

- exchanges: two-thirds of linkages (56/87) took place within movement sectors, and only one third across them, despite theoretical opportunities for exchanges across sectors slightly outnumbering those for exchanges within sectors (880 vs. 842).
13. The third of Gould and Fernandez's (1989) measure of brokerage across subgroups, the liaison type, did not apply here as the unit of analysis was partitioned into two subgroups only.
 14. In the case of symmetric data, representative and gatekeeper brokerage scores are identical.
 15. Only members of the executive board were interviewed in the case of semi-bureaucratic organizations, while all regular members of informal grass-roots groups were in principle contacted.
 16. Regularity of linkage was once again assessed on the basis of respondents' perceptions rather than 'objective' criteria. 'National media' include the local sections of major national newspapers, sometimes the national sections of the same papers, and the regional offices of the major public and private radio and television networks; 'local media' consist of neighbourhood weekly newspapers and local radio stations.
 17. To some extent this may also be a self-reinforcing process: attention paid by media operators to the most visible SMOs may well encourage less influential SMOs to contact the former as a result of the former's perceived public role (Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986).
 18. A referendum which took place in Spring 1990 recorded an overwhelming majority in favour of the abolition of hunting, yet the result was not validated due to a turnout slightly below the 50% threshold (Diani 1995: 43).
 19. Even in the mid-1980s members of these groups were particularly active in both the traditional left (11% vs. 4% of activists of other ecology groups, $p = 0.10$) and in radical protest movements (14% vs. 4%, $p = 0.03$).
 20. Modelled here as a dichotomous variable measuring whether an SMO occupied a brokerage position in the latent network, or not (13 out of 42 did).
 21. The structure of Legambiente has since then changed, with the national headquarters getting an increasingly high profile (Donati 1996).
 22. The assumption of the volatility of movement networks is recurrent in the literature (Klandermans 1997). Individual affiliations, however, tend to display a substantial degree of continuity over time (Diani 1995, ch. 4).
 23. Cook *et al.* (1983: 278) have long emphasized the importance of looking at the conditions under which certain patterns of network ties are likely to emerge. In the field of social movements, however, this problem has rarely been the focus of specific attention. For preliminary explorations see Diani (1995, ch. 7) and Balser (1997).
 24. Staggenborg (1988) offers interesting examples of individual brokers within the American prochoice movement.

6

Community Embeddedness and Collaborative Governance in the San Francisco Bay Area Environmental Movement

Christopher Ansell

In recent years, students of policy formation, planning, and public administration have become interested in a management strategy called 'collaborative governance' (Gray 1989). In this approach to governance, public agencies, and public officials openly and inclusively engage various stakeholders in a process of dialogue and mutual adjustment about problems of common concern. Stakeholders are generally seen as having different, even antithetical interests. But the strategy puts faith in the idea that through dialogue, stakeholders may identify unanticipated opportunities for positive cooperation or at least ways to mitigate the costs of adversarial relations.

In economic sociology and organization theory, another body of literature has developed around the importance of 'embeddedness' in shaping governance structures. Following Granovetter (1985), this literature argues that the 'embedding' of economic activity in social relations allows exchange to be organized with less reliance on either formal contracts or organizational hierarchy. Network embeddedness enhances the ability of organizations to manage interpersonal or inter-organizational exchange through informal and relational mechanisms, like norms of trust and reciprocity (Uzzi 1996; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). This embeddedness perspective is close in spirit to the argument put forward by social capital theorists that dense horizontal networks among independent civic associations are necessary for the cultivation of an autonomous civil society (Putnam 1993).

Communitarianism is one idiom through which the two sides of this discussion are brought together (Sandel 1996). It is through 'communities'—typically though not necessarily territorial in nature—that the conditions enumerated in both the collaborative governance literature and in the embeddedness/social capital literature are to be found. The necessity of including the stakeholders most directly affected by public actions and the requirement of face-to-face deliberation entailed by the notion of 'communicative rationality' are seen as best promoted through decentralized planning and policy decisions (Barber 1984; Williams and Matheny 1995).

The dense embeddedness of territorial communities is seen as providing the trust and social capital necessary to overcome political polarization. Within communities, embeddedness and collaborative governance should march hand-in-hand.

The attractiveness of this view depends in part upon a presumed relationship between political mobilization and territorial communities. An implicit presumption of the communitarian idea is that commitment to place is more likely to lead to integrative policy debates than commitment to issue. In the evolution of social movements and interest groups, cross-local mobilization around certain issues or interests leads to a 'disembedding' of associations from territorial communities. These associations become focused on narrow goals that they pursue unchecked by the more integrative concerns of any community, resulting in adversarial politics. The vertical and sectoral nature of representation is accentuated over the horizontal and integrative.

A contrasting view sees this disembedding as a process of modernization in which interest representation is freed from the parochial passions of communal politics and where subordinated interests free themselves from the informal coercion of local political fiefdoms. Freed from the informal personalism of local communities, these associations become professionalized, and consequently, more open to rational deliberation. The first view sees territorially embedded associations as more favourable towards collaboration, while the second view sees issue-based associations as more inclined to collaboration.

Similar tensions run through social movement theory. New social movements often express anti-bureaucratic, 'small-is-beautiful,' communitarian views. For these social movements, grassroots mobilization means 'community organizing' (Lichterman 1996). These movements exemplify the ideals of civic participation, developing the dense horizontal networks celebrated in civil society arguments. Furthermore, the grassroots organizing of social movements can be seen as necessary for 'opening up' the policy process, forcing public agencies to adopt a more inclusive policy style (Dryzek 1996). New social movements, in particular, are seen as the critical advocates of direct participatory democracy and collaborative governance can be seen as an administrative form of this participation. These affinities suggest that collaborative governance may be particularly likely to emerge in political arenas where new social movements are active.

Other perspectives on social movements, however, would suggest that they would be less likely to engage in collaborative governance. Social movements embrace 'outsider' strategies of grassroots mobilization and direct action in contrast to the 'insider' lobbying strategies embraced by interest groups (Staggenborg 1988; Walker 1997). In addition, while social movement organizations may be densely networked together, these networks may be primarily subcultural or countercultural (Melucci 1989). Such networks serve to mobilize and sustain opposition to the dominant culture and the status quo (Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Lo 1992). A venerable tradition within social movements and within social movement theory views collaboration with the state and societal opponents as leading to cooptation and deradicalization (Michels 1959; Piven and Cloward 1977).

This tension can also be restated in a communitarian idiom. In the first version, the communitarianism of new social movements is something they advocate as a plan for politics and society as a whole. In the second, the social movement is itself the community, which defines itself in opposition to the surrounding mainstream community.

Seen through this communitarian lens, the hypothetical relationship between embeddedness and collaborative governance becomes somewhat more provocative. How does embeddedness in a particular territorial community or a particular issue-oriented community affect social movement attitudes towards collaboration? How does embeddedness in a social movement subculture affect the attitudes of groups towards collaboration? In this chapter, I examine these questions through an investigation of one social movement community defined in both territorial and issue-related terms—the San Francisco Bay Area environmental movement.

The San Francisco Bay Area is home to a progressive and well-established environmental movement. It is a region famous for its progressive politics and social movement activism. It is also a region both richly endowed with natural resources and increasingly pressured by urban development. These factors combine to produce a local environmental movement with surprising organizational depth and diversity. The movement varies from local groups working to preserve small neighbourhood natural areas to associations working to protect natural resources on a global scale. Bay Area environmental organizations range from strictly volunteer groups with small, informal memberships to well-staffed professional organizations with sizeable budgets. The vibrant, well-established, and diverse character of this movement make it an interesting community in which to explore some of the issues associated with the relationship between embeddedness and collaboration.

VARIETIES OF EMBEDDEDNESS

Embeddedness has predominantly come to mean the embedding of a person or organization in a set of social relations or networks. Building on distinctions drawn in network analysis, Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) usefully distinguish between positional, structural, and relational embeddedness. A major measure of positional embeddedness is centrality. Presumably, the more central an organization is within a network of relationships, the more it is deeply embedded in that network. This measure should capture the full ambiguity of the attitude of social movements towards cooperative modes of governance. If social movements create an oppositional dynamic, higher centrality should lead towards a less sanguine view of collaboration. If social movements provide the basic infrastructure of civil society, then greater centrality may promote a more favourable attitude towards collaboration. Of course, it is very possible that both these effects could be pulling in different directions and consequently 'wash out' the effect of centrality.

Network theory identifies several measures of centrality (Freeman 1979). While these measures are often highly correlated in practice, they capture slightly different meanings of positional embeddedness. Degree centrality refers to the number of ties that a nodal actor sends to other actors (outdegree) or receives from other actors (indegree). In this context, degree centrality indicates whether an SMO has a particularly dense or impoverished set of relationships with other actors in the community. High outdegree suggests that an organization is actively networking with other groups. High indegree indicates that an organization is prominent or perhaps powerful—other organizations seek its advice, resources, or influence. Closeness centrality indicates the distance of one particular actor to all other actors in the network (as measured by path length). Actors with high closeness centrality can presumably more easily and directly connect and interact with other actors in a network. High closeness centrality means that an actor can easily influence and extract resources from the full network. Betweenness centrality refers to the degree to which an actor is on the path ‘between’ other actors in the network and can thus presumably mediate relationships between those actors. Thus, the centrality measure comes closest to measuring the degree to which an actor operates as a powerful broker within a network.

Relational embeddedness, according to Gulati and Gargiulo, refers to the degree of cohesion in a social network. In studying social movement embeddedness, cohesion might refer to the degree to which the network is closed in on itself and thus operates like a subculture or counter-culture. One measure of this is the degree to which actors are involved in cliques with other actors in the social network. In network terms, a (maximal) clique is a group in which every member has a relationship to every other member of the clique. In open networks, cliques may be rare and where they exist may be quite small. As a network becomes more closed, we should expect the number and size of cliques to increase. The more cliques of large size that an actor is a member of, the more that actor is important to the closure of the network as a whole.

Structural embeddedness is operationalized by Gulati and Gargiulo as structural equivalence. In network analysis, actors are structurally equivalent when they have a similar pattern of ties to third parties. Borgatti and Everett (1992) have observed that structural equivalence is not a pure measure of structural position, but rather captures aspects of both network position and network proximity. This is clearly a disadvantage if one wants to isolate the importance of network position. However, it may be an advantage when trying to operationalize embeddedness. Arguably, the concept of embeddedness presumes the importance of direct dyadic interaction (through which face-to-face interaction operates) *and* the importance of indirect ties (that promote the generalized norms of trust and reciprocity to the network level). In other words, embeddedness implies not only the importance of belonging to concrete set of dyadic relations, but also of belonging to a broader network of ties. Like the clique model, structural equivalence identifies actors that belong to the same network. But the clique model identifies membership in specific

‘subgroups’ by identifying where networks have become relatively closed. In contrast, structural equivalence identifies common networks in terms of both direct and indirect ties. Structural equivalence identifies network communities that are not closed.

Following Granovetter, I use the term *embeddedness* to refer to the idea of integration into particular networks. Both the social capital and communitarian literature, however, also point to the way in which organizations are rooted in particular communities. Therefore, we also need to consider how social movement organizations are situated in their communities temporally and socially. And we need to examine the kinds of communities they are rooted in—territorial versus issue-based communities.

Temporally, we are concerned with the length of time that a person or organization has been situated in a particular communal context. Presumably, the longer a person or organization has been situated in a given context, the more they have been socialized into the norms of that context and the more they have had time to develop informal, locally-specific knowledge and strategies for working in that context.

Socially, we are concerned with the degree to which an organization is open to and interpenetrated by its surrounding environment. Many social movement organizations, for example, have only a very limited demarcation from informal social networks. On the other hand, bureaucratization and professionalization may draw increasingly sharp boundaries between organizations and their environments. This boundary increases the autonomy of organizations from their social context (Udy 1962). In the context of social movements, we can distinguish between those organizations that organize and support themselves through strong interconnections with their immediate context versus those that gain relative autonomy from that environment.

In territorial terms, we are concerned with how narrowly or widely social movement organizations define their territorial focus. Are they primarily focused on protecting a local natural resource (a specific wetland, coastline, forest, etc.)? Or do they understand the entire world to be potentially within their ambit (wetlands, coastlines, forests, etc.)? The assumption here is that the more local the territorial scope of an association, the more it may have face-to-face relations on the basis of territorial residence and proximity. As territorial scope expands, organization might still be organized through face-to-face networks, but these will be less associated with ties of neighbourhood and residential proximity. As territorial scope expands, we expect people to be brought together around shared interests or attitudes. It is also useful to further distinguish whether social movement organizations understand themselves to be operating primarily in terms of place-oriented or issue-oriented communities.

Finally, in terms of issue-oriented communities, we know that the environmental movement is composed of a great many specialized though overlapping issue foci. Because of their concern with certain issues, the critical reference

groups for environmental associations may be specialized policy communities. It is highly plausible to expect that attitudes towards collaboration may vary from issue to issue as the specificities of certain policy debates and solutions vary. The environmental justice movement, for instance, might be highly conflictual while policy debates in recycling might be much more cooperative.

THE SURVEY

A survey of the Bay Area environmental movement was conducted during the spring of 2000, with most of the surveys being administered during the months of March and April. For the purposes of this study, the 'Bay Area' encompasses the nine counties that belong to the Association of Bay Area Governments: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma. The survey was administered on environmental groups with an office or an outpost, however informal, in the Bay Area. The preliminary list of environmental groups was composed from three sources available on the internet: the Bay Area Progressive Network, Bay Area Action's Ecocalendar directory of Bay Area environmental groups, and Yahoo's listing of environmental groups for each of the nine counties. I then examined the websites links of many of these groups to identify other groups involved in environmental issues. The resulting list included 174 organizations.¹ Eventually, we collected 70 completed surveys.² While this response rate seems low in comparison with the total population surveyed, we found that a large number of organizations in our initial sample were either impossible to contact or actually moribund. It is quite reasonable to conclude that this data contains a selection bias towards more active and better-established organizations, though the surveyed organizations still represent a wide variety of organizational types.

The survey itself asked a range of questions eliciting information on organizational characteristics, relations with other environmental organizations, and attitudes towards collaboration. With respect to collaboration, I made a decision in the design of the survey to focus on general attitudes towards collaboration with government and with groups with opposing interests.³ The following questions best capture the general attitude towards collaborative governance: 'How valuable is close collaboration with government agencies in solving environmental problems?'; 'How useful is it to enter into dialogue with groups or segments of the population whose values, interests, or goals are strongly opposed to your own?'. Answers were coded from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating that the respondent thought that collaboration with government agencies or dialogue with opposing groups was 'a waste of time' and 5 indicating that it was 'very valuable' (see Table 6.1).

The survey also asked a battery of questions to elicit the dimensions of network embeddedness and to identify how organizations related to the Bay Area community. With respect to network embeddedness, the survey elicits information only on

TABLE 6.1. *Summary measures of variables measuring propensity to collaboration with government agencies and dialogue with opposing groups*

	Collaboration	Dialogue
Minimum	1.00	1.00
Maximum	5.00	5.00
Mean	3.903	3.659
Standard deviation	1.086	1.170
N	62	63

interorganizational networks, or what Diani calls the 'visible' network (Diani 1995).⁴ Interorganizational network relations were elicited by asking respondents to identify, from the full list of 174 organizations, the organizations with whom they had 'directly worked'.⁵ 'Directly' was defined as 'groups within whom your organization had personal contact' and was included to discourage the inclusion of organizations with whom they had had only indirect contact through common membership in an alliance or umbrella group. 'Worked' was defined as contact ranging from 'informal consultation to formal alliance'. This information was then coded as a 70×70 asymmetric matrix.

I then calculated the measures of degree, closeness, and betweenness centrality that would be used to assess positional embeddedness (all analyses were conducted using the UCINET V package: Borgatti *et al.* 1998). Because the data is asymmetric, the measures included indegree and outdegree centrality as well as incloseness and outcloseness. A single measure is produced for betweenness centrality. I also used the clustering routine CONCOR (Breiger *et al.* 1976) to estimate structural equivalence, which served as my measure of structural embeddedness. I began by allowing the procedure to produce two consecutive splits, yielding four blocks. I then used block membership as a dummy variable in my subsequent linear regression analysis. I will return in the discussion below to how I subsequently refined this analysis. Finally, I conducted a clique analysis on the data. I first established that the largest cliques in the network were seven-member cliques (i.e. there were no cliques with greater than seven members). There were 13 seven-member cliques, most of them with overlapping memberships. I then took the number of seven-group cliques to which an organization belonged as an indicator of how much that organization contributed to the closure of the network as whole.

A question about the year of foundation located each organization temporally in the environmental movement. Since we know that new organizations may be created by activists with long careers in the environmental movement, the survey also asked how long the respondent had been working in the environmental movement in general and in the Bay Area environmental movement in particular.⁶

With respect to the integration of each organization in the local Bay Area community, the survey asked about the reliance of the organization on volunteers, the number of full-time staff, and the number of members. The more that organizations rely on volunteers and the more they are membership organizations, the more I regard them as open to the local environment. I regard organizations as more autonomous from their local communities if they are run primarily by full-time staff and do not utilize volunteers or have a membership base. The survey also asked if the organization adopted any of the following techniques to recruit members: word of mouth, advertising, personal contacts, door-to-door membership campaigns, and mailings. As mobilization techniques, I consider word of mouth and personal contacts to depend on a strong rootedness in the local community. These are techniques that presume reliance on an extended informal network. In contrast, advertising and mailings are impersonal means of recruitment. Door-to-door campaigns are intermediate between informal and formal. The survey also asked about whether the group's financing came from any of the following sources: membership dues, services provided, government grants or other public funding, grants from private foundations, or charitable donations from private donors. Here, the reasoning is that organizations that depend on resources from membership and, to a somewhat lesser extent, from charitable donations from private donors, are more embedded in the community than those who derive funding from services or government/foundation grants.

A second measure of linkage to the local community is affiliation with larger state-wide, nation-wide, or international organizations. Arguably, the stronger the external control or authority of the extra-local organization, the less the local group is tied to and responsive to the local community. The survey sought to elicit the character of this relationship by asking whether the surveyed organization would describe itself as a branch office, a chapter, an affiliate, or a member of this external group.⁷ For example, a branch office is generally more under the control of a central organization than a chapter and consequently, in theory, is relatively less strongly tied to and responsive to the local context. While recognizing that these terms are inevitably somewhat vague and variable in their interpretation, the strength of linkage to the local community is judged as follows: independent organizations (no external affiliation) are most locally rooted, followed by members, affiliates, chapters, and branch offices.

Territorial jurisdiction was ascertained by asking organizations to identify the label that best captured scope of their territorial involvement: neighbourhood, town or city, county, East Bay, Peninsula, South Bay, North Bay, Bay Area, Northern California, California, the West, the USA, or the World. I also coded an 'In-Bay' dummy variable to include all responses that indicated that the best label was either neighbourhood, town or city, county, East Bay, Peninsula, South Bay, North Bay, or Bay Area.

To ascertain the ties of groups to issue-oriented communities, the survey presented respondents with a broad list of issues and asked them to identify those

issues their group worked on.⁸ Each issue was then coded as a dummy variable. In addition, I coded the total number of issues that a group worked on, since we often hear that 'single issue' groups will act differently than groups working on a broad range of issues. Since even quite small groups worked on quite a few issues, I also sought a way to represent patterns of linkage to multiple issue domains. I used correspondence analysis to identify the commonalities in the patterns of issue linkage across all issues, utilizing the scores produced by this procedure as an indication that groups in similar issue communities.⁹

The survey also sought to determine whether a group identified more closely with its territorial community or with its issue community. The survey first asked whether the group felt itself to be part of a larger community of groups with complementary goals. Of course, nearly everyone answered yes. The following question then asked the respondent whether they would describe this community primarily in terms of 'territory' or a 'group of people working on a particular issue regardless of place'. A third option allowed them to identify this community as 'a group of people working on a particular issue in a particular place'.

Finally, the survey asked about which of the following strategies the group adopted to deal with environmental issues: a legal strategy, direct action, education and research, cultivation of public awareness, formulation of new policies or regulations, monitoring of existing legislative or policy implementation, lobbying congress, state legislatures, county boards of supervisors, or municipal councils, or lobbying international, federal, state, or local agencies. This question was partly designed to help distinguish social movement strategies (direct action, cultivation of public awareness) from interest group strategies (formulating policy and lobbying legislative bodies and agencies). In addition, it was expected that organizations adopting legal strategies would have quite adversarial attitudes, while organizations that specialized in lobbying agencies would have more collaborative attitudes (as potential insiders).

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

With respect to attitudes towards collaboration with public agencies, a linear regression analysis found that structural network embeddedness (structural equivalence) did positively affect attitudes towards collaboration, while relational network embeddedness (cliques) had a negative impact. Affiliations with groups outside the Bay Area also negatively affected the attitudes towards collaboration. At least as operationalized, other indicators of being rooted in the local community (temporal, territorial) or in particular issue-oriented communities were substantively and statistically insignificant in relation to collaboration. With the exception of outcloseness centrality, the measures for network centrality (positional embeddedness) were also insignificant. As will be discussed below, however, outcloseness seems to capture something very similar to structural embeddedness.

As for the degree to which organizations are tied to the local community, the most important finding was that organizations with affiliations to organizations outside the Bay Area have a less favourable attitude towards collaboration with government agencies. On the other hand, the character of the relationship to these external organizations does not appear to matter. Branch organizations are no less favourable towards collaboration than chapters, etc. Contrary to what we might expect from Staggenborg's (1988) or Walker's (1997) analysis of the professionalization and bureaucratization of social movements, neither membership base, nor modes of recruiting members, nor reliance on volunteers or staff size seem to have had any significant impact on collaboration. However, those organizations that derived funding from government grants (not surprisingly) did have a more collaborative attitude towards government agencies than those that did not. But contrary to expectations, organizations that adopted legal strategies were actually more favourable towards collaboration. Also contrary to expectations, neither the adoption of direct action strategies nor the adoption of lobbying strategies (including lobbying of agencies), had any significant influence on the attitude towards collaboration.

Perhaps the most interesting findings were the results for structural and relational network embeddedness. In my initial CONCOR analysis, I produced four structurally equivalent blocks.¹⁰ With membership in these blocks coded as dummy variables in the linear regression model, one of the blocks (Block 1) proved quite positive (substantive and statistical significance) to collaboration. To examine the robustness of this finding, I then analysed a more aggregated (two-block) and more disaggregated (eight-block) model. When Block 1 was aggregated with Block 2, the relationship with collaboration declined substantively and statistically. When Block 1 was further disaggregated into two blocks, the relationship between one of the resulting blocks (Block B) and collaboration was sharper (the positive substantive relationship increased and statistical significance was somewhat improved). For the other block, the relationship was still positive, but no longer statistically significant.

Given my predilection for larger blocks, I decided to keep these groups together in presenting my image matrix analysis. But before presenting that analysis, let me report the findings for relational embeddedness. Recall that relational embeddedness measures the cohesion of the network and that I operationalized individual contributions to network closure as the number of cliques of which each organization was a member. The modest (though highly significant statistically) negative impact of this variable on collaboration supports the argument that the more subcultural or countercultural the social movement, the less it will view governmental collaboration in favourable terms. The multivariate results for the variables discussed above are reported in Table 6.2. The finding that one block of structurally equivalent organizations were quite favourable towards collaboration obviously raises questions about the nature of this block in contrast to the other blocks. The following image matrix (Fig. 6.1) helps to understand the distinctiveness, in network terms, of Block 1.

TABLE 6.2. OLS coefficients predicting propensity to collaboration with government agencies ($N = 62$; standard errors in parentheses)^a

Block 1	0.94** (0.24)
Public grants	0.66** (0.22)
Legal strategies	0.45* (0.22)
Outside affiliations	-0.59** (0.22)
Clique	-0.10** (0.03)
Constant	3.61** (0.21)
Multiple R^2	0.46**

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

^aBlock 1 was coded 1 if the organization was in Block 1 and 0 otherwise; public grants was coded 1 if the organization reported receiving funding for public grants and 0 otherwise; legal strategies was coded 1 if the organization reported utilizing legal strategies and 0 otherwise; outside affiliations was coded 1 if the organization reported an affiliation outside the Bay Area and 0 otherwise; clique reports the number of seven-member cliques to which an organization belongs. It varies from 0 to 13, with a mean of 1.3 and a standard deviation of 3.122.




FIG. 6.1. Image matrix of the Bay Area environmental movement. Cutoff for reporting image matrix links: average density of entire network = 0.10

To some extent, the image matrix suggests a classic core-periphery structure for the Bay Area environmental movement. Block 3 is the core block. Blocks 1 and 2 send ties to Block 3 that are unreciprocated. From this perspective, Blocks 1 and 2 represent relatively peripheral groups. Both are integrated, however, into

the broader Bay Area movement by their own efforts to network with core actors. The ties sent by peripheral Blocks 1 and 2 to Block 3 are fairly dense: the density of ties is over twice the density of network as a whole. In contrast to these peripheral blocks, Block 4 appears to be isolated from the movement as a whole and to lack internal cohesion.

Yet the image matrix also suggests that the structure of the movement departs in some interesting ways from a classic core-periphery structure.¹¹ Most importantly, Block 1 sends links not only to the core (as in a classic core-periphery structure), but also to the other peripheral block (Block 2). If Block 2 did not also send ties to Block 3, Fig. 5.1 would suggest a movement with two distinct cores.

A second departure from the classic core-periphery structure is that the peripheral blocks are themselves internally cohesive. In such a structure, peripheral groups seek relations with the core, but not among themselves. Here, in contrast, the image matrix reveals that the two 'peripheral' blocks—1 and 2—are internally cohesive. This is particularly true of Block 2. The density of within-block ties in Block 2 is nearly three times the density of the overall network. This suggests that Block 2 has some cliquish tendencies. In contrast, Block 3—the block you might expect to be most cliquish—does not appear particularly cohesive.

In this modified core-periphery structure, Block 1 appears distinctive. Not only is it internally cohesive, but it also sends ties to both Blocks 2 and 3. My initial inclination was to see Block 1 in a sort of brokerage role, providing a bridge between Blocks 2 and 3. Yet this does not really appear to be the case. Block 1 is sending ties to Blocks 2 and 3, but not receiving them. A broker would be receiving ties (cf. Diani 1995: 123, and in this book). Nor is it possible to conclude, as I initially did, that Block 1 integrates the movement as a whole because it is the only block that has strong ties to the two other main blocks. Yet the fact that Block 1 has both a degree of internal cohesion and ties to both other blocks is important. Block 1 groups send a large quantity of ties to other blocks. While Block 1 groups are peripheral, they appear strongly oriented towards 'networking'. This impression is reinforced by examining outcloseness centrality—the measure of closeness centrality based on just those ties that organizations send to other organizations. If outcloseness centrality is substituted for Block 1 in the multivariate equation, it has a statistically significant positive association with attitudes of collaboration (as reported in Table 6.4, the zero-order correlation between outcloseness and Block 1 is 0.277). If both are included in the regression, Block 1 remains highly significant while outcloseness centrality loses its statistical significance.

Before exploring this 'networking' strategy more fully, it is important to see whether these findings also hold for the other dependent variable—the degree to which groups were willing to engage in dialogue with groups holding opposing values and perspectives. My analysis produces similar findings: Block 1 also proves to be favourable towards dialogue with opposing groups (see Table 6.3). Again, I experimented with more and less aggregated blockings. In this analysis,

TABLE 6.3. OLS coefficients predicting propensity to dialogue with opposing groups ($N = 63$; standard errors in parentheses)

Block B	1.31** (0.33)
Sustainable development	1.11** (0.32)
Urban sprawl	-1.02** (0.34)
Outside affiliations	0.58* (0.24)
Clique 1 ^a	-0.82** (0.32)
Constant	3.25** (0.19)
Multiple R ²	0.40**

* $p < 0.05$.

** $p < 0.01$.

^aIn Clique 1, groups who were a member of at least one of the 13 seven-member cliques were coded 1; all other groups were coded 0.

only one of the two partitions of Block 1—Block B ($N = 11$)—is significantly related to propensity to dialogue. The following analysis uses Block B, rather than Block 1, because Block B provides a better fit than Block 1 in a bivariate model and also seems to considerably sharpen up the multivariate model.

In this analysis, affiliation with an external group again proves to dampen enthusiasm for dialogue, but financial support from public grants and recourse to legal strategies does not have any significant influence. The number of seven-member cliques an organization belonged to proves to be only marginally significant. However, a recoded clique measure (Clique 1) proved more powerful and is included in the multivariate model. Using availability to dialogue as the dependent variable, other variables operationalizing various forms of network embeddedness and the linkage of the groups to territorial and issue-oriented communities were reexamined. In bivariate analyses, involvement in four issues areas—renewable resources, sustainable development, urban sprawl, and wilderness—has an important influence on inclination to dialogue. In the multivariate model, only sustainable development and urban sprawl remained robust. Involvement in the issue area of sustainable development had a quite positive influence, while involvement with the issue of urban sprawl seemed to significantly dampen this positive spirit.

Having now established the overall relationship between the structure of the network and the inclinations of environmental groups to engage in collaboration with public agencies and dialogue with groups with different perspectives, we can now investigate more closely the nature of the different blocks of organizations identified above. By examining the zero-order correlations between block membership and other survey variables, Table 6.4 provides a detailed profile of each of the blocks. These profiles allow us to pose a general question about the findings of this network analysis: is block membership really a proxy for other variables? In particular, is Block 1 (or Block B) simply identifying a group of nonradical

environmental groups? While it might still be interesting to understand why these groups are structurally equivalent, such a finding would vitiate the preliminary finding that the characteristics of the network explains attitudes towards collaboration and dialogue. Based on the zero-order correlations between survey variables and blocks (Table 6.4), we can sketch the following profiles of blocks:

1. Block 2 organizations seem to be *professional issue-oriented advocacy groups*. These organizations are the least place-oriented (-0.199) and the most issue-oriented (0.130) of any of the blocks. They appear to rely more heavily on staff (0.199) than on volunteers (-0.137). They do not rely on word of mouth (-0.265*) or personal contacts (-0.185) to recruit members, nor do they raise money through services (-0.256*). Their focus is not local and they are the least focused on environmental protection within the Bay Area of any block (In-Bay = -0.210). Their strategies focus on lobbying legislatures (0.278*) and public agencies (0.211). They tend to have had more negative experiences with public agencies than other blocks (-0.234) and their relation with these agencies tends to be conflictual (0.261*). These groups appear to rely significantly on a strategy of networking with other groups (outdegree = 0.290*). While none of the blocks is particularly cliquish, Block 2 has the greatest tendency in this regard (0.155).
2. The profile of Block 4 is in many respects the opposite of Block 2. Groups in this block are largely *local, volunteer-based environmental groups*. These organizations do not have significant staff resources (-0.163) and tend to rely instead on volunteers (0.199). Their focus is localized. Their action is oriented towards counties (0.198), the Peninsula (0.186), and especially, the North Bay (0.337**). While they have a strong focus *within* the Bay Area (0.353*), they are not particularly focused on the Bay Area as a whole (-0.092). Of all four main blocks, they are the most place-oriented (0.112) and the least issue-oriented (-0.180). They do not generally target public agencies for lobbying (-0.172), though their experiences with public agencies have been better than those of other blocks (0.158). These local organizations are relatively isolated (as shown in Fig. 6.1): they make relatively little effort to network with other groups (outdegree = -0.266*); nor are they the target of networking (indegree = -0.276*). They are the least cliquish of all the blocks (-0.181).
3. Block 3 (core) groups are probably *membership-based environment groups with significant organizational resources*. These groups have both staff (0.198) and members (0.144). They recruit members through word-of-mouth (0.236*) and door-to-door campaigns (0.248). Support from foundations (0.323*) rather than dues (-0.013), however, appears to be their main source of revenue. These organizations are the least focused on lobbying legislatures (-0.211) or public agencies (-0.187) of any of the blocks. As suggested in Fig. 6.1, many other Bay Area groups want to network with

TABLE 6.4. Pearson correlations between block membership and survey variables

Variables	Blocks					N	
	A	B	1	2	3		
Date founded	0.177	0.043	0.157	-0.101	-0.092	0.043	70
Number staff	-0.108	-0.106	-0.162	0.188	0.198	-0.163	69
Number members	-0.067	-0.111	-0.138	0.078	0.144	-0.114	69
Volunteer	0.061	-0.036	0.012	-0.137	-0.050	0.199	70
Word of mouth	0.068	-0.139	-0.069	-0.265*	0.236*	0.048	70
Advertising	-0.197	0.126	-0.045	-0.022	0.052	0.003	63
Door-to-door	0.201	-0.135	0.041	-0.185	0.248	-0.175	63
Personal contacts	0.132	0.000	0.096	-0.149	-0.013	0.068	63
Dues	0.123	-0.046	0.046	0.007	-0.013	-0.046	70
Service	0.071	0.032	0.076	-0.256*	0.050	0.116	70
Public funding	0.029	-0.100	-0.063	-0.077	0.072	0.061	70
Foundations	-0.211	-0.248*	-0.351**	0.058	0.323**	-0.074	70
Private donors	0.136	-0.048	0.053	-0.015	0.083	-0.160	70
Neighbourhood	0.092	-0.120	-0.036	0.010	0.000	0.033	70
County	0.086	0.097	0.139	-0.228	-0.090	0.198	70
Peninsula	0.014	-0.166	-0.128	-0.183	0.122	0.186	70
North Bay	-0.092	-0.120	-0.163	-0.132	0.000	0.337**	70
South Bay	0.156	-0.049	0.067	-0.074	-0.052	0.069	70
East Bay	-0.128	0.069	-0.031	0.036	0.035	-0.049	70
Bay Area	0.101	0.220	0.253*	-0.217	0.015	-0.092	70
In-Bay	0.078	-0.048	0.013	-0.210	-0.107	0.353**	70
Place-oriented	0.137	-0.052	0.054	-0.199	0.028	0.112	67
Issue-oriented	0.014	-0.008	0.003	0.130	0.023	-0.180	66
Legal action	0.106	-0.044	0.036	0.120	-0.036	-0.124	70
Direct action	-0.010	0.124	0.097	0.029	0.036	-0.195	70
Education	0.048	0.118	0.131	-0.129	-0.029	0.020	70
Awareness	0.120	-0.092	0.006	-0.059	0.018	0.032	70
Policymaking	0.019	-0.077	-0.051	-0.004	0.047	0.002	70
Monitoring	-0.048	0.039	0.000	0.110	-0.058	-0.039	70
Legislatures	-0.086	0.069	-0.002	0.278*	-0.211	-0.010	70
Agencies	0.067	0.143	0.165	0.211	-0.187	-0.172	70
Best experience	-0.005	0.003	-0.001	-0.008	-0.116	0.158	63
Worst experience	0.191	0.126	0.237	-0.234	-0.092	0.084	59
Cooperative	0.064	0.163	0.181	-0.080	-0.148	0.061	61
Conflictual	-0.153	-0.121	-0.206	0.261*	0.096	-0.179	59
Frequency	-0.159	0.024	-0.083	0.170	-0.105	0.057	69
Incloseness	0.058	-0.440***	-0.327**	0.075	0.201	0.042	70
Outcloseness	0.023	0.314**	0.277*	0.228	-0.207	-0.298*	70
Indegree	-0.137	-0.110	-0.185	0.060	0.323**	-0.276*	70
Outdegree	0.036	0.408***	0.365**	0.290*	-0.358**	-0.266*	70
Clique	-0.063	0.072	0.017	0.155	-0.004	-0.181	70

* $p < 0.05$.** $p < 0.01$.*** $p < 0.001$.

- Block 3 groups ($\text{indegree} = 0.323^{**}$). But Block 3 groups do not appear to aggressively network with other groups ($\text{outdegree} = -0.358^{**}$).
4. Instead of profiling Block 1 as whole, I will focus on the sub-block with the highest propensity to collaboration and dialogue—Block B. In sharp contrast to Block 3, Block B does not rely on foundations for financial support (-0.253^*). Of all the Blocks, Block B appears to be the collection of groups whose scope of action is most focused on the Bay Area per se (0.220). This association between these groups and the Bay Area as a whole is, in fact, statistically significant for the larger Block 1 from which Block B is derived (0.253^*). However, Block B is neither particularly place- (-0.052) nor issue-oriented (-0.008). Nor does it have a characteristic strategic profile, though it does have a tendency to work with public agencies (0.143). The relationship between these groups and public agencies tends to be cooperative (0.163). Yet the most distinctive characteristic of Block B is its networking profile: it cultivates strong networks with other groups ($\text{outdegree} = 0.408^{***}$) and maintains strong access to the entire Bay Area environmental network ($\text{outcloseness} = 0.314^{**}$). However, this access is unilateral. These groups are very far from being central players in the Bay Area environmental movement ($\text{incloseness} = -0.440^{***}$).

These profiles are not sharply etched in the data. The correlations between block membership and the survey variables are only statistically significant for a few variables. While it is legitimate to suggest that Block B is somewhat more cooperative than the other blocks, it also appears more likely to engage in 'direct action' than the other blocks. More importantly, neither of these variables is statistically significant. Based on the survey, there is little evidence that block membership is simply a proxy for the moderation of the block members. In contrast, the correlations between membership in block B and the network variables in Table 6.4 are highly statistically significant (especially incloseness and outdegree).

Block 1 groups are not central players in the Bay Area environmental movement. They are on the periphery of the movement. Yet by their own initiative they are solidly linked to other Bay area organizations. How then should we explain, in network terms, why they are open both to collaboration with public agencies and to dialogue with groups with contending perspectives? The analysis suggests two points. First, Block B groups operate like niche organizations that presuppose a more extensive organizational network that they may 'plug into' for purposes of mobilizing various issue-oriented or place-oriented communities. Second, these groups are constituted in such a way that they work according to a 'network logic' rather than an 'organizational logic'. I suspect that the size and scope of the Bay Area Environmental Movement provides a basis for a variety of organizational and issue niches. The niche organizations of Block B rely and depend on the reservoir of resources, people, and institutions that constitute the core of the movement—particularly those in Block 3 (the *membership-based environmental groups* with

significant organizational resources). These core organizations operate according to an 'organizational logic'—they seek to develop and maintain resources and support through the development of organizational capacities. They administer on-going programs and coordinate relatively complex organized activities. To support these programs and activities, they routinize fund-raising. While they are by no means autarkic, this organizational logic cultivates an internal focus on maintaining and improving the organization's own programs and administration. In contrast, niche organizations are constituted as nodes in a more extensive network. They do not seek to administer or maintain extensive programs. Instead, they focus on trying to operate within a broader organizational field of existing organizations and social networks. Resources are mostly external to the organization.¹² These are lean organizations that prize flexibility of manoeuvre. Program planning or routinized fund-raising are less important than the ability to recognize and take advantage of strategic opportunities as they arise.

In February and March 2001, in-depth interviews were conducted with eight of the 11 groups in Block B in order to probe this argument. With three partial exceptions, we found that a strategy of networking was a critical aspect of mobilization for these groups. One fairly prominent group (A), for instance, described a strategy of mobilization in which they create coalitions through personal contacts and meetings. These coalitions are built up over years and can then be rapidly mobilized as issues arise. A second group (B) indicated that networking was an essential strategy and that they worked with other organizations on every project. These networks are built strategically by partnering with organizations that its members trust. A third group (C) says you cannot be effective unless you work with other organizations and that there was no issue on which it did not collaborate with other organizations. Networking was 'ubiquitous'. This group suggested that it would sometimes work with other groups even though it had nothing to gain, because that was the norm of the environmental movement. A fourth group (D) reported that networking was 'the most important strategy at our disposal'. The person interviewed—a board member active in the Bay Area environmental movement over the last 30 years—reported that she had 'probably worked with every organization in the bay area at one time or another'. A fifth group (E) indicated that networks were the only way of building broad support on issues and the interviewee reported that 'My job is to relate all over the place.' The final three groups suggested that networking had a more modest role in their organizations. Group F reports that networking is important but other groups do not provide much support. The interviewee suggested that he was not currently in a 'network-building' mode and that he was not very deliberate about networking. Group G claims that 'local, national, and international networking' is one of their main activities, but that they were more important for moral support than for specific projects. The interviewee claimed that the group did not actively seek to build coalitions. Finally, Group H does work regularly with other organizations, but finds cooperation often lacking (partly because of the nature of the issue the group works on).

These organizations operate with quite limited staffs and resources, yet seem relatively unconcerned about funding. All of them seemed to be adept at piggy-backing on resources available in the larger community. Group A, whose committed but low paid staff worked at home to save money, noted that it specifically sought to work in coalitions in order to maximize the effect of their resources. They receive a substantial amount of pro bono help. Group B tries to 'leverage' their resources through partnerships. Group C shares expenses with related organizations (e.g. joint hosting of events). With few fixed costs aside from its newsletter, Group D says that it stretches its existing resources by working with groups or agencies that have resources to share. Group E stopped raising funds two years ago. Group F indicates that the funds required for effort are minimal, but that they stretch resources by getting people involved who occupy strategic positions in the community. Group G is a one-person operation without funding, which means that 'networking is all he has'.

A few of the organizations explicitly noted the synergy between networks and large organizations. Group B says that a loose network gets more done, but you also need the expertise that established organizations can provide. Group C suggests that networks are better on single issues, especially when there is a well-defined focus. Larger organizations provide the money to get a message out. Diversity of organizational strategy is one of the key strengths of the environmental movement. Group D indicates that you need a mix of networks and organizations because they focus on issues with different scopes. Networks tend to focus on local issues while established organizations work on broader issues of state and national significance. Group G notes that both decentralized direct action networks and mainstream groups are necessary to appeal to different segments of the population.

Why might these groups that rely heavily on networking be more oriented towards collaboration and dialogue with other groups? Although the argument cannot be substantiated with the current survey evidence, my view is that niche organizations that rely heavily on a 'network logic' are by nature more inclined to engage other groups. By their very nature, they are oriented towards collaborative action with other groups. Group A, for instance, noted that its approach has always been to work with government institutions and engage in legal processes, knowing that there are good people in agencies who want to do the right thing. Group D provided numerous examples of how her organization has used political channels and other groups to change state and national laws. Group E notes that it is open to working with all parties. Group G notes that while they loathe hunting, they understand that hunting groups can be powerful allies that reach different constituencies.

At the same time, the tensions generated by networking strategies were quite visible in the interviews. Group A claims to have been very disappointed with other environmental organizations that have wanted to compete with them rather than work together. Group B indicates that it must cautiously build networks with groups that its members trust. Group D indicates that it 'always' networks with organization and individuals who agree with their position on the issue at hand.

Group F notes that other groups have not really offered much concrete help. Group G notes that they have encountered problems in working with other groups because they do not share the same perspective. He notes an internal debate in his organization concerning whether they should network only with groups that understand their message or with groups that have a different perspective in the hopes that they might change how they think. Group H claims that other environmental groups have sometimes been uncooperative, leading to unnecessary legal battles.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper began by posing a hypothetical relationship between embeddedness and collaborative governance. In the research conducted for this paper, collaborative governance was not measured directly. I suspect that understanding actual patterns of collaborative governance would require a much more issue-specific and processual research design. My goal in this paper, however, was to see whether embeddedness could explain something about the general propensity to embrace collaborative governance. Therefore, the proxy for collaborative governance used in this study was attitude towards collaboration, and more specifically, attitudes towards collaboration with public agencies and dialogue with opposing groups. The paper found evidence that embeddedness does shape attitudes towards collaboration with agencies and opposing groups.

Yet the main thrust of the paper has been to elaborate different types of embeddedness and ultimately to ask what types of embeddedness encourage collaboration. Following Gulati and Gargiulo, I distinguished between positional, relational, and structural forms of network embeddedness. In the introduction to the paper, I also framed the question of embeddedness in a more general communitarian perspective. From this perspective, I suggested that groups strongly linked to territorial communities, who value place above issue, are likely to be more inclined to adopt collaborative attitudes. But I also noted the opposing perspective: that professional, issue-oriented groups were more open to negotiation and compromise (and hence collaboration). It is also plausible that social movement communities that operate as subcultures or counter-cultures may be less oriented to cooperation.

With respect to the view that place-based rather than issue-based organizations have more collaborative attitudes, I find mixed support. I find little *direct* support for this argument. Organizations oriented to place appeared no more likely than organizations oriented to issues to be collaborative. Nor does the age of the organization or the length of time its leaders have been part of the local community—possible indicators of accumulated social capital—appear to have any significant influence on attitudes towards collaboration or dialogue. Yet the analysis does indicate that organizations unaffiliated with larger state-wide, nation-wide, or international organizations—who by implication are more strongly linked to the local community—do have more collaborative attitudes and are more likely to

engage in dialogue with groups that have opposing perspectives. Some suggestive (but not statistically significant) evidence from Table 6.4 indicates that the least place-oriented and most issue-oriented block (Block 2) experienced more conflictual relations with public agencies than the most place-oriented and least issue-oriented block (Block 4). Yet this finding is not strong and we must take account of the fact that the issue-oriented groups were more intimately engaged in working with public agencies. Other evidence on issue orientation suggests that attitudes towards dialogue will depend on the issue: groups concerned with sustainable development were more favourable towards dialogue, while the urban sprawl community was less favourable.

The most interesting findings from the survey relate to the nature of network embeddedness. At least in analysing attitudes towards collaboration, this study found little support for various measures of centrality (positional embeddedness) as the critical measure of embeddedness. Frankly, based on the findings of previous studies and on my own sense that centrality is an intuitively direct operationalization of the idea of embeddedness, this was a surprise. Indegree and outdegree centrality, the individual measures best representing the importance of 'dense' social networks, were not significant. While closeness centrality did show some explanatory promise, structural and relational embeddedness were ultimately more successful explanatory variables.

Relational and structural embeddedness help to delineate how embeddedness in social movement networks might affect attitudes towards collaboration and dialogue. Relational embeddedness is intended to capture the cohesion of networks and I have used it here to capture the subcultural or counter-cultural dimension of social movement networks. I have reasoned that subcultural or counter-cultural networks are more closed than other networks, a dimension I measure by examining membership in cliques. Network closure is theorized, in turn, as producing less openness towards external parties and, consequently, dampened enthusiasm for collaboration and dialogue with these parties. And indeed, this was found to be the case for both collaboration with public agencies and dialogue with opposing groups.

It is clear, however, that not all structurally equivalent blocks are similarly prone towards collaboration and dialogue. I found that membership in only one of the four blocks I initially analysed predicted positive attitudes towards collaboration and dialogue and that only one subgroup within this block was unambiguously favourable towards collaboration and dialogue. Analysing the relationships between blocks, however, indicated that the block with favourable attitudes towards collaboration and dialogue was the block with a strong propensity to adopt a 'networking' strategy. The groups in this block were distinguished by the fact that they had a low indegree, but a high outdegree. They were clearly not central players in the Bay Area environmental movement, but they were remarkably well integrated into the Bay Area environmental movement through their own unilateral efforts to network (high outcloseness). These groups are peripheral actors, but they know how to plug themselves into and utilize the resources of the broader network. The interviews suggest, though do not confirm, that this 'networking logic'

is related to a greater openness to working with all types of organizations and persons on a collaborative basis.

In this study, relational embeddedness locates organizations that tend to be closed to collaboration and dialogue outside the in-group (clique), while structural equivalence locates organizations open to outside collaboration. It is noteworthy that relational and structural embeddedness have provided a better explanation of attitudes towards collaboration and dialogue than the commonly adduced distinction between 'outsider' direct action strategies and 'insider' lobbying strategies.

NOTES

1. Since my intention was to focus on the subset of voluntary and non-profit organizations that engage in political activity broadly defined—i.e. activity designed to sway public policy in particular directions—I dropped organizations from the list that are *primarily*: (1) commercial; (2) educational (except in a broader political sense); (3) journals, magazines, newsletters; (4) governmental; (5) research organizations; (6) recreational; (7) land trusts; (8) recycling organizations; and those organizations for which environmental issues are distinctly peripheral to their main mission. When in doubt, I retained the organization.
2. At the outset of the project, an early version of the survey was tested on several organizations. Based on this experience, a number of survey questions were rewritten in order to improve interpretability and to reduce the time it took to administer the survey. We also arrived at a method for administering the survey: we personally contacted the organization and sought to administer the survey to the highest 'executive' position in the organization. 'Top executive position' means the person with overall responsibility for day-to-day management and policy-making. For example, we sought to survey the Executive Director, the President, the Chairman, etc. Because of their busy schedules, it was not always possible to survey these leaders. But we followed this guideline whenever possible. Once contact was made, we forwarded the survey to this person by fax, mail, or e-mail. When possible, we then conducted the survey in person (usually over the telephone), though this was not always possible either. A cover letter that accompanied the survey promised anonymity for the organization in any presentation of the survey results. We found it quite difficult to get these organizations to respond to the survey, especially since many of them are run by small, overworked staffs or volunteers. Often it proved exceedingly difficult just to establish contact with these organizations. Once contact had been made, however, we aggressively followed up by telephone and e-mail with any organizations that expressed an initial willingness to complete the survey.
3. This approach was not ideal because, as respondents told us in completing the survey, their attitudes towards collaboration varied depending on the public agencies and interest group opponents in question. In an early phase of designing the survey, I considered asking questions about relationships with specific agencies and specific groups. But this approach proved difficult for two reasons. First, I believed it quite important to keep the primary independent variable (embeddedness) distinct from the dependent variable (collaboration). Thus, it was useful to think of collaboration more as a general attitude

than a network relation. Second, our early field test of the survey convinced us that collecting a successful sample meant that we had to greatly streamline the questionnaire. Asking about relations to specific agencies or opposing groups was, from this perspective, infeasible.

4. In his study of the Italian environmental movement, Diani (1995) has clearly shown that interpersonal ties among activists (the 'latent' network) may yield quite a different view of movement networks.
5. The relationship 'directly worked' could certainly be usefully disaggregated. Krackhardt, for example, finds that advice networks yield a significantly different image of an organization than do friendship networks (Krackhardt 1992). Preliminary testing of the survey, however, suggested that respondents were impatient with the network questions on the survey. We decided to keep the question as simple as possible.
6. For example, if a director with a great deal of experience moved to a newly founded group, then founding date would probably give a misleading characterization of the local social capital or contextual knowledge accessible to the group.
7. If respondents were not sure, we used the following distinctions to guide them: (a) a 'branch office' is a direct administrative extension of a central organization and the branch office ultimately reports to (and derives its authority from) that office; (b) a 'chapter' has been 'chartered' by a parent organization and is similar to other chapters organized and governed by the same charter; but the chapter is generally self-governing (elects its own officers) and through voting or delegation contributes to the governance of the parent organization; (c) an 'affiliate' is also self-governing and participates in the governance of a larger 'umbrella' organization to which it belongs; (d) it differs from a chapter in that it is not constituted by a charter and thus is typically constitutionally different from other affiliates; (e) 'member' implies the weakest relationship between a local group and a larger organization. Your group subscribes to a larger organization, but does not actively participate in its governance.
8. The issues are air quality, animal rights, coastline preservation, endangered species, environmental education, environmental justice, fisheries, global warming, natural areas protection, nuclear safety, ozone, parks and recreation, pesticides, recycling, renewable resources, rivers or watersheds, sustainable development, toxics, transportation, urban sprawl, water quality, wetlands, wilderness, and wildlife.
9. Correspondence analysis produces a measure similar to structural equivalence on two-mode relational data (here, the two modes are organizations \times issues). In this case, I identified the correspondence between the patterns of issues that organizations indicated that they worked on. The analysis then creates scores that dimensionalize the distances between these correspondences. See Wasserman and Faust (1995: 334–43).
10. I had some substantive predilection for more aggregated blocks, since structural equivalence was supposed to identify common network membership in open networks rather than in closed subgroups. See Appendix 1 for a profile of the blocks generated by CONCOR, in the light of the survey variables.
11. It is interesting to compare the image matrix for the Bay Area environmental movement with the one produced by Diani for the 'visible network' of the Milan environmental movement (1995: 123). The Milan movement appears to be a more straightforward core–periphery structure.
12. This finding mirrors Diani's conclusion that high outdegree is uncorrelated with organizational resources in the Milan environmental movement (1995: 105–8).

Part III

Networking the Political Process