

Cybersecurity Management

T10 – Quantum Security

2025-2026

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Quantum – Where we are?

Like at the birth of the Internet...

29 October 1969

LOGIN

We typed the L and asked on the phone: “Did you see the L?”

“ Yes, we see the L”

We typed the O and asked on the phone: “Did you see the O?”

“ Yes, we see the O”

Then we typed G and the System actually crashed




Warm start



- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=90za6mazNps>

Classical vs Qubit

Classical



Quantum




$$|\Psi\rangle_{a_0} = \alpha |0\rangle_{a_0} + \beta |1\rangle_{a_0}$$

With 275 qubits, we can represent more basis states than the number of atoms in the observable universe

2^{275}


Quantum Technologies



Quantum computing

Speed-up tasks

- Quantum database search (Grover's algorithm)
- Quantum prime number factorization (Shor's algorithm)




Quantum communication

Secure communication

Efficiency

Quantum Computing – Where we are?



Applications of Quantum Communication

Secure Communication

Secure Quantum Computing in the cloud

Secure Identification

Clock Synchronization

Position Verification

Online Games


No-Cloning theorem

- The no-cloning theorem states that it is impossible to create an independent and identical copy of an arbitrary unknown quantum state




Entanglement

It strongly correlates two particles, that measurement of one can tell the measurement result of the other, even if they are far apart.



<https://youtu.be/nkLPsJPxad0>

Methods of qubit transmission




Direct Transmission: Using Quantum Channel


Teleportation: Take advantage of two classical bits and an entangled qubit pair and avoid using quantum channel

Teleportation Protocol

- Alice prepares the state, she wants to send.
- An entanglement is created and shared between Alice and Bob.
- Alice performs measurement.
- Alice sends the measurement results to Bob.
- Bob applies gates according to results



Challenges of direct transmission



Transmission Losses

- Losses in transmission media


Decoherence

- Interaction with environment

No cloning theorem

- Qubits can't be copied

Challenges of teleportation



Transmission Losses

- Losses in transmission media


Decoherence

- Interaction with environment

Source fidelity

- Quality of generated entanglement pairs

Quantum Network



Takeaways

Qubits are very fragile and are prone to many losses.

So, we don't transmit Qubits over long distances


We can use entanglement assistance to teleport the qubit without transmitting the qubit through a quantum channel.

But entanglement pairs are also qubits, so we can't send the pair over long distances too.

So, we generate multiple entanglement pairs, and through teleportation perform entanglement swapping to enable long-distance entanglement distribution.

Quantum Key Distribution

“The” encryption: One Time Pad




- **Proven security if:**
 - Length text = Length key
 - Key is used one time only
 - Key is generated **randomly**



**Quantum Random Number
Generators (QRNG)
can do this!!!**

QRNG




Currently, they achieve low rates: ~4 Mb/s



<https://idquantique.com>


Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

- It enables two parties to produce a shared random **secret key** known only to them, which can then be used to encrypt and decrypt messages
- The two communicating users can detect the presence of any third party trying to gain knowledge of the key (**eavesdropping**)
- Qubits are coded into quantum particles (photons), e.g., using polarization
- Any measurement by an eavesdropper will alter qubit state (photon polarization) and this perturbation is going to be detected
- However other sources of noise (no eavesdropping) can introduce perturbations



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hm2Nmw_gnMQ

Encoding qubits as photons



Vertical
90° Polarization
Bit Value = 1

Horizontal
0° Polarization
Bit Value = 0

Rectinilinear Basis



Diagonal
45° Polarization
Bit Value = 0

Anti-Diagonal
135° Polarization
Bit Value = 1



Diagonal Basis

BB84 Protocol


- Oldest protocol, works for polarization-encoded QKD systems
- Several phases:
 - Distribution
 - Sifting
 - Error estimation and correction
 - Privacy amplification



BB84 - Distribution



BB84 – Key sifting



Alice's selected basis

Alice's selected states

Alice's raw-key

Bob's selected basis

Bob's measured states


Bob's raw-key

Alice's sifted-key

Bob's sifted-key

	+	x	x	+	x	+	+	+	x	+	x	x
Alice's selected states	↑	↗	↗	→	↘	→	↑	↑	↗	→	↘	↘
Alice's raw-key	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
Bob's selected basis	+	+	x	+	x	X	+	+	x	+	+	x
Bob's measured states	↑	→	↗		↘	↘	↑	↑	↗	→		↘
Bob's raw-key	1	0	0		1	1	1	1	0	0		1
Alice's sifted-key	1		0		1		1	1	0	0		1
Bob's sifted-key	1		0		1		1	1	0	0		1

BB84 – Error estimation



A sample is chosen, shared, and if **errors > 10%**, it is assumed that there is **eavesdropping** and the key is **discarded**

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kdRuqvlaww>

Alice's selected basis

	+	x	x	+	x	+	+	+	x	+	x	x
Alices's selected states	↑	↗	↗	→	↘	→	↑	↑	↗	→	↘	↘
Alice's raw-key	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
Bob's selected basis	+	+	x	+	x	X	+	+	x	+	+	x

Without eavesdropping

Bob's measured states


↑	→	↗		↘	↘	↑	↑	↗	→		↖
Bob's raw-key	1	0	0		1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Alice's sifted-key	1		0		1		1	1	0	0	1
Bob's sifted-key	1		0		1		1	1	0	0	1

With eavesdropping

Bob's measured states

↑	→	↗		↖	↘	↑	↑	↗	↑		↖
Bob's received bits	1	0	0		0	1	1	1	0	1	1
Alice's sifted-key	1		0		1		1	1	0	0	1
Bob's sifted-key	1		0		0		0	1	0	1	1

BB84 – Last steps



- **Error correction**
 - Aka, information reconciliation
 - Needed to correct the rest of bits that were not discarded during error estimation
 - Using a cascade protocol, Bob can correct errors exposing (leaking) a minimum amount of bits through the classical channels
 - Eavesdropper can get significant information about keys in this phase
 - Process ends with identical Alice and Bob secret keys
- **Privacy amplification**
 - Using a hash function, a secret key of length n is transformed into a shorter one of length $m < n$
 - In this way, potential information retrieved by eavesdropper is cancelled.

Some numbers

Obtained with <https://www.qkdsimulator.com>

Initial Configuration							
Property Qubit Count	Basis choice bias delta	Eve basis choice bias delta	Eavesdropping	Eavesdropping rate	Error estimation sampling rate	Biased error estimation	Error tolerance
1000	0.5	0.5	0	0.1	0.2	0	0.11

Statistics and Overview	
Property	Value
Initial number of qubits	1000
Final key length	343
Raw key mismatch before error correction	0.0
Raw key mismatch after error correction	0
Information leakage (Total number of disclosed bits)	52
Overall key cost for authentication	256
Key length before error correction	415
Bit error probability	0.0
Bits leaked during error correction	20

Some numbers

Obtained with <https://www.qkdsimulator.com>

Initial Configuration							
Property Qubit Count	Basis choice bias delta	Eve basis choice bias delta	Eavesdropping	Eavesdropping rate	Error estimation sampling rate	Biased error estimation	Error tolerance
1000	0.5	0.5	1	0.2	0.2	0	0.11

Statistics and Overview	
Property	Value
Initial number of qubits	1000
Final key length	234
Raw key mismatch before error correction	0.0438
Raw key mismatch after error correction	0
Information leakage (Total number of disclosed bits)	166
Overall key cost for authentication	256
Key length before error correction	420
Bit error probability	0.0405
Bits leaked during error correction	134

Commercial QKD

- IDquantique

The screenshot shows the IDQ website's navigation bar at the top, featuring links for Random Number Generation, Quantum-Safe Security, Quantum Sensing, What's New, Resources, and About IDQ. Below the navigation bar, a breadcrumb trail indicates the current page: Home | Quantum-Safe Security | Products | Clavis XG QKD System. To the right of the breadcrumb trail is a "Back to products" button with a left arrow icon. The main content area features a large image of the Clavis XG QKD System hardware, which is a black, rectangular server-style unit with the IDQ logo on the front panel.

Clavis XG QKD System

Quantum Key Distribution for production environments requiring high key transmission rate or extended range interconnection

- Long range (up to 150 km)
- High key rate (>100 kb/s)
- Complex network topologies (ring, hub and spoke, meshed, star)
- Controlled and monitored centrally
- Interoperability with major Ethernet and OTN encryptors


[DOWNLOAD BROCHURE](#)

[VIEW USE CASES](#)

[HOW TO BUY](#)

Local SME on Quantum

- LuxQuanta -> Continuous Variable QKD



LuxQuanta® Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution system

Adding quantum security to optical networks

LuxQuanta Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CV-QKD) systems are ideal for distributing highly secure keys in metropolitan networks, integrating this technology into existing optical fiber links and coexisting with conventional telecommunication technologies.

[Contact us for more information](#)



Built with mature
telecommunication components




Easy network
integration



High performance at metro
distances



Reduced system
and implementation cost



A clear path to future scalability via
full photonic integration

Recent research

JOURNAL OF LIGHTWAVE TECHNOLOGY, VOL. 40, NO. 13, JULY 1, 2022

4119


Cost-Effective ML-Powered Polarization-Encoded Quantum Key Distribution

Morteza Ahmadian , Marc Ruiz , Jaume Comellas , and Luis Velasco 

Recent research

Cost-Effective ML-Powered Polarization-Encoded Quantum Key Distribution




Morteza Ahmadian[✉], Marc Ruiz[✉], Jaume Comellas[✉], and Luis Velasco[✉]



Recent research

Cost-Effective ML-Powered Polarization-Encoded Quantum Key Distribution

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Post-Quantum Cryptography

Classical Cryptography

- Uses difficult mathematical problems to protect data from non-quantum threats.
- Encompasses the standard encryption algorithms that pretty much every business or government entity uses today to protect its data.
 - AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
 - RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman).
- Built on math problems like large number factorization and discrete logarithms.
- Vulnerable to quantum threats
 - Shor's algorithm is a quantum algorithm for finding the prime factors of an integer.

Post-Quantum Cryptography

- Evolution of classical cryptography.
- Based on math problems, that are not tractable by quantum computers..

Lattice-based cryptography	Code-based cryptography	Multivariate-based cryptography
Based on abstract structures of mathematics. It currently looks like the most promising method.	Uses error-correcting-codes that allows read or data being transmitted to be checked for errors and corrected in real time.	Based on solving multi variable equations. These equations are hard to solve using brute force.

References QKD

- Wehner, Stephanie & Elkouss, David & Hanson, Ronald. (2018). Quantum internet: A vision for the road ahead. *Science*. 362. eaam9288. 10.1126/science.aam9288.
- Introduction to QKD
 - <https://medium.com/quantum-untangled/quantum-key-distribution-and-bb84-protocol-6f03cc6263c5>
- BB84 short video
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kdRuqlaww>
- Online QKD simulator
 - <https://www.qkdsimulator.com/>
- Open-Source Quantum Development
 - <https://qiskit.org/>
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography

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