2020

POLICING THE UNIVERSITY

SPECIAL REPORT FOR COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Introduction

The contemporary debate regarding policing brings forth new challenges to the university's relationship between its own security apparatus and law enforcement. The university public safety system is inextricably tied to a violent history of policing. In other words, securing the university cannot be removed from its parental entity: policing the university. Policing the university is antithetical to any academic mission of intellectual freedom because it constrains the free exchange of ideas due to the purview of surveillance, force, and violence. Deterring, preventing, foreseeing, and solving crime are not easy tasks. While crime remains a reality for all college and university campuses, critical questions demand critical answers.

This report investigates and studies the problems of justice inherent to the university security and police system. First, a historical approach serves to frame the university security and police system as structurally and operationally similar to the municipal police model. This section also focuses on efforts to professionalize campus safety departments, especially after the protests of 1968. The second section serves to frame the university security and police system through the judicial challenges and legislative reforms of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. This section highlights the state and federal regulations of campus security, including efforts to publicize statistics of crime that occurs on campus and nearby public property. The third section attempts to create an operational model of the university security and police system. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections are a case study of Columbia University's public safety system with an added focus on its affiliated institutions, Barnard College and Teachers College. The seventh section ends with a list of recommendations to the Columbia administration.

Historical Background

First Campus Police Department

The history of the university security and police apparatus formally began in 1894 with the establishment of the Yale Police Department (YPD). The first department of its kind—creating a model for the types of security and policing systems that exist on today's college campuses—the YPD was created in response to tense relations between Yale students and the larger New Haven community. Two New Haven police officers, William Weiser and James Donnelly, were initially "assigned exclusively to the Yale campus as a means of effecting better student-police relations."[1] The University eventually hired Weiser and Donnelly away from the New Haven Police Department, forming the YPD with Weiser as Chief. This development technically allowed these officers to retain their official police authority, including the power of arrest.

In his memoir, Chief Weiser highlighted the professional standard to which he committed his work, which would later dominate many aspects of the growth and professionalization of campus security, including a commitment to service and protection.[2] He wrote,

> Our duties were to protect the students, their property, and all college property from injury…. As we were constantly on the lookout for opportunities to show the students our good will, we began to be tolerated. Gradually things began to change…. The cloud of suspicion lifted and finally we basked in the sunshine of good fellowship. We have now arrived at a position where we are identified with the University; we belong on the campus; we are friendly with the students; and we stand ready at all times to render to everybody such favors or assistance as may be in our power.[3]

[1] John W. Powell, Michael S. Pander, and Robert C. Nielsen*, Campus Security and Law Enforcement*, (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1994), 3.
[2] *E.g.,* The core values of Columbia University Public Safety, similarly, are pride, professionalism, and service.
[3] Chief William Weiser in Powell, Pander and Nielsen 1994, 5.

Professionalization Era

By the 1920s and 1930s universities coordinated with local police to handle serious criminal matters while facilities and grounds departments handled most of the custodial and security needs through the use of watchmen, who were responsible for protecting college property and performing other maintenance tasks. By the end of the 1930s the responsibilities of these watchmen had evolved to begin to deal with the enforcement of university policies, regulations, and codes of conduct.

With the enactment of the G.I. Bill in 1944 and a growing middle class with new white-collar aspirations, the 1950s saw an explosion in university enrollment, changing the needs and landscape of campus security operations. College administrators began to follow the model that Yale had established—hiring retired police officers to lead campus security departments in exchange for a low wage. However, "most of these former police officers did not have any administrative experience and merely tried to set up departments similar to those from which they had retired."[4] In 1953, a group of security administrators established the Northeastern College and University Security Association to foster professionalism and the exchange of information.[5]

Protests of 1968

The worldwide protests of 1968 were truly global, and college campuses were no exception. As a matter of fact, college campuses were often a stage for some of these demonstrations, especially at Columbia University.[6] On May 22, 1968, between two and five in

[4] *Ibid*. *E.g*., paramilitary ranks such as captain, corporal, sergeant, and lieutenant, which are still widely used today, were one such structural component that was borrowed from the institution of policing.
[5] *Ibid*. This organization is now called the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA), has over 800 institutional partners, and offers accreditation, training, and management services.
[6] *See* Michael A. Baker, *Police On Campus: The Mass Police Action at Columbia University, Spring, 1968*, (New York: New York Civil Liberties Union, 1969), 19: "April 23, 9:00 PM: all campus entrances are closed except guarded gates at 116th and Broadway and 116th and Amsterdam. Approximately 50 New York City policeman are on campus during the afternoon and evening."

the morning, “nearly 1,000 policemen” were on Columbia’s campus where “extensive police violence occurred.”[7] Protests occurred nationwide at many colleges and universities including Harvard, Cornell, University of Georgia, and Kent State University in Ohio where the National Guard ultimately shot several students. The student dissent era of the 1960s and 1970s arguably offered the biggest push towards the professionalization of college security departments.

Because local and state police were not sensitive to the issues facing campuses, often resorting to violence and forceful arrests, college administrators had to solve the central tension of guaranteeing both public safety and a degree of academic freedom. The philosophy was that institutions ought to control these situations on campus with their own personnel rather than calling in local police. As a result, campus security had to evolve to meet institutional needs and problems. Before 1968, many campus security professionalization efforts mirrored those of their municipal police counterparts with respect to training, hiring practices, and organizational structures.[8] While evolved campus security operations retained certain police structures, they differentiated in other respects.

The evolved operations developed into highly professional, well-trained security departments that reflected the sophistication and academic mission of the institution. Salaries and benefits became competitive, recruitment standards and job requirements increased, departmental budgets increased alongside technological advancements, and even new uniforms were designed

[7] *Ibid.*, 24.
[8] K.J. Peak, "The professionalization of campus law enforcement: comparing campus and municipal police agencies," in *Campus Crime: Legal, Social, and Policy Perspectives* by Bonnie S. Fisher and John J. Sloan III, (Springfield: C.C. Thomas, 1995), 231. Peak references Uchida’s (1993) historical analysis of American policing and the professionalization efforts between 1910 and 1960. These efforts were designed to make officers “experts…ensuring they were the only people qualified to do the job,” as well as “increasing autonomy of urban police departments…. [and making] departments administratively efficient.” Efforts were also undertaken to enhance the quality of police personnel through “I.Q. tests, psychiatric evaluations, and neurological tests for prospective officers.” *See also* Eugene A. Paoline III and John J. Sloan III, “Variability in the organizational structure of contemporary campus law enforcement agencies: A national-level analysis,” *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 26, no. 4 (2003).

to reflect a University operation rather than a municipal one. These newly established departments were relocated into new spaces, responding now to presidents and vice presidents rather than the head of the physical plant, and service, professionalism, and prevention became their core values. Some departments were codified by law into private police departments, while others solely remained private security departments.

"A Brief History of Anti-Black Violence and Policing at Columbia University" by Columbia Black Students' Organization (BSO)

In their 2019 report Columbia BSO detailed extensive accounts of anti-Black violence from 1968 to the present within the Columbia community and Harlem neighborhood, including incidents involving both Columbia and Barnard Public Safety.[9] The report is a history of the broad and disproportionate violence that Black students and Harlem residents have faced because of hyper-criminalization, gentrification, police militarization, and counterinsurgency tactics, including Columbia University Public Safety's involvement in the largest gang raid in the city's history.[10] BSO's report serves to frame the violent history of the campus security apparatus within the institutional context of Columbia and her affiliates. This report, in accordance with BSO's historical account, recognizes that the campus security apparatus is inextricably tied to a violent history of anti-Black policing.

[9] Columbia University Black Students' Organization, " A Brief History of Anti-Black Violence and Policing at Columbia University," (New York: BSO Political Committee, 2019), https://drive.google.com/file/d/163tgQpWNfFpnQez5D6zzX7cpU-UqApNY/view.
[10] *Ibid.*, 1.

New Challenges

The professionalization of campus security departments did not make crime magically disappear. There were now policies and procedures to effectively respond to and mitigate crime, but crime was still a reality that warranted further protection by institutional authorities. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, colleges and universities now had to confront a new dilemma—liability resulting from injury. Torts against colleges and universities defined this era in the history of the campus security apparatus, eventually leading towards state and federal legislation that would completely revolutionize future campus security operations.

Legal Background

A Test of Torts

The first tort suits brought against colleges by students were litigated through the 1970s and 80s, with these types of suits becoming routine only in the 80s.[11] These cases provided an impetus for colleges to not only prevent liability concerns on their campus, but also actively foresee and control such threats. In fact, before 1978, there was essentially no legal precedent concerning institutional liability for damages related to campus crime, but by the 1980s, those precedents had been well settled.[12]

The theories of liability advanced by these lawsuits claimed that institutions of higher education (IHEs) have a duty to warn about known risks and provide adequate security protection.

[11] Michael Clay Smith, "Vexatious Victims of Campus Crime," in *Campus Crime: Legal, Social, and Policy Perspectives* by Bonnie S. Fisher and John J. Sloan III, (Springfield: C.C. Thomas, 1995), 25.
[12] *Ibid*., 26.

Additionally, these duties are not owed to everyone, but rather only to those persons with whom the institution maintained a special relationship, such as students, employees, and guests invited for business. One such case, *Figueroa v. Evangelical Covenant Church* established this when a nonaffiliate was abducted from a college parking lot when she went to leave her child at the college-operated day-care center. The court concurred that she was not a business invitee of the institution, but rather a licensee, and thus the institution had no special relationship with her and owed her no duty of security protection.

Duarte v. State was the first to establish a duty to warn of known risks. Tanya Gardini, a first-year at California State University (CSU) in San Diego, was murdered in her residence hall by a nonaffiliate. Her mother, Yvonne Duarte, sued CSU alleging that the "university expressly and impliedly represented that the housing facilities were reasonably safe and secure for their occupants," and that she was not told of known prior crimes upon inquiry.[13] *Duarte* established that institutions have a duty to be honest and forthright when asked about known risks.

Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. extended this duty to impose a positive duty on institutions to warn potential victims of foreseeable risks, even without request. Kathleen Peterson, a student at the community college, suffered injuries when "an unidentified male jumped from behind 'unreasonably thick and untrimmed foliage and trees' which adjoined the stairway and attempted to rape her."[14] The facts showed that the college had known of prior attacks at the same location, and that they "did not publicize the prior incidents or in any way warn the plaintiff that she was in danger of being attacked in that area of campus."[15]

[13] *Duarte v. State*, 148 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
[14] *Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist.*, 36 Cal.3d 799 (Cal. 1984)
[15] *Ibid*.

Peterson highlighted another duty under an alternative theory of liability: duty to provide adequate security protection. Whether that means providing sufficient light in a certain area at night or the trimming of shrubbery that can create hiding places and opportunities for crime, as evident in the aforementioned case, colleges have a duty to not only warn of foreseeable risks, but also provide sufficient security. The seminal case for providing appropriate security measures is *Miller v. State of New York*.

Madelyn Miller, a student at the State University of New York at Stony Brook (SUNY), was raped twice in her dormitory building at knife point, threatened by mutilation or death if she made noise. In court, Miller alleged that "strangers were not uncommon in the hallways, and there had been reports to campus security of men being present in the women's bathroom," and that Miller

> herself had complained twice to the Assistant Quad Manager of her dormitory area about nonresidents loitering in the dormitory lounges and hallways when they were not accompanied by resident students. The school newspaper had published accounts of numerous crimes in the dormitories such as armed robbery, burglaries, criminal trespass, and a rape by a nonstudent. Notwithstanding these reports, the doors at all of the approximately 10 entrances to the dormitory building were concededly kept unlocked at all hours, although the doors each contained a locking mechanism.[16]

Because of these circumstances, the court held that since the State acted as landlord it was "vested by such law with the ownership, care, custody, control and maintenance of school properties….and in particular [Miller's] dormitory, and that the injuries suffered were caused by the State's negligence in its failure to maintain reasonable security."[17] Other reasonable dangers, such as inadequate fences and gates, as well as insufficient campus patrolling, as argued in *Mullins v. Pine Manor College* can constitute liability for damages incurred.

[16] *Miller v. State of New York*, 62 N.Y. 2d 506 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984).
[17] *Ibid.*

The circumstances regarding adequate and reasonable protection are fact-specific. The courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have been hesitant to impose any duty to guarantee the prevention of crime through policing.[18] However, as the Arizona Supreme Court indicated in *Jesik v. Maricopa Community College*, a duty to provide police protection could emerge in some situations. Peter Jesik, a student involved in a violent argument, "reported this threat to Scott Hilton, a security guard employed by Phoenix College, and received assurances of help and protection…. Hilton, the complaint alleges, failed to arm himself or take any other precautionary measures."[19] Jesik was later killed by the student, whom the security guard did not properly screen or question after Jesik's reporting of the confrontation. The court held "that the statutory duty of adequate supervision coupled with notice imposed a specific duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the decedent," such as calling the police.[20] As shown, duties to provide adequate protection vary case by case.

Recent cases have highlighted exactly this. After the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007, families of victims sued Virginia Tech for negligence for not providing timely warnings to students about what was happening on the campus. Prior lower court decisions upheld the claims to negligence by the families, but in 2013, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed these decisions indicating that "there was no duty for the Commonwealth to warn students about the potential for criminal acts by third parties."[21] The State argued that the acts of the gunman were unforeseeable because of the confusion and uncertainty regarding his actions, and that regardless of whether or

[18] *See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs*., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), "which held that the due process clause does not impose an affirmative obligation upon government to ensure that citizens are not harmed through the wrongful acts of other private citizens…. [and] that a failure of police protection will not generally constitute a deprivation of the civil rights of someone injured by a criminal."
[19] *Jesik v. Maricopa Community College*, 125 Ariz. 543 (1980)
[20] *Ibid*.
[21] *Commonwealth of Virginia v. Peterson*, 80 Va. Cir. 21 (Cir. Ct. 2013)

not a special relationship was owed to the students, a duty to warn was untenable. Virginia Tech did send out an email blast two hours after the massacre had already begun, but it was too late.

Many—if not most—liability claims argued against IHEs are won by the institutions.[22] The reported appellate opinions reveal that IHEs "win many cases because the court found the risk was not foreseeable, or that the risk was foreseeable, but the institution took adequate steps to warn and protect, or that the institution was immune from suit because of sovereign immunity principles or tort liability limits on charities and nonprofits, which vary greatly from state to state."[23] While campus crime control efforts originated in the judicial realm through the torts of the 1970s and 80s, the 1990s became the period of statutory and legislative reform of campus security and police departments.

Legislative Reforms

State laws regulating campus security preceded federal legislation. After the murder of Jeanne Clery, a student at Lehigh University, in 1986, Pennsylvania became the first state to enact a state-level campus security act in 1988.[24] Florida followed suit in 1989 with the Post-Secondary Education Security Information Act. Federal statutory reforms of security operations on college campuses began a year later with the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 (CACSA).[25] Enacted as an amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1965, Congress found "a clear need to encourage the development on all campuses of security policies and procedures, for uniformity and consistency in the reporting of crimes on campus, and to encourage the development of policies and procedures to address sexual assaults and racial violence on college

[22] Smith, "Vexatious Victims," 36.
[23] *Ibid.*
[24] College and University Security Information Act, Pa. P.L. 448, No. 73; later amended as P.L. 591, No. 87.
[25] Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-542.

campuses."[26] As has been established in the previous section, the legislative effort to increase transparency and accountability among IHEs came after tort cases in the 70's and 80's mandated certain duties to IHEs such as warning students of known risks and providing adequate security protection.

The seminal aspect of CACSA was the mandated disclosure of an annual security report (ASR) containing information on campus security policies and crime statistics by all IHEs receiving Title IV federal grants. The law mandated that IHEs include in their ASRs:

1. Several statements regarding crime and emergency reporting policies and procedures including how the institution would response to such reports;
2. Policies concerning access to campus facilities, including residence halls;
3. Policies concerning the legal authority of campus law enforcement personnel, including a statement on the working relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies;
4. Programs and services related to crime prevention and crime awareness;
5. Statistics regarding the on-campus occurrence of major felony offenses[27] reported to local police and institution officials, including policies for monitoring criminal activity at off-campus student organizations and residences;
6. Statistics on the number of arrests for alcohol-, drug-, and weapons-related crime;
7. Policies regarding enforcement of underage drinking and drug laws, including any drug- or alcohol-abuse education programs.

[26] *Ibid*., § 202.
[27] The major felony offenses are murder (nonnegligent manslaughter), rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. All statistics must include the three years prior to the publishing of the report.

The law also manded that IHEs release timely reports ("timely warnings") to the campus community on the incidence of major felony offenses as they are reported to campus security or local law enforcement.[28] The law defined campus as "any building or property owned or controlled by the institution of higher education within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area and used by the institution in direct support of, or related to its educational purposes; or any building or property owned or controlled by student organizations recognized by the institution."[29] The law made a clear distinction here for "schools with branch campuses not in a reasonable contiguous geographic area" such as Columbia University, in which the institution must "regard each of them as separate campuses for reporting purposes."[30] The law also set forth the timeline for IHEs to release their ASRs to the public and the Department of Education (DOE).

Subsequent laws amended various portions of the Campus Security Act. The Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991 changed the time period for reporting crime statistics from a calendar year to an academic year.[31] The Higher Education Amendments of 1992 amended the Campus Security Act to require that IHEs institute policies and procedures to specifically protect the rights of survivors of sexual assault.[32] The Higher Education Amendments of 1998 renamed the Campus Security Act to the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (hereafter, Clery Act) in memory of Jeanne Clery, the Lehigh University student who was raped and murdered in her dorm room.[33] The Clery Act expanded

[28] The ambiguity of "timely" is one of the more criticized aspects of the law itself. Virginia Tech was sued and fined after the massacre that took place in 2007 for not providing a sufficiently timely warning. These timely reports are often referred to as "Clery Crime Alerts" or "Clery Reports."
[29] CACSA, § 204. *See also* Magnus Seng, "Crime and Fear on Campus," in *Campus Crime: Legal, Social, and Policy Perspectives* by Bonnie S. Fisher and John J. Sloan III, (Springfield: C.C. Thomas, 1995) for in-depth critique of the validity and reliability of crime statistics and oversight generated by the act.
[30] Magnus Seng, "Crime and Fear on Campus," 39-40. This report will later focus on the specific "branch-campus" relationships between Columbia University, Barnard College, and Teachers College.
[31] Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-26. Today, this deadline is October 1st.
[32] Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325.
[33] Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244.

reporting requirements to include arson and negligent manslaughter, as well as the geographic locations that must be in ASRs to include residence halls, IHE-operated non-campus buildings and facilities, and public property adjacent to property owned by the IHE. Additionally, IHEs were required to report crime data to DOE, disclose such data along with required policy statements in their ASRs to current students and employees, and, upon request, provide such data to the public.

In 2000, the Clery Act was once again amended by the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act to require IHEs to provide information on the location of the state's sex offender registry.[34] The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 additionally provided for the tracking of convicted, registered sex offenders enrolled as students at IHEs, including offenders working or volunteering on campus. Additional amendments to the Clery Act were added through the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA), which added new requirements for IHEs to create and distribute emergency response procedures and evacuation protocols.[35] HEOA also required IHEs to begin including in their ASRs any bias-related hate crimes in the following categories: larceny, simple assault, intimidation, and vandalism. Additionally, HEOA mandated publication of policies related to missing students and fire safety, and required IHEs to disclose the results of disciplinary proceedings to the alleged victim of any crime of violence, including non-forcible sex offenses.

The newest amendments to the Clery Act came as part of the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which incorporated provisions from the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act.[36] These included three new ASR-reportable crime categories—domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking—and expanded the categories of bias-related hate

[34] Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386.
[35] Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-315.
[36] Violence Against Women Act of 1994 Reauthorization, Pub. L. No. 113-4.

crimes to include bias against national origin and gender identity. VAWA further amended the Clery Act to require ASRs to include policy statements on programs to prevent sexual assault, domestic violence, dating violence, and stalking, including policies that address how such incidents would be handled, including the standard of evidence that would be used in such proceedings. Finally, VAWA mandated that students and employees receive written notification of available services to victims, as well as notification of their rights which includes their right to notify or not notify law enforcement of a crime of sexual violence.

The statutory framework above attempts to create a singular, uniform model under which all campus security and policing systems function on the federal level. For further uniformity, all crime reports must utilize the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) and National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS).

However, state regulations complicate certain levels of this model, such as where campus police derive their enforcement authority. All but three states—Hawaii, Idaho, and New Hampshire—have strict statutory provisions for the commissioning of sworn campus police officers. In the State of New York, for example, security personnel at City College of New York are "Public Safety Officers [who] are sworn law enforcement/NYS Peace Officers… and have the power to make arrests in compliance with New York State Criminal Procedure Law [and] Peace Officers Law."[37] Provisions among states might also make distinctions between public and private IHEs, between colleges and universities, and even between both. In New Hampshire, for example, where a strict provision for the commissioning of sworn campus police officers is not in place, the University of New Hampshire, a public university, has a fully accredited law enforcement agency

[37] *See* New York State Criminal Procedure Law § 2.10, subs. 79, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/CPL/2.10.

(UNH Police Department), whereas Keene State College, a public college, does not have sworn police officers, opting to have a Department of Public Safety instead.[38]

State laws regarding gun and sexual assault policies on college campuses can also be another point of distinction. The Education Commission of the States conducted two 50-state comparisons of gun and sexual assault policies on college campuses. The former report found that eight states allow individuals to carry concealed weapons on campus, 22 states prohibit individuals from possessing a firearm on a public college or university campus, and 15 states allow guns to be stored in locked and parked vehicles on the institution's premises.[39] The latter report found that 21 states have a campus sexual assault policy, but of those that do, only five states define affirmative consent.[40] Again, of those 21 states, only Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Virginia do not require institutions to provide regular training for students and staff. Four states involve local law enforcement in the creation or enforcement of the campus sexual assault policy, three of which use memoranda of understanding (MOUs). 16 states require that policies address support services for victims. State regulations can arguably change the landscape of campus safety procedures, policies, and security operations.

Training requirements, sexual assault policies, and other criminal statutes are among some of the features that differ from state to state, and consequently, from institution to institution, making the campus security model a little less uniform. Additionally, because DOE handles regulations of Title IX protections, administrations may change the enforcement of these statutes.[41]

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[38] *See* 2019 Keene State College Annual Campus Crime and Fire Safety Report, https://www.keene.edu/administration/policy/detail/clery-report/download/, 6.
[39] Education Commission of the States, "50-State Comparison: Postsecondary Campus Safety," April 24, 2019, https://www.ecs.org/50-state-comparison-postsecondary-campus-safety/.
[40] *Ibid*.
[41] *See* DOE, "Department of Education Issues New Interim Guidance on Campus Sexual Misconduct," September 22, 2017, https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-education-issues-new-interim-guidance-campus-sexual-misconduct. In 2017, the Department of Education rescinded two Obama-era policy guidelines concerning sexual misconduct allegations, allowing schools to choose between a preponderance of the evidence standard or a

Operational Models

Today, there generally exist five types of security operations which have evolved from the inception of campus police at Yale University in 1884: (1) low-level watch-guard operations primarily designed to protect college property; (2) contracts with guard services; (3) contracts with local police departments; (4) proprietary security departments and; (5) proprietary police-oriented law-enforcement agencies.[42] The breadth and depth of campus security operations are largely determined by a range of factors, including the availability of institutional funds, the size of the institution, urban development, and community crime characteristics.[43] In fact, one study which used regression analysis to measure the spillover effects between campus and community crime found that only two community crimes, robbery and motor vehicle theft rates, had any significant effect on campus crime rates.[44]

Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Campus Law Enforcement 2011-12 Report

No two schools operate their security apparatus in the exact same way. There will also be overlap in the basic types of security operations described above. Literature on nationwide campus law enforcement and security operations is limited to the 2011-12 report by BJS. This special report authorized by Department of Justice's (DOJ) statistical agency surveyed more than 900 U.S. 4-year IHEs with 2,500 or more students about their security operations during the 2011-12 school

reasonable doubt standard. In doing so, victims have a higher burden of proof in their allegations of sexual misconduct or sexual assault.

[42] Powell, Pander and Nielsen, *Campus Security and Law Enforcement*, 20.

[43] *Ibid*., 70.

[44] Adriana Fernandez and Alan J. Lizotte "An Analysis of the Relationship Between Campus Crime and Community Crime: Reciprocal Effects?" in *Campus Crime: Legal, Social, and Policy Perspectives* by Bonnie S. Fisher and John J. Sloan III, (Springfield: C.C. Thomas, 1995), 79.

year.[45] This report is the most recent, comprehensive study concerning nationwide campus security operations. The special report gathered some remarkable findings.

First, 68% of the schools surveyed utilized sworn police officers to provide law enforcement services on campus. The percentage of public (92%) schools that used sworn police officers was more than double that of private (38%) schools.[46] Of these sworn police officers, about 94% were authorized to carry either a sidearm, chemical or pepper spray, baton, or a combination of any of these.[47] Sworn police officers also had arrest (86%) and patrol (81%) jurisdictions that went beyond the geographically contiguous campus.[48] Additionally, the use of armed officers grew from the last survey with 75% of campuses now using armed officers compared to 68% in 2004-05.

Second, as the growth of technological and informational systems exploded in the early 2000s, patrol officers were now using in-field computers in about twice as many agencies (52%) during 2011-12, compared to (27%) during 2004-05.[49] 90% of agencies used cars and 80% used both SUVs and bicycles in their patrols.[50] 94% of both public and private institutions used emergency telephone systems, with 92% of all schools having a blue light phone system.[51] Moreover, agencies serving public campuses (64%) were more than twice as likely as those on private campuses (26%) to have a radio system that was fully interoperable with other first responders' systems, and nearly all public schools (93%) compared to just over half of private schools (57%) had a system that was either fully or partially interoperable.[52] Most public (66%)

[45] Schools with 5,000 or more students received a longer survey.
[46] Brian A. Reaves, "Campus Law Enforcement, 2011-12," U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 2015, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cle1112.pdf, 2.
[47] *Ibid*., 9.
[48] *Ibid*., 4-5.
[49] *Ibid*., 10.
[50] *Ibid*., 25.
[51] *Ibid*., 8.
[52] *Ibid*., 15.

and private (55) schools with more than 5,000 students utilized a voluntary, opt-in mass emergency notification system, as opposed to a mandatory, opt-out format (31% public vs. 39% private).[53] Of those students enrolled in mass notification systems, e-mails (100%), text messages (99%), and institutional websites (98%) were the most common forms of notification.[54]

Third, the report found that between the 2004-05 and 2011-12 school years, the increase in full-time campus law enforcement employees (+16%) outpaced the increase in student enrollment (+11%). On average, private campuses (4.8) enjoyed a higher ratio of full-time employees per 1,000 students than public campuses (3.6).[55] This is most likely due to the fact that private schools have higher endowments and receive larger departmental budgets.

Fourth, when it came down to the hiring process, sworn officers had to go through more than twice as many screening methods as non-sworn officers.[56] Entry-level sworn officers were required, on average, to complete 1,027 hours of training, with a third of that conducted in the field, whereas non-sworn officers had to complete 230 hours, or about one-fourth of that of sworn officers.[57] When it came down to educational requirements, sworn officers (20%) and non-sworn officers (14%) worked for an agency with a college education requirement.[58] Most agencies (74% of sworn and 76% of non-sworn) required *at least* a high school diploma.

Finally, when it came down to salaries, benefits, and diversity, the average starting salary for entry-level sworn officers was 34% higher than for non-sworn officers.[59] The average pay gap between sworn and non-sworn officers with five years of experience remained consistent at 35%

[53] *Ibid*., 16.
[54] *Ibid*.
[55] *Ibid*., 3.
[56] *Ibid*., 17. *N.B.* The common screening methods between both sworn and non-sworn officers included personal interviews, criminal record checks, reference checks, driving record checks, and background investigations.
[57] *Ibid*.
[58] *Ibid*., 18. *N.B.* This includes 4-year and 2-year degrees, as well as non-degree programs.
[59] *Ibid*.

($42,700 vs. 31,600), and for directors and chiefs was a bit lower at 29% ($85,200 vs. 65,600).[60] About 51% of sworn and 43% of non-sworn officers worked for an agency that authorized collective bargaining for their employees, and starting salaries for unionized sworn officers were, on average, $9,000 higher than those that had not unionized.[61] Nearly all sworn and non-sworn officers (99%) worked for departments that allowed them to earn overtime pay or compensatory time. Many also had access to tuition assistance and reimbursement programs, and more non-sworn officers had access to shift differential and merit pay than sworn officers.[62] The report conclusively found a slight increase in the percentage of women and minorities working as sworn officers, with African-Americans/Blacks making up the largest non-white group at 21% of sworn officers.[63]

The three largest agencies by number of full-time employees—including sworn and non-sworn officers, as well as staff—were Temple University (481), University of Pennsylvania (478), and New York University (359).[64] The three largest agencies by number of full-time sworn personnel were once again Temple (133), Penn (116), and, because NYU does not have sworn officers, University of Southern California (102).[65] The report also ranked agencies serving the 100 largest campuses by total enrollment. At the top of the list was Arizona State University with 73 full-time sworn personnel serving 72,254 students.[66] Portland State University, which ranked 77th on this list, was the first school to use non-sworn personnel. Columbia University, which

[60] *Ibid*.
[61] *Ibid*., 19.
[62] *Ibid*.
[63] *Ibid*.,
[64] *Ibid*., 22. Columbia University ranked 11th by number of full-time employees with 188. In the 2004-05 report, Columbia was not included in this list.
[65] *Ibid*.
[66] *Ibid.*, 23.

ranked 90th, was second to use non-sworn personnel.[67] Accordingly, most large universities utilize sworn personnel.

Ivy League

This report thus highlights nationwide operational models between different types of institutions, agencies, sizes, and localities. This report permits a comparative analysis between the services, techniques, mechanisms, strategies, and architectures across the largest campus security and police agencies in the country. Because the methodology of this report focuses mainly on campuses with more than 2,500 students, with an even bigger focus on campuses with more than 5,000, the sample selection can provide interesting insights into institutions like Columbia and her peers. In fact, Columbia's 160 full-time security officers make it the largest force in the Ivy League.



[67] *Ibid.*

Columbia University Public Safety (CUPS)

Columbia University has been hailed as one of the safest urban universities in the country.[68] With its central operations situated in the neighborhood of Morningside Heights in the borough of Manhattan, Columbia enrolled 33,032 students across three undergraduate, nine graduate and professional, and four medical schools as of October 2018.[69] Columbia's size, location, and campus characteristics thus make it an appropriate and relevant institution for an in-depth examination of its campus security operations. As previously established, Columbia solely utilizes non-sworn personnel for its security operations. This salient characteristic makes Columbia valuable in the study of campus crime, and especially in studying how large universities can forgo fully sworn police departments in exchange for non-sworn personnel.

Columbia's operations span four branch campuses. Its undergraduate and graduate schools are primarily centered on the Morningside Heights/Manhattanville campus. Its medical schools are housed at the Medical Center campus in Washington Heights. Columbia has two additional extended campuses dedicated to research in the natural sciences—Nevis Laboratories in Irvington, New York and the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory in Palisades, New York. Columbia also has four affiliated institutions: Barnard College, Teachers College, Union Theological Seminary, and Jewish Theological Seminary. These affiliated institutions have their own administrations, and operate through bilateral relationships with Columbia University. Accordingly, their public safety operations function separately from CUPS.

[68] *See* Columbia Facilities and Operations, "Columbia University named one of the Safest Colleges in America 2017 by the National Council for Home Safety and Security," June 20, 2017, https://cufo.columbia.edu/news/columbia-university-named-one-safest-colleges-america-2017-national-council-home-safety-and.
[69] Office of the Provost, "Student Enrollment (Fall 2018)," https://opir.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Columbia%20Facts/Facts_2018.pdf.

New York Police Department (NYPD)

Detective Jason Harper, 26th Precinct, Community Affairs Unit

Columbia's Morningside campus sits in the center of the New York Police Department's (NYPD) 26th Precinct. Columbia maintains a good working relationship with the NYPD. According to the 26th Precinct's Community Affairs Unit lead Detective Jason Harper, CUPS is "heavily involved," often handling the first parts of investigations.[70] CUPS also has the ability to monitor NYPD's radio frequency. Per University policy, Columbia does not process arrests, opting to call NYPD with discretion. Columbia also maintains high levels of cooperation between their crime prevention and investigation units by sending emails and person of interest (POI) alerts to NYPD when necessary. The University does not permit police officers to be stationed at or patrol campus, and NYPD is only allowed on campus at the invitation of CUPS or when conducting official business.

When asked about protests or high-profile events, Det. Harper said, "Columbia reaches out to NYPD to alert them, especially during protests," but he also noted that most of the information regarding such events already comes from intelligence within the NYPD. Finally, regarding the relationship between Columbia, Barnard, and Teachers College, Det. Harper noted that separate campuses have separate policies and operations.

A March 2020 article by the New York Post reported exactly this distinct separation between security operations at Columbia and Barnard. The Post claimed that "Barnard College was noticeably absent from local crime briefings... While reps from Columbia University showed up to the 26th Precinct stationhouse on West 126th Street semi-regularly to meet with cops and the

[70] Det. Jason Harper, in-person conversation, July 8, 2019.

community…officials from its sister school were seldom seen."[71] Det. Harper told the Post that "[Barnard] weren't disinvited. They hadn't expressed interest."[72]

26th Precinct Crime Characteristics & Statistics

According to public records, NYPD's 26th Precinct is the second-safest precinct in the entire city, as measured by the number of major felony offenses committed.[73] When measured by the number of non-major felony offenses committed, the 26th Precinct is the seventh-safest residential precinct in the entire city.[74]



[71] Sara Dorn, "Barnard missed months of crime briefings before Tessa Majors' murder," NY Post, March 15, 2020, https://nypost.com/2020/03/15/barnard-missed-months-of-crime-briefings-before-tessa-majors-murder/.
[72] *Ibid*.
[73] NYPD, "Historical Crime Data by Precinct: Citywide Seven Major Felony Offenses 2000-2019," https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/historical-crime-data/seven-major-felony-offenses-by-precinct-2000-2019.pdf.
[74] NYPD, "Historical Crime Data by Precinct: Citywide Non-Seven Major Felony Offenses 2000-2019," https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/historical-crime-data/non-seven-major-felony-offenses-by-precinct-2000-2019.pdf. *N.B.* Non-major felony offenses include criminal possession of controlled substances, including the criminal sale of marijuana, criminal possession, use, and sale of firearms, criminal possession of a weapon, criminal sexual acts, including sexual abuse, incest, and course of sexual conduct against a child, and other penal law offenses such as contempt, reckless endangerment, and other state laws.



When measured by the number of misdemeanor offenses committed, the 26th Precinct is the fourth-safest precinct in the entire city.[75]



[75] NYPD, "Historical Crime Data by Precinct: Citywide Misdemeanor Offenses 2000-2019," https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/historical-crime-data/misdemeanor-

NYC Crime Location Map Analysis

The NYC Crime Location Map is a detailed map that shows the number of major felony offenses committed in a given precinct or locality within a certain date range. Because Clery Crime Alerts released by CUPS "do not present, nor are they intended to present, a complete picture of crime on campus,"[76] the NYC Crime Map can aid in the presentation of a clear, complete picture of crime on and around campus, including the frequency, locality, and volume of crime.

Remarkably, the NYC Crime Map shows a different picture than the one presented by Columbia's ASR and Clery Crime Alerts. Between January 1, 2019 and June 30, 2019, a conservative estimate accounted for over 200 major crimes within the Morningside Heights community. Within this same time frame, Columbia's 2018 and 2019 ASRs accounted for 85 major crimes, almost half of which were burglaries. Of the 85 major crimes reported by Columbia within this time frame, 21 of them were reported as having occurred on public property and only one occurred on the non-campus geography. This discrepancy in the volume and frequency of crime occurring in the community, including on campus, non-campus and public property, is source for confusion given that Columbia owns and operates much of the property in the Morningside Heights neighborhood. The NYC Crime Map reveals that many crimes are taking place in public streets and sidewalks, predominantly in upperclassman residential areas and, incidentally, near places where students often patronize. While the main campus interior remains relatively untouched, the exterior shows a completely different picture. At best, Columbia's underestimation of crime happening in the community is a matter of calculative error and lackluster communication with NYPD. At worst, Columbia is underrepresenting the frequency and volume

offenses-by-precinct-2000-2019.pdf. *N.B.* Misdemeanor offenses include minor drug infractions such as possession and use of drug paraphernalia, bail jumping, perjury, identity theft, resisting arrest, obstructing governmental administration, graffiti violations, selling untaxed cigarettes, prostitution, gambling, and public lewdness.

[76] This disclaimer appears on almost all Clery Crime Alerts.

of crime by only reporting those that affect Columbia's property and affiliates, and ultimately those that CUPS investigates.



Understanding Columbia's relationship with crime in its own neighborhood is crucial for all affiliates—students, faculty, and staff—to be better informed about crime patterns and the preventative measures in place to protect them. CUPS maintains a duty to accurately depict, foresee, and prevent crime occurring in the campus community. By better leveraging its relationship with NYPD, CUPS can uphold a greater degree of transparency and accountability by reporting, accounting for, and logging all crime that is occurring on campus, non-campus, and public property.

CUPS Annual Security Reports

Columbia's ASR states, "crimes that are reported to Public Safety and included in the statistical report are classified by what is referred to as 'Clery geography.'"[77] Clery geography is split into three distinct categories: on campus, non-campus, and public property. Columbia's Morningside Clery geography is responsible for reporting crime statistics in buildings, as well as public property adjacent to those buildings, between 110th Street and 131st Street of Riverside Drive and Morningside Drive. According to Columbia's most recent ASRs, the two most frequent offenses to occur on campus are discipline for drugs and discipline for alcohol. In fact, these offenses are so frequent that they outnumber the next most-frequent crime—stalking—by approximately sevenfold. In 2018, discipline for drugs reached a four-year peak with 192 cases reported, up from 181 in 2017, 139 in 2016, and 109 in 2015.[78]

The imprecision of these statistics in reflecting an accurate portrayal of crime on Columbia's campus is worth noting. In fact, one of the more widely criticized aspects of the Clery

[77] Columbia University Public Safety, "2019 Annual Security and Fire Safety Report," October 1, 2019, https://publicsafety.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/SecurityReport2019.pdf, 36.
[78] *Ibid*.. 46.



Act, as Seng (1995) argues, is the "requirement to disseminate information only on crimes reported to the campus police or security authorities. Obviously, these figures will be affected by the extent people are willing to report their on-campus victimizations to the police," and, conversely, by the ability of campus security authorities to catch offenders.[79] CUPS, in their 2018 ASR, actually highlight this very problem by stating, "The University has no specific policies or procedures allowing survivors or witnesses to report crimes on a confidential basis for purposes of statistical collection only."[80]

Fernandez & Lizotte (1995) and Sloan (1993, 1994) argue that property offenses are the predominant form of crime on campus. This proves to be generally true at Columbia, where the second-most frequent on campus crime, not counting residence hall offenses, is burglary.[81]

[79] Magnus Seng, "Crime and Fear on Campus," 8.
[80] CUPS, "2019 ASR," 36.
[81] *Ibid*., 46.

Clery Crime Alerts

Pursuant to federal law, CUPS is required to alert the campus community to certain crimes that pose a continuing danger to the campus community in a manner that is timely and will aid in the prevention of similar crimes. Such alerts are called Clery Crime Alerts (or, simply, "Crime Alerts"), and they are designed to notify the campus community of crimes considered by CUPS to pose a serious or continuing threat. Crime Alerts follow a timely warning policy that, by design, gives notice to students and employees to avoid a certain area or be additionally cautious about a pattern of crime.[82]

While CUPS principally utilizes Crime Alerts to fulfill its duty to warn, Crime Alerts serve as an efficient mechanism to notify the campus community of POIs, including persona non grata (PNGs), and execute further sanctions against these individuals up to and including arrest. CUPS maintains a log of all Crime Alerts from 2017 to the present on their website, in addition to communicating such details in the form of email blasts and the emergency text messaging system.[83]

Analyses of publicly-available Crime Alerts records dating from 2017 to 2020 produced a variety of outcomes. First, in terms of frequency, burglary and robbery are the most common crimes that warrant a Crime Alert. As predicted by various scholars, property crimes are the most predominant form of crime that occurs on campus.[84] The predominant crime, burglary, occurs most often in on-campus residence halls in the form of mail package theft. Secondly, when it comes to capturing perpetrators on security cameras via closed-circuit television (CCTV), 84% of all

[82] All Crime Alerts include the following information: a succinct statement of the incident; possible connection to previous incidents, if applicable; photo of the suspect, if available; physical description of the suspect, if no photo is available; date the bulletin was released; other relevant and important information about the crime(s); information on crime prevention, personal safety or other community safety resources.
[83] CUPS, "Clery Crime Alerts," https://publicsafety.columbia.edu/content/clery-crime-alerts.
[84] See Fernandez & Lizotte (1995), Sloan (1993, 1994), Bromely (1993), Mansour & Sloan (1992)



Crime Alerts include CCTV footage to aid in the capture and arrest of the suspect(s) involved.



35% of all Crime Alerts posted since 2017 have resulted in the apprehension of the suspect(s), of which a handful were previous offender(s) or already had their identity known to CUPS and/or NYPD. Thirdly, in almost all Crime Alerts, CUPS notified and involved the NYPD.



Only six of these alerts were distributed because the NYPD strictly notified CUPS. Fourthly, in terms of locality, Crime Alerts were almost evenly split as having occurred on campus versus on public property.



Lastly, because all Crime Alerts are timestamped, over half of them occurred between 4:00PM and 1:00AM.



While such findings are limited in presenting a complete picture of crime on campus, they are useful in determining the kinds of measures that CUPS could employ in preventing, deterring, and solving crime. For example, while most Crime Alerts utilize CCTV to distribute images of a wanted suspect to the larger community, they are often not enhanced enough to justify a confident identification.[85] Another example of how this data could be useful is in the timing of certain crimes. CUPS currently stations contracted security officers from Summit Security Services on Broadway and Amsterdam Avenue during nighttime hours. These third-party contractors patrol upperclassman residential vicinities that are pervasive localities for criminal activity as seen in the NYC Crime Map analysis.[86] Although Crime Alerts serve to primarily fulfill a legal responsibility

[85] *See, e.g.,* CUPS, "Clery Fondling Report on March 9, 2020," https://publicsafety.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/W09-Clery-Fondling-Butler%20Plaza%203-9-2020.pdf.
[86] Summit Security Services are responsible for access control of non-first-year residence halls.

(i.e. duty to warn), they also serve to keep the community aware of ongoing or serious threats to the community.

However, in the pursuit of presenting a complete picture of crime on campus, this analysis clearly shows major discrepancies in the types of crimes that warrant a Crime Alert in the first place. As previously discussed, most Crime Alerts which CUPS distributes concern property crimes. Only one sexual assault was distributed as a Crime Alert despite CUPS reporting fourteen cases of sexual assault in 2018 and 2017. In the same time frame, 43 cases of stalking were reported, but there were zero Crime Alerts for stalking. Because Crime Alerts are designed to enable members of the community to protect themselves regarding serious and continuing dangers, there needs to be a greater degree of transparency on behalf of CUPS to define and clarify the threshold and limiting principles of a Crime Alert.

Incident on December 11, 2019

On December 11, 2019 at approximately 5:30 PM, Tessa Majors, a first-year affiliate of Barnard College, was fatally stabbed after a botched robbery in Morningside Park. Via the emergency text messaging system, CUPS sent out an alert nearly two hours later at 7:27 PM that police were investigating a robbery and stabbing inside Morningside Park, noting that the suspect was a "male wearing a green jacket and a mask."



Above: Emergency text message notification on Dec. 11, 2019

Later that night, at 10:47 PM, Vice President of Public Safety James McShane sent out via email blast a copy of the Clery Crime Alert about the robbery-homicide writing, "at around 6:45 a Barnard affiliate was the victim of a robbery inside of Morningside Park near W. 116th Street. In the course of the robbery, the victim was fatally stabbed."[87]

McShane's email underscores a major discrepancy in the reported timing of the crime. It took CUPS nearly two hours to formally notify the campus community about the serious and dangerous situation happening on public property in front of University President Lee Bollinger's own residence. McShane's account stands in stark contrast to the official police report which stated that officers responded at 5:30 PM to a report of an assault in Morningside Park.[88] The two-hour gap in which CUPS failed in their duty to warn and McShane's inconsistent report are cause for serious speculation about the practices, protocol, and procedure of CUPS Clery Crime Alerts.

As of the date of this report, the robbery-homicide Crime Alert does not appear on CUPS' website log despite the fact that two separate robberies occurred both before and after Majors' death. CUPS explicitly states, "Columbia University is required to alert the campus community to certain crimes that pose a continuing danger to the campus community in a manner that is timely and will aid in the prevention of similar crimes."[89] CUPS must maintain a higher degree of transparency in order to truly aid in the prevention of similar crimes such as the one that resulted in the untimely passing of an undergraduate affiliate. While the 2020 ASR has not yet been released, CUPS crime statistics must accurately reflect this tragic incident.

[87] James McShane, "Crime Alert: Robbery/Homicide Email on Dec. 11, 2019."
[88] *See* New York Times, "Student, 18, Is Fatally Stabbed Near Barnard Campus," https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/nyregion/barnard-student-fatal-stabbing.html.
[89] CUPS, "Clery Crime Alerts."

CUPS Departmental Responses

Executive Director of Finance and Administration, Albert Becker, provided the following responses to questions regarding contracts, departmental budget, organizational structure, pay schedules and unionization, talent recruitment and retention, training, feedback and accountability, services, and operational protocol. **Answers are in bold.**

Contracts

Does your office contract with any third-party to conduct its operations? If yes, please describe the services that they provide and the cost of each contract.	**Contract Security Services – the guards secure and patrol off campus locations**
Does your office contract with any local or federal government agencies including but not limited to New York Police Department (NYPD), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), US Secret Service (USSS), or Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)?	**No. Does not plan on contracting with such agencies in the future.**

Departmental Budget

Please provide a copy of your department's balance sheet for FY 18-19, including all investments.	**The specifics of our budget are not public information.**
What is your department's total budget for FY 18-19? Please also provide the total budget for FY 17-18 and FY 16-17.	**The specifics of our budget are not public information.**
How is your budget generally allocated?	**The majority of the funds are allocated for personnel services with the remaining used to maintain equipment, supplies and operations.**
Has the budget ever been at a deficit? If so, how does your office secure more funds?	**The specifics of our budget are not public information.**
Has the budget ever been at a surplus? If so, how does your office allocate excess funds?	**The specifics of our budget are not public information.**

Organizational Structure

Please provide a copy of your organizational chart, including titles and names of your executive command.	**See Figure 1 – Public Safety Organization Chart**
Has your organizational structure drastically changed in the past ten years?	**As the University expanded into Manhattanville we have hired additional Public Safety staff to patrol and secure the Manhattanville campus which increased the Department headcount.**
What is the racial and ethnic makeup of your non-executive and executive command?	**See Figure 2 – Ethnic Breakdown**
What percentage of your officers speak another language? Please list all languages spoken by your officers.	**We do not specifically track this information.**
What percentage of your officers live in New York City?	**68%**
What is the relationship between your office and the administration of your school?	**N/A**

Staffing Breakdown Summary 5/17/19

Total Staffing Breakdown		
	Total	Percentage
Asian	11	4%
Black	89	33%
Hispanic	111	41%
White	47	18%
N/D	10	4%
Total	268	

Officers of Admin Staffing Breakdown		
	Total	Percentage
Asian	4	7%
Black	5	8%
Hispanic	25	42%
White	21	36%
N/D	4	7%
Total	59	

** Lieutenants are included under the Uniform Staffing not in Officer of Administration

Uniformed Staffing Breakdown		
	Total	Percentage
Asian	7	3%
Black	84	40%
Hispanic	86	41%
White	26	12%
N/D	6	3%
Total	209	

Figure 2 – Ethnic Breakdown



Figure 1 – CUPS Organizational Chart

Pay Schedules & Unionization

Are salaries freely negotiated or determined by a pay grade? If determined by a pay grade, please provide the scale used by your office.	**Salaries are negotiated through collective bargaining with Transport Workers Union of America (TWU).**[90]
What is the starting salary of a public safety officer?	**$45,525, excluding shift differential and overtime**
What is the average salary of a public safety officer?	**$52,466, excluding shift differential and overtime**
What benefits are offered to your employees?	**TWU Guards Benefits Plan**[91]
Are your employees unionized?	**Yes, TWU Local 241**

Talent Recruitment & Retention

Please list the job descriptions, qualifications, and requirements for all the positions in your office.	**See Figure 3 – Security Officer Job Description**
What is the retention rate for your employees?	**N/A. We do not track**
On average, how long does an employee stay at your organization?	**N/A. We do not track**
What is the rate of promotion or advancement within your organization?	**N/A. We do not track**
How does your office recruit prospective officers? What is the general recruitment strategy?	**A Job posting is placed in the University Talent Link system which includes the job description and announces the position opening on the Columbia site. The posting is immediately picked up by many other employment sites online such as Indeed. We participate in University Job fairs. We post the openings in trade organizations such as ASIS. We accept referrals from other members of the University.**
How are officers generally selected for the position?	**Public Safety Officer applications are reviewed by the Public Safety HR team. Applicants with appropriate experience and license are identified. The applicants with**

[90] *See* TWU 241 Contract.

[91] *See* TWU Benefits Plan.

	the most experience including those with Higher Education security are selected for an interview. The interview candidates are asked to submit a list of references who are then asked to provide a Reference check. An interview team of two trained Public Safety Managers conducts the candidate interviews and develops questions after reviewing the resume and Skill Survey. In addition candidates are placed in hypothetical situations and asked how they would handle the encounters. The Interview Teams are trained in Motivation Based Interviewing as well as guidelines established by the University. After the Candidates are interviewed they are rated on an assessment sheet and the interview team either recommends them for hire or recommends not to hire. The interview packets are collated and all documents including the interviewer's assessment sheets are sent to the Operations Directors for their review. If the Operation Directors concur with the hire recommendation then the candidate is notified and the on boarding process begins which includes background checks, drug screening and a medical screening.
What qualities make for a successful public safety officer?	**A successful public safety officer is a motivated, engaged individual with good judgment and even temperament. Good customer service skills are equally as important as prior security experience.**

JOB DESCRIPTION FORM

Job Title: **Security Officer**

Basic Function

Reporting to the Public Safety Sergeant, the Security Officer protects Columbia University personnel and facilities against the hazards of fire, accidents and vandalism; maintains law and order, and enforces all regulations, including those in manual for Security Officers; protects the building structure and grounds to which officer is assigned, including the contents, occupants and visitors; patrols as assigned and seeks out and takes preventive action against existing hazards or conditions which may cause injury, damage or interference with the usual operation, and reports same immediately; guides visitors in a courteous manner and assists as directed; returns lost or found articles to Public Safety Office; assists ill or injured persons in obtaining care and treatment, and reports such event immediately by radio and on proper report forms; maintains order on post and makes request for necessary assistance from law enforcement agencies; makes court appearances as required. Security Officers are required to use computer systems and other technology such as the visitor management system, Lenel alarm and CCTV systems. In addition, he or she is required to enter reports in online incident reporting systems and make entries in the online Lost and Found system. The Security Officer may be assigned to any of the Columbia University Manhattan Campuses. WOMEN ARE ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGED TO APPLY. The Security Officer will be assigned to work either a day shift (8 am to 4 pm), an evening shift (4 pm to Midnight) or an overnight shift (Midnight to 8 am) depending on the needs of the department. The position requires the Security Officer work holidays, weekends, nights, and a variety of shifts and double shifts when circumstances warrant. Security Officers are considered Essential Personnel in order to maintain the safety and security of University property, personnel, affiliates and visitors.

Characteristic Duties and Responsibilities

Maintains order on post, enforces University Public Safety regulations, and requests assistance from law enforcement agencies when necessary. 20%

Patrols as assigned and seeks out and takes preventive action to address existing hazards or conditions which may cause injury, damage or interference with the day-to-day University operations, and reports same immediately; 20%

Guides visitors in a courteous manner and assists as directed; returns lost or found articles to Public Safety Office; assists ill or injured persons in obtaining care and treatment, and reports such event immediately by radio or telephone and on proper report forms. 20%

Protects the building structure and grounds to which he or she is assigned, including the contents, occupants and visitors; 20%

Protects Columbia University personnel and facilities against the hazards of fire, accidents and vandalism. 20%

Supervision Received and/or Exercised

Security Officer is directly supervised by Public Safety Sergeants and/or Lieutenants on a daily basis and may be directly or indirectly supervised by Public Safety managers and directors.

Minimum Qualifications

High school diploma and/or its equivalent required. Must possess, or have the ability to obtain and maintain a valid NYS Guard License. NYS Dept. of State's 8 hour mandated certificate of training required. Must be physically fit and able to pass a physical exam. The Security Officer should be able to engage in strenuous physical activity, including walking, climbing stairs, as well as standing or sitting for long periods of time. The Security Officer must also be willing and able to perform duty in inclement weather conditions. He or she should also have the ability to write legible reports, use a portable radio, and use judgment that is sound and proper when addressing emergency situations.

Prior satisfactory work experience in law enforcement or security preferred.

Figure 3 – Security Officer Job Description

Training, Feedback & Accountability

Is there federal, state, or locally mandated training that your officers are required to receive? If so, please provide a list of that mandatory training.	**All Security Officers must be licensed through NYS Division of Licensing Services. The law mandates that in order to obtain this license, an 8-hour course must be taken from a NY State certified Security School. Within the first 90 days of employment, an additional 16 hours of classroom training must be provided and an annual 8-hour refresher course must be taken for license renewal. The curriculum must be NY State approved. The Department of Public Safety is a NYS certified training school and numerous members of the management staff are NYS Certified Instructors.**
How long are new public safety officers in training?	**All newly hired officers and supervisors receive an additional 80 - 120 hours of classroom training on University policy and Public Safety procedures followed by another 240 hours of on the job campus orientation training among the three Columbia campuses.**
Who trains new public safety officers?	**Public Safety Training and Development Unit with assistance from the Public Safety Management Team, as well other University stakeholders and partners.**
How does your office retrain officers who have received complaints or been accused of misconduct?	**Retraining varies based on the misconduct. Some are reinstructed by Management, some meet with the Assistant Director of Training and Development for a more in-depth training session, and some are sent to training outside the department. When appropriate, officers also receive formal discipline, up to and including termination.**
How does your office utilize feedback from the community to update or change its training program?	**We constantly review our training program to ensure that there are no gaps in necessary training and that we understand the concerns of the Columbia Community. Emerging issues on campus are cross referenced with our training program and refresher training is implemented when necessary through memo's, Roll Call Training Bulletins, guest speakers and management discussions.**

What internal mechanisms does your office have to measure and ensure accountability?	**All Public Safety members are held to a high degree of accountability. When members are found violating procedures, Public Safety policy and rules, the member is subjected to a formal disciplinary process. The member is interviewed by Management, reinstructed if found responsible for a violation and when necessary disciplined. In addition, each Operations Command has a series of Self Inspections where Supervisors are assigned to conduct audits on a monthly basis to ensure compliance with Public Safety procedures. When deficiencies are found they are corrected and members are reinstructed.**
What external mechanisms does your office utilize to measure and ensure accountability?	**Ombuds Office – Employees can have confidential discussions to discuss workplace issues, EOAA – Employees, students and third parties can inquire about their rights under University policies, and Drivers Alert program – Bumper Stickers on all our Public Safety Vehicles that instruct people to call an 800 number to report unsafe driving. The company notifies a Public Safety manager who conducts an investigation. See also, https://publicsafety.columbia.edu/content/your-rights-and-responsibilities**

Services

How many times was the blue light service utilized in the academic year 18-19?	**Emergency Call Box service was activated approximately 78 times between 9/4/2018 to 5/24/2019.**
How many times was the escort service utilized in the academic year 18-19?	**Walking Escort was utilized approximately 10 times between 9/4/2018 to 5/24/2019.**
How many times was the "Safe Haven" service utilized in the academic year 18-19?	**We do not track.**
How many times was the device engraving service utilized in the academic year 18-19?	**627 times**
How many times was the guard service utilized in the academic year 18-19?	**1,188 Guard Service requests from September 2018 to May 2019**

Does your office publicly release a log of all criminal activity reported to your office?	**The crime log for the most recent 60-day period is open to public inspection at the Public Safety Command Center, free of charge, upon request, during normal business hours. Anyone may have access to the log, whether or not they are associated with the institution. Any portion of the log that is older than 60 days is available within two business days of a request for public inspection. We maintain a 7-calendar year archive which may be reviewed.**

Operational Protocol

What is your office's protocol for a non-student, non-affiliate found violating school or university policy?	**Depends on circumstances and severity of violation. We may ask violator to comply with university policy. If they refuse, we may ask them to leave campus, prohibit them from returning, or call the NYPD if circumstances warrant.**
What is your office's protocol for a public safety officer found violating school, university, or departmental policy?	**Depends on violation and severity of misconduct. Public Safety may address discipline internally or refer the matter to EOAA or other University partners if it falls under their purview.**
What is your office's protocol for someone found violating local, state, or federal law?	**Depending upon the nature and severity of the violation, the NYPD may be notified to address the matter.**
What is your office's relationship with local law enforcement such as the NYPD?	**We have a very good working relationship with the NYPD.**
Does your office have access to NYPD's data?	**No, All citizens have access to open Source NYPD data from their website: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/index.page**
Does your office share data other than that directly related to crime with local, state, or federal law enforcement?	**No.**
Are your public safety officers permitted to restrain, arrest, or detain someone suspected of committing a crime on campus?	**Our Public Safety Officers are unsworn and unarmed. They have the same arrest powers as a normal citizen. See New York State Criminal Procedure Law Section 140.30,**

	140.35, 140.40. Regarding the use of force see New York State Penal Law Article 35.
Are your public safety officers permitted to restrain, arrest, or detain someone suspected of committing a crime not on campus?	**See above CPL and PL sections**
Are your public safety officers ever permitted to use force?	**Reasonable force consistent with Penal Law Article 35.**
Should a student who is witnessing or experiencing a crime on-campus call 9-11 or your office first?	**We ask students to call Public Safety and then 911 for serious matters. Most non-serious matters can be addressed by Public Safety who will then notify 911 if necessary.**
Should a student who is witnessing or experiencing a crime not on campus call 9-11 or your office first?	**Call 911 first and then when safe inform Public Safety.**
What information or technology systems does your office utilize?	**We utilize a CAD system for recoding calls for service and dispatch.**
How long does your office retain information or data of students?	**We don't have any databases on students, per se. We retain case reports and other information as per the University's retention policies**
How many reports of officer misconduct were received by your office for the academic year 18-19?	**N/A. This information is not publicly available.**
Of the reports received above, how many actions were taken by your office for the academic year 18-19?	**N/A. This information is not publicly available.**
Does your office utilize social media to release information?	**We use Facebook as an additional means of communicating routine non-emergency information.**
Please define the geographical area that your officers patrol.	**Patrols are conducted in marked and unmarked vehicles, on foot, and on bicycle in the general vicinity of the campuses. On the Morningside campus we generally patrol from 103rd Street to 125th Street, from Riverside Drive to Morningside Drive.**

Barnard College Public Safety (BCPS)

Barnard College is a private, all-women college adjacent to the main campus block of Columbia University. Barnard College Public Safety (BCPS) is responsible for all security operations on the Barnard campus which runs between 116th and 120th Street of Claremont and Broadway Avenue. Balancing Barnard's proximity to Columbia against the administrative and operative differences between the two institutions is challenging. While patrols and Clery geographies might overlap, the two institutions maintain separate policies, procedures, and crime statistics. Additionally, unlike Columbia's campus which is accessible to the public at all times, Barnard has a policy that requires everyone entering campus after 11 PM to produce valid identification to the BCPS officer operating the gate.[92] This policy was at the center of a controversial confrontation between BCPS personnel and Columbia University student, Alexander McNab.

T&M Report

Barnard administrators retained the services of private security and investigative firm T&M Protection Resources to analyze the confrontation between BCPS personnel and McNab in order "to determine if race was a factor in the response by BCPS."[93] Barnard's anti-discrimination policy strictly prohibits the use of race as the determinative factor for initiating action. The report

[92] Barnard College, "After Hours Campus Access Policy," https://barnard.edu/public-safety/policies/after-hours-campus-access-policies. Policy statement reads: "On a daily basis, beginning at 11:00 p.m., access will be restricted to the main gate at 117th and Broadway and the link gate at 119th and Claremont. All persons entering the campus must pass through those gates. Access will be permitted only to those presenting a valid Barnard College or Columbia University identification badge. Guests without such credentials are permitted with an escort; escorts must hold a valid Barnard College or Columbia University identification badge."

[93] T&M Protection Resources, LLC, "Analysis of Confrontation between Barnard College Public Safety And A Columbia University Student On April 11, 2019," August 1, 2019, 3.

concluded that T&M did not find any conclusive evidence that race was a factor in the confrontation.

T&M's report outlined various problems concerning the policies, procedures, and protocols of BCPS. Most importantly, the report identified serious miscommunication in Public Safety Officer (PSO) #1's "10-13 radio transmission"[94] because of the lack of written guidelines and training, especially those regarding radio codes. In his 33-year career at BCPS, PSO #1, an officer-of-color, claimed that he had used the code "hundreds of times," but other officers contradicted this notion saying it was seldom used. However, upon arriving at Milstein, Supervisor #10, absent any purported physical threat communicated through radio, approached the student from the rear, physically restrained him, and told him to go outside to "talk about it."[95] McNab, rightfully allowed to be in the space, refused until Supervisor #10 and PSO #1 physically removed themselves from his person, including releasing PSO #1's grasp of his right arm. Supervisor #10 escalated the situation by initiating the use of physical force to remove the student; PSO #1 followed with even greater force.

T&M's reporting is inconsistent with video footage of the incident, and misrepresents the dynamics of the confrontation. T&M writes that after the officers had surrounded and braced the student at the counter, Supervisor #10 "allowed him to rise and reach into his front pants pocket. The male retrieved a wallet…[and] handed the identification card to Supervisor #10."[96] The video footage shows that the student did not hand over his identification, but rather the supervisor grabbed the identification from his hand.[97] Without even looking at the ID, Supervisor #10 tells

[94] 10-13 is a universally recognized law enforcement and NYPD radio code used to indicate that an officer needs immediate assistance due to an imminent and serious threat of physical injury to the officer; *Ibid.*, 7.
[95] Andrew Wang, Twitter Post, April 12, 2019, 4:13 PM, https://twitter.com/andrwwang/status/1116796580680613889.
[96] T&M, 8.
[97] Andrew Wang, 0:35.

the student to walk outside four times, initially never mentioning anything about "verify[ing] his enrollment status."[98] The report noted that once the student produced the identification, the supervisor removed his hand from the student, but the footage revealed that had already happened so that the student could retrieve his identification.[99] T&M misreported the sequence of events to justify Supervisor #10's hold of the student as being necessary until the student produced valid identification. It makes no mention of the supervisor's seizing of his ID, but rather portrays the supervisor as passive and judicious. The report makes no mention of the supervisor's repeated denial of the student's right to be in the building by asking him to step to the dark, unrecorded exterior to prove his enrollment. The report also makes no mention of the supervisor's hold on the student's left leg while simultaneously prompting him to walk outside. Only once the supervisor realized that he was being filmed—not once the student had produced the identification card—did he release his manual and crural hold.[100]

T&M attributed the lack of updated written guidelines, protocols, and procedures, especially those regarding use of force, arrest powers, and de-escalation tactics, available to staff to a "robust unionized environment."[101] The report noted that BCPS management, including the Executive Director and supervisors, characterized "labor management issues [as] a barrier to formalizing policies, procedures, guidelines and appropriate training."[102] In the absence of written policies and protocols, staff then rely heavily on prior law enforcement experience to execute their duties. Because BCPS is a private college security department, the transferal of police training,

[98] *Ibid*., 0:36; T&M, 8.
[99] Andrew Wang, 0:27.
[100] *Ibid*., 0:24.
[101] T&M, 21.
[102] T&M, 22.

tactics, and methods to the college campus is, at its core, the central mechanism of policing the university.

The principal question that T&M asked was if race was a factor in the response by BCPS towards the Columbia University student. This report recognizes that this question is important because of both Barnard's and Columbia's anti-discrimination policies, yet this report emphasizes that the majority of the uniformed staff in these departments are Black and Hispanic, while management (i.e. supervisors and administrators) is largely white and Hispanic. In asking if race was the determinative factor for an officer-of-color's initiating action on a black student, Barnard limits its liability and culpability solely to the black letters of anti-discrimination law. In doing so, Barnard forsakes transparency merely to escape liability, and dismisses the power dynamic between a white supervisor escalating a non-violent interaction between an officer-of-color and a black male student. Rather than disciplining the white supervisor's behavior of escalation, Barnard fired the Hispanic Executive Director, Antonio Gonzalez.

Although T&M could not make a determination that race was a determinative factor in the response by BCPS, the mere fact that a Black male student could reasonably fit the impression or stereotype of a homeless man as he was leaving dance practice or going into the library is the definition of implicit bias. The well-documented disparate treatment and enforcement of Barnard's 11 PM policy is a prime example of the implicit bias for which BCPS must be held responsible. Barnard must reimagine ineffective policies that promote implicit bias.

BCPS Annual Security Reports

Barnard's ASRs reveal a generally safe campus. Few crimes occurred on-campus in the three previous reporting periods. The infrequent occurrence of crime on Barnard's campus is

consistent with its smaller Clery geography. However, this is one limitation of the federal statutes governing statistical collections of crime on campus. IHEs are only required to report crimes occurring within their Clery geography; they are not required to report those outside of it. Just like Columbia, the most frequent violations occurring on campus were drug and alcohol referrals.[103]

One major difference in Barnard's ASR is the ability to confidentially report crimes solely for purposes of statistical collection. Whereas Columbia has "no specific policies or procedures allowing survivors or witnesses to report crimes on a confidential basis for purposes of statistical collection only," Barnard does define such procedures as the responsibility of the Title IX coordinator.[104] While Columbia does survey Campus Security Authorities (CSA) such as Residence Life Coordinators, Deans of Students, Athletic Directors, and other Student Affairs personnel, Barnard's established procedure permits a greater degree of transparency in depicting a clear picture of crime on campus while protecting the identity of survivors and witnesses. CUPS makes no explicit mentioning of the Title IX office as the office for students to do so.

Clery Crime Alerts

Barnard's Public Safety website only lists six Crime Alerts in 2019 and eighteen in 2020. Most Crime Alerts are about property crimes such as robbery, larceny, and burglary, including theft of packages. As of the date of this report, Barnard's Crime Alerts website makes no mention of the robbery-homicide that resulted in the death of Barnard first-year, Tessa Majors. Because the

[103] Barnard College Public Safety, "2018 Annual Security and Fire Safety Report," October 1, 2019, https://barnard.edu/sites/default/files/inline-files/BC%20ASR%20for%202018%20final_3.pdf., 32.
[104] *Ibid*., 63: "Title IX Coordinator works in collaboration with Public Safety to insure such incidents are captured for statistical reporting purposes while protecting the identity of the victim of such crimes."

incident did not take place on Barnard's Clery geography,[105] Barnard is likely not federally mandated to report the incident in its ASR.

BCPS Departmental Responses

Multiple attempts were made both in-person and via email throughout the summer of 2019 to Executive Director Gonzalez regarding the aforementioned departmental questions on contracts, departmental budget, organizational structure, pay schedules and unionization, talent recruitment and retention, training, feedback and accountability, services, and operational protocol. On June 24, 2019, around 4:30 PM, David Norris, Dispatcher for BCPS, made multiple attempts to obstruct communication of the departmental questions to BCPS by making repeated requests to return another time, refusing to answer questions, and, upon being asked, refusing to give his name and title. Rather than give his name, Norris demanded identification three times.

Given that transparency was lacking, Arthur Abbott, BCPS Supervisor, was called by the attending gate officer to assist in the receipt of the departmental questions. On June 28, 2019, Executive Director Gonzalez respectfully declined to meet to discuss the subject matter of this report. It is important to note that T&M was still conducting its investigation of the April 11th confrontation. This report assumes that Executive Director Gonzalez could not comment due to the ongoing investigation.

[105] The upper steps of Morningside Park are public property adjacent to Columbia-owned buildings, including the University President's, Lee Bollinger, House. This would classify the park as public property under Columbia's Clery geography.

Teachers College Public Safety (TCPS)

Like Barnard College, Teachers College (TC) is a private institution affiliated with Columbia that operates under its own administration. As such, Teachers College Public Safety (TCPS) is responsible for the security operations of the Teachers College campus. Unlike Columbia and Barnard, TC is not open to the public, and valid identification is required to enter campus and buildings which lie between 120th and 122nd Streets of Broadway and Amsterdam Avenue.

TCPS Annual Security Reports

TC's ASRs show that very little criminal activity occurred on campus in prior years. In fact, zero major crimes have occurred in the residence halls or non-campus area in the last three years. VAWA offenses are the most frequent, with seven incidences of stalking reported in 2018. Given that TC has no undergraduates, it is no surprise that there are zero alcohol or drug violations. Similar to Barnard, TC's little criminal activity is consistent with its small Clery geography. TCPS prepares its ASRs through a Clery working group composed of various administrative officials, including an NYPD crime analyst. The group is led by the Clery Compliance Coordinator, Joseph Rinaldi. Similar to Barnard, TCPS has a procedure in place solely for the purpose of confidentially collecting crime statistics.[106]

[106] *See* Teachers College Public Safety, "Teachers College Campus Security Act (Clery Act) Crime or Incident Report Form," 2019, https://www.tc.columbia.edu/publicsafety/compliance-and-statistics/crime-statistic-report-form/Clery-CSA-Incident-Report-For--Year-2019.pdf.

Clery Crime Alerts

Only two Crime Alerts are posted on the Public Safety website, both for off campus related crimes.[107]

TCPS Departmental Responses

Multiple attempts were made both in-person and via email throughout the summer of 2019 to Robert Wilson, Director of Operations, regarding the aforementioned departmental questions on contracts, departmental budget, organizational structure, pay schedules and unionization, talent recruitment and retention, training, feedback and accountability, services, and operational protocol. In an email on July 30, 2019, Wilson declined to provide responses citing confidential or privileged information. One final attempt was made to receive responses from TCPS Assistant Vice President, John DeAngelis, but it was unsuccessful.

Recommendations

- Create an inter-school public safety commission with leaders from CUPS, BCPS, TCPS, and other University-wide stakeholders to assess institutional security needs, coordinate departmental strengths and weaknesses, repair working relationships, and develop a University-wide operational guide with a broadly accepted set of protocols, policies, and procedures;

- Prohibit the use of police tactics, strategies, and methods on all University campuses, including using previous law enforcement experience to hire for all upper management and officer positions;

- Support an independent audit to ensure complete Clery compliance, including improving the statistical collection of crime from NYPD and Campus Security Authorities;

[107] *See* TCPS, "Clery Crime Alert – Robbery (Off Campus) 07/19/2020," https://www.tc.columbia.edu/publicsafety/public-safety-alerts/clery-crime-alert---robbery-off-campus-07192020/ and TCPS, "Clery Crime Alert – Assault (Off-Campus) 02/17/2020," https://www.tc.columbia.edu/publicsafety/public-safety-alerts/clery-crime-alert---assault-off-campus-02172020/W08-Clery-Assault-Broadway-119th-street-2020-02-17.pdf.

- Develop specific University-wide policies and procedures allowing survivors or witnesses to report crimes on a confidential basis for purposes of statistical collection only, including appropriately releasing Clery Crime Alerts when a continuing threat to students occurs;

- Communicate relevant security information from Columbia, Barnard, and Teachers College to all University students, including compiling and releasing security information of all three schools across departmental websites and other information access points;

- Identify, outline, and distribute timely warning protocol, policy, and procedure with explicit threshold requirements for release of such warnings;

- Support an independent investigation to determine if Columbia University Public Safety adequately warned students of the danger posed by the robbery-homicide on December 11, 2019;

- Innovate new technologies to better support enforcement of public safety policies, such as implementing card readers to verify active student enrollment and improving quality of CCTV footage;

- Reallocate resources within public safety departments, where appropriate, to University mental health providers, crisis and social workers, and other rehabilitative services to eschew police services and other forms of violence;

- Accept the following demands from Columbia's Mobilized African Diaspora (MAD):[108]

    - Disclose with full transparency Columbia's relationship to the NYPD, including NYPD's presence in Columbia-owned real estate throughout New York and any donations Columbia makes to organizations such as the New York Police Foundation and Police Benevolent Association of the City of New York (NYC PBA);
    - End the $1.54 million Police Management Institute Executive Training Program contract with the NYPD;
    - Release itemized, annual budget reports detailing funding, spending, investments, and all financial allocation over the last twenty years;
    - Commit to the creation of a Community Safety Task Force as stated in section 3(c), including the creation of University-wide Community Safety Survey;

[108] *See* Mobilized African Diaspora, "Demand Letter," August 31, 2020, https://docs.google.com/document/u/1/d/1yLZN0AyGZlvpnNxzbc9osaWMMeI7WjxGJo0Ujc1x98I/mobilebasic.

- Create a transparent and centralized reporting process for students/community members who have experienced misconduct from CUPS, BCPS, and TCPS officials;
- Commit to the Ban-the-Box initiative on all applications to all of Columbia's schools;
- Improve the academic and safety environment for Black students as stated in section 5(a).