Jew and Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in Leo Strauss: A Review Essay

Jonathan Cohen

Modern Judaism, Vol. 16, No. 1. (Feb., 1996), pp. 81-91.

Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0276-1114%28199602%2916%3A1%3C81%3AJAPTRT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

Modern Judaism is currently published by Oxford University Press.

Jonathan Cohen

JEW AND PHILOSOPHER: THE RETURN TO MAIMONIDES IN LEO STRAUSS: A REVIEW ESSAY*

The influence of Leo Strauss on the study of Jewish thought has been twofold. In the first instance, his novel and radical readings of Jewish philosophical texts, most particularly of the works of Maimonides, have generated that combination of unease and respect that moves other scholars to engage in comprehensive counterargument. Much of Isadore Twersky's long chapter on law and philosophy in his *Introduction to the Mishneh Torah*[1] can be read as an animated response to Straussian theses. In place of the Straussian contention that the aims of law and philosophy are contradictory and mutually exclusive, Twersky characterizes the two spheres as "reciprocal and complementary." Maimonides' elitism is seen by Twersky as a wise recognition of societal reality, not as a permanent comment on human nature, and his esotericism is viewed as "circumscribed" by pedagogical, not intrinsic-philosophical, considerations. A good deal of David Hartman's book *Torah and Philosophic Quest*[2] is an attempt to prove that Maimonides strove to "integrate" philosophy into a refined religious sensibility and that he did not choose "the way of dualism" which bifurcates theoretical excellence and concern for the polis. Whole chapters of Marvin Fox's *Interpreting Maimonides*[3] are devoted to contesting Strauss's method of locating and interpreting contradictions in the *Guide of the Perplexed*, as well as Strauss's implicit claim that Maimonides believed in the self-sufficiency of reason.

Interest in Strauss by students of Jewish thought, however, has not been confined to his readings of Jewish philosophical texts. Recent years have seen a proliferation of scholarship dedicated to articulating the "Judaic" implications of Strauss's own world-view. In 1987, Strauss's early work *Philosophie und Gesetz* was translated into English by Fred Baumann at the Jewish Publication Society and given an introduction by Ralph Lerner that characterized it as expressing a yearning for "an enlightened Judaism to which he might cleave with heart and mind."[4] In

*Kenneth Hart Green, *Jew and Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Modern Judaism 16 (1996): 81–91

1989, Hilail Gildin issued a collection of Strauss's essays under the rubric of a series devoted to the "Culture of Jewish Modernity."[5] In 1991, Alan Udoff published a collection of essays originally presented at a conference on Strauss's thought held at Baltimore Hebrew University.[6] The "Jewish" writings of Strauss have most recently been translated into Hebrew and introduced by Ehud Luz (publication in process at the Bialik Institute in Jerusalem). It is this framework of contemporary interest in the Jewish aspects of Strauss's thought that provides the context for the appearance of Kenneth Hart Green's new book.

The uniqueness of Green's book lies in the way in which it integrates the two concerns mentioned above, namely Strauss's interpretations of Maimonides, and the issue of his own "Judaic" thought. One of Green's major contentions is that Strauss, despite his own statements that Judaism and philosophy are mutually incompatible, is nonetheless to be characterized as both a Jew and a philosopher. Initially, so testifies Green, he was of the opinion that Strauss's Jewish experience was only the "occasion" for the elaboration of a philosophical position of universal import. In the course of his research, however, Green came to realize that what he calls Strauss's "Jewish Thought" should be seen as a "central pillar" (p. xii) in Strauss's philosophical orientation, and that this insight can be verified by following Strauss's developing attitude to Maimonides.

It is not difficult to understand why one might be drawn to the substance of Strauss's reflections on Judaism as a striking alternative to the more widely appreciated positions of Cohen, Buber, and Rosenzweig. Strauss's penetrating rehabilitation of the integrity of the Bible in the face of historical scholarship ("re-collections of re-collections"), his claims concerning the non-mercenary character of Jewish morality, and his preference for the traditional Jewish awareness of the power of evil in human affairs over the residue of Enlightenment optimism that can be found in Cohen and even in Rosenzweig, combine with other insights to suggest Strauss as a potential Jewish "comrade" in the reconstruction of a traditional Jewish orientation fully cognizant of the philosophical alternatives. Indeed, the temptation to "judaize" Strauss and bring him into the fold can be very strong. Nonetheless, I do not believe that succumbing to such a temptation does justice to the complexity of Strauss's reflections, however much satisfaction might be derived from the knowledge that such a profound thinker is to be found within the ranks. While Green's complex analysis reflects an acute sensitivity to the "subtlety" and "ambiguity" that can often be found commingled with an extraordinary "lucidity" in Strauss's writings (p. 237, n. 1), it would seem that Green has tipped the scales to one side in portraying Strauss as a "Jewish thinker."

Green's thesis is predicated on the following syllogism:

1. Strauss grew to see Maimonides as *the* rationalist philosopher par excellence, whose classic treatment of the issue of revelation and reason has the potential to lead moderns out of their quandary. (The problem for modern philosophy has been the abandonment of the search for the one, unconditional truth. The problem for Jewish thought has been the loss of the certainty of revelation as external reality and not just as internal experience).
2. Strauss viewed Maimonides as a Jewish thinker, whose Judaism had a substantive and decisive influence on his thought.
3. Therefore, Strauss, as a follower of Maimonides, is also to be viewed as one who can be said to have propounded "Jewish Thought," although this in no respect affects his (or Maimonides') stature as a bona fide philosopher.

The corroboration for Green's thesis is presented in the form of a chronological account of the development of Strauss's thought from his earliest essays through to his "mature" position. A change of perspective is effected by emphasizing Strauss's early works, those composed before the articles that came to make up his famous collection, *Persecution and the Art of Writing*.[7] The analysis of these earlier texts takes up fully 80 percent of the book. Green's access to the Leo Strauss Archive at the University of Chicago, as well as his close analysis of the original German texts of Strauss's youthful writings provide him with new insights into the growth of key strands in Strauss's thought.

Strauss's very first essay praises Rudolf Otto for showing a genuine concern with the external reality of the transcendent divine object as described within Old Testament religion. The Spanish-Jewish tradition of negative theology is already seen by Strauss as the basis for a consideration of the radical "otherness" of God as a real objective pole for the religious orientation, as distinguished from the modern tendency to reduce religion to internal states of subjective consciousness. This is seen by Green to be a nascent Maimonidean disposition.

Basing himself on Strauss's own later retrospection, Green highlights the degree to which Strauss held Hermann Cohen in high esteem at this time, due to his "Maimonidean" combination of unmitigated Jewish loyalty with an uncompromising search for the philosophical truth. Although criticizing Cohen's misunderstanding of the political motives of Spinoza's critique of Maimonides (in another early essay), Strauss begins to form his own reservations about both Cohen's and Spinoza's tendentious readings of "the" authoritative medieval Jewish philosopher.

In yet another "pre-Maimonidean" essay, Strauss criticizes what he considers to be Ernst Simon's scholastic dogmatism in calling for a more "pious" construction of early Israelite history, while praising Dubnov's frank adoption of Spinoza's critical assumptions as in keeping with genuine freedom of thought. In so doing, however, Strauss reflects on how

Jewish belief might achieve a genuine, non-scholastic, rational justification. He sympathizes with Maimonides' realization that "the power of God over nature," or Creation, is the Archimedean point on which the whole of the Jewish tradition rests, and he is drawn to Maimonides' attempt to undertake a rational discussion of the relative merits of the doctrines of creation and eternity.

In his last "pre-Maimonidean" essay, Strauss draws even closer to Maimonides. Although as yet unable to entertain even the possibility of a return to Aristotelian natural theology under the conditions of modern, mechanistic, natural science, Strauss nonetheless grows to respect the genuinely scientific (if pre-modern) motivation of Maimonides' quest. He does not fully accept Spinoza's assertion that Maimonides' thinking is controlled *a priori* by Scriptural doctrines. Furthermore, he locates the ultimate disagreement between Maimonides and Spinoza as centering not around the issue of allegoresis, cosmology, or even of God-concept. It has to do rather with their respective presuppositions concerning the sufficiency of unaided human reason to give a full account of the Whole. According to Green, Strauss is already beginning to develop a healthy respect for Maimonides' recognition that the assumption of rational self-sufficiency is rationally problematic and cannot be simply asserted.

With the composition of *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*,[8] so runs Green's account, the real "Maimonidean" period of Strauss's work begins. In the years preceding his completion of the *Critique* in 1928, the prospect of a "return" to the Maimonidean world-view no longer seems so unthinkable to Strauss as he gradually liberates himself from the assumptions of modern natural science and historicism. If the world-picture of modern science has been shown by radical historicism to be merely one temporally bound option for the theoretical construction of the universe (apart from its practical successes), then a return to the classic "teleotheology" may no longer be an "impossibility," just a "very great difficulty."[9] As Shlomo Pines has maintained,[10] Strauss's thinking during this period was dominated by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Unlike Pines, however, Green, basing his theory on the recollections of Strauss's friend Jacob Klein, claims that the profound effect of Neitzsche and Heidegger on Strauss was not to "convert" him to their ultimate nihilism. Rather, the projected consequences of such a thoroughgoing and well-argued nihilism prompted Strauss to question the anthropocentric epistemology that lies at the basis of modern philosophy, along with what he saw as its inevitable degeneration into temporalistic relativism. Like Heidegger, Strauss turned to the past. His interest, however, was not in the "pre-rational," pristine perception of "Being" in the pre-Socratics but rather in the possibility of rehabilitat-

ing the idea of natural human ends as it appears in Plato, Aristotle, and their great Jewish disciple Maimonides.

Green, then, sees *Spinoza's Critique of Religion* as the staging of a confrontation between Spinoza's claim to rational self-sufficiency and the Maimonidean brand of rationalism, which is willing to be guided by revelation. Spinoza's self-enclosed account of the Whole is exposed as ultimately hypothetical, motivated by a eudaemonistic, modern Epicureanism.[11] On the other hand, the genuineness of Maimonides' grounding in the teleological pre-modern science he knew is not called into question. Nonetheless, at this stage, so claims Green, Strauss still saw Maimonides' philosophizing as guided by the Jewish concept of God as willing Creator. He portrays Maimonides as a believer in "pregiven" Jewish notions, having recourse to philosophy in order to defend Judaism against "unbelieving" philosophy in the areas in which they conflict. Strauss nonetheless wonders, even at this stage, whether there are any indications in Maimonides' writings as to the rational grounds that might have led such an independent thinker to adhere to "pregiven" Jewish principles.

For Green, the composition of *Philosophy and Law* in the early thirties indicates Strauss's virtual identification with the Maimonidean orientation. It is with this book that Strauss discovers the Platonic "shape" of Maimonidean philosophizing. Here, it is not the rational ground of Maimonides' theology or cosmology that is of prime concern. It rather becomes clear to Strauss that Maimonides' main focus is on the moral and political conditions necessary for the cultivation of the life of philosophy within the framework of any community or society. In order to promote their common ultimate end—the cognitive quest for God—Revelation and Philosophy align themselves on a basis different from the one presented in *Spinoza's Critique of Religion.* Revelation does not theologically "control" philosophic activity. The prophet emerges as the paragon of natural cognitive development. This qualifies him to translate the rational Divine overflow he is uniquely suited to assimilate into a law that can bind philosophers and non-philosophers alike. Reason's *internal* understanding of its own limitations opens it to the possibility of transcendent aid in the perception of superlunary truths. Philosophy comes to need revelation at its outermost limits, while revelation enjoins the philosophic quest for those cognitively qualified to draw near to God. Reason and Revelation mutually support each other and are accommodated to one another within the framework of society.

For Green, it is this "Platonic" philosophizing, concerned as it is with the very *problematic* of the reconciliation of Thought to Society, that makes Strauss a Maimonidean. Once having "arrived" at this point, any further insights gained by Strauss from this perspective are viewed by

Green as mere "deepenings," not as major shifts. Other scholars, particularly Strauss's teacher Julius Guttmann, though acknowledging the significance of theopolitical themes evident in Strauss's early writings for his later thought, see Strauss's rediscovery of the esoteric posture of philosophy vis-à-vis society as his most important breakthrough.[12] For Green, however, Strauss's more well-known "mature" standpoint, as expressed in *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, does not signify his relinquishment of a *substantive* attachment to Judaism. Maimonides' (and Strauss's) awareness of the essential difference between the principles of Biblical theology and the kinds of mythologies that Plato was concerned with in his attempts to make a place for philosophizing in the *polis*, bespeak an irreducible loyalty to Judaism. The Biblical understanding of the absolute unity and omnipotence of God and the absolutely non-mercenary character of divinely commanded morality were seen by Strauss (by virtue of Maimonides) to be irrefutable from the premises of unaided reason, if also undemonstrable from those same premises. This realization on the part of both Maimonides and Strauss, prompted by their inner understanding of and loyalty to Judaism, affects their philosophical positions so profoundly that both can be called Jews and Philosophers—as the title of Green's book suggests.

Despite the coherence of the stage theory in which Green chronicles the development of Strauss's understanding of Maimonides, I do not believe that this scheme actually supports the syllogism underlying his thesis. It is the second premise of the syllogism, namely that Strauss viewed Maimonides as a Jewish thinker throughout his work, that breaks down under the weight of Green's own evidence. If it is true, as Green asserts, that in Strauss's final stage all accommodations between Revelation and Reason devised by Maimonides are to be seen as mere "noble rhetoric," while Maimonides' ultimate position is that the two "attitudes" of "obedience" and "investigation" are irreconcilable; it would appear impossible to infer that Maimonides was a "Jew" in any substantive sense. If Maimonides, then, does not "come down on the side of Judaism," and Strauss is seen as a disciple of Maimonides, then Strauss cannot be seen to have "come down on the side of Judaism" either, and the "Jewish" character of Strauss's thought must also be called into question.

As long as we accompany Strauss along the earlier stages of his interpretation of Maimonides, a journey which, as mentioned, forms the bulk of Green's book, the syllogism can be made to work. In the first stage, Maimonides is a "philosophical theologian" (chap. 4), proceeding from pre-given Jewish premises. In the second stage (chap. 5), Strauss portrays Maimonides as a genuine philosopher, totally committed to reason. *A posteriori*, however, Maimonides, in traversing the limits of reason, expresses a genuine need for Revelation as a completion of Reason.

This, too, can be portrayed as a substantively Jewish position, having *theoretical* recourse to Revelation. Once Strauss's interpretation of Maimonides is guided by the crucial insight of esotericism, however (chap. 6), Biblical revelation can no longer be seen as a substantive underpinning of either Maimonides' or Strauss's thought. It is merely the authoritative guise within which "true opinions" are purveyed to the multitude.

Green is aware of the problem created by his interpretation of Strauss's third Maimonidean stage. For this reason, he offers a revised conception of what the "Jewishness" of Maimonides' position could be thought to consist of. Maimonides is shown to be acutely sensitive, more than any other philosopher, to the crucial importance of non-mercenary morality to the health of society. He is also characterized as uniquely aware of the rational and moral status of the underlying principles of Biblical revelation: God as unfathomable, mysterious, omnipotent Will—whose sanction alone can provide the basis for a morality based on justice and charity. These insights, so claims Green, change the orientation of the philosopher to such a substantive extent that the bearer of them should be seen as a "Jewish philosopher."

There are, however, a number of difficulties with this solution. First of all, Green claims that, in Strauss's view, while the Arabic philosophers akin to Maimonides—Al-Farabi and Avicenna—did "come down on the side of philosophy," Maimonides nowhere divulges where he made his ultimate "home" (p. 122). This opens up the possibility of an interpretation of the "Jewish" influence on Maimonides' thought in the spirit advanced by Green. A close look at *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, however, reveals that, in Strauss's view, Maimonides most certainly *did* "come down on the side of philosophy," together with his Arab counterparts. In his introduction, Strauss attributes to Al-Farabi the following view: "philosophy by itself is not only necessary but sufficient for producing happiness: philosophy does not need to be supplemented by something else, or by something that is thought to be higher in rank than philosophy . . . religious speculation, and religious investigation of the beings, and the religious syllogistic art, do not supply the science of the beings, whereas philosophy does supply it".[13] Just a few pages earlier, Strauss writes of "Farabi, whom Maimonides, the greatest Jewish thinker of the Middle Ages, regarded as the greatest among the Islamic philosophers, and indeed as the greatest philosophic authority after Aristotle . . .".[14] These statements, however, must be correlated with other statements by Strauss in that collection of essays. In his article "The Literary Character of the Guide for the Perplexed," Strauss writes, "Maimonides doubtless subordinated *his own views* (emphasis mine) to those of the Jewish tradition"[15] and later: "the general principle underlying his entire work, and nowhere contradicted by him, that knowledge of the

truth is absolutely superior in dignity to any action . . ."[16] When statements like these are further combined with remarks like the following: "Jews of the philosophic competence of Halevi and Maimonides took it for granted that being a Jew and being a philosopher are mutually exclusive,"[17] it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that in Strauss's estimation, Maimonides chose the philosophic alternative. If, indeed, Strauss follows Maimonides through to the third stage, he would have to be seen as having chosen the philosophic alternative as well.

It is possible, however, that Strauss gained his evaluation of the power of the Biblical alternative independent of his admiration for Maimonides' philosophical rigor. Green makes much of Strauss's reverence for the Biblical God-concept and Biblical morality. Yet, apart from one remark showing that Maimonides was aware of the non-categorical character of philosophical morality, Green provides virtually no textual evidence that Strauss's understanding of the foundations of the Biblical world-view is in any way derived from Maimonides. For Strauss's evaluation of the Bible and its tradition as a self-conscious antiphilosophical polemic, fully aware of the philosophical option as a "natural" direction of the human soul, one must turn to his essays: "Jerusalem and Athens,"[18] and "Interpretation of Genesis".[19] The possibility that Strauss might have significantly deviated from Maimonides' substantive positions, although still holding him up as an example of philosophy at its most penetrating, is not permitted by Green's pre-established scheme.

Another piece of evidence, provided by Green himself, also seems to cast doubt on his thesis. Green documents the degree to which Strauss felt himself to have been influenced by the philosophical posture of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. He characterizes this posture as "remaining free of attachment to either one party or the other, even while 'rehabilitating' their most radical arguments' (p. 24), the holding of two rival parties at "an ironic distance" (p. 23), and, at the end of the book (in another context) "to preserve both commitments in their primary integrity" by "not losing anything essential to the vitality of both" (p. 136). Could it be that it was this "philosophical virtue" that guided Strauss throughout his researches? Could it be that Strauss attached himself to Maimonides because he found him to be the highest embodiment of this virtue? If so, then it would be inaccurate to portray Strauss as one who was possessed of a "double commitment," as the title of Green's book would seem to suggest. It might be more appropriate to view him as one who attained a "double freethinking" by the positive reconstruction of radical alternatives.

Although one could view all of Strauss's hymns of praise to the Bible and the Jewish tradition in Lessingian terms, this need not mean that Strauss's Jewish origins, theopolitical predicament, and confrontation with Maimonides were mere "occasions" of general philosophical dis-

covery. The alternative to seeing Strauss's Jewish connection as nonessential to his thinking, however, need not be that he held a worldview decisively informed by Jewish presuppositions. Green is correct in claiming that Strauss's inner understanding of the implications of the Bible for morality made a great difference in his view of philosophy and philosophizing. Because of the "possibility" of revelation, philosophers must be more modest in their claims to have constructed self-sufficient systems that are closed to revelation in principle. Since revelation is irrefutable, the very choice of the philosophic life of free investigation cannot be seen as a rationally self-evident choice.[20] This "influence" of the Bible or of Judaism on Strauss, however, does not make him a Jew by his own definition.

For Strauss, it would appear that there are three kinds of genuine Jews. There is the paradigmatic simple Jew, characterized by Strauss as piously obedient and unpreoccupied with "what is above, what is below, what is before or what is behind".[21] Then there is the theologizing Jew who engages in the Kalam-like "art of syllogism"[22] in order to defend the faith for the sake of those who have fallen prey to doubts. Finally, there is the possibility of the "theologian who is open to the challenge of philosophy."[23] Like the Biblical writers and the likes of Yehudah Halevi, this Jew has become aware of the philosophical "attitude" from within. He nonetheless "comes down on the side of revelation," and knows how to cast it as an alternative to philosophy at the highest level, preferring to pay a thoroughly understood theoretical price for the presuppositions of an absolute morality. His choice comes from having been touched by what Yehudah Halevi calls the "divine thing," either directly or through the medium of tradition. Strauss himself can be classed with none of these. It would probably be more accurate to see him as another type he has so well characterized, as a "philosopher who is open to the challenge of theology."[24]

In speaking of the Zionist vision, Strauss says that although the advent of the State of Israel may signal "the most profound modification of the Galut which has occurred . . . it is not the end of the Galut; in the religious sense, and perhaps not only in the religious sense, the State of Israel is a part of the Galut."[25] I believe a statement with a similar structure would be most apt in describing Strauss's orientation to Judaism. Although the Biblical perspective, interpreted in the light of its "highest possibility," may involve a "profound modification" of the philosophical attitude, in the sense that philosophers should not be tempted to think that their reliance on unaided reason has actually issued in a self-sufficient philosophical system, it can nonetheless be assimilated into the philosophical attitude of unfettered investigation by serving as a Socratic reminder that the most important questions have not been resolved and the quest for the truth must continue unabated.

The fact that Strauss's thought cannot be construed as "Jewish" by any definition that Strauss himself advanced (unless, that is, we assume—in most un-Straussian fashion—that we are able to understand him "better than he understood himself") in no way reduces the importance of his insights for modern Jewish thought. Those Jews who would philosophize from the standpoint of a "pre-given" commitment to the Jewish tradition, or those whose philosophical development would proceed on the basis of a clarification of their own Judaism, must give answers to the questions raised by Leo Strauss. The individualistic, temporalistic, or situational orientations to revelation evident in the thought of Buber, Rosenzweig, Heschel, and even Soloveitchik can no longer be seen in the same uncritical light. The necessity for interaction between modern Jewish thought and its existentialist or pragmatic counterparts in contemporary philosophy can no longer be taken for granted. There is no need, then, for Strauss to be "judaized" in order that his insights might serve as the basis for a reconsideration of the direction of contemporary Jewish thought. This kind of move would be similar to the "repatriation" of Spinoza as a condition for evaluating his influence on Jewish philosophical discourse from the 18th to the 20th centuries.

Despite the above reservations, the scholarly community owes Kenneth Hart Green a debt of gratitude on a number of scores. First, his pioneering researches have provided access to aspects of Strauss's early thought hitherto unexplored. Second, he has shown that Strauss actually *passed through* positions taken by other scholars of Maimonides on the way to his final position. For example, his view of Maimonides as "philosophical theologian" in *Spinoza's Critique of Religion* is strikingly similar to those of Wolfson and Twersky. His reformulation of the integration of the religious and philosophic quest in *Philosophy and Law* is closer to Hartman's and Marvin Fox's positions, than the views of the "mature" Strauss so vigorously criticized by both. This realization could be somewhat chastening for those Maimonidean scholars who would claim to have "surpassed" Strauss. Finally, Green reminds us that those who "are not satisfied" with Strauss's understanding of Maimonides must "root their alternative view in a comprehensive reflection on philosophy, religion, politics and morality. The alternative conception of these four things, rooted in a different approach toward their natures, must stand on a ground that is as well thought out and solid as the view of Strauss, yet diverges from it in its fundamental principles." (137–138)—a formidable challenge to be sure.

It is to be hoped that this thought-provoking book will indeed be merely the first of a series of volumes dedicated to probing the significance of Strauss's reflections on Judaism.

NOTES

1. (New Haven, 1980), pp. 356–514.
2. (Philadelphia, 1976).
3. (Chicago, 1990), especially part 1, pp. 1–90.
4. In English: *Philosophy and Law*, Lerner's comment from Foreword, p. xii. First published as *Philosophie und Gesetz* (Berlin, 1935).
5. At the Wayne State University Press.
6. The book is titled *Leo Strauss' Thought: Towards a Critical Engagement* (London, 1991). The conference at Baltimore Hebrew University was held in 1986.
7. (Glencoe, Ill., 1952)
8. The original German edition was called *Die Religionskritik Spinozas* (Berlin, 1930).
9. Preface to Strauss's introduction to the English edition of *Spinoza's Critique of Religion* (New York, 1965), p. 7.
10. In his Hebrew article "On Leo Strauss," in *Molad*, Vol. 7, Nos. 37–38 (1976), pp. 455–457.
11. See, for example, *Spinoza's Critique*, p. 208.
12. See Julius Guttmann, "Philosophie der Religion oder Philosophie des Gesetzes?" Hebrew version in *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, Vol. 5 (1976), pp. 188–207.
13. *Persecution*, pp. 12–13.
14. Ibid., p. 9.
15. Ibid., p. 84.
16. Ibid., p. 92.
17. Ibid., p. 90.
18. In Thomas Pangle (ed.), *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy* (Chicago, 1983), pp. 147–173.
19. In *L'Homme: Revue francaises d'anthropologie*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1981), pp. 5–36.
20. Preface, p. 29.
21. *Persecution*, p. 20.
22. Ibid., pp. 13, 99.
23. Quoted from the very end of "Progress and Return," the essay which ends the collection edited by Thomas Pangle, *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism* (Chicago, 1989), p. 270.
24. Ibid.
25. Preface, p. 6.