

Mechanism: Limited Direct Execution

In order to virtualize the CPU, the operating system needs to somehow share the physical CPU among many jobs **running seemingly at the same time**. The basic idea is simple: run one process for a little while, then run another one, and so forth. By **time sharing** the CPU in this manner, virtualization is achieved.

There are a few challenges, however, in building such virtualization machinery. The first is *performance*: how can we implement virtualization without adding excessive overhead to the system? The second is *control*: how can we run processes efficiently while **retaining control over the CPU**? Control is particularly important to the OS, as it is in charge of resources; without control, a process could simply run forever and take over the machine, or access information that it should not be allowed to access. Obtaining high performance while maintaining control is thus one of the central challenges in building an operating system.

THE CRUX:

HOW TO EFFICIENTLY VIRTUALIZE THE CPU WITH CONTROL

The OS must virtualize the CPU in an efficient manner while retaining control over the system. To do so, **both hardware** and operating-system support will be required. The OS will often use **a judicious bit of hardware support** in order to accomplish its work effectively.

6.1 Basic Technique: Limited Direct Execution

To make a program run as fast as one might expect, not surprisingly OS developers came up with a technique, which we call **limited direct execution**. The “direct execution” part of the idea is simple: just run the program **directly on the CPU**. Thus, when the OS wishes to start a program running, it creates a **process entry** for it in a process list, allocates some memory for it, loads the program code into memory (from disk), locates its **entry point** (i.e., the `main()` routine or something similar), jumps

OS	Program
Create entry for process list	
Allocate memory for program	
Load program into memory	
Set up stack with <code>argc/argv</code>	
Clear registers	
Execute <code>call main()</code>	Run <code>main()</code>
	Execute <code>return</code> from <code>main</code>
Free memory of process	
Remove from process list	

Figure 6.1: Direct Execution Protocol (Without Limits)

to it, and starts running the user's code. Figure 6.1 shows this basic direct execution protocol (without any limits, yet), using a normal call and return to jump to the program's `main()` and later back into the kernel.

Sounds simple, no? But this approach gives rise to a few problems in our quest to virtualize the CPU. The first is simple: if we just run a program, how can the OS make sure the program doesn't do anything that we don't want it to do, while still running it efficiently? The second: when we are running a process, how does the operating system stop it from running and switch to another process, thus implementing the time sharing we require to virtualize the CPU?

In answering these questions below, we'll get a much better sense of what is needed to virtualize the CPU. In developing these techniques, we'll also see where the "limited" part of the name arises from; without limits on running programs, the OS wouldn't be in control of anything and thus would be "just a library" — a very sad state of affairs for an aspiring operating system!

6.2 Problem #1: Restricted Operations

Direct execution has the obvious advantage of being fast; the program runs natively on the hardware CPU and thus executes as quickly as one would expect. But running on the CPU introduces a problem: what if the process wishes to perform some kind of restricted operation, such as issuing an I/O request to a disk, or gaining access to more system resources such as CPU or memory?

THE CRUX: HOW TO PERFORM RESTRICTED OPERATIONS

A process must be able to perform I/O and some other restricted operations, but without giving the process complete control over the system. How can the OS and hardware work together to do so?

ASIDE: WHY SYSTEM CALLS LOOK LIKE PROCEDURE CALLS

You may wonder why a call to a system call, such as `open()` or `read()`, looks exactly like a typical procedure call in C; that is, if it looks just like a procedure call, **how does** the system know it's a system call, and do all the right stuff? The simple reason: it *is* a procedure call, but hidden inside that procedure call is the **famous trap instruction**. More specifically, when you call `open()` (for example), you are executing a procedure call into the C library. Therein, whether for `open()` or any of the other system calls provided, the library uses an agreed-upon calling convention with the kernel to put the arguments to `open()` in **well-known locations** (e.g., on the stack, or in specific registers), puts the **system-call number** into a well-known location as well (again, onto the stack or a register), and then executes the aforementioned trap instruction. The code in the library **after the trap unpacks return values** and returns control to the program that issued the system call. Thus, the parts of the C library that make system calls are **hand-coded in assembly**, as they need to carefully follow convention in order to process arguments and return values correctly, as well as execute the **hardware-specific trap instruction**. And now you know why you personally don't have to write assembly code to trap into an OS; somebody has already written that assembly for you.

One approach would simply be to let any process **do whatever it wants** in terms of I/O and other related operations. However, doing so would prevent the construction of many kinds of systems that are desirable. For example, if we wish to build a file system that **checks permissions before** granting access to a file, we can't simply let any user process issue I/Os to the disk; if we did, a process could simply read or write the entire disk and thus **all protections would be lost**.

Thus, the approach we take is to introduce a new processor mode, known as **user mode**; code that runs in user mode is restricted in what it can do. For example, when running in user mode, a process **can't issue I/O requests**; doing so would result in the processor **raising an exception**; the OS would then **likely kill the process**.

In contrast to user mode is **kernel mode**, which the operating system (or kernel) runs in. In this mode, code that runs can do what it likes, including privileged operations such as issuing I/O requests and executing all types of **restricted instructions**.

We are still left with a challenge, however: what should a user process do when it wishes to perform some kind of privileged operation, such as reading from disk? To enable this, **virtually all** modern hardware provides the ability for user programs to perform a **system call**. Pioneered on ancient machines such as the Atlas [K+61,L78], system calls allow the kernel to carefully expose certain key pieces of functionality to user programs, such as accessing the file system, creating and destroying processes, **communicating with other processes**, and allocating more

TIP: USE PROTECTED CONTROL TRANSFER

The **hardware assists** the OS by providing **different modes** of execution. In **user mode**, applications do not have full access to hardware resources. In **kernel mode**, the OS has access to the full resources of the machine. **Special instructions to trap** into the kernel and **return-from-trap** back to user-mode programs are also provided, as well as instructions that allow the OS to tell the hardware where the **trap table** resides in memory.

memory. Most operating systems provide a few hundred calls (see the POSIX standard for details [P10]); early Unix systems exposed a more concise subset of **around twenty calls**.

To execute a system call, a program must execute a special **trap** instruction. This instruction **simultaneously jumps into the kernel** and raises the privilege level to kernel mode; once in the kernel, the system can now perform whatever privileged operations are needed (**if allowed**), and thus do the required work for the calling process. When finished, the OS calls a special **return-from-trap** instruction, which, as you might expect, returns into the calling user program **while simultaneously reducing** the privilege level back to user mode.

The hardware needs to be a bit careful when executing a trap, in that it must make sure to **save enough of the caller's** registers in order to be able to return correctly when the OS issues the return-from-trap instruction. On x86, for example, the processor will push the program counter, flags, and a few other registers onto a **per-process kernel stack**; the return-from-trap will pop these values off the stack and resume execution of the user-mode program (see the Intel systems manuals [I11] for details). Other hardware systems use **different conventions**, but the basic concepts are **similar** across platforms.

There is one important detail left out of this discussion: how does the trap know **which code** to run inside the OS? Clearly, the calling process can't **specify an address** to jump to (as you would when making a procedure call); doing so would allow programs to **jump anywhere** into the kernel which clearly is a **Very Bad Idea**¹. Thus the kernel must carefully control what code executes upon a trap.

The kernel does so by setting up a **trap table** at boot time. When the machine boots up, it does so in privileged (kernel) mode, and thus **is free to configure machine hardware** as need be. One of the first things the OS thus does is to tell the hardware what code to run when **certain exceptional events** occur. For example, what code should run when a hard-disk interrupt takes place, when a **keyboard interrupt** occurs, or when a program makes a system call? The OS informs the hardware of the

¹Imagine jumping into code to access a file, but just after a permission check; in fact, it is likely such an ability would enable a **wily** programmer to get the kernel to run arbitrary code sequences [S07]. In general, try to avoid Very Bad Ideas like this one.

OS @ boot (kernel mode)	Hardware	
initialize trap table	remember address of... syscall handler	
OS @ run (kernel mode)	Hardware	Program (user mode)
Create entry for process list Allocate memory for program Load program into memory Setup user stack with argv Fill kernel stack with reg/PC return-from-trap	restore regs (from kernel stack) move to user mode jump to main	Run main() ... Call system call trap into OS
Handle trap Do work of syscall return-from-trap	save regs (to kernel stack) move to kernel mode jump to trap handler	
	restore regs (from kernel stack) move to user mode jump to PC after trap	... return from main trap (via exit())
Free memory of process Remove from process list		

Figure 6.2: Limited Direct Execution Protocol

locations of these trap handlers, usually with some kind of special instruction. Once the hardware is informed, it remembers the location of these handlers until the machine is next rebooted, and thus the hardware knows what to do (i.e., what code to jump to) when system calls and other exceptional events take place.

TIP: BE **WARY OF **USER INPUTS** IN SECURE SYSTEMS**

Even though we have taken great pains to protect the OS during system calls (by adding a hardware trapping mechanism, and ensuring all calls to the OS are **routed through** it), there are still many other aspects to implementing a **secure** operating system that we must consider. One of these is the **handling of arguments** at the system call boundary; the OS must check what the user passes in and **ensure that arguments are properly specified**, or otherwise reject the call.

For example, with a `write()` system call, the user specifies an address of a buffer as a source of the write call. If the user (either accidentally or maliciously) passes in a “bad” address (e.g., **one inside the kernel’s portion** of the address space), the OS must detect this and reject the call. Otherwise, it would be possible for a user to **read all of kernel memory**; given that kernel (virtual) memory also usually includes **all of the physical memory** of the system, this small slip would enable a program to read the memory of **any other process in the system**.

In general, a secure system must treat user inputs with great suspicion. Not doing so will undoubtedly lead to easily hacked software, a despairing sense that the world is an **unsafe and scary place**, and the loss of job security for the all-too-trusting OS developer.

To specify the **exact system call**, a **system-call number** is usually assigned to each system call. The user code is thus responsible for placing the desired system-call number in a register or at a specified location on the stack; the OS, when handling the system call inside the trap handler, examines this number, **ensures it is valid**, and, if it is, executes the corresponding code. This level of **indirection** serves as a form of **protection**; user code cannot specify an exact address to jump to, but rather must request a **particular service via number**.

One last aside: being able to execute the instruction to **tell the hardware where the trap tables are** is a very powerful capability. Thus, as you might have guessed, it is also a **privileged** operation. If you try to execute this instruction in user mode, the hardware won’t let you, and you can probably guess what will happen (hint: adios, offending program). Point to ponder: what horrible things could you do to a system if you could **install your own trap table**? Could you take over the machine?

The timeline (with time increasing downward, in Figure 6.2) summarizes the protocol. We assume each process has a **kernel stack** where registers (including **general** purpose registers and the **program counter**) are saved to and restored from (by the hardware) when transitioning into and out of the kernel.

There are two phases in the limited direct execution (**LDE**) protocol. In the first (at **boot time**), the kernel initializes the trap table, and the CPU remembers its location for subsequent use. The kernel does so via a privileged instruction (all privileged instructions are **highlighted in bold**).

In the second (when running a process), the kernel **sets up a few things** (e.g., allocating a **node on the process list**, allocating memory) before using a return-from-trap instruction to start the execution of the process; this switches the CPU to user mode and begins running the process. When the process wishes to issue a system call, it traps back into the OS, which handles it and **once again** returns control via a return-from-trap to the process. The process then completes its work, and returns from `main()`; this usually will return into **some stub code** which will properly exit the program (say, by calling the `exit()` system call, which traps into the OS). At this point, the OS cleans up and we are done.

6.3 Problem #2: Switching Between Processes

The next problem with direct execution is achieving a switch between processes. Switching between processes should be simple, right? The OS should just decide to stop one process and start another. What's the big deal? But it actually is a little bit tricky: specifically, if a process is running on the CPU, this by **definition** means **the OS is not running**. If the OS is not running, how can it do anything at all? (hint: it can't) While this sounds almost philosophical, it is a real problem: there is clearly no way for the OS to take an action **if it is not running on the CPU**. Thus we arrive at the crux of the problem.

THE CRUX: HOW TO **REGAIN** CONTROL OF THE CPU

How can the operating system **regain control** of the CPU so that it can switch between processes?

A Cooperative Approach: Wait For System Calls

One approach that some systems have taken in the past (for example, early versions of the Macintosh operating system [M11], or the old Xerox Alto system [A79]) is known as the **cooperative** approach. In this style, the OS *trusts* the **processes of the system** to behave reasonably. Processes that run for too long are assumed to **periodically give up** the CPU so that the OS can decide to run some other task.

Thus, you might ask, how does a friendly process give up the CPU in this utopian world? Most processes, as it turns out, transfer control of the CPU to the OS **quite frequently** by making **system calls**, **for example**, to open a file and subsequently read it, or to **send a message** to another machine, or to create a new process. Systems like this often include an explicit **yield** system call, which does nothing except to **transfer control to the OS** so it can run other processes.

Applications also transfer control to the OS when they do something **illegal**. For example, if an application divides by zero, or tries to access memory that it shouldn't be able to access, it will generate a **trap** to the

OS. The OS will then have control of the CPU again (and likely terminate the offending process).

Thus, in a cooperative scheduling system, the OS regains control of the CPU by **waiting for a system call** or an illegal operation of some kind to take place. You might also be thinking: isn't this **passive approach** less than ideal? What happens, for example, if a process (whether malicious, or just full of bugs) ends up **in an infinite loop**, and never makes a system call? What can the OS do then?

A Non-Cooperative Approach: The OS Takes Control

Without some **additional help from the hardware**, it turns out the OS can't do much at all when a process refuses to make system calls (or mistakes) and thus return control to the OS. In fact, in the cooperative approach, your only recourse when a process gets stuck in an infinite loop is to resort to the **age-old solution** to all problems in computer systems: **reboot the machine**. Thus, we again arrive at a subproblem of our general quest to gain control of the CPU.

THE CRUX: HOW TO GAIN CONTROL WITHOUT COOPERATION

How can the OS gain control of the CPU even if processes are not being cooperative? What can the OS do to ensure a rogue process does not take over the machine?

The answer turns out to be simple and was discovered by a number of people building computer systems many years ago: a **timer interrupt** [M+63]. A timer device can be programmed to raise an **interrupt** every so many milliseconds; when the interrupt is raised, the currently running process is halted, and a **pre-configured interrupt handler** in the OS runs. At this point, the OS has regained control of the CPU, and thus can do what it pleases: stop the current process, and start a different one.

As we discussed before with system calls, the OS must inform the hardware of **which code to run** when the timer interrupt occurs; thus, at boot time, the OS does exactly that. Second, also during the boot sequence, the OS **must start the timer**, which is of course a privileged

TIP: DEALING WITH APPLICATION MISBEHAVIOR

Operating systems often have to deal with misbehaving processes, those that either through **design** (maliciousness) or accident (bugs) attempt to do something that they shouldn't. In modern systems, the way the OS tries to handle such malfeasance is to **simply terminate** the offender. One strike and you're out! Perhaps brutal, but **what else should** the OS do when you try to access memory illegally or execute an illegal instruction?

operation. Once the timer has begun, the OS can thus feel safe in that control will eventually be returned to it, and thus the OS is free to run user programs. The timer can **also be turned off** (also a privileged operation), something we will discuss later when we **understand concurrency in more detail**.

Note that the hardware has some responsibility when **an interrupt** occurs, in particular to **save enough of the state** of the program that was running when the interrupt occurred such that a subsequent return-from-trap instruction will be able to resume the running program correctly. This set of actions is quite similar to the behavior of the hardware during an explicit system-call trap into the kernel, with various registers thus getting saved (e.g., onto a kernel stack) and thus easily restored by the return-from-trap instruction.

Saving and Restoring Context

Now that the OS has regained control, whether cooperatively via a system call, or more forcefully via a timer interrupt, a decision has to be made: **whether to continue running** the currently-running process, or switch to a different one. This decision is made by a part of the operating system known as the **scheduler**; we will discuss scheduling policies in great detail in the next few chapters.

If the decision is made to switch, the OS then executes a **low-level** piece of code which we refer to as a **context switch**. A context switch is conceptually simple: all the OS has to do is save a few register values for the currently-executing process (onto its kernel stack, for example) and **restore a few** for the soon-to-be-executing process (from its kernel stack). By doing so, the OS thus ensures that when the return-from-trap instruction is finally executed, instead of returning to the process that was running, the system **resumes execution of another process**.

To save the context of the currently-running process, the OS will execute some **low-level assembly code** to save the general purpose registers, PC, and the **kernel stack pointer** of the currently-running process, and then restore said registers, PC, and **switch to the kernel stack** for the soon-to-be-executing process. By switching stacks, the kernel enters the call to the **switch code** in the context of one process (the one that was interrupted) and **returns in the context** of another (the soon-to-be-executing one). When the OS then finally executes a return-from-trap instruction,

TIP: USE THE TIMER INTERRUPT TO REGAIN CONTROL

The addition of a **timer interrupt** gives the OS the ability to run again on a CPU even if processes act in a **non-cooperative** fashion. Thus, this hardware feature is essential in helping the OS maintain control of the machine.

TIP: REBOOT IS USEFUL

Earlier on, we noted that the only solution to infinite loops (and similar behaviors) **under cooperative preemption** is to **reboot** the machine. While you may **scoff** at this hack, researchers have shown that reboot (or in general, starting over some piece of software) can be a hugely useful tool in building robust systems [C+04].

Specifically, reboot is useful because it moves software **back to a known and likely more tested** state. Reboots also reclaim **stale or leaked** resources (e.g., memory) which may **otherwise be hard to handle**. Finally, **reboots are easy to automate**. For all of these reasons, it is not uncommon in large-scale cluster Internet services for **system management software** to periodically reboot sets of machines in order to reset them and thus **obtain the advantages listed above**.

Thus, next time you reboot, you are not just enacting some ugly hack. Rather, you are using a time-tested approach to improving the behavior of a computer system. **Well done!**

the soon-to-be-executing process **becomes the currently-running process**. And thus the context switch is complete.

A timeline of the entire process is shown in Figure 6.3. In this example, Process A is running and then is interrupted by the timer interrupt. The hardware saves **its registers** (onto its kernel stack) and enters the kernel (switching to kernel mode). In the timer interrupt handler, the OS **decides to switch** from running Process A to Process B. At that point, it calls the `switch()` routine, which carefully saves current register values (**into the process structure of A**), restores the registers of Process B (from its process structure entry), and then **switches contexts**, specifically by changing the **stack pointer to use B's kernel stack** (and not A's). Finally, the OS returns-from-trap, which **restores B's registers** and starts running it.

Note that there are two types of register saves/restores that happen during this protocol. The first is when the timer interrupt occurs; in this case, the *user registers* of the running process are **implicitly** saved by the *hardware*, **using the kernel stack** of that process. The second is when the OS decides to switch from A to B; in this case, the **kernel registers** are explicitly saved by the *software* (i.e., the OS), but this time into memory in the process structure of the process. The latter action moves the system from running as if it just trapped into the kernel from A to as if it just trapped into **the kernel from B**.

To give you a better sense of how such a switch is enacted, Figure 6.4 shows the context switch code for xv6. See if you can make sense of it (you'll have to know a bit of **x86, as well as some xv6**, to do so). The context structures `old` and `new` are found in the old and new process's process structures, respectively.

OS @ boot (kernel mode)	Hardware	
initialize trap table	remember addresses of... syscall handler timer handler	
start interrupt timer	start timer interrupt CPU in X ms	
OS @ run (kernel mode)	Hardware	Program (user mode)
		Process A
		...
	timer interrupt save regs(A) → k-stack(A) move to kernel mode jump to trap handler	
Handle the trap Call switch() routine save regs(A) → proc.t(A) restore regs(B) ← proc.t(B) switch to k-stack(B) return-from-trap (into B)	restore regs(B) ← k-stack(B) move to user mode jump to B's PC	
		Process B
		...

Figure 6.3: Limited Direct Execution Protocol (Timer Interrupt)

6.4 Worried About Concurrency?

Some of you, as attentive and thoughtful readers, may be now thinking: “Hmm... what happens when, during a system call, a timer interrupt occurs?” or “What happens when you’re handling one interrupt and another one happens? Doesn’t that get hard to handle in the kernel?” Good questions — we really have some hope for you yet!

The answer is yes, the OS does indeed need to be concerned as to what happens if, during interrupt or trap handling, another interrupt occurs. This, in fact, is the exact topic of the entire second piece of this book, on concurrency; we’ll defer a detailed discussion until then.

To whet your appetite, we’ll just sketch some basics of how the OS handles these tricky situations. One simple thing an OS might do is disable interrupts during interrupt processing; doing so ensures that when

```

1  # void swtch(struct context **old, struct context *new);
2  #
3  # Save current register context in old
4  # and then load register context from new.
5  .globl swtch
6  swtch:
7      # Save old registers
8      movl 4(%esp), %eax # put old ptr into eax
9      popl 0(%eax)      # save the old IP
10     movl %esp, 4(%eax) # and stack
11     movl %ebx, 8(%eax) # and other registers
12     movl %ecx, 12(%eax)
13     movl %edx, 16(%eax)
14     movl %esi, 20(%eax)
15     movl %edi, 24(%eax)
16     movl %ebp, 28(%eax)
17
18     # Load new registers
19     movl 4(%esp), %eax # put new ptr into eax
20     movl 28(%eax), %ebp # restore other registers
21     movl 24(%eax), %edi
22     movl 20(%eax), %esi
23     movl 16(%eax), %edx
24     movl 12(%eax), %ecx
25     movl 8(%eax), %ebx
26     movl 4(%eax), %esp # stack is switched here
27     pushl 0(%eax)      # return addr put in place
28     ret               # finally return into new ctxt

```

Figure 6.4: The xv6 Context Switch Code

one interrupt is being handled, no other one will be delivered to the CPU. Of course, the OS has to be careful in doing so; disabling interrupts for too long could **lead to lost interrupts**, which is (in technical terms) bad.

Operating systems also have developed a number of sophisticated **locking** schemes to protect concurrent access to internal data structures. This enables multiple activities to be on-going within the kernel at the same time, particularly useful on multiprocessors. As we'll see in the next piece of this book on concurrency, though, such locking can be complicated and lead to a variety of interesting and hard-to-find bugs.

6.5 Summary

We have described some key low-level mechanisms to implement CPU virtualization, a set of techniques which we collectively refer to as **limited direct execution**. The basic idea is straightforward: just run the program you want to run on the CPU, but first make sure to **set up the hardware** so as to limit what the process can do without OS assistance.

ASIDE: HOW LONG CONTEXT SWITCHES TAKE

A natural question you might have is: how long does something like a context switch take? Or **even a system call**? For those of you that are curious, there is a tool called **Imbench** [MS96] that measures exactly those things, as well as a few other performance measures that might be relevant.

Results have improved quite a bit over time, roughly tracking processor performance. For example, in 1996 running Linux 1.3.37 on a 200-MHz P6 CPU, system calls took roughly **4 microseconds**, and a context switch roughly 6 microseconds [MS96]. Modern systems perform almost an order of magnitude better, with sub-microsecond results on systems with 2- or 3-GHz processors.

It should be noted that not all operating-system actions track **CPU performance**. As Ousterhout observed, many OS operations are **memory intensive**, and memory bandwidth has not improved as dramatically as processor speed over time [O90]. Thus, depending on your workload, buying the latest and greatest processor may not speed up your OS as much as you might hope.

This general approach is taken in real life as well. For example, those of you who have children, or, at least, **have heard of children**, may be familiar with the concept of **baby proofing** a room: locking cabinets **containing dangerous stuff** and covering electrical sockets. When the room is thus readied, you can let your baby roam freely, secure in the knowledge that the most dangerous aspects of the room have been restricted.

In an analogous manner, the OS **"baby proofs" the CPU**, by first (during boot time) setting up the trap handlers and starting an interrupt timer, and then by only running processes in a restricted mode. By doing so, the OS can feel quite assured that processes can run efficiently, only requiring OS intervention to perform privileged operations or when they have monopolized the CPU for too long and thus need to be switched out.

We thus have the basic mechanisms for virtualizing the CPU in place. But a major question is left unanswered: which process should we run at a given time? It is this question that the scheduler must answer, and thus **the next topic** of our study.

ASIDE: KEY CPU VIRTUALIZATION TERMS (MECHANISMS)

- The CPU should support at least two modes of execution: a restricted **user mode** and a privileged (non-restricted) **kernel mode**.
- Typical user applications run in user mode, and use a **system call** to **trap** into the kernel to request operating system services.
- The trap instruction **saves register state carefully**, changes the hardware status to kernel mode, and jumps into the OS to a pre-specified destination: the **trap table**.
- When the OS finishes servicing a system call, it returns to the user program via another special **return-from-trap** instruction, which reduces privilege and returns control to **the instruction after the trap** that jumped into the OS.
- The trap tables must be set up by the OS at boot time, and make sure that they cannot be readily modified by user programs. All of this is part of the **limited direct execution protocol** which runs programs efficiently but without loss of OS control.
- Once a program is running, the OS must use **hardware mechanisms** to ensure the user program does not run forever, namely the **timer interrupt**. This approach is a **non-cooperative** approach to CPU scheduling.
- Sometimes the OS, during a timer interrupt **or system call**, might wish to switch from running the current process to a different one, a low-level technique known as a **context switch**.

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- [MS96] “Imbench: Portable tools for performance analysis” by Larry McVoy and Carl Staelin. USENIX Annual Technical Conference, January 1996. *A fun paper about how to measure a number of different things about your OS and its performance. Download Imbench and give it a try.*
- [M11] “Mac OS 9” by Apple Computer, Inc.. January 2011. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mac_OS_9. *You can probably even find an OS 9 emulator out there if you want to; check it out, it’s a fun little Mac!*
- [O90] “Why Aren’t Operating Systems Getting Faster as Fast as Hardware?” by J. Ousterhout. USENIX Summer Conference, June 1990. *A classic paper on the nature of operating system performance.*
- [P10] “The Single UNIX Specification, Version 3” by The Open Group, May 2010. Available: <http://www.unix.org/version3/>. *This is hard and painful to read, so probably avoid it if you can. Like, unless someone is paying you to read it. Or, you’re just so curious you can’t help it!*
- [S07] “The Geometry of Innocent Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86)” by Hovav Shacham. CCS ’07, October 2007. *One of those awesome, mind-blowing ideas that you’ll see in research from time to time. The author shows that if you can jump into code arbitrarily, you can essentially stitch together any code sequence you like (given a large code base); read the paper for the details. The technique makes it even harder to defend against malicious attacks, alas.*

Homework (Measurement)

ASIDE: MEASUREMENT HOMEWORKS

Measurement homeworks are small exercises where you write code to run on a real machine, in order to **measure some aspect of OS** or hardware performance. The idea behind such homeworks is to give you a little bit of hands-on experience with a **real operating system**.

In this homework, you'll measure the costs of **a system call and context switch**. Measuring the cost of a system call is relatively easy. For example, you could repeatedly call a simple system call (e.g., performing a 0-byte read), and time how long it takes; **dividing the time by the number of iterations** gives you an estimate of the cost of a system call.

One thing you'll have to take into account is the **precision** and accuracy of your timer. A typical timer that you can use is `gettimeofday()`; read the man page for details. What you'll see there is that `gettimeofday()` returns the time in microseconds **since 1970**; however, this does not mean that the timer is precise to the microsecond. Measure back-to-back calls to `gettimeofday()` to learn something about how precise the timer really is; this will tell you **how many iterations** of your null system-call test you'll have to run in order to get a good measurement result. If `gettimeofday()` is not precise enough for you, you might look into using the `rdtsc` instruction available on x86 machines.

Measuring the cost of a context switch is a little trickier. The `lmbench` benchmark does so by running two processes **on a single CPU**, and setting up two UNIX **pipes between them**; a pipe is just one of **many ways processes** in a UNIX system can communicate with one another. The first process then issues a write to **the first pipe**, and waits for a read on the **second**; upon seeing the first process **waiting for something to read** from the second pipe, the OS puts the first process in the **blocked state**, and **switches to the other process**, which reads **from the first pipe** and then **writes to the second**. When the second process tries to read from the first pipe again, it **blocks**, and thus the back-and-forth cycle of communication continues. By measuring the cost of communicating like this repeatedly, `lmbench` can make a good estimate of the cost of a context switch. You can try to re-create something similar here, using pipes, or perhaps some other communication mechanism **such as UNIX sockets**.

One difficulty in measuring context-switch cost arises in systems with more than one CPU; what you need to do on such a system is ensure that your context-switching processes are **located on the same processor**. Fortunately, most operating systems have calls to bind a process to a particular processor; on Linux, for example, the `sched_setaffinity()` call is what you're looking for. By ensuring both processes are on the same processor, you are making sure to measure the cost of the OS stopping one process and restoring another **on the same CPU**.