

This is a supplementary appendix to Carlos Velasco Rivera, “Political Dynasties and Party Strength: Evidence from Victorian Britain.” All sections, figures, and tables are referenced in the main paper.

# Appendix A: Candidate Bargaining Power and Mobility

This section discusses how endowing candidates with bargaining power and agency regarding whether to accept a party's nomination decisions does not affect the main prediction of my theory. The discussion also shows that my prediction does not change even when allowing for candidate mobility.

## Candidate Bargaining Power

The theory I introduced in section 2 does not endow candidates with agency over whether to accept the party's nomination decision. However, introducing this additional element to the theory does not change its main prediction. To see why this is the case, suppose that candidates have bargaining power in relation to the party leadership. Candidates may find desirable to run under a party banner not only because of a party's electoral resources, but also because doing so may allow them to have access to coveted positions in parliament, or extract higher rents. However, assume that a candidate's bargaining power depends on the electoral resources at his disposal and the local organizational strength of a party. In particular, suppose that given their electoral advantage, dynastic politicians have a higher bargaining power in relation to their non-dynastic counterparts, and that the bargaining power of candidates decreases when local party organizations are present in a constituency. Given these assumptions, let's consider the type of candidate nominations in equilibrium under two scenarios: when local organizations are present and when local organizations are absent.

**Case 1: Outcome under Local Organizations** Suppose that there is a local organization present in a constituency, and suppose that the party decides to give the party ticket nomination to a non-dynastic candidate. In this scenario, the dynastic candidate can either choose to accept the party's decision or choose to run as an independent. If he chooses to run as an independent, his electoral prospects may not be very high as the party has a strong organization to fight off candidates running with their own resources in an electoral race. When this happens, dynastic candidates risk losing an election and incurring some cost for having participated in the race. As a result, it may be in his advantage to accept the party's nomination of the non-dynastic candidate and not run for office.

**Case 2: Outcome under No Local Organizations** Now suppose that the party lacks local organization in a given constituency, and that it still decides to give the nomination to a non-dynastic candidate. In this scenario, the dynastic candidate can either choose to accept the party's decision, or choose to run as an independent. If he chooses to run as an independent, he has good electoral prospects as the party's candidate lacks organization and resources of his own to beat the dynastic politician. In this scenario, the party then is better off choosing the dynastic politician to run under the party banner.

Together, these two cases show that the theory still predicts that dynastic candidates will be more likely to run in constituencies where parties are organizationally weak even after allowing for candidate agency to decide whether to accept a party's nomination decision.

## Candidate Mobility

Note also that the theoretical framework discussed so far does not rely on candidates being mobile. The discussion only requires that in a given constituency there is a supply of dynastic candidates. Under this assumption, when a party does not grant the nomination to a dynastic candidate implies that in the current period the dynastic politician will be out of office. It is possible that in a future election he may or may not be called to run for office again.

If we allow for some candidate mobility, the theory's main prediction does not change. To see why this is the case, suppose that some dynastic candidates have the ability to compete in different constituencies (this could happen, if for example, they have a national brand that allows them to be recognized in constituencies different from the ones from where their relatives originally ran for office). Now consider a simple case in which there are two constituencies: one where there is a party organization and another where none exists. The party has now to consider the nominations across these two constituencies. In this scenario, it is easy to see, by the discussion above, that in equilibrium the dynastic candidate will run in the constituency where the party is weak and the non-dynastic candidate in the constituency where the party has an organizational presence.

## Appendix B: Additional Figures and Table




Figure 1: **Proportion of Dynastic MPs by Political Party (1832 -1885).** The left panel plots of the proportion of dynastic MPs in the Conservative and Liberal parties. The right panel report the difference in the proportion (and 95% confidence interval) of dynastic MPs between the Conservative and Liberal parties. The panels show that the Liberal party experienced a significant decline in the share of dynastic MPs following the Second Reform Act of 1867.

	Unopposed Dynastic Candidate (1868 - 1880)					
	(C)	(C)	(L)	(L)	(L)	(C)
Patron (C)	0.478*** (0.118)	0.502*** (0.118)	0.066 (0.130)			
Log(Population)		0.020 (0.016)			0.014 (0.022)	
Patron (L)				0.236** (0.120)	0.253** (0.121)	-0.087*** (0.023)
Intercept	0.022* (0.012)	-0.182 (0.155)	0.116*** (0.025)	0.097*** (0.023)	-0.046 (0.224)	0.087*** (0.023)
Observations	159	157	183	183	180	159
R <sup>2</sup>	0.335	0.341	0.002	0.047	0.053	0.005

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 1: **Patrons and Unopposed Dynastic Candidates in Boroughs (1868-1880).** The table reports OLS estimates for the relationship between the presence of a Conservative (and Liberal) patron and the probability of observing a Conservative (and Liberal) dynastic candidate run unopposed to office in the period 1868-1880. Columns (1)-(2) show that the presence of a Conservative patrons is positively correlated with the probability of observing a conservative dynastic candidate run unopposed for office, and Column (3) shows that their presence is not correlated with the probability of observing an unopposed Liberal dynastic candidate. Similarly, columns (4) and (5) show that the presence of a Liberal patron is positively correlated with the probability of observing a Liberal dynastic candidate run unopposed, and column (6) shows that it is negatively correlated with the probability of observing a Conservative dynastic candidate running unopposed. These estimates suggest that the backing of a patron explains the presence of unopposed dynastic candidates in boroughs.




Figure 2: **Average Age of MPs by Dynastic Background (1832-1885).** The figure plots the average age of MPs by dynastic background for the entire period. The figure shows that dynastic MPs were on average about 5 to 6 years younger, though the difference disappeared by the end of the period.




Figure 3: **Unopposed Rates by Dynastic Background and Constituency Type.** The figure plots the percent of dynastic and non-dynastic MPs elected without facing opposition in boroughs (left panel) and counties (right panel). Consistent with the deterrence mechanism, the figure shows that in boroughs (where the barriers to entry were significantly lower) dynastic MPs were more likely to run unopposed relative to their non-dynastic MPs. The figure also shows that in counties unopposed rates between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs were virtually the same.




Figure 4: **Family Ties between Patrons and MPs.** The figure plots the proportion of MPs related to the patron in the constituency they represent across parties. The share of all dynastic MPs related to patrons in their constituency is 61 percent. Among Conservatives the proportion of MPs related to patrons is 73 percent.






Figure 5: **Representatives of Restricted Sample Across Parties.** The figure plots standardized differences in key covariates between constituencies where the dynastic background of all candidates is known and those in which at least one of the candidates were never elected to office. The left panel reports results for Conservatives and the right panel for Liberals.

	Share of Party Vote							
	Full Sample				Restricted Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dynastic	0.013** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.019*** (0.006)	0.011** (0.005)	0.015** (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)
Incumbent			0.021*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.008)			0.008 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)
Terms			-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)			-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Liberal			-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)			-0.010** (0.005)	-0.009** (0.005)
Borough			-0.009 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.006)			-0.019*** (0.006)	-0.019*** (0.007)
Patron (L)			-0.026* (0.016)	-0.027* (0.016)			-0.034** (0.016)	-0.036** (0.016)
Patron (C)			-0.021 (0.041)	-0.021 (0.041)			0.010 (0.022)	0.008 (0.023)
Log(Electors)			-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)			-0.001 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)
Intercept	0.480*** (0.005)	0.480*** (0.005)	0.522*** (0.040)	0.519*** (0.040)	0.482*** (0.005)	0.482*** (0.005)	0.514*** (0.053)	0.514*** (0.052)
Year FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	203	415	415	415	120	245	245	245
R <sup>2</sup>		0.025	0.073	0.081		0.024	0.125	0.131

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: **Share of Party Vote for Dynastic Candidates in Two-Member Constituencies (1868-1880).** The table displays the average difference in party vote share between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates in the three general elections in the period 1868-1880. Columns (1)-(4) report the results relying on the sample of races where there was at least one candidate candidates whose dynastic background is not known because they were never elected to office (these were dropped from the analysis). Columns (5)-(9) report the estimates for the sample that only includes races where the background of every candidate is known. The first column reports the results where the unit of analysis is the co-partisan pair (dynastic vs. non-dynastic). Columns (2)-(4) report the results for OLS specifications where the unit of analysis is the candidate. The point estimates show that on average dynastic candidates a 1-2 percentage point advantage relative to non-dynastic candidates. All estimates are robust to the incumbency status of candidates, number of terms they had served in office, party affiliation, type of constituency where candidates compete, presence of a parton, size of the electorate, time trends, and limiting the analysis to races where the background of all candidates is known.




Figure 6: **Sensitivity of Dynastic Personal Vote Advantage to Missing Background of Candidates.** The figure plots the estimate (and 95% confidence interval) of the magnitude of the dynastic personal vote advantage as a function of the proportion of candidates with a missing background who are randomly coded as dynastic. All estimates are based on a regression that controls for the incumbency status of candidates, party affiliation, type of constituency in which a race takes place, presence of a patron in a constituency, size of the electorate, and year fixed effects. The plot shows that over 70 percent of candidates whose background is not known would have to be dynastic for the dynastic advantage to disappear.

	Pr(Liberal Org.)			Pr(Conservative Org.)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Patron (L)	-0.225** (0.089)		-0.187** (0.086)			
Log( $\Delta$ Elec. <sub>68-65</sub> )		0.137*** (0.024)	0.217*** (0.036)		0.201*** (0.028)	0.227*** (0.043)
Log(Population <sub>71</sub> )			-0.098*** (0.030)			-0.053 (0.035)
Patron (C)				-0.351*** (0.087)		-0.228*** (0.085)
Intercept	0.225*** (0.024)	-0.796*** (0.181)	-0.352* (0.214)	0.518*** (0.030)	-1.024*** (0.212)	-0.634** (0.257)
Observations	293	252	251	293	252	251
R <sup>2</sup>	0.021	0.113	0.163	0.053	0.167	0.198

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 3: Endogenous Party Organizations.** The table reports OLS regression estimates of the relationship between a constituency reporting a local Liberal (Columns 1-3) or Conservative (Columns 4-6) party organization and the presence of a patron, the log of franchise expansion following the Second Reform Act, and log population. The estimates show a negative relationship between the presence of patrons and the probability of observing a party organization, and a positive correlation between the outcome of interest and the log magnitude in the expansion of the franchise.




Figure 7: **Percent of Dynastic MPs Representing Unfamiliar Constituencies (1832-1885).** The figure plots the percent of MPs serving in constituencies not previously represented by them or a family member.

Liberal Dynastic Candidate										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Organization	-0.696* (0.372)	-0.465 (0.384)	-0.542 (0.391)	-0.462 (0.412)	-0.490 (0.415)	-0.894** (0.389)	-0.692* (0.401)	-0.766* (0.413)	-0.691 (0.434)	-0.645 (0.429)
Patron (L)	1.493*** (0.531)	1.522*** (0.534)	1.425** (0.603)	1.376** (0.546)	1.224** (0.557)	1.233** (0.558)	1.053* (0.612)	1.008* (0.574)		
Total Seats		0.339 (0.287)	0.558 (0.355)	0.497 (0.362)	0.276 (0.344)	0.693 (0.432)	0.482 (0.433)			
Log(Population <sub>71</sub> )			-0.228 (0.287)	-0.194 (0.193)	-0.206 (0.293)	-0.264 (0.197)				
Log( $\Delta$ Elec. <sub>68-65</sub> )			0.026 (0.207)	-0.066 (0.214)						
$\Delta$ Electorate <sub>68-65</sub> (Share Electorate <sub>65</sub> )			0.170 (0.515)	0.027 (0.537)						
Intercept	-0.731*** (0.186)	-0.962*** (0.210)	-1.515*** (0.520)	0.286 (2.002)	0.195 (1.674)	-0.448** (0.199)	-0.649*** (0.223)	-1.097* (0.605)	0.701 (2.038)	1.311 (1.721)
Observations	194	194	194	176	183	160	160	160	147	151
Log Likelihood	-145.116	-138.937	-137.887	-125.087	-131.757	-125.879	-122.076	-121.589	-110.654	-116.140
Akaike Inf. Crit.	294.232	283.875	283.773	262.173	275.514	255.758	250.151	251.178	233.308	244.281
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.										

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 4: **Party Strength and the Probability of Liberal Dynastic Candidates (Boroughs Only).** The table reports binomial regression estimates for the relationship between Liberal party strength (Organization) and the probability of a dynastic politician running for office in the 1880 general election in the sample of boroughs. Columns (1)-(5) report results based on the full sample of races. Columns (6)-(10) report estimates based on the sample of races where the dynastic status of all candidates is known. The estimates show that party strength is negatively correlated with the incidence of dynastic liberal candidates in across all specifications in the restricted sample.

<i>Probability of Vote Against Party Line</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dynastic	0.448*** (0.135)	0.277** (0.146)	0.195 (0.148)	0.220* (0.149)	0.219* (0.122)
Whig	1.891*** (0.190)	0.529 (0.562)	0.369 (0.564)	0.409 (0.565)	0.397 (0.463)
Dynastic * Whig		1.768*** (0.602)	1.870*** (0.603)	1.845*** (0.604)	1.853*** (0.493)
Organization (L)			-0.469*** (0.176)	-0.517*** (0.179)	-0.517*** (0.146)
Borough				0.222 (0.166)	0.219 (0.135)
Intercept	-4.446*** (0.098)	-4.366*** (0.098)	-4.207*** (0.110)	-4.379*** (0.172)	-4.367*** (0.160)
Parliament RE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	676	676	676	676	676

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 5: **Dynastic Status and Probability of Dissent among Liberals by Party Faction.** The table reports maximum likelihood estimates from a binomial regression for the relationship between the dynastic status of Liberal MPs and their probability of voting against the party whip in partisan divisions after accounting for a legislator's party faction. Even after controlling for whether a legislator identified himself as Whig, we find that dynastic politicians were more likely to dissent from the party line. This finding shows that belonging to a whig faction is not a confounder for the dynastic status of legislators.

## Appendix C: Political Dynasties and Patronage

As argued and shown in this paper, dynastic politicians enjoy an advantage in personal resources. Further, in the particular time period I examine, politicians had to spend significant amounts of resources to win and stay in office. The implication of the advantage assumption in the British context is that dynastic MPs should oppose any measure that poses a threat to the use of patronage and resources in order to win elections. To examine this claim, this section focuses on the Corruption and Illegal Practices Act of 1883. The debate in parliament surrounding this legislation offers a unique opportunity to examine the claim of interest. The purpose of the legislation was to curb excessive spending in electoral races, provide a clear definition on corrupt and illegal practices, and impose heavy penalties for incurring in them (O’Leary 1962, p. 160). Therefore, one can learn about the means that dynastic politicians used to attain office by looking at how legislators of this type voted on specific provisions of the bill. This section focuses on four relevant amendments and provides evidence that independent of party affiliations, dynastic MPs were less likely to support clauses that would reduce the barriers to entry to electoral races and curb the use of patronage to secure the vote of constituents.

The impetus for the enactment of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 were the record number of electoral petitions (42) and the exorbitant level spending observed in the 1880 general election. This bill is considered as landmark in the British case since as Rix (2008, p. 66) notes, it “(...) not only provoked debates about corruption but also raised wider questions such as the composition of the Commons, the relationship between MPs and constituents and the role of party organisation.” The analysis in this section focuses on the votes on specific amendments that can allow us to learn about how dynastic politicians relate to constituents, the source of their advantage, and whether they were less disciplined partisans in parliament.

To carry out this task, I selected four relevant amendments that were voted in the process of passing the legislation. Each of them was selected based on whether the substance of the amendment led to a clear prediction regarding the vote of dynastic MPs irrespective of their political affiliation. Table 6 provides the key characteristics of the four selected amendments analyzed in this section along with the predicted position of dynastic MPs. The first column provides the main goal of a given amendment. The second column provides the specific provision that was put to a vote, and the third column includes the position we would expect dynasts to take in relation to a given amendment.

The first row reports the information on the proposal that sought to reduce the barriers to entry to running for a seat in parliament. Under the status quo, candidates were required to pay the expenses incurred by the returning officer (the official in charge of the poll) (Pinto-Duschinsky 1981, p.16). The amendment was aimed at ending this practice by relying on local taxes to defray these costs. This measure would have effectively reduced one of the barriers that potential candidates faced to enter a race. As such, the prediction is that



Type	Amendment Content	Prediction
<b>Reduce Barriers to Entry</b>	Include “That it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power to insert a new Clause in the Bill charging the returning officer’s expenses at Parliamentary Elections upon the rates in boroughs and counties.”	Dynastic MPs Oppose
<b>Restrict Conveyances</b>	Include “No person shall lend a carriage or horse to any candidate, election committee, or agent, or to any other person for the purpose of conveying voters to or from the poll, and every person lending or borrowing a carriage or horse for the conveyance of voters to or from the poll shall be guilty of an illegal practice.”	Dynastic MPs Oppose
<b>Forbid Public Houses</b>	Include “or any premises where any intoxicating liquor is sold”	Dynastic MPs Oppose
<b>Allow Entertainment</b>	Include “Nothing in this section shall prohibit any entertainment given by any person, in the nature of ordinary hospitality, which is not inconsistent with his usual mode of living, and which in any case is not of a corrupt nature or given with a corrupt motive.”	Dynastic MPs Support

Table 6: **Predicted Position of Dynastic MPs on Selected Amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883.** The table displays the purpose, content, and predicted position of Dynastic MPs across four selected amendment to this legislation. For instance, the first row displays information on a bill that had the goal of reducing the barriers a candidate faced when deciding to run in a given race. In particular, the amendment sought to transfer the payment of a returning officer’s expenses (defrayed by candidates under the status quo) to the public purse. Given the advantage in resources that dynastic politicians enjoy, the prediction is that they should be more likely to oppose including the clause in the act.

dynastic MPs, all else equal, should oppose this amendment.

Another controversial issue in passing this legislation was that of paid conveyances (transportation of voters to the polls). This practice was considered a source of corruption, but several members of parliament considered that restricting this practice would also disenfranchise many voters (Rix 2008, p. 74). In particular, observers at the time considered that Conservative candidates had an advantage along this dimension, but banning the practices of conveyances would also affect the turnout of individuals belonging to the working class and out-voters (Rix 2008, p. 72-74). Thus, if dynastic politicians had an advantage in personal resources that could be used to transport voters to the polls, they should have been more likely to oppose the amendment banning this practice.

The third provision discussed in the process leading to the approval of this reform was that of prohibiting the use of public houses to carry out business related to elections. According to Sir Henry James, the attorney general at the time, the rationale for introducing this clause to the bill was to prevent treating (i.e., offering food or drink in order to influence an individual's vote), as in past election petitions this practice had been identified taking place in public houses and hotels (Hans vol. 269, 03 July 1883, 196). Therefore, if dynastic politicians relied on patronage to win elections, and one of the ways of doing so was purchasing votes in public houses, they should be more likely to oppose the proposed clause.

Finally, the fourth amendment analyzed in this section deals with the entertainment of constituents and potential supporters. As it has been noted, one of the main goals of the legislation was to define illegal and corrupt practices in elections. The entertainment of voters was one the practices discussed when debating the legislation. One proposal aimed at limiting the restrictions on existing practices. In particular, the amendment analyzed in this section had the purpose of protecting the entertainment of constituents. The amendment specifically sought to protect any entertainment that was "consistent with a person mode of living". As such, the proposed clause would permit wealthy patrons entertain potential supporters without fear of being penalized. And again, dynasts, owing to their resources have an advantage along this dimension and the way they maintained support among the electorate, should be more likely to support the inclusion of the proposed clause.

To test these predictions, I fit a linear probability model, where the outcome of interest is a binary indicator for whether a given MP is in favor of a specific amendment and zero otherwise. As predictors, I include binary indicators for the dynastic background of MPs and the party they represent in parliament (Conservative, Liberal, Liberal/Labour, Home Rule, and Home Rule Parnellites). Table 7 reports the estimates from fitting this model. The results show a clear partisan divide in the vote for each of the amendments. For instance, relative to Conservative MPs, Liberals were more likely to support reducing barriers to entry in electoral races, restricting the practice of conveyances, forbidding the use of public houses to carry out electoral business, and less willing to make legal the entertainment of electors.

However, consistent with the predictions laid out in Table 6, the results show that independent of partisan affiliation, dynastic MPs were less likely to support reducing barriers to entry for candidates running for office (Column 1), restricting the practice of conveyances (Column 2), prohibiting the use of public houses to carry out business related to election

(Column 3), and more likely to vote in favor of protecting the practice of entertaining constituents. Further, with the exception of the result for the amendment aimed at restricting conveyances, all point estimates are statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a picture where dynastic politicians vote against rules that would erode their personal advantage.

	Pr(Aye)			
	Reduce Barriers	Restrict Conveyances	Forbid Public Houses	Allow Entertainment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dynastic	−0.084** (0.041)	−0.032 (0.045)	−0.093** (0.043)	0.072* (0.044)
Home Rule	0.711*** (0.085)	0.095 (0.120)	0.426*** (0.126)	−0.518*** (0.129)
Home Rule (P)	0.887*** (0.099)	0.493*** (0.184)	−0.127 (0.184)	0.054 (0.083)
Liberal	0.311*** (0.042)	0.282*** (0.047)	0.701*** (0.045)	−0.848*** (0.047)
Liberal/Lab.	0.952*** (0.247)	0.985*** (0.258)	0.850*** (0.258)	−0.827*** (0.217)
Intercept	0.048 (0.036)	0.015 (0.042)	0.150*** (0.041)	0.827*** (0.045)
Observations	313	278	295	114
R <sup>2</sup>	0.367	0.163	0.487	0.795

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 7: Dynastic MP support for selected amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883.** The table reports the point estimates for the difference in support among Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs (under a linear probability) across four selected amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883. The results show that independent of partisan affiliations, dynastic MPs were less likely to support measures that curbed patronage and corruption (reducing barriers to entry, restricting conveyances, and banning the use of public houses to carry out business) but more likely to support the one that protected such practices (i.e., allowing for the entertainment of constituents). With the exception of the conveyances amendment, the difference in support/rejection between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs across the selected amendments is statistically significant.

I also examine whether dynastic politicians were more likely to vote against their party across each of these four key amendments. To do so, I restrict the sample to members of parliament affiliated with either of the two main parties (Conservatives and Liberals). Based

on this sample, I fit a linear probability model where the outcome of interest is again MP support for each of the selected amendments. The predictors now include a dummy for whether an individual is a member of the liberal party, whether he is a dynastic politician, and the interaction between the two. The main parameters of interest are the coefficient on the dummy indicating whether an MP is a dynastic politician, and the coefficient of the interaction between the liberal and dynastic status of legislators. The first captures the propensity of Conservative dynastic MPs to vote along party lines; the sum of this parameter along with the one for the interaction report the same quantity of interest for Liberal dynastic MPs.

	Pr(Aye)			
	Reduce Barriers	Restrict Conveyances	Forbid Public Houses	Allow Entertainment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dynastic	−0.014 (0.059)	0.000 (0.073)	−0.057 (0.070)	0.129* (0.069)
Liberal	0.379*** (0.054)	0.306*** (0.060)	0.720*** (0.060)	−0.800*** (0.054)
Liberal * Dynastic	−0.161* (0.083)	−0.061 (0.094)	−0.038 (0.089)	−0.129 (0.084)
Intercept	0.014 (0.041)	−0.000 (0.050)	0.132*** (0.049)	0.800*** (0.048)
Observations	278	262	280	101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.204	0.134	0.488	0.823

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table 8: Difference in support rates between Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs conditional on party affiliation (Conservative or Liberal) for selected amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883.** The table reports the estimates for the difference in support rates between Conservative Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs and Liberal Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs for each of four selected amendments under a linear probability model. The main quantities of interest are the estimate for the coefficient of the Dynastic variable and the sum of this coefficient and the sum of the one for the interaction between the Liberal and Dynastic variables. The first quantity represents how likely were dynastic Conservative MPs to support an amendment in relation to their Conservative non-dynastic peers. The second quantity reports the same measure for Liberal MPs. The table shows that there are only significant differences in the reduction in barriers to entry and the allowing entertainment amendments. In the first case, dynastic Liberal MPs were less likely to vote for the amendment relative to their non-dynastic colleagues. In the second case, Conservative dynastic MPs were more likely to vote for the amendment in relation to their Conservative non-dynastic peers.

Table 8 reports the results from fitting this model. Columns (1)-(4) show that there

are clear differences only in the proposed amendment to reduce barriers to entry in electoral races and the amendment aimed at protecting the practice of entertainment. In the first case, Liberal dynastic MP were about 16 percentage points less likely to vote for the measure aimed at charging a returning officer's expenses to the public coffers. In the second case we instead find that conservative dynastic MPs were about 12 percentage points more likely to vote for a measure protecting the practice of entertainment relative to their non-dynastic colleagues.

Together, the evidence in this section suggests that dynastic politicians had an advantage in personal resources, and that this advantage manifested itself in the form of patronage towards electors and officials (paying expenses of returning officers, conveying electors to the polls, treating them in public houses, and entertaining them). As a result, when the momentous Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 was discussed, they supported any measure that could protect their electoral advantage.

Further, the evidence suggests that dynastic politicians were a vestige of the past and antithetical to the development of the British party system. One of the key insights in Cox (1987) is that in the context of larger franchises resulting from different reforms, representatives could no longer rely on influence in order to win elections. Instead, politicians turned to voting with their party in order to signal policy positions and thereby win the support of voters. But the evidence offered in this section suggests that dynastic politicians remained attached to patronage.

## References

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