

# **LI.FI Security Review**

DexManagerFacet.sol(v1.0.2)

## **Security Researcher**

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#### 1 About Researcher

Sujith Somraaj is a distinguished security researcher and protocol engineer with over eight years of comprehensive experience in the Web3 ecosystem.

In addition to working as a Security researcher at Spearbit, Sujith is also the security researcher and advisor for bridge protocols, including LI.FI & Garden. Finance (over \$16B in combined volume) and also is a former founding engineer and current CISO at Superform, a yield aggregator with over \$170M in TVL.

Sujith has experience working with protocols including Berachain, Optimism, Monad, Blast, ZkSync, Decent, Drips, SuperSushi Samurai, DistrictOne, Omni-X, Centrifuge, Superform-V2, Tea.xyz, Paintswap, Bitcorn, Sweep n' Flip, Byzantine Finance, Variational Finance, Satsbridge and Angles

Learn more about Sujith on sujithsomraaj.xyz or on cantina.xyz

#### 2 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of that given smart contract(s) or blockchain software. i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee against a hack (or) the non existence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, I always recommend proceeding with several audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Lastly, the security audit is not an investment advice.

This review is done independently by the reviewer and is not entitled to any of the security agencies the researcher worked / may work with.

### 3 Scope

src/Facets/DexManagerFacet.sol(v1.0.2)

#### 4 Risk classification

Severity level	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: high	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: low	Medium	Low	Low

#### 4.1 Impact

**High** leads to a loss of a significant portion (>10%) of assets in the protocol, or significant

harm to a majority of users.

**Medium** global losses <10% or losses to only a subset of users, but still unacceptable.

**Low** losses will be annoying but bearable — applies to things like griefing attacks that can

be easily repaired or even gas inefficiencies.

#### 4.2 Likelihood

High almost certain to happen, easy to perform, or not easy but highly incentivized

Medium only conditionally possible or incentivized, but still relatively likely

**Low** requires stars to align, or little-to-no incentive

### 4.3 Action required for severity levels

**Critical** Must fix as soon as possible (if already deployed)

**High** Must fix (before deployment if not already deployed)

Medium Should fix

**Low** Could fix

### 5 Executive Summary

Over the course of 1 hours in total, LI.FI engaged with the researcher to audit the contracts described in section 3 of this document ("scope").

In this period of time a total of 0 issues were found. This review focussed only on the patch of an infinite loop issue in the batchAddDex function of the DexManagerFacet, not the facet on its entirety.

Project Summary				
Project Name	LI.FI			
Repository	lifinance/contracts			
Commit	299df50b5d584acb0c81			
Audit Timeline	April 13, 2025			
Methods	Manual Review			

Issues Found			
Critical Risk	0		
High Risk	0		
Medium Risk	0		
Low Risk	0		
Gas Optimizations	0		
Informational	0		
Total Issues	0		

# 6 Findings