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Threat Personas and Application Vulnerability Scoring Model

Phil Huggins & Robin Oldham CISO Mentor & Cydea





Objectives of this session

- Borrow UX concept of personas for a structured and reusable way to consider and discuss threats
- 2. Create some Threat Personas!
- 3. Explore a fast, developer-friendly way to use them and prioritise vulnerabilities



Phil Huggins
onacuk / LinkedIn
CISO Mentor

Robin Oldham
RTO LinkedIn
LinkedIn
Cydea

Follow along / ask questions on Twitter

Looking for outputs? Check these GitHub repos:

- Threat Personas
- VSort







AUDIENCE PARTICIPATION AHEAD







The plan...

11:00	Introduction to threat personas					
11:15	Break out - create some!					
	15m Groups of ~5, create your persona					
	5m Crowd-sourced some attributes					
	15m Present back					
11:50	Short break					
12:00	Introduction to app vulnerability scoring					
12:20	Worked example					
12:30	Your turn (based on your group/persona)					
12:45	Questions					





Threat Personas







Name and biographical info

help reader connect with them



Other useful metadata



More detailed narrative about them and what makes them tick



Characteristics or attributes. What they care about



Threat Personas



A *threat persona* is a narrative describing a fictional individual that embodies the characteristics of the threat actor under consideration.

This allows us to **structure** our consideration of threat actors in a **reusable** and **calculable** way.

The *Threat Actor Library (TAL)* developed by Tim Casey is a good example of this approach (though a bit 'GRC' in its use of language.)

Here we use some more developer-friendly language to do the same thing.

Generate these in advance for your organisation and use to inform developers about the threat they face during threat modelling sessions and application risk assessments.

Characteristics:

- Internal/External
- Malicious/Non-Malicious
- Goals (Curiosity, Personal Fame, Personal Gain, National Interests, Revenge, etc)
- **Skills** (No technical skills, End user, Power user, Developer, Researcher)
- Knowledge (External to organisation, Ex-Organisation insider, Organisation partner, Customer, Employee, Other insider)
- Opportunity (Connected to Internet, Physically nearby, Access to connected partner, Access to organisation, Access to specific network / system)
- Deterrability (Unconcerned criminal, Careful criminal, Careless law-abiding, Careful law-abiding)





Disgruntled Customer

Summary: Marie Bourdin is a customer of the business. She has consistently pushed to get access to drugs that our doctors have been uncomfortable prescribing to her. She is becoming frustrated with the business and is continuing to press for access to drugs but is starting to think about revenge. (External, Malicious)

Goals: Her main goal is to gain access to drugs that the doctors are not comfortable prescribing to her. Her secondary goal is to disrupt the business when we refuse to provide access to the drugs. (Personal Gain, Revenge)

Skills: Marie is no technical expert but she is clever and capable of understanding how systems work. (Power User)

Knowledge: She is building up knowledge of how the business works every time she interacts with us. (Customer)

Opportunity: Marie has no special access to the business other than via the Internet. (Connected to the Internet)

Deterrabilty: Marie is prepared to break the law to achieve her goals but is methodical and careful in her approach. (Careful Criminal).







Disgruntled Insider

Summary: Dr Chiara Romano is a member of the clinical team. She has been growing increasingly frustrated as she perceives she is being unfairly denied a promotion. She doesn't intend to commit criminal acts but as her frustration becomes anger she becomes focused on expressing her anger and may not realise how far she is going. (Internal / Malicious)

Goals: Her goal is to cause disruption and distress to the management team although she does not want to cause any physical harm to a patient.(Revenge)

Skills: She is a typical end-user with little deeper understanding and no access to exploits or knowledge of how to conduct scripted attacks. (User)

Knowledge: Chiara knows how the organisation works and knows the systems she uses for her day to day job. (Organisation Employee)

Opportunity: She has access to the building as does any employee but also has access to SYSTEM A as a doctor. (Access to Organisation)

Deterrabilty: Chiara doesn't believe she is criminal, she believes she is right but still acts in order to avoid detection. (Careful Criminal).







Misha Melnyk: Career criminal



EXTERNAL, MALICIOUS

Misha Melnyk is a career criminal who believes himself out of the reach of the authorities although he is careful not to commit crimes in his home country. He has been an active criminal online for about 10 years. He regularly buys exploits on the dark market but is not himself a developer.

GOALS

Personal Gain

OPPORTUNITY

Connected to the Internet

SKILLS

Power User

KNOWLEDGE

External to organisation

DETERRABILITY

Unconcerned criminal





Your turn.

Open this

OSS2020 Threat Personas

(link also in chat)





(Breakout Rooms woking on Threat Personas)





(Quick present back Persona output)





Next up--> Blitz this form Threat Persona Characteristics

(link also in chat)





(*Phew* short break... Start back 12:00!)





Application Vulnerability Scoring





Scoring Model Goals

Simple and explainable
Short, no more than 10 questions
Developer-friendly language
Question & answer driven
Relative prioritisation not objective risk



10 Questions



- 1. How skilled is the attacker?
- 2. Do the attackers have the knowledge they need to attack?
- 3. Why would the attacker attack us?
- 4. Will they work within legal and ethical boundaries?
- 5. How likely are they to find us?
- 6. How hard is the vulnerability to find?
- 7. How hard is the vulnerability to use?
- 8. How many authentication steps are required to attack the vulnerability?
- 9. Is the vulnerability protected from attack?
- 10. Is the system monitored for attacks on the vulnerability?







Attacker

- 1. Attacker Skill
- 2. Attacker Knowledge
- 3. Attacker Reward
- 4. Attacker Deterrability
- 5. Attacker Recon Approach



Vulnerability

- 6. Vuln Findability
- 7. Vuln Exploitability
- 8. Vuln Authentication
- 9. Vuln Protection
- 10. Vuln Monitoring





Model Components

Skill:

(Attacker Skill vs Vuln Exploitability) and (Attacker Skill vs Vuln Authentication)

Opportunity:

(Recon Approach and Attacker Skill and Attacker Deterrability) vs Vuln Findability

Motivation:

Attacker Reward and Skill and Opportunity

Success:

Motivation vs (Vuln Protection and Vuln Monitoring)





Spreadsheet Implementation

Threats	How skilled is the attacker?	Score	Do the attackers have the knowledge they need to attack this vulnerability?	Score	Why would the attackers attack this vulnerability?	Score	How likely are they to find this vulnerability?	Score	How likely are they to break Legal or Ethical boundaries ?	Score
	Security Researcher	10	Public Knowledge	10	High Reward	10	Internal User	10	Will break legal and ethical boundaries	4
	Developer	8	Cursory Inspection	8	Some Reward	6	Mass Scanning	8	on the limits of what is legal	1
	Power User (Scripting)	4	Private Knowledge	4	Minimal Reward	4	Accident	6	Works within Legal and ethical boundaries	-2
	User (Basic Literacy)	1	Confidential Knowledge	1	No Obvious Reward	2	Targeted	2		
Vulnerability	How hard is the vulnerability to find?	Score	How hard is the vulnerability to use?	Score	How many authentication steps are required to use the vulnerability?	Score	How well do we protect the vulnerability from attack?	Score	Are we watching for the vulnerability to be used?	Scor
	Automated	1	Automated	1	None	0	None	0	No	0
	Easy Manual	2	Easy Manual	2	One	4	Ineffective Control	2	Performance Monitoring	4
	Skilled Manual	6	Skilled Manual	6	Two	6	Hide the vuln	4	Security Monitoring	6
	Hard Manual	8	Hard Manual	8	More than Two	10	General Control	6	Exploit-Specific Monitoring	10
	Almost Impossible	10	Almost Impossible	10			Vulnerability-Specific Control	10		

Attacker Skill	(How Skilled - How Hard) - (How Skilled - Number of Auths)
Attacker Opportunity	(Likely to Attack + How Skilled + Ethical/Legal boundaries) - How hard to Find
Attacker Motivation	(Why attack + Attacker Skill + Attacker Opportunity)
Likelihood of Attacker Success	Attacker Motivation - (How well protected + How well Monitored)





OPEN SECURITY SUMMIT

Attacker

Disgruntled Insider

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- 1. Attacker Skill
- 2. Attacker Knowledge
- 3. Attacker Reward
- 4. Attacker Deterrability
- 5. Attacker Recon Approach

- = User (1)
- = Private Knowledge (4)
- = Some Reward (6)
- = Will break Ethical & Legal boundares (4)
- = Internal User (10)





Worked Example

Vulnerability

Broken access control allows an internal user to enumerate records owned by a different internal user by incrementing record identifier in the URL.

6. Vuln Findability = Automated (1)

7. Vuln Exploitability = Automated (1)

8. Vuln Authentication = None (0)

9. Vuln Protection = None (0)

10. Vuln Monitoring = Security Monitoring (6)



Worked Example



Calculation

Attacker Skill =
$$(1-1)$$
- $(1-0)$ = -1
Atatcker Opportunity = $(10+1+4)$ -1 = 14
Attacker Motivation = $(6+-1+14)$ = 19
Atatcker Success = 19 - $(0+6)$ = 13

Broken Access Control Vuln Score: 13







AUDIENCE PARTICIPATION AHEAD







Your turn...

We have discovered an XSS Injection attack via the message system on our customer web application that is available to all logged-in customer accounts.

By sending a crafted message to our customer service team via the site messaging functionality the XSS code executes in the customer service agent's browser.

The customer service agents can authorise returns, refunds and issuing gift cards as well as accessing and updating customer account data.

We do not have specific application security monitoring in the application but we do have a cloud-based WAF using the OWASP Modsecurity Core rules.





Questions to the room

- 1. Are the questions developer friendly?
- 2. Are these the right model parameters?
- 3. Do the model relationships make sense?
- 4. Are the weightings correct?
- 5. What would you add or take away?





Thank You

Robin & Phil

