implementing a project, among others.

B Reports


Work Reference	5	
Name of work	Construction Of New Street No.2 Kirat Nagar	
Name of sector	Road pathways & Bridges	
Name of MP	Smt. Paramjit Kaur Gulshan	
Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha or Nominated	Lok Sabha	
Amount recommended by MP (Rs. lakh)	3.00	
Date of MP's recommendation	01/06/2010	
Amount sanctioned by DA (Rs. lakh)	1.50	
Date of administrative sanction by DA	03/10/2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Work Eligible: Y ✓ Encroached upon: /N ✓ Deviations: N ✓ Resistance faced: N ✓ Complaints: N ✓ Asset well located: Y ✓ Asset useful: Y ✓ Plaque installed: N ✓ Tendering: Y ✓ Utilization Certificate :y ✓ Social & Cultural Impact: Y ✓ Environmental Impact: Y ✓ Overall Impact: Y
Advance released (Rs.)	1.50	
Date of release of advance as first installment	03/10/2010	
Date of start of work	03/10/2010	
Date of completion	08/19/2010	
Date of Work Completion Report	08/19/2010	
Unspent balance, if any (Rs.)	NIL	
Type of Implementing Agency	LMB	
Name of Implementing Agency	EXECUTIVE ENGINEER NAGAR COUNCIL FARIDOT	
Name of User Agency	EO,MC FDK.	
Days to work completion after sanction	162	
Expenditure booked (Rs. lakh)	3.00	

Figure 2: **Front Page of a Work's Detailed Report.** The figure shows the front page of the detailed report of a work implemented in Faridkot, Punjab. I rely on the information provided in these reports to measure the quality of works (wasteful, eligibility), the type of implementing agency (NGO or other entity), and whether they are implemented by co-partisan legislators.

Analytical Details: 05
Work description and basic features:
The work related to Construction Of New Street No.2 Kirat Nagar. It was sanctioned during the financial year 2009-10. The total cost of the work is 3 lakh. The work was recommended by Smt. Paramjit Kaur Gulshan, Lok Sabha MP. The Implementing agency for the work as well as the User Agency identified for proper upkeep and maintenance was Nagar Council Faridkot.
Onsite and Offsite observations:
<p>The work was found eligible under the MPLAD Scheme guidelines. The work was found duly completed and no encroachments were found or reported. No specific diversion in usage has been observed and the asset was being used for the intended purpose. The User Agency is responsible to upkeep and maintenance of the said asset. The quality of the asset was found satisfactory. MPLADS plaque was not installed at the work site.</p> <p>The work was executed by the Executive Engineer Nagar Council, Faridkot through usual tendering process. There was no convergence of MPLAD Scheme funds with any other scheme of the Government of India or the State Government. UC was not submitted to DA. The work had been completed by the implementing agency in approx. 5 months. The officials of the District Authority are not reported to have undertaken any inspection of the work place during its execution. The District Authority is not reported to have received any complaints against the work. The District Authority is not maintaining Asset Register (Cheque register is being maintained). MP wise records are kept for the MPLADS funds. In the agreement with the user agency a clause of maintaining the asset is kept so that user agency should maintain the assets once created with the help of MPLAD scheme funds.</p>
Impact of Work:
Construction of all weather roads under MPLAD Scheme has facilitated quick movement of goods and people from/to the area all the year round bringing in its wake an overall improvement in the economic, social and cultural development of the people of the area. The area has also got the benefit of dust free neat and clean environment.

Figure 3: **Back Page of a Work's Detailed Report.** The figure shows the back page of the detailed report of a work implemented in Faridkot, Punjab. I rely on this section of the reports to corroborate the information regarding the quality of the project provided on the front page.

C Descriptives and Regression Tables




Figure 4: **Distribution of Chief Minister Tenure Across Samples by Party Alignment.** The barplots describe the distribution of Chief Minister Tenure (in years) by partisan alignment across the three samples used to examine the effect of party alignment on project quality and the strategic use of resources associated with the MPLADS. The distribution by party alignment across the three samples is similar. About 29 percent of observations belong to a Chief Minister's first year of tenure; 23 percent to the second year, 19 percent to the third year, 16 percent to the fourth year, and 13 percent to an administration's final year in office.

	Log Approval Time		Log Approved Cost		Log Number of Projects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Co-Party	-0.149*** (0.008)	-0.166*** (0.009)	0.268*** (0.077)	0.333*** (0.109)	0.221*** (0.065)	0.303*** (0.092)
MPs per District	0.050*** (0.012)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.200*** (0.061)	0.200*** (0.061)	0.140*** (0.053)	0.140*** (0.053)
Margin	0.213*** (0.056)	0.216*** (0.056)	0.027 (0.451)	0.012 (0.451)	0.061 (0.387)	0.043 (0.387)
Turnout	-0.616*** (0.091)	-0.616*** (0.091)	1.788*** (0.455)	1.788*** (0.455)	2.257*** (0.393)	2.260*** (0.393)
Reserved	-0.016 (0.043)	-0.016 (0.043)	-0.150 (0.109)	-0.149 (0.109)	-0.126 (0.094)	-0.126 (0.094)
Bye Election	-0.107*** (0.019)	-0.105*** (0.019)	0.419* (0.215)	0.418* (0.215)	0.292 (0.182)	0.292 (0.182)
Log Cumulative Spending			-0.002 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
CM Tenure	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.036*** (0.006)	-0.018 (0.062)	-0.021 (0.083)	0.015 (0.052)	0.019 (0.070)
CM Tenure ²	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.009 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.017)
Co-Party × CM Tenure		0.020** (0.008)		0.018 (0.125)		0.005 (0.105)
Co-Party × CM Tenure ²		-0.003 (0.002)		-0.021 (0.031)		-0.021 (0.026)
National	0.013 (0.725)	0.018 (0.724)	-0.164 (1.421)	-0.207 (1.421)	-0.146 (1.228)	-0.197 (1.228)
Gov. Coal.	-0.516*** (0.033)	-0.513*** (0.033)	0.143 (0.510)	0.139 (0.510)	0.030 (0.435)	0.024 (0.435)
Intercept	2.121*** (0.286)	2.141*** (0.287)	1.685*** (0.641)	1.613** (0.643)	0.742 (0.590)	0.654 (0.592)
Party Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	320,883	320,883	5,506	5,506	5,512	5,512
Log Likelihood	-384,881.40	-384,884.1	-11,874.75	-11,878.2	-10,967.33	-10,969.9

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1: **Co-Partisanship, Approval Times, and Use of MPLADS Resources** The table reports regression estimates for the relationship between co-partisanship and the log of approval times for development works (Columns 1-2), the log of total cost approved (Columns 3-4), and the log of the total number of approved projects (Columns 5-6) during a given year of a state administration. The estimates show that party alignment decreases the approval times of projects, and is associated with higher total cost and number of approved projects by bureaucrats. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report estimates from a model that considers heterogenous effects by the year of tenure of a state administration. Only the model considered in Column (2) shows that the effect of co-partisanship on approval times decreases as a state administration progresses.

	Log Approval Time		Log Approved Cost		Log Number of Projects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Co-Party	-0.146*** (0.008)	-0.165*** (0.009)	0.266*** (0.077)	0.330*** (0.109)	0.218*** (0.065)	0.300*** (0.092)
MPs per District	0.044*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.200*** (0.061)	0.200*** (0.061)	0.139*** (0.053)	0.139*** (0.053)
Log(Margin Reciprocal)	-0.059*** (0.004)	-0.060*** (0.004)	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.018 (0.037)	-0.025 (0.032)	-0.024 (0.032)
Turnout	-0.541*** (0.091)	-0.542*** (0.091)	1.806*** (0.454)	1.807*** (0.454)	2.279*** (0.392)	2.283*** (0.392)
Reserved	-0.006 (0.043)	-0.006 (0.043)	-0.148 (0.109)	-0.148 (0.109)	-0.124 (0.095)	-0.124 (0.094)
Bye Election	-0.058*** (0.019)	-0.055*** (0.019)	0.419* (0.214)	0.418* (0.214)	0.294 (0.182)	0.294 (0.182)
Log Cumulative Spending			-0.002 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
CM Tenure	-0.024*** (0.004)	-0.037*** (0.006)	-0.019 (0.062)	-0.022 (0.083)	0.015 (0.052)	0.018 (0.070)
CM Tenure ²	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.009 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.017)
Co-Party × CM Tenure		0.022*** (0.008)		0.019 (0.125)		0.006 (0.105)
Co-Party × CM Tenure ²		-0.003 (0.002)		-0.021 (0.031)		-0.021 (0.026)
National	0.133 (0.726)	0.139 (0.725)	-0.122 (1.424)	-0.166 (1.423)	-0.089 (1.231)	-0.141 (1.230)
Gov. Coal.	-0.544*** (0.033)	-0.541*** (0.033)	0.134 (0.510)	0.130 (0.510)	0.018 (0.435)	0.013 (0.435)
Intercept	2.297*** (0.289)	2.321*** (0.290)	1.739*** (0.646)	1.664** (0.648)	0.818 (0.593)	0.726 (0.595)
Party Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	320,883	320,883	5,506	5,506	5,512	5,512
Log Likelihood	-384,769.2	-384,770	-11,877.13	-11,880.58	-10,969.53	-10,972.11

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: **Co-Partisanship, Approval Times, and Use of MPLADS Resources (Controlling for Reciprocal Margin of Victory)** The table reports estimates for the model in equation 1 but instead of controlling for a legislator's margin of victory, it controls for its reciprocal. The estimates for co-partisanship remain unchanged in relation to those reported in Table 1. However, the estimates show that smaller margin's of victory (corresponding to a large reciprocal) are associated with lower approval times.

	Log Approval Time			Log Approved Cost			Log Number of Projects			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Co-Party	-0.211*** (0.011)	-0.171*** (0.022)	0.242*** (0.092)	1.390*** (0.328)	0.229** (0.094)	1.419*** (0.338)	0.180** (0.078)	1.174*** (0.274)	0.168** (0.078)	1.170*** (0.281)
MPs per District	0.055*** (0.013)	0.053*** (0.013)	0.193*** (0.068)	0.195*** (0.068)	0.201*** (0.069)	0.203*** (0.069)	0.113* (0.058)	0.115*** (0.058)	0.124*** (0.059)	0.127*** (0.059)
Margin	0.224*** (0.065)	0.223*** (0.065)	0.008 (0.500)	-0.049 (0.500)	-0.101 (0.515)	-0.157 (0.516)	0.042 (0.428)	-0.011 (0.428)	-0.079 (0.434)	-0.129 (0.435)
Turnout	-0.400*** (0.112)	-0.377*** (0.110)	1.249** (0.502)	1.283** (0.503)	1.306** (0.515)	1.343*** (0.516)	1.777*** (0.432)	1.806*** (0.432)	1.826*** (0.435)	1.855*** (0.436)
Reserved	-0.054 (0.048)	-0.053 (0.048)	-0.136 (0.119)	-0.139 (0.119)	-0.125 (0.121)	-0.127 (0.121)	-0.117 (0.102)	-0.119 (0.102)	-0.098 (0.103)	-0.099 (0.103)
Bye Election	-0.215*** (0.022)	-0.216*** (0.022)	0.507** (0.254)	0.511** (0.254)	0.588** (0.263)	0.596** (0.263)	0.373* (0.214)	0.378* (0.214)	0.462** (0.220)	0.469** (0.220)
Log Cumulative Spending	0.041*** (0.009)	0.060*** (0.014)	0.184 (0.149)	0.638*** (0.200)	0.190 (0.153)	0.652*** (0.205)	0.163 (0.124)	0.551*** (0.167)	0.166 (0.127)	0.549*** (0.170)
CM Tenure	-0.017*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.003)	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.118*** (0.039)	-0.045 (0.030)	-0.118*** (0.040)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.101*** (0.033)	-0.040 (0.025)	-0.099*** (0.033)
Co-Party × CM Tenure		-0.028 (0.019)		-0.957*** (0.302)		-0.972*** (0.312)		-0.802*** (0.253)		-0.789*** (0.258)
Co-Party × CM Tenure ²		0.003 (0.004)		0.157*** (0.060)		0.156** (0.062)		0.126** (0.050)		0.120** (0.051)
National	1.085 (1.033)	1.065 (1.033)	-0.259 (1.512)	-0.343 (1.514)	0.225 (1.540)	0.131 (1.542)	-0.127 (1.304)	-0.212 (1.306)	0.365 (1.304)	0.274 (1.306)
Gov. Coal.	-0.577*** (0.037)	-0.580*** (0.037)	0.232 (0.582)	0.212 (0.581)	0.664 (0.614)	0.637 (0.614)	0.054 (0.494)	0.036 (0.494)	0.507 (0.514)	0.484 (0.514)
Intercept	1.939*** (0.291)	1.893*** (0.291)	1.935*** (0.709)	1.273* (0.731)	1.884*** (0.720)	1.191 (0.743)	1.033 (0.651)	0.444 (0.669)	0.969 (0.645)	0.369 (0.664)
Party Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Drop MPs with NAs	-	-	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	227,689	227,689	3,874	3,874	3,690	3,690	3,880	3,880	3,690	3,690
Log Likelihood	-271,843.2	-271,846.7	-8,385.256	-8,381.032	-8,004.003	-7,999.174	-7,740.072	-7,734.706	-7,340.228	-7,334.383

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: Co-Partisanship, Approval Times, and Use of MPLADS Resources (Dropping Observations Reported in First Year of State Administrations) The table reports regression estimates for the relationship between co-partisanship and the log of approval times of development works (Columns 1-2), the log of total cost approved (Columns 3-6), and the log of the total number of approved projects (Columns 7-10) in a given period (dropping observations reported in the first year of a state administration). The findings reported in Table 1 are robust to this sample. Regression estimates of the impact of co-partisanship when analyzing the aggregated monitoring sample are also robust to dropping MPs who reported at least one work with a missing date of recommendations (Columns 5-6 and 9-10).

	Log Approval Time					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Co-Party	-0.094** (0.037)	-0.093** (0.038)	-0.093** (0.038)	-0.094** (0.038)	-0.099*** (0.038)	-0.095** (0.038)
Review	0.022 (0.023)	0.023 (0.023)	0.023 (0.023)	0.023 (0.023)	0.023 (0.023)	0.022 (0.023)
Co-Party × Review	-0.087*** (0.030)	-0.087*** (0.031)	-0.087*** (0.031)	-0.087*** (0.031)	-0.087*** (0.031)	-0.086*** (0.031)
Local		-0.040*** (0.013)	-0.040*** (0.013)	-0.040*** (0.013)	-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.014)
National			-0.012 (0.048)	-0.001 (0.048)	0.007 (0.050)	0.543* (0.290)
Gov. Coal.			-0.016 (0.053)	-0.017 (0.052)	-0.018 (0.052)	-0.239** (0.099)
MPs per District				0.060*** (0.022)	0.061*** (0.022)	0.073*** (0.023)
Margin					-0.055 (0.156)	-0.057 (0.156)
Turnout					-0.419* (0.251)	-0.423* (0.256)
Reserved					-0.012 (0.059)	-0.002 (0.060)
Intercept	2.052*** (0.075)	2.068*** (0.075)	2.084*** (0.080)	1.932*** (0.105)	2.185*** (0.162)	2.160*** (0.165)
Party Dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	34367	34367	34367	34367	34367	34367

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: **Alignment and Bureaucrat Review Status: Select Grade.** The table reports regression results assessing whether the effect of party alignment is larger when bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are in charge of project approval in the Select pay scale. The main coefficient of interest is the interaction between the *co-party* and *review* indicators. The table shows that the presence of bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review decreases the project approval time by an additional 8.7 percent for co-partisan legislators. This result is robust across all regression specifications.

	Log Approval Time					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Co-Party	-0.133*** (0.025)	-0.131*** (0.025)	-0.136*** (0.025)	-0.136*** (0.025)	-0.137*** (0.025)	-0.132*** (0.024)
Review	0.021* (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.022* (0.011)	0.022* (0.012)	0.023** (0.011)	0.023** (0.012)
Co-Party × Review	0.020 (0.015)	0.017 (0.015)	0.017 (0.015)	0.017 (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	0.016 (0.016)
Local		-0.059*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.012)
National			0.045 (0.058)	0.051 (0.058)	0.078 (0.059)	0.166 (0.130)
Gov. Coal.			-0.267*** (0.051)	-0.272*** (0.052)	-0.290*** (0.051)	-0.627*** (0.069)
MPs per District				0.028 (0.019)	0.025 (0.020)	0.057*** (0.021)
Margin					0.306** (0.153)	0.376** (0.151)
Turnout					-0.245 (0.216)	-0.349 (0.231)
Reserved					0.026 (0.057)	0.026 (0.057)
Intercept	2.048*** (0.062)	2.077*** (0.062)	2.169*** (0.067)	2.099*** (0.082)	2.207*** (0.154)	2.224*** (0.169)
Party Dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	61902	61902	61902	61902	61902	61902

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: **Alignment and Bureaucrat Review Status: Junior Grade.** The table reports regression results assessing whether the effect of party alignment is larger when bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are in charge of project approval in the Junior pay scale. The main coefficient of interest is the interaction between the *co-party* and *review* indicators. The table shows that the presence of bureaucrats in the year prior to their promotion does not make a difference for the impact of party alignment. This is expected, as the promotion to the Junior scale is automatic. This finding is robust across all regression specifications.

	Log Approval Time					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Co-Party	-0.037 (0.044)	-0.037 (0.044)	-0.034 (0.045)	-0.036 (0.045)	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.040 (0.049)
Review	0.040 (0.026)	0.040 (0.026)	0.040 (0.026)	0.040 (0.026)	0.040 (0.026)	0.040 (0.026)
Co-Party × Review	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.030)
Local		-0.014 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)
National			-0.047 (0.073)	-0.041 (0.073)	-0.040 (0.069)	0.331 (0.417)
Gov. Coal.			0.080 (0.059)	0.082 (0.059)	0.081 (0.059)	-0.129 (0.136)
MPs per District				0.053** (0.026)	0.052** (0.026)	0.068** (0.029)
Margin					-0.093 (0.328)	-0.095 (0.328)
Turnout					-0.421 (0.337)	-0.291 (0.345)
Reserved					0.017 (0.063)	0.026 (0.063)
Intercept	1.960*** (0.080)	1.966*** (0.082)	1.962*** (0.098)	1.828*** (0.123)	2.090*** (0.217)	1.993*** (0.226)
Party Dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16247	16247	16247	16247	16247	16247

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: **Alignment and Bureaucrat Review Status: Super Grade.** The table reports regression results assessing whether the effect of party alignment is larger when bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are in charge of project approval in the Super pay scale. The main coefficient of interest is the interaction between the *co-party* and *review* indicators. The table shows that the presence of bureaucrats in the year prior to their promotion does not make a difference for the impact of party alignment. This finding is robust across all regression specifications.

	Wasteful Project		NGO-Implemented		Ineligible Project		Tendering		Log Approval Time	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Co-Party	0.052*** (0.017)	0.077*** (0.025)	0.073*** (0.018)	0.052** (0.024)	-0.0004 (0.015)	0.0002 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.032)	-0.222*** (0.072)	-0.137 (0.099)
Margin	0.187** (0.090)	0.181** (0.090)	-0.116 (0.107)	-0.111 (0.107)	-0.030 (0.077)	-0.029 (0.077)	-0.129 (0.150)	-0.134 (0.151)	-0.735 (0.452)	-0.768* (0.452)
Turnout	0.013 (0.130)	0.002 (0.130)	0.179 (0.160)	0.184 (0.161)	0.170 (0.108)	0.174 (0.108)	0.008 (0.240)	0.013 (0.240)	-1.640** (0.676)	-1.655** (0.674)
Reserved	0.029 (0.025)	0.029 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.114** (0.055)	-0.116** (0.056)	-0.005 (0.136)	-0.013 (0.136)
CM Tenure	-0.043*** (0.014)	-0.034* (0.020)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.027 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.018)	0.031* (0.017)	0.051** (0.024)	-0.071 (0.054)	0.031 (0.079)
CM Tenure ²	0.009** (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.0002 (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.006)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.022 (0.019)
National	-0.058 (0.165)	-0.039 (0.166)	-0.065 (0.157)	-0.072 (0.158)	0.015 (0.148)	0.008 (0.149)	-0.039 (0.200)	-0.045 (0.201)	0.474 (0.612)	0.487 (0.614)
Gov. Coal.	0.068*** (0.021)	0.062*** (0.022)	0.052** (0.022)	0.054** (0.022)	0.010 (0.018)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.072** (0.030)	-0.071** (0.030)	0.079 (0.103)	0.072 (0.104)
Co-Party × CM Tenure		-0.018 (0.028)		0.037 (0.026)		-0.018 (0.025)		-0.037 (0.032)	-0.192* (0.105)	
Co-Party × CM Tenure ²		0.0002 (0.007)		-0.008 (0.006)		0.006 (0.006)		0.012 (0.008)	0.051* (0.027)	
Intercept	0.013 (0.124)	0.009 (0.124)	0.089 (0.149)	0.097 (0.149)	-0.052 (0.104)	-0.056 (0.104)	0.183 (0.217)	0.174 (0.217)	3.267*** (0.622)	3.205*** (0.619)
Party Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,414	3,414	3,421	3,421	3,426	3,426	3,417	3,417	3,001	3,001
Log Likelihood	-989.868	-996.089	-725.961	-732.806	-686.996	-694.227	-1,500.680	-1,506.652	-4,601.355	-4,604.592

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Impact of Co-Partisanship on Project Quality and Type of Implementing Agency. The table reports estimates of the relationship between co-partisanship and the probability that projects are wasteful and implemented by NGOs. Columns (1) and (3) show that co-partisanship is negatively associated with these outcomes. Columns (2) and (4) explore heterogeneous effects, and shows that these are only present in the case of wasteful projects, with the impact of co-partisanship decreasing throughout the tenure of a state administration. Columns (5)-(8) show that co-partisanship bears no effect on the eligibility of projects or the contracting procedure for their implementation. Columns (9) shows that the project approval times of co-partisan legislators are shorter, replicating the result reported in the analysis of the monitoring sample.

	Wasteful Project		NGO-Implemented		Ineligible Project		Tendering		Log Approval Time	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Co-Party	0.056*** (0.018)	0.083*** (0.026)	0.062*** (0.019)	0.043* (0.026)	0.010 (0.016)	0.001 (0.023)	-0.018 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.034)	-0.213*** (0.076)	-0.136 (0.104)
Margin	0.147 (0.093)	0.140 (0.093)	-0.110 (0.111)	-0.104 (0.111)	0.014 (0.080)	0.019 (0.080)	-0.036 (0.157)	-0.035 (0.157)	-0.612 (0.465)	-0.640 (0.465)
Turnout	0.089 (0.129)	0.076 (0.130)	0.143 (0.166)	0.143 (0.167)	0.229** (0.113)	0.239** (0.113)	0.042 (0.254)	0.043 (0.254)	-1.889*** (0.702)	-1.890*** (0.701)
Reserved	0.023 (0.026)	0.022 (0.026)	-0.010 (0.036)	-0.008 (0.036)	0.008 (0.022)	0.007 (0.023)	-0.087 (0.058)	-0.088 (0.058)	0.031 (0.143)	0.025 (0.143)
District Capacity	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.030** (0.014)	0.028 (0.018)	0.029 (0.018)	-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.035*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.032)	0.015 (0.032)	-0.073 (0.079)	-0.073 (0.079)
CM Tenure	-0.047*** (0.015)	-0.034 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.036* (0.020)	-0.022* (0.013)	-0.014 (0.019)	0.033* (0.018)	0.047* (0.026)	-0.090 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.082)
CM Tenure ²	0.011*** (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.006)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.020)
National	-0.065 (0.165)	-0.047 (0.166)	-0.049 (0.159)	-0.052 (0.159)	0.011 (0.147)	-0.006 (0.148)	-0.003 (0.203)	-0.016 (0.203)	0.846 (0.606)	0.854 (0.607)
Gov. Coal.	0.094*** (0.023)	0.088*** (0.023)	0.039 (0.024)	0.040 (0.025)	0.017 (0.020)	0.020 (0.020)	-0.085** (0.034)	-0.082** (0.035)	-0.113 (0.103)	-0.117 (0.103)
Co-Party × CM Tenure		-0.022 (0.030)		0.046* (0.028)		-0.016 (0.026)		-0.027 (0.035)		-0.156 (0.110)
Co-Party × CM Tenure ²		0.002 (0.008)		-0.013* (0.007)		0.009 (0.007)		0.012 (0.009)		0.040 (0.028)
Intercept	-0.047 (0.123)	-0.050 (0.124)	0.114 (0.153)	0.125 (0.153)	-0.111 (0.107)	-0.115 (0.108)	0.143 (0.226)	0.141 (0.226)	3.234*** (0.622)	3.190*** (0.622)
Party Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,128	3,128	3,132	3,132	3,137	3,137	3,129	3,129	2,767	2,767
Log Likelihood	-933.696	-939.979	-684.336	-690.479	-601.199	-606.829	-1,393.044	-1,398.190	-4,235.981	-4,239.917

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Impact of Co-Partisanship on Project Quality and Type of Implementing Agency (Controlling for District Capacity). The table reports estimates of the relationship between co-partisanship and the probability that projects are wasteful and implemented by NGOs, after controlling for district capacity. As columns (1) and (3) show, the negative effect of co-partisanship on both outcomes is robust to controlling for this potential confounder.

	Wasteful Project		NGO-Implemented		Ineligible Project		Tendering		Log Approval Time	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Co-Party	0.054*** (0.017)	0.080*** (0.025)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.052** (0.024)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.0002 (0.022)	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.227*** (0.072)	-0.141 (0.099)
Margin	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	0.011 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.053 (0.035)	0.056 (0.035)
Turnout	0.003 (0.131)	-0.008 (0.131)	0.183 (0.160)	0.188 (0.161)	0.171 (0.107)	0.174 (0.108)	0.001 (0.240)	0.006 (0.240)	-1.582** (0.676)	-1.595** (0.675)
Reserved	0.025 (0.025)	0.025 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.021)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.107* (0.056)	-0.108* (0.056)	-0.001 (0.136)	-0.009 (0.136)
District Capacity	-0.044*** (0.014)	-0.034* (0.020)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.027 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.018)	0.032** (0.017)	0.051** (0.024)	-0.069 (0.054)	0.033 (0.079)
CM Tenure	0.009** (0.004)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.0002 (0.005)	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.018*** (0.006)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.022 (0.019)
CM Tenure ²	-0.045 (0.165)	-0.027 (0.166)	-0.075 (0.158)	-0.081 (0.158)	0.013 (0.148)	0.006 (0.149)	-0.039 (0.200)	-0.045 (0.201)	0.425 (0.613)	0.436 (0.614)
National	0.067*** (0.022)	0.062*** (0.022)	0.051** (0.022)	0.054** (0.022)	0.010 (0.018)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.068** (0.030)	-0.067** (0.030)	0.079 (0.103)	0.072 (0.104)
Gov. Coal.		-0.019 (0.028)		0.037 (0.026)		-0.018 (0.025)		-0.035 (0.032)		-0.191* (0.105)
Co-Party × CM Tenure		0.0003 (0.007)		-0.008 (0.006)		0.006 (0.006)		0.012 (0.008)		0.051* (0.027)
Co-Party × CM Tenure ²	0.071 (0.124)	0.064 (0.125)	0.040 (0.150)	0.049 (0.151)	-0.061 (0.103)	-0.065 (0.104)	0.180 (0.220)	0.170 (0.220)	2.988*** (0.623)	2.913*** (0.619)
Party Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Administration RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,414	3,414	3,421	3,421	3,426	3,426	3,417	3,417	3,001	3,001
Log Likelihood	-993.769	-999.917	-728.229	-735.092	-689.494	-696.719	-1,503.54	-1,509.542	-4,604.052	-4,607.302

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Impact of Co-Partisanship on Project Quality and Type of Implementing Agency (Log of the Margin of Victory Reciprocal). The table reports estimates of the relationship between co-partisanship and the probability that projects are wasteful and implemented by NGOs after, controlling for the log of the reciprocal of a legislator's margin of victory. As columns (1) and (3) show, the negative effect of co-partisanship on both outcomes is robust to this alternative specification. However, in contrast to the estimates reported in Table 7, under this specification a legislator's margin of victory does not seem to be related to the probability that a project is wasteful.

	Wasteful Project		NGO-Implemented		Ineligible Project		Tendering	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Co-Party	0.097 (0.090)	0.095 (0.089)	-0.028 (0.063)	-0.023 (0.063)	0.018 (0.058)	0.018 (0.063)	-0.017 (0.089)	-0.001 (0.094)
Review	0.039 (0.051)	0.037 (0.052)	-0.062 (0.059)	-0.064 (0.063)	0.029 (0.061)	0.034 (0.060)	-0.042 (0.064)	-0.050 (0.064)
Co-Party × Review	-0.094 (0.089)	-0.082 (0.099)	0.067 (0.075)	0.070 (0.076)	-0.031 (0.097)	-0.037 (0.101)	0.021 (0.099)	0.032 (0.098)
Local	0.060 (0.072)	0.057 (0.073)	0.032 (0.041)	0.028 (0.042)	0.006 (0.050)	0.005 (0.051)	-0.020 (0.068)	-0.021 (0.073)
National	-0.003 (0.070)	-0.035 (0.352)	-0.029 (0.057)	-0.051 (0.215)	0.025 (0.049)	-0.070 (0.216)	-0.070 (0.121)	0.083 (0.442)
Gov. Coal.	0.091 (0.070)	0.113 (0.078)	-0.045 (0.041)	-0.026 (0.055)	0.013 (0.041)	0.009 (0.049)	-0.108 (0.080)	-0.125 (0.125)
Margin	0.406 (0.301)	0.403 (0.279)	-0.003 (0.170)	-0.010 (0.179)	0.083 (0.187)	0.065 (0.198)	-0.286 (0.381)	-0.371 (0.450)
Turnout	-0.067 (0.276)	0.027 (0.308)	-0.054 (0.245)	0.021 (0.288)	0.049 (0.200)	0.110 (0.201)	-0.228 (0.428)	-0.175 (0.496)
Reserved	0.019 (0.065)	0.021 (0.064)	-0.010 (0.044)	-0.010 (0.044)	0.042 (0.064)	0.040 (0.067)	-0.146 (0.091)	-0.151* (0.090)
Intercept	0.020 (0.183)	-0.146 (0.203)	0.166 (0.150)	0.105 (0.195)	-0.018 (0.129)	-0.021 (0.167)	0.725*** (0.252)	0.587* (0.345)
Party Dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	380	380	380	380	380	380	380	380

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: **Impact of Alignment on Project Quality by Bureaucrat Review Status: Select Grade.** The table reports regression results assessing whether the effect of party alignment is larger when bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are in charge of project approval in the Select pay scale. The main coefficient of interest is the interaction between the *co-party* and *review* indicators. The table shows that the presence of bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review does not make a difference for the impact of party alignment on whether projects are wasteful, ngo-implemented, ineligible under project guidelines, or procured through tendering. This result is robust across all regression specifications.

	Wasteful Project		NGO-Implemented		Ineligible Project		Tendering	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Co-Party	0.055 (0.055)	0.062 (0.052)	0.042 (0.061)	0.055 (0.057)	0.023 (0.049)	0.022 (0.049)	0.013 (0.089)	0.013 (0.089)
Review	-0.013 (0.039)	-0.011 (0.039)	0.022 (0.054)	0.017 (0.057)	-0.007 (0.046)	-0.006 (0.046)	0.035 (0.061)	0.035 (0.061)
Co-Party \times Review	0.010 (0.065)	0.006 (0.067)	0.012 (0.073)	0.007 (0.073)	-0.001 (0.063)	-0.003 (0.063)	-0.060 (0.077)	-0.060 (0.077)
Local	0.039 (0.028)	0.041 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.039)	-0.040 (0.038)	0.013 (0.030)	0.020 (0.030)	-0.045 (0.065)	-0.045 (0.065)
National	0.026 (0.042)	0.056 (0.144)	-0.056 (0.057)	-0.141 (0.204)	0.023 (0.040)	-0.016 (0.140)	0.088 (0.216)	0.088 (0.216)
Gov. Coal.	0.061 (0.049)	0.070 (0.060)	-0.029 (0.050)	0.039 (0.056)	0.024 (0.034)	0.034 (0.044)	-0.080 (0.079)	-0.080 (0.079)
Margin	0.252 (0.216)	0.221 (0.216)	-0.376 (0.229)	-0.344 (0.223)	-0.073 (0.147)	-0.085 (0.153)	0.047 (0.323)	0.047 (0.323)
Turnout	0.091 (0.191)	0.182 (0.204)	-0.341 (0.259)	-0.217 (0.317)	0.182 (0.204)	0.294 (0.239)	-0.033 (0.408)	-0.033 (0.408)
Reserved	0.035 (0.038)	0.037 (0.040)	-0.066 (0.054)	-0.062 (0.054)	0.047 (0.033)	0.046 (0.034)	-0.124 (0.079)	-0.124 (0.079)
Intercept	-0.046 (0.112)	-0.138 (0.168)	0.426*** (0.162)	0.204 (0.215)	-0.043 (0.139)	-0.091 (0.179)	0.389 (0.285)	0.389 (0.285)
Party Dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	679	679	679	679	679	679	679	679

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: **Impact of Alignment on Project Quality by Bureaucrat Review Status: Junior Grade.** The table reports regression results assessing whether the effect of party alignment is larger when bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are in charge of project approval in the Junior pay scale. The main coefficient of interest is the interaction between the *co-party* and *review* indicators. The table shows that the presence of bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review does not make a difference for the impact of party alignment on whether projects are wasteful, ngo-implemented, ineligible under project guidelines, or procured through tendering. This result is robust across all regression specifications.

	Wasteful Project		NGO-Implemented		Ineligible Project		Tendering	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Co-Party	0.087 (0.131)	0.101 (0.139)	0.003 (0.128)	0.011 (0.138)	-0.014 (0.133)	-0.015 (0.147)	-0.001 (0.134)	0.005 (0.141)
Review	0.029 (0.151)	0.019 (0.147)	-0.015 (0.094)	-0.019 (0.106)	-0.033 (0.097)	-0.037 (0.100)	0.017 (0.134)	0.038 (0.141)
Co-Party × Review	-0.057 (0.151)	-0.048 (0.149)	0.041 (0.111)	0.041 (0.125)	0.030 (0.151)	0.034 (0.147)	-0.027 (0.162)	-0.044 (0.176)
Local	-0.041 (0.131)	-0.065 (0.112)	-0.017 (0.086)	-0.022 (0.084)	0.024 (0.108)	0.019 (0.121)	0.065 (0.172)	0.064 (0.175)
National	0.011 (0.124)	-0.358 (1.152)	-0.032 (0.157)	-0.079 (0.348)	0.005 (0.124)	0.127 (0.349)	-0.060 (0.192)	-0.446 (1.208)
Gov. Coal.	0.070 (0.091)	0.156 (0.182)	-0.016 (0.103)	0.079 (0.111)	0.025 (0.067)	0.024 (0.165)	-0.183 (0.163)	-0.200 (0.257)
Margin	0.100 (0.501)	0.034 (0.569)	-0.114 (0.373)	-0.148 (0.420)	-0.235 (0.374)	-0.242 (0.408)	-0.699 (0.519)	-0.688 (0.533)
Turnout	0.134 (0.471)	0.182 (0.486)	-0.071 (0.316)	0.037 (0.370)	0.073 (0.356)	0.133 (0.395)	-0.060 (0.540)	-0.155 (0.585)
Reserved	-0.014 (0.108)	-0.007 (0.111)	0.030 (0.064)	0.025 (0.069)	0.045 (0.071)	0.044 (0.067)	-0.225 (0.138)	-0.228 (0.147)
Intercept	-0.005 (0.367)	0.122 (0.532)	0.166 (0.193)	0.045 (0.307)	0.056 (0.251)	-0.012 (0.394)	0.666* (0.346)	1.007 (0.939)
Party Dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Parliament RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MP RE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	129	129	129	129	129	129	129	129

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: **Impact of Alignment on Project Quality by Bureaucrat Review Status: Super Grade.** The table reports regression results assessing whether the effect of party alignment is larger when bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review are in charge of project approval in the Super pay scale. The main coefficient of interest is the interaction between the *co-party* and *review* indicators. The table shows that the presence of bureaucrats whose performance is subject to review does not make a difference for the impact of party alignment on whether projects are wasteful, ngo-implemented, ineligible under project guidelines, or procured through tendering. This result is robust across all regression specifications.

D Effect of Party Alignment Accounting for Project's Sector

One possibility is that party alignment affects the calculation of legislators regarding the types of projects they propose. This could be an issue if certain project types, for example, are more likely to be wasteful, or take less time to be approved. To assess this mechanism, I implement the approach introduced in Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen (2016) to estimate the Average Controlled Direct Effect (ACDE) of co-partisanship on the different outcomes of interest examined in Table 7. The ACDE identifies the effect that a treatment has on an outcome when the value of a given of post-treatment variable is set to some value. This approach is particularly useful in the present context because partisan alignment may affect the type of projects legislators propose.




Figure 5: **Proportion of Works by Sector in the Evaluation Sample.** The barplots display the proportion of works across the three largest sectors (Roads and Bridges, Educational Facilities, and Other) reported in the MPLADS evaluation by legislator type (opposition and aligned). The figure shows that aligned MPs report a higher proportion of works in the Other and Educational Facilities sectors. This pattern may be explained by the higher degree of flexibility in the choice of implementing agency for works belonging to these sectors.

To measure project type, I rely on the sector to which each project belongs as reported in the MPLADS evaluation. I aggregated sectors into the three largest categories: roads or bridges, educational facilities, and other works (the latter category comprises mainly the construction of community halls). In the particular application I examine, the ACDE refers to the effect of co-partisanship on the different outcomes analyzed in Table 7 when a project belongs to the roads and bridges sector. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 13. The table shows that after accounting for the sector to which a project belongs, party alignment still has a positive impact on whether a project is wasteful and a negative impact approval time. The point estimate for the ACDE of co-partisanship on whether a project is implemented by an NGO is smaller than the one reported in Table 7, and is not statistically

significant. This evidence suggests that legislators are constrained in the types of agencies allowed to implement certain projects. Thus, in order to maximize their rents, aligned legislators are more likely to propose certain projects so that these can be implemented by their preferred agencies. Indeed, Figure 5 in the Appendix shows that co-partisan legislators are more likely to propose works in the Other and Educational Facilities sectors, for which there may be more flexibility in the choice of implementing agencies.

	Wasteful	NGO-Implemented	Ineligible	Tendering	Log Approval Time
ACDE	0.057	0.030	0.001	-0.004	-0.224
s.e.	0.017	0.031	0.018	0.068	0.154
pvalue	0.001	0.339	0.954	0.952	0.146

Table 13: **Average Controlled Direct Effect (ACDE) of Co-Partisanship in Evaluation Sample.** The table reports point estimates (bootstrap standard errors and p-values) for the Average Controlled Direct Effect (ACDE) for the impact of co-partisanship on the outcomes in the evaluation sample analyzed in Table 7. The ACDE accounts for the potential effect that co-partisanship may have through the sector to which a given project belongs. All point estimates are based on regressions that include the same set of baseline covariates reported in Table 7.

E Sources of Variation in Co-Partisanship

Given the absence of exogenous variation in co-partisanship, questions remain about the source of identification to estimate the impact of this variable on the quality of MPLADS projects and overall bureaucratic performance. To address this concern, I further explore the data to characterize the difference sources of variation in co-partisanship.

As discussed in section 4, there are two sources accounting for the variation in co-partisanship: across legislators within the state, and within legislators across administrations. Figure 6 explores the two sources of variation in the co-partisan variable in the two parliamentary periods covered in the monitoring sample. Each barplot reports the total number of MPs (grey), the total number of MPs who were only co-partisans (dark grey), and those that experienced at least one transition from co-partisan to opposition status (switchers) or viceversa (light grey), across each of the states analyzed in the sample.¹ The figure shows that in states such as Maharashtra and West Bengal in the 14 Lok Sabha, all the variation comes from the across comparison between co-partisan and opposition legislators within the state. Things are different in states such as Tamil Nadu, where the identification comes from both the within- and cross-comparison of legislators.²

¹Switchers exclusively refer to MPs that experienced a change in administration in the states they represent, as it is illegal for them to “cross the floor” while in office.

²States such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, experienced a change in the partisan identity of the state administration during the 14 Lok Sabha. Yet as can be seen in Figure 6, not all MPs who were co-partisan experienced a transition to opposition status in the monitoring sample. This can happen because either there are no records of approved works for a given MP following a change in administration, or the MP stepped down from office before the change in state leadership.




Figure 6: **Within- and Cross-Legislator Variation in Co-Partisanship Across States in the Monitoring Sample.** The figure displays for each state barplots representing the total number of MPs (grey), the total number of co-partisan legislators (dark grey), and (in light grey) the total number of MPs that switched from co-partisanship to the opposition (or viceversa) at least once within a parliamentary period. The left panel shows that during the 14 Lok Sabha states such as Maharashtra and West Bengal experienced only cross-sectional variation in co-partisanship. In contrast, the right panel shows that in the 15 Lok Sabha Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu experienced both within- and cross-legislator variation in co-partisanship.

Still, the broad picture depicted in Figure 6 does not quantify the contribution of each of the two sources of variation to the estimates of the impact of co-partisanship on bureaucratic performance. To provide an answer to this question, I implement the approach proposed in Aronow and Samii (2016). This procedure allows researchers to compare a “nominal sample” (such as the one depicted in Figure 6) and an “effective sample”, consisting of the observations (or groups of observations) contributing most to the regression estimates of a given covariate of interest. To characterize the effective sample one simply needs to compute a weight for each observation, defined as the square of the residual of a regression of the treatment on all pre-treatment covariates (normalized by the sum of all weights in the sample). Aronow and Samii (ibid.) show that higher values of a weight are associated with a higher impact on the estimates of an average treatment effect. One then can aggregate these weights along particular covariates of interest to determine the extent to which certain groups drive estimates of a treatment effect.³

Table 14 reports the results from implementing this procedure, and shows that with

³In particular, as defined in equation 9 of Aronow and Samii (2016), the average of a binary covariate Z in the effective sample is given by $\frac{\sum_{i \in n} \mathbf{1}\{Z_i=1\}w_i}{\sum_{i \in n} w_i}$, where w_i is the normalized residual square from a regression of the treatment on observed covariates in a sample of n observations.

	Nominal Sample	Effective Sample
Monitoring	0.30	0.37
Aggregate	0.38	0.46
Evaluation	0.56	0.62

Table 14: **Proportion of Switcher MPs in the Nominal and Effective Samples.** The table reports the proportion of legislators who experience a transition from co-partisanship to the opposition (or viceversa) in the nominal and effective samples across the monitoring, aggregated monitoring, and evaluation datasets. For a given dataset (rows), the nominal sample simply reports the proportion of observations associated with switcher MPs. In contrast, the effective sample reports the weighted average of switcher MPs. Following Aronow and Samii, 2016, the weights for the effective sample are defined as the normalized residual square from a regression of the treatment (co-partisanship) on observed covariates.

the exception of the evaluation sample, the cross-legislator variation has a higher weight in estimating the impact of co-partisanship on the different outcomes of interest. For instance, the first row in the table shows that the proportion of switchers in the nominal and effective monitoring samples was only 30% and 37% respectively. A similar pattern holds in the aggregate monitoring dataset. However, we observe different a trend in the evaluation data. In this dataset switchers represented 56% and 65% of all observations in the nominal and effective samples respectively.

F Representativeness of Evaluation Sample

Another concern regarding the empirical analysis that estimates the impact of co-partisanship on the quality of MPLADS projects is its reliance on a non-representative sample. It may turnout, for example, that the type of legislators and works evaluated during the government’s audit are widely different in observed attributes in relation to their respective populations. Here I show that this is not a concern. Legislators included in the evaluation are on average very similar to those who were not. Further, although on average the cost of audited works was higher (in relation to the universe of works of a given MP included in the evaluation), this simply indicates that the conclusions drawn in section 5.2 are limited to more expensive (and perhaps more visible) projects.

To assess the representativeness of legislators, I compute standardized mean differences between legislators included in the sample and those that were not along the following observables: the number of works legislators reported to MOSPI, the average cost sanctioned for reported works, the proportion of works different stages of progress (no report, ongoing, completed), and the proportion of MPs that had no works reported in the monitoring system. The left panel in Figure 7 shows the results from this exercise. Across all dimensions we find relatively small magnitudes for the standardized differences between MPs in and those excluded from the survey (all are below one third of a standard deviation).

To examine the representativeness of the works for the MPs included in the government audit, I compute the standardized mean difference of the log of the cost approved between works included in and excluded from the evaluation for each legislator. The panel on the right of Figure 7 displays a scatter plot of these differences (y-axis) against the proportion of sampled works for legislators (x-axis). In general, we observe that the cost for works in the evaluation is significantly higher, although the difference tends to fall as the proportion of works sampled for an MP increases.⁴

⁴As it can be seen in the figure, standardized differences in the log of cost are not close or equal to zero as the proportion of sampled works approaches one. The reason for this discrepancy is that district authorities may not have submitted the reports for all the works associated with a given MP. Another possibility is that district authorities may also have under-reported the cost of works.




Figure 7: **Representativeness of Sampled MPLAD Works.** The panel on the left reports standardized differences along several indicators of MPLADS performance between in-sample and out-of-sample MPs. In general, MPs across the two groups tend to be similar, as the absolute value of standardized differences tends to be small. The panel on the right displays a scatter plot of standardized differences in the average log cost of works included in and excluded from the evaluation and the proportion of sampled works. Overall, works included in the sample tend to be more costly, but the difference tends to fall as the proportion of sampled works for a given MP increases.

References

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