

Knowledge Representation

Chapter 2. Propositional Representation and Reasoning (II)

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1 Rule-based reasoning

2 Default negation

Rule-based reasoning

- Rules are a substantial ingredient of commonsense reasoning
- Example:



“fire causes smoke”

```
smoke if fire smoke :-  
fire
```

logic programming notation

We sometimes write:

smoke \leftarrow *fire* $\underbrace{\textit{smoke}}_{\textit{head}} \leftarrow$

$\underbrace{\textit{fire}}_{\textit{body}}$

Rule-based reasoning

Two possible readings

- Rule firing (bottom-up):

“I make a *fire*, so I get *smoke* as a byproduct”

$$\frac{\textit{smoke} \leftarrow \textit{fire} \quad \textit{fire}}{\textit{smoke}} = \text{Modus Ponens}$$

Better for **causal inference** (used in Answer Set Programming)

- Goal achievement (top-down):

“How can I get *smoke*? one way is making a *fire*”

goal = *smoke?*

smoke \leftarrow *fire* rule head found

new goal = *fire?*

fire fact found = success!

Goal-oriented backtracking (used in Prolog)

Rules as Logical Formulas

- First choice: translate as **material implication** in **classical logic**

$$smoke \leftarrow fire \quad \equiv \quad \neg fire \vee smoke$$

✓ **Modus Ponens** is granted


✗ But **semantics is not aligned** with rule-based reasoning

Suppose we only knew $KB = \{smoke \leftarrow fire\}$

Rule reasoning	Classical models
$fire=false$: no way to be derived	$\{fire, smoke\}$ derivability? $\{smoke\}$ derivability?
$smoke=false$: only derivable if $fire$	\emptyset both false ✓ 👉 minimal model

Minimal models and recursion

- Minimal models cover (positive) recursion nicely
- Example: two gear wheels



$spinA \leftarrow spinB$

$spinB \leftarrow spinA$

Two classical models

$\{spinA, spinB\}$

unjustified movement!

\emptyset

nothing moves ✓



minimal model

Positive Logic Programs (syntax)

- A **positive logic program** is a set of **rules** like

$$\underbrace{p}_{\text{head}} \leftarrow \underbrace{q_1, \dots, q_n}_{\text{body}}$$

or, written in text format

$$p \text{ :- } q_1, \dots, q_n.$$

with $n \geq 0$, where p, q_1, \dots, q_n are atoms.

Commas in the body represent conjunctions.

- **Ordering** among rules or in the body is **irrelevant**.
- When $n = 0$, the rule is called a **fact**, and we usually omit the \leftarrow .

Positive Logic Programs (semantics)

- Read rule $(p \leftarrow q_1, \dots, q_n)$ as $(q_1 \wedge \dots \wedge q_n \rightarrow p)$
- **Close World Assumption (CWA)** (minimize truth):
get the model(s) with \subseteq -less true atoms
- In general, we may get **several** \subseteq -minimal models.
Ex. $M(p \vee q) = \{\{p\}, \{q\}, \{p, q\}\}$, two minimal models $\{p\}, \{q\}$
- **Positive programs** have exactly **one**: the \subseteq -**least** model $LM(P)$.
Example:

p	$s \leftarrow q$	$b \leftarrow s, a$
q	$a \leftarrow b, p$	$a \leftarrow c$
$r \leftarrow p, s$		

the models are $\{p, q, r, s\}, \{p, q, r, s, a, b\}, \{p, q, r, s, a, b, c\}$.

Positive Logic Programs (computation)

- The least model can be easily computed by “rule application” (deductive closure).
- Direct consequences operator [van Endem & Kowalski 76]
 $T_P(\mathcal{I})$ = collect all heads in program P whose bodies are true in \mathcal{I}


$$T_P(\mathcal{I}) := \{H \mid (H \leftarrow B) \in P \text{ and } \mathcal{I} \models B\}$$

- Compute sequence of interpretations $\mathcal{I}_0, \mathcal{I}_1, \mathcal{I}_2, \dots$

Start with $\mathcal{I}_0 := \emptyset$ (all atoms false)

Repeat $\mathcal{I}_{k+1} := T_P(\mathcal{I}_k)$ until we reach a fixpoint $\mathcal{I}_{k+1} = \mathcal{I}_k$

Positive Logic Programs (computation)



Go “firing rules” (Modus Ponens)
until nothing new is derived

$$\begin{array}{l} pp \\ qq \\ rr \leftarrow pp, ss \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} ss \leftarrow qq \\ a \leftarrow b, pp \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} b \leftarrow ss, a \\ a \leftarrow c \end{array}$$

$T_P(\emptyset) = \{p, q\}$, $T_P(\{p, q\}) = \{p, q, s\}$, $T_P(\{p, q, s\}) = \{p, q, s, r\}$,
 $T_P(\{p, q, s, r\}) = \{p, q, s, r\}$ fixpoint = least model $LM(P)$! proved by
 [van Endem & Kowalski 76]

👍 Each true atom is justified by a proof by Modus Ponens

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} p \quad \frac{q \quad s \leftarrow q}{s} \quad r \leftarrow p, s \\ \hline r \end{array}}{r}$$

1 Rule-based reasoning

2 Default negation

Default Negation

- Goal: incorporating **default reasoning** in rules

- CWA means **false by default**.

But we **cannot check falsity** in rules



Idea: allow negative literals in rule bodies

“**not** p ” = “no evidence/proof for p ” = “ $\neg p$ can be **assumed**”

- A **normal logic program** is a set of rules of the form:

$$\underbrace{p}_{\text{head}} \leftarrow \underbrace{q_1, \dots, q_m, \text{not } q_{m+1}, \dots, \text{not } q_n}_{\text{body}}.$$

with $n \geq m \geq 0$. If $m = n$ (no negations) we get a positive rule.
Again, ordering is irrelevant.

Default Negation



Example: “fill the tank if empty and
no evidence on fire”

fill \leftarrow *empty, not fire*

Suppose that the tank is empty indeed:

empty

Expected behaviour:

- No rule to derive *fire*, so we derive *not fire*
then we get *fill* by Modus Ponens: final model $\{ \textit{empty}, \textit{fill} \}$

Default Negation

- ⚠ Classical logic reading $\text{empty} \wedge (\text{empty} \wedge \neg \text{fire} \rightarrow \text{fill})$ with minimal models (CWA) **does not suffice!**
- Classically equivalent to $\text{empty} \wedge (\text{fill} \vee \text{fire})$. Minimal models: $\{\text{empty}, \text{fill}\}$ but also $\{\text{empty}, \text{fire}\}$.
- **Assuming** there might be a *fire* is ok but there is no proof for *fire*
👉 any assumption must be eventually ...



- We expect **non-monotonicity**. Example: adding the fact *fire* should now derive $\{\text{empty}, \text{fire}\}$ and **retract** *fill*

Default Negation

- Problem: material implication is **not directional**
- These formulas are **classically equivalent**:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{empty} \wedge \neg \text{fire} \rightarrow \text{fill} &\equiv \text{empty} \rightarrow \text{fire} \vee \text{fill} \\ &\equiv \text{empty} \wedge \neg \text{fill} \rightarrow \text{fire} \end{aligned}$$

but writing the latter as a rule

$$\text{fire} \leftarrow \text{empty}, \text{not fill}$$

“If empty and **no evidence** on filling then start a fire”
has a **quite different** meaning!

Default Negation



Sometimes defaults are **conflicting**.
A classical example: **Nixon's diamond**

- “*q*uakers are normally *p*acifist” (unless *b*ellicose)
- “*r*epublicans are normally *b*ellicose” (unless *p*acifist)
- “Richard Nixon is a both a Quaker and a Republican”

p ← *q, not b*

b ← *r, not p*

q

r


- There is **no constructive way** to apply the rules

Adding negation: stable models

- Gelfond, M., and Lifschitz, V. (ICLP 1988)
The stable model semantics for logic programming.

Step 1

Guess an
assumption



Default negation:
not b

Step 2

Reduce program
not's accordingly

$p \leftarrow q, \text{not } b^T$
 $b \leftarrow r, \text{not } p^\perp$
 q
 r

pr


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Adding negation: stable models

- Gelfond, M., and Lifschitz, V. (ICLP 1988)
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Step 1

Guess an
assumption



Default negation:
not r

Step 2

Reduce program
not's accordingly

$p \leftarrow q, \text{not } b \perp$
 $b \leftarrow r, \text{not } p \perp$
 q
 r

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Stable models: formal definition

Definition (program reduct)

$P^{\mathcal{I}}$ = reduct of program P with respect to interpretation \mathcal{I}

$$P^{\mathcal{I}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \begin{array}{l} (p \leftarrow q_1, \dots, q_m) \\ | (p \leftarrow q_1, \dots, q_m, \text{not } q_{m+1}, \dots, \text{not } q_n) \in P \text{ and} \\ q_j \notin \mathcal{I}, \text{ for all } j = m+1, \dots, n \end{array} \}$$

👉 Observation: $P^{\mathcal{I}}$ is **positive**, it has a **least model** $LM(P^{\mathcal{I}})$!

Definition (stable model)

\mathcal{I} is a **stable model** of program P iff $LM(P^{\mathcal{I}}) = \mathcal{I}$. □

Stable models: some properties

$M(P)$ = “classical models of P ”; $SM(P)$ = “stable models of P ”

Proposition (Stable models are models)

$SM(P) \subseteq M(P)$. Any stable model of P is also a classical model.

When the program is **normal** (things will change with disjunction):

Proposition (Stable models are minimal classical models)

If $I \in SM(P)$ then there is no $J \in M(P)$, $J \subset I$.

Proposition (Complexity)

Deciding whether a program P has a stable model, $SM(P) \stackrel{?}{=} \emptyset$, is an **NP-complete** problem.

Stable models



Back to the example. P has 2 rules:

$$\begin{array}{l} \textit{fill} \leftarrow \textit{empty}, \textit{not fire} \\ \textit{empty} \end{array}$$

Three atoms: possible assumptions $\mathcal{I} = 2^3$

💡 $SM(P) \subseteq M(P)$, just check the 3 classical models!

\mathcal{I}	$P^{\mathcal{I}}$	$LM(P^{\mathcal{I}})$
$\{\textit{empty}, \textit{fire}\}$	\textit{empty}	$\{\textit{empty}\} \neq \mathcal{I}$ not stable
$\{\textit{empty}, \textit{fire}, \textit{fill}\}$	\textit{empty}	$\{\textit{empty}\} \neq \mathcal{I}$ not stable
$\{\textit{empty}, \textit{fill}\}$	$\begin{array}{l} \textit{fill} \leftarrow \textit{empty} \\ \textit{empty} \end{array}$	$\{\textit{empty}, \textit{fill}\}$ stable!

Stable models



Suppose a spark starts a fire now. P has 4 rules:

$fill$	\leftarrow	$empty, not\ fire$
$empty$		
$fire$	\leftarrow	$spark$
$spark$		

- Only two (classical) models now:

\mathcal{I}	$P^{\mathcal{I}}$	$LM(P^{\mathcal{I}})$
$\{empty, spark, fire\}$	$empty$ $fire \leftarrow spark$ $spark$	$\{empty, spark, fire\}$ stable!
$\{empty, spark, fire, fill\}$	$empty$ $fire \leftarrow spark$ $fire$	$\{empty, spark, fire\} \neq I$ not stable

Observation: the example shows **non-monotonic reasoning!**

- Example 1: stable model $\{\text{empty}, \text{fill}\}$ allowed us to conclude *fill*
- Example 2: **adding new formulas** “a spark started a fire” stable model $\{\text{empty}, \text{spark}, \text{fire}\}$ retracts previous conclusion (*fill* is not true any more)

Stratified programs

- A normal program is **stratified** if it has no cycles through negation
- 👍 Rules can be **organized in layers**: negation means a layer jump.

$$\begin{array}{lll} \text{Layer 1} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \\ b \leftarrow a \end{array} \right. & \{a, b\} \\ \text{Layer 2} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} c \leftarrow \text{not } a \underbrace{\text{not } a}_{\perp} \end{array} \right. & \{a, b\} \\ \text{Layer 3} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l} d \leftarrow b, \text{not } c \underbrace{\text{not } c}_{\top} \end{array} \right. & \{a, b, d\} \end{array}$$

Proposition

A stratified program has a **unique stable model** $|SM(P)| = 1$.

Incoherent programs

- If P unstratified we may have $|SM(P)| > 1$
but also $|SM(P)| = 0$! P is called **incoherent** if $SM(P) = \emptyset$
This may happen even if $M(P) \neq \emptyset$ (classically consistent).
- Example (Russell's paradox):
“make a **Catalogue** citing of all **books without self-citations**”



citeC citeC $\leftarrow \leftarrow$ not selfC not selfC
 selfC \leftarrow citeC

Assume $\mathcal{I} \models \text{selfC}$ As
 proved = \emptyset selfC unju

- An even simpler example: $\text{problem} \leftarrow \text{not problem}$

Choices and constraints

We can use **auxiliary atoms** to exploit negative cycles as follows:

- **Choice rule**: nondeterministic generation of an atom.

Ex: when *spark*, sometimes *fire* and sometimes no

$$\textit{fire} \leftarrow \textit{spark}, \textit{not aux} \qquad \textit{aux} \leftarrow \textit{spark}, \textit{not fire}$$

Adding fact *spark* yields $\{\textit{spark}, \textit{fire}\}$ and $\{\textit{spark}, \textit{aux}\} = \{\textit{spark}\}$ if we remove *aux*. Common abbreviation = **choice rule**:

$$\{\textit{fire}\} \leftarrow \textit{spark}$$

- **Constraint**: dismiss stable models when a condition holds.

If *wet* holds, choosing *fire* is disregarded.

$$\textit{aux} \leftarrow \textit{wet}, \textit{fire}, \textit{not aux}$$

Common abbreviation = **constraint**:


$$\perp \leftarrow \textit{wet}, \textit{fire} \qquad \text{or simply} \qquad \leftarrow \textit{wet}, \textit{fire}$$

Splitting

Atom p is **defined** in P when some $(p \leftarrow B) \in P$ (possibly $B = \top$)

Some programs P can be **split** in two parts P_B, P_T

- the **bottom** P_B contains no atom defined in P_T
- the **top** P_T does not define atoms occurring in P_B



- First compute the **stable models** of the bottom
then use each of them for the top

Beyond normal programs

- **Disjunctive programs**: we allow multiple atoms H_i in the head

$$p_1, \dots, p_k \leftarrow q_1, \dots, q_n, \text{not } q_{n+1}, \dots, \text{not } q_m$$

Commas in the head correspond to **disjunctions** \vee .

- Example: when not *busy*, I go to the *cinema* or watch *tv*

$$c, tv \leftarrow \text{not } b$$

- The reduct P^I defined as before, but is **not a positive program** now!
There is no least model $LM(P^I)$ any more.
- Example: for $I = \{c\}$, P^I is the program c, tv
 $c \vee tv$ has 3 classical models $\{c\}$, $\{tv\}$ and $\{c, tv\}$.

Disjunctive logic programs

Definition (stable model)

\mathcal{I} is a stable model of P iff it is a **minimal model** of $P^{\mathcal{I}}$.

In our example:

$$c, tv \leftarrow \text{not } b$$

I	P^I	minimal models	Stable?
$\{c\}$	c, tv	$\{c\} \{tv\}$	yes
$\{tv\}$	c, tv	$\{c\} \{tv\}$	yes
$\{c, tv\}$	c, tv	$\{c\} \{tv\}$	no
$I \models b$		\emptyset	no

Disjunctive logic programs

Property still preserved when P is disjunctive:

Proposition

Stable models are minimal classical models:

$I \in SM(P)$ implies $I \in M(P)$ and no $J \in M(P)$ is smaller $J \subset I$.

But complexity increases:

Proposition

Deciding $SM(P) \neq \emptyset$ for disjunctive programs is a NP^{NP} -complete (a.k.a. Σ_2^P -complete) problem.

NP^{NP} : means NP on a Turing machine with an NP oracle. This is (conjectured) harder than NP .