# Asymmetric Key Cryptography

Using a private key (not shared) and a public key (which is distributed) for encryption

#### **Maths**

## **Euler's Phi/Totient Function**

- $\phi(1) = 0$
- $\phi(p) = p-1$  for p -> Prime number
- $\phi(m \ x \ n) = \phi(m) imes \phi(n)$  for m, n are relative primes
- $\phi(p^e)=p^e-p^{e-1}$  for p-> prime number

#### Fermat's Little Theorem

**⊘** Note

Only apply if p -> Prime number

- 1.  $a^{p-1} = 1 \mod p$
- $2. \quad a^p = a \bmod p$
- 3.  $a^{-1} mod p = a^{p-2} mod p$

#### **Euler's Theorem**

- 1.  $a^{\phi(n)} = 1 \pmod{n}$
- $2. \ a^{k x \phi(n)+1} = a \pmod{n}$
- 3.  $a^{-1} mod \ n = a^{\phi(n)-1} \ mod \ n$

# **Principles**

#### **Authentication**

- Can be implemented by using the keys (public and private) from the same key source
- For example: in the communication between A and B if A's private key is used for encryption and A's public key is used for decryption by B, A is the aunthenticated sender

## Confidentiality

- Using double encryption and decryption:
  - Encrypt using the private key of A and public key of B
  - Decrypt using the private key of B and public key of A

#### **RSA**

## **Key Generation**

- 1. Select 2 **relatively prime** numbers (p,q)
- 2. n = p \* q
- 3.  $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$
- 4. Choose value of  $oldsymbol{\mathsf{e}}$  such that  $1 < e < \phi(n)$  and  $gcd(e,\phi(n)) = 1$
- 5.  $d = e^{-1} mod \ \phi(n)$

## **Private Key**

 $\{e,n\}$ 

#### **Public Key**

 $\{d, n\}$ 

## **Encryption**

 $c = m^e mod n$ 

## **Decryption**

 $m=c^d mod \ n$ 

#### **Potential Attacks**

- Factorisation
- Chosen Cipher Text Intercept and masking plaintext
- Encryption Exponent When the encryption exponent is set too low (Recommended: Prime numbers around  $2^{16} + 1$ 
  - Coppersmith
    - ullet For  $C=M^e mod \ N$
    - If  $M < N^{\frac{1}{e}}$ , M can be directly recovered by taking eth root of C
  - Broadcast
    - If Alice sends the same message with same exponent to 3 different recipients, attacker (Eve) can use chinese remainder theorem to decrypt the message
  - Related messages (Franklin Reiter)

- If 2 messages (P1 and P2) were encrypted with same e, and if P1 is related to P2 in by a *linear function*, Eve can decrypt the corresponding C1 and C2 in feasible computation time
- Short pad (Coppersmith)
  - Alice pads with r1, encrypts and sends message to Bob
  - Eve intercepts and drops message (C1)
  - Bob requests message again and Alice sends again with padding of r2
  - Eve intercepts again (C2)
  - Eve knows C1 and C2 has same plaintext
  - If r1 and r2 are short, Eve can recover original plaintext
- Decryption Exponent Releaved and low exponent
- Plaintext
  - Short message
    - Short messages can be easily decrypted by brute force
    - Use padding (in the start or end of message) using OAEP to prevent this
  - Cyclic
  - Unconcealed
- Modulus Common modulus
- Implementation
  - Timing and power (Paul Kocher)
    - Blinding and Random Delays can help with this

## Diffie Hellman Key Exchange Algorithm

#### **Procedure**

- 1. Consider a prime number  ${\bf q}$
- 2. Select  $\alpha$  such that  $\alpha < q$  and  $\alpha$  is *primitive root* of q
- 3. Assume  $X_A$  (Private key of A) and  $X_A < q$ . Calculate  $Y_A = lpha^{X_A} mod \ q$  (Public Key of A)
- 4. Repeat previous step for B
- 5. Calculate secret keys
  - $K_A = (Y_B)^{X_A} \mod q$
  - $K_B = (Y_A)^{X_B} mod q$
- 6. If  $K_A == K_B$ , key exchange succesfull

#### Man in the middle attack

Insert a man in the middle of A and B (Eve) and carry out diffie hellman exchange with each A and B

Complete this section

#### El-Gamal

## **Key Generation**

- 1. Select prime number P
- 2. Select private key d
- 3. Select 2nd part of encryption key  $e_1$
- 4. Select 3rd part of encryption key  $e_2$   $e_2 = e_1^d mod \ P$
- 5. Public key =  $(e_1, e_2, P)$ , Private Key = d

## **Encryption**

- 1. Select random integer r
- 2. Calculate  $C_1 = e_1^r mod \ P$
- 3. Calculate  $C_2 = (M st e_2^r) mod \ P$
- 4. Cipher Text =  $(C_1, C_2)$

## **Decryption**

1.  $M = [C_2 * (C_1^D)^{-1}] mod P$ 

# **Knapsack Algorithm**

**⊘** Todo

Complete this section

#### Given:

- Sum (S)
- Weights (W) Superincreasing tuple

## **Key Generation**

Public Key (Hard Knapsack)

Private Key (Easy Knapsack)

# **Key Distribution**

#### **Methods**

- Public Announcement
- Public Key Directory
- Public Key Authority
- Certificate Authority

# **Digital Signature**

A cryptosystem uses the private and public keys of the receiver: a digital signature uses the private and public keys of the sender

#### **Services**

- Message Authentication
- Message Integrity
- Nonrepudiation

## **Attacks Types**

- Key Only Attack
- Known Message Attack
- Chosen Message Attack

## Forgery Types

- Existential Forgery
- Selective Forgery

## **Algorithms**

## **RSA Digital Signature**

- Signing
  - $S = M^d mod n$
- Verifying
  - $M' = S^e \mod n$

ullet If M'==M, accept

#### With Message Digest

- Signing
  - D = h(M) (Digest)
  - $S = D^d mod n$
- Verifying
  - $D' = S^e mod n$
  - If D' == h(M), accept

## **ElGamal Digital Signature**

- Public key  $(e_1,e_2,p)$ , Private key d
- Signing
  - $S_1 = e_1^r mod p$
  - $S_2 = (M dS_1)r^{-1}mod(p-1)$
- Verifying
  - $ullet V_1 = e_1^M mod \ p$
  - $ullet \ V_2 = e_2^{S_1} S_1^{S_2} mod \ p$
  - ullet If  $V_1 == V_2$ , accept

## Schnorr Digital Signature

- ullet Public key  $(e_1,e_2,p,q)$ , Private key d
- Signing
  - $S_1 = h(M \mid e_1^r mod p)$
  - $S_2 = r + dS_1 \mod q$
- Verifying
  - $ullet \ V = h(\ M \ | \ e_1^{S_1} e_2^{-S_2} mod \ p \ )$
  - If  $V == S_1$ , accept  $(S_1 \text{ is congruent to } V \ mod \ p)$

## **Digital Signature Standard**

- ullet Public key  $(e_1,e_2,p,q)$ , Private key d
- Signing
  - $\bullet \ \ S_1 = (e_1^r \ mod \ p) \ mod \ q$
  - $S_2 = (h(M) + dS_1) \ r^{-1} \ mod \ q$
- Verifying
  - $ullet \ V = (e_1^{h(M)S_2^{-1}}\ e_2^{S_1S_2^{-1}}\ mod\ p)\ mod\ q$
  - If  $V == S_1$ , accept  $(S_1$  is congruent to  $V \ mod \ p)$
- Properties:

- Faster computation wrt RSA
- Smaller signatures wrt ElGamal

## **Elliptic Curve Digital Signature**

# **Application**

- Time Stamped Signatures
  - Time stamped to prevent replay of documents
- Blind Signatures (David Chaum)
  - Signing without knowing content of message
  - Procedure
    - Blinding the message from Bob:  $B=M imes b^e mod\, n$  (e -> Alice Public Key, b -> Blinding Factor)
    - ullet Signing by Alice:  $S_{blind}=B^d\ mod\ n$
    - ullet Unblind by Bob:  $S=S_bb^{-1}\ mod\ n$