



Statically Typed String Sanitation Inside a Python

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Problem

Web applications must ultimately command systems, such as web browsers and database engines, using strings. Strings derived from improperly sanitized user input are therefore a potential vector for command injection attacks.

Milieu

To address the largest security threat facing today's web applications:

- **Developers** use libraries and frameworks which ultimately **ground out to operations on strings**.
- **Researchers** propose information flow and taint analyses, which are often **attack-specific**, can become complicated, and do not generalize to arbitrary validation tasks (e.g., “is this a unix file path?”).

Approach

We introduce **regular expression types** for classifying strings and equip these types with standard operations. Our approach makes it possible to specify and verify correctness of conventional implementations of input sanitation procedures.

References

- N. Fulton, C. Omar, and J. Aldrich. Statically typed string sanitation inside a python. First International Workshop on Privacy and Security in Programming (PSP). ACM, 2014.

Two Illustrative Excerpts

String **concatenation** is typed using regular expression concatenation:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{S-T-CONCAT} \\
 \frac{\Psi \vdash e_1 : \text{stringin}[r_1] \quad \Psi \vdash e_2 : \text{stringin}[r_2]}{\Psi \vdash \text{rconcat}(e_1; e_2) : \text{stringin}[r_1 \cdot r_2]}
 \end{array}
 \qquad
 \begin{array}{c}
 \text{S-E-CONCAT} \\
 \frac{e_1 \Downarrow \text{rstr}[s_1] \quad e_2 \Downarrow \text{rstr}[s_2]}{\text{rconcat}(e_1; e_2) \Downarrow \text{rstr}[s_1 s_2]}
 \end{array}$$

Substring operations pattern match on the head of a string. Regular expression derivatives provide a natural approximation (lhl is roughly the derivative of lhd):

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{S-T-CASE} \\
 \frac{\Psi \vdash e_1 : \text{stringin}[r] \quad \Psi \vdash e_2 : \sigma \quad \Psi, x : \text{stringin}[\text{lhd}(r)], y : \text{stringin}[\text{lhl}(r)] \vdash e_3 : \sigma}{\Psi \vdash \text{rstrcase}(e_1; e_2; x, y.e_3) : \sigma}
 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{S-E-CASE-}\epsilon \\
 \frac{e_1 \Downarrow \text{rstr}[\epsilon] \quad e_2 \Downarrow v_2}{\text{rstrcase}(e_1; e_2; x, y.e_3) \Downarrow v_2}
 \end{array}
 \qquad
 \begin{array}{c}
 \text{S-E-CASE-CONCAT} \\
 \frac{e_1 \Downarrow \text{rstr}[as] \quad [\text{rstr}[a], \text{rstr}[s]/x, y]e_3 \Downarrow v_3}{\text{rstrcase}(e_1; e_2; x, y.e_3) \Downarrow v_3}
 \end{array}$$

This system (λ_{RS}) also contains **replacement**, **checked casts** and **dynamically checked coercions**. See the paper for details[1].

Implementation Example

We are working toward a regular string types library for the extensible programming language Atlang.

```

1 @fn
2 def sanitize(s : stringin[r'.*']):
3     return (s.replace(r'"', '&quot;')
4               .replace(r'<', '&lt;')
5               .replace(r'>', '&gt;'))
6
7 @fn
8 def query(s : stringin[r'^"]*'):
9     return 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE ' +
10           'name=' + s + ' '
11
12 @fn
13 def div(s : stringin[r'^<>]*'):
14     return '<div>Results for '+s+'</div>'
15
16 @fn
17 def main():
18     input = sanitize(user_input())
19     results = db_execute(query(input))
20     return div(input) + format(results)

```