Supply Chain Threats

Storytime

- It's 2020 You are the CTO of ITHeaven
- The Company:
 - Provide Web Services hosting to Third Parties
 - More than 50 VMs running in parallel
- Observability is a challenge given the amount of devices to monitor
- No resources available to build an observability stack from scratch
 - Decision: Use an existing on-premise solution
 - Solarwinds Orion




Solarwinds Orion

- Enterprise-class infrastructure management software
 - Manage and monitor data centers and IT infrastructure
- Features
 - Centralized management of physical and virtual infrastructure
 - Real-time monitoring (Dashboards)
 - Alerting
 - Reporting
- Requires to install an on-premise platform server within the company network
 - + Need to install an agent on the assets to monitor



Solarwinds Orion






Client infrastructure

Solarwinds infrastructure

Solarwinds Orion - SunBurst

- Command-an-Control (C2) Attack Schema
 - Cobalt Strike beacon
- Provide remote access to attackers
 - Privilege escalation
 - Spyware
 - Ransomware
 - DDoS



Solarwinds Orion

- Fire-Eye detects an intrusion in their systems via
 Orion platform (November 2020)
 - 8 months since the malicious update release
- More than 18.000 customers installed the malicious update
 - Public sector and private companies affected
- Software Supply Chain Attack




Supply Chain

- Traditional Supply Chain
 - Turning raw materials into finished goods and products
- Digital Supply Chain
 - Assembling components into a funcional service or experience
 - Trust is a requirement



- + Actors
- + Components
- + Dependencies









The Four Pillars of the Digital Supply Chain

Software

- Open source libraries (GitHub)
- Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
- Commercial Software
 - Microsoft 365 / Google Workspace

Hardware

- Network equipment
 - Routers / Firewalls / Switches
- Workstations / Bare-Metal Servers

Services

- Cloud Providers (AWS / GCP / Azure)
- Marketing agencies


People

- Freelancers
- Consultants



Vendor Lock-In

Security Threats




Attack Vector: Software

- SolarWinds Orion lessons:
 - A supplier's risk is your risk
 - The security of your third-party software directly impacts your own security and reputation
 - No vendor is too big to fail
 - Even large and renowned software companies can be compromised
 - Infrastructure and misconfigurations flaws
 - Software vulnerabilities
 - Software vendors must embrace a Quality-First policy
 - Shift-Left Paradigm

Quality-First: Software - SAST


- How do software companies enforce quality checks before release?
- Static Application Secure Testing (SAST)
 - Source code analysis before compilation
 - White Box Testing
 - Scans for insecure patterns
 - Duplicated Code (Technical Debt)
 - Code Coverage
 - Verifies compliance with security and quality policies
 - Enforces organizational security related requirements





Quality-First: Software - SAST


- SonarQube
 - Features
 - Static code analysis
 - Quality metrics
 - Helps to identify and manage technical debt
 - Easy integration with CI/CD tools
 - User-friendly graphical interface





Quality-First: Software - DAST

- Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)
 - Runtime analysis (or analysis during execution)
 - Simulates malicious requests
 - Black Box Testing
 - Detects vulnerabilities related to the service runtime environment



Quality-First: Software - DAST

- OWASP ZAP
 - Open Worldwide Application Security Project
 - Open Source
 - ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy)
 - Includes an automated web-application scanner
 - Compatible with APIs
 - Build uppon OWASP Top Ten



Attack Vector: Hardware Compromise


- BadBox (2023)
 - Cybercriminal operation
 - Selling off-brand Android TV Boxes and Smartphones with preinstalled malware at firmware level
 - The device is infected before it reaches the final consumer









- Estimated peak of 192.000 BadBox infected devices
 - Top affected countries: Russia, China, India, Belarus, Brazil and Ukraine




- Infection at ROM Level
 - Boot level libraries
- Use of a Stager encrypted script
- Auto-Update via C2 server
- Execution of the payload in the launcher




- Ad-Fraud Campaigns (PEACHPIT)
 - Load of webpages with ads via WebView




- Residential Proxy
 - Enroll the device into a residential proxy-network
 - Attackers get a revenue from users and Residential VPN providers
 - Users will exit to internet with your public IP as source






- Residential Proxy
 - Threat actors behind BadBox made this residential proxy service commercially available to interested customers






- Many of C2s associated to BadBox have been taken down
- Remainder devices should be considered dormant
 - The BadBox campaign can be relaunched via OTA at any time
- Infected devices are still available on the wild





Attack Vector: Third-Party Compromise

- Island hopping
 - Attackers target vulnerable third party vendors
 - Turn trusted business relationships into pathways for intrusions





Attackers target the weakest link in the supply chain

Attack Vector: Third-Party Compromise

- Examples [Spain]:
 - Mango (October 2025)
 - Origin: External marketing service
 - Data: Personal data for marketing (telf, e-mail)
 - Cruz Roja (October 2025)
 - Origin: External Contact Center
 - Data: Personal data of donors and partners
 - Iberdrola (May 2024)
 - Origin: Unknown third party party provider
 - Data: Personal Data (name, surname, DNI)

CIBERSEGURIDAD >

Mango sufre un ciberataque con acceso a nombres o teléfonos de clientes

La compañía textil asegura que no se ha visto comprometida información de carácter bancario. El origen está en un servicio externo de marketing

02 D'OCTUBRE Incidente de ciberseguridad en un proveedor de contact center

Cruz Roja Española informa de que un proveedor externo de la organización ha sufrido un ciberataque. Según los datos disponibles, podría ser que la información personal de personas socias y donantes, como datos bancarios y de afiliación, haya sido comprometida.

Queremos destacar que este incidente no ha comprometido en ningún momento los sistemas internos de Cruz Roja Española, sino únicamente los del proveedor afectado.


Un ciberataque a Iberdrola deja al descubierto los datos de 850.000 clientes en España

La energética niega que se hayan comprometido datos financieros, pero sí nombre, apellidos y número de DNI. Afirma haber avisado a todos los afectados

International: SolarWinds Attack

Defense - TPRM

- Zero Trust Never Trust, always verify
 - Don't trust anything nor anyone by default
- Define a Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) policy



Defense - Certifications

- Formal audits verifying that a company has a structured cybersecurity program in place
 - Require security certifications before beginning a commercial engagement
- Examples
 - ISO 27001
 - Published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
 - Defines security controls in IT Operations or data security
 - Esquema Nacional de Seguridad (ENS)
 - Real Decreto 311/2022
 - Includes required security measures at different levels:
 - Organizational, Operational and Protective measures
 - Required for the Spanish public sector and their providers
 - 3 level categories: Basic, Medium and High



Defense - Certifications



PROS:

- Establishes a security baseline
- Provides a common, recognized framework to assess the security level of a company
- Demonstrates the company is proactive towards security

CONS:

- Point-In-Time Snapshot: A certificate proves a company was compliant on the day of the audit, not necessarily today
- Risk of "Paper Compliance": A certification doesn't guarantee a strong day-to-day security culture
- **Doesn't cover everything**: Certifications are mean to suit all use-cases, might not cover specific services or products

Our strategy:

- Use certifications as a mandatory first step to establish a relation, but not the only step
- Define your own questionnaires and contractual requirements to mitigate the potential security risks arising from he commercial relationships

References

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- https://cybersierra.co/blog/third-party-risk-management-guide/
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