Information Security 11.1

Information Security 11.1 All rights are reserved IP Security

Chapter 16 Fudan University

Review

- Cryptography
- Authentication techniques

• Authenucaus.
• PKI, CA, cert.


• PKI, CA, cert.

• Fudan University



Review

- Cryptography
- Authentication techniques




IP Security

- have a range of application specific security mechanisms
 - eg. S/MIME, PGP, Kerberos, SSL/HTTPS
- however there are security concerns that cut across protocol layers
- would like security implemented by the network for all applications
- Q: If security mechanisms in app layer have implemented. Security is needed in network level? Or vice versa?

IPSec

- general IP Security mechanisms reserved by Li Jingtao @ Fudan Universit
- provides
 - authentication
- confidentiality
 - key management
 - applicable to use over LANs, across public & private WANs, & for the Internet

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Benefits of IPSec

- in a firewall/router provides strong security to all traffic crossing the perimeter
- in a firewall/router is resistant to bypass
- is below transport layer, hence transparent to applications
- can be transparent to end users
- can provide security for individual users
- secures routing architecture



IP Security Architecture

- specification is quite complex
- defined in numerous RFC's
 - incl. RFC 2401/2402/2406/2408
- many others, grouped by category
 - mandatory in IPv6, optional in IPv4
 - have two security header extensions:
 - Authentication Header (AH)
 - Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)



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Access control

Connectionless integrity

Data origin authentication

Rejection of replayed packets

Confidentiality

Limited traffic flow confidentiality

AH	ESP (encryption only)	ESP (encryption plus authentication)
	✓	✓
by Li	Tin	✓
✓	rigiao @ Fu	da_{1}
TVedi	✓	Versity
by Li Jir	ota V	✓
	Fudar	Univer


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Authentication Header (AH)


- provides support for data integrity & authentication of IP packets
 - end system/router can authenticate user/app
- prevents address spoofing / replay attacks by tracking sequence numbers
- based on use of a MAC
 - HMAC-MD5-96 or HMAC-SHA-1-96
- parties must share a secret key

Authentication Header






Transport vs Tunnel Modes





Transport & Tunnel Modes




Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

- provides message content confidentiality & limited traffic flow confidentiality
- can optionally provide the same authentication services as AH
- supports range of ciphers, modes, padding
 - incl. DES, Triple-DES, RC5, IDEA, CAST etc
 - CBC & other modes
 - padding needed to fill blocksize, fields, for traffic flow



Encapsulating Security Payload



Transport vs Tunnel Mode ESP

- transport mode is used to encrypt & optionally authenticate IP data
 - data protected but header left in clear
- can do traffic analysis but is efficient
 - good for ESP host to host traffic
 - tunnel mode encrypts entire IP packet
 - add new header for next hop
 - good for VPNs, gateway to gateway security



Security Associations

- a one-way relationship between sender & receiver that affords security for traffic flow
- defined by 3 parameters:
- Au Security Parameters Index (SPI)
 - IP Destination Address
 - Security Protocol Identifier
 - has a number of other parameters
 - seq no, AH & EH info, lifetime etc
 - have a database of Security Associations




Security Parameters Index - SPI

- Can be up to 32 bits large
- The SPI allows the destination to select the correct SA under which the received packet will be processed
 - According to the agreement with the sender
 - The SPI is sent with the packet by the sender
- SPI + Dest IP address + IPSec Protocol (AH or ESP) uniquely identifies a SA



Outbound Processing






 \bigcirc Send to $\stackrel{\circ}{B}$



Inbound Processing






Combining Security Associations

- SA's can implement either AH or ESP
- to implement both need to combine SA's
 - form a security association bundle
- may terminate at different or same endpoints
 - combined by
 - transport adjacency
 - iterated tunneling
 - issue of authentication & encryption order



Combining Security Associations



Bakup

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Key Management

- handles key generation & distribution
- typically need 2 pairs of keys
 - 2 per direction for AH & ESP
- manual key management
 - sysadmin manually configures every system
 - automated key management
 - automated system for on demand creation of keys for SA's in large systems
 - has Oakley & ISAKMP elements


Oakley


- a key exchange protocol
- based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange
- adds features to address weaknesses
 - cookies, groups (global params), nonces, DH key exchange with authentication
- can use arithmetic in prime fields or elliptic curve fields

ISAKMP

- Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
- provides framework for key management
- defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify, & delete SAs
- independent of key exchange protocol, encryption alg, & authentication method

ISAKMP





(b) Generic Payload Header



SAKMP Payloads & Exchanges

- have a number of ISAKMP payload types:
 - Security, Proposal, Transform, Key,
 Identification, Certificate, Certificate, Hash,
 Signature, Nonce, Notification, Delete
- ISAKMP has framework for 5 types of message exchanges:
 - base, identity protection, authentication only, aggressive, informational

Summary

- have considered:
 - IPSec security framework
 - AH
- AllieESP
- Jingtao @ Fudan University key management & Oakley/ISAKMP Li Jingtao @ Fudan University