Security Checklists

Surprisingly effective at scale






Attackers have bosses and budgets too.

3:01 PM · Sep 13, 2014 · Twitter for iPhone

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Reducing internal costs is just as important as raising attacker costs

THE NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER

THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO

HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT

PICADOR


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
BESTSELLING AUTHOR OF BETTER AND COMPLICATIONS

When do checklists work so well?

- Complex situations that require expertise
 - ☐ Specialization leading to Super-specialization
- ☐ Time pressure
- Consistency is critical
- Situation is stressful
- ☐ There are easy-to-ignore steps

Checklists let you ignore some tradeoffs





When do humans make mistakes?

- Complexity
- Novel situations that seem routine
- Subtle distinctions
- "Blame and train"
- Assumptions necessary for speed

Problem statement

We can only do security reviews for X% of new features.

If we don't do them, only Y% of features have a threat model.

We've seen Z security incidents from features with no security review/threat model.


What can we do to fix it?

- Meet with teams to tell them how important threat modeling is
- ☐ Train every engineer how to threat model
- Staff up a security review team
- ☐ Block every feature on security review
- etc.

It's not worth teaching every engineer how to threat model

Imagine this new feature


We don't have link previews. Our users want this. So let's add it!



An example of STRIDE for a new feature

Spoofing We're authenticating requests using our normal framework, so let's mark as N/A **Tampering** I guess someone could give us a malformed URL, but that would just error. We're using a standard URL parsing library, so N/A Repudiation We log requests, so we're good, right? N/A Information Disclosure We're using existing frameworks, so let's mark as N/A Denial of Service I'm pretty sure Infra handles this, so I'll mark as N/A Elevation of privilege My app only has two roles, and another team owns that so I'll mark as N/A

What did this threat model miss?



Internal Network

Counterpoints

- "They didn't threat model properly!"
 - Yes, my point isn't that threat modeling is useless, but that rather it takes effort to do. Busy developers are busy, and generally won't spend enough time developing a threat model that's good enough to catch things.
- "STRIDE isn't the only threat model"
 - Yes, but this is representative of most threat modeling frameworks.
- "Threat models should be reviewed by security"
 - ☐ We don't have time to review every threat model. We can only review a fraction of them.
- "Threat models are still useful"
 - Agree! When we have time to make them, we still make them. Done well, they're very valuable.

Do you want direct security involvement throughout the project?

If you think the project is risky and want help from Security from the beginning: trust your gut. We'll be involved and help however we can.

Yes No

Does this component make major changes or implement new authentication or security controls?

Say "yes" if this component adds new ways for people to authenticate, adds to or changes existing security controls, or otherwise explicitly implements security/privacy features.


Yes No

Your project's Risk Ranking

Your project is High Risk!

Choose Components

Slack's goSDL



Here's how it works

- Whenever a new feature is considered at Asana, a PM will add a task to a centralized project
- ☐ This task has a lot of subtasks to do various things
- One of them is fill out a security risk assessment for their feature
- It asks questions of them, like "Do you use cryptography?"
- ☐ It's easy to fill out and serves as useful documentation
- Security team can scan and decide if they want to get more involved

Tips for using this well

- Embed this wherever your developers are doing their work
 - Design docs
 - Product management review
 - Production readiness review
 - etc.
- Don't use another new tool, use whatever you're already using
- Emphasis on easy: skip jargon and terms of art when you can. Include descriptions and examples.
- Read all of the filled out checklists and judge which ones to get involved with.
- ☐ Iterate.


Other successful applications of checklists

Incident Response

- Incident set up
- Runbooks
- ☐ Where logs live and how to search for them
- Who to inform and when
- Incident Coordinator rotation
- How and when to contact DFIR
- Post incident action items

Vendor review

- ☐ Short checklists here make a big difference!
- ☐ Have a few questions which are absolutely disqualifying
- Don't leave a whole lot to judgement or personal opinion



Questions?