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Cryptographic Protocols
Solution to Exercise 4

4.1 "OR"-Proof

a) Intuitively, the idea is that Vic sends Peggy a challenge c, and she has to give answers to two challenges that add up to c. This way, Peggy can use the simulator for GI to prepare for the isomorphism that she does not know. Let S be the simulator for the GI protocol.

Peggy		**Vic**
knows (b, σ): $\mathcal{T} = \sigma\mathcal{G}_b\sigma^{-1}$, $b \in \{0,1\}$		knows $\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{G}_0, \mathcal{G}_1$
$(\mathcal{T}_{1-b}, c_{1-b}, \rho_{1-b}) \leftarrow S(\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{G}_{1-b})$ choose random permutation π $\mathcal{T}_b := \pi\mathcal{T}\pi^{-1}$	$\xrightarrow{\mathcal{T}_0, \mathcal{T}_1}$	
	$\xleftarrow{c}$	choose $c \in_R \{0,1\}$
$c_b \equiv_2 c - c_{1-b}$ compute $\rho_b := \pi\sigma^{-c_b}$	$\xrightarrow{c_0, c_1, \rho_0, \rho_1}$	check $c_0 + c_1 \stackrel{?}{\equiv}_2 c$ for $i \in \{0,1\}$, if $c_i = 0$, check $\mathcal{T}_i = \rho_i\mathcal{T}\rho_i^{-1}$ if $c_i = 1$, check $\mathcal{T}_i = \rho_i\mathcal{G}_i\rho_i^{-1}$

The proof that this protocol is complete, a proof of knowledge and zero-knowledge is given in the next subtask for the general case.

b) The desired predicate is $Q'((x_0, x_1), (b, w)) := Q(x_b, w)$, where $b \in \{0,1\}$ indicates for which instance w is a witness.

In the following, let S be the HVZK simulator for (P, V) and let $\mathcal{C}$ be an additive group.

Peggy		**Vic**
knows (b, w)		knows (x_0, x_1)
$(t_{1-b}, c_{1-b}, r_{1-b}) \leftarrow S(x_{1-b})$ choose t_b according to P	$\xrightarrow{t_0, t_1}$	
	$\xleftarrow{c}$	choose $c \in_R \mathcal{C}$
$c_b := c - c_{1-b}$ compute r_b according to P	$\xrightarrow{c_0, c_1, r_0, r_1}$	check $c_0 + c_1 \stackrel{?}{=} c$ for $i = 0, 1$, check whether (t_i, c_i, r_i) is valid according to V

Completeness: The protocol is easily seen to be complete.

Proof of Knowledge: The protocol is 2-extractable: Fix a first message (t_0, t_1) and let (c_0, c_1, r_0, r_1) and (c'_0, c'_1, r'_0, r'_1) be accepting answers for two challenges $c \neq c'$. Since $c \neq c'$, $c_i \neq c'_i$ for at least one $i \in \{0, 1\}$. Since (t_i, c_i, r_i) and (t_i, c'_i, r'_i) are two accepting transcripts for the same first message, the 2-extractability of (P, V) allows to compute w such that $Q(x_i, w) = 1$. The witness for Q' is thus (i, w).

Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge: The simulator for the protocol is as following: Run the simulator honest-verifier simulator S on both instances x_0 and x_1: $(t_0, c_0, r_0) \leftarrow S(x_0)$ and $(t_1, c_1, r_1) \leftarrow S(x_1)$. The simulated transcript is $\big((t_0, t_1), c_0 + c_1, (c_0, c_1, r_0, r_1)\big)$.

Observe that since the challenges c_0 and c_1 are uniformly distributed, so is the challenge $c = c_0 + c_1$. Also, if we additionally have that $\mathcal{C}$ is polynomially bounded, we have that the protocol is zero-knowledge.

4.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge of a Preimage of a Group Homomorphism

The protocols are instantiations of the proof of knowledge of a pre-image of a one-way group homomorphism. That is, for each scenario, one needs to provide a suitable homomorphism ϕ between two groups, u and ℓ (for each z), as well as a challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ such that the preconditions of the theorem are satisfied.

a) Let $\phi : \mathbb{Z}_m^* \times \mathbb{Z}_m^* \to \mathbb{Z}_m^*, (x, y) \mapsto x^{e_1} y^{e_2}$. Then, ϕ is a homomorphism since

$$\begin{aligned}\phi((x, y) \cdot (x', y')) &= \phi((xx', yy')) = (xx')^{e_1}(yy')^{e_2} = x^{e_1} y^{e_2} x'^{e_1} y'^{e_2} \\ &= \phi(x, y) \cdot \phi(x', y').\end{aligned}$$

Let $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \{0, \ldots, e_1 + e_2 - 1\}$ be polynomially bounded. For $z \in \mathbb{Z}_m^*$, let $u := (z, z)$ and $\ell := e_1 + e_2$. Then,

1. ℓ is prime, and thus $\gcd(c_1 - c_2, \ell) = 1$ for all $c_1, c_2 \in \mathcal{C}$, and
2. $\phi(u) = \phi(z, z) = z^{e_1} z^{e_2} = z^{e_1 + e_2} = z^{\ell}$.

b) Let $\phi : \mathbb{Z}_q^4 \to H^2, (x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) \mapsto (z_1, z_2) = (h_1^{x_3} h_2^{x_1}, h_1^{x_2} h_2^{x_4} h_3^{x_1})$. Clearly, ϕ is a

homomorphism since

$$\begin{aligned}
&\phi((x_1,x_2,x_3,x_4)+(x'_1,x'_2,x'_3,x'_4))\\
&=(h_1^{x_3+x'_3}h_2^{x_1+x'_1},h_1^{x_2+x'_2}h_2^{x_4+x'_4}h_3^{x_1+x'_1})\\
&=(h_1^{x_3}h_2^{x_1}\cdot h_1^{x'_3}h_2^{x'_1},h_1^{x_2}h_2^{x_4}h_3^{x_1}\cdot h_1^{x'_2}h_2^{x'_4}h_3^{x'_1})\\
&=(h_1^{x_3}h_2^{x_1},h_1^{x_2}h_2^{x_4}h_3^{x_1})\cdot(h_1^{x'_3}h_2^{x'_1},h_1^{x'_2}h_2^{x'_4}h_3^{x'_1})\\
&=\phi((x_1,x_2,x_3,x_4))\cdot\phi((x'_1,x'_2,x'_3,x'_4)).
\end{aligned}$$

Let $\mathcal{C}\subseteq\mathbb{Z}_q$. For $z\in H^2$, let $u:=(0,0,0,0)$ and $\ell:=q$. Then,

1. ℓ is prime, and thus $\gcd(c_1-c_2,\ell)=1$ for all $c_1,c_2\in\mathcal{C}$, and
2. $\phi(u)=\phi(0,0,0,0)=(1,1)=z^q=z^\ell$.

c) Completeness: The protocol is easily seen to be complete.

Proof of Knowledge: The protocol is 2-extractable: Fix a first message (t_1,t_2) and let (r_1,r_2) and (r'_1,r'_2) be accepting answers for two challenges $c\neq c'$. Since both answers are accepting, this means that $h_1^{r_1}=t_1\cdot z_1^c$, $h_2^{r_2}=t_2\cdot z_2^c$, $h_1^{r'_1}=t_1\cdot z_1^{c'}$, $h_2^{r'_2}=t_2\cdot z_2^{c'}$, $a_1r_1+a_2r_2=cb$ and $a_1r'_1+a_2r'_2=c'b$. From here, one can obtain that $h_1^{r_1-r'_1}=z_1^{c-c'}=h_1^{x_1(c-c')}$ and $h_2^{r_2-r'_2}=z_2^{c-c'}=h_2^{x_2(c-c')}$. Hence, $x_1=\frac{r_1-r'_1}{c-c'}$ and $x_2=\frac{r_2-r'_2}{c-c'}$. Also, $a_1x_1+a_2x_2=a_1\frac{r_1-r'_1}{c-c'}+a_2\frac{r_2-r'_2}{c-c'}=\frac{1}{c-c'}(a_1r_1+a_2r_2-a_1r'_1-a_2r'_2)=\frac{1}{c-c'}(cb-c'b)=b$.

Zero-Knowledge: We restrict the challenge space to be polynomially bounded. Then, as seen in the lecture, it is enough to show that the protocol is c-simulatable. Given a challenge $c\in C$, we can sample a random pair (r_1,r_2) from $S:=\{(s_1,s_2)\in\mathbb{Z}_q^2:a_1s_1+a_2s_2=cb\}$. Then, we assign $t_1=h_1^{r_1}z_1^{-c}$ and $t_2=h_2^{r_2}z_2^{-c}$. Observe that the distribution is as in the protocol execution. In the protocol execution $(r_1,r_2)=(v_1,v_2)+c(x_1,x_2)$, where (v_1,v_2) is a random pair that satisfies $a_1v_1+a_2v_2=0$, and (x_1,x_2) is a pair that satisfies $a_1x_1+a_2x_2=b$. Then, the pair (r_1,r_2) is a random pair that satisfies $a_1r_1+a_2r_2=cb$.

The problem can actually be solved as using the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for a preimage of a homomorphism.

Let h be a generator from H (e.g. $h=h_1$), and let us define $h_3:=h^{a_1}$, $h_4:=h^{a_2}$. Moreover, we define the homomorphism $\phi:\mathbb{Z}_q^2\to H^3,(x_1,x_2)\mapsto(h_1^{x_1},h_2^{x_2},h_3^{x_1}h_4^{x_2})$. The goal is to prove knowledge of a preimage of the triple (z_1,z_2,h^b). It is easy to see that with $u:=(0,0)$ and $l:=q$, we have the conditions: $\gcd(c_1-c_2,\ell)=1$ for all $c_1,c_2\in\mathcal{C}$, and $\phi(u)=\phi(0,0)=(1,1,1)=z^q=z^\ell$.