Asynchronous Consensus without Trusted Setup or Public Key Cryptography



Souray Das




Sisi Duan



Shengqi Liu



Atsuki Momose




Ling Ren





Victor Shoup




souravd2@Illinois.edu








- Agreement
 - b'=b
- Validity
 - All honest node input $b \Rightarrow BA$ outputs b



- Agreement
 - b' = b
- Validity
 - All honest party input $b \Rightarrow ABA$ outputs b
- Termination
 - The protocol eventually terminates

Common Subset or Interactive Consistency

n party protocol tolerating t failures to agree on a subset of inputs



Agreement:

 $M_i = M_j = M$ for honest parties (i, j)

Validity:


M contains at least n-2t honest input


Termination:

The protocol terminates

Applications of Common Subset

n party protocol tolerating t failures to agree on a subset of inputs







Secure multi-party computation




Distributed Key Generation

Asynchronous Networks

Definition (Asynchronous Networks):

- 1. Message delays between honest parties are unbounded
- 2. Messages must eventually arrive




Great to model communication over the internet!



Asynchronous Common Subset (ACS)

Common subset protocol over asynchronous network






Deterministic consensus is impossible in asynchronous network [FLP86]


ACS with external common coin

ACS protocols needs to be randomized!



How to build an asynchronous common coin protocol?

Rely on ACS ⊗




Circular dependency 😊

Asynchronous Consensus: Prior Works

Protocols	Communication Cost	Expected #Round	Assumptions
AJM+'21, GLL+'22	$O(\kappa n^3)$	0(1)	SXDH, RO
DXKR'22	$O(\kappa n^3)$	$O(\log n)$	DDH, RO

Relies on public key cryptography assumption

Insecure against quantum computers [Shor 99]



Asynchronous Consensus: Prior Works

Protocols	Communication Cost	Expected #Round	Assumptions
AJM+'21, GLL+'22	$O(\kappa n^3)$	0(1)	SXDH, RO
DXKR'22	$O(\kappa n^3)$	$O(\log n)$	DDH, RO
AGPS'23 ($n \ge 4t + 1$)	$O(n^5)$	0(1)	None

What about information theoretic protocols?

Asynchronous Consensus: Prior Works

Protocols	Communication Cost	Expected #Round	Assumptions
AJM+'21, GLL+'22	$O(\kappa n^3)$	O(1)	SXDH, RO
DXKR'22	$O(\kappa n^3)$	$O(\log n)$	DDH, RO
AGPS'23 ($n \ge 4t + 1$)	$O(n^5)$	O(1)	None
This work	$O(\kappa n^3)$	0(1)	RO*

Can we design a post-quantum secure ACS protocol without setup?




Is it concretely efficient?


Background

(n, t) Threshold Secret Sharing

A mechanism to share a secret s into n shares




(n, t) Threshold Secret Sharing




- A mechanism to share a secret s into n shares
- Any subset of t + 1 shares reveal the secret
- Any subset of t or less shares reveal nothing about s


(n, t) Threshold Secret Sharing




- A mechanism to share a secret s into n shares
- Any subset of t+1 shares reveal the secret
- Any subset of t or less shares reveal nothing about s
- An example of (5,3) threshold secret sharing scheme



(n, t) Verifiable Secret Sharing




- A protocol to share a secret s into n parties
- Any subset of t + 1 parties can recover the secret
- Any subset of t or less parties learn nothing about s
- An example of (5,3) threshold secret sharing scheme




Parties can validate that they received valid shares.


Reliable Broadcast (RBC) [Bracha 84]



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


We need asynchronous RBC for long messages [CKLS02, DXR21].

Index Gather

Definition: Asynchronous consensus with weak agreement property

Party validation: Parties validate each other based on the actions taken by others



Termination: Same as ACS*

Validity: $X_i \subseteq [n]$ contains only validated parties

Binding Core:

- When the first honest party outputs
- There exists a core set X of $|X| \ge n t$
- Everyone outputs a superset of X i.e, $X_j \supseteq X$


 $V_i \subseteq [n]$ is the set of parties party i has locally validated

Earliest gather protocol: [Canetti-Rabin'93]

Prior approach to construct setup free ACS

ACS Construction from Weak Leader Election

Protocol proceed in iterations. Each iteration has two phases:



Weak = parties disagree on who the leader is with constant probability


When parties agree on an honest leader, the protocol terminates successfully

Weak-leader election protocol

Protocol:


- 1. Assign each party a random rank
- 2. Party with highest rank is the leader

Easy with an external common coin!




We focus on protocols that do not rely on external common coin

Weak-leader election protocol without external coin




Weak-leader election protocol without external coin



This approach is insecure 🕾

Attack: Weak-leader election protocol


Attack: Weak-leader election protocol



Adversary learns s_1, s_2, s_3 after first gather output

Pick s_4 such that $r_4 = s_1 + s_4$ is the highest rank

Attack: Weak-leader election protocol




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Fix 1: Use threshold Verifiable Random Function

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


We do not know any threshold VRF without public key cryptography

Our Approach

Index Cover Gather

Index Gather with binding cover property



 $V_i \subseteq [n]$ is the set of parties party i has locally validated

Binding Core:


- When the first honest party outputs
- There exists a core set X of $|X| \ge n t$
- Everyone outputs a superset of $X_j \supseteq X$

Binding Cover:


- When the first honest party outputs
- There exists a cover set Y of valid parties
- Everyone outputs a subset of $X_j \subseteq Y$

Index cover gather protocol with $O(n^3)$ communication cost


Insecure weak-leader election



Our secure weak-leader election




Our secure weak-leader election



Lets try to attack our weak-leader election

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


Adversary learns s_1, s_2, s_3 after first gather output

Pick s_4 such that $r_4 = s_1 + s_4$ is the highest rank

Attack is inconsequential!


Lets try to attack our weak-leader election



Adversary need to fix S_4 before the index cover gather outputs at any honest party

ACS Construction from Weak Leader Election

Protocol proceed in iterations. Each iteration has two phases:



Contributions:

- 1. Efficient weak-leader election protocol using only hash functions
- 2. Concrete optimizations in the agreement phase
- 3. Simple hash-based weak asynchronous VSS protocol

Implementation and Evaluation


Implementation and Evaluation

- Atop the [DXKR'22] asynchronous DKG code base
- python for networking
- bls12381 field operations for finite field arithmetic
- Up to 128 geo-distributed nodes in AWS across 8 regions
- Baselines:
 - 1. ACS protocol from [DXKR'22]
 - 2. ACS from FIN (assumes common-coin)

Lots of scope for optimizing the implementation!


Evaluation: Bandwidth Usage

Definition: Amount of data a party sends during the index ACS protocol




Evaluation: Message Count

Definition: Number of messages a party sends during the index ACS protocol



Evaluation: Runtime

Definition: End-to-end latency of the index ACS protocol



Summary:

- Asynchronous Consensus Protocol assuming only Hash-function
- Optimal fault-tolerance $n \ge 3t + 1$
- $O(\kappa n^3)$ communication cost;
- O(1) round complexity
- Protocol with concrete efficiency

Open Problems


- Improve efficiency or prove lower bounds
- Better implementation (will be generally helpful for the community)

Let's agree on a common subset, in a flash Asynchronously, with nothing more than a hash

Resilience has to be perfect

Communication, just cubic

In theory and practice, we hope to make a splash - Victor Shoup



Paper link



Code

Thank You! (souravd2@Illinois.edu)!