#### **66TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE**





# The Authoritarianism of Classroom Peers over Sexist Attitudes. A Good Case to Evidence Contextual Effects' Potential

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#### Scenario of gender inequalitites


**Traditional Attitudes** 

**Sexism** 

Negative attitude towards women that influences behaviors and social structures, contributing to gender inequality (Brandt 2011). Prejudice against women (Rudman & Phelan, 2007).








Authoritarianism represents a person's beliefs about the apt relationship between a group and its members, fostering the subordination of personal needs and values to contribute to the group cohesion (Brandt & Henry, 2012).


Ideological beliefs represent a broad concept that can be associated with a number of attitudes (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 2006).



At individual level



Authoritarianism and social dominance are related with sexism and hostile sexism, respectively (Sibley & Becker, 2012).



Poteat, Espelage, & Green (2007) and Poteat & Spanierman (2010) found that classmates's authoritarianism predicts prejudice towards gay men and lesbians, over individual levels of authoritarianism. Van Assche, Roets, De keersmaecker, & Van Hiel (2017) found that right wing authoritarianism climate between countries and regions were associated with negative attitudes towards age, ethnicity, and gender-based outgroups.

**GAP** 

There is a larger emphasis in the literature regarding students' political engagement and participation, and less about students' attitudes (Kennedy, 2019).

There is larger attention on school effectiveness factor: what promotes desirable citizenship outcome (Knowles, et al. 2018) with lower attention to non-desirable features of the school environment.

What is the relationship between the classroom levels of authoritarianism and student's endorsement of sexist attitudes?

#### Data


- International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2009 and 2016 (ICCS)
- Latin American module: 8th graders

2009: Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay (Schulz, Ainley, Friedman, & Lietz, 2011)

**2016**: Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico and Perú.

#### Measures

- Gender equality & Sexism: "Students' attitudes toward gender equality" (GENEQL),
  - 1. Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government.
  - 2. Men and women should have the same rights in every way.
  - 3. Women should stay out of politics.
  - 4. When there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than women.
  - Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs.
  - 6. Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women.



Some reasons support this decision.

- 1. CFA shows you two dimensions (Castillo, Miranda, Bonilla, 2019).
- 2. Differential relationship with the factors. The predictors have a different effect depending on the latent variable (which is observed in the results).

#### Measures

Q1	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the government and its leaders?							
	(Pl	ease tick only one box in each row.)						
			Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree		
L53G01A	a)	It is better for government leaders to make decisions without consulting anybody	□,		□,	□,		
L53G01B	b)	People in government must enforce their authority even if it means violating the rights of some citizens	□,		□,	□,		
LS3G01C	c)	People in government lose part of their authority when they admit their mistakes	□,		□,	□,		
LS3G01D	d)	People whose opinions are different than those of the government must be considered its enemies	□,	<b>□</b> 2	□,	□,		
LS3G01E	e)	The most important opinion of a country should be that of the president.	□,		□,	□,		
L53G01F	f)	It is fair that the government does not comply with the law when it thinks it is not necessary	□,	<b>□</b> ,	□,	□,		
Q2		ow much do you agree or disagree with the fol vernments and their power?	llowing	stateme	nts about	t		
	(Pl	ease tick only one box in each row.)						
			Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree		
LS3G02A	a)	Concentration of power in one person guarantees order.	□,	<b>□</b> ₂	□,	□.		
L53G02B	b)	The government should close communication media that are critical.	□,	□,	□,	□,		
L53G02C	c)	If the president does not agree with <congress>, he/she should <dissolve> it</dissolve></congress>	□,		□,	□,		
L53G02D	d)	Dictatorships are justified when they bring order and safety.	□,		□,	□,		
L53G02E		Entertain the second of the se						
Lista	e)	Dictatorships are justified when they bring economic benefits.	□,	<b>□</b> ,	□,	□.		

- AUTGOV. Student attitudes towards authoritarianism in government
- This scale presents similar items to those referred in the Altemeyer's scale of Right-Wing Authoritarianism of 1996 (Lewis, 1997). Including items of the authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression facets (Dunwoody & Funke, 2016; Funke, 2005).


# Analytical strategy

- Multilevel IRT model with predictors (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2016).
- In particular, we specified a special version of a partial credit model (Masters, 2016) as a multilevel IRT model (Kamata & Vaughn, 2011) with predictors.

#### The specified model permits to

- a) obtain specific differences between school climates (Mcneish & Stapleton) that reflect the relationship between ideological climates and the attitudes of interest and,
- b) to express the effect sizes as differences in the expected answers (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2016)


## Model specification



Specified models expressed as generalized structural equation model

We fitted 6 models.

3 models for sexism and 3 for gender equality support



Same pattern of results in Mexico,
Guatemala,
Paraguay,
Dominican
Republic and
Chile


 $(\beta_b - \beta_w)aut$ 


#### **Contextual effect**


RWA  $\gamma_c$  Gender equality = -0.60\*\*\*


RWA  $\gamma_c$  **Sexism** = 0.76\*\*\*





















#### **Contextual effect**

RWA  $\gamma_c$  Gender equality = -0.11


RWA  $\gamma_c$  **Sexism** = 0.44\*\*


The most part of contextual effect faded away, **except in Colombia for sexism.** 





		Sex	ism	Gender o	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
Chile	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
ج	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
O	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05		0.08	
<u>a</u> .	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.22	***
Colombia	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	***
o u	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	***	-0.48	**
ō	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
S	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.10		0.40	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	***	0.57	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.44	**	-0.11	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.33	***	0.04	
i≅	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
물	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02		0.04	
Dominican Republic	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	*	-0.59	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.20	**	0.07	
μC	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08		0.28	*
۵	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sex	ism		equality port
Countries	Path and parameter s	Е	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
Guatemala	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
Ĕ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
Ę	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
ğ	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
Ō	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
0	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
Mexico	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
ě	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Σ	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13		0.77	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	**	0.73	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.10		-0.38	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	
<u>&gt;</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	*	0.23	***
ž	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.52	***	0.66	***
9	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.61	***	-0.68	**
Paraguay	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.64	*	0.55	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.29	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.37	**	0.14	
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.08		-0.45	











Same pattern of results in Mexico, Peru, Dominican Republic and Chile

Contextual effect:  $(\beta_b - \beta_w)aut$ 

RWA  $\gamma_c$  Gender equality = -0.53\*\*\*

RWA  $\gamma_c$  **Sexism** = 0.86\*\*\*







#### **Contextual effect**


RWA  $\gamma_c$  Gender equality = -0.11

RWA  $\gamma_c$  **Sexism** = 0.44\*\*

The most part of contextual effect faded away, **except in Colombia for sexism.** 







## Discussion

- The present results are consistent with which has been previously found for homophobia (Poteat et al., 2007; Poteat & Spanierman, 2010).
- Higher authoritarianism is positively related to the endorsement of sexism, and is negatively related to the support of gender equality. In contrast to open classroom discussion and other school practices (Carrasco & Torres Irribarra, 2018), this is a feature of the school environment where the source is not the school practices, but the students who are members of a school.
- When we compare model 2 and model 3, in all cases, with two exemptions (Colombia and Dominican Republic), the contextual effects of authoritarianism faded away.
- There are school attributes that can be a contribution: civic knowledge, open classroom discussion.

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# Thank you!

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# Results

Table 2: multilevel IRT logit estimates with predictors.

	Sexism		Sexism		equality port
	Paths and parameters	E	p val	E	p val
Chile	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.76	***	-0.68	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.52	***	-1.49	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	0.76	***	-0.81	***
Colombia	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	1.02	***	-0.66	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.79	***	-1.27	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	0.76	***	-0.60	***
Dominican Republic	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.50	***	-0.19	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.62	***	-0.51	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	0.12		-0.32	**
Guatemala	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.96	***	-0.51	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.57	***	-0.96	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	0.62	***	-0.45	*
Mexico	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.75	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.41	***	-1.58	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	-0.04		-0.83	***
Paraguay	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.80	***	-0.50	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.32	***	-1.08	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	0.53	***	-0.58	***

		Sex	iom	Gender	equality
		Sex	ism	sup	port
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
a	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
Chile	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
O	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05		0.08	
<u></u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.22	***
वृ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	***
<u> </u>	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	***	-0.48	**
Colombia	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
O	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.10		0.40	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	***	0.57	***
	$(\beta_b-\beta_w)au$	0.44	**	-0.11	
()	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.33	***	0.04	
i <u>i</u>	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
물	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02		0.04	
<del>Q</del>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
Ž	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
Dominican Republic	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
. <u>Ö</u>	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	*	-0.59	*
Ë	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.20	**	0.07	
TC	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08		0.28	*
۵	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sex	ism		equality port
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
<u>a</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
Guatemala	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
ē	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
<u>ja</u>	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
ย	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
3	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
Mexico	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Š	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13		0.77	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	**	0.73	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.10		-0.38	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	
>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	*	0.23	***
En la	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.52	***	0.66	***
Paraguay	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.61	***	-0.68	**
a	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.64	*	0.55	
_	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.29	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.37	**	0.14	
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.08		-0.45	

		Sex	ism	Gender (	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
<u>o</u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
Chile	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
O	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05	*	0.08	ale de de
<u>ia</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	***	0.22	***
n dr	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	**
Colombia	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	**	-0.48	**
0	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$ $opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17		0.09	**
	$civ_h \rightarrow \theta_h$	-0.10 -0.46	***	0.40	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.44	**	-0.11	
	$\operatorname{aut}_{\mathbf{w}} \to \mathbf{\theta}_{\mathbf{w}}$	0.33	***	0.04	
Ö	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02		0.04	
nd	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
Se	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
Dominican Republic	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	*	-0.59	*
	$ses_h \rightarrow \theta_h$	-0.20	**	0.07	
Ξ	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08		0.28	*
00	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sex	ism	Gender o	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
<u> </u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
μ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
ter	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
Suatemala 	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
Ū	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
ic	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
Mexico	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Š	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13		0.77	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	**	0.73	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ au	0.10		-0.38	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	
>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	*	0.23	***
en .	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.52	***	0.66	***
Paraguay	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.61	***	-0.68	**
ar	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.64	*	0.55	
4	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.29	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.37	**	0.14	
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.08		-0.45	

		Sex	ism	Gender	equality
		Jexisiii			port
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
<u> </u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
Chile	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
O	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ au	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05		0.08	
<u>.</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.22	***
Colombia	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	***
Ö	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	***	-0.48	**
ō	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
0	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.10		0.40	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	***	0.57	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut		**	-0.11	
U	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.33	***	0.04	
Ě	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
ğ	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02		0.04	
e p	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
Dominican Republic	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	*	-0.59	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.20	**	0.07	
υC	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08		0.28	*
ے	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sex	ism		equality port
Countries	Path and	Е	p val	E	p val
	parameter s				
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
<u>_</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
Guatemala	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
ē	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
Ta t	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
9	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
0	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
<u>:</u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
Mexico	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Σ	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13	ale ale	0.77	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	**	0.73	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ aut		***	-0.38	***
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	* * *
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	*	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	***
a A	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	***	0.23	***
ğ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.52	***	0.66	**
Paraguay	$aut_b \to \theta_b$ $sex_b \to \theta_b$	0.61 -0.64	*	-0.68 0.55	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$ $ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	*	0.09	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	**	0.29	
	$(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{b}-\boldsymbol{\beta}_{w})$ aut			-0.45	
	G D FW/	0.00		-0.73	

		Sex	ism	Gender e	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
<u>e</u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
Chile	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
0	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05		0.08	
<u>a.</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.22	***
Colombia	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	***
Ë	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	***	-0.48	**
8	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
Ü	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.10		0.40	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	***	0.57	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.44	**	-0.11	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.33	***	0.04	
ı≧	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
9	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02		0.04	
<u>ā</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
~~	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
Dominican Republic	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	*	-0.59	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.20	**	0.07	
E	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08		0.28	*
۵	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sex	ism	Gender sup	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
Guatemala	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
Ĕ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
Ę	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
ğ	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
Ō	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
0	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
Mexico	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
ã	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Σ	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	***
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13	**	0.77	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	<b>ホ</b> ホ	0.73	* *
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.10	***	-0.38	***
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	*	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$ $opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	***
a 🖈	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	***	0.23	***
B	**	-0.52	***	0.66	**
Paraguay	$aut_b \to \theta_b$ $sex_b \to \theta_b$	0.61	*	-0.68	
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$ $ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.64 -0.16	**	0.55	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	*	0.09	
	$civ_h \rightarrow \theta_h$	-0.21	**	0.29	
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.08		-0.45	
	$(p_b - p_w)uu$	0.00		-0.45	

		Sexism		Gender equality support	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
<u>o</u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
Chile	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
O	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05		0.08	
<u>.e</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.22	***
Colombia	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	***
o L	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	***	-0.48	**
Ō	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
0	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.10	di di di	0.40	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	***	0.57	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.44	**	-0.11	
U	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.33	***	0.04	
ij	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
3	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02	d.	0.04	ata ata
Dominican Republic	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	**	-0.59	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.20	***	0.07	*
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08	*	0.28	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sexism		Gender equality support	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
Guatemala	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
μ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
ē	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
ğ	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
Ō	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
Mexico	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
e X	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Š	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13		0.77	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	**	0.73	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.10		-0.38	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	
>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	*	0.23	***
Paraguay 	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.52	***	0.66	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.61	***	-0.68	**
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.64	*	0.55	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.29	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.37	**	0.14	
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.08		-0.45	

		Sexism		Gender equality support	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
<u>o</u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
Chile	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
O	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05		0.08	
<u>.</u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.22	***
و	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	***
ŭ	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	***	-0.48	**
Colombia	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
Ŭ	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.10		0.40	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	***	0.57	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.44	**	-0.11	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.33	***	0.04	
ĕ	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
Dominican Republic	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02		0.04	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	*	-0.59	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.20	**	0.07	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08		0.28	*
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sexism		Gender equality support	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	Е	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
<u> </u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
ЗЭ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
ē	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
Guatemala	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
อั	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ au	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
<u>S</u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
Ä	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Mexico	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
_	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13		0.77	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	**	0.73	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)$ au	0.10		-0.38	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	
Paraguay	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	*	0.23	***
	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.52	***	0.66	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.61	***	-0.68	**
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.64	*	0.55	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.29	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.37	**	0.14	
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.08		-0.45	

		Sexism		Gender equality support	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.44	***	-0.20	**
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.81	***	0.91	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.00		-0.01	
	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.14	***	0.40	***
a	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.57	***	0.93	***
Chile	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.70	***	0.06	
Ū	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-1.18	***	0.85	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21		0.12	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.87	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.28		0.75	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.26		0.26	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.72	***	-0.37	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.48	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.05		0.08	
<u></u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.22	***
بق	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.68	***	0.69	***
Ĕ	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	1.15	***	-0.48	**
Colombia	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	**	-0.02	
Ö	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.17	**	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.10		0.40	**
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.46	***	0.57	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.44	**	-0.11	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.33	***	0.04	
ı≅	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.20	***	-0.04	
물	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.02		0.04	
Dominican Republic	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.06	*	0.13	**
	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.46	***	0.78	***
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.38	***	-0.24	*
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.73	*	-0.59	*
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.20	**	0.07	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.08		0.28	*
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	*	0.42	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.05		-0.28	*

		Sexism		Gender equality support	
Countries	Path and parameter s	E	p val	E	p val
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.68	***	-0.17	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.24	**
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.01		0.03	
<u> </u>	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	**	0.21	***
Ĕ	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.71	***	0.90	***
ţe	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.99	***	-0.25	
Guatemala	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.72	**	0.10	
Ō	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.14		-0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16		0.07	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.36		0.85	***
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.31		-0.08	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.26	***	-0.23	*
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.38	***	0.58	***
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.01		0.07	
0	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.03		0.32	***
<u>.</u>	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.36	***	1.00	***
Mexico	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.36	***	-0.61	**
Σ	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.42	*	-0.03	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.07		0.05	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.13		0.77	***
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.18	**	0.73	**
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.10		-0.38	
	$aut_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	0.54	***	-0.24	***
	$sex_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.35	***	0.07	
	$ses_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.09	*	0.04	ale de de
Paraguay 	$opd_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.10	***	0.23	***
	$civ_w \rightarrow \theta_w$	-0.52	***	0.66	**
	$aut_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	0.61	***	-0.68	* *
	$sex_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.64	**	0.55	
	$ses_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.16	*	0.09	
	$opd_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.21	**	0.29	
	$civ_b \rightarrow \theta_b$	-0.37	7.7	0.14	
	$(\beta_b - \beta_w)au$	0.08		-0.45	