

Guiding AI to Fix Its Own Flaws: An Empirical Study on LLM-Driven Secure Code Generation

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Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become powerful tools for automated code generation. However, these models often overlook critical security practices, which can result in the generation of insecure code that contains vulnerabilities—weaknesses or flaws in the code that attackers can exploit to compromise a system. However, there has been limited exploration of strategies to guide LLMs in generating secure code and a lack of in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of LLMs in repairing code containing vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs by examining their inherent tendencies to produce insecure code, their capability to generate secure code when guided by self-generated vulnerability hints, and their effectiveness in repairing vulnerabilities when provided with different levels of feedback. Our study covers both proprietary and open-weight models across various scales and leverages established benchmarks to assess a wide range of vulnerability types. Through quantitative and qualitative analyses, we reveal that although LLMs are prone to generating insecure code, advanced models can benefit from vulnerability hints and fine-grained feedback to avoid or fix vulnerabilities. We also provide actionable suggestions to developers to reduce vulnerabilities when using LLMs for code generation.

CCS Concepts

- Security and privacy → Software security engineering

Keywords

Large Language Models, Secure Code Generation, Vulnerability Repair

1 Introduction

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) for code generation has grown rapidly. These models, such as GitHub Copilot [20] and OpenAI ChatGPT [37], have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in completing partial code snippets or generating code from natural language descriptions. Despite these advances, a critical concern remains: the security of the code generated by these models. Multiple studies have shown that LLM-generated code often contains vulnerabilities—defects that can be exploited to compromise software functionality, integrity, or confidentiality [4, 26, 38, 40, 41, 44]. For instance, Perry et al. [41] showed that using AI code assistants can produce more insecure code. Pearce et al. [38] reported that




Figure 1: We performed a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs in secure code generation and repair across three dimensions.

GitHub Copilot generated vulnerable code in 40% of cases across 18 different types of vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are categorized under the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [1], a well-known framework that standardizes software weaknesses.

While existing studies highlight concerns regarding vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code, a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs across varying scales and series remains lacking. Most prior works [4, 26, 38] have focused on a narrow set of LLMs targeting large-scale and closed-source models (e.g., GPT-3.5/4 or GitHub Copilot, etc). However, open-weight models are increasingly used in real-world applications for their flexibility, lower cost, and reduced latency. Their efficiency makes them ideal for resource-constrained environments, privacy-sensitive settings, and on-device code assistants. Despite their growing use, comprehensive evaluations of their security risks and comparisons with proprietary models are still lacking. In addition, although recent studies have shown promising results in employing LLMs especially smaller-scale LLMs [57] (ranging from 220M to 20B) to ensure code functionalities, the effectiveness of these models in addressing vulnerability-related problems remains largely unexplored.

Addressing the security risks of LLM-based code generation requires developing effective detection [6, 14, 30, 46, 63] and mitigation strategies [10, 13, 49, 56, 61]. Our work focuses on vulnerability mitigation and uses CodeQL for vulnerability detection. Existing

efforts can be summarized in two paradigms, differing in their point of intervention during the code generation process. The first paradigm, *proactive vulnerability prevention*, is applied *before* the LLM to generate the code. In this paradigm, researchers design carefully crafted prompts, incorporating predetermined vulnerability information [50, 53] or demonstrations of safe coding practices [61] to guide the LLM away from known security pitfalls and steer it toward generating secure code directly. However, these techniques assume users to either possess the required expertise in constructing the prompt or have access to a comprehensive code base, which limits their broader applications.

On the other hand, the second paradigm, *post-hoc vulnerability repair*, is applied *after* vulnerable code has been generated. This paradigm focuses on correcting vulnerabilities that were not preemptively addressed during code generation. While earlier works trained or fine-tuned standalone neural models as code repairers [10, 13, 56], they heavily relied on existing vulnerability repair datasets and were unable to resolve unseen vulnerability types. In addition, these approaches require extensive computing resources when an LLM (e.g., CodeLlama [49]) is tasked to be the code repairer. As a result, there has been an increasing interest in directly prompting an LLM for vulnerable code repair [34, 35, 39], particularly drawing on the success of reasoning prompts such as Chain of Thought [55]. However, the exploration of prompting-based vulnerable code pair is only in its infancy, and many approaches are limited to leveraging only the superficial error messages returned by a vulnerable code detector for repair.

In this work, we aim to systematically examine the capabilities of modern LLMs in handling code vulnerabilities (Figure 1). Our exploration is structured into three dimensions, each designed to address specific gaps in understanding and improving the secure code generation performance of LLMs, thereby addressing the following research questions (RQs):

RQ1. Do LLMs generate vulnerable code? We examine a broader range of LLMs—including both *proprietary* and *open-weight* models spanning various scales and series to show the tendency of how often these LLMs generate vulnerable code. To do this, we use two benchmarks, SecurityEval[47] and SecCodePLT[58], which are designed to test secure code generation in Python. These benchmarks cover a broad range of vulnerability types defined under CWE. By using these benchmarks, we provide a clear picture of the types and frequencies of vulnerabilities each LLM is likely to produce.

RQ2. Does providing self-generated vulnerability hints help vulnerability prevention? Corresponding to proactive vulnerability prevention, we investigate how *self-generated vulnerability hints* can guide LLMs in producing secure code, thereby eliminating the reliance on human expertise for prompt construction. The self-generated vulnerability hints are suggestions generated by the LLM itself to highlight potential security risks during code generation, guiding LLMs to prevent them. We assessed various LLMs to see if they can effectively use these self-generated hints to minimize code vulnerabilities.

RQ3. How does LLMs leverage different levels of feedback in post-hoc vulnerability repair? We test the ability of LLMs to repair their code vulnerabilities by incorporating two distinct types of

feedback. We begin by using CodeQL [19]—an external vulnerability detection tool—to identify security issues within the generated code. The first type of feedback, termed *direct feedback*, is provided directly by CodeQL and includes only the raw vulnerability information with a short description and localization information. The second type, *explained feedback*, is obtained by prompting the GPT-4o [37] to explain the CodeQL results, which provides both the vulnerability information and detailed suggestions and actions for resolving the issue. This design of feedback draws inspiration from recent works on feedback-driven code debugging [12, 27, 33], where an LLM is prompted to first enrich the raw feedback received from external evaluators and then utilize it for better debugging. However, as far as we know, none of the prior research has examined the application of this advanced approach for vulnerability repair. By analyzing their responses to these two types of feedback, we assess LLMs’ ability to repair vulnerable code under varying levels of guidance. This phase emulates the reviewing and refining workflow that human developers adopt to enhance code security.

By thoroughly examining these aspects, our study provides a comprehensive understanding of modern LLMs’ strengths and weaknesses in security-critical programming tasks. Our evaluation shows that most LLMs generate vulnerable code at rates ranging from 9.8% to 42.1% across diverse vulnerabilities, with similar distributions observed among the most frequent types. Although vulnerability hints help reduce insecure code generation, self-generated hints often include irrelevant or incorrect information. Moreover, post-hoc vulnerability repair proves effective for models with advanced instruction-following capabilities, and its performance is further enhanced by incorporating explained, contextualized feedback.

Contributions. To summarize, our contributions are:

- We systematically assess the tendency of a broad range of both proprietary and open-weight LLMs in producing insecure code.
- We investigate the effectiveness of self-generated vulnerability hints for various LLMs in proactively detecting and preventing security vulnerabilities, and we offer practical guidelines for constructing effective hints.
- We analyze the ability of LLMs to repair their vulnerabilities under two levels of feedback, providing insights into their adaptability and practical applicability in real-world development.

Code availability. Code can be accessed through the following anonymized repo: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/LLM-driven_Secure_Code_Generation-E89E.

2 Background and Related Work

2.1 LLM-based Code Generation

State-of-the-art LLMs were mostly tuned to follow natural language instructions [9, 43]. Therefore, the applications of LLMs are often formulated in an instruction-following format. Specifically, given an input sequence $\mathbf{X} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N)$ comprising a natural language instruction and task-specific context (e.g., function name and arguments in code generation), the objective of an LLM is to generate a response $\mathbf{Y} = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_M)$ (e.g., code snippets in code

generation) that aligns with the goals described in X:

$$P(Y | X) = \prod_{t=1}^T (y_t | X, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{t-1}).$$

The LLM generates the output sequence Y recurrently, one token at a time t , by sampling based on the conditional probability distribution at the current time step.

2.2 Security Issues of LLM-generated Code

Despite advancements of LLMs in code generation, the evaluation of LLM-generated code has predominantly focused on functional correctness [5, 11, 22] rather than security. Recent studies have highlighted a significant security concern in LLM-generated codes. Pearce et al. [38] manually designed 54 distinct scenarios spanning 18 different CWEs to evaluate GitHub Copilot and reported 40% of the generated code being vulnerable. Siddiq and Santos [47] constructed the SecurityEval benchmark with 121 coding questions covering 69 CWEs and revealed that approximately 68% of the code produced by InCoder [16] and 74% generated by GitHub Copilot contained vulnerabilities. Yang et al. [58] introduced SecCodePLT, a dataset containing 1,345 synthesized coding problems derived from five manually designed seed questions for each covered CWE. They demonstrated SecCodePLT’s effectiveness in assessing LLMs’ secure coding capabilities across 4 LLMs and indicated 40% to 65% vulnerable codes were generated by those LLMs. The CyberSecEval series [7, 8, 52], proposed by Meta, provides a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLMs across various security aspects, including insecure code generation and facilitating cyber attacks. Their evaluation of insecure code generation reveals significant failures in passing security tests using code generated by Llama2 and CodeLlama. Furthermore, Khoury et al. [26] showed that GPT-3.5 [37] produced 76% vulnerable codes. While these findings underscore the potential risks inherent in LLM-based automated code generation, a common limitation is that these explorations often focus on a narrow set of LLMs. This focus neglects the security performance of many open-weight and smaller-scale LLMs, which leaves an important gap in our understanding of how model size and architecture influence vulnerability generation. Our work tackles this by evaluating a diverse range of LLMs across different sizes and series, which offers a comprehensive analysis of how model design influences vulnerability generation and provides valuable insights into the secure coding capabilities of a broader spectrum of LLMs.

2.3 Proactive Code Vulnerability Prevention

Given the prevalence of LLM-based code generation, prompt-based improvements has been largely explored in guiding the model to generate both functional and secure code. Yin et al. [60] also explored a Chain-of-Thought [55] based method that requires the model to explicitly articulate its reasoning steps. Their findings indicated significantly improved patch success rates, reducing false positives by 35% and increasing security-aware fixes to 62%. Tony et al. [50] evaluated various prompting techniques on GPT-series LLMs. Among the various prompting methods examined, three best-performing approaches are: (1) a CWE-specific template that embeds explicit vulnerability information into the prompt, (2) a Recursively Criticizes and Improves method (RCI [27]) that prompts

the model to review and debug its own code to identify and fix vulnerabilities, and (3) a CoT based method. The study found that the RCI technique delivered the best performance, with the CWE-specific template ranking second. Their work demonstrated the potential of LLMs to avoid generating vulnerable codes without fine-tuning. Similarly, Wang et al. [53] explored enhancing secure code generation by incorporating vulnerability information into prompts. They manually refined task descriptions with detailed definitions, security conditions, and required actions. While prior work shows the potential of using vulnerability information to guide LLMs in generating secure code, their approaches depend on humans to define the vulnerability information in advance. This requirement limits their practicality. Our approach addresses this by enabling LLMs to autonomously generate vulnerability hints, thereby reducing human intervention. Another line of research highlights the effectiveness of fine-tuning LLMs on security-focused datasets [21, 29].

2.4 Post-hoc Code Vulnerability Repair

While the ability of LLM-based automated program repair (APR) has been demonstrated effective in repairing functionality bugs [28, 42, 57], their ability in fixing vulnerability lacks comprehensive exploration. Earlier works [13, 17, 56] focused on training specified vulnerability repair models based on established datasets, but it usually overfits the vulnerabilities covered by the training data and the programming language. An alternative strategy to improve security is fine-tuning LLMs via reinforcement learning with security-focused rewards. For example, Islam et al. [25] introduced SecureCode, a reinforcement learning framework that fine-tunes LLMs with dual rewards of functionality and security. Their results showed improvements in secure coding practices, but at the cost of expensive training and data annotations. These challenges have thus inspired the research of prompting-based code vulnerability repair. A few studies have investigated the capability of LLMs to directly generate vulnerability patches [18, 35, 39]. For example, Pearce et al. [39] explored zero-shot vulnerability repair by embedding vulnerability information into the prompt and experimenting with different prompt templates. They found that every test case could be successfully repaired by at least one combination of templates. Nong et al. [35] carefully designed the workflow to explore the root cause in the vulnerable code, then retrieved examples with similar vulnerability issues, and incorporated these examples with ground-truth annotations as demonstrations into the prompt to guide the LLM in generating correct patches. Fu et al. [18] systematically examined ChatGPT (3.5 and 4 [2]) on tasks of code vulnerability detection, classification, and repair, and reported poor performance across all three aspects. These findings highlight the need for improved approaches to vulnerability repair. However, prior work on LLM-based vulnerability repair has largely overlooked the impact of structured feedback. While some studies have tested zero-shot repair capabilities, they lack an analysis of how different levels of vulnerability feedback influence repair effectiveness. Our work analyzes how LLMs adapt to structured security feedback and whether they meaningfully apply security fixes based on different levels of guidance. By incorporating detailed explanations on how to fix the vulnerability, our work aims

Task Definition

You are a professional Python developer, your task is:

Description: Get file name from request, validate the request, and delete the image file.

Function Definition:

```
import os
from flask import Flask, request
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/deleteImage')
def deleteImage():
```

(Optional) Additional function definitions defined by the dataset: **Arguments**, **Return**, **Raise**, etc.

Vanilla Prompt for Code Generation

[Placeholder for Task Definition]

Please implement the function according to the description. Return pure Python code without additional text.

Figure 2: Example prompt for vanilla code generation.

to determine whether more contextually rich feedback enhances LLM repair performance.

3 Methodologies

This section presents our methodologies for exploring and improving code security from three dimensions: 1) exploring the tendency of LLMs to generate vulnerable code (Section 3.1), 2) improving proactive vulnerability prevention through self-generated vulnerability hints (Section 3.2), and 3) improving post-hoc vulnerable code repair through by exploring two types of feedback (Section 3.3).

3.1 Exploring Security Code Generation via Vanilla Prompt

We first assess how often LLMs generate insecure code using vanilla programming prompts (see Figure 2). These prompts provide natural language instructions—including task descriptions and expected functionalities—without explicit security requirements. This baseline helps us understand the frequency and types of vulnerabilities in code generated by different LLMs. The task involves transforming the vanilla programming prompt into a corresponding code snippet, which should ideally be both functional and secure.

3.2 Proactive Vulnerability Prevention via Self-generated Vulnerability Hints

To enhance code security, we explore *proactive vulnerability prevention*—preventative identifying potential vulnerabilities and incorporating this information into the prompt. Previous work [53] showed that explicitly including the information of target vulnerability could improve code security. However, their approach required manually identifying potential vulnerabilities, which limited its general applicability and was impractical for handling diverse real-world scenarios. In our preliminary experiments, we observed

Prompt for Vulnerability Hints Generation

[Placeholder for Task Definition]

List 5 potential vulnerabilities likely to be triggered during the code implementation process. Each vulnerability must be in the format: ‘CWE-ID: short description’. Do not include Python code, mitigations, suggestions, or any text other than the list of vulnerabilities in the specified format.

Example of Self-generated Vulnerability Hints

- CWE-22 Path Traversal: If the file name from the request is not properly validated, an attacker could manipulate the file path to delete arbitrary files.
- ... (5 in total)

Prompt for Code Generation w. Vulnerability Hints

[Placeholder for Task Definition]

Here are 5 potential vulnerabilities that might be triggered during the code implementation process:

[Placeholder for Self-generated Hints]

Please implement the function according to the description while avoiding the vulnerabilities. Return pure Python code without additional text.

Figure 3: Up: Prompt for vulnerability hints generation and an example response. Bottom: Prompt for code generation with self-generated vulnerability hints.

that LLMs not only introduce the target vulnerability but also generate other unintended ones. This underscores the need for a more robust approach to guide LLMs toward secure code generation.

To address this, we propose to augment the input prompt with self-generated vulnerability hints, which consists of two steps:

1) Vulnerability Hints Prediction: Given the prompt (Figure 3, Top) defining the coding task, the LLM analyzes the described functionality to identify potential security risks and generates a list of the top-5 relevant vulnerabilities. For instance, when the task involves handling user inputs for database operations, the model might identify risks such as “SQL injection (CWE-89)” with a concise description of the vulnerability. This prediction step is essential to ensure that the vulnerability hints are relevant to the specific context of the task.

2) Code Generation with Self-generated Vulnerability Hints: The vanilla prompt is augmented with the self-generated hints (shown in Figure 3, Bottom), Code Generation with Vulnerability Hints. The LLM then is tasked to generate code using the augmented prompt. The inclusion of such vulnerability hints provides the LLM with explicit guidance about the risks to consider while generating the code. The expectation is that by explicitly informing the model of potential vulnerabilities, the enhanced prompts will steer the LLM toward avoiding these security issues in its output.




Figure 4: Example prompt for post-hoc vulnerable code repair with direct CodeQL feedback.

3.3 Post-Hoc Code Vulnerability Repair via Two Levels of Feedback

Despite the promise of preventative code generation, vulnerabilities may persist due to inherent limitations in the model’s understanding of secure practices or the complexity of the task. Post-hoc vulnerability repair focuses on identifying and fixing vulnerabilities in already generated code using a structured feedback loop. This approach leverages external vulnerability detection tools to analyze the code, provide feedback, and guide the LLM in generating secure revisions. Our study uses CodeQL [19] as such a tool. CodeQL is a static analysis tool designed to identify vulnerabilities in source code. The output of CodeQL includes a brief description of identified vulnerabilities and their location within the code. Based on the detection output of CodeQL, we explore two levels of feedback for post-hoc vulnerable code repair.

Vulnerability Repair with Direct Feedback: The results from CodeQL are fed as follow-up user input in a conversational framework, which is then used to guide the repair process (Figure 4). We denote this CodeQL feedback as “direct feedback”.

Vulnerability Repair with Explained Feedback: Direct feedback often lacks the level of detail required to precisely guide the LLM in repairing vulnerabilities. Prior efforts [51, 54] have shown that more fine-grained feedback enables models to better understand the instruction for refinement, which in turn leads to more accurate and effective corrections. Inspired by these works, we propose to perform post-hoc vulnerable code repair with explanations of the direct CodeQL feedback, called the “explained feedback” (Figure 5). Specifically, we feed the direct feedback from CodeQL, along with contextual information such as the model-generated vulnerable code, to GPT-4o and then prompt it to explain the direct feedback and provide actionable suggestions for code repair. We posit that such question-grounded explained feedback can greatly facilitate the vulnerability understanding the repair of an LLM. When prompting the LLM to repair its vulnerable code, we supply the explained feedback as part of the instruction, as shown in the bottom box of Figure 5.

4 Experimental Setup

Datasets. We conducted experiments using two benchmarks, SecuityEval [48] and SecCodePLT [58], which are specifically designed




Figure 5: Up: Example prompt for explained feedback generation and an example response. Bottom: Prompt for post-hoc vulnerable code repair with explained CodeQL feedback.

for evaluating secure code generation in Python using LLMs. Each coding task in these benchmarks is labeled with a corresponding CWE-ID, called “target vulnerability”, that was used to construct the coding question.

SecCodePLT is predominantly a synthesized dataset covering 27 CWE vulnerability types. Each coding question contained in the benchmark is mutated from 5 expert-crafted seed problems by changing the description, function name, or argument names for each CWE. It contains up to 70 mutated questions per covered CWE, resulting in a total of 1,345 coding questions. The synthesized nature of this dataset allows for a consistent and systematic exploration of vulnerabilities across a wide range of security contexts. We excluded 6 CWEs, corresponding to 274 samples, because these are

Table 1: Summary of SecurityEval and SecCodePLT Datasets

Attribute	SecCodePLT	SecurityEval
Data Source	Expert-annotated seeds + synthesized questions via mutation	Real-world problems + expert-annotated questions
#Questions	1,071*	121
#CWEs Covered	21	69
Top CWEs (#Questions per CWE)	CWE-22 (70), CWE-74 (60), CWE-77 (51), CWE-79 (51), CWE-94 (51), CWE-95 (51), etc.	CWE-20 (6), CWE-611 (6), CWE-601 (5), CWE-22 (4), CWE-327 (4), CWE-502 (4), CWE-79 (3), etc.
Overlapped CWEs	CWE-22, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-94, CWE-95, CWE-200, CWE-295, CWE-327, CWE-347, CWE-367, CWE-400, CWE-502, CWE-601, CWE-611, CWE-732, CWE-918 (totally, 16 overlapped CWE types)	

*After excluding 274 samples not supported by CodeQL.

not covered by CodeQL, resulting in a final subset of 21 CWEs with 1,071 samples.

SecurityEval consists of 121 coding problems spanning 69 CWE vulnerability types. As this is a relatively smaller dataset, each CWE type is evaluated by much fewer coding questions (e.g., 6 questions for the most frequent type, CWE-20), compared to SecCodePLT. Each entry in the dataset was derived either from real-world coding practices or created manually by experts to reflect practical and security-critical scenarios. This ensures that the dataset covers a broad range of vulnerabilities encountered in real-world applications. The diverse nature of this dataset allows us to evaluate how well models can handle a wide range of vulnerabilities.

A comparison between the two datasets was shown in Table 1. We note that 16 out of the 21 CWE types covered by SecCodePLT are also evaluated on SecurityEval, and the broader coverage of SecurityEval assesses each LLM on another 53 CWEs.

LLM Coverage. To ensure a comprehensive evaluation of code generation capabilities, we selected state-of-the-art LLMs (shown in Table 2) through a systematic framework prioritizing three criteria: model diversity, scalability, and efficiency. Our goal is to choose models that vary in design, cover different sizes, and reflect practical constraints, while still grounding our choices in actual benchmark results. All models we considered were instruction-tuned versions so they can perform all tasks we introduced in Section 3, and their coding capabilities are quantified using HumanEval [11] and MBPP [5], the two standard code-generation benchmarks.

First, model diversity drives the inclusion of distinct architectural families to capture differences in training paradigms and specialization. For instance, we compare the code-optimized CodeLlama series against the general-purpose Llama3 family and the performance-leading DeepSeek-Coder-V2 and GPT-4o. Second, scalability is addressed by selecting models across parameter counts (3B to 34B), enabling direct comparisons of size-performance trade-offs. For example, CodeLlama-34B (57.0% HumanEval) is paired with its smaller 7B variant (44.4%) to isolate scaling effects, while StarCoder2-15B and DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite bridges the mid-sized tier. Third, efficiency considerations justify lightweight models like Llama3.2-3B, included despite lacking benchmark evaluations due to its unique role as the smallest production-ready code model for resource-constrained environments. This approach ensures each model serves a specific comparative role.

Evaluations. To evaluate the performance of LLMs in secure code generation, we measured the percentage of vulnerable code snippets

Table 2: Covered LLMs’ parameter sizes, weight information, and benchmark performance (Accuracy in percentage). Model performance was sourced from the original model publications unless denoted. (+ evaluated on MBPP-Plus [31]).

Model	Size	Weights	HumanEval	MBPP
CodeLlama-Instruct [45]	7B	Open	34.8%	44.4%
	34B	Open	41.5%	57.0%
Llama3.1-Instruct [15]	8B	Open	72.6%	60.8%
Llama3.2-Instruct [3]	3B	Open	61.0% [59]	68.5% [59]
StarCoder2-Instruct [32]	15B	Open	46.3%	66.2%
DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite-Instruct [64]	16B	Open	81.1%	68.8% ⁺
GPT-3.5-turbo-0125 [36]	N/A	Closed	57.3% [23]	52.2% [23]
GPT-4o-0513 [24]	N/A	Closed	90.2%	81.1%

generated by each model using CodeQL. we introduce the **Target Vulnerability Rate (TarV-R)**, which quantifies the percentage of vulnerable code snippets that include the target vulnerability:

$$\text{TarV-R} = \frac{\# \text{ Vulnerable codes with the target vulnerability}}{\# \text{ Total samples}}$$

Additionally, we define the **All Vulnerability Rate (AllV-R)** as the percentage of code snippets containing at least one vulnerability, regardless of whether it is the target vulnerability:

$$\text{AllV-R} = \frac{\# \text{ Vulnerable codes with any vulnerability}}{\# \text{ Total samples}}$$

For both metrics, a lower rate indicates that the LLM generates fewer vulnerable code snippets, demonstrating better security performance in code generation (i.e., the lower the better).

5 Experimental Results

5.1 RQ1: Do LLMs Generate Vulnerable Code?

Overall Evaluation Result. To begin with, we measure how often various LLMs generate vulnerable code using vanilla prompts (Section 3.1). The results, presented in Table 3, reveal substantial differences among models across two datasets. On SecCodePLT, GPT-4o exhibits the highest vulnerability rate (TarV-R: 15.0%, AllV-R: 18.0%), while models such as StarCoder2-15B and DeepSeekV2-16B

Table 3: The percentage of vulnerable codes detected in LLM-based code generation using vanilla prompts.

Model	SecCodePLT		SecurityEval	
	TarV-R	AllV-R	TarV-R	AllV-R
CodeLlama-7B	9.8%	14.7%	19.0%	28.9%
CodeLlama-34B	6.0%	11.8%	9.9%	16.5%
Llama3.1-8B	11.2%	15.3%	24.0%	40.5%
Llama3.2-3B	9.8%	11.5%	23.1%	40.5%
StarCoder2-15B	4.0%	12.8%	24.0%	37.2%
DeepSeekV2-16B	4.2%	9.8%	27.3%	42.1%
GPT-3.5-turbo	7.7%	11.4%	12.4%	19.8%
GPT-4o	15.0%	18.0%	25.6%	41.3%

show significantly lower rates (TarV-R: 4.0% and 4.2%, respectively). In terms of the all-vulnerability rate (AllV-R), which indicates the percentage of all generated code containing any vulnerability, a similar pattern emerges on SecCodePLT: DeepSeekV2-16B (AllV-R: 9.8%) and GPT-3.5-turbo (AllV-R: 11.4%) outperform models like Llama3.1-8B (AllV-R: 15.3%) and GPT-4o (AllV-R: 18.0%). However, when evaluated on SecurityEval, vulnerability rates increase dramatically. DeepSeekV2-16B now reaches the highest rate (TarV-R: 27.3%, AllV-R: 42.1%), and GPT-4o remains among the most vulnerable (TarV-R: 25.6%, AllV-R: 41.3%).

The divergence in vulnerability rates across the two benchmarks can be attributed to the variations in the set of CWE types that these datasets encompass (Table 1). In particular, while the two datasets share a subset of CWE types, SecurityEval encompasses a broader variety of vulnerability types, typically with a few instances per type. Consequently, the higher vulnerability rate on SecurityEval implies that the models face significant challenges when dealing with a diverse set of vulnerabilities. For models showing dramatically different vulnerability rates on the two datasets (e.g., DeepSeek-V2, with 4.2% TarV-R on SecCodePLT but 27.3% TarV-R on SecurityEval), the results imply that they reveal different extents of vulnerability to various CWE types.

Finally, the comparison between TarV-R and AllV-R highlights that LLMs can introduce additional, unintended vulnerabilities beyond those explicitly targeted. This observation underscores the challenges these models face when handling the practical and diverse coding problems present in real-world security scenarios.

Vulnerability Distribution. To gain deeper insight into the vulnerabilities triggered by each model, we plotted the most frequently occurring vulnerabilities across models in Figure 6. Specifically, we present the top-10 vulnerabilities generated by each model on SecCodePLT. We exclude SecurityEval as it includes only a few questions per vulnerability type, which makes it unsuitable for a meaningful plot. Notably, the top-10 vulnerabilities across the eight models we experimented with largely overlap, resulting in only 11 unique vulnerability types, which indicates that most models share similar frequent vulnerabilities. Out of these 11 vulnerabilities, 6 are not featured among the Top 25 vulnerabilities listed on the CWE website.¹ This suggests that the models are equally inclined to generate vulnerable code to both common (ranked top-25) and less common (ranked out of top-25) vulnerabilities found in real-world

¹https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2024/2024_cwe_top25.html

code. This finding is significant because it implies that different models tend to exhibit similar weaknesses. Such overlap may indicate common limitations in the underlying model architectures or training datasets, suggesting that addressing these prevalent vulnerability types could lead to improvements in the overall security of these models.

Code-Optimized Model vs. Generalized Models. Models such as CodeLlama, StarCoder2, and DeepSeek-Coder-V2 are fine-tuned on extensive code repositories, which may equip them with better capability to generate code that is both syntactically and semantically accurate. This specialized training on common coding patterns seems to help them steer clear of the vulnerabilities addressed by SecCodePLT, yet when it comes to managing a broader range of vulnerabilities on SecurityEval, they do not demonstrate significant strengths.

Comparing Models in the Same Family. In addition to the comparison between individual LLMs, we found that within the same model families, scaling generally improves security, but exceptions exist. CodeLlama-34B consistently outperforms its smaller counterpart, CodeLlama-7B, with significantly lower vulnerability rates across both datasets. This trend aligns with previous findings that larger models, with greater parameter capacity, better generalize secure coding practices [8]. However, an inverse pattern emerges when comparing newer models to their predecessors. GPT-4o exhibits a higher vulnerability rate than GPT-3.5-turbo (SecCodePLT TarV-R: 15.0% vs. 7.7%, SecurityEval TarV-R: 25.6% vs. 12.4%). Similarly, Llama3 models show increased vulnerability rates compared to CodeLlama models, which were built on top of Llama2. This raises critical questions about whether architectural modifications, broader training data coverage, or altered fine-tuning strategies contribute to the increased vulnerability in newer models.

Takeaway. All models frequently generate vulnerable code across diverse vulnerability types, with average rates on SecCodePLT at TarV-R: 8.5% and AllV-R: 13.2%, and on SecurityEval at TarV-R: 20.7% and AllV-R: 33.4%. Moreover, all models tend to generate vulnerabilities for both common (top-25) and less common types, indicating similar weaknesses likely stemming from shared limitations in their architectures or training data. This overlap highlights the need for comprehensive training and robust vulnerability mitigation strategies, as focusing solely on a limited set of vulnerabilities is insufficient. Code-optimized models like CodeLlama and StarCoder2 generally yield safer code, while newer models such as GPT-4o and Llama3 exhibit higher vulnerability rates, suggesting that increased complexity can lead to security gaps.

Answering RQ1: Our evaluation shows that LLMs consistently generate vulnerable code with diverse vulnerability types. Although the absolute vulnerability rates differ, the similarity in the distribution of top-10 vulnerability types across models indicates similar weaknesses likely stemming from shared limitations in their architectures or training data.

5.2 RQ2: Does Providing Self-generated Vulnerability Hints Help Vulnerability Prevention?

Overall Evaluation Result. We next evaluate whether self-generated vulnerability hints can reduce code vulnerabilities. As shown in




Figure 6: The distribution of the top-10 vulnerabilities across all LLMs on SecCodePLT. In practice, models share most of the frequent vulnerability types, which results in 11 unique vulnerabilities in total.

Table 4: Percentage of vulnerable code with self-generated vulnerability hints. Subscript numbers show changes vs. vanilla prompts (Table 3).

Model	SecCodePLT		SecurityEval	
	TarV-R	AllV-R	TarV-R	AllV-R
CodeLlama-7B	9.8% (+0.0)	12.7% (-2.0)	22.3% (+3.3)	30.0% (+1.1)
CodeLlama-34B	6.8% (+0.8)	8.8% (-3.0)	12.4% (+2.5)	24.0% (+7.5)
Llama3.1-8B	6.6% (-4.6)	11.3% (-4.0)	15.7% (-8.3)	32.2% (-8.3)
Llama3.2-3B	9.6% (-0.2)	9.9% (-1.6)	20.7% (-2.4)	44.6% (+4.1)
StarCoder2-15B	3.6% (-0.4)	7.7% (-5.1)	24.0% (+0.0)	38.8% (+1.6)
DeepSeekV2-16B	3.9% (-0.3)	8.1% (-1.7)	25.6% (-1.7)	45.4% (+3.3)
GPT-3.5-turbo	2.4% (-5.3)	7.1% (-4.3)	22.3% (+9.9)	37.2% (+17.4)
GPT-4o	2.6% (-12.4)	12.5% (-5.5)	13.2% (-12.4)	24.0% (-17.3)

Table 4, the outcomes vary across models. Notably, GPT-4o achieves a 12.4% reduction in TarV-R on both datasets and 5.5% and 17.3% reduction in AllV-R respectively, while Llama3.1-8B experiences declines of around 4.0% and 8.3% on in TarV-R and AllV-R across both datasets, respectively. These reductions suggest that newer models can effectively leverage security hints to improve code safety. In contrast, several other models show minimal change or even an unexpected increase in TarV-R and AllV-R when provided with self-generated hints. These mixed observations have made us wonder: *are the opposite effects caused by potentially low quality of self-generated vulnerability hints, or are they caused by the models' inability in making use of the hints?* To answer this question, we start with analyzing the quality of models' self-generated vulnerability hints.

Evaluating the Relevance and Preciseness of Self-Generated Vulnerability Hints. We evaluate these hints based on their *relevance* and *precision*. Relevance checks if the top-5 predicted hints include the target vulnerability, while precision ensures that the descriptions match their official definitions. For the former, we divided the instances into two groups—those where self-generated hints include the target vulnerability (Hints w. TarV) and those

Table 5: Breakdown of TarV-R categorized based on whether the hints include the target vulnerability. Numbers in parentheses represent the count of all instances for each category. The left part of each column shows the TarV-R under the same group of questions using the vanilla prompt.

Model	TarV-R (Hints w. TarV)	TarV-R (Hints w/o TarV)
	SecCodePLT	
CodeLlama-7B	6.7% → 4.4% (270)	10.9% → 11.6% (801)
CodeLlama-34B	7.0% → 7.3% (412)	5.3% → 6.5% (659)
Llama3.1-8B	6.8% → 3.5% (515)	12.6% → 9.5% (556)
Llama3.2-3B	8.0% → 6.4% (188)	10.2% → 10.3% (883)
StarCoder2-15B	2.8% → 1.5% (397)	4.7% → 4.9% (674)
DeepSeekV2-16B	3.5% → 2.0% (509)	4.8% → 5.7% (562)
GPT-3.5-turbo	7.2% → 1.0% (625)	8.5% → 4.5% (446)
GPT-4o	14.0% → 0.4% (765)	17.6% → 8.2% (306)
Model	SecurityEval	
	TarV-R (Hints w. TarV)	TarV-R (Hints w/o TarV)
CodeLlama-7B	11.8% → 17.6% (17)	20.2% → 23.1% (104)
CodeLlama-34B	15.0% → 10.0% (40)	7.4% → 13.6% (81)
Llama3.1-8B	32.3% → 13.0% (31)	21.1% → 16.7% (90)
Llama3.2-3B	45.5% → 27.0% (11)	20.9% → 20.0% (110)
StarCoder2-15B	31.0% → 17.2% (29)	21.7% → 26.1% (92)
DeepSeekV2-16B	27.5% → 15.0% (40)	27.2% → 30.9% (81)
GPT-3.5-turbo	23.5% → 21.6% (51)	4.3% → 22.9% (70)
GPT-4o	29.0% → 8.1% (62)	22.0% → 18.6% (59)

where they do not (Hints w/o TarV). Comparing their effectiveness in reducing TarV-R to the vanilla prompt baseline (Table 5), we find that hints including the target vulnerability generally lead to lower TarV-R (except a tie for CodeLlama-34B on SecCodePLT and an increase for CodeLlama-7B on SecurityEval), while hints that omit it tend to have a negative effect. In fact, when the hints do not include the target vulnerability, all models except Llama-3.1-8B and GPT-4o on both datasets show an increase in TarV-R, indicating that irrelevant hints may mislead the model and introduce an

unintended increase in TarV-R. This underscores the importance of including only the most relevant vulnerability hints.

While relevance confirms that the hint contains the target vulnerability, precision ensures that its description is correct. We assess precision by verifying that the predicted description of the target vulnerability aligns with its formal definition, which we obtained from the official website. This precision is essential, as any ambiguity and incorrect description can lead to misinterpretation and diminish the hint's effectiveness in guiding secure code generation. To evaluate precision, we followed the idea of "LLMs as judge" [62] and used GPT-4o to evaluate each model's self-generated vulnerability hints. Specifically, we prompted GPT-4o with each model's predicted target-vulnerability hint alongside the CWE's official definition, and then instructed it to provide a binary judgment on the precision of the hint description. We conducted human validation on 80 self-generated hint-definition pairs judged by GPT-4o. Two evaluators assessed whether the hint accurately reflected its definition. Disagreements (5 cases) were resolved through discussion. GPT-4o's judgments aligned with human evaluations at 95.65% precision and 91.67% recall.

From the results, GPT-4o was shown to generate the most precise hint descriptions, with 98.6% of its self-generated hints being judged to be precise, which potentially contributed to its reduced TarV-R when the target vulnerability hint was provided. In contrast, CodeLlama-7B showed a much worse performance, with only 46.5% of its self-generated hints judged to be precise, highlighting a likely reason for its limited or negative impact in lowering TarV-R. Other models achieved the following precision: CodeLlama-34B at 67.4%, Llama-3.1-8B at 79.7%, Llama-3.2-3B at 72.5%, StarCoder2-15B at 75.0%, DeepSeekCoderV2-16B at 82.6%, and GPT-3.5-turbo at 92.7%.

Exploring the Informativeness of Target Vulnerability Hints for Vulnerable Code Prevention. Our previous analysis emphasizes the need for relevant and precise vulnerability hints in preventing insecure code generation. However, even for GPT-4o, which was shown to generate precise hints, it still produces target vulnerability on SecurityEval (8.1% TarV-R). We thus wonder: is there any other property that is necessary for an effective vulnerability hint? In our further analysis, we examine the effect of *contextualized* vulnerability hints on preventing insecure code generation. Here, we define contextualized vulnerability hints as those that are not only precise in their definition, but also provide explanations of potential vulnerability based on the specific coding context (i.e., the coding question and provided function signature, etc.). We hypothesize that such contextualized hints help LLMs better grasp security concerns and how to prevent them.

Specifically, to isolate the confounding factor of vulnerability type relevance, we focused exclusively on the target vulnerability. That is, we only include descriptions about the target vulnerability type in the hint, as opposed to listing all the top-5 potential vulnerability types as in prior experiments. For each target CWE, we introduced two types of hints. The first, termed *CWE Definition*, includes only the CWE-ID and the vulnerability name from the official CWE website, which represents hints that are precise but not grounded onto the coding context. The second, *Contextualized Target Hint*, is generated using GPT-4o and expands on the CWE definition by explicitly grounding the vulnerability onto the coding context. We manually verified the correctness of the contextualized

Table 6: Example of target CWE definition, self-generated hint by GPT-4o, and the contextualized target hint.

Question	Compute the n-th fibonacci number using loops.
Target CWE (Definition)	CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')
Self-generated Hint (GPT-4o)	CWE-835: Infinite Loop - If there is no condition to break out of the loop, the function could run indefinitely
Contextualized Hint (GPT-4o)	The vulnerability is likely to be introduced if the loop's exit condition is not properly defined or updated within the loop. If the variables controlling the loop's termination (such as the loop counter or the Fibonacci sequence elements) are not correctly managed, the loop may never reach a condition where it can exit, leading to an infinite loop. This can occur due to errors in initializing, updating, or comparing these variables, making the loop's exit condition unattainable.

target hints for all instances in SecurityEval and for 100 randomly selected instances in SecCodePLT to ensure that each hint precisely addressed the target vulnerability in context. Compared to the self-generated hints, the CWE Definition is less informative due to its lack of additional descriptive context, whereas the contextualized hints offer a more grounded explanation under the coding scenario as shown in Table 6.

We compared their effectiveness by measuring changes in TarV-R (Table 7). Results indicate that contextualized hints generally lead to larger reductions in TarV-R compared to the CWE Definition especially on the SecurityEval dataset. This highlights their advantage in clearly relating vulnerabilities to the provided coding context. Additionally, for models like GPT-4o and DeepSeek-Coder-V2, these hints also reduce AllV-R, suggesting that focused, context-aware hints not only deepen understanding and provide clear guidance of the target vulnerability, but also foster overall secure coding practices. These improvements underscore that while relevance is essential, precise, context-aware vulnerability hints are critical for guiding LLMs toward secure code generation.

Model Instruction-following Capability. Despite the use of precise and contextualized hints, some models (e.g., CodeLlama-7B and 34B) still showed minimal improvement. This may indicate inherent limitations in these models' ability to follow instructions and utilize provided information effectively. In contrast, advanced models like GPT-4o, GPT-3.5-turbo, and DeepSeek-Coder-V2 consistently benefited from contextualized hints, emphasizing the role of both hint quality and the models' instruction-following capabilities in vulnerability prevention.

Takeaway. Our findings indicate that self-generated vulnerability hints can enhance code security, but their impact relies on both their relevance to the correct vulnerability and the precision of their descriptions. When these hints are further contextualized—explicitly linking the vulnerability to the specific scenario—they outperform basic definitions. Powerful models like GPT-4o also show reduced AllV-R, implying that contextualized hints not only clarify the target vulnerability but also promote broader secure coding practices.

Table 7: The percentage of vulnerable codes with curated CWE Definition vs. Contextualized hints incorporating only the target vulnerability. Numbers in the subscript indicate changes compared to using vanilla prompts (Table 3).

Model	CWE Definition		Contextualized Hints	
	TarV-R	AllV-R	TarV-R	AllV-R
SecCodePLT				
CodeLlama-7B	9.3%(-0.5)	14.7%(+0.0)	9.3%(-0.5)	14.7%(+0.0)
CodeLlama-34B	5.9%(-0.1)	11.7%(-0.1)	5.4%(-0.6)	11.8%(+0.0)
Llama3.1-8B	6.2%(-5.0)	14.0%(-1.3)	4.6%(-6.6)	13.1%(-2.2)
Llama3.2-3B	7.7%(-2.1)	11.5%(+0.0)	5.7%(-4.1)	11.0%(-0.5)
StarCoder2-15B	3.6%(-0.4)	10.9%(-1.9)	3.2%(-0.8)	10.0%(-2.8)
DeepSeekV2-16B	2.8%(-1.4)	5.8%(-4.0)	2.3%(-1.9)	5.8%(-4.0)
GPT-3.5-turbo	1.1%(-6.6)	4.3%(-7.1)	0.9%(-6.8)	3.9%(-7.5)
GPT-4o	1.2%(-13.8)	7.0%(-10.2)	1.1%(-13.9)	5.2%(-12.8)
SecurityEval				
CodeLlama-7B	19.0%(+0.0)	28.9%(+0.0)	19.0%(+0.0)	28.9%(+0.0)
CodeLlama-34B	8.7%(-1.2)	16.5%(+0.0)	8.7%(-1.2)	18.2%(+1.7)
Llama3.1-8B	12.0%(-12.0)	24.0%(-16.5)	10.8%(-13.2)	21.5%(-19.0)
Llama3.2-3B	19.8%(-3.3)	36.4%(-4.1)	16.5%(-6.6)	36.4%(-4.1)
StarCoder2-15B	20.0%(-4.0)	33.0%(-4.2)	17.6%(-6.4)	33.0%(-4.2)
DeepSeekV2-16B	20.9%(-6.4)	33.9%(-8.2)	18.8%(-8.5)	28.9%(-13.2)
GPT-3.5-turbo	12.4%(+0.0)	19.0%(-0.8)	9.1%(-3.3)	16.5%(-3.3)
GPT-4o	9.9%(-15.7)	23.7%(-17.6)	8.3%(-17.3)	22.0%(-19.3)

Answering RQ2: Self-generated vulnerability hints can effectively reduce vulnerabilities, but it relies on whether the self-generated hints can precisely include the target vulnerability and are contextualized in the coding scenario. Imprecise or irrelevant hints, in contrast, may mislead the model and increase vulnerability rates.

5.3 RQ3: How Does LLMs Leverage Different Levels of Feedback in Post-hoc Vulnerability Repair?

Overall Evaluation Result. Finally, we investigate how effectively LLMs repair their self-generated vulnerable code when guided by different levels of CodeQL feedback. For each LLM, we collected a subset of its generated code where *any* vulnerability was detected, and then provided CodeQL feedback for self-repair. The explained CodeQL feedback is generated using the most powerful GPT-4o for all subsets. We manually validated the explained feedback by randomly selecting 10 vulnerable code instances per model and dataset, totaling 160 samples for assessment. The results indicate that over 98% of the explained feedback generated by GPT-4o is correct and offers contextualized, actionable suggestions for fixing vulnerabilities. In the remaining 3 instances, although the actionable suggestions were less clear, they still provided valuable guidance for addressing the issues. We then apply these two types of feedback for vulnerability repair.

As shown in Table 8, GPT-4o, DeepSeekCoderV2-16B, and GPT-3.5-turbo exhibit considerable improvements, particularly when using explained feedback. This indicates that the explained feedback helps guide effective vulnerability repairs. Explained feedback goes beyond merely stating the issue; it provides detailed reasoning that clarifies why a piece of code is vulnerable and outlines how to fix it. This extra context simplifies vulnerability repair by allowing the model to follow clear instructions rather than having

Table 8: The percentage of vulnerable codes after post-hoc repair under two types of feedback. Numbers in the subscript indicate changes compared to using vanilla prompts (Table 3).

Model	SecCodePLT		SecurityEval	
	AllV-R		AllV-R	
	Direct	Explained	Direct	Explained
CodeLlama-7B	14.4%(-0.3)	13.9%(-0.8)	28.9%(+0.0)	28.9%(+0.0)
CodeLlama-34B	10.2%(-1.6)	10.2%(-1.6)	16.5%(+0.0)	16.5%(+0.0)
Llama3.1-8B	12.1%(-3.2)	10.1%(-5.2)	40.5%(+0.0)	40.5%(+0.0)
Llama3.2-3B	10.0%(-1.5)	9.1%(-2.4)	40.5%(+0.0)	40.5%(+0.0)
StarCoder2-15B	12.0%(-0.8)	11.7%(-1.1)	37.2%(+0.0)	37.2%(+0.0)
DeepSeekV2-16B	5.4%(-4.4)	2.4%(-7.4)	28.9%(-13.2)	20.7%(-21.4)
GPT-3.5-turbo	4.3%(-7.1)	3.5%(-7.9)	10.7%(-9.1)	6.6%(-13.2)
GPT-4o	6.8%(-11.2)	3.7%(-14.3)	13.2%(-28.1)	13.2%(-28.1)

to infer the underlying reasoning. For models that show little or no improvement, this may be due to their limitations in instruction following. These findings align with our observations in Section 5.2, where larger and newer models demonstrated a better ability to follow human instructions. In contrast, the limited impact of direct feedback suggests weaker reasoning capabilities for applying fixes without detailed guidance.

Takeaway. These findings highlight the effectiveness of feedback-driven vulnerability repair. Direct feedback, based on raw CodeQL results, requires models to reason through the issue and determine appropriate fixes on their own. In contrast, explained feedback, which explicitly details the vulnerability context and outlines the necessary correction steps, significantly enhances repair effectiveness. On the other hand, models that struggle to utilize either type of feedback effectively reveal limitations in their reasoning and instruction-following abilities.

Answering RQ3: More powerful LLMs are effective in post-hoc vulnerability repair when provided with detailed, explained feedback rather than raw direct feedback. Conversely, less powerful models struggle to fully utilize either type of feedback.

6 Discussion

Threats to validity. We acknowledge several threats to the validity of the results and findings of our study. First, our evaluation is based on a static vulnerability detection tool, CodeQL, which effectively identifies many common security issues through static analysis, but fails to capture dynamic vulnerabilities or those that manifest under specific runtime conditions. Second, our experiments focus exclusively on Python code. Although Python is widely used and provides a practical testbed for secure code generation, its unique features and common usage patterns may not represent the security challenges of other programming languages such as C++ or Java. Consequently, the trend of unique vulnerabilities for specific language needs to be noticed and explored separately. Third, though we strive to cover a broad range of vulnerabilities, our study is limited to two prominent datasets. These datasets might not cover the entire range of potential vulnerabilities, potentially leaving out some other issues. Moreover, our evaluation framework operates in a static, single-turn setting, which contrasts with real-world development environments where developers engage in multi-turn interactions with LLMs to iteratively refine and debug code. This

static approach may not fully capture the potential improvements achievable through dynamic, conversational exchanges.

Suggestions for developers. Our findings suggest several strategies for developers aiming to integrate LLMs into secure coding workflows. Firstly, adapting different LLMs at various stages could be promising: smaller code-optimized models can be used to generate initial code with fewer vulnerabilities, while larger models are applied to vulnerability reasoning and repair. This mixed strategy can offer a cost-effective path to safer code. Secondly, it is evident that incorporating fine-grained, explained feedback is essential for effective vulnerability repair, as demonstrated by the significant improvements observed with detailed explanations and actionable suggestions. Developers should design their systems to provide rich, actionable insights (e.g., incorporating a powerful reasoning model for vulnerability hints predictions and vulnerability repair suggestions) that guide the LLM in identifying and fixing security flaws. Thirdly, expanding the set of vulnerabilities is crucial, as the lower performance of LLMs on the complex SecurityEval dataset indicates. By including a broader range of vulnerabilities, developers can enhance model robustness and better address diverse security risks in real-world scenarios.

7 Conclusion

In this work, we conducted a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs in the domains of secure code generation and vulnerability repair. Our study revealed that while LLMs are inherently prone to generating insecure code, their security performance can be significantly improved through the incorporation of self-generated vulnerability hints and explained, contextualized feedback. Importantly, the effectiveness of self-generated hints is contingent upon their relevance and precision. Contextualized feedback can result in lower vulnerability rates in code repair tasks. Moreover, our comparative analysis across a diverse set of models highlighted that more advanced models tend to benefit more from the provided hints and feedback.

Acknowledgments

The project was sponsored by the Virginia Commonwealth Cyber Initiative (CCI). Hao Yan was also partially funded by the GRA Fellowship from the Center for Advancing Human-Machine Partnership (CAHMP) at GMU. The project was supported by resources provided by the Office of Research Computing at George Mason University (<https://orc.gmu.edu>) and funded in part by grants from the National Science Foundation (Award Number 2018631).

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