# **Empreinte Sociométrique**

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#### **Abstract**

We describe an algorithm that takes contact data to represent the social footprint of a person in a secure and universal way. It allows recognizing an identity without sharing or exposing any personal information to any potential eavesdropper. It could evolve with time and may carry the whole contact history of a person, making it possible to verify if he or she matches with even very old data, all without needing any kind of disclosure between parties. Last update: this technique is pending patent.

# I. Introduction

Ike a tyre or a shoe leaving a distinctive mark on the ground, or a finger on a glass, each one of us leaves a trace the more specific the richer our social interactions are. In particular, the history of our contact data is every day more distinct to someone else's. Even before we move from our parents house, we start leaving personal trails (a first cell phone, a pseudo we use for a game, ...) and, of course, our full civil status (names, date of birth, etc.).

Of course, we wouldn't want to share all these information to everyone. So, ensuring maximum security is obviously mandatory when it comes to manipulating personal data.

We herein describe a way to build such a safe footprint that we call *Empreinte Sociométrique*[1] and that is both totally secure, thanks to the use of strong pseudonymization techniques, and particularly effective, that is it ensures that, even though two different *Empreintes Sociométriques* don't look quite alike, they might be representing the same person, but no external stakeholder may ever know.

Embedded in a QR Code or used as is, it could become an assistant to any identification device or to further data manipulation, such as secure deduplication and anonymous enrichment, or even blind comparison of customer databases, all in full compliance with the latest regulations (GDPR, CCPA, . . . ).

# II. FORMAL DESCRIPTION

#### 1. General Algorithm

An *Empreinte Sociométrique*<sup>1</sup> takes an input data characterized by its source and its type and operates several operations to form the final elements: its corpus and its signature concatenated into one long string.

**Definition 1** (Source Data). A source data  $\varsigma$  is the actual contact data we want to print in the *Empreinte Sociométrique*, eg. "Cyril".

It is defined in the *words* space:  $\omega$ .

**Definition 2** (Data Type). We define the data type  $\tau$  as a code defining which kind of source data we are dealing with, eg. "firstname".

It is defined in a set of data types  $\mathcal{T}^2$ .

**Definition 3** (Input Data). We define an input data  $d_i$  as a tuple of data type and source data:

$$d_i := [d_i^{\tau}, d_i^{\varsigma}] \text{ with } \left\{ egin{array}{l} d_i^{\tau} \in \mathcal{T}, ext{the data type} \\ d_i^{\varsigma} \in \omega, ext{the source data} \end{array} 
ight.$$

**Definition 4** (Recombined Contact). A recombined contact is a final contact data potentially made out of different input data.

For example, you can create a recombined address4 by concatenating a streetName with a streetNumber.

Let  $\nu: \omega \to \omega$  be a normalization function that takes an input data and returns its normalized counterpart.

 $<sup>^{*} \</sup>mbox{filed}$  under registration number FR1905778 at INPI on May 29, 2019

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>a literate translation being a *Sociometric Imprint* 

 $<sup>^2</sup>$ see Table 1 for available values in  ${\cal T}$ 

And let  $\rho: \omega^n \to \omega$  be a recombination function that takes several input data to build a missing recombined contact.

Finally, let  $\mathfrak{h}()$  be a cryptographic hashing function<sup>3</sup>,  $\mathfrak{c}(msg, key)$  an encryption function and  $\zeta()$  a compression algorithm.

# **Algorithm 1:** Overall construction

**Input:** A vector  $\mathbf{d} := \{d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n\}$  of input data, a key K

**Output:** The *Empreinte Sociométrique* or an error

1 if  $d = \emptyset$  then

throw empty input data set

3 initialize the set of normalized data  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \emptyset$ ;

4 for  $i \leftarrow 0$  to n by 1 do 5 | if  $d_i^{\tau} \notin \mathcal{T}$  then 6 | continue;

7 normalize input data:  $d_{Norm} \leftarrow \nu(d_i)$ ;

8 | **if**  $d_{Norm} \neq \emptyset$  **then** 9 |  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow d_{Norm}$ ;

10 create the set of recombined contacts  $\mathcal{R}$  from the normalized data:  $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow \rho(\mathcal{D})$ ;

initialize the vector of ciphered contacts  $\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \emptyset$ ;

12 for  $i \leftarrow 0$  to  $\|\mathcal{R}\|$  by 1 do 13  $\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \mathfrak{h}(\mathcal{R}_i)$ ;

14 initialize the sets of categorized contacts:

 $\mathcal{V}$  the variants, and  $\overline{\mathcal{V}}$  the invariants;

15 for 
$$i \leftarrow 0$$
 to  $\|\mathcal{C}\|$  by 1 do  
16 | if  $\mathcal{C}_i$  is invariant then  
17 |  $\overline{\mathcal{V}} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}_i$ ;  
18 | else  
19 |  $\mathcal{V} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}_i$ ;

20 build the corpus c using  $\mathcal{V}$  and  $\overline{\mathcal{V}}$ ;

21 encrypt it and compress it to build the *Empreinte Sociométrique*:

$$ES \leftarrow \zeta \circ \mathfrak{c}(c, K);$$

22 return ES;

Algorithm 1 describes the general steps to take that leads from a set of input data to its

Empreinte Sociométrique.

In a nutshell, the whole process could be summed up as follows:

- Data handling;
- Normalization of contact data;
- Recombination to maximize endpoints;
- Ciphering of each endpoint;
- Organization of the corpus;
- Encryption;
- Compression;
- Signature and final packaging.

To ensure maximum security, the whole operation should take place on the data owner side.

# 2. Step-by-Step Process

As seen in Algorithm 1, the very first step applied to an input data  $d_i$  is to check whether it is a valid or not.

At this stage, an input data would be deemed invalid for two reasons:

- The source data is empty:  $d_i^{\varsigma} = \emptyset$ ;
- The data type doesn't exist:  $d_i^{\tau} \notin \mathcal{T}$ .

Each invalid input data is discarded while each valid one is then applied the normalization function  $\nu()$ .

#### 2.1 Normalization

The goal of such a normalization is to homogenize source data to make sure the subsequent operations handle equivalent data.

**Definition 5** (Equivalence). We speak of data equivalence when we cannot distinguish them from one another after normalization:

$$\forall x, y \in \omega : x \equiv y$$

$$\iff \begin{cases} x^{\tau} = y^{\tau} \\ \|\nu(x)\| = \|\nu(y)\| \\ n \leftarrow \|\nu(x)\|, \forall i := [1..n] : \\ \nu(x)[i] = \nu(y)[i] \end{cases}$$
 (2)

In other words, two input data are said equivalent if they share the same data type and their normalized versions are identical.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>set as a system parameter

Normalization could be applied differently depending on the data type  $d^{\tau}$ .

The following are the transformations that might be applied to an input data source  $d^{\varsigma}$ :

 Replacement of punctation and special characters by spaces, eg.

• Trim and extraction of excess spaces, eg.

$$\sl My\sl Sdata \mapsto My\sl Sdata = My data$$

- Removal of accents, eg. é  $\mapsto$  e, ñ  $\mapsto$  n;
- Capitalization, eg. Cyril → CYRIL;
- Dictionary substitution eg.

$$\left. \begin{array}{c} \text{AVE} \\ \text{AVENUE} \\ \text{AVN} \\ \text{AVNU} \end{array} \right\} \longmapsto \text{AV} \qquad \begin{array}{c} \text{F} \\ \text{Madam} \\ \text{Ms} \\ \text{Mrs} \end{array} \right\} \mapsto 2 \quad \textit{etc}.$$

In some case, normalization could transform the source data to a single space which in turn would lead to  $d_i$  being discarded.

# Example 1. Let

be two source data of the same data type:

$$d_1^{ au}=d_2^{ au}= ext{address4},$$

then we have:

$$\nu(d_1^{\varsigma}) = \nu(d_2^{\varsigma}) = d_2^{\varsigma} \Longrightarrow d_1 \equiv d_2$$

As  $d_1$  and  $d_2$  are equivalent, only one of them would be kept in the set of normalized data  $\mathcal{D}$  to pass onto the recombination step.

#### 2.2 Recombination

Once the data will be irreversibly ciphered into the final *Empreinte Sociométrique*, we need to maximize the chance to get a match when using it, the goal of the recombination function  $\rho$ 

is to provide as many representations as possible of the data.

Each data type may have dozens or even hundreds of possible combinations so we won't detail them here. Instead, we will use an example.

## **Example 2.** Let the vector **d** be the input data:

```
{(gender, Mr.), (firstname, John),
  (middle, F.), (lastname, Kennedy),
  (streetNumber, 1600), (streetName,
Pennsylvania Avenue), (city, Washington),
  (zip, DC 20500)}
```

Let  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \nu(\mathbf{d})$  be a set of normalized data:

```
{1, JOHN, F, KENNEDY, 1600, PENNSYLVANIA AV, WASHINGTON, DC 20500}
```

Then  $\mathcal{R} \leftarrow \rho(\mathcal{D})$  might yield the following additional values:

- 1 JOHN;
- JOHN F;
- 1 JOHN F;
- JOHN KENNEDY;
- 1 JOHN KENNEDY;
- JOHN F KENNEDY;
- 1 JOHN F KENNEDY;1600 PENNSYLVANIA AV;
- WASHINGTON DC 20500;
- 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AV WASHINGTON DC 20500;
- JOHN KENNEDY 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AV WASHINGTON DC 20500;
- 1 JOHN KENNEDY 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AV WASHINGTON DC 20500;
- JOHN F KENNEDY 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AV WASHINGTON DC 20500;
- 1 JOHN F KENNEDY 1600 PENNSYLVANIA AV WASHINGTON DC 20500.

$$\implies \|\mathcal{R}\| = 22$$

Once ciphered, these 22 recombined contacts will form the basis of the corpus.

## 2.3 Ciphering

As we want to take advantage of the very characteristics of cryptographic hashing, ie. making an input its unique yet irreversible fixed-length image, and as we want it to be both secure and

widely spread to devices, the cipher  $\mathfrak{h}()$  to apply to each item of  $\mathcal{R}$  should be a well-known well-tested cryptographic hashing function:

$$\forall i \in [1.. \|\mathcal{R}\|] : \mathcal{C}_i \leftarrow \mathfrak{h}(\mathcal{R}_i) \tag{3}$$

Note. Because of the subsequent steps of our process, the strength of  $\mathfrak{h}()$  is actually not that important, so it could be an algorithm as trivial as MD-5 or a more secure one such as Blake-2 or Keccak<sup>4</sup>.

The only thing mandatory is to set it once and for all to be sure any future utilization will use the same cipher.

# 2.4 Corpus

Lorem ipsum ...

# 2.5 Signature

Lorem ipsum ...

# 2.6 Output

Lorem ipsum ...

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# REFERENCES

[1] Cyril Dever. Système de traitement d'une base de données personnelle par un opérateur extérieur, patent pending FR1905778, 2019.

 $<sup>^4{\</sup>rm Short\,list\,available\,on\,Wikipedia:\,https://bit.ly/3bDpGxd}$ 

# Appendix

 Table 1: Input data types

Code	Description	Examples
gender	Title or gender	M, Mr., 1,
firstname	First name or given name	John
middle	Middle initials or other names	J., John
birthname	Birth name	Kennedy
lastname	Last name or married name	Kennedy
suffix	Suffix	Jr.
birthdate	Date of birth	
birthplace	Place of birth	
addresses	List of postal address	(see Table 2)
aliases	List of aliases	(see Table 3)
emails	List of e-mail addresses	(see Table 4)
ids	List of official IDs	(see Table 5)
mobiles	List of mobile phones	(see Table 6)
phones	List of telephone numbers	(see Table 7)
socials	List of social media	(see Table 8)
updated Unix timestamp of collect		1544529071

 Table 2: Address data type

Field	Definition	Possible values (or examples)
type Address type		"birth" \rangle "home" \rangle "work"
address2	Additional name	c/o Mme Dupont
address3	Additional address	Apt. 123
address4	Street number and name	1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
address5	PO Box or locality	BP 987
address6	City and ZIP code	Washington, DC 20500
address7	International destination	U.S.A.
city	City	Washington
country	Country	United States of America
fullAddress	Full address	1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, DC 20500
streetName	Street name	Pennsylvania Ave NW
streetNumber	Street number	1600
zip	ZIP code	DC 20500
updated	Time of collect	1544529071

 Table 3: Alias data type

Field	Definition	Possible values (or examples)
type	Alias type	
value	Alias value	John John
updated	Time of collect	1544529071

**Table 4:** *E-mail data type* 

Field	Definition	Possible values (or examples)
type	E-mail type	"business"∨"personal"
value	E-mail address	john@john.com
isHash	If is already hashed	true V false
engine	Hashing algorithm	"blake2"∨"md5"
updated	Time of collect	1544529071

 Table 5: ID data type

Field	Definition	Possible values (or examples)
type	ID type	
value	ID value	1234567890abcdef
isHash	If is already hashed	true $\lor$ false
engine	Hashing algorithm	"blake2" ∨ "md5"
updated	Time of collect	1544529071

 Table 6: Mobile phone data type

Field	Definition	Possible values (or examples)
type	Mobile phone type	"business"∨"personal"
value	Mobile phone number	+33 (0) 623 456 789
isHash	If is already hashed	true V false
engine	Hashing algorithm	"blake2"∨"md5"
format	Format	"+dd (d) ddd ddd"
updated	Time of collect	1544529071

 Table 7: Telephone data type

Field	Definition	Possible values (or examples)
type	Telephone type	"business"∨"personal"
value	Phone number	+33 (0) 123 456 789
isHash	If is already hashed	true V false
engine	Hashing algorithm	"blake2"∨"md5"
format	Format	"+dd (d) ddd ddd"
updated	Time of collect	1544529071

 Table 8: Social media data type

Field	Definition	Possible values (or examples)
type	Alias type	"facebook" \rangle "linkedin" \rangle "twitter" \rangle "youtube"
value	Alias value	@john
updated	Time of collect	1544529071