


Saturn™

End-to-End Secured Payment Authorization System

- Decentralized operation accomplishes similar goals as 3D Secure and "Tokenization" but without registries or additional services
- Facilitates the design of brand/bank independent, "rich UI" wallets, supporting both card- and bank-to-bank payments
- Equally applicable on the mobile Web, locally in a shop, at an automated gas station, or as a "PC companion" on the Web
- Eliminates the traditional payment terminal and reduces merchant PCI requirements to a minimum
- Requires a single "active" method on the issuer side to function*

Disclaimer: This is a system in development and specifications are subject to change without notice

^{*} Reservations and recurring payments will in non-card-based scenarios need a second method as well






② Merchant Invokes the Wallet with a PaymentClientRequest Message

```
Payment method URLs to be matched against the virtual cards
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
"@qualifier": "PaymentClientRequest",
"supportedPaymentMethods": [{
  "paymentMethod": "https://bankdirect.net",
  "payeeAuthorityUrl": "https://payments.bigbank.com/payees/86344"
  "paymentMethod": "https://supercard.com",
  "payeeAuthorityUrl": "https://secure.cardprocessor.com/payees/1077342"
}],
"paymentRequest": {
  "payee": {
     "commonName": "Demo Merchant",
     "homePage": "demomerchant.com"
  "amount": "550.00",
  "currency": "EUR",
  "referenceId": "#1000000",
  "timeStamp": "2020-08-11T15:54:20Z",
  "expires": "2020-08-11T16:25:00Z",
  "software": {
     "name": "WebPKI.org - Payee",
     "version": "1.00"
```

The Merchant (Payee) invokes the Wallet (after a user action) with a list of supported payment methods. Those who are matching the user's virtual cards will be shown in the Wallet UI to select from. The payeeAuthority properties hold URLs which are used to securely bind the Merchant's authorization signature for a particular payment method / network. The paymentRequest object contains the actual request data to be reflected in the wallet UI.



② Wallet Receives the PaymentClientRequest



When **PaymentClientRequest** has been received by the client, the Wallet user interface is launched. The authorization method may consist of a PIN but could also be a biometric option such as touching a fingerprint reader. The authorization is only used to unlock the Signature Key as described in next slide. Note that the Saturn authorization concept not only emulates payment cards, *but payment terminals as well*.



3 Internal Wallet Processing – Creation of Signed Authorization Data

```
"requestHash": { →
                                                        Hash of received paymentRequest object
     "algorithm": "S256",
     "value": "5MPHvmWLuOGRAm00Z78C7KW5f1kKPMW9OrI2D4VK1Oo"
                                                                                  Copied from PaymentClientRequest
  "payeeAuthorityUrl": "https://payments.bigbank.com/payees/86344",
  "payeeHost": "demomerchant.com", ←
                                                                                  Acquired by the Wallet software
  "paymentMethod": "https://bankdirect.net",
  "credentialId": "54674448",
                                                        Core data of selected virtual card
  "accountId": "FR7630002111110020050014673",
  "encryptionParameters": {
     "algorithm": "A256GCM",
     "encryptionKey": "9MdPM5jEnPRtk-yYGIMmYaQLrk0gTXVQNhQQIHQ0aQk"
  "userAuthorizationMethod": "PIN", +
                                                        Input to Risk Based Authentication
  "timeStamp": "2020-08-11T17:54:35+02:00".
  "software": {
     "name": "WebPKI Suite/Saturn",
     "version": "1.35"
  "platform": {
     "name": "Android",
     "version": "10",
     "vendor": "Huawei"
                                                        https://cvberphone.github.io/doc/security/isf.html
  "authorizationSignature": { ←
     "algorithm": "ES256",
     "publicKey": { ←
                                                         Signature key of selected virtual card
        "kty": "EC",
       "crv": "P-256",
       "x": "censDzcMEkgiePz6DXB7cDuwFemshAFR90UNVQFCg8Q",
       "v": "xg8rze6ewG0-eVcSF72J77gKiD0IHnzpwHaU7t6nVeY"
     },
     "value": "EaGSWKOK6DFHVe8RJHlhA5c3gKSN1Gih....Pdi6vaxdA8ofiAW6Py-wxWUNFxybSTAA"
}
        When the user has authorized the transaction the Signature (private) key associated with the selected card is used to sign a
        JSON object holding authorization data as follows: requestHash holds the hash of the paymentRequest object (see
        PaymentClientRequest slide), while accountId holds the actual Account ID of the selected card. For more information about
        encryptionParameters, turn to the slide Risk Based Authentication.
```



3 Wallet Processing – Creation and Sending of PayerAuthorization Message

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
"@qualifier": "PayerAuthorization",
"providerAuthorityUrl": "https://payments.mybank.com/authority",
                                                                       "Non-secret" data of selected virtual card
"paymentMethod": "https://bankdirect.net",
"encryptedAuthorization": {
  "algorithm": "A256GCM",
                                                      https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jef.html
  "keyEncryption": {
     "algorithm": "ECDH-ES",
     "publicKey": { ←
                                               Encryption key of selected virtual card
        "kty": "EC",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "TfCrhFwZRU_ea7lUWwRi3HkuyT2yF9IxN5xKh2khjlk"
        "y": "nZFwxLP0TvFXD2xPKzRTIGevgLjpiMw2BP86hszj5x4"
     "ephemeralKey": {
        "kty": "EC",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "80mByDxNt213LAKLjTC7VWLq0HwqZoyrxdf33Cvpk1c",
        "y": "73oDKxbAYxFVbWckvxHY8gO2NY nK8nCVwWUoP8GBy0"
     }
  "iv": "9AXDHPcmNNn77jK8",
  "tag": "gpUpZZRD0K1JRCyJui 9mw",
  "cipherText": "yUrV2yfBwUoylw2GE-0dsbmT1wbrWhmn....F-7jHwRIVIt6Cvpj0Ok7FD2Kcon_TjiQ"
                                                                                           Encrypted user authorization
```

PayerAuthorization messages provide the URL to the issuing bank's "Authority" object and the selected payment method which both are featured in virtual cards. This data is used by Merchants (Payees) for routing payment authorization requests to the applicable Bank. The actual authorization data (see previous slides) is *encrypted* by the Wallet using an *Issuer (not User) specific Encryption key* (with a *matching private key only known by the issuing Bank*), which also is stored in the virtual card. That is, Merchants do not get any information concerning Users (Payers) except their Bank and associated payment method.



Bank/Acquirer ProviderAuthority Object

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
                                                               Authority object (self) URL of a virtual payment card issuer
  "@qualifier": "ProviderAuthority",
  "httpVersion": "HTTP/1.1",
  "providerAuthorityUrl": "https://payments.mybank.com/authority", +
  "homePage": "https://mybank.com",
  "serviceUrl": "https://payments.mybank.com/service",
  "supportedPaymentMethods": {
     "https://bankdirect.net": ["https://sepa.payments.org/saturn/v3#account"],
                                                                                         Payment network, [Payment rails, ...]
     "https://supercard.com": ["https://sepa.payments.org/saturn/v3#account"]
  },
  "extensions": {
     "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3/extensions#hybrid": "https://payments.mybank.com/hybridpay"
  "signatureProfiles": ["https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3/signatures#ES256.P-256"],
                                                                                               Accepted signature types
  "encryptionParameters": [{ ←
     "dataEncryptionAlgorithm": "A128CBC-HS256",
                                                                         https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jef.html
     "keyEncryptionAlgorithm": "ECDH-ES",
     "publicKey": {
       "kty": "EC",
       "crv": "P-256",
       "x": "TfCrhFwZRU ea7lUWwRi3HkuyT2yF9IxN5xKh2khjlk",
       "y": "nZFwxLP0TvFXD2xPKzRTIGevgLjpiMw2BP86hszj5x4"
  "timeStamp": "2020-08-11T15:29:12Z",
  "expires": "2020-08-11T16:29:13Z",
                                                        https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jsf.html
  "issuerSignature": { ←
     "algorithm": "ES256",
     "certificatePath": ["MIIBtTCCAVmgAwIB....3FwxFeOawwmz1bM6", "MIIDcjCCAVqgAwIB....e_-5TddhlTUMNPvw"],
     "value": "ZoeXuaOcM_r31oFKdyy0o7Ad5bl1WUC-....QqCS23ihlzQBy-5I7RyEO_HuZiuWmZRw"
}
```

"Authority" objects hold Keys, Payment methods, and URLs which are used by Merchants, Banks, and Acquirers as Secure Distributed Entity Databases creating the foundation for scalability including <u>Delegated Trust</u>. "Authority" objects are published on the Internet and accessed by HTTP GET operations. A Bank/Acquirer "Authority" object is signed by the Bank/Acquirer itself. The suppotedPaymentMethods object declares the payment methods understood by the Bank. The encryptionParameters are used by Issuers for encrypting user account data.



Merchant (Payee) PayeeAuthority Object

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
                                                                           URL to the Merchant "Authority" object itself
"@qualifier": "PayeeAuthority",
"payeeAuthorityUrl": "https://payments.bigbank.com/payees/86344",
"providerAuthorityUrl": "https://payments.bigbank.com/authority",
                                                                            URL to the Merchant Bank/Acquirer "Authority" object
"localPayeeId": "86344",
"commonName": "Demo Merchant",
                                                     Merchant core data
"homePage": "https://demomerchant.com",
"accountVerifier": {
  "algorithm": "S256",
  "hashedPayeeAccounts": ["kUwpqk-cbkDaBjwDD etPSh FtC-Ap2K A2MQzXNy U"] +
                                                                                            Merchant account verification
"signatureParameters": [{
  "algorithm": "ES256",
  "publicKey": {
                                               Merchant signature key
     "kty": "EC",
     "crv": "P-256",
     "x": "8VY09NWUy-aVGNHZZQDIyy-H3RxLfXbiPR2SVIEubjE",
     "y": "OuHehTNjMbphW0s3nBBVdAALLdzE9x-hup4CnJ1gM-o"
}],
"timeStamp": "2020-08-11T15:49:57Z",
"expires": "2020-08-11T16:49:58Z",
"issuerSignature": { ←
                                                      https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jsf.html
  "algorithm": "ES256",
  "publicKey": { ←
                                            The same public key as in the Bank/Acquirer "Authority" object signature certificate
     "kty": "EC",
     "crv": "P-256",
     "x": "-Vr8Wk3ygt5J2 J3R8TrRaa-AWW7ZiXa6q1P7ELs6qc",
     "y": "Vuc6z3WiZ3tgXTXvU6F5qdiiYePWeUI1g9Tx83ySDcM"
  "value": "Xb yLOpGbmboDjufFnCDdRfyAJiNm1-U....8ou kr izI05kOnJshpd-JkpcWcP4kw"
```

A Merchant (Payee) "Authority" object is like a short-lived, automatically updated, X.509 certificate not requiring a CA. Such an object is published on the address payeeAuthorityUrl hosted by the party (Bank or Acquirer) which vouches for the Merchant. If a Merchant is to be "revoked", the object is simply removed. To automate revocation checks, there is an expires attribute which also is used to clear caching of Merchant "Authority" objects. The signatureParameters list enable key renewals as well as validation of signatures using old keys.



Merchant Creates and Sends an AuthorizationRequest Message

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
                                                                      Where the message is actually sent
"@qualifier": "AuthorizationRequest",
"recipientUrl": "https://payments.mybank.com/service",
"payeeAuthorityUrl": "https://payments.bigbank.com/payees/86344", •
                                                                             URL to Merchant "Authority" object
"paymentMethod": "https://bankdirect.net", <
"paymentRequest": {
                                                         Payment method (must match user authorization)
   Copy of the original paymentRequest
},
"encryptedAuthorization": {
    Copy of the original encryptedAuthorization
                                                      Sample data for a SEPA payment method:
                                                      "@context": "https://sepa.payments.org/saturn/v3#account",
"payeeReceiveAccount": {
                                                      "iban": "FR7630004003200001019471656",
                                                      "nonce": "nZFwxLP0TvFXD2xPKzRTIGevgLjpiMw2BP86hszj5x4"
"referenceId": "#1000001",
                                                     The nonce is adding privacy protection to the account verification
"clientIpAddress": "220.13.198.144",
                                                      hashes published in the accountVerifier object of PayeeAuthority.
"timeStamp": "2020-08-11T15:54:38Z",
"software": {
  "name": "WebPKI.org - Payee",
  "version": "1.00"
"requestSignature": {
                                                        https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jsf.html
  "algorithm": "ES256",
  "publicKey": { ←
                                               Merchant signature key
     "kty": "EC",
     "crv": "P-256",
     "x": "8VY09NWUy-aVGNHZZQDIyy-H3RxLfXbiPR2SVIEubjE",
     "v": "OuHehTNjMbphW0s3nBBVdAALLdzE9x-hup4CnJ1qM-o"
  "value": "91wNxmoZt-TKUGD1R7prluueL2DSv9iZ....TqYipTRDXSewSlfWgnoxsTkjkw07pJog"
```


The AuthorizationRequest is sent by a Merchant (Payee) to the serviceUrl of the "Authority" object given by the user's choice of payment card (method). See providerAuthorityUrl. The inclusion of payeeAuthorityUrl enables the targeted User Bank to verify that the Merchant belongs to a known Bank-to-Bank or Acquirer payment network.




5 User Bank Responds with an AuthorizationResponse Message

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
"@qualifier": "AuthorizationResponse",
"accountReference": "FR*0504", ←
                                              Optional short form of the user account to be featured in receipts etc.
"encryptedAccountData": {
  Parameters removed for brevity...
  "cipherText": "okjRig8y97oHa0kw7buu17XcTZOZAtS1....XG4BoMqDwY0e2fxlGPSHzko5Hs 0UHXz"
},
"referenceId": "#0100345648",
                                                  Encrypted user account data
"logData": "CT100006",
"timeStamp": "2020-08-11T15:54:38Z",
"software": {
  "name": "WebPKI.org - Bank",
  "version": "1.00"
},
"authorizationRequest": {
  "@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
  "@qualifier": "AuthorizationRequest",
  "recipientUrl": "https://payments.mybank.com/service",
     Copy of the original AuthorizationRequest...
                                                          https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jsf.html
                                                                                   User Bank certificate path
"authorizationSignature": {
  "algorithm": "ES256",
  "certificatePath": ["MIIBtTCCAVmgAwIB....3FwxFeOawwmz1bM6", "MIIDcjCCAVqqAwIB....e_-5TddhlTUMNPvw"],
  "value": "b03W5RPCmoA2ARILtbdvCrlrAi5i0Cr4....hib3XUgun9KxpbL6Ig7i4pA ko7Gf4yA"
```

After received the AuthorizationRequest, User Bank performs an extensive list of operations to verify the validity of the request, including fetching the Merchant's (Payee) PayeeAuthority and ProviderAuthority objects. If the verification succeeds, User Bank responds with an AuthorizationResponse message which in addition to the original AuthorizationRequest, also holds the user's account ID encrypted by the Merchant provider's encryption key. This information is used for Card Payments and Refunds.



* See <u>Authority Objects</u>. The flow may stop after step #5 resulting in a *Secure Authorization Object* which *only* can be activated by another *Request*. This scheme supports hotel bookings, upfront reservations for automated gas stations, as well as recurring payments. The card data *Encryption* and *Decryption* processes enable standard card data to securely pass through Merchants from Issuers to Acquirers.



In the Hybrid mode traditional card payment methods are "emulated" including support for hotel bookings, upfront reservations for automated gas stations, as well as reoccurring payments. For three-corner payment schemes like PayPal and Alipay as well as for payments where the User and Merchant have the same bank, *step #7 is not applicable*.



Private Messaging and Risk Based Authentication

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
  "@qualifier": "ProviderUserResponse",
  "encryptedMessage": {
                                                               https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jef.html
     "algorithm": "A256GCM",
     "iv": " K4Sqt5y1uKhwiSi",
     "taq": "Xmqyx5XZWmxSFfypag-y_A",
     "cipherText": "qXIsLsZ-zIxVIIV920dpxPmTOwGRghU_....fsxbw1LX61Tu6GbsSw1gXEcwkW8S4fOQ"
}
                                    When decrypted and rendered by the Wallet (sample)
                                               Message from My Bank
                                      Transaction requests exceeding €2,500 requires
                                      additional user authentication to be performed.
                                      Please enter your mother's maiden name:
                                                        Submit
```

Occasionally a User Bank needs to inform the user of something related to an AuthorizationRequest like an account overdraft. Another situation requiring an action from the user's side is when the amount requested is unusually high or when "suspicious" user patterns have been identified. In both cases the request is *ignored* and the normal response is replaced by a message which only the (Wallet) user can read while still being delivered through the Merchant's "channel" to the Wallet. Privacy is accomplished by the User Bank encrypting the message contents with the symmetric key supplied in encryptionParameters (see Creation Data). This key is a random value generated for each Wallet invocation.

A private message like above (requiring an *action*), forces the Wallet adding the response to the user authorization data and then performing a full signed and encrypted User Authorization request again. This process may be repeated if necessary.



RefundRequest Option

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
"@qualifier": "RefundRequest",
"recipientUrl": "https://payments.bigbank.com/refund",
"amount": "550.00",
"payeeSourceAccount": {
  "@context": "https://sepa.payments.org/saturn/v3#account",
  "iban": "FR7630004003200001019471656"
"referenceId": "#1000004",
"timeStamp": "2020-08-11T22:07:50Z",
"software": {
  "name": "WebPKI.org - Payee",
  "version": "1.00"
},
"authorizationResponse": {
   Copy of the original AuthorizationResponse
                                                       https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/isf.html
"requestSignature": {
  "algorithm": "ES256",
  "publicKey": { ←
                                              Merchant signature key
     "kty": "EC",
     "crv": "P-256",
     "x": "8VY09NWUy-aVGNHZZQDIyy-H3RxLfXbiPR2SVIEubjE",
     "y": "OuHehTNjMbphW0s3nBBVdAALLdzE9x-hup4CnJ1qM-o"
   'value": "rrqbEkm7ZM6uGjnIWg-3c2YHPXsDhzVz....FsMSNotc7QvAsvn2sTFJ-GGdN5Fx6EfQ"
```

By including the account ID of the user (but *encrypted* with the Merchant's *payment provider key*), in the <u>AuthorizationResponse</u> object the Merchant can (*aided by their payment provider*), transfer money in the opposite direction. A **RefundRequest** message consists of an embedded **AuthorizationResponse** and an *amount*, signed by the Merchant. Note that the Merchant must send the refund request to *its own bank*. The Merchant's Bank is supposed to respond with (a here not shown) **RefundResponse** object.



Gas Station Option (Reserve/Capture)

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
"@qualifier": "PaymentClientRequest",
"supportedPaymentMethods": [
   Parameters removed for brevity...
"paymentRequest": {
  "payee": {
     "commonName": "Planet Gas",
     "homePage": "https://planetgas.com"
  "amount": "200.00",
  "currency": "EUR",
  "nonDirectPayment": { ←
                                       Additional object
     "type": "RESERVATION",
     "subType": "GAS_STATION",
     "fixed": true,
     "expires": "2020-08-11T16:36:00Z"
  "referenceId": "#1000017",
  "timeStamp": "2020-03-21T06:22:59Z",
  "expires": "2020-03-21T06:53:00Z",
  "software": {
     "name": "WebPKI.org - Payee",
     "version": "1.00"
                                 User Interface Implications (Non-normative)
                           Payee
                                    Planet Gas
                                    €200
                            Total
                                    Reserved, actual payment will match fuel quantity
```

Gas Station payments presume Card Payments or Hybrid Mode to be carried out.



Real Time Account Balance Option

Retrieve the ProviderAuthority extensions object

```
{
    "@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
    "@qualifier": "ProviderAuthority",
    ....

"extensions": {
    "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3/extensions#balance": "https://payments.mybank.com/balance"
}
    ....
}
```

The real time account balance option presumes that the virtual card also is equipped with a dedicated *balance key*. This key does unlike the *signature key* not require any user authorization because it can only be used to read the balance of the account associated with the virtual card. The process starts by the Wallet using the virtual card's "Bank Authority URL" to retrieve the <u>ProviderAuthority</u> object using an HTTP GET. In that object there should be an extensions object as shown above. After that the Wallet creates a <u>BalanceRequest</u> (as shown on the next slide), signs it with its balance key, and POSTs it to the URL provided by the specific balance extension.

Virtual Card Properties





Balance Key

- Payment Method URL
- Bank Authority URL
- Account ID
- · Card Logotype



BalanceRequest Message

```
"@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
  "@qualifier": "BalanceRequest",
  "recipientUrl": "https://payments.mybank.com/balance",
  "credentialId": "54674448",
  "accountId": "FR7630002111110020050050466",
  "currency": "EUR",
  "timeStamp": "2020-08-11T10:43:05+02:00",
  "software": {
     "name": "WebPKI Suite/Saturn",
     "version": "1.34"
  },
  "requestSignature": {
                                                 https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/jsf.html
     "algorithm": "ES256",
     "publicKey": { ←
                                                  Balance key of selected virtual card
       "kty": "EC",
       "crv": "P-256",
       "x": "kiTXwSkkNag5RPjFyPgSNmhPl_97qQPCbPQ2GFmMSp4",
       "y": "g8-4ymBfTg8o14EaJluDE8QmRfkrEy3M0VP61-TsoXg"
     "value": "jstrRDK-2n5FfpiAOr896f1TKuc6wTSU....5zHmAJWMkAIsnA0E679es5KgBiRIH0Ha70XejQUw"
                                         BalanceResponse Object
  "@context": "https://webpki.github.io/saturn/v3",
  "@qualifier": "BalanceResponse",
  "accountId": "FR7630002111110020050050466",
  "amount": "5543.00",
  "currency": "EUR",
  "software": {
     "name": "WebPKI.org - Bank",
     "version": "1.00"
}
```

The resulting response object holds the current balance of the specified account.



Saturn - FAQ

- Q: Doesn't Saturn's Merchant-to-User Bank AuthorizationRequest introduce security risks?
- A: Yes, similar risks as on-line bank applications which effectively are open to requests from anywhere. Security features include:
 - · Small and strict message format
 - · All messages are signed using industry standard cryptographic algorithms
 - <u>AuthorizationRequest</u> is signed by the Merchant and vouched for by the Merchant's Bank/Acquirer through the <u>PayeeAuthority</u> object which also enables *verifiable* Merchant account data
 - User signs a hash of paymentRequest with a key which only the User Bank knows about
 - · Only mutually signed authorizations are considered valid for processing
 - Integral support for RBA (Risk Based Authentication)
 - · Tokenization of payment authorizations makes attacks on Merchant databases useless
- Q: Can you trust the Wallet key storage?
- A: Saturn depends on hardware backed keys like the AndroidKeystore.
- Q: Doesn't Saturn effectively requires new client-side technology to fly?
- A: Yes indeed, exactly like Apple Pay did. W3C's https://www.w3.org/TR/payment-request/ is instrumental.
- Q: Wouldn't it be better sending requests from the Wallet directly to the User Bank and then handing over responses to the Merchant?
- A: Not really, see https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/defensive-publications/payment-authorization-scheme.pdf for more details on this matter which also is a *prerequisite for Wallet payment method independence*.
- Q: Is Saturn a "Push" or "Pull" payment system?
- A: Saturn is not a payment system, it is rather a scheme where a User authorizes Merchant-initiated requests* which are transported back to the User Bank via the Merchant. That is, the actual payment system is not a part of the depicted scheme.
- Q: How does Saturn relate to ISO 20022, ISO 8583, and SEPA?
- Q: How are Virtual Cards enrolled?
- A: Virtual Cards would typically be enrolled from the User Bank's Web site using a secure enrollment protocol like: https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/security/keygen2.html
- Q: Is Saturn a REST API?
- A: No, because a payment is not a resource but rather an event with transactional behavior. In addition, messages are uniquely defined by their JSON contents making *digitally signing*, *embedding*, *debugging*, and *documenting* straightforward. Wallet communication is based on an *interactive*, *scenario-dependent*, *asynchronous*, *bi-directional* message channel. See: https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/web/yasmin.html

^{*} Enabling Saturn supporting not only direct payments, but bookings, recurring payments, and automated gas station payments without modifications to the underlying payment system