Wealth Protection in Bankruptcy and Serial Entrepreneurship

Donghyun Kang

Erasmus School of Economics

March 2025

Motivation

Bankruptcy law has to balance two conflicting interests

- 1. Protect creditor rights ⇒ increase credit supply
- 2. Protect debtor opportunities \Rightarrow encourage entrepreneurs to take risk

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– EU Directive on Restructuring and Insolvency, 2019

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RQ: Does protecting post-bankruptcy wealth help *failed* entrepreneurs to restart?


Post-bankruptcy wealth and serial entrepreneurship

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Variation in post-bankruptcy wealth by bankruptcy law



Research design


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Variation in post-bankruptcy wealth while holding law constant




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Variation in post-bankruptcy wealth while holding law constant



Identifying assumption: Timing of inheritance is random to that of bankruptcy

Personal bankruptcy discharges personally liable debts

Bankruptcy process

1. Debtor files to local jurisdiction & court reviews the filing

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▶ 9.5 months

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 - The rest is discharged

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Institutional features about windfalls

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Institutional features about windfalls

- 1. If inheritance is anticipated, the court rejects the filing Fig: inheritance timing
- 2. Unexpected windfalls after bankruptcy ruling belong to debtor
 - Creditors do not have claims to them

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- \Rightarrow Link 4 datasets via personal identifier (\simeq Social Security numbers in the US)

Sample selection

Treatment group: bankrupt entrepreneurs who receive windfalls from inheritance

- Treatment window: occurs up to 3 calendar years after bankruptcy
- Average: 55,000 EUR / Median[†]: 20,000 EUR
- Median inheritance $^{\dagger} = 22\%$ of pre-bankruptcy debt

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
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
Control group: bankrupt entrepreneurs who do not receive inheritance

- Matched to the 'treated' group by individual characteristics (age, wealth etc.)
- :. Number of unique individuals: 214 treated & 205 matched control
- Sample period: year of bankruptcy through 5 subsequent years (years 0–5)
 - ► Matching detail ► Summary statistics


Dynamics of business ownership around bankruptcy



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Estimating effects of inheritance on serial entrepreneurship

Regression with matched sample:

Owner_{it} =
$$\alpha_y + \beta$$
After inheritance_{it} + $\gamma X'_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$, $(t = 0, ..., 5)$

- Owner_{it}: indicator equals one if individual i owns a business in event year t
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 - Alternative measure using variation in size: Large inheritance $_{\mathrm{it}}$

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 - Alternative measure using variation in size: Large inheritance $_{it}$
- Calendar-year fixed effect: α_y
- Controls X'_{it}, characteristics on:
 - Bankruptcy case: bankruptcy chapter, discharge ratio
 - Individual: pre-bankruptcy wealth and income, age, gender, years of education
- Cluster standard errors at the individual level

Effect of inheritance on serial entrepreneurship

Owner _{it} = $\alpha_y + \beta$ After inheritance _{it} + $\gamma X'_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$, $(t = 0,, 5)$			
	(1)	(2)	
After inheritance	0.048 (1.64)	0.054 (1.39)	
After inheritance $ imes$ Large inheritance		-0.012 (-0.24)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	
Observations	2,480	2,480	

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- Larger windfalls do not have incremental effect



Why doesn't windfall wealth promote serial entrepreneurship?

The null effect contrasts with related studies:

- Wealth protection in bankruptcy ⇒ first-time entrepreneurship ↑
 (Fan and White 2003; Armour and Cumming 2008; Cerqueiro et al. 2019)
- Wealth windfalls outside bankruptcy ⇒ entrepreneurship ↑
 (e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Andersen and Nielsen 2012; Bellon et al. 2021; Cespedes et al. 2021)

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 (e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Andersen and Nielsen 2012; Bellon et al. 2021; Cespedes et al. 2021)
- → Experience of severe loss may discourage reentry for bankrupt entrepreneurs
 - Managers' personal experiences reduce their risk-taking (e.g., Malmendier et al. 2011; Dittmar and Duchin 2016; Schoar and Zuo 2017)

Measures of experiencing severe losses

Entrepreneurial experiences with severe impacts on personal income & wealth

1. Experiencing **negative** personal income from business before bankruptcy

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Entrepreneurial experiences with severe impacts on personal income & wealth

- 1. Experiencing **negative** personal income from business before bankruptcy
- 2. Accumulating large personal debt from failed business
- 3. Being held fully personally liable for business debts (vs. partially liable)
 - Solely owned an unlimited liability company (ULC) before bankruptcy (vs. LLC)

Estimating effects of experiencing severe loss

Regression with matched sample:

Owner_{it} =
$$\alpha_y + \beta_1$$
After inheritance_{it} + β_2 Severe loss_i + β_3 After inheritance_{it} × Severe loss_i + $\gamma X'_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$,

 $\beta_1 \& \beta_3$: differential response to inheritance by experience of severe loss

	Measures of severe loss				
	(1) Negative income	(2) Large business debt	(3) Full personal liability		
After inheritance	0.131*** (2.78)	0.103*** (2.75)	0.126 (1.64)		
After inheritance \times Severe loss	-0.136** (-2.31)	-0.132** (-2.31)	-0.102 (-1.27)		
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	2,018	2,480	2,480		

Experience effect persists across different inheritance sizes

⁻ Sample mean of Owner = 19%

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Returns to serial entrepreneurship

Key premise of the 'second-chance' policy:

- 'Serial entrepreneurs outperform first-time business owners'

Returns to serial entrepreneurship

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
- 'Serial entrepreneurs outperform first-time business owners'
- → Compare profit: serial vs. matched group of *first-time* entrepreneurs
 - Prior literature: Profit \simeq Entrepreneurial quality

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
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 - Number of unique entrepreneurs: 110 serial & 110 matched control (t=0,...,5)

Returns to entrepreneurship between two groups




Before (re)starting, similar income levels





After (re)starting, 20% lower profits for the treated



Conclusion

First study to examine if post-bankruptcy wealth helps failed entrepreneurs to restart a business

- Windfall wealth ⇒ serial entrepreneurship, *only if* less severe experience

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Marginal quality of serial entrepreneurs is low

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Limited effectiveness of "second-chance" bankruptcy policies

- 1. Wealth protection effect limited by personal experience
- 2. Low entrepreneurial quality
- 3. Costs for other entrepreneurs in the economy (e.g., reduced credit supply)

Thank you!


Appendix

Summary statistics: mean, [t-statistic]

	Treated (1)	Control (2)	(1)-(2)
KK)			(1,)-(2)
-1,200.7	-1,114.3	-1,110.5	-3.8	[-0.0]
282.4	280.3	282.4	-2.1	[-0.2]
43.8	47.6	47.4	0.2	[0.3]
73.1	80.4	80.0	0.4	[0.1]
11.7	11.7	11.5	0.2	[1.2]
stics				
45.7	41.1	40.0	1.1	[0.2]
91.0	90.3	92.1	-1.8	[-1.4]
ısiness expe	erience			
18.4	21.0	19.0	2.0	[0.5]
61.6	55.7	62.7	-7.0	[-1.3]
4.4	2.2	2.5	-0.2	[-0.1]
4,851	214	205		
	-1,200.7 282.4 43.8 73.1 11.7 stics 45.7 91.0 usiness expo	-1,200.7 -1,114.3 282.4 280.3 43.8 47.6 73.1 80.4 11.7 11.7 stics 45.7 41.1 91.0 90.3 siness experience 18.4 21.0 61.6 55.7 4.4 2.2	-1,200.7 -1,114.3 -1,110.5 282.4 280.3 282.4 43.8 47.6 47.4 73.1 80.4 80.0 11.7 11.7 11.5 stics 45.7 41.1 40.0 91.0 90.3 92.1 siness experience 18.4 21.0 19.0 61.6 55.7 62.7 4.4 2.2 2.5	-1,200.7 -1,114.3 -1,110.5 -3.8 282.4 280.3 282.4 -2.1 43.8 47.6 47.4 0.2 73.1 80.4 80.0 0.4 11.7 11.7 11.5 0.2 stics 45.7 41.1 40.0 1.1 91.0 90.3 92.1 -1.8 isiness experience 18.4 21.0 19.0 2.0 61.6 55.7 62.7 -7.0 4.4 2.2 2.5 -0.2


Full table with s.e.

Distribution of inherited wealth • Back to wealth regression



Average: 308,000 DKK (\approx 50,000 EUR in 2023) / Median † : 115,000 DKK (\approx 18,000 EUR)


Distribution of inheritance relative to debt Back to Wealth regression



- Unsecured debt = dischargeable debt
- Median ratio[†] = 22%


Timing of inheritances relative to bankruptcy

▶ Back to wealth regression




Timing of inheritances does not exhibit bunching in first 6–12 months

Dynamics of net wealth around bankruptcy • Back to wealth regression



Effect of experiencing severe indebtedness from business





NR. 174 09.09.2016 113 . ÅRGANG

Udgivet i henhold til lov nr. 419 af 31. maj 2000.

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Statstidende ISSN 1399-8714

Statstidende herer til Justitsministeriets område og varetages af Civilstyrelsen, tif.: 33 92 33 34. civilstyrelsen@civilstyrelsen.dk

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Dødsboer	2
Forskellige kundgørelser	30
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Sample page from the State Gazette

- About 2,800 (daily) issues of the Gazette between 2006–2016



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- Using document index, locate relevant sections

09 09 2016 STATSTIDENDE

torerne ikke får mulighed for at øve indflydelse nå skifterettens afoarelse om gældssanering.

John Mikkel Jensen har drevet virksomheden JollyShopping.com v/ John Jensen CVR-nr 12345678

Patton i Pandere don 07.00.2016 Datebrade

S07092016-304

I gældssaneringssagen for Thomas Thomasan

Fodselsdato 10.02 1945 Mallabakkan 0 3400 Hillered Sagsnr. 1608-773

Randers

indkaldes kreditorerne til møde i Retten i Hillerod Lokale B. Sandre Jernbanevei 18 B. stuen. 3400 Hillered.

mandag den 10.10.2016. kl. 13.00.

til behandling af skyldnerens forslag til eældssanering

Forslaget med bilag ligger til eftersyn i skifteretten Udeblivelse medfører, at kreditorerne ikke får muliehed for at udøve indflydelse på skifterettens aføarelse om eældssanerine

Hillered den 07.09.2016

Advokat Kristian Kristiansen Retskreds Hillerad

Kondolse

207002016-27

Skifteretten i Hiarring har den 06 09 2016 afsaet kendelse om gældssanering for

Alica Matta Johnhron Fedselsdato 10 01 1964 Sønderparken 20 9800 Hiarring

Sanenr SKS SKIE-261/2016

nå folgende vilkår

Usikret gæld stiftet af Alice Mette Jakobsen for den 12.05.2016 nedsættes til en dividende på 0.6890%, der betales med en engangsudlodning når kendelse om eældssanering er en-

Hierring, den 06.09.2016.

Som skifterettens medhiælner Jone Janean, advokat Advokaterne Jens and Jesner Vestergade 3 9800 Hiarring

Retskreds Hierrine

earldssanering for

\$07092016-92 Sø- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den 06 09 2016 afsaet kendelse om

Jesner Rasmus Jesnersen Endselsdato 19 10 1960 Waargrethevei 2, 4 th 2300 Kabenbayn S

Sagsnr. G 46/16-K

på følgende vilkår Skyldnerens oæld stiftet inden den

12.04.2016 nedsættes til 34.94% som afdrages over en fem-årige periode Sø- og Handelsretten, Skifteretten, den

07.09.2016 Retskreds

Se- og Handelsretten

\$07002016-00

So- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den 06.09.2016 afsagt kendelse om gældssanering for

Ali Haram Amadu

Endealedato 14 07 1957 Vestergade 14 4 th 2100 Kahanhaya Ø

Saosnr G 76/16-K på følgende vilkår

Skyldnerens oæld stiftet inden den 13.04.2016 nedsættes til 7.15952% og afdrages over en fem-årig periode.

Sø- og Handelsretten, Skifteretten, den 07.09.2016

Datebrade So, on Handelsretten

\$07092016-106 Sø- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den 06 09 2016 afsaet kendelse om exeldssanering for

Annia Darmurran Endeelsdate 25 12 1980 Christian 8.s Vei 2B, 1 tv 1805 Frederiksberg C

Sagsnr. G 36/16-K på følgende vilkår

Skyldnerens gæld stiftet inden den 08 03 2016 nedeettes til 4 65628% og afdrages over med 4.18564% 4 uger efter endelig kendelse om gældssanerine on 0.47064% den 01.05.2017

Sa. on Handelsrotton Skifteretten den 07.09.2016

Datebrode So- og Handelsretten Sample page from the State Gazette

- About 2,800 (daily) issues of the Gazette between 2006-2016

- Using document index, locate relevant sections

- Obtain 210,000 notices on different stages of bankruptcy & liquidation proceedings (e.g., case opens, calls for creditors, ruling is made ...)

09.09.2016 STATSTIDENDE

torerne ikke får mulighed for at øve indflydelse på skifterettens afgørelse om gældssanering.

John Mikkel Jensen har drevet virksomheden JollyShopping.com v/ John Jensen, CVR-nr. 12345678.

Retten i Randers, den 07.09.2016.

Retskreds Randers

S07092016-304

I gældssaneringssagen for

Fødselsdato 10.02.1945 Møllebakken 9 3400 Hillerød Sagsnr. 1608-773

indkaldes kreditorerne til møde i Retter i Hillerød, Lokale B, Søndre Jernbanevei 18 B, stuen. 3400 Hillerød.

mandag den 10.10.2016, kl. 13.00,

til behandling af skyldnerens forslag til eældssanerine

Forslaget med bilag ligger til eftersyn i skifteretten. Udeblivelse medfører, at kreditorerne ikke får mulighed for at udøve indflydelse på skifterettens afsørelse om

Hillerød, den 07.09.2016.

eældssanerine

Hillerad

Advokat Kristian Kristiansen Retskreds

Kendelse S07092016-37

Skifteretten i Hjørring har den 06.09.2016 afsagt kendelse om gældssanering for

Alice Mette Jakobsen
Fødselsdato 10.01.1964
Sønderparken 20
9800 Hjørrine

Sagsnr. SKS SKIF-261/2016

på følgende vilkår:

Usikret gæld stiftet af Alice Mette Jakobsen før den 12.05.2016 nedsættes til en dividende på 0,6890%, der betales med en engangsudlodning, når kendelse om gældssanering er en-

Hierring, den 06.09.2016.

Som skifterettens medhjælper: Jens Jensen, advokat Advokaterne Jens and Jesper Vestergade 3 9800 Histrine

Retskreds Hjørring

> S07092016-92 Sø- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den 06.09 2016 afsagt kondelse om

gældssanering for Jesper Rasmus Jespersen Fødselsdato 19.10.1960

Fødselsdato 19.10.1960 Waargrethevej 2, 4 th 2300 København S Sagsnr, G 46/16-K

på følgende vilkår.

Skyldnerens gæld stiftet inden den 12.04.2016 nedsættes til 34,94%, som afdrages over en fem-årige periode.

Sø- og Handelsretten, Skifteretten, den 07.09.2016.

Retskreds Sø- og Handelsretten

sretten

\$07002016.00

S07092016-99
Sø- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den
06.09.2016 afsagt kendelse om
gældssanering for

Ali Hesam Amadu

Fødselsdato 14.07.1957 Vestergade 14, 4 th. 2100 København Ø

Sagsnr. G 76/16-K nå følgende vilkår:

Skyldnerens gæld stiftet inden den 13.04.2016 nedsættes til 7,15952% og afdrages over en fem-årig periode. Sø- og Handelsretten. Skifteretten, den

07.09.2016. Retskreds

Retskreds Sø- og Handelsretten

S07092016-106

Sø- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den 06.09.2016 afsagt kendelse om gældssanering for

Annie Rasmussen Fødselsdato 25.12.1980 Christian 8.s Vej 2B, 1 tv. 1805 Frederiksberg C Saesnr, G 36/16-K

på følgende vilkår

Skyldnerens gæld stiftet inden den 08.03.2016 nedsættes til 4,65628% og afdrages over med 4,18564% 4 uger efter endelig kendelse om gældssanering og 0,47064% den 01.05.2017.

Sø- og Handelsretten, Skifteretten, den 07.09.2016. Retskreds

Sø- og Handelsretten

Sample page from the State Gazette

- About 2,800 (daily) issues of the Gazette between 2006–2016
- Using document index, locate relevant sections
- Obtain 210,000 notices on different stages of bankruptcy & liquidation proceedings (e.g., case opens, calls for creditors, ruling is made ...)
- Calls for creditors' meeting
- Rulings (under Kendelse)

S07092016-92

Sø- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den 06.09.2016 afsagt kendelse om gældssanering for

Jesper Rasmus Jespersen

Fødselsdato 19.10.1938 Margrethevej 32, 2 th 2300 København S

Sagsnr. G 46/16-K

på følgende vilkår:

Skyldnerens gæld stiftet inden den 12.04.2016 nedsættes til 34,94%, som afdrages over en fem-årige periode.

Sø- og Handelsretten, Skifteretten, den 07 09 2016

Retskreds

Sø- og Handelsretten

Sample notice on bankruptcy ruling

Contains structured, textual info on the case & the debtor

S07092016-92

Sø- og Handelsrettens skifteret har den 06.09.2016 afsagt kendelse om gældssanering for

Jesper Rasmus Jespersen

Fødselsdato 19.10.1938

Margrethevej 32, 2 th

2300 København S

Sagsnr. G 46/16-K

på følgende vilkår:

Skyldnerens gæld stiftet inden den 12.04.2016 nedsættes til 34,94%, som afdrages over en fem-årige periode.

Sø- og Handelsretten, Skifteretten, den 07 09 2016

Retskreds

Sø- og Handelsretten

Sample notice on bankruptcy ruling

Contains structured, textual info on the case & the debtor

- Date of ruling
- Name
- Date of birth
- Address
- Discharge ratio (= %Debt discharged in bankruptcy/Total debt)
- Court
- → Assign personal identifiers to 14,000 bankrupt individuals

Effect by inheritance size

Inherited wealth: measured in 1 million DKK

	Measures of severe loss			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Negative	Large	Full personal	
	income	business debt	liability	
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth	0.190***	0.060	0.131***	
	(6.01)	(1.04)	(3.84)	
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth \times Severe loss	-0.206***	-0.091	-0.121***	
	(-5.87)	(-0.56)	(-2.79)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	2,018	2,480	2,480	

Effect of larger inheritances

Large inheritance: indicator for inheritance above median

	М	easures of sever	e loss
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Negative	Large	Full personal
	income	business debt	liability
After inheritance	0.149**	0.099**	0.217**
	(2.38)	(1.98)	(2.12)
After inheritance $ imes$ Severe loss	-0.145*	-0.111	-0.194*
	(-1.81)	(-1.42)	(-1.80)
After inheritance $ imes$ Large inheritance	-0.040	0.007	-0.155
	(-0.43)	(0.10)	(-1.21)
After inheritance \times Large inheritance \times Severe loss	0.023	-0.040	0.159
	(0.20)	(-0.41)	(1.17)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,018	2,480	2,480

20% lower income from serial entrepreneurship

Income is measured in 1,000 DKK

	Labor and entrepreneurial income			Labor and entrepreneurial incom (conditional on surviva		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
After inheritance	-63.8*** (-2.64)		-34.8 (-1.20)	-59.8** (-2.28)		-31.9 (-1.02)
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth		-43.1*** (-2.91)			-41.1*** (-2.75)	
After inheritance \times Large inheritance			-61.7** (-2.00)			-60.4* (-1.91)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,213	1,213	1,213	998	998	998

Full summary statistics: mean, (standard deviation), [t-statistic] • Back to slides

	P	All		Matched	d sample		Diffe	erence
			Trea	ted (1)	Cont	rol (2)	(1)-(2)
A. Wealth and income (1,000 DK	к)							
Pre-bankruptcy wealth	-1,200.7	(2,152.0)	-1,114.3	(1,780.2)	-1,110.5	(1,806.6)	-3.8	[-0.0]
Pre-bankruptcy income	282.4	(137.9)	280.3	(126.4)	282.4	(134.6)	-2.1	[-0.2]
B. Individual characteristics								
Age	43.8	(8.4)	47.6	(6.9)	47.4	(6.8)	0.2	[0.3]
Male (%)	73.1	(44.4)	80.4	(39.8)	80.0	(40.1)	0.4	[0.1]
Years of education	11.7	(1.8)	11.7	(1.9)	11.5	(1.9)	0.2	[1.2]
C. Bankruptcy case characterist	ics							
Business debt chapter (%)	45.7	(49.8)	41.1	(49.3)	40.0	(49.1)	1.1	[0.2]
Discharge ratio (%)	91.0	(13.5)	90.3	(14.6)	92.1	(11.3)	-1.8	[-1.4]
D. Pre-bankruptcy personal bus	iness expe	erience						
Pre-bankruptcy LLC owner (%)	18.4	(38.7)	21.0	(40.8)	19.0	(39.3)	2.0	[0.5]
Pre-bankruptcy ULC owner (%)	82.8	(37.8)	82.2	(38.3)	81.0	(39.3)	1.3	[0.3]
Severe income loss (%)	61.6	(48.6)	55.7	(49.8)	62.7	(48.5)	-7.0	[-1.3]
Low past performance (%)	4.4	(20.6)	2.2	(14.8)	2.5	(15.5)	-0.2	[-0.1]
Number of individuals	4851		214		205			

Inheritance does not lead to serial entrepreneurship • Back to Table

	(1)	(2)	(3)
After inheritance	0.048		0.054
	(1.64)		(1.39)
After inheritance × Inherited wealth		0.055	
		(1.03)	
After inheritance \times Large inheritance			-0.012
			(-0.24)
Business debt chapter	-0.062*	-0.060*	-0.061*
	(-1.83)	(-1.79)	(-1.82)
Discharge ratio	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
	(2.39)	(2.32)	(2.41)
Pre-bankruptcy wealth	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(-1.78)	(-1.73)	(-1.79)
Pre-bankruptcy income	-0.000	-0.000*	-0.000
	(-1.61)	(-1.66)	(-1.60)
Age	-0.000	-0.001	-0.000
	(-0.18)	(-0.23)	(-0.16)
Male	0.101***	0.104***	0.100***
	(3.14)	(3.25)	(3.09)
Years of education	0.019**	0.020**	0.020**
	(2.29)	(2.34)	(2.29)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.06	0.06	0.06
Individual-year observations	2,480	2,480	2,480

Personal experience: negative personal income • Back to Table

	(1)	(2)	(3)
After inheritance	0.131***		0.149**
	(2.78)		(2.38)
After inheritance × Severe income loss	-0.136**		-0.145*
	(-2.31)		(-1.81)
After inheritance × Inherited wealth		0.190***	
		(6.01)	
After inheritance $ imes$ Inherited wealth $ imes$ Severe income loss		-0.206***	
		(-5.87)	
After inheritance × Large inheritance			-0.040
			(-0.43)
After inheritance $ imes$ Large inheritance $ imes$ Severe income loss			0.023
			(0.20)
Severe income loss	0.056*	0.030	0.055*
	(1.68)	(0.94)	(1.68)
Business debt chapter	-0.027	-0.027	-0.026
	(-0.71)	(-0.69)	(-0.68)
Discharge ratio	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(1.56)	(1.42)	(1.53)
Pre-bankruptcy wealth	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-1.03)	(-1.04)	(-1.04)
Pre-bankruptcy income	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000*
	(-2.46)	(-2.50)	(-2.47)
Age	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Male	0.051	0.055	0.050
	(1.28)	(1.38)	(1.24)
Years of education	0.019*	0.021**	0.019*
	(1.93)	(2.20)	(1.93)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.05	0.07	0.05
Individual-year observations	2,018	2,018	2,018

Personal experience: large business debt • Back to Table

	(1)	(2)	(3)
After inheritance	0.103***		0.099**
	(2.75)		(1.98)
After inheritance × Business debt chapter	-0.132**		-0.111
	(-2.31)		(-1.42)
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth		0.060	
		(1.04)	
After inheritance $ imes$ Inherited wealth $ imes$ Business debt chapter		-0.091	
		(-0.56)	
After inheritance × Large inheritance			0.007
			(0.10)
After inheritance \times Large inheritance \times Business debt chapter			-0.040
			(-0.41)
Business debt chapter	-0.014	-0.053	-0.014
	(-0.37)	(-1.50)	(-0.36)
Discharge ratio	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
	(2.35)	(2.31)	(2.35)
Pre-bankruptcy wealth	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000*
man banka atau kacama	(-1.77)	(-1.73)	(-1.78)
Pre-bankruptcy income	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-1.54)	(-1.63)	(-1.54)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-0.15)	(-0.18)	(-0.11)
Male	0.101***	0.104***	0.100***
v	(3.15)	(3.23)	(3.10)
Years of education	0.020**	0.020**	0.020**
Year fixed effects	(2.30) Yes	(2.35) Yes	(2.29) Yes
	res	res	res
R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06
Individual-year observations	2,480	2,480	2,480

Personal experience: full personal liability • Back to Table

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
After inheritance	0.126		0.217**	
	(1.64)		(2.12)	
After inheritance × Full personal liability	-0.102		-0.194*	
	(-1.27)		(-1.80)	
After inheritance × Inherited wealth		0.131***		
		(3.84)		
After inheritance $ imes$ Inherited wealth $ imes$ Full personal liability		-0.121***		
		(-2.79)		
After inheritance \times Large inheritance			-0.155	0.061
			(-1.21)	(0.63)
After inheritance \times Large inheritance \times Full personal liability			0.159	-0.035
			(1.17)	(-0.34)
Full personal liability	-0.216***	-0.234***	-0.216***	-0.216***
	(-3.85)	(-4.68)	(-3.85)	(-3.85)
Business debt chapter	-0.052	-0.051	-0.052	-0.052
	(-1.62)	(-1.59)	(-1.62)	(-1.62)
Discharge ratio	0.002**	0.001*	0.002**	0.002**
	(1.98)	(1.77)	(1.98)	(1.98)
Pre-bankruptcy wealth	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-1.16)	(-1.15)	(-1.13)	(-1.13)
Pre-bankruptcy income	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(-2.05)	(-2.15)	(-1.92)	(-1.92)
Age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
****	(-1.05)	(-0.91)	(-1.02)	(-1.02)
Male	0.090***	0.090***	0.086***	0.086***
Years of education	(2.83)	(2.90)	(2.72)	(2.72)
Years of education	0.014 (1.56)	0.015* (1.68)	0.013	0.013
After inheritance × Small inheritance	(1.50)	(1.00)	(1.54)	
Arter inneritance × Small inneritance				0.217**
After inheritance × Small inheritance × Full personal liability				(2.12)
After inneritance × Small inneritance × Full personal liability				-0.194* (-1.80)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	(-1.80) Yes
	162	162	162	res
R ²	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Individual-year observations	2,480	2,480	2,480	2,480

Robustness: severe loss vs. low entrepreneurial quality • Back to Table

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
After inheritance	0.054*	0.126***	0.103***	0.117
	(1.69)	(2.69)	(2.63)	(1.22)
After inheritance × Low past performance	-0.167*	-0.162	-0.217**	-0.145
	(-1.81)	(-1.60)	(-2.31)	(-1.59)
After inheritance × Severe income loss		-0.129**		
		(-2.19)		
After inheritance × Business debt chapter			-0.125*	
			(-1.95)	
After inheritance \times Full personal liability				-0.086
				(-0.86)
Low past performance	-0.049	-0.037	-0.030	-0.021
	(-0.59)	(-0.40)	(-0.37)	(-0.24)
Severe income loss		0.058*		
		(1.65)		
Business debt chapter	-0.049	-0.040	-0.002	-0.048
	(-1.25)	(-1.00)	(-0.05)	(-1.30)
Full personal liability				-0.258***
				(-3.63)
Discharge ratio	0.002**	0.001	0.002*	0.001*
	(2.03)	(1.58)	(1.95)	(1.73)
Pre-bankruptcy wealth	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(-1.47)	(-1.07)	(-1.45)	(-0.63)
Pre-bankruptcy income	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(-2.69)	(-2.46)	(-2.62)	(-2.87)
Age	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.002
	(-0.15)	(0.03)	(-0.17)	(-0.80)
Male	0.071*	0.053	0.071*	0.063
V	(1.71)	(1.25)	(1.72)	(1.56)
Years of education	0.024**	0.018*	0.024**	0.014
	(2.55)	(1.79)	(2.50)	(1.45)
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.13
Individual-year observations	2,022	1,902	2,022	2,022

		abor and			entrepreneurial income			
	entrepreneurial income				reneurial ional on s			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
After inheritance	-63.8***		-34.8	-59.8**		-31.9		
	(-2.64)		(-1.20)	(-2.28)		(-1.02)		
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth		-43.1***			-41.1***			
		(-2.91)			(-2.75)			
After inheritance × Large inheritance			-61.7**			-60.4*		
•			(-2.00)			(-1.91)		
Past bankruptcy	-10.4	-31.2	-11.0	-5.5	-26.3	-6.0		
. ,	(-0.30)	(-1.00)	(-0.32)	(-0.14)	(-0.76)	(-0.15)		
Pre-entrepreneurial wealth	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.0		
•	(0.39)	(0.43)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(-0.08)		
Pre-entrepreneurial labor income	0.7***	0.7***	0.7***	0.8***	0.8***	0.8***		
	(10.90)	(10.73)	(11.16)	(10.48)	(10.30)	(10.75)		
Age	-1.1	-1.2	-1.0	0.2	0.1	0.3		
9	(-0.72)	(-0.79)	(-0.68)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.17)		
Male	17.1	14.8	16.4	19.8	18.3	18.7		
	(0.66)	(0.58)	(0.63)	(0.72)	(0.67)	(0.68)		
Years of education	0.6	0.1	0.6	0.1	-0.5	-0.0		
	(0.14)	(0.01)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(-0.10)	(-0.00)		
Starting a limited liability company	51.0**	55.0**	53.2**	50.5**	56.3**	54.0**		
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(2.37)	(2.52)	(2.49)	(2.08)	(2.30)	(2.24)		
Years of business experience	7.0**	7.0**	7.0**	6.4*	6.6*	6.3*		
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	(2.15)	(2.12)	(2.15)	(1.73)	(1.77)	(1.72)		
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
R ²	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.44		
Individual-year observations	1,213	1,213	1,213	998	998	998		

Labor and

Labor and

Robustness: severe loss vs. low entrepreneurial quality

Alternative channel: experiencing severe loss \approx ? low entrepreneurial quality

- Measure of low entrepreneurial quality: low past performance, *relative* to industry
- Low past performance_i: individual i's annual entrepreneurial income has always remained at the bottom decile in the 88-industry before bankruptcy
- → By measuring *persistent* low performance, separates low skills from 'bad luck'

Repeat the tests controlling for Low past performance;

Severe loss ≠ low entrepreneurial quality Full table → Back to Robustness

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
0.054*	0.126***	0.103***	0.117
(1.69)	(2.69)	(2.63)	(1.22)
-0.167*	-0.162	-0.217**	-0.145
(-1.81)	(-1.60)	(-2.31)	(-1.59)
	-0.129**		
	(-2.19)		
		-0.125*	
		(-1.95)	
			-0.086
			(-0.86)
-0.049	-0.037	-0.030	-0.021
(-0.59)		(-0.37)	(-0.24)
	(1.65)		0 ***
			-0.258***
V	V	V	(-3.63)
			Yes
yes	yes	yes	Yes
2,022	1,902	2,022	2,022
	O.054* (1.69) -O.167* (-1.81) -O.049 (-O.59)	O.054* O.126*** (1.69) (2.69) -O.167* -O.162 (-1.81) (-1.60) -O.129** (-2.19) -O.049 -O.037 (-O.59) (-O.40) O.058* (1.65) Yes Yes Yes Yes	O.054* O.126*** O.103*** (1.69) (2.69) (2.63) -O.167* -O.162 -O.217** (-1.81) (-1.60) (-2.31) -O.129**

Long tenure ≠ experiencing negative income → Back to Robustness

	(1)
After inheritance	0.169***
	(3.19)
Severe income loss	0.056*
	(1.73)
Long tenure in ULC	-0.025
	(-0.69)
After inheritance \times Severe income loss	-0 . 129**
	(-2.17)
After inheritance \times Long tenure in ULC	-0.090
	(-1.55)
Controls	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes
Observations	2,018

Age has no effect on response • Back to Robustness

	(1)	(2)
After inheritance	0.097	0.011
Age at bankruptcy	(0.51) -0.001 (-0.45)	(0.28)
After inheritance \times Age at bankruptcy	-0.001 (-0.27)	
Above median age		-0.030 (-0.81)
After inheritance \times Above median age		0.074 (1.31)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,480	2,480

Effect of negative income similar across chapters • Back to Robustness

	(1) Ordinary chapter	(2) Business debt chapter
After inheritance	0.128**	0.157*
	(2.31)	(1.89)
Severe income loss	0.051	0.093
	(1.30)	(1.36)
After inheritance \times Severe income loss	-0.124*	-0.200*
	(-1.75)	(-1.93)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,290	728

Similarly no response at extended horizon • Back to Robustness

Limit to bankruptcies up to 2014:

	Window: up to 7 years after bankruptcy		Window: between 4 and 7 ye after bankruptcy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
After inheritance	0.033 (0.97)		0.026 (0.57)	0.014 (0.32)		0.012 (0.22)
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth		0.042 (0.81)			0.026 (0.53)	
After inheritance \times Large inheritance			0.013 (0.24)			0.004 (0.07)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,644	2,644	2,644	1,296	1,296	1,296

Moreover, find consistent results on experience of severe loss


Summary statistics: mean, [t-statistic] • Back to text

	Matched	d sample	Difference	
	Serial entrepreneurs (1)	First-time entrepreneurs (2)	(1)-(2	.)
A. Pre-entrepreneurship wealth and inco	me (1,000 DKK)			
Pre-entrepreneurial wealth	-608.4	591.7	-1 , 200.1***	[-4.1]
Pre-entrepreneurial labor income	251.0	254.5	-3.4	[-0.1]
B. Individual characteristics				
Age	49.2	49.1	0.1	[0.1]
Male	0.9	0.9	0.0	[o.o]
Years of education	11.9	11.9	0.0	[o.o]
C. Entrepreneurial characteristics				
Starting a limited liability company (%)	55.5	55.5	0.0	[o.o]
Years of business experience	6.4	0.0	6.4***	[16.7]
D. Experiencing windfall wealth after ba	nkruptcy			
Inheritance event (%)	50.9	0.0	50.9***	[10.6]
Number of individuals	110	110		

Effect of inheritance on restarters' survival is ambiguous • Back to table

	(1)	(2)	(3)
After inheritance	0.086*		0.144***
	(1.88)		(2.72)
After inheritance $ imes$ Inherited wealth		0.008	
After inheritance × Large inheritance		(0.36)	0.127*
After inheritance × Large inheritance			-0.124* (-1.92)
Past bankruptcy	0.040	0.075	0.039
	(0.78)	(1.60)	(0.75)
Starting a limited liability company	0.130***	0.128***	0.135***
	(3.18)	(3.11)	(3.27)
Years of business experience	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(-0.58)	(-0.53)	(-0.59)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,213	1,213	1,213

Consistent result when comparing profit within bankrupt • Back to table



Consistent result when comparing profit within bankrupt • Back to table

	Labor and				Total	
	entrepreneurial income			income		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
After inheritance	-17.3 (-1.31)		-26.2 (-1.56)	-8.2 (-0.89)		-14.3 (-1.26)
After inheritance \times Owner	-65.3** (-2.15)		-67.1* (-1.80)	-57.2** (-2.05)		-69.6** (-2.14)
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth		4.2 (0.49)			3.3 (0.54)	
After inheritance \times Inherited wealth \times Owner		-27.3 (-1.37)			-26.3 (-1.53)	
After inheritance \times Large inheritance			16.9 (0.74)			11.5 (0.71)
After inheritance \times Large inheritance \times Owner			5.0 (0.12)			26.7 (0.72)
Owner	22.7 (0.92)	-1.9 (-0.10)	22.6 (0.91)	-3.5 (-0.16)	-24.1 (-1.41)	-3.7 (-0.16)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,480	2,480	2,480	2,480	2,480	2,480

Matching process • Back to main sample • Back to income sample

Main control group: similar bankrupt entrepreneurs who do not receive inheritance

- → Find a nearest-neighbor for each 'treated' (with replacements):
 - 1. Exact matching: year of bankruptcy, bankruptcy chapter (either ordinary or business debt chapters), gender, age at bankruptcy (\pm 1)
 - 2. Among exact matches, select the nearest neighbor based on pre-bankruptcy wealth (measured at year -1)
 - 3. Refine: exclude pairs with large wealth difference (\geq 1,000,000 DKK & \geq 50%)

Control group of first-time entrepreneurs for comparing income: Compare profits between serial & matched group of *first-time* entrepreneurs (not bankrupt, by definition)

- Exact match by entrepreneurial characteristics
 - Age (\pm 1), gender, years of education, incorporation choice, year of (re)starting
- Choose the nearest neighbor in terms of pre-entrepreneurial income

Definition of entrepreneurs

Owners of: Unlimited or Limited liability companies ("ULC", "LLC")

- 1. ULC entrepreneur: primary income from ULC, per labor market register
 - Type of ULCs: sole proprietorship, partnership
 - Business debt = personally liable
 - Business income = personal income
- 2. LLC entrepreneur: person who owns a LLC, per Central Business Register
 - Type of LLCs: public & private limited liability companies
 - Business debt = personally liable, if borrowed personally or guaranteed

Two bankruptcy chapters: Ordinary vs. business debt chapters

- Denmark has two different personal bankruptcy procedures
- Mostly similar: liquidates all assets and discharges debt
- Difference: "business debt chapter" may be preferable for eligible entrepreneurs (Bang-Pedersen 2018)

	Ordinary chapter	Business debt chapter
Nature of debt	Any non-consumer debt	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Stable job at filing	Yes	No
Repayment period	5 years	3 years

[†] (Useful in identifying entrepreneurs with large business debts)