## A Screenshots

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Fig. 4 No report




# **Donation Phase**

Your endowment: €8.00

Your decision will remain completely anonymous.

<sup>37</sup> Note to editor: For space considerations we recommend that this entire appendix (except perhaps part D) be put as an online supplement.

Fig. 5 Report donation only before phase 2



Your endowment: €8.00

Your decision, but not your identity, will be shown to another participant for information purposes, be for he or she makes a donation.

This participant will see your donation again, after all decisions in this experiment have been made.


Fig. 6 Report Donation Only After Phase 2



Your endowment: €8.00

Your decision, but not your identity, will be shown to another participant for information purposes, be for he or she makes a donation. The other person will see your donation again, after all decisions in this experiment have been made.

Fig. 7 Report Donation and Identity Before Phase 2




Your endowment: €8.00

Your decision and your identity will be shown to participant 16 for information purposes, before he or she makes a decision.

Participant 16 was your partner in the "Meet and Greet" stage. You will meet this participant again at the end of the experiment.

This participant will see your donation again, after all decisions in this experiment have been made.

Fig. 8 Report Donation and Identity After Phase 2



Your endowment: €8.00

Your decision and your identity will be shown to participant 12 for information purposes after all decisions have been made.

Participant 12 was your partner in the "Meet and Greet" stage. You will meet this participant again at the end of the experiment.

Fig. 9 Treatments Phase 2



Your endowment: €8.00

Another participant in this experiment has donated to *Brot fuer die Welt*: €0.00

Your decision will remain completely anonymous.

Fig. 10 Treatments Phase 2



Your endowment: €8.00

Participant 8 – your partner in the meet and greet stage – has donated to Brot fuer die Welt: €0.00

Your decision will remain completely anonymous.

Please enter the amount, that you would like to donate to *Brot fuer die Welt*:

## **B** Protocols

### B.1 Experimenter oral presentation: Wording and protocol

"Thank you for showing up for this experiment. We first will determine a volunteer who will help us in administrating the experiment"

[Determination of Volunteer]

"The laboratory is - as you can see - divided into two parts. The inner part [SHOW THE INNER PART, WHERE SUB-JECTS ARE SEATED] can not be observed from outside. This assures the anonymity of your decisions. The experiment starts with a *Meet and Greet Stage*, in which you will introduce yourself to another participant. This event will take place in the inner part of the lab and will take 5 minutes. To find your assigned partner easily you will get a sticker with a number on it. Please place this sticker visibly on your cloths. Further instructions will follow. Please do not forget to take off your sticker before leaving the lab. Now please draw a sticker and go to the place indicated by the sticker number in the inner part of the lab.

If there a no further questions, please go into the inner part of the lab the last person please closes the door [EXPERI-MENTERS ARE IN THE OUTER PART] Your payment will be distributed in envelopes by the volunteer at the end of the experiment."

## **B.2** Payment Procedure

After all decisions have been made a file with subject numbers and payoffs is generated. The experimenters put the amount in a labeled envelope and close it. The envelopes have all roughly the same weight. After that, the volunteer is called in to distribute the envelopes to the subjects. Subjects are then asked to sign that they have received the money and put the receipt in a closed box before leaving the lab. This box was then emptied by a research assistant who was not familiar with this particular experiment to do the accounting.

## C Supplementary Statistics and Data

## C.1 Perceived influence: regressions

We can implicitly measure the leaders' beliefs about their influence using their elicited beliefs about others' contributions. Define:

Blfpn, a subject's reported belief of the contribution of her partner,

Ctbn, a subject's own contribution,

Blfav a subject's reported belief of the average contribution of a "subject who does not get a report",

*Rpb*2, a dummy indicating whether the subject's contribution was reported to another subject before that subject's contribution decision,

Idd, a dummy indicating whether the subject's identity was reported with this contribution.

Table 6 Perceived influence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Poisson	OLS	Psn	OLS	Psn, donors	Psn	Probit	Probit
Dependent var.:			В	LFPN	,	BPGEN		
BLFAV	0.15**	0.33*	0.15**	0.34*	0.14**	0.19**	-0.094	-0.097
	(0.054)	(0.14)	(0.049)	(0.14)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.089)	(0.090)
RPTB4	0.20	-0.043	-0.071	-0.28	-0.14	0.088	-0.058	-0.049
	(0.25)	(0.39)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.41)
CTBN	0.041	0.021	0.038	0.020	0.021			
	(0.093)	(0.19)	(0.091)	(0.19)	(0.093)			
$RPTB4 \times CTBN$	0.097	0.40*	0.18+	0.44*	0.19+			
	(0.091)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.21)	(0.11)			
$IDD \times RPB4$			0.48*	0.60	0.53*			-0.019
			(0.23)	(0.43)	(0.25)			(0.49)
$IDD \times RPB4 \times CTBN$			-0.12+	-0.11	-0.13+			
			(0.066)	(0.16)	(0.069)			
BGEN						-0.35	-0.085	-0.085
						(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.36)
$RPTB4 \times BGEN$						0.81*	1.25*	0.99
						(0.32)	(0.55)	(0.70)
$IDD \times RPB4 \times BGEN$								0.46
								(0.83)
Summed (net) Coefficien	ıts							
$IDD \times RPB4$			.41	.33	.38			07
			(.26)	(.46)	(.27)			(.46)
$IDD \times RPB4 \times CTBN$				.06	.33+	.06		
			(.09)	(.20)	(.09)			
$IDD \times RPB4 \times BGEN$								1.44*
								(.68)
Observations	98	98	98	98	89	98	98	98
(Pseudo) R <sup>2</sup>	0.105	0.363	0.111	0.371	0.095	0.102	0.099	0.102

Robust standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.10, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01

Subset: First-stage subjects who report their donations at some point.

In columns 1 and 2 we estimate versions of the following equations with both Poisson and OLS regressions:

$$Blfpn = f(\beta_1 RPB4 + \beta_{BA} Blfav + \beta_C Ctbn + \gamma Rptb2 \times Ctbn) + \varepsilon$$
 (1)

Equation 1 models a homogeneous predicted influence, pooling identified and unidentified reports. In columns 3 and 4 we allow an interaction with the identified treatment, estimating:

$$BLFPN = f(\beta_{DC}Rptb2 + \beta_{DIC} \times Idd \times Rptb2 + \beta_{BA}Blfav + \beta_{C}Ctbn + \gamma Rpb2 \times Ctbn + \delta Idd \times Rpb4 \times Ctbn) + \varepsilon$$
(2)

The " $\beta$ " coefficients are intended to capture effects other than the leader's believed influence of her donation on the follower. The Rpb2,Idd, dummy variables and the interactions of these serve as controls for any independent framing effect of these treatments on beliefs, and also differences away what the leader perceives to be the secular effect of receiving an (identified) report on the follower's donation, irrespective of the amount reported. Blfav acts as a control for the leader's overall belief over what followers will donate; inclusion of this control serves to reduce the possibility of small-sample bias (as latent beliefs may not be evenly spread across the randomized treatments), and also controls for any potential effect of the leader's treatment on her own overall belief of others' contributions. As mentioned in the main text, Ctrbn removes the potential bias from a correlation between (latent determinants of) one's own generosity, and one's beliefs over one's partner. This variable also captures a possible direct effect a leader's contribution may have on her predictions for her partner (relative to the prediction for the average gift), e.g., if the prediction is adjusted as an ex-post justification of her own choice.

Column 5 runs the same specification as column 3, but limits the estimator to those leaders who made a nonzero donation. The predicted influence may be nonlinear; leaders may believe that reporting a gift that is above average (or higher than the gift the donation follower otherwise would have made) will have a strong positive effect on the follower's gift. To detect this, we define the dummy variables  $BGEN = \mathbf{1}(CTBN > BLFAV)$  and  $BPGEN = \mathbf{1}(BLFPN > BLFAV)$  and estimate the specifications below (leaving out the continuous "own contribution" variables to reduce multicollinearity). In column 5 we estimate

$$BLFPN = f(\beta_1 RPB4 + \beta_3 IDD \times RPB4 + \beta_4 BLFAV + \beta_5 BGEN + \gamma RPB4 \times BGEN + \delta IDD \times RPB4 \times BGEN) + \varepsilon.$$
(3)

We also measure the predicted extensive margin influence in columns 7 and 8 using the specifications:

$$BPGEN = f(\beta_2 RPB4 + \beta_4 BLFAV + \beta_5 BGEN + \gamma RPB4 \times BGEN) + \varepsilon$$
(4)

and

$$BPGEN = f(\alpha + \beta_2 BLFAV + \beta_3 RPB4 + \beta_5 BGEN + \gamma RPB4 \times BGEN + \beta_3 IDD \times RPB4 + \delta IDD \times RPB4 \times BGEN) + \varepsilon$$
(5)

# C.2 Data from the Questionnaire

Additionally to the experimental data, we have information from a short survey at the end of the experiment, where we asked about subjects motivation to donate. The options we presented to them were in line with the questions we want to answer with the experiment: Desire to influence, warm glow, being influenced and reputation. Contrary to our experimental results only 5% of the subjects said that reputation did play a role in their giving behavior. They also did not acknowledge that they were influenced by their partners donation. This speaks for the necessity of complementing survey data with carefully collected experimental data, as policy relevant behavior that is either influenced by subconscious processes or is socially not fully acceptable is hardly revealed by surveys only.