

Container Images Considered Harmful

(... and some things we can do about it.)

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OPEN CONTAINER
INITIATIVE

An Ideal Image Format


Deduplicated as much as possible (*transfer and storage*)

Parallelisable (*transfer and storage*)

Reproducible (and have a canonical representation)

Non-avalanching

Transparent



What's Wrong With Tar?

- A fair bit.

An Ideal Image Format

Deduplicated as much as possible (*transfer and storage*)

Parallelisable (*transfer and storage*)

Reproducible (have a canonical representation)


“Non-avalanching”


Transparent

What Tar Gives Us


What Tar Gives Us

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I'm not pranking you – your image gets **bigger**.



opensuse/tumbleweed₁

/bin/bash

/bin/zsh

/usr/bin/ping

/usr/bin/blah

/usr/share/man/**

/usr/lib/foo.so

% oci-pull image

opensuse/tumbleweed₂

/bin/bash

/bin/zsh

/usr/bin/ping

/usr/bin/blah

/usr/share/man/**

/usr/lib/foo.so

/usr/lib64/bar.so

% umoci unpack

opensuse/tumbleweed₁

/bin/bash

/bin/zsh

/usr/bin/ping

/usr/bin/blah

/usr/share/man/**

/usr/lib/foo.so

≠

% umoci unpack

opensuse/tumbleweed₂

/bin/bash

/bin/zsh

/usr/bin/ping

/usr/bin/blah

/usr/share/man/**

/usr/lib/foo.so

/usr/lib64/bar.so

```
% oci-pull ubuntu
```

```
ubuntu:19.04
```

```
/bin/bash
```

```
/bin/zsh
```

```
/usr/bin/apt
```

```
/usr/bin/ping
```

```
/usr/share/man/**
```

```
/usr/lib/libc.so
```

```
% oci-pull opensuse
```

```
opensuse/tumbleweed
```

```
/bin/bash
```

```
/bin/zsh
```

```
/usr/bin/ping
```

```
/usr/bin/zypper
```

```
/usr/share/man/**
```

```
/usr/lib/libc.so
```

```
% oci-build myimg
```

myimg₁

/foo/**

/opt/bar/**

/usr/share/man/**

/usr/lib/libc.so

≠

```
% oci-build myimg
```

myimg₂


/foo/**


/usr/share/man/**


/usr/lib/libc.so


/opt/bar/**

What is the alternative?












(v1)






(v2)



Another alternative...






(v2)





(v2-alternative)



reflinks


Root Filesystem



Stop!


Demo time.

Bill of Materials



What is actually in
this thing?

Bill of Materials



Yet More Alternatives...

- `catar` (from systemd) does attempt to solve similar problems.
 - Might be useful for transfer, but doesn't match our reflink storage needs.
 - Maybe using a “single blob” model for transfer (like `catar`) would help.
 - OCI distribution could use HTTP Range requests.
 - Have a catar-like jump-table at the tail of the blob.

Where?

- <https://github.com/openSUSE/umoci>
 - There is a *very* experimental branch with the demo code.
- <https://www.cyphar.com/blog/post/20190121-ociv2-images-i-tar/>
 - The much more long-form rant about tar.
- <https://github.com/cyphar/talks>
 - Where you can get the slides later.


Next Steps?

- Reduce size of transfers (compression still beats us in many cases).
- Design the “bill of materials” format.
- Write a specification and submit it for review.
 - Make sure all possible users are happy with switching.
- Get everyone to switch.
 - This last one might take a while.


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Questions?




Pictured: A Humble File.



| | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|-----|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | foo | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|-----|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | bar | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |



baz

| Node | Color | Value |
|------|-----------|-------|
| baz | Yellow | 100 |
| bar | Red | 60 |
| foo | Red | 20 |
| qux | Dark Blue | 20 |
| bar1 | Red | 30 |
| bar2 | Red | 20 |
| bar3 | Red | 10 |
| foo1 | Red | 20 |
| qux1 | Dark Blue | 20 |

FINGERPRINTING BY RANDOM POLYNOMIALS

by


Michael O. Rabin
Department of Mathematics
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

and

Department of Computer Science
Harvard University

We have to go back (to 1981)!

Content-Defined Chunking



Pictured: A(nother) Humble File.

