
Casting APIs in Stone?



In an ideal world APIs evolve in a strictly controlled manner where everybody upgrade when a new version arrives. Unfortunately, this is seldom the case for any API implemented by multiple parties. Consider the following:

* One user group needs a new piece of information
* The security team wants to deploy a new encryption algorithm

**Old Solution**: We create new API version!

Well...is the new piece of information and the new encryption algorithm actually related? Probably not, effectively creating an *undesirable dependency* on a new version.

**New Solution**: Let each party publish an ***Authority Object*** describing their *current capabilities* like *Extensions*, *Algorithms*, *Keys*, *Service URLs*, *Trust Anchors*, etc. That is, *before* you invoke a party, you retrieve their ***Authority Object*** and adapt the call accordingly. This may seem like overhead, which is true. However, ***Authority Objects*** can usually be *cached* since such data is intended to be valid for a certain period like an hour or a day.

At a certain point in time, the API user community will surely find it worthwhile creating a brand new version of everything but even that can be advertised in an ***Authority Object***.

In [Saturn](https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/saturn/), which was designed to last for *decades*, this scheme has been extensively used, not only for showing capabilities, but for establishing trust (in cryptographic sense), between the participants. The latter required *digitally signed* ***Authority Objects***.

The ***Authority Object*** concept also permits the introduction of *entirely local* or "experimental" extensions without disturbing the regular use of the API. Extensions are preferably expressed as URIs.

Note that the actual *publisher* of an ***Authority Object*** may not necessarily be the same entity as the one being published!

A somewhat dated “defensive publication” covering this topic in more detail is available at:

<https://cyberphone.github.io/doc/defensive-publications/authority-objects.pdf>

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