Regression Specifications & Interpretations

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1 Conventions

- Outcome (Y_{it}): share of member (i)'s tweets in month (t) that are deficit-related (r3–r12).
  Extensive-margin models (r13–r14) use (1{Y_{it}>0}).
- All models are member–month **logits** with **member fixed effects** (_i) and **month fixed effects** (_t); SEs two-way clustered by **member** and **month**.
- Indicators & covariates: GOP(_i), LegWin(_t), PartisanWin(_t), COVID(_t), IRA(_t), TweetPart(_t) (z), DefMag(_t) (z), control_combo(_t), gop_trifecta(_t).

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2 r3 — Deficit Tweeting: Legislative Windows, Partisanship & Power

Baseline: Democrats, outside legislative windows.

Model

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname{logit}(Y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t &+ \beta_1 \operatorname{GOP}_i + \beta_2 \operatorname{LegWin}_t + \beta_3 \operatorname{PartisanWin}_t \\ &+ \beta_4 \operatorname{COVID}_t + \beta_5 \operatorname{IRA}_t + \beta_6 \operatorname{TweetPart}_t + \beta_7 \operatorname{DefMag}_t \\ &+ \beta_8(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{LegWin}_t) + \beta_9(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{PartisanWin}_t) \\ &+ \beta_{10}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{COVID}_t) + \beta_{11}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{IRA}_t) \\ &+ \beta_{12}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{TweetPart}_t) + \beta_{13}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{DefMag}_t) + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned}$$

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3 r4 — Pre/Post/Passage Effects

Baseline: Democrats, outside legislative windows.

Model

$$\begin{aligned}\operatorname{logit}(Y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t &+ \beta_1 \operatorname{GOP}_i + \beta_2 \operatorname{PreWin}_t + \beta_3 \operatorname{PassageWin}_t + \beta_4 \operatorname{PostWin}_t \\ &+ \beta_5 \operatorname{PartisanWin}_t + \beta_6 \operatorname{TweetPart}_t + \beta_7 \operatorname{DefMag}_t \\ &+ \beta_8(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{PreWin}_t) + \beta_9(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{PassageWin}_t) \\ &+ \beta_{10}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{PostWin}_t) + \beta_{11}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{PartisanWin}_t) \\ &+ \beta_{12}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{TweetPart}_t) + \beta_{13}(\operatorname{GOP}_i \times \operatorname{DefMag}_t) + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned}$$

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4 r5 — Majority Context: Presidency (LegWin × GOP)

Baseline: Democrats, presidency majority, outside legislative windows.

Model

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(Y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t &+ \beta_1\,\text{GOP}_i + \beta_2\,\text{LegWin}_t + \beta_3\,\text{MinorityPres}_t \\ &+ \beta_4(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t) + \beta_5(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t \times \text{MinorityPres}_t) \\ &+ \beta_6(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{PartisanWin}_t) + \beta_7(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{COVID}_t) \\ &+ \beta_8(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{IRA}_t) + \beta_9(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{TweetPart}_t) \\ &+ \beta_{10}(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{DefMag}_t) + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned}$$

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5 r6 — Majority Context: Chamber + Presidency

Baseline: Democrats, no control, outside legislative windows.

Model

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(Y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t &+ \beta_1\,\text{GOP}_i + \beta_2\,\text{control\_combo}_t \\ &+ \beta_3(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t) + \beta_4(\text{LegWin}_t \times \text{control\_combo}_t) \\ &+ \beta_5(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{PartisanWin}_t) + \beta_6(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{COVID}_t) \\ &+ \beta_7(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{IRA}_t) + \beta_8(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{TweetPart}_t) \\ &+ \beta_9(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{DefMag}_t) + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned}$$

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6 r7 — Mechanism: Partisanship × Legislative Windows

Baseline: Democrats, outside legislative windows, mean bill partisanship.

Model

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(Y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t &+ \beta_1\,\text{GOP}_i + \beta_2\,\text{LegWin}_t + \beta_3\,\text{TweetPart}_t \\ &+ \beta_4(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{TweetPart}_t) + \beta_5(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t) \\ &+ \beta_6(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t \times \text{TweetPart}_t) \\ &+ \beta_7(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{PartisanWin}_t) + \beta_8(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{COVID}_t) \\ &+ \beta_9(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{IRA}_t) + \beta_{10}(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{DefMag}_t) + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned}$$

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7 r8 — Mechanism: Fiscal Scale × Legislative Windows

Baseline: Democrats, outside legislative windows, mean deficit magnitude.

Model

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(Y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \,\text{GOP}_i + \beta_2 \,\text{LegWin}_t + \beta_3 \,\text{DefMag}_t \\ + \beta_4(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{DefMag}_t) + \beta_5(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t) \\ + \beta_6(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t \times \text{DefMag}_t) \\ + \beta_7(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{PartisanWin}_t) + \beta_8(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{COVID}_t) \\ + \beta_9(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{IRA}_t) + \beta_{10}(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{TweetPart}_t) + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned}$$

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8 r9 — Who Governs? GOP vs Dem Under Trifectas

Baseline: Democratic trifecta, outside legislative windows.

Model

$$\begin{aligned}\text{logit}(Y_{it}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \,\text{GOP}_i + \beta_2 \,\text{LegWin}_t + \beta_3 \,\text{gop\_trifecta}_t \\ + \beta_4(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t) + \beta_5(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{gop\_trifecta}_t) \\ + \beta_6(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{LegWin}_t \times \text{gop\_trifecta}_t) \\ + \beta_7(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{PartisanWin}_t) + \beta_8(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{IRA}_t) \\ + \beta_9(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{TweetPart}_t) + \beta_{10}(\text{GOP}_i \times \text{DefMag}_t) + \varepsilon_{it}\end{aligned}$$

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9 r13 — Extensive Margin (Binary, from r9)

Model

$$\text{logit}(1\{Y_{it} > 0\}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + [\text{same covariates as r9 with corresponding betas}] + \varepsilon_{it}$$

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10 r14 — Extensive Margin (Binary, from r6)

Model

$$\text{logit}(1\{Y_{it} > 0\}) = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + [\text{same covariates as r6 with corresponding betas}] + \varepsilon_{it}$$