2017 Situation Report on International Migration

Migration in the Arab Region
and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

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Foreword

The story of migration in the Arab region is multi-faceted and varies in scope and definition between countries. However, it is above all a story of people. Their movements, whether voluntary or involuntary, regular or irregular, are part of the social, economic, environmental, cultural and political narratives of their societies. The story of migration in the Arab region is therefore also a story of regional development.

The *2017 Situation Report on International Migration* provides new insight into the critical nexus between migration and sustainable development. Building on the 2015 Report, it places the story of migration in the Arab region squarely within the framework of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It showcases migrants' potential to contribute to the development of their countries of origin and destination, and offers evidence and indicators that link migration to positive development outcomes.

In addition, the 2017 Report builds on the previous report in exploring the patterns and trends of migration in the Arab region, including the importance of labour migration, continuing population displacement, and the emergence of new channels of irregular migration.

Migration to the Arab region includes high levels of labour migration, with migrant workers in the region constituting around 12 per cent of the world's labour migrants. Migrants working in the region contribute to the economies of host countries, while also supporting development in their countries of origin. Nearly 30 per cent of global remittances were sent from the Arab region alone in 2014.

Around 26 million migrants from the Arab region live or work abroad. This diaspora contributes to the development of the region through investment, transfer of remittances, and stimulation of cultural, trade and social links between countries.

Displacement is still a common occurrence in the region, affecting more than 19 million refugees, asylum-seekers, internally-displaced persons, stateless persons and other persons of concern. The region comprises nearly one-third of the world's displaced persons, with Jordan and Lebanon hosting the highest number of refugees per capita in the world.

Harnessing the potential benefits of migration for development, upholding migrant protection and rights, and ensuring ethical and just recruitment are central objectives of global frameworks linking migration and development. Good migration governance and human-rights based policies that focus on the specific needs of groups and individuals are therefore vital to achieving development gains.

The critical implications of migration for sustainable development outcomes have been increasingly recognized at the international, regional and national levels. In 2016, for the first time at the global level, countries committed to developing a framework for cooperation on international migration to ensure that migration was humane and regular, benefitting both migrants and societies. In the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, States pledged to develop a global compact for safe orderly and regular migration, and a global compact

on refugees. Arab countries are actively contributing to the formulation of those compacts through regional consultations and representation at global negotiations. The compacts' goals are also being closely aligned with the 2030 Agenda, which includes unprecedented sustainable development targets related to migration.

Given its transnational nature, migration requires cooperation between countries, agencies, civil society actors and migrants to proactively promote safe, orderly and regular migration in the Arab region. We hope that the present report will inform discussions, commitments and policies to secure positive migration and development outcomes.

**Mohamed Ali Alhakim**

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Introduction

Migration plays a key role in sustainable development across the globe. If well-managed, human mobility can lead to considerable gains for migrants and can generate significant development for communities of origin and destination. If migration is poorly managed, however, it can impede sustainable development and place migrants in vulnerable situations, including human trafficking and smuggling, and drive them to use dangerous routes and modes of travel.

Recognizing the increasing numbers of migrants and refugees and the growing importance of human mobility in shaping the social and economic fabric of communities, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the 193 Member States of the United Nations in September 2015, stresses that human mobility plays an important role in the global development agenda. It calls for global action to ensure that all human beings can achieve dignity and equality, and enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives in a healthy and sustainable environment.

In September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly held its first high-level Summit for Refugees and Migrants, aimed at developing a global approach for governing international migration. The Summit resulted in the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, a major breakthrough expressing the political will of world leaders to save lives, protect rights and share responsibility on a global scale. The Declaration provides for two global compacts: the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, and the global compact on refugees. Currently under development, the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration contains a comprehensive framework on migration, and a list of issues to be addressed through international principles and commitments. The global compact on refugees aims to ease pressure on countries receiving refugees, and to foster conditions that enable refugees to voluntarily return to their countries of origin and protect their rights. The benefits and opportunities of safe, orderly and regular migration are substantial, but are often underestimated. The United Nations estimates that 244 million people (4 per cent of the world's population) are international migrants, and the development effects of human mobility are much greater than this number suggests, since many more people are affected economically, socially and politically by migration and displacement. Migration and displacement must be considered as countries strive for inclusive and sustainable development.

Diverse and complex migration and displacement dynamics in the Arab region provide opportunities and pose challenges for sustainable development and further illustrate the importance of a robust global framework to address migration issues. In 2016, the region hosted over 35 million international migrants: large numbers of labour migrants, especially in Gulf Cooperation Council countries; and over 8 million refugees, including 5.2 million Palestinians displaced since 1948 and their descendants, and more than 2 million Syrian refugees. Conflicts in the region have also led to internal displacement affecting over 16 million people, mainly in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. While the majority of those displaced within and across borders have remained in the Arab region, displacement has also greatly

affected neighbouring and distant regions. The Syrian conflict has resulted in over 5.6 million refugees since 2011. Refugees from Iraq, Somalia and the Sudan are also fleeing to other parts of the world. Large numbers of migrants transiting through the Arab region and across the Mediterranean have brought migration to the forefront of the political agenda in Europe and beyond.

The current situation in the Arab region requires actors and policymakers to adopt policies and strategies that respond to the realities of these migration dynamics. Undoubtedly, migration will continue to be a strong demographic force in the Arab region. Border walls and restrictive legal and policy regimes cannot stop migration or refugee movements, but rather make migrants' journeys more dangerous and less beneficial for everyone. Arab countries must therefore adopt governance schemes that ensure the protection of migrants and their families, enhance the benefits of human mobility while decreasing the associated risks and costs, and provide safe channels for people to migrate and use their skills.

Within the context of global processes addressing links between migration and sustainable development, the *2017 Situation Report on International Migration* highlights the importance of good migration governance in advancing the rights and wellbeing of migrants, and in facilitating sustainable development outcomes for migrants and their communities of origin and destination. It stresses the importance of migration in a range of development areas, as illustrated by the inclusion of human mobility in recent global strategies and agreements on urbanization, climate change, disaster risk reduction and financing for development.

The present publication builds on the first edition of the *Situation Report on International Migration*, published in 2015, and provides an updated overview of contemporary migration trends, patterns and policy developments in

the Arab region. In addition, it examines the contributions of international migration to the region's economic and social development, especially in the context of ongoing and recent global processes, such as the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, the global compact on refugees and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Chapter 1 provides an update on the latest migration and displacement trends and figures at the regional and subregional levels. Chapter 2 gives an overview of national policy developments in international migration in the Arab region between April 2015 and March 2017. It also presents international efforts on migration governance involving Arab countries, including interregional, regional and subregional processes and bilateral cooperation. Chapter 3 considers human mobility in the Arab region within the context of current global processes and frameworks on migration governance and sustainable development. It examines the link between international migration in the region and the 2030 Agenda, which recognizes that migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance to the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, thus requiring coherent and comprehensive responses. It also focuses on labour migration targets under the SDGs involving labour migrants' recruitment, their rights and remittances. The chapter sets out policy and programming options, and methods for collecting meaningful data to monitor progress of the migration-related SDGs.

To facilitate the discussion, the Arab region has been divided into four subregions: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; the Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; the Mashreq: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, State of Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic; and Arab least developed countries (LDCs): the Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen.

1. Overview of Migration Trends in the Arab Region

"Migration is one of the main coping and survival mechanisms available to those affected by environmental degradation and climate change."

Sylvia Lopez-Ekra, Chief of Mission at International Organization for Migration - Ghana

1. Overview of Migration Trends in the Arab Region

The present chapter analyses demographic, migration and displacement data and examines migration within the Arab region to inform and encourage evidence-based policy interventions. It begins with an overview of migration and displacement dynamics and trends in the region as a whole, followed by an analysis of the four major subregions[1] and an overview of remittance flows to and from the Arab region. Key trends and issues shaping recent migration and displacement patterns and flows in the region are highlighted in text boxes.

Data used in the present chapter are largely from international sources. Information on migrant stocks (including countries of origin and destination, age and sex) is drawn from a dataset entitled Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision, established by the United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). For the purpose of analysis, DESA defines international migrants as either foreign-born or foreign citizens, giving precedence to place of birth when data are available. In the Arab region, foreign citizenship is the predominant criteria for determining international migrants.[2] DESA figures include refugee numbers; however, to present the most up-to-date and comprehensive information on refugee trends in the region, the present report uses data supplied by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Numbers and profiles of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are obtained from UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2016 and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) database, respectively. For Syrian refugees, relevant UNHCR operational data have also been used.

Subsection D of this chapter uses remittance data from the 2015 World Bank's Annual Remittance Data (April 2016 update) and bilateral remittance data from the World Bank's Bilateral Remittance Matrix (April 2016 update). It should be noted that remittance data from those two sources might vary somewhat, as the World Bank estimates them on a slightly different basis.

A. Migration and displacement in Arab countries

Migration and displacement are prominent and dynamic features of the Arab region, which hosts roughly 14 per cent of global international migrant stocks (refugees and other international migrants), including those originating from within the region and those arriving from outside the region. The size of the migrant population has increased by 150 per cent, from under 15 million in 1990 to nearly 35 million by 2015 (figure 1). Protracted conflicts in numerous Arab countries have led to high levels of displacement in the region. The region is also characterized by high levels of labour migration. Around 12 per cent of the world's labour migrants are in the Arab region, according to estimates from 2013.[3] GCC countries in particular are a major hub for labour migrants, with migrant workers comprising an estimated 67 per cent of all workers in the subregion.[4] While Maghreb countries have long been exporters of labour, primarily to Europe, countries in the subregion also attract labour from other Maghreb countries and sub-Saharan Africa. The subregion remains a common transit area for mixed migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. Within the Mashreq, labour

Figure 1. Migrant stocks in Arab countries (millions), 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 2. Migrant stocks in top 10 countries of destination in the Arab region, 2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.
Note: The arrows in figure 2 indicate whether the migrant stock has increased or decreased since 2010.

Figure 3. Migrants as a percentage of the total population in the Arab region and in GCC countries, 1990-2015

- ■ Migrants as percentage of the population in all Arab countries
- ■ Migrants as percentage of the population in GCC countries

Source: DESA, 2015b.
Note: In 2015, total population in the Arab region was 392,414,353; in GCC countries, it was 52,692,583.

Figure 4. Migrant stocks in the top five countries of destination in the Arab region (millions), 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

circulation has been a long-standing trend, alongside persistent displacement within and across borders.

Migration and displacement have increased in the region, particularly migration to GCC countries (figure 3). Migration and displacement in Mashreq countries increased by 211 per cent and 142 per cent, respectively, between 1990 and 2015.[5] With over 10.2 million

migrants in 2015, Saudi Arabia has remained the largest host country for migrants in the Arab region since 1990. However, migration to Saudi Arabia has grown at a slower rate than several of the other top host countries in the subregion, most notably the United Arab Emirates, whose migrant stock rose by over 500 per cent between 1990 and 2015, reaching 8.1 million (figure 4). Other countries hosting large numbers of migrants since 1990 are

Figure 5. Migrants as a percentage of the total population in countries with the highest migrant concentration in the Arab region, 1990-2015

Legend: United Arab Emirates | Qatar | Kuwait | Bahrain | Oman | Jordan

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Jordan (3.11 million), Kuwait (2.86 million) and Lebanon (1.99 million) (figure 2).[6]

In the United Arab Emirates, migrants comprised 88 per cent of the total population in 2015. In Qatar and Kuwait, they made up 75 per cent and 73 per cent of the population, respectively; and 51 per cent of the population in Bahrain in the same year (figure 5).

India is by far the largest single country of origin for migrants in the Arab region, with Indians representing nearly a quarter of all migrants in the region (8.2 million), most of them in GCC countries. South Asian countries[7] account for 44 per cent of migrants in the Arab region, while migrants from South East Asia[8] constitute 10 per cent, with many Asian migrants concentrated in GCC countries. A further 37 per cent of migrants and refugees in the region originate from other Arab countries, including Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic (figure 6), a share which has remained roughly similar since 1990.[9] According to 2015 DESA data, Palestine is the largest Arab country of origin (3.5 million), followed by the Syrian Arab Republic (3 million). The numbers from the Syrian Arab Republic have increased significantly since

2010, because of the ongoing conflict in the country (figure 7).

The number of female migrants in the Arab

Figure 6. Main countries of origin for migrants in the Arab region, 2015

India	8.2 million
Palestine	3.5 million
Syrian Arab Republic	3.0 million
Bangladesh	2.8 million
Pakistan	2.8 million
Other Arab countries	6.4 million
Rest of the world	7.9 million

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 7. Migrant stocks in the Arab region by top countries of origin (millions), 1990-2015

India

Palestine
Syrian Arab Republic
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Egypt

Source: DESA, 2015b.

region has doubled from 5.6 million in 1990 to 11.6 million in 2015. However, the proportion of females in the total stock of migrants decreased from 39 per cent to 33 per cent over the same time period (figure 8). The data also show large differences in the proportion of female migrants between subregions and by country of origin. For example, although almost 60 per cent of all female migrants to the Arab region are in GCC countries, their proportion in this subregion was only 38 per cent of the total migrant population in 2015. In contrast, women make up nearly half of all migrants in the Mashreq (figure 9).

The high proportion of women among migrants from Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic (47.7 per cent and 48.3 per cent, respectively) can be explained by the fact that displacement, prominent among these populations, often tends to involve more women and children (figure 10) than the typically more male-dominated labour migration flows characterizing most other migration within and to the Arab region.[10] Figure 10 shows the disproportionate representation of working-age male migrants in the Arab region as a whole.

Figure 8. Share of female migrants in the total migrant stock in the Arab region, 1990-2015

Millions

%

Total migrant stock
Female migrant stock
Female migrant stock as a percentage of total migrant stock

Source: DESA, 2015b.

1. Displacement as a result of conflict

The Arab region hosts more than 19 million displaced persons, of which over 3 million are refugees[11] and more than 16 million are IDPs. In addition to these figures, there are

5.2 million Palestinian refugees in the region registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).[12]

The number of refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs, returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and other persons of concern from the Syrian Arab Republic is at an all-time high (12,133,722).[13] The Syrian Arab Republic has

Figure 9. Proportion of female migrants as a percentage of the total migrant population by age group in Arab subregions, 2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table 1. Female migrants in the Arab region by country of origin and share of total migrant population, 2015

Country of origin	Female migrants	Female migrants as a percentage of total migrant population
India	1,961,255	23.9
Palestine	1,662,291	47.7
Syrian Arab Republic	1,489,374	48.3
Egypt	889,664	31.5
Indonesia	758,333	27.0
Pakistan	676,122	25.2
Philippines	488,950	26.8
Bangladesh	465,386	30.6
Yemen	298,977	32.8
Iraq	253,595	37.8
Sri Lanka	248,664	40.0
Sudan	213,777	35.5
Somalia	212,546	37.9
Jordan	201,804	38.0
Nepal	136,750	27.3

Source: DESA, 2015b.

generated the largest number of IDPs and refugees in the world, with over 6.5 million IDPs and 5.3 million refugees as of mid-2016.

Figure 10. Distribution of male and female migrants in the Arab region by age, 2015

Working age males: 79% of total male migrant stock
Working age females: 62% of total female migrant stock

Source: DESA, 2015b.
Note: 'Working age' refers to ages 15-64.

Countries within the Arab region hosting the highest number of refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic are Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Together, these countries host over 2 million Syrian refugees, more than 13 per cent of all refugees worldwide, not including Palestinians. In Lebanon, Syrian refugees (over 1 million) constitute over 17.7 per cent of the country's total population.[14]

Most Palestinian refugees are concentrated in Jordan (2,117,361) and in Palestine (2,074,167). A significant number of Palestinian refugees also resides in Lebanon (449,957). Statistics for Palestinian refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic estimate that 450,000 Palestinian refugees were still residing in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2017. Over 95 per cent (430,000) are in critical need of sustained humanitarian assistance. Almost 280,000 are internally displaced, and an estimated 43,000 are trapped in hard-to-reach or inaccessible locations. Over 120,000 Palestinian refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic have fled the country, including more than 31,000 to Lebanon and over 16,000 to Jordan. Many Palestinian refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic who fled to Jordan and Lebanon find themselves in precarious and marginalized situations because of their uncertain legal status, with limited social protection.[15]

Box 1. Internally displaced persons

Around 41 per cent of all people internally displaced globally due to conflict and generalized violence were living in the Arab region at the end of 2016, totalling over 16 million.[a] More than 2.3 million people were newly internally displaced in the region over the course of 2016, accounting for one-third of all new conflict-related internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. Most new internal displacement in the region was in the Syrian Arab Republic (824,000), Iraq (659,000) and Yemen (478,000). New internal displacement in the region has decreased relative to 2015, during which more than 5 million people were newly displaced due to conflict. In 2016, the Democratic Republic of the Congo overtook the Syrian Arab Republic as the country generating the largest number of conflict-related IDPs.[b]

A quarter of all IDPs due to conflict globally were in the Mashreq subregion at the end of 2016, with over 9.6 million IDPs, mostly in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. By the end of 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic had more IDPs than any other country in the world (over 6.3 million), many of them having endured multiple displacements. Humanitarian access has been a significant challenge and, as at December 2016, roughly 4.9 million people were living in hard-to-reach areas, including almost 1 million in besieged areas.[c]

Internally displaced persons due to conflict and generalized violence in the Arab region (stock at year end), 2012-2016

Country	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Syrian Arab Republic	3,000,000	6,500,000	7,600,000	6,600,000	6,325,978
Sudan	3,000,000	2,426,700	3,120,000	3,264,286	3,320,000
Iraq	2,100,000	2,100,000	3,276,000	3,290,310	3,034,614
Yemen	385,000	307,000	334,090	2,509,068	1,973,994
Somalia	1,350,000	1,100,000	1,106,751	1,223,000	1,106,751
Libya	50,000	59,400	400,000	500,000	303,608
Palestine	144,500	146,000	275,000	221,425	193,277

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2016a.

In Iraq, more than 1.6 million people were newly displaced over the course of 2015 and 2016, with an estimated 4.3 million internally displaced in the country by mid-2016.[d] In 2016, an estimated 1 million people returned home, some to unsafe or demolished areas. Military campaigns to regain government control over territories controlled by the so-called Islamic State have led to new waves of displacement in the country, including over 350,000 people displaced due to the Mosul operation launched in October 2016.[e] For nearly 15 years, Iraq has been among the top 10 countries worldwide with the highest levels of conflict-related internal displacement.

High levels of internal displacement owing to conflict and violence also persist in the Arab least developed countries (LDCs), namely Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen. The subregion hosted over 6.4 million IDPs at the end of 2016, about 16 per cent of the global total of conflict-related internal displacement.[f]

New internal displacement in the Arab LDCs was lower in 2016 than in 2015, largely due to a decrease in Yemen with 478,000 new displacements in the country in 2016 as opposed to 2.2 million in the previous year. However, the volatile situation in Yemen, involving high rates of return and multiple displacements, means that the situation on the ground is not adequately reflected in this lower number. By mid-2016, over 2 million people were internally displaced within Yemen.[g] According to the Task Force on Population Movement, 10.3 per cent of the population of Yemen either remain displaced or have returned to their area of origin since the start of the conflict in March 2015.[h]

A country with historically high levels of internal displacement, the Sudan hosts the largest number of IDPs in the Arab LDCs, with over 3.3 million as at the end of 2016. In Somalia, over 1.1 million people remain internally displaced due to conflict-related causes, with 112,000 newly displaced in 2016.[i]

Internal displacement is not a typical characteristic of the Maghreb subregion, but the resurgence of conflict and political instability in Libya in 2014 has caused hundreds of thousands to be displaced from their homes. As at the end of 2016, an estimated 304,000 people were internally displaced in Libya.[j] Although fighting in parts of the country continues to prompt new displacement, thousands of people have also been able to return.[k]

Internal displacement due to conflict and generalized violence (stock percentages), 2016

Syrian Arab Republic		6.3 million
Sudan		3.3 million
Iraq		3.0 million
Yemen		2.0 million
Somalia		1.1 million
Libya		0.3 million
Palestine		0.2 million
Other Arab countries		0.1 million
Rest of the world		23.9 million

Source: Global Internal Displacement Database (IDMC), 2016a.

In addition to conflict-related internal displacement, over 240,000 people were newly internally displaced due to natural disasters in the Arab region in 2016, the vast majority of them in the Arab LDCs (98 per cent): 123,000 in the Sudan, 70,000 in Somalia, and 36,000 in Yemen.[l]

Source: Compiled by IOM.
[a] Calculations based on data compiled by IDMC from a variety of sources.
[b] IDMC, 2017.
[c] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2017.
[d] UNHCR, 2017b.
[e] IOM, 2017a.
[f] IDMC, 2016a.
[g] UNHCR, 2017b.
[h] IOM and UNHCR, 2017.
[i] IDMC, 2016a.
[j] IOM, 2017c.
[k] IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, Libya. Available from www.globaldtm.info/libya/ (accessed 14 May 2017).
[l] IDMC, 2016a.

B. Migration and displacement from Arab countries

Over the past 25 years, the number of migrants and refugees from Arab countries has grown steadily. In 2015, an estimated 26,052,294 people from Arab countries were living abroad, both within and outside the region – almost 5.7 million more than in 2010 and almost 15 million more than in 1990 (figure 12). This recent upsurge is mostly explained by the movement of migrants from the Mashreq, many of them refugees. About half of all those moving from Arab countries remained in the region: this proportion rose from 42 per cent in 1990 to 52 per cent in 2010, and then slightly decreased to 50 per cent in 2015 (figure 11). In 2015, the top three counties of destination for migrants from Arab countries were Jordan (3,034,795), France (2,922,460) and Saudi Arabia (2,602,375).[16]

Most migration from Arab countries is driven by displacement or search for work. A large share of migrants from the Arab region travels to GCC countries, mostly for temporary or long-term employment. For instance, most migrants from Egypt and Jordan are in

GCC countries (73 per cent and 66 per cent, respectively).[17] Other destinations, such as Libya, have also been popular among Arab labour migrants, although the current Libyan conflict has slightly decreased those trends. Labour migration to outside the Arab region is also prominent.

Figure 11. Total number of migrants from Arab countries and the share remaining in the region, 1990-2015

Millions   %

- Number of migrants from Arab region
- Number of intra-regional Arab migrants
- Proportion of intra-regional Arab migrants

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Most migrants from the Arab region originate in the Mashreq, comprising 57 per cent of all stocks from the Arab region (14,809,489). Nearly 21 per cent of migrants from the Arab region are from the Maghreb, almost 20 per cent are from the Arab LDCs, and barely 3 per cent are from GCC countries.[18]

The main countries of origin in the Arab region in 2015 were the Syrian Arab Republic, with approximately 5.3 million migrants including refugees, followed by Palestine with 3.6 million,[19] and Egypt with 3.3 million. Egypt has overtaken Morocco as the Arab country with the third largest population abroad for the first time in 25 years (figure 13).

The number of Syrian refugees has grown significantly, rising by over 350 per cent between 2010 and 2015 due to the ongoing conflict and resulting in large-scale displacement internally and across the country's borders. Prior to the conflict, the Syrian Arab Republic was a net immigration country, with over 1.6 million migrants in 2010 (positive net migration stock of over 560,000).[20]

Crisis and conflicts in various Arab countries, such as Iraq, Libya, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia, the Sudan and

Figure 12. Migration from the Arab region by subregion (millions), 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 13. Top five countries of origin in the Arab region (millions), 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table 2. Total refugees from Arab region by country of origin, 2013-2016

Country of origin	Mid-2013	Mid-2014	Mid-2015	Mid-2016
Algeria	3,752	3,691	3,541	3,622
Bahrain	249	285	373	424
Comoros	473	528	562	571
Djibouti	641	809	921	1,113
Egypt	9,456	13,050	16,105	18,672
Iraq	409,181	426,114	377,747	279,955
Jordan	1,588	1,633	1,767	1,903
Kuwait	935	990	978	932
Lebanon	3,652	4,238	4,329	4,487
Libya	3,089	3,353	4,317	6,999
Mauritania	34,284	34,340	34,121	36,492
Morocco	1,093	1,345	1,559	2,033
Oman	24	26	31	41
Palestine	96,801	96,658	97,241	98,767
Qatar	15	17	21	21
Saudi Arabia	439	600	629	752
Somalia	1,130,939	1,080,788	1,105,618	1,097,757
Sudan	632,014	670,332	640,919	638,986
Syrian Arab Republic	1,888,823	3,029,465	4,194,554	5,303,613
Tunisia	1,250	1,368	1,484	1,625
United Arab Emirates	74	88	93	106
Yemen	2,228	2,514	5,832	15,657

Source: UNHCR, 2016e.
Note: Data exclude 5.27 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA.

Figure 14. Top five countries of origin for refugees from the Arab region, mid-2016

Syrian Arab Republic — 71%
Somalia — 15%
Sudan — 8%
Iraq — 4%
Palestine — 1%
Rest of the Arab region — 1%

Syrian Arab Republic	5,303,613
Somalia	1,097,757
Sudan	638,986
Iraq	279,955
Palestine	98,767
Rest of the Arab region	95,450

Source: UNHCR, 2016e.

Yemen, have led to a significant increase in displacement. The Arab region has been by far the greatest contributor to record high displacement globally (table 2). As at mid-2016, nearly half (46 per cent) of all refugees worldwide originated from the Arab region, with the largest numbers from Iraq, Somalia, the Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic (figure 14). Syrians alone account for one-third of all refugees globally.

While most refugees from Arab countries have remained in the region, significant numbers have fled to Europe, Africa and North America. The European Union received over 1 million first-time asylum applicants from the Arab region between 2015 and 2016 (roughly 550,000 and 540,000, respectively), a large increase from 41,000 in 2010.[21] Asylum seekers from the Arab region represented 45 per cent of all those applying for asylum in the European Union in 2016, with Syrians accounting for almost 28 per cent of all applicants, and over 62 per cent of applicants from the Arab region. The other main

Table 3. First-time asylum applicants to the European Union from the Arab region as a share of applicants from the region and as a share of all applicants to the European Union, 2016

Country of citizenship	First time applicants	As a percentage of applicants from the Arab region	As a percentage of applicants from all regions
Syrian Arab Republic	334,830	62.3	27.8
Iraq	127,000	23.6	10.5
Somalia	18,960	3.5	1.6
Morocco	11,190	2.1	0.9
Algeria	11,165	0.9	0.9
Sudan	11,085	2.1	0.9
Lebanon	6,155	1.1	0.5
Egypt	4,510	0.8	0.4
Libya	4,320	0.8	0.4
Palestine	2,495	0.5	0.2
Other Arab countries	6,140	1.1	0.5
Total	537,850	100	45

Source: Eurostat, n.d.

Table 4. Main European Union destinations for refugees and asylum seekers from the Arab region, 2016

Country	Total refugee population	Total first-time asylum applicants 2016
Germany	317,387	392,120
Sweden	112,146	9,625
Netherlands	56,737	7,270
Greece	43,794	34,345
Austria	32,168	15,425
France	29,721	19,680
United Kingdom	28,803	9,180
Italy	26,249	8,895

Sources: UNHCR, 2016e; Eurostat, n.d.

nationalities from the Arab region were Iraqis, followed by Somalis and Moroccans (table 3).

Germany is the top destination in Europe for asylum seekers from the Arab region, receiving 73 per cent of all first-time applicants from Arab countries to the European Union in 2016 (table 4). Other main recipients of asylum applications in 2016 were Greece (6.4 per cent), France (3.7 per cent) and Austria (2.9 per cent).

C. Migration and displacement in Arab countries, by subregion

1. Gulf Cooperation Council countries

(a) Migration to GCC countries

In 2015, GCC countries hosted the largest migrant population in the Arab region, and one of the largest worldwide. The total migrant stock in GCC countries of 25.4 million has more than tripled since 1990 from 8.2 million, largely driven by labour migration to the subregion. Saudi Arabia hosts the largest number of migrants, reaching 10.2 million in 2015 (also ranking fourth among countries of destination worldwide),[22] followed by the United Arab

Emirates with 8.1 million from around 2.4 million in 2000. Not only do GCC countries host the largest migrant population in the Arab region, but the concentration of migrants in the GCC population is greater than anywhere else in the world. The proportion of migrants among the total GCC population reached 48 per cent in 2015 (3 per cent more than in 2010, and 13 per cent more than in 1990). With the exception of Oman (41.4 per cent) and Saudi Arabia (32.2 per cent), migrants make up the majority of the population in GCC countries. The share of migrants among the total population was greatest in the United Arab Emirates (88.4 per cent) and Qatar (75.5 per cent). The emirate of Dubai is the most extreme example, with migrants constituting 91 per cent of the population.[23] Over 85 per cent are economically active, indicating that most of Dubai's labour is performed by migrants. Estimates suggest that migrants comprised roughly 67 per cent of all workers in the GCC subregion as of 2013.[24]

Most migrants in GCC countries come from Asia. In 2015, 8.2 million migrants were from India, 2.8 million from Bangladesh and another 2.8 million from Pakistan. A smaller share originates from within the Arab region. In 2015,

Figure 15. Main countries of origin for migration to GCC countries, 2015

India	8.2 million
Bangladesh	2.8 million
Pakistan	2.8 million
Egypt	2.4 million
Indonesia	1.8 million
Other Arab countries	3.0 million
Rest of the world	2.5 million

Source: DESA, 2015b.

21 per cent of migrants in GCC countries were from other Arab countries, mainly Egypt (2.4 million), Yemen (871,375) and the Syrian Arab Republic (689,975) (figure 15).

While the number of female migrants to GCC countries increased between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of female migrants among the total migrant population decreased from 33 per cent in 1990 to 28 per cent in 2015 (figure 16). In 2015, 64 per cent of all migrants in the GCC were working-age males (15-64 year of age) (figure 17).

(b) Migration from GCC countries

In 2015, the number of migrants from GCC countries was 697,435 (accounting for 2.6 per cent of all migrants from the Arab region). Although still small, this number is more than double what it was in 1990 (302,863). Saudi Arabia is the largest country of origin, with 270,029 nationals living abroad in 2015, mainly in Libya, the United Kingdom and the

Figure 16. Share of female migrants among the total migrant stock in GCC countries, 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 17. Age structure of migrants in GCC countries, 2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Box 2. Refugees in Gulf Cooperation Council countries

No Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country is party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and none have national legal frameworks specific to refugee and asylum considerations. In general, persons fleeing persecution and conflict are treated like other third-country nationals, and are subject to national immigration laws that usually require non-nationals to secure a sponsor if they wish to seek entry and employment. However, GCC countries do recognize the challenges of individuals fleeing persecution or conflict and display a level of tolerance and humanitarian consideration, including respect for the principle of non-refoulement. For example, persons entering Saudi Arabia on visit visas are normally prohibited from taking up any kind of employment, but Syrians and Yemeni holders of visit visas might be permitted to work for a limited period subject to renewal. Other examples include long-staying Palestinians in Saudi Arabia who can access free tertiary education and an estimated 250,000 Rohingya whose status was regularized by Saudi authorities in 2012 for an initial four-year period. Nevertheless, individuals fleeing conflict and persecution are subject to government scrutiny and might face obstacles in securing or maintaining sponsors and renewing their visas, particularly if they do not hold a valid travel document.

The number of persons fleeing refugee-producing countries to the GCC subregion can only be estimated using GCC governments' immigration data, since only few refugees in GCC countries are registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). For example, Saudi Arabia stated that it had hosted 2.5 million Syrians since the start of the conflict in 2011,[a] but the ability to verify that number, the methodology used to calculate it, or how many Syrians were resident at any given period is limited. In 2016, the United Arab Emirates announced its intention to admit 15,000 vulnerable Syrians over the next five years.

From 2015 to March 2017, only 2,290 persons fleeing persecution from over 20 countries from the Arab region and beyond, including Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, were formally registered by UNHCR in GCC countries: 959 in 2015, 1,057 in 2016, and 274 in 2017 (as at March).[b] Although the number of Syrian and other refugees formally registered with UNHCR appears to be relatively low, this does not mean that other persons with protection needs do not exist in the GCC subregion.

Source: Compiled by UNHCR.
[a] Reuters, 2015.
[b] UNHCR, 2016d.

United States. Saudi Arabia is followed by Kuwait with 187,871 nationals living abroad (27 per cent of migrants from the subregion) and the United Arab Emirates with 136,557 (19 per cent of migrants from the subregion) (table AII.5).

In 2015, most migrants from GCC countries migrated within the Arab region (45 per cent) or to North America (23 per cent) and Europe (16 per cent) (figure 18). While migration to other countries in the Arab region has increased by 53 per cent since 1990, migration to Europe and North America has grown by

over 500 and 450 per cent, respectively, over the same period. In 2015, the top countries of destination for GCC migrants were the United States of America (99,127), Palestine (77,777) and the United Kingdom (74,915) (figure 19).

Between 1990 and 2010, the percentage of female migrants from GCC countries decreased for all countries except the United Arab Emirates. The period 2010-2015, however, shows an increase in the proportion of female migrants. In 2015, the percentage of females was highest for migrants from Qatar, reaching almost 50 per cent. Migrants from Bahrain

Figure 18. Main regions of destination for migrants from GCC countries (thousands), 1990-2015

Legend:
- Arab region
- Europe
- Australia and New Zealand
- Northern America
- South and South East Asia
- Other

Source: DESA, 2015b.
Note: Except for the Arab region, other regional groupings in figure 18 follow DESA categories. For example, Europe refers to the broad region, not the smaller group of European Union countries.

Figure 19. Main countries of destination for migrants from GCC countries, 2015

United States of America	99,127
Palestine	77,777
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	74,915
United Arab Emirates	71,263
Canada	62,513
Other Arab countries	162,845
Rest of the world	148,845

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 20. Percentage of female migrants from GCC countries, 1990-2015

Legend: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

were least likely to be women, with the share of females among the total migrant stock decreasing from 52 per cent in 1990 to 30 per cent in 2015 (figure 20).

There are few refugees originating from the GCC subregion compared with those leaving other Arab subregions. As of mid-2016, the main countries of origin for refugees within the GCC subregion were Kuwait with 932, Saudi Arabia with 752, and Bahrain with 424. There were only 106 refugees from the United Arab Emirates, 41 from Oman and 21 from Qatar as at March 2017.[25]

2. Maghreb

(a) Migration to the Maghreb

The Maghreb hosted 1,158,749 migrants in 2015 (1.3 per cent of the total subregional population). According to available data, Libya hosted the largest number of migrants (771,146) followed by Algeria (242,391) in 2015. Libya also had the highest proportion of migrants as a share of the total population at 12.3 per cent, while migrants represented less than 1 per cent of the total population in each of the other Maghreb countries (table AII.2).

Statistical data on migration in the Maghreb vary across reputable sources. According to DESA data, 71 per cent of migrants in the Maghreb came from within the Arab region in 2015, mainly from Palestine (343,650), Somalia (125,349) and Iraq (84,490). Migrants from countries outside the Arab region mostly came from France, totalling 43,936, with a large share likely to be returning diaspora (figure 21).[26] Excluding Somalis, DESA data show insignificant numbers of sub-Saharan migrants in the Maghreb. Other sources suggest that there are high numbers; for instance, the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in Libya suggests significant presence of various African nationalities, including Egyptians, Chadians, Nigerians, Sudanese and Malians.[27]

Figure 21. Main countries of origin for migrants and refugees to the Maghreb, 2015

Palestine	343,650
Somalia	125,349
Western Sahara	90,939
Iraq	84,490
France	43,936
Other Arab countries	271,879
Rest of the world	198,506

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 22. Share of female migrants among total migrant stock in the Maghreb, 1990-2015

Total migrant stock
Female migrant stock
Female migrant stock as a percentage of total migrant stock

Source: DESA, 2015b.

The countries of the Maghreb include countries of origin and destination for migrants, as well as transit countries, with particularly large movements to and through Libya (box 3). Displacement from Libya has also grown in response to ongoing insecurity and conflict in the country since 2011, with thousands of Libyans now in Tunisia and other neighbouring countries.[28] In addition to those who have fled the country, nearly 300,000 people were estimated to be internally displaced within Libya in May 2017.[29]

While the number of female migrants in the Maghreb slightly increased between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of female migrants among the total population decreased from 46 per cent to 35 per cent over the same period (figure 22). In 2015, working age men accounted for 52 per cent of all migrants in the Maghreb (figure 23).

As at mid-2016, the Maghreb subregion hosted 108,536 refugees, with most located in Algeria (94,219). Libya had 9,300 refugees, while Morocco and Tunisia hosted 4,329 and 688 refugees, respectively.[30]

While internal displacement is not typical in the Maghreb subregion, conflict and political instability in Libya has caused a significant increase in the number of internally displaced. As at March 2017, although 228,000 displaced persons had returned home since 2011, an estimated 257,000 were still internally displaced.[31]

(b) Migration from the Maghreb

In 2015, migrants from the Maghreb totalled over 5 million. This number amounts to 21 per cent of all migrants and refugees from the Arab region, making the Maghreb the second largest subregion of origin after the Mashreq. However, migration from the Maghreb grew at a slower rate than that of other Arab subregions. While the number of those moving

Figure 23. Age structure of migrants in the Maghreb, 2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

from the other Arab subregions more than doubled between 1990 and 2015, numbers of migrants from the Maghreb increased by 78 per cent, from 3,020,934 in 1990 to 5,391,079 in 2015 (figure 24).

In 2015, most migrants from the Maghreb originated from Morocco (2,834,641) and Algeria (1,763,771), representing 53 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively, of all migrants from the subregion (table AII.6).

Europe has consistently been the main destination for migrants from the Maghreb based on data from 1990 onwards, with the main countries of destination being France (51 per cent), Spain (14 per cent) and Italy (11 per cent) (figure 25). Much of this migration is driven by search for work, education or family reunification.

Female migrants made up 40-48 per cent of all migrants and refugees from the Maghreb between 1990 and 2015. Libyan migrants were

Box 3. The Maghreb as a transit subregion

The Maghreb subregion remains a key transit point for sub-Saharan Africans, particularly those passing through Libya and the Central Mediterranean to Europe. In 2016, over 181,000 migrants and refugees arrived in Italy, about 90 per cent of them departing from Libya, with the rest leaving mainly from Egypt.[a] At the time of writing, numbers for 2017 indicated a slight decrease in migration across the Central Mediterranean compared with the previous year, with almost 100,000 arrivals in Italy as at September 2017.[b] While migration from North Africa across the Mediterranean is not a new trend, numbers increased in 2014 with over 170,000 arrivals in Italy, up more than 270 per cent from the year before.[c] While absolute numbers have remained high over the past several years, the composition of nationalities has shifted considerably (table below). Syrians and Eritreans were the predominant nationalities of migrants in 2014, together making up 45 per cent of all arrivals in Italy. At over 42,000, Syrians alone accounted for 25 per cent of all arrivals in Italy that year. In 2015, however, Syrians began crossing Turkey to reach Greece, with nearly half a million arriving in Greece in 2015.[d] In contrast, departures of Syrians from Libya slowed to just 7,500 in 2015, and 1,200 in 2016. The number of Eritreans increased in 2015, but fell to nearly half the 2015 figure in 2016 (from nearly 40,000 to just over 20,000), a trend which is continuing into 2017. The numbers of Somali and Sudanese migrants crossing the Mediterranean have also decreased in 2016 and 2017.[e]

Maritime arrivals to Italy by country of origin, 2014-2016

	2014		2015		2016	
	Country of origin	As a percentage of total arrivals	Country of origin	As a percentage of total arrivals	Country of origin	As a percentage of total arrivals
	Syrian Arab Republic	25	Eritrea	25	Nigeria	21
	Eritrea	20	Nigeria	14	Eritrea	11
	Nigeria	5	Somalia	8	Guinea	7
	Gambia	5	Sudan	6	Ivory Coast	7
	Palestine	4	Gambia	5	Gambia	7
Total arrivals	170,100		153,842		181,436	

Source: IOM, 2017f.

Meanwhile, arrivals of West Africans in Italy have surged, with Nigerians as the top nationality in 2016 and into 2017. In addition to West Africans and Eritreans, other nationalities arriving in Italy in 2016 included Sudanese, Bangladeshis and Somalis, with the number of Bangladeshis particularly increasing in the first half of 2017. While there was speculation that movement from the Eastern Mediterranean would shift to the Central Mediterranean following the signing of a statement between the European Union and Turkey in early 2016, this does not appear to have happened as the number of migrants traversing the Central Mediterranean did not increase in 2016.

Migrants face great hardship and danger on their journeys to and within North Africa, and during sea crossings. On the trip to Libya, reports show that migrants are often crammed into overcrowded vehicles, and left without food and water by smugglers. They are sometimes stranded in the desert as a result of vehicles breaking down, falling out of crowded vehicles, or being left behind when becoming ill. Numerous

reports document abuse, torture, bonded labour and arbitrary detention of migrants in Libya.[f] There are no reliable estimates of deaths during land journeys, but anecdotal evidence suggests fatalities are common.[g] Crossing the Mediterranean presents further risk; it is estimated that over 13,000 people have drowned trying to cross the Central and Western Mediterranean since 2014.[h]

In addition to migration through the Central Mediterranean, Morocco has also been a transit point for North African and sub-Saharan migrants and for Syrian refugees crossing to Spain. While numbers are generally much lower than the Central Mediterranean, the route has become more popular in the past two years with more than 10,200 migrants detected in 2016, and with over 10,000 arrivals in Spain as at September 2017.[i]

Source: Compiled by IOM.
[a] IOM, 2017f. All arrivals data to Italy have been provided to IOM by the Italian Ministry of Interior.
[b] UNHCR, 2017c.
[c] IOM, 2017f. Italian Ministry of Interior for data on arrivals to Italy.
[d] Ibid. Arrivals data from Greek authorities.
[e] IOM, 2017f. All arrivals data to Italy have been provided to IOM by the Italian Ministry of Interior.
[f] United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2016.
[g] IOM, 2017e.
[h] Data refer to deaths in the Central Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean from January 2014 to early September 2017. Available from http://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean (accessed 12 September 2017).
[i] Frontex, 2017.

Figure 24. Number of migrants from the Maghreb by region of destination (millions), 1990-2015

Non-Arab Africa · Arab Africa · Arab Asia · Non-Arab Asia · Europe · Latin America · Northern America · Oceania

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 25. Main countries of destination for migrants from the Maghreb, 2015

France	2,748,071
Spain	758,806
Italy	591,602
Israel	249,609
Germany	183,627
Other Arab countries	96,405
Rest of the world	762,959

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 26. Female migrants as a percentage of total migrant stock from the Mashreq, 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

the most likely to be female, with women constituting 47-48 per cent of the total Libyan migrant stock outside the country (figure 26). Tunisia had the smallest percentage of female migrants, with a low of 40 per cent in 1990 and a high of 43 per cent in 2000.[32]

As at mid-2016, there were 14,279 refugees from the Maghreb subregion, with the largest number from Libya (7,000).[33]

3. Mashreq

(a) Migration to the Mashreq

The Mashreq hosted 7,086,022 migrants in 2015 – more than twice as many as in 1990 (2,929,860) – including large numbers of refugees. While the absolute number of migrants more than doubled between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of migrants among the Mashreq's growing population increased to a lesser degree from 3.1 per cent to 4.3 per cent over the same time period.[34] Circulation of labour in the subregion is longstanding, including an estimated 630,000 Egyptians in Jordan, according to the country's latest census.[35] Lebanon also hosts considerable numbers of migrant workers, including domestic workers and refugee populations.

However, much of the recent growth in migrant stocks in Lebanon is due to displacement from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, and less recently from Palestine. Over 82 per cent of the

Figure 27. Main countries of origin for migrants to the Mashreq, 2015

Palestine	3,059,651
Syrian Arab Republic	2,353,825
Iraq	422,029
Egypt	255,066
Jordan	72,373
Other Arab countries	206,003
Rest of the world	717,075

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Box 4. Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic

As the Syrian conflict entered its seventh year, close to 2,050,000 Syrian refugees were registered with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) across the region as at January 2017. The majority were hosted in Lebanon (under 1 million), Jordan (655,000), Iraq (230,000) and Egypt (116,000), with smaller numbers in North African countries and Yemen.[a] Fluctuations in Syrian refugee figures reflect the complexity of the refugee situation. In addition to accounting for births and deaths through continual verification of family status and composition, other population movements result in frequent changes to refugee statistics, such as departures from host countries through resettlement and other forms of admission to third countries. In contrast, informal departures as a result of irregular secondary movements are more challenging to record, but are still monitored through continual verification exercises in host countries. Prior to the conflict, there were over 520,000 Palestinian refugees living in the Syrian Arab Republic, many of whom have now been displaced yet again.

After seven years of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, vulnerabilities are increasing for Syrian refugees and their families with many facing difficulties accessing services, affecting their ability to provide food, housing, health care, education, and other basic needs for their families. Many Syrian refugees have exhausted their savings and resources, and some are slipping further into poverty. With the exception of Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen, Arab countries are not parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Nevertheless, Governments and refugee-hosting communities in the region continue to demonstrate generosity and resilience, while bearing the burden of the conflict's regional political, economic, social and security consequences. Refugees in host countries are adding pressure on public services to deliver basic services to an increasingly high number of vulnerable people. This is testing the limits of infrastructure and public services that were already fragile before the crisis.

More than 200 local, national and international partners are responding to the needs of refugees and host communities under the coordinated Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan,[b] a five-country partnership platform (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey) designed to protect and assist over 4.8 million refugees and around 4.6 million host community members, while building the capacity of national and municipal service delivery systems. It is composed of nationally-led plans, including the Jordan Response Plan (led by the Government of Jordan) and the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (led by the Government of Lebanon), and country chapters prepared by the United Nations in coordination with the Governments of Egypt, Iraq and Turkey. While host countries and communities continue to play a significant role in stabilizing the region, more needs to be done through humanitarian and development support and funding.

Source: Compiled by ESCWA.
[a] Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2017.
[b] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2017-2018: In Response to the Syria Crisis* (Geneva, 2017). Available from http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/16434.

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migrant population in Mashreq countries in 2015 was from Palestine (3,059,651), the Syrian Arab Republic (2,353,825) and Iraq (422,029). In total, over 90 per cent of migrants in the Mashreq subregion came from other Arab countries (figure 27). The number of migrants coming from outside the subregion is small, with most coming from Israel (65,754) and Turkey (19,864) (table AII.3).

The percentage of females among the total migrant population has remained at approximately 50 per cent since 1990 (figure 28), and the distribution of males and females by age group is fairly even (figure 29).

As of mid-2016, the Mashreq subregion hosted 2,240,989 refugees. Most are in Lebanon and Jordan, with 1,035,701 and 691,769 refugees,

Figure 28. Share of female migrants among total migrant stock in the Mashreq, 1990-2015

Millions

Legend:
- Total migrant stock
- Female migrant stock
- Female migrant stock as a percentage of total migrant stock

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 29. Age structure of migrants in Mashreq countries, 2015

Males   Females

Source: DESA, 2015b.

respectively. Iraq and Egypt host 282,331 and 210,865 refugees, respectively, and the Syrian Arab Republic hosts 20,323.[36] In addition, there are almost 5,190,252 Palestinian refugees in the subregion who fall under the mandate of UNRWA. They are divided between Jordan (2,117,361), Palestine (2,074,167) and Lebanon (449,957). The latest data suggest about 450,000 Palestinian refugees remain in the Syrian Arab Republic, with over half internally displaced within the country.[37]

(b) Migration from the Mashreq

By 2015, 14.8 million migrants from the Mashreq were living outside their countries of origin, representing 57 per cent of all migrants from the Arab region. Between

Figure 30. Number of migrants from the Mashreq by region of destination (millions), 1990-2015

Legend:
- Non-Arab Africa
- Arab Africa
- Arab Asia
- Non-Arab Asia
- Europe
- Latin America
- Northern America
- Oceania

Source: DESA, 2015b.
Note: DESA data do not include full refugee data. Due to the extent of recent displacement from the Mashreq, data in figure 30 might be an underestimation, or might misrepresent numbers from some regions.

1990 and 2000, migrants from the Mashreq increased by only 18 per cent from just over 6 million to slightly over 7 million.

Figure 31. Main countries of destination for migrants from the Mashreq, 2015

Jordan	3.01 million
Lebanon	1.97 million
Saudi Arabia	1.65 million
Turkey	1.59 million
United Arab Emirates	1.20 million
Other Arab countries	2.60 million
Rest of the world	2.70 million

Source: DESA, 2015b.

In contrast, between 2000 and 2015, the number of migrants originating in the subregion rose by 107 per cent, with a 35 per cent increase in the last five years (from 10,705,102 in 2010 to 14,809,489 in 2015) (figure 30).

The Syrian Arab Republic (5,011,509), Palestine (3,551,185), Egypt (3,268,970) and Iraq (1,479,966) represent the top countries of origin for migrants from the Mashreq, according to DESA data. These countries are also among the top five countries of origin for migrants from the Arab region as a whole (table AII.7).

According to DESA data, most migrants from the Mashreq remain in the subregion. Jordan (3,019,775) and Lebanon (1,975,506) are the largest host countries, followed by Saudi Arabia (1,655,185) and Turkey (1,594,467) (figure 31). However, other data sources suggest those data may not capture the full picture. According to Jordan's 2015 National Population and Housing Census, the country hosts 2.9 million non-Jordanians,[38] including 1.26 million Syrians.[39] The census also notes other prominent nationalities within Jordan, including Egyptians (636,270), Palestinians (634,182),[40] Iraqis (130,911), Yemenis (31,163)

Figure 32. Female migrants as a percentage of total migrant stock from the Mashreq, 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

and Libyans (22,700).[41] UNHCR reports that Turkey hosts 2.8 million registered Syrian refugees, in addition to refugees of other nationalities and non-refugee populations.[42] Lebanon reportedly hosts 1.01 million registered Syrian refugees,[43] making it the country with the highest proportion of refugees among its total population globally.

Palestinians form the highest share of female migrants from the Mashreq, with a low of 43 per cent in 1995 and a high of 51 per cent in

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Box 5. Egyptian labour migration: results from the Egypt Household International Migration Survey

In 2013, Egypt conducted the Egypt Household International Migration Survey within the framework of the Households International Migration Surveys in the Mediterranean Countries, a regional initiative of the European Commission in collaboration with several United Nations organizations and the League of Arab States. Based on the results of interviews with over 83,000 households, the Survey captured extensive information on migration trends, dynamics and consequences. Nearly all Egyptian migrants abroad at the time of the survey were male (98 per cent) and most cited economic factors as motivation to migrate. Around 97 per cent of Egyptian male migrants were employed. In contrast, female migrants were most likely to move for marriage or family reunification. More than 95 per cent of current migrants were in Arab countries, including 40 per cent in Saudi Arabia, 21 per cent in Libya, 14 per cent in Kuwait, 11 per cent in Jordan, and 4 per cent in the United Arab Emirates.

Data show that around half of Egyptian migrants working in the Arab region were employed in the construction sector, while other main groups worked in wholesale and retail trade, agriculture or manufacturing. Age and occupation patterns showed that skills mismatch was greatest for young migrants in the Arab region and Europe, with overeducation as the most common among this group, particularly among young migrants from urban areas. Around 50 per cent of migrants had completed their secondary education, and 15 per cent had a higher education degree. Those with higher education qualifications were more likely to be living in Europe or North America.

Over three-quarters of migrants who had moved to their first destination since 2000 had paid to acquire a work permit or facilitate labour migration, with families and friends as the most common sources of financial support. Younger and rural migrants were more likely to need financial support to facilitate their migration. The Egypt Survey demonstrates the important role of networks in the migration process, with 65 per cent of current migrants possessing a network in the country of destination prior to their move. This was particularly true for rural young people from southern Egypt (76 per cent). Data indicated that most current Egyptian migrants did not receive any form of benefits from their employer abroad, including health insurance, paid vacation, sick leave, payment for overtime work, and maternity or paternity leave.

The Survey showed that migrants in the Arab region and Europe were more likely to send remittances home than those in North America. More than 70 per cent of current migrants in the Arab region had sent home remittances in the year preceding the Survey, with those from rural areas more likely to have remitted. Among former migrants who had returned to Egypt from the Arab region and Europe, 80 per cent had sent remittances in the year before returning. In contrast, most migrants in North America had not sent remittances.

Source: Farid and El-Batrawy, 2015.
Note: The methodology of the Survey, which relied on interviewing households in Egypt with a household member living abroad (a 'current migrant'), overrepresents individual migrants compared with entire family migration from Egypt. This might cause a distortion in the results.

1990. Egyptians outside their home country are least likely to be female, representing between 32 per cent of the total migrant stock in 2010 and 38 per cent in 1990. Except for Iraq, the percentage of female migrants followed a downward trend for all countries of the Mashreq between 1990 and 2015. Since 2010, however, the percentage of female migrants from Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic has increased (figure 32).

Labour migration is also a factor within this subregion (particularly Egyptian migrants to the GCC subregion), as well as the movement of migrants within the Mashreq subregion. In a recent household survey in Egypt, which looked at migrants currently abroad, over 95 per cent were in GCC countries and Libya.[44] Over half of all Egyptians abroad were either in Saudi Arabia (39.9 per cent) or Libya (21.2 per cent) (box 5).

As at mid-2016, there were 5,707,397 refugees from the Mashreq subregion globally, including 5,303,613 Syrians, 279,955 Iraqis, 98,767 Palestinians registered with UNHCR, and 18,672 Egyptians.

4. Arab least developed countries

(a) Migration to the Arab least developed countries

In 2015, the Arab LDCs hosted 1.1 million migrants (1.3 per cent of the subregion's total population). This is an increase of 48,900 from 2010 (1.4 per cent) and of 238,811 from 2005 (1.3 per cent), although it is still over 1 million fewer than in 1990 when the Arab LDCs hosted 2,248,003 migrants (5.4 per cent) (table AII.4).

Most migrants in the Arab LDCs (30 per cent) come from Somalia (338,855); while others come from Eritrea (160,791), South Sudan (135,558) and Ethiopia (80,876) (figure 33). Djibouti has the highest percentage of migrants among the total population for the period 1990-2015 (13 per cent in 2015).[45]

The percentage of females among the total migrant stock in the Arab LDCs remained

Figure 33. Main countries of origin for migrants in the Arab LDCs, 2015

Somalia	338,855
Eritrea	160,791
South Sudan	135,558
Ethiopia	80,876
Chad	74,565
Other Arab countries	73,486
Rest of the World	271,836

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 34. Share of female migrants among total migrant stock in the Arab LDCs, 1990-2015

Total migrant stock
Female migrant stock
Female migrant stock as a percentage of total migrant stock

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 35. Age structure of migrants
in the Arab LDCs, 2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Figure 36. Main regions of destination for
migrants from the Arab LDCs (millions),
1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

between 47 per cent and 49 per cent from
1990 to 2015 (figure 34). In 2015, 48 per cent
of migrants in the Arab LDCs were female.
The percentage of female and male migrants
was also balanced across all age groups
(figure 35).

As at mid-2016, the Arab LDCs hosted
715,249 refugees. The Sudan and Yemen
hosted 351,450 and 268,486, respectively.
Mauritania hosted 68,590, and Djibouti
and Somalia hosted 16,696 and 10,027,
respectively.[46] Crises in Somalia and
the Sudan have produced protracted
displacement, contributing to these refugee
numbers and to over 1.1 million internally
displaced persons in Somalia and over 3.3
million in the Sudan.

(b) Migration from the Arab least developed countries

The number of migrants from the Arab LDCs
increased from 2,067,112 in 1990 to 3,908,562

in 2010, and to 9,407,659 by mid-2016. The
increase of 141 per cent between 2010 and
2016 was the biggest leap in 25 years. The
total number of migrants from the Arab LDCs
accounts for nearly 35 per cent of all migrants
from the Arab region in 2016.[47]

Somalia (1,998,764), the Sudan (1,890,861)
and Yemen (1,012,889) represent the top
three countries of origin and 95 per cent
of migrants from the Arab LDCs. While the
number of migrants, including those forcibly
displaced from Somalia and Yemen, steadily
increased between 1990 and 2015, the Sudan
peaked at 2,819,194 in 2005 then decreased
to 1,196,493 in 2010, and again increased to
1,890,861 in 2015 (table AII.8).

In 2015, 45 per cent of all migrants from the
Arab LDCs were in non-Arab Africa, and
33 per cent were in Arab Asia (figure 36).

Figure 37. Main countries of destination for migrants from the Arab LDCs, 2015

▉ Saudi Arabia	847,861
▉ South Sudan	552,391
▉ Kenya	496,084
▉ Ethiopia	471,299
▉ Chad	363,465
▉ Other Arab countries	1,095,995
▉ Rest of the world	1,227,867

Source: DESA, 2015b.

The main country of destination for migrants from the Arab LDCs is Saudi Arabia, receiving 847,861 migrants by 2015, followed by South Sudan (552,391), Kenya (496,084), Ethiopia (471,299) and Chad (363,465) (figure 37).

In 2015, the percentage of female migrants among all migrants from the Arab LDCs was 44 per cent. Comorian migrants were most likely to be female (51 per cent), while Yemenis were least likely (35 per cent). Since 1990, Yemen has consistently had the migrant population with the lowest share of females in the Arab LDCs (figure 38).

As at mid-2016, there were 1,790,576 refugees from the Arab LDCs living outside their countries of origin. The main countries of origin within the subregion were Somalia and the Sudan, with 1,097,757 and 638,986 refugees from these countries, respectively. A total of 36,492 refugees were from Mauritania, 15,657 from Yemen, 1,113 from Djibouti, and 571 from the Comoros.

Box 6. Yemen as a transit country

Despite entering its third year of active conflict, Yemen remains a key transit country for migrants from the Horn of Africa aiming to reach Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as well as a country of destination for Somali refugees and other migrants. In 2016, a record number of over 117,000 migrants and asylum seekers were estimated to have entered Yemen, mainly from Ethiopia (over 80 per cent) and Somalia.[a] This marks a steady increase from 2013, and a major rise from a decade ago when arrivals reached about 26,000. Roughly 25 per cent of migrants that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) assists in the country are unaccompanied children, most of them teenage boys from Ethiopia.[b] Most Ethiopians aim to continue onwards to Saudi Arabia, while Somalis are more likely to seek refuge in Yemen. As at mid-2016, there were nearly 270,000 refugees registered with UNHCR in Yemen, the vast majority from Somalia, as well as several thousand Ethiopians, Iraqis and Syrians.[c]

Migrants' journeys to and through Yemen are fraught with risk. The sea crossing from Djibouti and Puntland to the Yemeni coast has caused thousands of deaths over the years, with estimates suggesting over 3,100 fatalities among migrants and refugees over the decade 2007-2016.[d] Arriving in Yemen, migrants and refugees face a risk of kidnapping, with many enduring severe abuse, torture and forced labour until a ransom is paid. An unknown number die as a result of this treatment. Based on over 4,000 screening interviews with migrants seeking assistance at IOM migrant response points in Aden and Al Hudaydah in 2016, nearly 40 per cent reported they had been abducted and 30 per cent had been tortured.[e] Reports also show that those continuing their journeys north encounter harsh conditions, including the risk of recapture, arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation, robbery, exploitation and physical hardships. Migrants are often caught in conflict, and dire humanitarian needs in Yemen

Figure 38. Percentage of female migrants among total migrant stock from the Arab LDCs, 1990-2015

Source: DESA, 2015b.

exacerbate the challenges faced by those transiting. For those who reach the Saudi border, crossing is not always possible, especially given the current conflict, leaving many migrants stranded in Yemen. Over the period 2015-2016, IOM evacuated over 6,800 migrants from Yemen, including 3,500 Ethiopian migrants evacuated to Djibouti in 2016.[f]

While migrants and refugees are entering the country, others continue to leave. Since the start of the conflict in March 2015, more than 185,000 Yemenis and third-country nationals have fled Yemen, including over 90,000 to Oman and Saudi Arabia and more than 95,000 to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan.[g]

Source: Compiled by IOM.
[a] Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), 2017.
[b] IOM, 2017h.
[c] UNHCR, 2017b.
[d] Brian and Laczko, 2016.
[e] Calculated based on monthly Migrant Snapshots. Available from www.iom.int/countries/yemen. Figures for January 2016 were excluded from the calculation, as the number interviewed that month is not indicated.
[f] Veerassamy, 2017.
[g] UNHCR, 2017b.

Box 7. Youth and student migration in the Arab region

Young people (aged 15 to 24) make up an estimated 12 per cent of migrant stocks in the Arab region, with roughly 60 per cent of them male and 40 per cent female. Within the Arab region, patterns of youth migration differ. Although Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries hosted the largest number of youth migrants in 2015 (2.7 million), young people represented just 11 per cent of the total migrant population in GCC countries – the lowest of any Arab subregion. In contrast, while just 215,000 youth migrants live in the Arab LDCs, they represent 19 per cent of all migrant stocks in the subregion. Young people make up 17 per cent (1.2 million) of migrants living in the Mashreq and 15 per cent (171,171) in the Maghreb. Countries in which there are particularly high shares of youth migrants compared with total migrant stock in the country include Palestine (26 per cent), Egypt (25 per cent) and Yemen (22 per cent). The GCC countries of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates host the lowest shares of youth migrants (ranging between 7 per cent and 11 per cent).

The gender composition of youth migrants is roughly similar to that of other age groups: females make up 50 per cent of youth migrant stocks in the Mashreq, 49 per cent in the Arab LDCs, and 34 per cent in GCC countries.

Based on available data, the mobility of tertiary students from countries in the Arab region has increased from 203,508 in 2004 to 323,340 in 2013.a In 2013, the greatest number of outbound tertiary students from the Arab region came from Saudi Arabia, mainly studying in Western Europe and North America (figures A and B). Saudi Arabians studying abroad have increased six-fold since 2004, reaching over 73,000 in 2013 (figure A). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also become increasingly popular destinations for international students, with the numbers studying in Saudi Arabia increasing tenfold between 2012 and 2014 (figure B). France and the United States of America are the top destinations for students from the Arab region. However, while the number more than doubled in the United States between 2010 and 2014, students from the Arab region studying in France decreased over the same period (figure B).

Figure A. Top 10 countries of origin in the Arab region for outbound international tertiary students (thousands), 2004-2013

Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 2016.

Figure B. Top 10 destinations of outbound international tertiary students from the Arab region (thousands), 2010-2014

Source: UNESCO, 2016.
Note: Data are not available for the United Arab Emirates for 2010; and Egypt for 2010 and 2012.

a UNESCO, 2016.

D. Inflows and outflows of remittances in the Arab region

Remittances are an important source of income in the Arab region. While some countries have received far more than others, remittances increased in all Arab countries between 2000 and 2015 (figure 39). However, the numbers for 2015 show remittance growth slowing and even declining in some Arab countries: the Arab region received a total of $50.9 billion in 2014 dropping to $50.8 billion in 2015, with data for 2016 suggesting a greater decline (annex IV).

Remittance sending and receiving patterns correlate closely with migration patterns across the subregions. About 70 per cent of all remittances sent to the Arab region went to the Mashreq in 2015 ($35 billion). Egypt alone received nearly 40 per cent ($18.3 billion) of all remittances sent to Arab countries and is ranked as the sixth largest recipient of remittances globally. Other top receiving countries in the Arab region were Lebanon ($7.5 billion) and Morocco ($6.9 billion). The GCC subregion received the smallest amount of remittances, with an inflow of less than 1 billion in 2015 ($806 million), accounting for just 1.6 per cent of all remittances to

the Arab region. Mostly due to a decrease in remittances received by Tunisia, overall remittances for the Maghreb declined by about 0.4 billion between 2014 and 2015, reaching 10.8 billion and accounting for over 20 per cent of remittances received in the subregion. The Arab LDCs received $3.7 billion in remittances in 2015. Remittances as a share of GDP were highest in the Comoros (20.2 per cent), Palestine (17.1 per cent) and Lebanon (16.2 per cent).[48]

Overall, 58 per cent of remittances to Arab countries were sent from within the Arab region, primarily from GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia. A further 27 per cent were sent from Europe, mainly from France, followed by Italy, Spain and Germany; and North America (8.9 per cent) (figure 40).

The Arab region is one of the top remittance sending regions in the world, with migrants and refugees in the region sending an estimated $105 billion in 2014, amounting to 28 per cent of the global total. With an estimated $98 billion remittances sent from GCC countries in 2014, the subregion accounts for most outflows (93 per cent) from the Arab region (figure 41). It has also seen the steepest increase in the size of remittance

Figure 39. Remittance inflows to the Arab region by subregion, 1970-2016 (billions of dollars)

Source: World Bank, 2017a.
Note: Data for 2016 are estimates.

Figure 40. Top five remittance-sending countries to the Arab region by receiving subregion (billions of dollars), 2015

Source: World Bank, 2017a.

outflows, growing by 9 per cent between 2013 and 2014, and almost quadrupling since 2000. Saudi Arabia is the largest source of remittances in the region and one of the top sources worldwide, with migrants sending home nearly $37 billion in 2014. Lebanon is the top non-GCC country for sending remittances (4.4 billion in 2014). Migrants in the Mashreq remitted over $6 billion in 2015,

with over 70 per cent coming from Lebanon. Migrants in the Arab LDCs sent the smallest amount of remittances among the Arab subregions, at only $573 million in 2014.[49]

In 2015, the largest recipients of remittances from the Arab region were India ($38.6 billion), Egypt ($15.3 billion), Pakistan ($13.5 billion) and the Philippines ($9.1 billion) (figure 42).

Figure 41. Remittance outflows from the Arab region, by subregion (billions of dollars), 1980-2014

Source: World Bank, 2017a.
Note: Owing to limitations in remittance data on Libya for 2014, the data for the Maghreb is not complete.

Figure 42. Main recipient countries of remittances from the Arab region (billions of dollars), 2015

Source: World Bank, 2017a.

E. Summary of key findings

1. Regional trends and developments

Despite subregional and national differences, common patterns of migration and displacement in the Arab region are evident from the data presented in this chapter. The following points summarize the main findings and common themes at the regional and subregional levels:

- Despite improvements in data collection and statistics, the lack of data-gathering capacity in Arab countries and the absence of complete data sets in some countries hinder the accurate and timely analysis of migration and displacement

trends and limit the scope of possible analyses;

- According to available data, migration and displacement both into and out of Arab countries has increased over the past 25 years. Migrant stocks in the region have grown by over 150 per cent since 1990 to 35 million in 2015, with numbers increasing in all subregions;

- By the end of 2016, there were over 19 million displaced persons within the region, including more than 16 million internally displaced persons and over 3 million refugees. Around 5.2 million Palestinian refugees are also in the region. The Arab region is the largest refugee-producing region worldwide, with over 7.5 million refugees originating in Arab countries as at mid-2016;

- Labour migration and displacement form the main patterns of migration movements in the region, in addition to mixed migration flows crossing through the Maghreb to Europe and from the Horn of Africa to the GCC subregion;

- The GCC subregion hosts close to three-quarters of the migrant population in the Arab region (73 per cent), most of whom are labour migrants; followed by the Mashreq (20 per cent), the majority of whom are refugees and labour migrants;

- Migrants from Asia (mainly South Asia) account for over half of all migrant stocks in the Arab region, the majority of whom work in the GCC subregion. A further 37 per cent of migrants in the region come from other Arab countries;

- Saudi Arabia remains the largest host country of migrants in the Arab region, with nearly 30 per cent of all migrants in the region in 2015 (10.2 million);

- Over 25 million people from the Arab region were living outside their country of origin in 2015, with about half remaining in the Arab region;

- The countries of origin with the largest outflows of migrants in the Arab region in 2015 were the Syrian Arab Republic,

with approximately 5.3 million migrants (including refugees) residing abroad, followed by Palestine (3.6 million) and Egypt (3.3 million);

- In 2015, the top five migrant-hosting counties worldwide for persons originating in the Arab region were Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey that mainly hosted refugees, and France and Saudi Arabia that hosted primarily labour migrants;

- Remittance inflows and outflows have been increasing for all Arab subregions. GCC countries are the main sending countries (93 per cent of all remittances from the region), while Mashreq countries remain the main receiving countries.

2. Subregional trends and recent developments

(a) GCC countries

GCC countries receive the largest number of migrants in the Arab region, with stocks reaching 25 million in 2015. With the exception of Oman and Saudi Arabia, migrants make up the majority of the population in GCC countries, of which over 70 per cent are male.[50] In 2015, migrants in the GCC subregion sent 93 per cent of all remittances from the Arab region.[51] GCC countries are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, making it difficult to count the number of people from refugee-producing countries in the subregion. According to UNHCR data, over the reporting period 2015-2017, UNHCR formally registered 2,402 refugees and 2,434 asylum seekers of more than 20 nationalities, including Iraqis and Syrians in the GCC subregion.[52] Migration from the GCC subregion is small, although migration of tertiary students from Saudi Arabia has increased.

(b) Maghreb

Over 5 million people from the Maghreb were living outside of their country of origin

in 2016, with 88 per cent of them in Europe.[53] The subregion also attracts migrants, many coming for work, and hosts 172,797 refugees.[54] It is also a transit area for sub-Saharan migrants seeking to reach Europe. The majority of migrants in the Maghreb (71 per cent in 2015) are from the Arab region, mainly Iraq, Palestine and Somalia, although sub-Saharan Africans are also prominent. Maghreb countries receive the second largest amount of remittances in the region, with roughly $10 billion annually in 2010, 2013 and 2015.[55]

(c) Mashreq

Characterized by labour migration and displacement, the Mashreq subregion hosts over 7 million migrants, more than 90 per cent of whom originate from within the Arab region – many of them are refugees. Over 82 per cent of the migrant population in Mashreq countries is from Iraq, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic.[56] According to 2016 UNHCR data, the subregion hosted 2,240,989 refugees, with Lebanon and Jordan among the top refugee-hosting countries globally, with 1,035,701 and 691,769 refugees, respectively.[57] About 70 per cent of all remittances sent to the Arab region went to the Mashreq in 2015 ($35 billion). Egypt alone received nearly 40 per cent ($18.3 billion) of all remittances sent to Arab countries.[58]

(d) Arab least developed countries

The Arab LDCs hosted 1.1 million migrants in 2015. Most were from Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and South Sudan.[59] By the end of 2015, the subregion hosted 715,249 refugees registered with UNHCR. Over 5 million migrants from the Arab LDCs were living outside their countries of origin in 2015, mainly in the GCC subregion and sub-Saharan Africa. The subregion has the smallest outflows and the second-smallest inflows of remittances compared with other Arab subregions.

2. Developments in Migration Governance in the Arab Region

© IOM / Emiliano Capozoli - Passport over the fence, Tunisia and Libya.

"Our duty to the people we serve is to work together
to move from fear of each other to trust in each other.
Diversity in all its forms is an asset, not a threat."

António Guterres, Secretary-General, United Nations

2. Developments in Migration Governance in the Arab Region

Given the growing numbers of international migrants in the Arab region over the past few years, especially refugees and other displaced populations, and increasing awareness of the need to deal with irregular migration, Arab countries are focusing greater attention on governing international migration. Some have even made significant efforts in placing migration among their national priorities, as reflected in relevant policies. Moreover, Arab countries continue to make necessary adjustments and reforms to implement the Sustainable Development Goals and the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.

The present chapter covers national policy developments in international migration in the Arab region between April 2015 and March 2017,[1] including in the areas of nationality and statelessness, labour migration, irregular migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, forced migration and refugees. It also considers international efforts in migration governance in which Arab countries took part or which directly or indirectly affect migration in the Arab region, including interregional, regional and subregional processes and bilateral cooperation.

Methods used to gather information include a desk review[2] and inputs from IOM country offices and from members of the Working Group on International Migration in the Arab Region. Although policy developments in international migration governance that take place outside the Arab region also impact migration in Arab countries, such developments are beyond the scope of the present report.

A. National policies on international migration and displacement

1. Nationality and statelessness

Statelessness persists in the Arab region, especially in some GCC countries.[3] The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants encourages States to take actions to reduce statelessness. National policies on nationality and statelessness have touched upon dual nationality, acquiring nationality, granting nationality to stateless persons, and outlining the rights and benefits of being a national.

Several countries have made progress toward those objectives. The 2016 draft constitution of Libya contains several articles on issues related to nationality. Article 12 defines who is a national and allows for dual nationality.[4] Article 13 sets out conditions for granting nationality, which include migrants married to Libyans and migrants who possess rare and distinguished expertise. However, the article also states that demographic composition and ease of integration, among other factors, must be taken into account for determining the granting of nationality. Article 14 prohibits the revocation and withdrawal of nationality under any circumstances, except for those who have only held citizenship for 10 years or less. However, article 213 prohibits those who hold dual nationality and naturalized Libyan citizens from assuming certain public sector positions; the 2016 constitution of Algeria also places the same restriction under article 63.[5]

In November 2015, Lebanon issued law No. 41 on acquiring Lebanese citizenship, under which members of the Lebanese diaspora can acquire Lebanese citizenship if they fulfil the

following conditions: if an individual's name, the names of paternal ancestors or those of second degree male paternal relatives are listed on the 1921-1924 or 1932 censuses, or on resident or immigrant registers available at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities.[6] However, this law has been highly criticized as discriminating against women.[7] Following the adoption of this law, the Lebanese nationality programme was launched by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants in August 2016, allowing those of Lebanese origin to apply for citizenship under the new law through an online portal.[8]

In Bahrain, decree No. 36 of October 2015 stipulates that anyone who withdraws or loses his/her Bahraini nationality, or obtains another nationality without prior permission, is no longer eligible for retirement rights and benefits.[9]

To respond to issues related to the treatment of the stateless community known as the *Bedoon*, the Government of Kuwait decided in May 2016 to grant nationality to around 4,000 stateless persons each year. The Central Agency for Remedying Illegal Residents' Status was asked to identify a list of stateless persons who 'deserve the honour of citizenship', to be submitted to the Interior Ministry and then to the Council of Ministers for approval.[10]

2. Labour migration

Since labour migration is a principal migration pattern in the region, Arab countries have issued a range of regulations to manage the dimensions and development impacts of labour migration. They have developed their systems to better manage work permits, entry, exit and residency conditions, the recruitment of migrant workers for specific jobs or from specific nationalities, the unification of labour contracts, and diaspora employment in countries of destination. Many have also made efforts to protect the rights of migrant workers, although the impact remains unclear;

and some have updated their labour laws to include labour migration, although migrant domestic workers remain excluded from most labour laws. The *kafala* (sponsorship) system still governs labour migration in GCC countries, Jordan and Lebanon. However, some of those countries have taken concrete steps towards reforming the system. Qatar passed law No. 21 regulating the entry, exit and residence of migrants, which came into force in December 2016.[11] Despite some improvements (including prohibition on withholding employees' passports), the new law continues to forbid workers from changing employers during the contract period without permission from their current employer (through the 'No Objection Certificate'). If no end date is listed on the contract, a worker can change jobs without the employer's permission only after five years, and upon receiving permission from the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs.[12] If the contract does specify an expiry date, a worker can switch jobs without the employer's permission when the contract ends, after giving notice to the employer. Even though this law has supposedly abolished the sponsorship system, the International Labour Organization has asserted that the system remains intact since workers still need their employers' consent to return to their countries of origin.[13]

In April 2015, Qatar amended some provisions of its 2004 labour law, launching its Wage Protection System[14] that obliges employers to pay salaries directly from their bank accounts into Qatari accounts in their employees' names. Violators face a sentence of one month in prison, and/or a fine between 2,000 and 6,000 Qatari riyals ($550-1,650).[15] Two months later, ministerial decision No. 4 was issued to regulate the Wage Protection System according to the labour law, requiring employers to make salary payments within seven days of their due date. Violators are not granted new work permits for any of their employees until pending wages are transferred.[16]

Saudi Arabia also significantly reformed its labour law in April 2015 by introducing 38 amendments under decision No. 258. Most importantly, the amendments impose financial penalties on employers who confiscate their employees' passports, do not provide them with contracts, or force them to perform jobs not stipulated in their employment contracts. Those reforms, however, exclude domestic workers.

Arab countries are also working towards a unified employment contract for migrants. Jordan adopted standard contracts for migrant garment workers in December 2015 to help them better understand their employment conditions before arriving in Jordan. This step also curbs contract substitution, whereby migrant workers sign employment contracts in their countries of origin and then sign different contracts when they arrive in Jordan.[17] However, monitoring mechanisms are not yet in place to counter trafficking in persons. In February 2017, the Council of Ministers of Jordan agreed to unify the fees for the renewal of work permits for all migrant workers, increasing them to 500 Jordanian dinars (around $700), except for workers in the garment sector.[18]

In September 2015, the United Arab Emirates announced three ministerial decrees related to labour migration, which came into force in January 2016. Decree No. 764 delineates a standard employment contract, and requires employers to offer contracts that conform to it, and to renew those already in force prior to the decree. The standard contract aims to address contract substitution. Its terms cannot be altered other than to benefit the worker, and after approval from both the worker and the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation.[19] Decree No. 765 on the rules and conditions for the termination of employment relations defines ways in which fixed-term and unlimited contracts can be terminated, and lists conditions that could end an employment relationship. This offers the

possibility of unilateral contract termination with due notice.[20] Decree No. 766 outlines rules and conditions for granting work permits to migrants who are changing employers, thus allowing free internal labour market mobility.[21]

Some Arab countries do not include migrant workers in the protections granted under their labour laws. In August 2015, Iraq amended its labour law to include such provisions. The amendment allows migrants to maintain their residencies and work licenses if they change employers, while requiring employers to pay for return tickets to countries of origin at the end of employment contracts.

During the reporting period (April 2015 to March 2017), several Arab countries made new policy developments on migrants' entry, exit and residence. Since 2014, Bahrain has been implementing a new visa policy in several phases. In October 2014, it allowed migrants from over 100 nationalities to obtain a visa either online before travelling, or on arrival. In April 2015, it enabled migrants from GCC countries to receive multi-entry visas either through the e-visa website, or upon arrival. Eleven more countries (mainly from Africa) were added to the list in February 2016, allowing migrants to apply for e-visas.[22] Bahrain has also eased its visa entry rules for migrants coming from GCC countries by accepting passports valid for three instead of six months.[23] In October 2016, Bahrain approved a draft order that introduced a one-time visa valid for two weeks; extended the duration of stay per visit for three-month multiple-entry visa holders from two weeks to a month; introduced a new multiple-entry visa valid for a year; and increased five-year multiple-entry visa fees from $160 to $450.[24] A month later, the Bahraini parliament passed a draft law regulating the stay of single migrant workers in the country. The law bans their stay in some residential areas and allocates specific areas of residency in an attempt to respond to complaints from Bahraini families on practices of single migrant workers that 'contradict

Bahraini customs', and to limit the large numbers of workers in residential areas.[25]

In September 2016, Egypt amended the provisions of its 1960 decree on migrants' entry, exit and residence. The new law requests the Minister of Foreign Affairs to issue a decision on different types of visas, validity periods, conditions, procedures and fees to obtain a visa, and conditions for visa exemption. The law also imposes fines on those who violate entry, exit or residence regulations, and allocates 5 per cent of entry fees to the Ministry to cover deportation expenses.[26]

A new law on entry, exit and residence of migrants in Morocco was still pending endorsement at the time of writing. If approved, it will repeal the 2003 law on irregular migration and the entry, exit and residence of migrants, and will encourage migrant integration based on mutual respect and tolerance.[27]

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and the Ministry of Planning and Development of Kuwait issued decree No. 11 of 2015, establishing a high committee comprising nine institutions and ministries. The committee addresses the demographic imbalance in Kuwait, and aims for more effective deployment of migrant labour and stronger integration of Kuwaiti citizens in the local labour market.[28] In October 2016, Kuwait issued another ministerial decision amending its residency law by raising the minimum salary required for migrants to sponsor their spouses and children who wish to come to the country, exempting some professions. Migrant workers now need to earn at least 450 dinars (around $1,487) per month, up from 250 dinars (around $826) to be eligible.[29] In the same month, the Syrian Arab Republic amended law No. 2 of 2014 with presidential decree No. 30, increasing residency permit fees from 15,000 pounds (around $70) to 45,000 pounds (around $210) for private permits; from 15,000 pounds

to 75,000 pounds (around $350) for work permits; and from 10,000 pounds (around $47) to 30,000 pounds (around $140) for general permits. The decree also imposes a yearly fee of 15,000 pounds (around $70) for temporary residency permits.[30]

In Egypt, decision No. 305 of 2015 regulating work permits for migrants repealed decision No. 136 of 2003 and all its amendments, thus increasing fees for renewing work permits for migrant workers after the third year. Moreover, the decision adds scientific experts, joint partners and temporary workers to the list of migrants who do not need a work permit, and facilitates internships for migrant students in Egyptian institutions. However, companies that wish to hire migrant workers need to prove a lack of Egyptian candidates for the position.[31] In October 2016, Egypt endorsed its action plan on institutional strengthening in the area of labour migration. The plan aims to develop a national labour migration policy for Egypt; enhance coordination between institutions, workers' organizations and employers' organizations; strengthen international cooperation and coordination; build the capacity of relevant stakeholders; and ensure migration through regular channels.[32]

In May 2015, the United Arab Emirates regulated the conditions of employment of GCC nationals through order No. 292, which requires employers to submit an employment application and work contract to the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation for approval.[33] To upgrade the efficiency of its services, the Ministry of Interior of the United Arab Emirates launched an online visa service in August 2015 for migrants from other GCC countries.[34] Starting in 2017, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation will take over from the Ministry of Interior in matters regarding the mandate of domestic workers and will be in charge of issuing and renewing entry and work permits.[35] Lebanon began issuing smart identification cards to migrant workers in November 2015, thus digitizing

migrant registration procedures for granting work permits by the Ministry of Labour. The biometric data on the new cards is used to determine migrants' place of work and compliance with work permit conditions.[36]

In October 2016, the Ministry of Administrative Development, Labour and Social Affairs of Qatar announced that it will be introducing an electronic labour recruitment system in 2017, thus eliminating the permanent committee charged with this task. The electronic system will handle the entire recruitment process of hiring foreign workers for the private sector, from submitting applications to receiving approvals.[37] Qatar also passed a law in October 2016 establishing committees tasked with resolving workers' disputes.[38] In November 2016, Qatar adopted law No. 15 on civil human resources, outlining policies on the hiring, firing, annual leave, benefits and retirement of workers in the public sector. The law gives precedence to Qatari citizens, ensued by the following categories in order of priority: children of Qatari women married to non-Qatari men, non-Qatari spouses of Qatari

nationals, nationals of other GCC countries, Arab migrants, and other nationalities.[39]

In May and November 2015, Oman adopted nine decisions on temporary jobs for migrants. Those decisions were issued by the Ministry of Manpower to extend its ban on the recruitment of migrant workers for temporary jobs in several professions.[40] The Council of Ministers of Saudi Arabia issued decision No. 497 of September 2015 on temporary and seasonal work visas. The decree imposes a fee for temporary and seasonal visas, and for the extension of residency permits for those types of work. The decree also establishes enforcement mechanisms, and lists penalties for violators.[41] In August 2015, Saudi Arabia also issued ministerial order No. 1/1935 on increasing the wages of migrants working in specific jobs in the public sector by providing them with 15 per cent cost-of-living allowance.[42] Saudi Arabia also opened overseas labour offices in November 2016 at Saudi embassies in Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Those offices raise awareness among

Box 8. Domestic workers

Domestic work in the Arab region is mainly regulated by the *kafala* system, although some Arab countries have been introducing reforms to better protect migrant domestic workers and uphold their rights.

In June 2015, Kuwait issued its first law designed to regulate domestic work: law No. 68 grants domestic workers the right to a weekly day off; 30 days of annual paid leave; a 12-hour working day with rest; and an end-of-service one month salary for each year worked, paid at the end of the employment contract. It also bans the confiscation of workers' passports, a common practice among employers.[a]

In the same month, Kuwait also introduced law No. 69 establishing publicly co-owned companies to organize the recruitment of domestic workers. These companies offer an alternative to private recruitment agencies, and provide training for domestic workers before they leave their country of origin.[b] According to news reports, 60 per cent of the shares of these companies are owned by cooperative societies and 40 per cent by government agencies.[c]

In July 2016, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior set a monthly minimum wage for domestic workers at 60 Kuwaiti dinars (around $197). Recruitment offices are required to submit bank guarantees of 40,000 Kuwaiti dinars (around $131,000), valid for two years, when a new office is established or is renewing its license to ensure funds are available to pay wages.[d]

Under the *kafala* scheme, employers assume full legal and economic responsibility for migrant workers. In November 2016, the Ministry of Interior of Kuwait issued a decision exempting employers from paying return airfare for 'runaway' domestic workers, or for those with criminal charges against them. This decision faced criticism because of the potential for employers to falsely report domestic workers as runaways to be exempt from their obligations as sponsors.[e]

In July 2016, Morocco also issued a law regulating the employment of domestic workers, which requires a signed contract between the employer and the worker. It also sets the minimum age for the recruitment of domestic workers at 18, with a phase-in period of five years during which females aged between 16 and 18 can work. Although considered a good start, those provisions have been criticized as child labour by several human rights organizations. The law limits working hours for girls aged 16 and 17 to 40 hours per week and for adults to 48 hours per week, compared with 44 hours per week for work in other sectors according to Morocco's general labour law.[f] The domestic labour law guarantees 24 hours of rest per week, and a minimum monthly wage of 1,542 dirhams (around $158), equivalent to 60 per cent of the minimum wage for jobs in other sectors according to the general labour law. Employers who violate this law face financial penalties.[g]

In February 2017, Qatar approved a draft law regulating the relationship between domestic workers and their employers under the *kafala* system. The law sets an age limit for the recruitment of domestic workers, and establishes a 10-hour working day with periods of rest and food and one paid day off per week. The law also provides for decent accommodation and health care for domestic workers, protects them from physical or psychological harm, and imposes penalties for violations.[h]

In November 2015, the Ministry of Labour of Lebanon issued decision No. 1/168 regulating issues related to recruitment offices. Most importantly, the decision bans offices from placing advertisements for domestic workers in the media, considering this practice as tantamount to human trafficking.[i] In mid-2016, the Government of Nepal introduced a directive on labour migration, requiring recruiting companies to freeze a deposit of $10,000 before bringing migrant workers to Lebanon, plus an extra deposit of $1,000 for each additional worker if the company wants to recruit more than 10 Nepalese workers. Following this directive, Lebanon stopped accepting the recruitment of Nepalese domestic workers, claiming that its terms and conditions contradicted Lebanon's labour laws.[j]

Owing to a significant number of labour disputes and human trafficking cases, Jordan stopped recruiting domestic workers from Kenya in August 2015.[k] On the grounds of preventing 'the spread of diseases from African countries' and in view of the claim that workers from those countries 'get involved in certain crimes', Oman prohibited the recruitment of domestic workers from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya and Senegal in January 2016.[l] Yet, the Ministry of Labour of Saudi Arabia announced in October 2015 that it would start accepting applications for the recruitment of domestic workers from Somalia, provided that those workers could prove that they were free from infectious diseases and had not been involved in criminal offences.[m] Saudi Arabia also lifted a ban on the recruitment of male domestic workers from Bangladesh in September 2016, and encouraged the establishment of organizations providing training and orientation for male domestic workers.[n]

Source: Compiled by ESCWA.
[a] الكويت، مجلس الوزراء، 2015أ; [b] الكويت، مجلس الوزراء، 2015ب; [c] Human Rights Watch, 2015; [d] Izzak, 2016a; [e] Migrant-Rights, 2016b; [f] Benchemsi, 2016; [g] Human Rights Watch, 2016c; [h] ILO, 2017a; [i] لبنان، وزارة العمل، 2016; [j] لبنان، رئاسة مجلس الوزراء، 2015ب; [k] United States, Department of State, 2016; [l] Human Rights Watch, 2016b; [m] فهد الثنيان، 2015; [n] Rasooldeen, 2016.

migrant workers of Saudi labour regulations, ensure the recruitment of skilled workers, and help teach migrant workers Saudi traditions and culture.[43]

In 2015, Morocco sent a memorandum to 10 of its local directorates, covering more than 345 institutions, on the acceptance of regular migrants and refugees who hold residency

Box 9. Labour force nationalization

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have made efforts to boost employment among nationals in both the private and public sectors. During the reporting period, they have considered increasing the number of nationals among the workforce, and have focused on women as a proportion of those employed and on nationals' average salaries.

Saudi Arabia has announced the nationalization of specific sectors of the private sphere. For instance, in March 2016, companies in the telecommunications sector were required to ensure that 50 per cent of their workforce was Saudi by June 2016, and 100 per cent by September 2016.[a] The Saudi Ministry of Labour and Social Development also stopped issuing work visas for migrant workers applying to 19 different professions.[b] In October 2016, the Ministry launched the *Mawzoon* (balanced) system to support its previously established *Nitaqat* nationalization programme. Since December 2016, the system has stipulated five indicators to measure the implementation of the nationalization programme in each institution: the percentage of Saudis among all employees, the average salary of Saudi staff, the percentage of women employees, job stability of Saudi employees, and the percentage of Saudis with high wages. Institutions are given points on the basis of those five factors, grouping them into the different categories of *Nitaqat*.[c] Moreover, this support scheme allows private companies in red and yellow categories[d] (categories that have a low nationalization rate) to continue employing migrant workers provided that at least 40 per cent of their employees are Saudi nationals, and that they pay a fee of 3,600 riyals (around $960) for the first migrant worker employed, 4,200 riyals (around $1,120) for the second, 4,800 riyals (around $1,280) for the third, and 9,000 riyals (around $2,400) for the fourth.[e] The Ministry also decided that migrant workers over 60 account for two employees under the *Nitaqat* scheme, with the exception of investors, professors and doctors.[f]

Oman issued decision No. 103 in April 2015, setting out conditions under which small companies can be exempt from nationalization schemes for two years, and listing the level of nationalization that companies established before the decision must follow over four years.[g] In December 2015, Qatari officials announced plans to nationalize jobs in the public sector to ensure that 9 out of 10 employees are nationals by 2026, provided that those nationals meet the job requirements.[h]

Source: Compiled by ESCWA.
[a] Anderson, 2016; [b] الجزيرة، 2015; [c] Saudi Gazette, 2016a; [d] See United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and IOM, 2015, for more information on the *Nitaqat* scheme and its categories; [e] The Hindu, 2016; [f] المملكة العربية السعودية، [g] عُمان، 2015 أ؛ [h] Khatri, 2015. 2016 ،وزارة العمل والتنمية الاجتماعية

permits in the vocational training system. Migrant and refugee children under the age of 18 can also benefit from this process provided that one or both their parents have regularized status.[44]

Mauritania forcibly returned around 6,000 migrant workers to their countries of origin in 2015. The majority of those workers were not given any legal alternatives, or screened for indicators of human trafficking.[45]

3. Irregular migration

To manage irregular migration, Arab countries recently introduced institutional and legal

reforms, such as forming committees to address irregular migration, imposing sentences and fines for irregular entry or stay, and launching regularization campaigns to legalize the situation of irregular migrants. Arab countries sometimes exercise forced return of irregular migrants who fail to show entry, residency or work permits. The region has also initiated policies to prevent irregular migration.

(a) Institutional and legal reforms

In October 2016, Egypt passed law No. 82 on combating irregular migration and migrant smuggling. The law stipulates fines and prison

sentences for smugglers and collaborators. Punishment entails life imprisonment and large fines when there are serious aggravating circumstances, including if smuggling results in death or disability, or if the offence is committed by an organized criminal group or for a terrorist purpose. The law does not criminalize migrants, and obliges the State to provide them with protection in line with international obligations. It also calls for the establishment of a national coordination committee to fight irregular migration and human trafficking through coordination at the national and international levels; the committee was formally established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 2017.[46] The Government has also launched a national strategy 2016-2026 on combating irregular migration, including monitoring tools and an action plan prepared every two years.[47]

To prevent irregular migration through the Sudan to Europe, the Department of Migration and Citizenship of Somalia banned the migration of all Somali nationals to the Sudan in April 2016, except diplomatic missions.[48] In Tunisia, a national strategy on migration was drafted in July 2015, but was still pending approval at the time of writing. The draft strategy's key action areas cover the promotion of regular migration and the reduction of irregular migration, and other issues such as the reinforcement of migration management governance, the protection of the rights of Tunisians abroad, the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, and mainstreaming migration into development strategies at the local, national and regional levels.[49]

(b) Regularization

Several Arab countries have introduced amnesty periods to allow irregular migrants to regularize their situation to avoid legal consequences for having entered, overstayed, or worked without legal permission.

Bahrain launched a regularization campaign from July to December 2015 for workers

who were absent from work, whose work was terminated, who were absent after their termination, or who did not renew their permits. Those workers could either leave Bahrain without penalty fines with the possibility of returning, or regularize their situation with a new employer in the country.[50] In September 2016, Bahrain launched a plan to introduce flexible work permits, allowing migrant workers who overstayed their visas to work for multiple employers.[51] This policy enables workers to take up temporary jobs in any sector except those that require professional licenses, such as engineering or nursing. At the time of drafting the present report, the flexible work permit was scheduled to be launched in the summer of 2017.

Jordan also announced a three-month amnesty period in March 2016 for employers to obtain free work permits for employees who are Syrian refugees, as well as Syrians who hold a Ministry of Interior card. During that period, around 32,000 permits were granted, thus regulating the access of Syrians to the labour market while regularizing the status of many who were already working.[52] The amnesty period was later extended until April 2017. Institutions that employ migrant workers in Lebanon were given 15 days in May 2015 by the Ministry of Labour to regularize their workers' situation or face fines.[53]

In October 2015, Morocco broadened its criteria for the regularization of migrants to include trafficking victims. The Government also provides benefits to those victims.[54] In December 2016, Morocco launched the second phase of its regularization campaign introduced in 2014.[55] A follow-up and appeal commission was established to reconsider rejected requests, so as to optimize the regularization process and increase the number of beneficiaries.[56]

The Ministry of Manpower of Oman announced an amnesty period from May to

July 2015, during which migrants could benefit from travel permits without being subjected to fines or punishment for irregular stay. The Ministry granted one week from the date it announced the amnesty for employers to submit the list of workers wishing to leave Oman permanently. It also removed the conditions for changing jobs, thus allowing the transfer of employees between small and medium enterprises.[57]

In early 2017, Saudi Arabia announced a 90-day grace period for undocumented migrants to regularize their status or to leave the country without legal consequences, such as a fine or other penalties.[58]

Qatar announced its first regularization period in 12 years between 1 September and 1 December 2016, a few days before the amendments to its labour law came into force. Migrants irregularly residing in the country could leave without legal consequences set out under law No. 4 of 2009 regulating entry, exit, residence and sponsorship of migrants.[59]

Yemeni workers who were irregularly residing in Saudi Arabia were also given a six-month residence visa, after undergoing medical tests. Around 446,000[60] irregular Yemeni migrants who entered the country before 10 April 2015 benefited from this regularization period that extended from May to July 2015.[61]

(c) Forced return

Around 1,053 persons were detained and deported in March 2016 from Kuwait following raids conducted by authorities on residential areas, mainly inhabited by migrant workers. Police checked migrant workers' documents to ensure they had regular status, and that they were not wanted by the police.[62] The Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior announced that at least 29,000 migrants were deported in 2016, a noticeable increase from 25,000 in 2015, for committing crimes or for violating residency, labour or traffic laws.

A new policy on irregular migrants in the Sudan was announced in March 2016, whereby South Sudanese migrants were considered irregular if they had not registered with the authorities within one week of arriving in the country.[63] Authorities then launched a crackdown on migrants from Eritrea in May 2016, during which around 1,300 persons were deported.[64] Similarly, the Yemeni authorities continue to deport hundreds of migrants from African countries, mostly Ethiopia, who are irregularly residing in Yemen.[65] The crackdown was originally conducted in September and November 2016 following speculation that some migrants had joined terrorist groups in the country.[66]

4. Human trafficking and migrant smuggling

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling are key issues that pose many challenges in the Arab region. The main factor differentiating migrant smuggling from human trafficking is that traffickers intend to exploit their victims while smugglers aim to profit from facilitating irregular movement. Arab countries are moving from criminalizing trafficked individuals and smuggled migrants to considering them as victims, thus ensuring their protection and access to legal assistance. Policies on human trafficking and migrant smuggling range from opening shelters and medical centres to treat victims, to broadening channels for reporting abuse. Many countries have adopted national action plans and formed committees to fight human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

(a) Legal reforms

In July 2015, Algeria reformed its code of criminal procedure, introducing provisions on the protection of victims, witnesses and their family members who participate in criminal judicial proceedings that apply to trafficking cases.[67] In March 2016, Djibouti passed law No. 133 on fighting human trafficking and migrant smuggling, repealing and replacing

its 2007 anti-trafficking law. The new law defines human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and punishes perpetrators with prison sentences from 2 to 10 years.[68] The Higher Judicial Council of Iraq issued a directive in January 2016 calling for all trafficking cases to be referred to judges specializing in human trafficking.[69]

In August 2016, Morocco passed law No. 27/14 on trafficking, which criminalized trafficking and clarified the difference between human trafficking, migrant smuggling and irregular migration by defining the constitutive elements of trafficking in accordance with international instruments, such as the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, in Particular Women and Children (Palermo Protocol).[70] In August 2016, Tunisia passed law No. 61 on the prevention of trafficking, which consists of 66 articles covering prevention, prosecution of offenders and protection of victims, and aims to fight all forms of human trafficking, especially trafficking in women.[71]

In 2013, the Federal National Council of the United Arab Emirates began amending law No. 51/2006 on combating human trafficking crimes. In March 2015, those amendments were approved to protect victims from being penalized for crimes committed as a direct result of being subjected to trafficking.[72] Moreover, Jordan formed a technical committee under the Ministry of Justice to revise the national anti-trafficking law of 2009. The committee drafted and submitted a new law that was still pending approval at the time of writing. Egypt also passed a law on combating migrant smuggling in October 2016. However, many Arab countries, such as Libya and Yemen, have yet to criminalize human trafficking.[73]

(b) Institutional developments and action plans

Countries in the Arab region have set up various institutions and committees as part of their efforts to investigate cases of human trafficking and to identify and protect victims.

In September 2016, Algeria established a national committee by presidential decree to prevent and combat trafficking in persons. Its main tasks are to prepare a national policy and action plan on preventing and combating trafficking, and protecting victims.[74] In 2015, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior formed two committees on human trafficking, led by a group of investigative officers and colonels tasked with investigating trafficking cases.[75] Djibouti also formed an interministerial committee on trafficking in persons and smuggling in March 2016.[76] In June 2015, Kuwait established a new department under the Ministry of Interior to act as the national coordinating body on human trafficking. The department functions as a law enforcement agency and maintains a hotline for trafficking-related concerns in both Arabic and English.[77] In addition, an interministerial committee formed by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice drafted a national strategy to combat human trafficking in September 2016.[78] In Lebanon, a human rights department was established under the Directorate General of General Security in November 2016, including a specialized unit on counter-trafficking.[79]

In October 2016, Qatar formed an anti-trafficking committee tasked with developing a national plan to counter human trafficking and preparing annual reports on progress in that regard.[80] The Ministry of Labour and Social Development of Saudi Arabia also established a specialized anti-trafficking unit in December 2015, which protects migrant workers by briefing them on their rights, investigating and preventing illegal trading in workers' visas, and training labour inspectors to identify victims of trafficking.[81] In March 2016, the Sudanese National Committee for Combating Human Trafficking drafted a national anti-trafficking strategy and submitted it to the Council of Ministers for endorsement.[82]

Pursuant to the new anti-trafficking law No. 61 of 2016, Tunisia formed a national committee to counter human trafficking in February 2017, under the coordination of the Ministry of Justice. The committee is composed of 17 members, including two representatives of Tunisian civil society. The committee's main tasks include updating the national anti-trafficking action plan, preparing a national strategy against trafficking, and coordinating national responses between different actors.[83] A special counter-trafficking unit under the Ministry of Interior has also been created to combat trafficking in Tunisia and to protect victims and witnesses.

(c) Protection of victims

In November 2015, Bahrain launched a hotline for human trafficking victims to report abuse. It addresses various concerns such as physical abuse, non-payment of wages, and the withholding of passports.[84] Bahrain also opened a service centre and shelter for migrant workers, supervised by the Labour Market Regulatory Authority, with a capacity of 120 victims and separate sections for women and men. Bahrain required all other existing centres dealing with human trafficking to shut down. In addition to providing training for migrant workers to learn new skills, the government-run centre offers services by a protection unit, a physical and mental health unit, and a police anti-trafficking unit.[85] Other Arab countries, such as Iraq and Jordan, have opened similar shelters or clinics for victims of human trafficking.[86]

Jordan adopted a national referral mechanism in 2015 to systematically identify trafficking victims and refer them to protection services, for which it is currently developing its standard operating procedures.[87] Moreover, a shelter for victims of trafficking was opened in 2016 under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Development. In September 2016, the United Arab Emirates developed a mobile and computer application to fight traffickers by allowing people to report alleged trafficking activities, and by enabling investigators to locate victims.[88]

5. Forced migration and refugee movements

Given the protracted conflicts and crises in the Arab region and the resulting displacement, some Arab countries have made efforts to manage refugee movements, including by establishing response plans, outlining conditions of asylum and the status of refugees, and developing systems to register refugees. However, the extent to which Arab countries host refugees and other displaced populations largely depends on international support, national resources, and development challenges. During the reporting period, no new ratifications of the 1951 Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol were undertaken by Arab countries.[89]

(a) Legal reforms, institutional developments and response plans

In January 2017, Djibouti passed law No. 159 on the status of refugees, thus reinforcing the national legal framework on asylum and refugee status and incorporating many important provisions from the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol to ensure that nationals and refugees enjoy equal civil, economic, social and cultural rights.[90] In December 2015, Morocco drafted law No. 26/14 on the rights and conditions of asylum as part of its comprehensive national migration policy launched in September 2013; however, the law was still under consideration at the time of writing.[91] In February 2016, Somalia passed a law on refugees and IDPs, previously submitted by the Ministry of Interior to parliament in 2013.[92] Article 18 of the 2016 draft constitution of Libya guarantees political asylum, and prohibits the handover of political refugees except to the international judiciary.[93]

In October 2015, Jordan launched its 2016-2018 response plan for the Syrian crisis. The plan covers various sectors, including education, energy, environment, justice, health, livelihood and food security, local governance and municipal affairs, shelter, social protection, transport and WaSH (water, sanitation and hygiene). It aims to build the capacity of the Jordanian authorities, improve the service delivery system and infrastructure in areas affected by demographic stress, meet the needs of both Syrian refugees and nationals affected by the crisis, provide employment and livelihood opportunities, mitigate pressures and support the government budget.[94] In September 2016, Jordan launched another response plan for the period 2017-2019 that builds on the 2016-2018 plan, and integrates refugee and resilience responses into one comprehensive vulnerability assessment with a single plan for each sector.

In January 2017, Lebanon launched its 2017-2020 response plan for the Syrian crisis, which aims to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to the most vulnerable displaced people and poor Lebanese, strengthen national and local service delivery to expand access to and the quality of basic public services, and reinforce Lebanon's economic, social, environmental and institutional capacity. The response plan covers various sectors, including basic assistance, education, energy, food security, health, livelihoods, protection, shelter, social stability and water.[95] Moreover, Lebanon established the State Ministry for Displaced Affairs in December 2016 to manage the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities, including providing solutions for local challenges such as resource use and education integration.[96] The national strategy of Tunisia[97] covers the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, along with other migration issues.

(b) Admission and non-admission policies

In January 2015, new regulations were issued restricting the number of Syrian refugees entering Lebanon: Syrians are only admitted to Lebanon if they fall under certain categories and fulfil requirements attesting to their reason for coming to Lebanon. Admission for reasons of seeking international protection is limited to exceptional cases determined in coordination with the Ministry of Social Affairs. In May 2015, the Government notified UNHCR that registration of Syrians should be suspended. Thereafter, Syrians who approached UNHCR were informed of the Government's decision, and needs were assessed to assist the most vulnerable.

In January 2016, following the adoption of the 2014 Asylum Act and the 2014 Trafficking Act and the ratification of the Palermo Protocol, the Commission of Refugees in the Sudan announced that it would start refugee status determination in Khartoum, with UNHCR acting as an observer. The procedures would help asylum seekers who qualify for refugee status to access their rights.[98] In May 2015, the Interior Minister of Somaliland announced that refugees fleeing the crisis in Yemen would no longer be admitted, stating that the decision was the result of insufficient international assistance.[99] In December 2015, after a six-week sit-in protest at UNHCR offices in Jordan, authorities deported around 585 Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees,[100] including women and children, who were protesting over assistance and resettlement allocations.[101]

(c) Residency, travel and employment policies

The General Directorate for Residency Affairs of the Interior Ministry of Kuwait announced in September 2015 that it would extend the residency permits of Syrians to avoid deportation. Syrians with expired employment contracts and those unable to renew their passports, and therefore their permits, benefited from the decision. Moreover, Syrians who had overstayed their visit visas were granted long-term visas.[102]

In May 2016, Lebanon lifted the fee to renew residency permits for Palestinian refugees who

had entered Lebanon from the Syrian Arab Republic before May 2014, provided that they had not received a deportation order. However, this decision was not widely circulated to the people concerned, and the information was only available in an internal memo. As of July 2016, Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR are no longer required by the Lebanese Government to pledge not to work when renewing their residency permits; instead, they need only to pledge to abide by Lebanese laws.[103] In November 2016, the Lebanese General Security started issuing biometric travel cards for Palestinian refugees, containing a computer chip detailing their identity and fingerprints. Previous travel documents were handwritten and not electronically readable. Underage Palestinians need their parents' or legal guardians' permission to receive a travel document.[104] In January 2017, Lebanon cancelled residency permit fees for Syrian refugees by offering six-month temporary, renewable and free permits, provided that refugees were registered with UNHCR before 2015 and had not previously renewed their residency through sponsorship or on another basis.[105]

In September 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic issued presidential decree No. 29, amending articles 10 and 12 of law No. 18 of 2014, to raise the cost of passports and travel documents of Palestinian refugees and fines imposed in case of losing them.[106]

6. Other policies

In addition to the issues discussed above, countries in the Arab region have made efforts to govern other aspects of migration, such as migrants' rights, access to health care, diaspora engagement and marriage between migrants and nationals.

Policymakers in Arab countries are increasingly recognizing the potential of diaspora communities to support the development of their countries of origin. In March 2016, Egypt launched a new dollar-denominated certificate

of deposit in local banks: the *Belady* Dollar Certificate will be offered by the three largest State-owned banks in Egypt to encourage Egyptians abroad to put their dollar savings into special certificates to ultimately increase foreign currency reserves in Egypt.[107]

In September 2016, law No. 231 of 1996 was amended by law No. 76 regarding Egyptians who intend to work abroad. The new law imposes fees on permits for highly skilled Egyptians to work in the public sector in countries of destination and requires them to obtain a permit before beginning their employment.[108] Article 53 of the 2016 draft constitution of Libya focuses on the rights of diaspora communities, including provisions for their protection, participation in elections and contributions to development.[109] In September 2015, Tunisia launched its national development plan for 2016-2020 covering five action areas, including a mention of migration under human development and social inclusion priorities for Tunisian diaspora communities.[110] In August 2016, Tunisia established the Office of the Secretary of State for Immigration and Tunisians Abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The newly established institution oversees all public organizations dealing with migration in Tunisia, including the Office for Tunisians Abroad and the National Observatory on Migration.[111] Tunisia also issued law No. 68 of 2016 that established the National Council for Tunisians Abroad to support and represent the Tunisian diaspora.[112] In March 2016, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of the Sudan issued a decision exempting Sudanese workers abroad from paying national taxes.[113]

Arab countries have also made institutional changes to reflect growing attention to migration-related issues. In June 2016, the Council of Ministers of Lebanon approved the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants to form a national committee to follow up on various issues relating to migration.[114]

Although migrants' health is still not a priority in the Arab region, many countries have adopted programmatic approaches to provide health services for migrants. For instance, the Moroccan ministries of interior, economy, finance, health, and Moroccans living abroad and migration affairs signed the *Ramed* agreement in October 2015 to provide health services for migrants, refugees and members of their families on the same basis as nationals under the medical assistance plan. In January 2016, the Ministry of Health launched a national plan on immigration and health for the period 2016-2021 to ensure migrant access to health services based on the following five areas of intervention: awareness and safety, prevention, adequate health services, national needs and health system support.[115]

GCC countries have also focused on providing medical treatment for migrants. In August 2016, the State-owned Private Engineering Office of Qatar announced a plan to deliver three hospitals for single migrant workers by 2017. Each hospital will have 120 beds and several medical services. The plan will ease pressure on existing hospitals and provide better services for nationals and migrants.[116] Saudi Arabia issued a directive in May 2016 to all medical centres run by the Ministry of Health to allow migrants to receive paid treatment in public hospitals.[117] In June 2016, the United Arab Emirates announced that migrant workers over the age of 40 who receive a monthly salary of up to 5,000 dirhams (around $1,360) and are covered by the Abu Dhabi basic insurance plan would be required to pay 50 per cent of treatment fees for themselves and their dependants.[118] Executive rules of the Infectious Diseases Law of the United Arab Emirates were announced in September 2016. Under those rules, patients, their cohabitants and persons 'suspected' of being infected with certain infectious diseases receive free treatment at public hospitals until their condition stabilizes. However, existing deportation rules remain intact, and migrants might still be deported if infected with specific diseases.[119]

In addition to issues pertaining to nationality, forced migration and expatriate engagement, the 2016 draft constitution of Libya contains provisions on migrants' right of movement and residence, and prohibits mass or arbitrary displacement. However, those rights are enjoyed only by those with legal residency, which violates international norms and contradicts the principle of non-refoulement that should apply to everyone. The right to undertake economic activity and the freedom of travel are also guaranteed in the draft constitution.[120]

In 2015, Oman issued decision No. 24 withdrawing its reservation to article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), indicating that it now concurs that men and women have the same rights with regard to freedom of movement and to choosing residence and domicile. Following that decision, the Omani Passport Act was amended to allow women to obtain a passport without permission from their legal guardian.[121]

During the reporting period, some Arab countries developed new policies related to social issues, such as the marriage of nationals to migrants. In June 2015, Qatar issued law No. 13 amending law No. 21 of 1989. The amendments established a committee tasked with examining marriages between Qataris and migrants. After considering requests, the committee submits its recommendations to the Minister of Interior, who makes the final decision on a case-by-case basis.[122] The Civil Status Department of Saudi Arabia has also started issuing family identification cards to divorced women, widows and Saudi women married to non-Saudi men, making it easier for them to complete governmental, administrative and legal procedures. Prior to that decision,

only male relations were provided with family records, which made women fully dependent on them for official documents.[123] In October 2016, Saudi Arabia imposed new limitations on marriages to non-Saudi nationals: Saudi men must be between 40 and 65 years old to marry non-Saudi women, and Saudi women must be between 30 and 55 years old to marry non-Saudi men. Saudi nationals also need special permission to marry non-Saudis, based on 17 requirements.[124]

B. International cooperation on migration

In addition to national efforts, Arab countries have undertaken reforms and actions at the international level by engaging in interregional, regional and subregional processes and bilateral cooperation to govern migration.

1. Interregional, regional and subregional processes

The second ministerial meeting of the African Union-Horn of Africa Initiative on Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants was held in March 2015, providing a forum for cooperation on migration, especially in the areas of human trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the meeting, States agreed to ratify and implement relevant international and regional instruments addressing human trafficking, migrant smuggling and organized international crime.[125]

The Valetta Summit on Migration brought together European and African leaders in November 2015 to strengthen international cooperation on migration and displacement and to address challenges and opportunities. The Summit resulted in the adoption of a political declaration and an action plan to address the root causes of irregular migration and displacement; enhance cooperation on regular migration; protect migrants and refugees; prevent and combat human trafficking, migrant smuggling and irregular

migration; and improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration of migrants.[126]

Senior officials representing member States at the Abu Dhabi Dialogue[127] convened a meeting in May 2016 to discuss labour recruitment processes and better protection for migrant workers from exploitation and unfair practices.[128] Another meeting was held in January 2017 to deliberate bilateral and multilateral cooperation on migration, especially the challenges associated with labour recruitment. The consultations resulted in the adoption of the Colombo Declaration containing guidelines for future collaboration on labour recruitment, skill building, skill certification and mutual recognition, technology facilitating labour mobility, and the global compact on safe, orderly and regular migration.[129]

The Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration and Refugees Affairs, established in 2014, held its second meeting in May 2016 to discuss migration and the SDGs. In August 2016, it convened an extraordinary meeting in preparation for the Summit for Refugees and Migrants. The extraordinary meeting covered several migration-related issues, such as the causes of large refugee movements, the positive contributions of migrants, international cooperation, responsibility sharing, implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and protecting migrants and refugees.[130] At the subregional level, in October 2016, justice ministers of GCC countries agreed on several model rules for fighting human trafficking. A joint panel was also established to prepare related draft laws.[131]

2. Bilateral cooperation

Countries of origin and destination engage in bilateral cooperation to better manage migration policies, especially regarding the recruitment, reception and return of migrants,

so as to facilitate the migratory process while protecting migrants' rights. Memorandums of understanding are the most common form of bilateral cooperation undertaken by Arab countries. In January 2016, Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding with Australia on higher education, research and vocational training to facilitate the exchange of students, academics and researchers, and to explore study and employment opportunities in both countries.[132] In 2016, Belgium and Morocco signed a programme of cooperation for the period 2016-2020 covering a number of issues, including encouraging Moroccans in Belgium to invest more in their country of origin.[133]

Many Arab countries have also signed memorandums of understanding to support the fight against migrant trafficking and smuggling. For instance, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates signed memorandums of understanding with India in March and April 2016, respectively, to prevent human trafficking, especially of women and children, focusing on the rescue, recovery, repatriation and reintegration of victims.[134,135] Italy and Libya signed a memorandum of understanding in August 2016 to conduct a training programme for the Libyan coast guard and navy to better secure Libyan waters, and to enhance their law enforcement capacity in tackling human trafficking and migrant smuggling and preventing deaths at sea.[136] Italy and Libya signed another memorandum of understanding in February 2017 on cooperation in combating irregular migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and on reinforcing border security between the two countries.

Many Arab countries have concluded memorandums of understanding specifically regarding the management of labour migration policies. Jordan signed agreements with Ghana in March 2016 and Uganda in October 2016. The agreement with Ghana established an interministerial task force charged with combating illegal recruitment agencies to prevent the exploitation of Ghanaian domestic

workers in Jordan.[137] The agreement with Uganda facilitates the exchange of labour and the recruitment of Ugandan domestic workers in Jordan, and ensures the protection of workers' rights through a hotline for labour complaints.[138] Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding with Albania in 2015 to regulate the employment of Albanians in Qatar,[139] and with India in December 2016 allowing visa-free travel for holders of diplomatic, special and official passports from both countries.[140] Saudi Arabia signed two memorandums of understanding on the recruitment of domestic labour with Chad in November 2015, and with Cambodia in February 2016. It also signed other memorandums with Jordan (September 2015), Morocco (March 2016) and India (April 2016) on labour migration. The United Arab Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding with Mauritius in February 2016 on enhancing cooperation between the two countries in the field of labour recruitment.[141] In June 2016, Mauritania joined a tripartite agreement with Mali and UNHCR to ensure the safe and voluntary return of refugees to Mali, and the safe asylum of refugees in Mauritania.[142]

C. Conclusions and recommendations

Since April 2015, the Arab region has witnessed many policy developments related to migration and displacement at the national and international levels. These developments demonstrate the importance of migration in the region. Recent policies reflect migration trends and national priorities. Arab countries have also undertaken many initiatives to achieve the SDGs, especially those related directly or indirectly to migration. Despite differences in policies related to migration across the region, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Nationality and statelessness: Access to nationality in the Arab region remains greatly restricted and gender-based, and

Arab countries devoted less attention to statelessness issues during the current reporting period compared with the previous biennium. Nationality laws in several Arab countries remain discriminatory towards women and minorities. For example, migrant women married to nationals in some Arab countries are unable to obtain their husbands' nationalities, and many Arab women married to non-nationals cannot pass their nationalities to their children. Moreover, stateless persons and their families are denied access to basic rights and freedoms.

Labour migration: Given the importance of labour migration in the region and its influence on development, Arab countries have particularly focused on governance in this area of migration. Pragmatic steps have been taken to reform the *kafala* system that still governs labour migration in many Arab countries; however, the system still exists in all Arab countries. In several countries, the working conditions of migrants are still deplorable, with many facing serious discriminatory practices, occupational health issues and poor working conditions. Regarding migrant domestic workers, Morocco is the latest country to ratify the 2011 Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189) to further protect migrant domestic workers' rights.

Irregular migration: Limited progress has been made in the Arab region on the governance of irregular migration, apart from launching regularization periods to legalize the situation of migrants who entered Arab countries irregularly, overstayed their visas or permits, or worked without legal permission. Problems remain with deportation practices that usually follow regularization periods and the extent to which such practices jeopardize the rights of migrants and refugees, such as their right to a fair trial given that circumstances leading to

irregularity are rarely considered, and the right to seek and enjoy asylum.

Human trafficking and migrant smuggling: Many Arab countries are recognizing trafficked persons as victims rather than criminals, which largely shifts the focus from imposing sentences and fines on victims to helping them receive treatment and assistance, and to guiding them through available legal options. However, Arab countries need to establish clear mechanisms for the prosecution and conviction of perpetrators and to identify and prohibit all forms of human trafficking in their national anti-trafficking legislation.

Forced migration and refugee movements: Even with high levels of protracted displacement across the region, which increase challenges and strain resources, many Arab countries have welcomed refugees and other displaced populations with solidarity. Nonetheless, solutions for refugees and other displaced populations remain uncertain in view of generous but insufficient international support and limited progress in addressing the root causes of displacement and refugee movements.

Other policies: Other areas related to migration have also captured the attention of Arab countries, although to a lesser extent, such as migrants' access to health services, diaspora engagement, and the impact of migration on development. More efforts are needed to improve the protection and rights of migrants, although recent initiatives appear promising.

International cooperation on migration: Arab States have engaged in international processes (interregional, regional, subregional and bilateral) on migration. While bilateral initiatives have mainly focused on labour cooperation, regional

processes have touched upon forced migration, refugee movements, irregular migration, human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

To promote good migration governance, Arab countries are encouraged to undertake the following:

a. Focus on developing comprehensive and inclusive migration policies that facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility;

b. Ratify international legal instruments to protect the rights of migrants and refugees, especially:

  i. 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;

  ii. 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons;

  iii. 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families;

  iv. 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;

  v. 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime;

  vi. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;

  vii. 2014 Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention (No. 29);

  viii. 1949 Migration for Employment Convention (No. 297);

  ix. 1975 Migrant Workers Convention (No. 143);

  x. 1997 Private Employment Agencies Convention (No. 181);

  xi. 2011 Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189);

  xii. 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.

c. Train law enforcement officers and criminal justice practitioners to implement policies and laws on asylum, human trafficking, migrant smuggling and irregular migration, to prevent abusive practices and protect victims of human trafficking, migrants and asylum seekers, and to ensure protection from refoulement;

d. Establish mechanisms to identify and respond to individuals that are particularly vulnerable to or at risk of becoming victims of trafficking, including children;

e. Ensure that men and women have equal rights to pass their nationality to their children, by lifting reservations to international instruments such as CEDAW;

f. Tackle the root causes of statelessness to prevent and reduce it, and improve the situation of stateless communities and their access to social services;

g. Adopt measures to address the controversial elements of the *kafala* system and employ a contract-based system that balances between employers and migrant workers' rights and obligations;

h. Guarantee the protection of migrant workers' rights by incorporating all workers, including migrant workers and domestic workers, in national labour laws and enforcement practices;

i. Ensure that labour force nationalization policies are implemented without violating migrants' rights;

j. Take measures to reduce xenophobia and discrimination against migrants and refugees;

k. Recognize the contributions of migrants and refugees to countries of destination;

l. Engage in dialogue with migrant, refugee and expatriate communities, in partnership with civil society organizations and other stakeholders, to guarantee their engagement in policy initiatives;

m. Support Arab countries of destination of refugees and other displaced populations by formulating development-oriented response plans and long-term strategies that address development challenges and potential environmental impacts, while taking into account the interests of refugees and host communities;

n. Continue to collaboratively engage in international and regional initiatives on migration and displacement, and commit to the adoption of a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration and a global compact on refugees.

3. Achieving the Migration-Related Sustainable Development Goals

"I believe in the diversity of the human condition. The best thing about the world is the amount of worlds it has."

Eduardo Geleano, journalist, writer and novelist, Uruguay

3. Achieving the Migration-Related Sustainable Development Goals

As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, Arab countries are key countries of origin, transit and destination for international migrants. Migration and displacement have critical implications for sustainable development outcomes. The important role of human mobility for development policies in the Arab region is further illustrated in that all available United Nations development assistance frameworks in the region include programming references to migration, refugees and return migration (figure 43). The 2016 Arab Forum on Sustainable Development reiterated the importance of various dimensions of international migration and displacement for development endeavours in the region.[1] The present chapter further highlights why endeavours to promote progress under the SDGs must consider SDG migration-specific targets.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognizes that migration is a multidimensional reality of significant relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive response. Migration can contribute to sustainable development when policies are managed well, which underscores the need for a comprehensive policy response as outlined in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (paragraph 111) adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development held in July 2015. The importance of migration for a broad range of development areas has been further illustrated by the inclusion of human mobility in recent global strategies and agreements. This includes a strong focus on the linkages between migration, sustainable urbanization and sustainable urban development in the New Urban Agenda adopted at the United Nations

Figure 43. References to migration and refugees in development assistance frameworks in the Arab region

Source: ESCWA and IOM calculations.
Note: References correspond to mentions of keywords, based on a keyword analysis in English and French conducted using the qualitative research software NVivo. Automatic codes were individually checked and adjusted. The results exclude references to keywords in agency names, such as the IOM or UNHCR. The following keywords were used in English: refuge, displace, asylum, migra, diaspora, return, and remit. The following keywords were used in French; réfug, déplac, asile, migra, diaspora, rapatri, retour, and transfert.

Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) held in October 2016, and the outcome document of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. Moreover, the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Nansen Initiative for the protection of cross-border displaced persons in the context of natural disasters and climate change, and the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction stress that climate and disaster-related human mobility are cross-cutting issues.

Migration governance is often defined as the entirety of migration-related policies and programmes of individual countries, inter-State discussions and agreements, multilateral forums and consultative processes, the activities of international organizations, and relevant laws and norms at the national and international levels.[2] A comprehensive approach to migration governance requires policies and programmes to strengthen refugee protection in accordance with international refugee law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It must uphold the right to seek asylum; respect the fundamental principle of non-refoulement and search and rescue policies both at sea and on land; and provide for protection-sensitive entry systems, adequate reception and mechanisms for identification and referral to asylum procedures, including return for those found not in need of international protection.

Good migration governance and the migration-related SDG targets are also relevant for the processes underpinning the United Nations global compact on safe, regular and orderly migration, and the global compact on refugees with its comprehensive refugee-response framework. Both global compacts must establish standards and mechanisms that allow human mobility to be safe and beneficial for all involved. This is a core concern of the migration governance agenda, which is inextricably linked to the SDGs.

A. Linking sustainable development, public policies and human mobility

Figure 44 illustrates the four dimensions in which human mobility interacts with sustainable development and the related public policies that can promote positive sustainable development outcomes.

The four dimensions in which human mobility interacts with sustainable development are explained below.

Sustainable development affects mobility: The level of development in an area or community can influence the mobility of people, with underdevelopment often characterized as a driver of migration. Traditional policy responses typically attempt to tackle the root causes of migration and displacement with simplistic assumption drivers of movement, including that low levels of development often create conditions that encourage migration away from certain countries and that high levels of development can attract migration.

Migration as an opportunity for development: Migration often leads to immediate and substantial development gains for migrants. Migration itself can therefore constitute a development strategy.[3] Well-managed migration policies can facilitate and enable safe migration, including empowering individuals to reap the advantages of human mobility without suffering significant risks. Proactive migration policies aim to create legal pathways for migration; provide male and female migrants with the necessary cultural and technical knowledge and skills; and safeguard migrants' human and labour rights. To supplement long-term migration opportunities, temporary and seasonal labour migration schemes can increase migration pathways and international work opportunities, and support temporary spikes in labour demand.[4] For example, Moroccan seasonal workers support agricultural production in Spain.

Figure 44. Areas of policy interventions, human mobility and sustainable development

Source: Adapted from Naujoks, 2016.
Note: The green boxes show the four principal dimensions that link sustainable development outcomes to human mobility. The blue boxes indicate the scope of public policies.

Mobile populations as contributors to development: Migrants and refugees can contribute to development in their countries of origin and destination, although the extent of their contributions depends on a variety of factors. Migrant and diaspora populations – resulting from conflict or economic migration – can have direct, intermediary or indirect effects on sustainable development outcomes in their home countries.[5] Diaspora actors can directly affect their home country's development by remitting money, investing, participating in trade or philanthropic projects, transferring knowledge, raising the country's tax income, spending as tourists, or bringing social change to the country or its bureaucracy. Refugees can potentially mitigate and reduce negative outcomes in their countries of origin by promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation, security restoration, the development of democratic institutions, and the creation of conditions allowing for voluntary and sustainable return to and reintegration in countries of origin.[6] In addition, migrants have intermediary effects when they act as agents for cooperation between third parties and actors in their home country; for example, when they facilitate investments in their home country from their employers or companies abroad. Lastly, they can affect development indirectly by acting as brand ambassadors, improving their home country's image in the country of destination, which can result in positive outcomes for economic cooperation and investment. Similarly, migrants and refugees contribute to host countries' economies and societies.[7] Their labour, productivity, skills,

and social and financial capital can be critical for economic and social development in many countries of destination. This includes migration as one factor to counter the social and economic consequences of population ageing. Related policy options include initiatives to engage diaspora populations, and policies enabling migrants and refugees to contribute fully to the economic and social spheres in host communities.[8] To achieve their stated goals, such policies must build trust between Governments and refugee and migrant populations, including by creating enabling legal and policy environments, establishing platforms for meaningful participation, and addressing the interests of those populations.

Mobile populations as vulnerable populations: Migrants, refugees and IDPs can be vulnerable groups, whose specific needs must be targeted by sustainable development efforts. The Doha Declaration on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted at the twenty-ninth ESCWA session held in December 2016, emphasizes the need to focus on migrants and refugees as vulnerable groups.[9] The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants reiterates that "no one will be left behind" and reaffirms all member States' commitments to the specific needs of migrants, refugees and IDPs.[10] Such commitments should go beyond the scope of humanitarian aid:[11] sustainable development programming should address long-term needs and enhance the capabilities and productive potential of refugees, migrants and IDPs.[12]

1. Good migration governance to meet the migration-related targets of the Sustainable Development Goals

Throughout the four dimensions, migration is directly and indirectly linked to the SDGs. Figure 45 sets out SDG targets that explicitly refer to migration and a selection of SDG targets that do not mention migration but that are, or can be, relevant to human mobility.

Targets directly relevant to migration include the necessity to protect migrant workers' labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments, especially for women migrants (target 8.8); facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration (target 10.7); and reduce the transaction costs of migrant remittances (target 10.c). In addition, the SDGs reference scholarships that can affect student mobility (target 4.b); and trafficking in persons, especially women and children, and forced labour and exploitation (targets 5.2, 8.7, 16.2). Target 17.18 plays a key role in bridging direct and indirect migration targets. The international community and member States should build capacity to produce high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by age, gender, race, ethnicity and migratory status, among others, to understand migrant-specific vulnerabilities and potentials regarding SDG targets.

SDG target 10.7 urges all Governments and stakeholders to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. Well-managed migration policies can empower migrants, protect their rights, ensure decent working conditions, and provide them with choices and liberties. So far, there are no commonly agreed-upon definitions of what constitutes 'orderly, safe, regular and responsible' migration, or 'planned and well-managed migration policies'. Some have expressed concern that terms such as 'orderly' and 'regular' suggest that this goal is concerned with migration sanctioned and controlled by the State.[13] However, well-managed migration policies are not primarily about control, but rather about addressing the risks of migration and helping migrants and their communities of origin, transit and destination to benefit from the positive development potential that human mobility offers. Such policies can facilitate migration, harness the development potential of migrants and refugees, address the root

causes of migration and displacement, give people a choice to stay or go, and design specific initiatives targeting vulnerable mobile populations. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Migration stressed that "it is in everyone's interest for migration to happen safely and legally, in a regulated rather than a clandestine way. The latter not only exposes other workers to unfair competition, provoking resentment and lowering overall standards of welfare, safety and hygiene, but also puts migrants at the mercy of unscrupulous employers and traffickers, who may subject them to the worst abuses."[14]

Well-managed migration policies require what scholars describe as the 'migration State' that acknowledges the need for migration and creates legal and regulatory environments which give migrants rights and liberties to benefit themselves and the communities they live in.[15] Regarding refugees, safe mobility

includes the provision of safe, legal and complementary pathways as alternatives to risky irregular movement.[16]

2. Facilitating 'good' migration

Since well-managed policies for migration can lead to significant development outcomes for migrants, policies should facilitate international mobility by opening legal migration channels, reducing costs associated with migration, and making international and internal mobility more accessible to those currently unable to migrate. In addition to SDG targets on well-managed migration policies (target 10.7) and the importance of decent labour conditions for migrant workers (target 8.8), target 4.b aims to expand the number of scholarships available to students in developing countries, especially LDCs, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education

Figure 45. SDG targets directly and indirectly relevant to human mobility

Source: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.

in developed countries and other developing countries. While human mobility is generally associated with clear development gains, some forms of human mobility have negative impacts; countries must therefore establish effective policies and programmes to address them. As such, SDG targets 5.2, 8.7 and 16.2 promote measures against human trafficking and forced labour to prevent disastrous consequences for those involved, especially women and children.

A legal identity, including birth registration, as noted in target 16.9, is often the first condition for obtaining a passport, which in turn has important ramifications for individuals' access to international mobility. As migration can raise income levels and improve access to services for migrants, countries of origin can also implement policies by using migration to lower poverty and increase social protection (targets 1.1-1.3). In general, migrants benefit more from international mobility if they have relevant skills, making SDG 4 on education pertinent to well-managed migration policies. To maximize the sustainable development outcomes of their citizens and of migrants, Governments can design health policies and insurances that take into account transnational livelihood strategies (target 3.8) and can promote access to banking and financial services (target 8.10). Well-managed migration also requires effective ways to uphold the rule of law and provide access to justice (target 16.3). In the migration context, it is important to provide equal opportunities and end discriminatory laws (target 10.3). Migration and displacement therefore intersect with a large number of SDGs and their targets, and are important for Governments to consider within the broader development agenda.

3. Migration as an enabler of development

Migration can enable the achievement of the SDGs by unlocking the benefits of human mobility for migrants and for communities of origin and destination. To this end, it is vital to develop well-managed migration policies (target 10.7), uphold migrants' labour rights (target 8.8), and lower the cost of sending remittances (target 10.c). The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants highlights that, while migration is first and foremost about human beings who are rights holders, there is also a utilitarian argument to be made. If the human rights of migrants are effectively promoted, respected and protected within well-governed migration processes, development outcomes can be greatly enhanced.[17]

By identifying migrant populations as contributors to development, Governments can link diaspora contributions to poverty eradication and social protection (targets 1.1-1.3); food security (targets 2.1-2.3); health coverage (target 3.8); primary and secondary education (target 4.1); access to energy (target 7.1); economic growth and productivity (targets 8.1-8.2); and employment and decent work (target 8.5). Diaspora foreign direct investment can be a key financial inflow (target 10.b), providing additional financial resources (target 17.3).[18] Similarly, migration can be used to increase productivity and create employment. Programming activities under targets related to education and health, among others, can empower migrants to fulfil their potential as contributors.

To achieve their goals, diaspora engagement and migrant empowerment policies must build trust between Governments and refugee and migrant populations, including by establishing platforms for meaningful participation, addressing the interests of those populations, and establishing an enabling legal and policy environment. Promising strategies treat diaspora, migrant and refugee populations as partners in local and national development endeavours. In addition to facilitating philanthropic contributions, diaspora investments and knowledge exchange, Governments often

play a role in providing incentives so that such contributions are aligned with local development priorities. Policies that enable migrants and refugees to contribute to their host communities empower them to fully participate in the labour market by exercising their right to work and freedom of movement. Programming objectives also include creating a healthy, socially integrated and well-trained mobile population with recognized skills, and establishing trust and partnerships with those populations.

4. Leaving no one behind: the SDGs and vulnerable mobile populations

Migrants, refugees, and stateless and displaced persons are often vulnerable populations whose specific needs must be considered so as to "leave no one behind", which is a key principle of the 2030 Agenda. The 2016 Human Development Report,[19] which focuses on leaving no one behind, emphasizes that poor, marginalized and vulnerable groups – including ethnic minorities, refugees and migrants – are those left furthest behind. Several SDGs and their targets mention universal access to certain services for all men and women; however, migrants, refugees, returnees and IDPs often face various legal, procedural or social challenges when accessing services and freedoms critical for sustainable human development.

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda focuses on the necessity to deliver quality education to migrant and refugee children. At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, stakeholders highlighted the urgent need for access to quality education, particularly in displacement settings. To address the particular vulnerabilities of migrants, some member States made the commitment to increase refugee access to labour markets and social services, thus strengthening coping capacity and self-reliance. This approach is also a key pillar of the Comprehensive Refugee Response

Framework adopted alongside the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016.

It is important to consider the specific vulnerabilities faced by migrant populations, including forcibly displaced populations and migrant women and men. Furthermore, it is vital to recognize systemic vulnerabilities resulting from the design of some migration regimes. For example, in some instances, *kafala* sponsorship systems can increase the vulnerability of migrants at the mercy of their *kafeels* (sponsors), brokers or employers, and who could sometimes face severe exploitation and limits on their rights and development opportunities.

Since human traffickers often target vulnerable people, endeavours to combat human trafficking (targets 5.2, 8.7, 16.2) are of particular relevance for displaced populations and vulnerable economic migrants.[20] This relates directly to the need for Governments to design policies addressing their poverty and social protection requirements (targets 1.1-1.3), reducing youth unemployment among young migrants (target 8.6), and providing universal health coverage (target 3.8) and primary, secondary, technical, vocational and tertiary education (targets 4.1-4.3). Targeting those populations is also relevant to increasing social, economic and political inclusion (target 10.2), and to ensuring equal opportunities and ending discriminatory laws (target 10.3). It also impacts the fight against xenophobia by underlining the benefits that migrants bring to their countries of destination, as highlighted in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. At times, vulnerable migrants and refugees do not have access to a legal identity and birth registration (target 16.9), effectively rendering them stateless. As such, government strategies to improve the rule of law and equal access to justice (target 16.3) should focus on eliminating barriers for mobile populations, including access to housing, land and property, policing and transitional justice.

5. Complex drivers of mobility

Conflict, violence, weak rule of law, and development challenges are strong drivers for people to leave their homes in search of safety, human security, better livelihood opportunities and higher living standards. Environmental and climatic changes can also threaten populations and the environments that sustain them and their livelihoods.

However, there is no linear relationship between development, migration and displacement. In other words, better development outcomes do not necessarily lead to less migration.[21] A common theory postulates that when economic development improves in a country of origin, the incentives of individuals to migrate are reduced. When a country is able to provide more productive employment, decent work opportunities and increased average income, individuals face reduced pressure to seek work and better living standards elsewhere, thereby reducing migration. Yet, it is well documented that the poorest segments of society are often excluded from migration, especially international migration, as migration can be costly. When these individuals are able to migrate, it is often through irregular methods, since they do not have the resources to use regular migration channels. Irregular migrants are more likely to be targeted and exploited by brokers who take advantage of their desire to migrate.

An alternative theory therefore exists, which posits that increased income for some individuals enables them to afford regular internal and international migration. The same holds true for improved education, health and other development outcomes. Consequently, sustainable development may lead to more incentives to stay in the country of origin, but it can also increase individuals' capacity to migrate. Increasing migration also increases the potential for development gains from migration. For this reason, development

programmes should not strive to reduce or prevent migration, but rather make migration a choice instead of a necessity.[22] In addition, the power to choose to migrate safely and regularly instead of being forced into dangerous, irregular migration provides migrants with more bargaining power to refuse indecent labour arrangements, which can decrease labour exploitation.

6. Key principles of well-managed migration policies

Several frameworks have been established to structure, assess and evaluate laws, policies and programmes on international human mobility. The present section outlines four frameworks that serve as useful examples for Governments to build and refine their migration policies: the Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, the Migration Governance Framework, the Migration Governance Index, and the dashboard of indicators for measuring policy and institutional coherence for migration and development.

(a) Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration

The 2006 Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration of the International Labour Organization (ILO) promotes 'managed' migration for employment purposes (principle 2) and emphasizes that while States have the sovereign right to develop their own policies to manage labour migration, international standards should make these policies coherent, effective and fair (principles 11 and 12). The Multilateral Framework comprises 15 non-binding principles (box 10), and a range of guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration. It also includes examples of best practices that aim to maximize the benefits of labour migration for all parties, set out in annex II to the Framework. Since 2014, ILO has expanded on the framework, and its constituents have adopted the Fair Migration Agenda, the general principles and operational

Box 10. Principles of the Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration

1. Ensuring decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity for migrant workers; and access to freely chosen employment, recognition of fundamental rights at work, an income that meets basic economic, social and family needs and responsibilities, and social protection for workers and their families.

2. Engaging in international cooperation to promote managed migration for employment, and coherent labour migration policies at the international and regional levels.

3. Collecting and applying knowledge and information to formulate, implement and evaluate labour migration policy and practice.

4. Employing international labour standards and other international instruments to make national policies on labour migration coherent, effective and fair.

5. Expanding avenues for regular labour migration.

6. Promoting social dialogue on labour migration policy.

7. Encouraging consultation between civil society and migrant associations on labour migration policy.

8. Upholding the human rights of all migrant workers, regardless of their status.

9. Establishing international labour standards for migrant workers, ensuring legal protection of migrant workers, and applying sectoral and other specific International Labour Organization (ILO) standards.

10. Effectively enforcing national laws and regulations to implement principles 8 and 9.

11. Preventing abusive practices, migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons, and irregular labour migration.

12. Promoting an orderly and equitable process of labour migration in countries of origin and destination.

13. Licensing and supervising recruitment and placement services for migrant workers.

14. Promoting social integration and inclusion.

15. Recognizing and maximizing the contribution of labour migration to employment, economic growth, development and the alleviation of poverty in countries of origin and destination.

Source: ESCWA synthesis of the Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration.

guidelines for fair recruitment, and the guiding principles on the access of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market.

(b) Migration Governance Framework

In 2015, IOM member States adopted the Migration Governance Framework to enhance governance of migration and mobility. It offers key elements for facilitating safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration and mobility through the following three principles: adhering to international standards and fulfilment of migrants' rights; formulating policy using evidence and a "whole-of-government" approach; and engaging with partners to address migration. These principles aim to achieve the following three objectives: advance the socioeconomic wellbeing of migrants and society; effectively address the mobility dimensions of crises; and ensure that migration takes place in a safe, orderly and dignified manner (box 11).

(c) Migration Governance Index

Designed by the Economist Intelligence Unit and IOM, the Migration Governance

Box 11. Key themes of the Migration Governance Framework

Principle 1: Good migration governance requires adherence to international standards and the fulfilment of migrants' rights:

- Comply with international migration law, including the nine core human rights treaties, International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions and the 1951 Refugee Convention;

- Combat xenophobia, racism and discrimination;

- Abide by humanitarian principles when providing assistance and protection to forced migrants;

- Enact policies and programmes that cause no harm and alleviate migrant vulnerability, and adopt child-oriented and gender perspectives;

- Ensure international cooperation to protect and uphold migrant rights throughout the migration cycle;

- Decriminalize irregular migrants;

- Provide access to timely status determination processes, justice and legal redress;

- Criminalize forced labour, human trafficking and migrant smuggling;

- Enable individuals to exercise their right to leave any country.

Principle 2: Migration and related policies are best formulated using evidence and whole-of-government approaches:

- Collect, analyse, use and disseminate credible sex and age disaggregated data on population and displacement movements, both nationally and transnationally, and on diasporas, labour markets, demographics, seasonal trends, education and health to inform policy;

- Use a whole-of-government approach including all ministries with responsibilities touching on the movement of people;

- Highlight migration links to climate change, crises and demographics.

Principle 3: Good migration governance relies on strong partnerships:

- Develop partnerships at the international, national and subnational levels, with international organizations, and in regional consultative processes;

- Engage all partners at the subnational, national, international and regional levels (government agencies, international organizations, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, employers, unions, diasporas, migrant associations, academia).

Objective 1: Good migration governance and related policy should seek to advance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society:

- Ensure non-national residents' access to health care, social services, education, housing and legal recourse;

- Promote cross-border labour market matching and trade in services, and facilitate international student migration and family reunification;

- Adopt gender-sensitive labour migration approaches;

- Promote stability and reduce drivers of forced migration;

- Implement regular lower-cost channels for remittance transfers, promote financial literacy among remittance-receiving households, and increase opportunities for diaspora investment in home communities;

- Maintain strong, results-focused integration, reintegration and social cohesion programmes;

- Communicate the domestic value of migration and mobility;

- Provide information on regular migration channels;

- Ensure that social benefits, including pensions, are portable and that international tax approaches are fair and do not discriminate on the basis of migration or residence status;

- Support socioeconomic development via strengthened diaspora engagement.

Objective 2: Good migration governance is based on effective responses to the mobility dimensions of crises:

- Provide support and assistance to people affected by crises on the basis of humanitarian principles, and register displaced persons and ensure their access to services;

- Facilitate access to safety and protection for displaced populations, and welcome refugees and asylum seekers;

- Facilitate access to consular services and evacuation assistance for nationals abroad affected by crises;

- Support sensitization and participatory campaigns and early transition and post-crisis recovery efforts.

Objective 3: Migration should take place in a safe, orderly and dignified manner:

- Provide access to adequate and regular channels for migration, mobility, residence and citizenship for all individuals;

- Facilitate regular travel and migration, detect irregular migration, prohibit illegal cross-border activity, identify and refer those in need of assistance and protection, and implement timely asylum determination processes;

- Implement efficient and well-operating visa, entry, stay and residency schemes, with limited wait times and reasonable fees;

- Respond in a timely manner to requests for documentation/re-documentation, and accept returning nationals;

- Maintain effective identity management;

- Work with national and international border, immigration, justice and security agencies to collect, analyse and use intelligence, including to address transborder criminal activity.

Source: Compiled by ESCWA based on the IOM Migration Governance Framework.

Index provides a consolidated framework for evaluating country-specific migration governance structures. It is based on 73 qualitative questions to measure performance across five domains identified as the building blocks of effective migration governance, drawn from the Migration Governance Framework. These domains are: institutional capacity, migrants' rights, safe and orderly migration, labour migration management, and regional and international cooperation and other partnerships.[23] A sixth domain,

Figure 46. Comparing the Migration Governance Index with the dashboard of PICMD indicators

Dimensions	Migration Governance Index	Dashboard on policy and institutional coherence for migration and development	
Dimensions	1. Institutional capacity	1. Promote institutional coherence	
	2. Migrant rights	Countries of origin	Countries of destination
	3. Safe and orderly migration	2. Reduce the costs of migration	
	4. Labour migration management	3. Protect the rights of migrants and their families	
		4. Promote the (re)integration of migrants	
	5. Regional and international cooperation, other partnerships	5. Enhance the development impact of migration	
Number of indicators	73	48	62
Implementing institution	IOM and Economist Intelligence Unit	OECD and UNDP under KNOMAD	

Sources: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM, based on the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016; and KNOMAD, 2016.

concerning migration in the context of crises, will be added in future iterations of the Index. The Index is an input-based benchmarking framework. It was piloted in Bahrain and Morocco in the Arab region.

(d) Dashboard of indicators for measuring policy and institutional coherence for migration and development

Since 2015, the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), the OECD Development Centre, UNDP and their knowledge partners[24] have developed a dashboard of indicators for measuring policy and institutional coherence for migration and development (PICMD). The dashboard of PICMD indicators measures the extent to which public policies and institutional arrangements are consistent with international best practices to minimize migration risks and maximize its development gains. There are two distinct dashboards: one for countries of origin and

another for countries of destination. A total of 48 indicators are coded for countries of origin and 62 for countries of destination in the following five policy dimensions: promoting institutional coherence; reducing the financial costs of migration; protecting the rights of migrants and their families; promoting the integration of migrants; and enhancing the development impact of diaspora engagement. Figure 46 compares the migration governance index with the PICMD indicators.

Although these four frameworks were not specifically developed to measure SDG target 10.7 on well-managed migration policies, each can contribute to this purpose. DESA and IOM are currently in the process of developing indicators to measure the implementation of target 10.7.[25] In the meantime, DESA has noted that the Migration Governance Framework can be considered the first international standard for well-managed migration policies under SDG target 10.7.

While outcome-based measurements of progress usually do not measure allocation of resources as an indicator of progress in migration policies, some frameworks do include data related to resource allocation to assess migration governance. Monitoring and reporting on this indicator should always clarify the correlation of resources to the implementation of policies and their outcomes. For example, the PICMD dashboard includes indicators that assess whether a Government has allocated funds to policies and programmes that support migration and development in the last three years (indicator 1.14) and whether a Government systematically evaluates the outcomes of migration and development programmes (indicator 1.15).

B. Migrants' recruitment, rights and remittances

The present section provides recommendations on four key migration-related SDG indicators regarding labour migrants' recruitment practices, rights and remittances. It proposes concrete indicators, policy and programming options, and meaningful data collection to measure SDG indicators on migrants' occupational injuries (8.8.1), migrant workers' labour rights (8.8.2), the recruitment costs borne by migrants (10.7.1), and remittance transfer costs (10.c.1). Table 5 shows that the norms behind those indicators have substantive foundations in existing and emerging migration governance frameworks and international law.

Using narrowly-defined indicators facilitates accurate data collection and progress measurement. However, indicators that are too narrow can result in other issues being overlooked. Even commonly used indicators for measuring the impact of migration can be too narrow to measure the overall development impact caused by human mobility. For example, remittance costs are often regarded as a reliable indicator because of well-established data collection methodology, and because reducing remittance costs is politically non-controversial. However, measuring only remittance transfer costs misses the complexity of actors and effects involved in migration and is too limited to inform the development of public policies on remittances. Remittance transfers are often private funds and some argue that, as such, they should not be 'directed' by Governments or considered as substitutes for official development assistance. However, government activities to promote the financial inclusion of migrants and their families, cooperation with the private sector to help migrants achieve savings and investment goals, and other related interventions are vital and should be measured, but would not be fully captured by the monitoring of only transfer costs.[26]

Measuring financial costs is only one area of concern when it comes to measuring Governments' progress towards well-managed migration policies. Recruitment is another critical area to be assessed. The processes of matching workers and employers across borders and guaranteeing decent work are at the core of the transnational governance of labour migration. Building on the use of well-defined indicators, it is paramount to adopt a broad perspective on human development policymaking and action, which also incorporates these other more complex facets of migration. This approach is consistent with the understanding that the 2030 Agenda is an integrated framework with interconnected SDGs, thus interventions must be holistic and transformative.

The four indicators discussed in this section adopt a human-centred approach, aimed at increasing migrants' agency and capacity. In his latest report to the General Assembly,[27] the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association stresses that labour rights are human rights, and the ability to exercise those rights in the workplace is prerequisite for workers to enjoy a broad range of economic, social, cultural and

Figure 47. Interlinkages between migration-related SDG indicators

Source: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.

political rights, among others. He adds that the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association enable people to voice and represent their interests, and are thus key to the realization of both democracy and dignity, to holding Governments accountable, and to empowering human agency. Upholding migrants' rights is therefore also a means to level the unequal relationship between workers and employers, thereby helping workers correct abuses and gain access to fair wages, safe working conditions and a collective voice.

The 2030 Agenda and the SDGs constitute an integrated agenda with highly interconnected targets. Figure 47 illustrates the interlinkages between the migration-related SDG indicators. Providing migrant workers with meaningful rights to form unions and bargain collectively can significantly improve their occupational safety and health. Stronger rights also allow

migrant workers to negotiate higher salaries (thus increasing their capacity to remit money to their families), and lower recruitment costs measured as the proportion of migrants' yearly income. In some instances, collective bargaining could lead to the elimination of recruitment fees and related costs. If migrants pay fewer and lower recruitment fees and have less debt, they can remit more to their families and accumulate more savings. A main reason for high recruitment fees is the lack of alternatives for potential migrants: often, migrants' desperation and strong competition can lead recruiters to charge exploitatively high costs, and employers to maintain poor working conditions. Moreover, studies show that being indebted to a recruiter and/or employer reduces migrants' willingness to exercise their labour rights. Furthermore, it has been reported that some employers prefer migrant workers to be in a weak position

because it makes them easier to control.[28] For this reason, reducing migration costs and eliminating debt bondage can positively impact migrant workers' meaningful exercise of their freedom of association. Reports show that highly indebted migrants often take on extra shifts, second jobs or dangerous, dirty and demeaning employment.[29] Long working hours and risky jobs are more likely to result in occupational injuries. Consequently, reducing the migration costs borne by migrants gives them the freedom to choose less risky employment, which in turn can lower work-related injuries as measured by indicator 8.8.1. Fewer occupational injuries can have positive effects on remittances, thus stimulating economic development in countries of origin.

Table 5 sets out the links between migration-related SDG indicators and other normative frameworks and instruments to further substantiate the SDG indicators.

Table 5. Links between migration-related SDG indicators and other frameworks

SDG Indicator	8.8.1 Frequency rates of fatal and nonfatal occupational injuries, by sex and migrant status	8.8.2 Increase in national compliance of labour rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining) based on ILO textual sources and national legislation, by sex and migrant status	10.7.1 Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of yearly income earned in country of destination	10.c.1 Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted
Addis Ababa Action Agenda	Not explicitly mentioned.	Effectively promote and protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants (para. 111).	Lower the costs of recruitment for migrants, and combat unscrupulous recruiters (para. 111).	Reduce the average transaction cost of migrant remittances by 2030 to less than 3 per cent of the amount transferred (para. 40).
Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration	All international labour standards apply to migrant workers, unless otherwise stated (principle 9a). National law and policies guided by relevant ILO standards in the areas of employment, labour inspection, occupational safety and health (principle 9c).	Promote decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity (principle 1a). All migrant workers should benefit from the principles and rights in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (principle 8).	Governments should consider licensing and supervising recruitment and placement services for migrant workers (principle 13). Simplify administrative procedures involved in the migration process and reduce processing costs to migrant workers and employers (guideline 12.3.).	Reduce costs of remittance transfers, including by facilitating accessible financial services, reducing transaction fees, providing tax incentives and promoting greater competition between financial institutions (guideline 15.6.).

SDG Indicator	8.8.1 Frequency rates of fatal and nonfatal occupational injuries, by sex and migrant status	8.8.2 Increase in national compliance of labour rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining) based on ILO textual sources and national legislation, by sex and migrant status	10.7.1 Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of yearly income earned in country of destination	10.c.1 Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted
Migration Governance Framework	Not explicitly mentioned, but related to advancing the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society (objective 1).	Adherence to international standards and fulfilment of migrants' rights (principle 1). Advance the socioeconomic well-being of migrants and society (objective 1).	Measures against unreasonable fees, and efforts to regulate recruiters and recruitment agencies (under objective 1). Reasonable fees for passports, visas, etc. (under objective 3).	Facilitating low-cost channels for remittances and supporting opportunities for investment in countries of origin (under objective 1).
Migration Governance Index	Bilateral agreements between countries of origin and of destination to ensure protection from extreme working conditions (heat, cold, radiation, etc.) (indicator 4.4.b).	Bilateral agreements between countries of origin and of destination on measures to ensure decent working conditions for migrant workers and protection from forced labour (indicator 4.4.b).	Bilateral agreements between countries of origin and of destination on combating undue recruitment fees, and on countries of destination promoting ethical recruitment (indicator 4.4.b).	Availability and active promotion of formal remittance schemes by Governments, and measuring the cost of transferring remittances (indicator 4.5).
Dashboard of indicators for measuring policy and institutional coherence for migration and development	Not explicitly mentioned.	All migrant workers have the right to join trade unions (3.5 CoD). Migrants have the right to form associations (3.11 CoD).	Regulation framework for the recruitment process in place and implemented (2.3 CoO and CoD). Recruitment fees for migrant workers are regulated by law (2.4 CoO and CoD).	No exclusive concessions or partnerships with money transfer operators (5.1 CoD). No restrictions or taxes on the outflow of remittances (5.2 CoD). No restrictions or taxes on the inflow of remittances (5.1. CoO). Financial literacy training available at the local level (5.2 CoO). Financial products targeting migrants are available (5.3. CoO).

SDG Indicator	8.8.1 Frequency rates of fatal and nonfatal occupational injuries, by sex and migrant status	8.8.2 Increase in national compliance of labour rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining) based on ILO textual sources and national legislation, by sex and migrant status	10.7.1 Recruitment cost borne by employee as a proportion of yearly income earned in country of destination	10.c.1 Remittance costs as a proportion of the amount remitted
Conventions	Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155); Occupational Health Services Convention, 1985 (No. 161); Safety and Health in Construction Convention, 1988 (No. 167); Working Conditions (Hotels and Restaurants) Convention, 1991 (No. 172); Safety and Health in Mines Convention, 1995 (No. 176); Safety and Health in Agriculture Convention, 2001 (No. 184); Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 2006 (No. 187) and its Recommendation (No. 197); Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 7).	Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (articles 26 and 40); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 8).	Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181) and its Recommendation (No. 188); Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).	Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97, article 9).

Source: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.
Note: 'CoO' refers to country of origin, and 'CoD' refers to country of destination.

1. Recruitment costs borne by migrant workers

SDG indicator 10.7.1 measures the recruitment costs borne by employees as a proportion of yearly income earned in the country of destination. All migration governance frameworks highlight the significance of those costs. The Secretary-General's eight-point agenda for action entitled "Making migration work" stresses that there are enormous gains to be made from lowering costs related to migration.[30] Such costs include fees paid in the recruitment process that pose a particular burden to low-skilled migrant workers.

(a) Migration and recruitment costs

Understanding of the root causes of high recruitment costs is still limited. Interestingly, there is considerable variation in the amounts that migrants pay, depending on migration corridors, economic sectors and skill levels. In most cases, recruitment costs of high-skilled migrant workers are typically paid by employers, whereas recruitment costs for low-skilled migrant workers, especially in corridors to the Middle East, tend to be excessively high.

While there is consensus that recruitment costs often include more than fees levied by labour intermediaries (such as recruitment agencies), there is no standard definition of recruitment cost. The ILO general principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment define the terms 'recruitment fees' or 'related costs' as any fees or costs incurred in the recruitment process for workers to secure employment or placement, regardless of the manner, timing or location of their imposition or collection.[31] While the components of recruitment costs vary depending on the country of origin, the country of destination, and whether migrants are going through formal or informal channels, they can generally be divided into documentation costs (passport and visa charges, contract approval fees, medical tests, security clearance, and language and other skill tests where applicable),

transport costs (in-country and international), job-matching costs (agency fees, fees for acquiring job information and documents), and the cost of financing those costs (interest on loans). When tests, training and recruitment processes take a considerable amount of time, migrants' opportunity costs should also be included in the calculation. If jobseekers are obliged to spend weeks or months preparing for their departure and cannot work during that period, this can also result in significant opportunity costs and investments of support from their households. Migrants are also sometimes obliged to bribe officials, recruiters and agents during the recruitment process.

To achieve lower recruitment costs, it is necessary to better understand the expenses migrants face. The following three common payment situations demonstrate the continued challenges for migrants. Firstly, in the best situation, migrants pay costs directly to a recruiter, with full and accurate knowledge that these expenses are the cost of their recruitment. Secondly, migrant workers are often charged hidden costs, for example, by being overcharged for international transport, housing and food. Migrants are not always informed that they will be charged these additional fees, given that prospective migrants are often asked to pay a lump sum (sometimes upfront) without itemized receipts. This practice allows recruitment agencies to exploit migrants by charging high fees. Some employers subsidize those items, which decreases migration costs. Thirdly, recruiters often promise bonuses and benefits to prospective migrants; however, migrants often do not receive these at the end of their employment period, resulting in an increase in their migration costs.

(b) Determinants of recruitment and migration costs

Several factors determine the extent of recruitment costs, including country of origin or destination, skill level, gender, age, migration experience and job type. Migration

costs are connected either to specific, fixed government fees (work permit, visa and passport fees) or to discretionary variable costs (medical testing, search and intermediary services, skills assessment, language testing, transportation). The former depend directly on the fees that agencies and institutions charge. Variable costs can depend on government regulations and on market forces. They are generally only partly regulated by Governments and existing regulations tend to be vague, stipulating only a maximum fee rather than giving a specific set price.

Recruiters often have exclusive access to scarce job opportunities for low-skilled migrants. Facing high demand for such jobs from numerous applicants who do not have good employment alternatives allows recruiters to charge high prices for their services. This situation results from the limited bargaining power of those searching for jobs and the lack of decent work in their communities of origin. Recent surveys on recruitment costs reveal that similar populations often have significantly different costs dependent on their country of origin. For example, Indians pay less than their Pakistani counterparts for similar jobs, which indicates that structural factors are more important than the actual costs involved in matching workers and jobs across borders.[32] Weak bargaining power is often compounded by a lack of knowledge about complex migration processes and regulations, giving recruiters disproportionate control.[33] Knowledge and networks are therefore vital: based on the KNOMAD surveys, more educated migrants who previously worked abroad pay lower fees, on average, than those migrating for the first time.

The fragmentation of the recruitment industry and reliance on a large number of small-scale recruiters raise significant challenges. Numerous recruitment agencies render regulatory enforcement and oversight more costly and supervision more difficult. Moreover, the small scale of these business operations can increase recruitment costs because recruiters cannot achieve large economies of scale.[34] For this reason, Governments should encourage the establishment of larger recruitment firms, whose activities can be monitored more easily and that can leverage economies of scale.

Additional fees are sometimes collected from migrants to pay intermediaries in the migration system, because official recruitment agencies do not operate at the local level and the system relies on subagents, unofficial brokers and other intermediaries whose costs are often not covered by official legislation and enforcement mechanisms in the recruitment industry. Studies in Bangladesh suggest that such payments constitute up to 77 per cent of total recruitment fees.[35]

(c) Estimates of recruitment costs

The average costs of recruitment are difficult to estimate, as they are determined by the country of origin, recruitment channel (formal or informal), job category and gender, among other factors. There are various estimates drawn from anecdotal data, but systematic estimation efforts using statistically robust methods are rare. Table 6 sets out estimated recruitment costs for migrant workers.

Recruitment costs can constitute up to half of migrant workers' earnings, and, in some cases, can reach 100 per cent. The average cost incurred by a Nepalese construction worker in the Arab region is estimated at $1,200, or six months of wages, compared with $2,891, or 14.5 months of wages, for a Bangladeshi worker.[36] The most comprehensive information on recruitment costs was collected in a series of surveys conducted in 2014 and 2015 under the auspices of the Global Knowledge Platform on Migration and Development.[37] Figure 48 and table 6 provide estimates for the 15 migration corridors covered by the surveys, 10 of which involve at least one country in the Arab region. The estimates reveal stark differences in total recruitment costs: Pakistani migrant workers

Table 6. Worker-paid recruitment costs in selected corridors, 2014-2015

Destination	Origin	Average monthly earnings in country of destination (USD)	Recruitment costs	
			Average (USD)	Months of earnings (averages)
Saudi Arabia	Pakistan	469	4,395	10.6
	Ethiopia	340	991	3.6
Qatar	India	592	1,149	2.0
	Philippines	469	480	1.1
	Nepal	339	1,054	3.3
Kuwait	Bangladesh	347	3,136	9.0
	India	494	1,248	2.5
	Sri Lanka	339	319	0.9
United Arab Emirates	Pakistan	394	2,351	7.2
Spain	Bulgaria	1,300	201	0.2
	Ecuador	1,300	1,032	0.8
	Morocco	1,300	333	0.3
Republic of Korea	Indonesia	1,200	1,506	1.3
	Thailand	1,200	1,466	1.2
	Viet Nam	1,200	1,582	1.3

Source: Leighton, 2017.
Note: Data are based on different survey methodologies and restricted to certain sectors.

Figure 48. Worker-paid recruitment fees in select corridors, 2014-2015

Source: ILO/WB/KNOMAD, as cited in Leighton, 2017.
Note: Data are based on different survey methodologies and restricted to certain sectors.

in Saudi Arabia spend, on average, more than 10 months of their earnings on recruitment costs, compared with two months for Indians in Qatar, while Bulgarians and Moroccans in Spain pay only five and eight days of their salaries on recruitment, respectively. Even though Indians, Nepalese and Pakistanis predominantly work in the construction sector, their costs differ substantially. Furthermore, in some GCC countries like Bahrain, female domestic workers from India and Sri Lanka rarely pay fees, further illustrating cost differences along gender lines.[38] The survey data show that for most interviewed migrants, total migration costs were less than 10 per cent of their annual foreign earnings.[39] While data from the KNOMAD surveys do not provide a comprehensive national or global picture, and without underestimating the high instances of debt bondage, survey results suggest that the extent to which migrants suffer from high levels of indebtedness from migration fees is less than commonly assumed. Nevertheless, they also highlight the differences in recruitment costs in specific migration corridors involving Arab countries compared with other regions.

(d) Methodology for collecting data on recruitment costs

Once recruitment costs are defined, the question then arises of how to effectively measure those costs and progress made towards their reduction. At first, data must be collected at the national level to establish a baseline of the average recruitment costs borne by migrant workers depending on their country of origin and of destination. Measuring any reduction in recruitment costs that takes place after the baseline assessment can then be used to measure progress. Ideally, such data should be collected through annual or ad hoc household or labour force surveys, adding relevant questions to existing surveys related to labour or migration. However, this requires a clear methodology to gauge what kind of data to collect. The process of developing a final methodology is currently ongoing under

the auspices of KNOMAD, in cooperation with ILO.[40] The 2014-2015 KNOMAD surveys provide insight into a possible methodology, including data on recruitment agency fees, passport and visa costs, air transport and medical exams, and wages to express recruitment costs in months of expected wages.[41]

The following issues regarding measuring recruitment costs are still under discussion, with significant implications for data collection and interpretation: the level of disaggregation, the place and methodology of data collection, and how data will be reported.

i. *Broad disaggregation:* Collected data must be sufficiently disaggregated, not only by sex and nationality, but also by sector (for example, agriculture, construction, domestic work). Considering the different realities migrant workers face depending on their specific situation, information on regular or irregular migration status or short-term versus long-term duration of stay could also be significant dimensions.[42] This is particularly relevant for seasonal migrants who move in search of agricultural work in peak seasons. The more detailed the information, the easier it is for countries to formulate policies clearly targeting specific groups of migrant workers.

ii. *Data collection methodology:* Given that, ideally, national authorities (ministries of labour, for example) should carry out the data collection, countries must have an adequate level of statistical capacity. Ultimately, the methodology will be developed in consultation with national statistical authorities and take into account the feasibility of data collection and analysis. An important methodological decision relates to whether surveys should be conducted in migrants' host countries, during their stay abroad, or in countries of origin, thus focusing on returnees. The 2014 KNOMAD surveys were conducted in the Republic of Korea, Kuwait and Spain, with migrants in or near their workplace; whereas the 2015

surveys interviewed migrants returning to Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Pakistan and the Philippines, and Vietnamese migrants in Malaysia.[43] Collecting data on migrants in host countries before contracts are completed makes it difficult to assess whether they have received or will receive full payment and bonuses, provided that such payments are part of their arrangements. Another methodological consideration is that certain types of migrants, such as domestic workers and seasonal agricultural migrant workers, are often not included in labour force and similar surveys. Hence, data collection efforts should consider how hard-to-reach populations can be included.

iii. *Reported values:* The method used to analyse reported data greatly impacts results. Given the large disparities between migrant groups and sectors, the reporting of mean or median values might be less meaningful than focusing on particular tail of cost distribution.[44] The KNOMAD surveys show that some workers have very high costs; Martin labels them as 'superpayers' and examines how their situation should inform targeted public policies.[45]

(e) Recommendations for reducing migrant-borne recruitment costs

There are three overarching strategies to reduce migrant-borne recruitment and migration costs: reduce the overall cost of migration; not require migrant workers to pay such costs (or reduce what they pay); and/or increase migrant workers' salaries. The following recommendations include proposals requiring employers to cover recruitment costs, and provide suggestions for reducing those costs and increasing migrant workers' salaries.

i. *Shift the financial burden away from migrant workers*

Stakeholders should ensure that migrants do not bear the cost of their recruitment. The ILO

Private Employment Agencies Convention (No. 181) prohibits private employment agencies from charging directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, any fees or costs to workers. However, it allows Governments to authorize exceptions for certain categories of workers and for specified types of services provided by private employment agencies. The ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative also states that employers should pay recruitment costs (box 12). In Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, laws state that migrant workers should not bear any recruitment costs; however, more oversight of compliance with these regulations is needed as migrants to these countries still pay significant fees in many cases. Policies that require employers to cover migrants' recruitment costs are easier to implement and monitor, and they can be easily communicated to prospective migrants, recruiters and employers.[46] In contrast, frameworks that allow recruiters and employers to collect some charges complicate the process and could create a recruitment cost floor.

If shifting all fees away from migrants is not feasible, countries and other stakeholders, including the private sector, should ensure that migrant workers at least do not pay the majority of the costs. Alternative sources for paying recruitment costs are employers and Governments that benefit from international labour force mobility. Some countries, such as the Philippines, have legislated that migrants must not pay more than a set share of their earnings before they travel. Spanish employers are required to pay half of the transport costs of migrant workers. However, some argue that requiring employers to pay all migration costs might lead to fewer jobs offered to migrant workers in countries of destination, and consequently lead to more competition among people wanting to go abroad.[47] In the absence of strong regulatory frameworks and clear policies in countries

Box 12. International Labour Organization (ILO) Fair Recruitment Initiative

The non-binding ILO general principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment outline the responsibilities of Governments, employers and labour recruiters in the recruitment process, drawn from international labour standards and good practices. The principles and guidelines cover the recruitment of all workers (nationals and migrant workers), whether employed directly or through intermediaries within or across national borders. They affirm that no recruitment fees or related costs should be charged to, or otherwise borne by, workers or jobseekers, adding that costs should be covered by prospective employers or their intermediaries. The 2015 ILO Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment focuses on establishing fair recruitment initiatives across migration corridors in North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, mainly by providing migrant workers with access to reliable information in collaboration with the media, and disseminating knowledge on fair recruitment practices. The Programme has implemented projects in Jordan, Nepal, the Philippines and Tunisia to achieve those objectives, including the use of web tools to monitor private employment agencies and develop a reporting system for violations.[a]

Source: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.
[a] ILO, 2017d.

of origin, recruiters are free to charge high fees for limited work opportunities abroad, thus highlighting the need for holistic transnational solutions that operate on both sides of the migration corridor.

ii. Reduce the overall cost of migration

a. Increase potential migrants' bargaining power at home: As outlined above, the lack of bargaining power for potential migrants makes them vulnerable to exploitation. Countries and other stakeholders can increase migrants' bargaining power by creating more and better jobs at home, thus giving them alternative livelihood options. The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants stresses that decent work empowers people to make informed decisions about whether to seek work overseas, and to deal with recruitment processes from a position of choice.[48] Migrants can be encouraged to form associations, unions and watch-dog groups at home that monitor contractual arrangements in countries of destination, and help them to bargain collectively. In general, the lack of reliable information disempowers prospective migrants. Therefore, the provision of

clear, understandable and comprehensive information can strengthen their position with regard to recruiters and employers.

Efforts to empower migrants should include attempts to alter social attitudes. Reports show that in societies where paying for the opportunity to work abroad is considered the norm, providing such services for free is viewed with suspicion by workers who might think that the offered jobs are not real.[49] Furthermore, an IOM study on recruitment in the United Arab Emirates from Nepal and the Indian state of Kerala finds that employers believe the work commitment and productivity of workers increases if workers make a significant financial investment.[50] Thus, changing social attitudes requires efforts by employers and employees.

b. Avoid exclusive access for recruiters: Relying exclusively on for-profit recruiters to match workers with jobs internationally is not always the best approach for workers. Alternatives include strengthening State-led systems. For example, the South Korean employment permit system has been lauded as a good practice for adopting a government-to-government

placement approach, so as to minimize exploitation of temporary migrant workers, especially through excessive recruitment fees.[51] This system functions reasonably well for most South Korean migrants, allowing them to repay their migration cost within two months. However, while select fees, such as for a Korean language test, are set by the Government of the Republic of Korea, many other fees depend on counterpart agencies in countries of origin.[52] A similar model is the bilateral relationship governing the movement of agricultural workers from Mexico to Canada under the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme. Such a model could be adopted in high migration corridors for particular sectors, including for construction or domestic workers from Pakistan and Bangladesh to Saudi Arabia, or for seasonal agricultural work.[53] Moreover, unions or international organizations could act as recruiters offering cost-efficient services that compete with for-profit recruiters, while maintaining their non-profit status and protecting labour rights.[54]

c. Establish a well-managed system: Countries must regulate their recruitment industry and enforce related rules, but this comes with certain challenges in a transnational setting. To address this, the Philippines has introduced serial liability rules making recruiters liable for contracts they broker, thus providing a strong incentive for intermediaries to protect the workers they match abroad.

Countries on both sides of the migration corridor should make processes cheaper, easier, faster and more transparent. Complex regulations often prevent employers and workers from contacting each other directly, and require the services of intermediaries.[55] Establishing transparent systems to recruit migrant workers and to provide information and updates on

processes has the potential of lowering recruitment costs in two ways. Firstly, it reduces bribe payments and shifts the power dynamics that enable recruitment agents to overcharge potential migrants – uncertainty about the process is a powerful tool for unscrupulous recruiters. Secondly, countries participating in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue noted the importance of information and communications technology in labour market regulation. Indonesia developed a labour exchange platform; and Saudi Arabia established *Musaned*, an electronic recruiting tool to recruit workers from Bangladesh and subsequently from other countries. In addition, IOM and a coalition of stakeholders are currently developing a voluntary multi-stakeholder certification process for labour recruiters called the International Recruitment Integrity System, which is currently being piloted. Upon implementation, it could provide an important due diligence tool for employers seeking to identify labour recruiters committed to fair recruitment principles.[56]

d. Establish and enforce the use of standardized contracts: Standardized contracts and meaningful enforcement mechanisms are important strategies for decreasing recruitment costs and ensuring certain standards with regard to wages, health and working conditions. For example, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates established such contracts for migrant workers in specific sectors in 2015, as did Morocco for domestic workers in 2016. A template for gender-responsive standard terms of employment for women migrant domestic workers was jointly prepared by UN Women and the Migrant Forum in Asia.[57] Standardized contracts can also be agreed bilaterally, as is the case with the Philippines and Saudi Arabia. It is however paramount to ensure that employers and intermediaries do not substitute migrant workers' contracts upon their arrival. The

Bahrain Labour Market Authority that registers and monitors recruitment agencies also investigates recruitment malpractices, and blacklists violators thus barring them from future recruiting. A brochure is provided to all arriving migrant workers in their native language along with a SIM card to report grievances. An e-hiring system established between Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia's *Musaned* e-portal allow for contract registration before workers move abroad.

e. Build meaningful partnerships with civil society and the private sector: SDG 17 stresses that achieving the ambitious targets of the 2030 Agenda requires a revitalized and enhanced global partnership which brings together Governments, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system and other actors, and mobilizes all available resources. This is of particular importance in reducing recruitment costs and strengthening migrant workers' rights where partnerships with the private sector are indispensable. While some private recruiters do not have the best interest of workers at heart, some recruiters can be considered partners interested in ensuring good worker-job matches.[58] To achieve this, some argue that instead of relying on penalty-based systems for 'bad recruiters', Governments should build incentive structures that establish relationships with 'good recruiters'. "A-rated" recruiters are offered a range of benefits, such as faster processing, fewer time-consuming processes, reduced fees and tax exemptions. Good recruitment agencies provide a valuable service to potential migrants and, because of migration's positive externalities, also to societies at large, which justifies the provision of certain benefits. Agencies could also receive awards and political backing to obtain business abroad.[59] For example, the Open Working Group on Labour Migration

and Recruitment of the Migration and Development Civil Society Network is developing a white list of recruitment agencies. Other partnerships involve civil society, employers and employers' associations. To provide frontline services to migrant communities through research and policy advocacy, the Open Working Group launched a knowledge hub and platform for engagement. The International Trade Union Confederation is assessing the feasibility of a platform where migrant workers rate recruitment agencies as a way of monitoring their performance.

f. Encourage industry self-regulation to promote fair recruitment standards: Establishing codes of conduct for recruitment agencies can supplement Government's efforts to address unfair recruitment processes, and to regulate relationships between recruiters and those looking for work overseas. Some voluntary self-regulation options include committing to voluntary industry standards, or joining associations that outline principles and standards for the industry and ensure compliance through a robust monitoring mechanism (box 13).

g. Enact legislation to promote fair recruitment processes: In some cases, policies and laws in countries that are not countries of origin or destination for a particular group of labour migrants can promote their rights and recruitment processes. Given the transnational economic behaviour of multinational corporations, countries can enact legislation that requires firms to ensure certain standards in their supply chains, such as the Modern Slavery Act of the United Kingdom and the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act. Such legislation requires large companies to publish information on their activities to guarantee that their operations reduce the risk of slavery and forced labour, including

Box 13. Industry self-regulation for fair recruitment

Several global, regional and national industry bodies have begun actively promoting fair recruitment initiatives. At the global level, the World Employment Confederation (WEC) draws ethical recruitment practices from the International Labour Organization (ILO) Private Employment Agencies Convention (No. 181) and the WEC Code of Conduct[a] that calls upon national employment industries and corporations to comply with relevant legislation, not charge migrant workers for recruitment fees, provide honest accounts of working conditions, and ensure occupational safety and health. At the regional level, the Alliance of Asian Associations of Overseas Employment Service Providers recently adopted a programme of action that includes a collective voice in national and international policymaking; self-regulation and self-policing; and decent work, safety and welfare for migrant workers.[b]

The Vietnam Association of Manpower Supply (VAMAS) is a national example of industry self-regulation to enhance ethical recruitment. It comprises 108 recruitment agencies that follow principles and guidelines based on national legislation and international instruments, such as ILO conventions and recommendations, to ensure fair recruitment processes.[c] It offers guidance and monitoring on various issues, including accurate job descriptions, transparent recruiting processes, contracts, pre-departure training for migrant workers, repatriation and reintegration.[d] Recruiters and labour officers also receive training on relevant international conventions and national regulations, the VAMAS code of conduct and its implementation and monitoring.[e]

Source: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.
[a] World Employment Confederation, n.d.
[b] IOM, 2016a.
[c] ILO, 2015d.
[d] Viet Nam Association of Manpower Supply (VAMAS), 2010.
[e] ILO and Australian Aid, 2011.

in their supply chains. As such, the incentive for organizations to take action lies with investors and consumers, who can boycott companies without strategies in place to uphold human rights in their operations and supply chains.[60]

h. Expand meaningful international cooperation: Countries of origin can cooperate bilaterally, multilaterally or regionally with other countries of origin and with countries of destination to regulate recruitment practices. Coordination among countries of origin should avoid a race to the bottom, where countries accept low labour standards so as to compete for their citizens' access to labour markets. Countries have also reached bilateral agreements in high-migration corridors to improve labour rights in general, and recruitment practices in particular processes. For instance, a

2012 memorandum of understanding between Bangladesh and Jordan seeks to align workers and employers' rights with international standards. A 2013 agreement on domestic worker recruitment between Saudi Arabia and the Philippines protects both parties in a migrant worker contract by setting out their respective responsibilities, and foresees the resolution of disputes through diplomatic channels. As a major labour-receiving country, Saudi Arabia has recently entered multiple agreements on labour migration with countries within the Arab region (Jordan and Morocco) and outside it (Cambodia, Chad and India).

Bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding between labour-sending and receiving countries aim to better protect migrant workers, especially domestic migrant workers, from abuse

and poor working conditions, and to further regulate recruitment practices. For example, an agreement between Jordan and Indonesia on domestic workers aims to improve overall recruitment practices and reduce migration costs, with penalties for employers who fail to comply with requirements, such as issuing work and residence permits. A similar agreement was established in 2014 between India and Saudi Arabia. Other countries that have signed bilateral agreements include Qatar with Indonesia and Viet Nam; the United Arab Emirates with Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam; and Kuwait with Indonesia and the Philippines. However, the ILO highlights that without solid labour laws and enforcement, the protection value of such bilateral agreements is minimal, and warns of factors that limit the positive impact of such agreements, specifically citing that some GCC countries' agreements are established merely as diplomatic instruments with little evidence to suggest serious intent for implementation. Such agreements might not address the inherently exploitative nature of some recruitment systems, such as elements of the *kafala* system, and could offer a workaround by introducing some innovative features into a fundamentally unethical system. Lastly, given the modest demand for jobs in countries of origin, and the possibility to hire workers from a range of sending countries, countries of destination have greater bargaining power, which may reduce the effectiveness of the agreements.[61]

i. Provide access to affordable financing: Migrants and their families often have to borrow large sums of money to afford the initial cost of migration. This can lead to crippling debt, especially where families borrow from moneylenders and pawnshops that charge high interest rates. In his 2017 report,[62] the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Migration

recommends that sending countries should help migrant workers finance their migration by increasing financial inclusion, and by fostering partnerships between local non-governmental organizations and banks, for example, particularly in poor and rural areas. Expanding low-interest loan programmes would be a viable first step to widening access. Some countries have already experimented with this approach. For instance, in Bangladesh, banks provide pre-departure loans set at the maximum recruitment fee to meet migration costs, with loan repayments collected from guarantors in the home country rather than from migrants abroad. They also establish branches in countries of destination to facilitate and reduce the cost of remittances, and provide business loans should migrants choose to return home. The Governments of Nepal and Sri Lanka have also experimented with such programmes. For example, the Sri Lankan Government serves as a guarantor for worker loans from some commercial banks; however, such loan programmes become financially unviable if migrants are unable to repay. The Government of the Philippines had to suspend a similar programme for that reason in 2008. More importantly, the existence of such programmes reinforces a system where workers are faced with high recruitment costs leading to debt, which therefore does not resolve the problem.[63] The KNOMAD surveys show that Egyptians in Kuwait borrowed 85 per cent of their migration cost. However, the survey also shows that many were able to take out loans at very low interest rates, mostly from relatives.[64] Moreover, the KNOMAD surveys reveal that access to financing is less problematic than previously thought.

Lastly, professional recruiters are not involved in all types of labour migration. It is therefore paramount to understand where the recruitment industry is relevant and where it is not, so as to advance global

and regional endeavours to understand and promote SDG indicator 10.7.1. Accordingly, policy interventions are also needed to reduce migration costs in migration corridors that do not heavily rely on recruiters and formal intermediaries.

iii. *Increase migrant workers' salaries*

Although migrant workers should not pay any recruitment cost, it may take time to fully establish regulatory and implementation frameworks to reach this goal. Since net recruitment costs are measured as a proportion of migrant workers' annual salary, a short-term way of decreasing the net cost involves increasing migrants' income. To this end, countries and other stakeholders should regulate the minimum wage in countries of destination through national legislation or bilateral agreements between host and sending countries, or by proactively promoting migration to countries with higher minimum and average wages. Moreover, income is often dependent on skills. Thus, training migrants for better-paid jobs and awarding them certificates recognized in destination economies can considerably lift migrants' salaries. The Philippines has negotiated a minimum salary for its domestic workers in the United Arab Emirates. However, fixing some salaries in a migration corridor could lead to wage differences among nationalities doing the same type of work in countries of destination, thus exacerbating inequalities between migrant workers.

Governments and regional processes should standardize job contracts and inform all parties of key aspects of the placement, such as duties, expectations and remuneration, in line with the ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative. This would reduce mismatches between jobs and workers, provide evidence in the event of legal redress, and ultimately reduce costs.

2. Labour rights and safe environments for migrant workers, particularly women and those in precarious employment

SDG 8 asserts that decent work lies at the heart of sustainable development, and that safe and secure working conditions are a fundamental part of decent work, as is the protection of labour rights and safe working environments.[65] The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants reaffirms the importance of protecting labour rights and ensuring a safe environment for migrant workers and those in precarious employment, and of protecting women migrant workers in all sectors. The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association stressed that the impact of the lack of assembly and association rights for migrant workers was compounded by harsh immigration laws, unscrupulous labour recruitment organizations, militarized labour systems and rights-restricted structures in export processing zones. Migrant domestic and agricultural workers, who are often excluded from labour law protection both at home and abroad, are doubly exploited and marginalized.[66]

The present section focuses on two concrete indicators that monitor progress under SDG target 8.8, and which directly reference migrants. It discusses the extent of migrant-specific and gender-disaggregated data on occupational health and safety, and the labour rights of migrant workers. It also outlines a series of recommendations to support national policymakers and international, regional and local actors working on migration and displacement in taking concrete steps to improve the working conditions and advance the rights of migrant workers.

(a) Methodology for measuring and preventing occupational injuries of migrants

Preventing fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries of migrants is an important

> **Box 14.** Categories of economic costs related to occupational injuries
>
> *Costs borne by workers:* loss of future earnings, and additional expenses for medical treatment and rehabilitation beyond those covered by insurance and compensation schemes.
>
> *Costs borne by employers:* staff turnover, training replacement workers, loss of worker output, insurance premiums and legal costs incurred.
>
> *Costs borne by the community:* social payouts, cost of incident investigation, workplace inspection and promotion activities by the Government, loss of human capital for fatal cases, and medical subsidies.
>
> **Source:** Workplace Safety and Health Institute, 2013.

measurement of working conditions (SDG indicator 8.8.1). It is also connected to promoting SDG 3 on ensuring healthy lives and well-being for all, since occupational injuries also lead to financial costs. ILO estimates that the direct and indirect costs of work-related fatal injuries account for a loss of 4 per cent of the world's annual GDP, or $2.8 trillion (box 14).[67]

An occupational injury is any personal injury, disease or death resulting from an occupational accident: an unexpected and unplanned occurrence, including acts of violence, arising out of or in connection with work.[68] International, national and local actors have yet to agree on how this indicator is measured and implemented with regard to migrant workers. The ILO campaign for the 2017 World Day for Safety and Health at Work emphasizes the need for countries to improve their capacity to collect and utilize reliable data on occupational safety and health, including the reporting challenges of indicator SDG 8.8.1. To this end, the ILO has launched a resource toolbox, including best practices and guidance material on promoting occupational safety and health, databases and references to international labour standards.[69]

Migration-specific questions should be included in existing surveys on occupational injuries. In some instances, new surveys need to be designed or administrative records

adjusted to account for migrant and non-migrant status. Egypt is currently the only Arab country for which data is available on occupational injuries in the SDG Indicators Global Database; however, although data on the frequency rates of such injuries for 2011 and 2012 are disaggregated by sex, disaggregation by migratory status is still unavailable.[70] Relevant data for SDG indicator 8.8.1 can be found in the ILOSTAT database under the categories: cases of fatal and non-fatal occupational injury by sex and economic activity, and fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 workers by sex and economic activity. Qatar is the only Arab country that provides continuous data for the last five years in the International Labour Organization Database (ILOSAT), but it is not disaggregated by migratory status. Moreover, data do not cover fatal injuries, and include only compensated injuries in the private sector while excluding incidents that did not lead to some degree of disability. Therefore, the numbers provided severely underestimate the overall rate of occupational injuries.

While none of the available data on occupational injuries in the SDG Indicators Global Database are disaggregated by migration status, some countries, such as the United States (figure 49), provide disaggregated data in their national databases. However, data collection methods should also take into account that migrant workers tend

to underreport their migration status fearing adverse consequences, especially those in an irregular situation. The lack of national data in the Arab region on occupational safety and health makes it impossible to estimate migrant workers' injuries based on the share of migrant workers in specific sectors. Only few countries provide data for the last five years, and rarely have information for multiple years. Only Qatar listed a decreasing trend of non-fatal occupational injuries per 100,000 workers over the period 2009-2015. Egypt offered stagnating numbers for cases of fatal occupational injury by economic activity for 2011, 2012 and 2014.[71] The 2014-2015 KNOMAD surveys on migrant workers who had returned to their countries of origin show that, when asked about injuries and sickness at work, migrant workers indicate fever, heat stress and cuts as the most common reasons for being unable to work; fatigue was also mentioned.

To improve working conditions for migrant workers, policymakers must understand workplace safety conditions and the challenges faced by particular sectors. However, the lack of data on occupational injuries does not only stem from insufficient capacity to collect and

analyse information or from an inadequate scope of inspections. There is also a lack of political commitment to adhere to international occupational safety and health standards and to enforce existing national policies and regulations.[72]

The international framework on occupational safety and secure work environments is mainly guided by the 1981 Occupational Safety and Health Convention (No. 155) and its 2002 Protocol, the 1985 Occupational Health Services Convention (No. 161) and its Recommendation, and the 2006 Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention (No. 187) and its Recommendation. Given that migrants in the Arab region work predominantly in the construction sector, especially in GCC countries, the 1988 Safety and Health in Construction Convention (No. 167) is of particular relevance. Only four countries in the Arab region, namely Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, are party to at least one of those conventions on occupational safety and health. Most Arab countries have not ratified any of these international legal instruments (table 7).

Figure 49. Fatal injuries involving foreign-born workers in the United States by country or region of birth, 2011-2015

Box 15. Occupational injuries in the construction sector in GCC countries

Migrant workers in the construction sector are frequently exposed to various hazards, and therefore have a comparatively high rate of fatal and disabling occupational injuries.[a] Although national legislation in the United Arab Emirates demands adequate preventive equipment to protect workers against the dangers of occupational injuries, they are too general and do not provide specific references to on-site safety, leading to less rigorous implementation of safety measures by contractors. The United Arab Emirates, in collaboration with ILO, has been promoting increased safety for migrant workers on construction sites. Two-thirds of patients admitted to hospital for work-related injuries in the United Arab Emirates are from India.

In a study of more than 1,100 construction workers, Qatar's National Human Rights Committee found that 11 per cent reported being injured at work, and more than half of those blamed a lack of adequate safety measures and procedures in the workplace.[b] The construction sectors in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are considered highly dangerous. As many migrant workers in GCC countries speak Hindi or Urdu as their first language, instructions in Arabic or English are inadequate. If low-skilled workers are not literate, they require pictures and illustrations to understand safety instructions. Consequently, more needs to be done to ensure the safety of migrant workers on construction sites.

Source: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.
[a] ILO, 2017e, p. 3.
[b] Study on the Conditions of Unskilled Labour Force in the Construction Sector in Qatar, Qatar National Human Rights Committee, quoted in DLA Piper, 2014, p. 78.

(b) Recommendations for ensuring safe working environments

To ensure safe and secure working environments for migrant workers, countries in the Arab region should undertake the following:

i. *Adopt international standards and establish national policies on occupational health and safety for migrant workers*

To advance SDG target 8.8 measured by occupational injuries, and to ensure that migrant workers have the same safe working conditions and occupational health coverage as national workers, Arab countries should ratify international ILO standards on occupational safety and health, in particular, and other conventions encompassing the working conditions of migrant workers, in general. Arab Governments should develop national policies on occupational safety and health that establish a system of defined rights, responsibilities and duties and create a national preventative safety and health culture, in accordance with international standards.[73]

ii. *Promote awareness, education and training*

Awareness-raising and education on occupational risks are key elements in reducing work-related injuries. The Safety in the Heat programme is a noteworthy example of preventive and protective measures.[74] Since over 50 per cent of migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates work outdoors,[75] the programme uses a broad multimedia campaign, including posters, pamphlets, videos and websites, targeting employers and workers to raise awareness on the perils of working in extreme heat during the summer months in GCC countries. The campaign also included training for supervisors and health and safety personnel and materials in different languages, and improved the monitoring of programme effectiveness through a hospital-based injury surveillance system. In addition to targeting large

employers, programmes should address occupational safety and health conditions in small and medium enterprises, and in the informal economy.[76] All GCC countries have introduced regulations to interrupt outdoor work during the extreme summer heat. Qatar banned midday outdoor work during the summer months when casualties at the World Cup construction sites increased. However, not all employers comply with this ban, and some reduce workers' wages for working fewer hours. Additional health and safety regulations have been introduced through the Workers' Welfare Standards of Qatar, requiring safer conditions on construction sites and in worker accommodation.[77]

iii. Build statistical capacity

Limits on the capacity to collect comprehensive disaggregated data often make evidence-based policy programming problematic. The ILO plan of action 2010-2016 on occupation safety and health outlines several activities for countries to build national legislation and programmes tackling fatal and non-fatal occupational injuries. To implement effective programmes that reach all migrant workers at risk in hazardous work conditions, national efforts and resources should be directed at understanding the gender dynamics of labour migration and the distinct challenges migrant workers face in different sectors, such as agriculture, domestic work, the apparel industry and construction. Ministries of health, agriculture, labour and immigration should assist institutions in collecting relevant information. However, to protect migrants' human rights, it is important to shield individual health data from immigration enforcement agencies, so as to not deter irregular migrants from using medical services. Moreover, collaboration with insurance or social security bodies can improve the collection and compilation

of accurate statistics on occupational injuries.[78] This issue is connected to the Cape Town Global Action Plan for Sustainable Development Data that aims to strengthen and expand programmes on household surveys, integrated survey systems, business and other economic surveys, population and housing censuses, and civil and vital statistics, so as to meet the requirements of the 2030 Agenda.[79]

iv. Implement labour inspection and complementary enforcement strategies

To examine the safety of a work site, frequent and unannounced inspections should be conducted. However, most Arab countries do not have enough inspectors to properly assess working conditions and enforce existing regulations.[80] For labour inspections to function as a tool to enhance adherence to labour standards, it is paramount that such inspections focus on monitoring working conditions and advocating workplace compliance, rather than checking the legal status of migrant workers. The latter is the responsibility of immigration department officials, and confounding the two tasks can be detrimental to effectively monitoring working conditions in sectors with a sizeable share of migrant workers.

To enable risk assessments and monitor progress made at the national level, tripartite committees on occupational safety and health should be established, comprising government officials, employers and workers. Further measures can include publishing the status of workplace conditions, excluding project bidders with poor safety records, increasing insurance premiums, withdrawing permits, and other incentive and penalty schemes. It is in the interest of countries and employers to curb the frequency of fatal and non-fatal occupational accidents, given their economic costs in terms of compensation,

lost working time, interrupted production and medical expenses.[81] Countries must also ensure access to effective complaint and grievance mechanisms in case of violations. Consulates of countries of origin should offer easily accessible services for affected migrant workers in countries of destination.

(c) Migrant labour rights

SDG indicator 8.8.2 focuses on international norms and national legislation protecting labour rights. It recognizes that disaggregated data on migrant workers, particularly female workers who are often employed in domestic work, are crucial for assessing their protection level. The methodology includes a complex matrix of 108 evaluation criteria for violations of, and progress in, trade union rights in law and in practice.[82] At present, indicator 8.8.2 concentrates explicitly on the right to freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining. Related international legal instruments include the Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948 (No. 87); and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). Most Arab countries have not ratified these long-standing ILO frameworks. GCC countries (except Kuwait), which host most labour migrants in the region, have not taken any steps towards ratification (table 7).

i. Methodology for measuring national compliance

In its Global Rights Index 2016, the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) paints a bleak picture of labour rights in the Arab region (table 8). Although data are not disaggregated by migration status, the report makes explicit reference to migrant workers in Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It states that the complete lack of freedom of association, and the *kafala* system that subjects millions of migrant workers to

the risk of forced labour, continues to be pervasive throughout Gulf countries.[83] Most GCC countries prohibit or severely limit migrant worker unionization and strikes, although they make up the majority of the private-sector workforce in countries like Qatar.[84] In the United Arab Emirates, construction workers have reportedly been arrested and deported for striking against low wages and poor working conditions.[85] Representation and voice at work are crucial to guaranteeing labour rights and the improvement of labour conditions for migrant workers. In Lebanon, the Government dismissed efforts to form a union to strengthen legal protection for domestic migrant workers' rights.[86] However, migrant workers organize informally and build support communities, which is critical for those who have little access to formal support systems like consulates and embassies.[87] Other countries with explicit restrictions on migrant workers forming, joining or serving in a union office include Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia and Yemen.[88] Labour rights indicators provide comprehensive numerical and textual information on country-level compliance with freedom of association and collective bargaining rights (figure 50).

While SDG indicator 8.8.2 only specifies freedom of association and collective bargaining, the full realization of labour rights and protection relates to other areas of labour exploitation, forced labour and discrimination in employment. Many migrant workers report unequal treatment depending on nationality, and the inability to terminate a contract unilaterally or change employers under the *kafala* system. The most frequently cited rights violation is withholding passports and other travel documents. Furthermore, it is critical to understand that different groups of migrant workers face differing challenges regarding

Table 7. Ratifications of ILO conventions related to SDG indicators 8.8.1 and 8.8.2 in the Arab region

Country	ILO conventions related to SDG indicator 8.8.2		ILO conventions related to SDG indicator 8.8.1			Total number of ratifications
	No. 87: Freedom of association	No. 98: Collective bargaining	No. 155: Occupational safety and health	No. 187: Promotional framework for occupational safety and health	No. 167: Safety and health in construction	
Bahrain	–	–	+	–	–	1
Kuwait	+	+	–	–	–	2
Oman	–	–	–	–	–	0
Qatar	–	–	–	–	–	0
Saudi Arabia	–	–	–	–	–	0
United Arab Emirates	–	–	–	–	–	0
Algeria	+	+	+	–	+	4
Libya	+	+	–	–	–	2
Morocco	–	+	–	–	–	1
Tunisia	+	+	–	–	–	2
Egypt	+	+	–	–	–	2
Iraq	–	+	–	+	+	3
Jordan	–	+	–	–	–	1
Lebanon	–	+	–	–	–	1
Syrian Arab Republic	+	+	+	–	–	3
Comoros	+	+	–	–	–	2
Djibouti	+	+	–	–	–	2
Mauritania	+	+	–	–	–	2
Somalia	+	+	–	–	–	2
Sudan	–	+	–	–	–	1
Yemen	+	+	–	–	–	2
Total number of ratifications	11	16	3	1	2	

Source: ESCWA and IOM calculations, based on NORMLEX Information System on International Labour Standards. Available from www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/ (accessed 17 February 2017).
Note: Cells with plus signs indicate ratification, and cells with minus signs indicate non-ratification.

Table 8. Global Rights Index 2016: violations of workers' rights

	Global Rights Index 2016	Country
5+	No guarantee of rights due to the breakdown of the rule of law	Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic
5	No guarantee of rights	Algeria, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
4	Systematic violation of rights	Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Tunisia, Yemen
3	Regular violation of rights	Morocco
2	Repeated violation of rights	-
1	Irregular violation of rights	-

Source: International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), 2016.
Note: No data is available for the Comoros.

Figure 50. Labour rights indicator scores for countries in the Arab region, 2012

Source: Kucera and Sari, 2016.
Note: Countries with a score of 10 received the most negative score by default due to a general prohibition of the right to establish and join organizations and/or conduct collective bargaining in law and in practice. No data are available for Palestine and Somalia; Yemen was dropped from the list due to inconsistent data.

the protection of their labour rights. Reforms of national labour laws in many Arab countries have done little to assist marginalized groups, such as domestic migrant workers, labour migrants with irregular immigration status, and refugees entering the labour market. Furthermore, where changes in legislation occur, they are regularly not implemented in practice, as shown in figure 50.

ii. Rights of migrant domestic workers

Countries in the Arab region host the greatest number of migrant domestic workers in the world: national figures report around 1.6 million, accounting for 17.9 per cent of all migrant workers in the region.[89] Other estimates peg migrant domestic workers in Gulf countries at 2.5 million.[90] Most Arab countries have failed

Box 16. Gender dimensions of migrant domestic work

Around 70 per cent of domestic workers are women, and they are among the most vulnerable groups of migrant workers. They face poor working conditions and insufficient legal protection. Most labour laws do not cover the inspection of private domiciles. Many employers of domestic workers are not considered 'employers' under national labour laws, and often do not fully understand their obligations under employment or immigration laws.

Domestic workers often live at their employers' domicile, creating isolation that can lead to further vulnerability. Those factors disproportionately affect women and reinforce gender disparities in terms of access to decent work, and impact the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 on poverty eradication, SDG 5 on gender equality and SDG 8 on decent work. Although female migrant workers dominate domestic work, half of the world's male migrant domestic workers reside in Arab countries. An estimated 10 per cent of male migrant workers in the region are domestic workers but the majority are employed as drivers or gardeners rather than housekeepers, thus highlighting the 'genderization' of domestic labour migration.[a] Migrant domestic workers usually earn less than other migrant workers, and experience wage discrimination depending on their country of origin.[b] Recognition of these gendered dimensions has emphasized gender mainstreaming across the SDGs, with specific focus on female migrant workers in target 8.8.

Source: Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.
[a] ILO, 2013b, pp. 21, 28 and 50.
[b] Kathiravelu, 2016.

to include migrant domestic workers in national legislation reforms, thus placing them at risk of exploitation.[91] The reports of human rights organizations overwhelmingly criticize the level of abuse suffered by domestic migrant workers under the *kafala* system. Human Rights Watch recently published dire accounts of domestic workers in Jordan, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.[92] There is a stark dissonance between national regulations, if they exist, and the reality for domestic migrant workers. Reported cases include physical, sexual and verbal abuse, involuntary confinement, and the denial of food or medical care by the employer. Other common issues are contract substitutions, withholding payment, and excessive working hours. Though prohibited by law, employers regularly confiscate passports. High recruitment costs leave workers vulnerable to debt bondage and forced labour. Moreover, the absence of inspections and inadequate legal aid leave victims of abuse without support or access to justice. They often

face countercharges by employers and police bias if they try to escape. Successful prosecution of forced labour cases is rare.[93] Despite hosting a large number of domestic workers, no Arab country has ratified the 2011 ILO Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189). However, it is hoped that national efforts, such as Morocco's new law regulating work for domestic workers, will help protect thousands of women and girls from exploitation and abuse.[94]

Countries of origin have largely been unable to institute sufficient safeguards for their workers. Most domestic workers in Arab countries come from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, India, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and the Sudan. Countries like Indonesia, Nepal and Sri Lanka have criticized abuses and have adopted initiatives to increase salaries and protection for their migrant workers.[95] Complaints have been submitted, particularly to GCC countries. Indonesia has implemented a migration ban to

Box 17. Refugees and labour rights in Jordan

Jordan has one of the highest proportions of refugees among its population in the world, and the Government has vowed to issue up to 200,000 work permits to Syrian refugees under the Jordan Compact to work in the country's export-oriented development zones. To facilitate the process, Jordan has waived work permit fees for Syrian refugees over a set period, to ensure that refugees can participate in the formal economy with better labour rights.

Jordan also actively promotes job creation for women refugees in the garment manufacturing sector. In addition to promoting skills-upgrading in the Jordanian workforce, the Better Work Jordan initiative, implemented by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank, supports refugees in gaining access to the apparel industry and building the necessary skills. However, the number of Syrian refugees who have obtained work permits remains very low, and the scheme does not give Syrians a choice of where to work. Despite limitations, such initiatives are key to establishing an enabling framework for refugees and achieving self-reliance, which is a critical element of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework adopted by the General Assembly in September 2016.

Source: ILO, 2016a.

several countries, including Oman, where traffickers abuse the *kafala* sponsorship system to their advantage. However, the policy does not stop migration and puts domestic workers at risk of trafficking or forced labour when they and recruitment agencies bypass the ban. However, countries like Bangladesh promote migration of domestic workers to the Arab region, without adequately advocating protection and higher salaries.[96]

iii. Protection needs and rights of refugees

Refugees constitute another especially vulnerable group. As described in chapter 1, most refugees and IDPs originate from Iraq, Libya, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Sudan and Yemen, and remain to a large extent in the Arab region, mostly in the Mashreq. For refugees and asylum seekers, the ability to engage in decent work can be crucial to their survival and self-sufficiency. Through work, refugees can bring growth and prosperity to host communities. The diverse skills, professional experience and entrepreneurial spirit offered by refugees can help fill labour shortages or gaps in

local markets, benefiting both refugees and host communities. The preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention states that refugees should enjoy the widest possible exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms. The Convention also contains specific provisions protecting the right to work for refugees. As such, refugees must benefit from the right to work, as provided for under international and regional human rights law.

Owing to their irregular status or because of host government policies and practices restricting access to the formal sector, refugees often remain in the informal economy and rarely gain access to formal employment. Their precarious situation makes them more vulnerable to discriminatory labour and abusive recruitment practices, and to unsafe working conditions. Like labour migrants in irregular situations, refugees have little protection against violations of labour rights and forced and bonded labour.[97] Hosting large numbers of refugees poses various challenges, which are best addressed by developing programmes and policies geared towards the social

and economic development of the entire community, including job opportunities for all. Consequently, refugees and nationals can develop their skills, improve their livelihoods, and contribute to the local community together.[98]

(d) Recommendations for strengthening the labour rights of migrant workers

Countries and other stakeholders can advance the labour rights of male and female migrant workers through a range of normative and practical measures, including the following:

i. *Commit to international standards for migrant workers*

The normative framework for the protection of labour rights, including those of migrant workers, offers a strong system of standards and guiding principles for labour migration in the twenty-first century. However, commitment to international norms remains limited in the Arab region. As a fundamental basis for protecting migrants' rights, all countries must ratify the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and key ILO conventions on migrant workers. The 2016 United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants has renewed the impetus for migrant protection. The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants highlights the necessity for minimum labour standards, promotes the fight against forced labour, and stresses that migrants must enjoy rights and protection under international law. As explicitly referenced by SDG indicator 8.8.2 on workers' freedom of association and collective bargaining, all countries in the Arab region that have not yet ratified ILO fundamental conventions No. 87 and No. 98 should do so, and lift any current restrictions in their national

laws limiting freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining.[99] To ensure the protection of particularly vulnerable migrant groups, countries in the Arab region are called upon to ratify the 2011 ILO Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189), thus advancing the protection of migrant domestic workers' rights.

ii. *Continue to reform the kafala system*

Although recent reforms in several GCC countries have addressed some shortcomings of the *kafala* sponsorship system, many issues remain. A contract-based system in line with labour laws and enforcement that strengthen protection would give migrant workers more certainty about their rights, working conditions and compensation. Employers must uphold their obligations, and migrant workers must be empowered to seek redress in cases of rights violations. Under most sponsorship systems, workers must have permission from their employer to renew permits, terminate contracts, transfer to another employer and, in some cases, exit the country. Such sponsorship systems are directly related to SDG target 8.7, which aims to eradicate forced labour and end modern slavery.

Several countries in the Arab region have introduced mandatory standard contracts in recent years, setting maximum working hours, hours of rest, rest days and other conditions for decent work. After their failed attempt in 2015, Gulf countries should resume discussions on a harmonized standardized contract for migrant workers in specific sectors to ensure the same rights across countries of destination and migrants' nationalities. National labour law reforms must focus on developing comprehensive and inclusive migration policies that are human rights-based and gender-sensitive, and that consider the needs and rights of different

groups of migrant workers, such as domestic workers.

iii. Develop and enforce evidence-based national policies

Comprehensive national policies require comprehensive data. To formulate informed policies, Governments must collect meaningful, comprehensive and disaggregated information on migrants' rights and protection in practice. Arab countries must formulate more concrete enforcement policies in terms of how to ensure a robust inspection system that focuses on monitoring working conditions and advocating compliance with labour law, rather than checking on the legal status of migrant workers; follow up on accusations and violations; guarantee unbiased investigation by police and other officials; and levy adequate fines for perpetrators.

iv. Improve access to means of redress and justice

Access to grievance mechanisms is crucial for realizing labour rights, as it enables migrant workers to report rights violations. Without formal unions and associations, it is difficult for migrant workers to demand their rights and decent working environments. In 2014, Qatar implemented an electronic complaints mechanism in various languages commonly spoken by migrant workers. Such mechanisms should also be implemented by countries of origin, which would require adequate staffing and training in consulates and embassies, since they are the main source of information on rights, legal assistance and shelter for migrants. Special procedures should be created for domestic workers to register abuse and unfair treatment, since they are one of the most vulnerable groups of migrant workers. Abusive practices are perpetrated by both employers and recruitment agents;

therefore, national policies should increase oversight of recruitment offices.

v. Foster cooperation on labour rights and conditions

The 2017 report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Migration emphasizes that key stakeholders, including employers, trade unions, training institutions and migrants, must be consulted in developing labour migration-related strategies. In this regard, it is crucial that labour migrants be allowed to form workers' associations and join trade unions.

Beyond national partnerships, labour mobility requires global, regional and bilateral cooperation and coordination to ensure safe working environments and the protection of labour rights. One method to achieve this is through the adoption of bilateral labour arrangements (agreements and memorandums of understanding). For example, a memorandum of understanding between Bangladesh and Jordan establishes that both parties must preserve the rights of workers and employers through legislation, in line with international standards and treaties.[100] While bilaterally agreed solutions cannot replace a comprehensive labour law that covers all migrant-intensive sectors and relevant enforcement mechanisms, such arrangements can improve labour conditions for certain groups and pave the way towards more comprehensive solutions. The Migration Governance Index encourages countries to form bilateral labour agreements that implement regulations for decent work and prevent extreme working conditions (heat, cold, radiation, etc.), undue recruitment fees or earnings below the minimum wage.[101] Bilateral labour arrangements are critical to promoting better working conditions for migrant workers. At the regional level,

Box 18. General principles for international remittance services

The following five principles for international remittance services, developed by the World Bank and the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures in 2007, provide general guidelines to improve the remittance transfer market, and make services contestable, transparent, accessible and sound.

- **Transparency and consumer protection:** The market for remittance services should be transparent and have adequate consumer protection;

- **Payment system infrastructure:** Improvements to payment system infrastructure that have the potential to increase the efficiency of remittance services should be encouraged;

- **Legal and regulatory environment:** Remittance services should be supported by a sound, predictable, non-discriminatory and proportionate legal and regulatory framework in relevant jurisdictions;

- **Market structure and competition:** Competitive market conditions, including appropriate access to domestic payment infrastructures, should be fostered in the remittance industry;

- **Governance and risk management:** Remittance services should be supported by appropriate governance and risk management practices.

Remittance service providers should participate actively in the implementation of the general principles; and public authorities should evaluate what action to take to achieve public policy objectives by implementing the general principles.

Source: World Bank and Bank for International Settlements, 2007.

the 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean, the Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration and Refugee Affairs and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue are key discussion platforms for advancing the rights of migrant workers in the Arab region. Countries should recognize migrants' contributions to development, and how the implementation of the 2030 Agenda is inextricably linked to the protection of migrant workers. To gauge progress under the 2030 Agenda, Arab countries must support the establishment of a global independent database to monitor migrants' rights.[102]

3. Transfer costs of migrant remittances

To reduce inequality within and among countries as envisioned by SDG 10, target 10.c aims to decrease the transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3 per cent of the amount remitted and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent by 2030. Less costly remittances mean that recipient households receive more money. Moreover, lower costs might encourage migrants or refugees to remit more, since high remittance costs could act as a deterrent to sending money. A 2008 cross-country regression study based on data from MoneyGram and Western Union found that a one percentage point reduction in transaction costs raised recorded remittances by 14-23 per cent.[103] The World Bank estimates that efforts to reduce remittance costs led to savings of approximately $42.5 billion between 2009 and 2013.[104] The Addis Ababa Action Agenda aims to ensure that adequate and affordable financial services are available to migrants and their families in both home and host countries by reducing the average transaction cost of migrant remittances by 2030 to less than 3 per cent of the amount transferred, and by using new technologies, promoting financial literacy and inclusion, and improving data collection.

(a) Remittance costs

There are many types of remittances: intra-family remittances, diaspora savings, philanthropic contributions, and/or diaspora investments. There are several factors that affect remittance costs, such as those incurred at the point of transfer, including transaction fees and exchange rates. Other costs are associated with acquiring the necessary documentation to send or receive funds, the channel in which receivers are paid (cash or credit), and the speed of the transfer.[105] At the macro level, an underdeveloped financial sector, weak competition between remittance service providers, a rigid regulatory environment geared towards preventing illegal financial transactions (money laundering and terrorist financing), lack of access to the financial sector, and hidden costs for both senders and receivers all contribute to higher remittance costs.

(b) Methodology for collecting data on remittance costs

Several variables are involved in calculating the transfer cost of remittances, including the transaction fee, the exchange rate and margin, and the speed of service. In principle, all those elements must be captured in the information to the consumer; however, this is not always the case in practice.[106] Since 2008, the World Bank has collected data on bilateral remittance costs for two amounts per corridor: the local currency equivalent of $200 and $500. The database has covered 365 remittance-sending corridors since 2016. The corridors studied flow from 48 remittance-sending countries to 105 receiving countries. Data is collected by researchers posing as customers, contacting firms within each corridor. Researchers collect data within each corridor on the same day, to control for fluctuations in exchange rates and other changes in fee structures. In most cases, data is captured from the main sending location/area for a corridor to the capital city or most populous city in the receiving market. However, data collection efforts need to increase significantly to fully reflect global practices: the 200 countries and territories for which United Nations statistics are provided constitute over 41,000 bilateral corridors. In addition, remittance cost surveys should not consider only urban populations in capital cities. Remittance costs to rural areas, which are often less integrated into financial markets, also need to be sufficiently assessed.

(c) Trends of remittance transfer costs

In the Arab region, the highest transfer costs occur when funds are sent from Saudi Arabia to Myanmar, where the sender has to pay over a tenth of the amount remitted in fees (figure 51). Egyptians in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have to pay 9.3 per cent and 7.1 per

Figure 51. Top five least and most expensive remittance corridors in the Arab region, 2016

Least expensive	
United Arab Emirates to Sudan	1.4%
Saudi Arabia to Sudan	1.7%
Kuwait to Pakistan	2.2%
Bahrain to Pakistan	2.3%
Saudi Arabia to Yemen	2.4%

Most expensive	
Saudi Arabia to Myanmar	11.1%
Saudi Arabia to Egypt	9.3%
Bahrain to Egypt	7.1%
United Arab Emirates to South Sudan	7.1%
Jordan to West Bank and Gaza	7.0%

Source: ESCWA and IOM calculations, based on World Bank, 2016a.
Note: Following the World Bank's methodology on the global average total cost of sending remittances, the data reflect the simple average of the total cost for sending $200 charged by each remittance service provider in 2016 included in the Remittance Prices Worldwide database.

cent, respectively, to send money home. The least expensive corridors for remitting funds are between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to the Sudan, amounting to less than 1.8 per cent of the transmitted $200.

The average cost of sending remittances in the Arab region stood at 7.6 per cent as at the fourth quarter of 2016, slightly higher than the global average of 7.4 per cent for the same period. The average cost of sending remittances to the Arab region decreased from 8.4 per cent to 7.4 per cent from the third quarter to the fourth quarter of 2015 following the inclusion of new low-cost remittance corridors in the calculation, mainly from GCC to other Arab countries. The cost of sending money to the Arab region is highest from OECD countries, particularly to Lebanon. Remittance costs from some GCC countries to other Arab countries are below the regional average, such as from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, partly because some commercial banks provide low cost services. For instance, the Saudi Central Bank reported a 63 per cent increase in the number of remittance service providers in banks between 2011 and 2015.[107] However, the cost of sending a base amount of $200 from Saudi Arabia to Algeria, Djibouti and Tunisia remains exceptionally high, reaching 25 per cent of the principal through MoneyGram, since few remittances flow from the GCC subregion to those countries. The second highest cost at 20 per cent of the principal is from the United Arab Emirates to the same three countries. The lowest costs are from Bahrain and Oman to Palestine at 0.3 per cent of the principal, followed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to Egypt at 0.5 per cent and 0.8 per cent, respectively, given the high volume of remittances. Overall, the average cost of sending $200 from both non-Arab and GCC countries to nine Arab remittance receiving countries – Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen – was 7.6 per cent, which is comparable to the Arab region average, while the average cost of sending $1,000 was 3.1 per cent of the principal.[108]

Figure 52 shows that among all 56 corridors with available data, of which at least one country is in the Arab region, 32 per cent of the corridors are above the 5 per cent threshold and 43 per cent are below the 5 per cent threshold, but still above the 3 per cent target threshold. A quarter of all corridors are in the "green zone" of 3 per cent and less. The World Bank's Remittance Prices Worldwide database shows that there are over 50 remittance service providers where the average cost of sending $200 is as low as 1 per cent and over 300 providers where it is below 5 per cent, demonstrating that the proposed goal of reducing transfer costs to less than 3 per cent by 2030 is attainable. Many major remittance service providers have scrapped fees for account-to-account transfers in high volume corridors, such as India.[109]

Major international banks' efforts at regulatory compliance, known as de-risking, continue to be a barrier to remittance cost reduction. The Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body that combats illegal financial transactions globally, defines 'de-risking' as the phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or restricting business relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid, rather than manage, risk.[110] In some cases, Governments view remittances as susceptible to illegal financial transactions, such as money laundering and financing terrorism, which can prompt them to close accounts and channels. According to a World Bank survey, account closures of money transfer operators are widespread, raising remittance costs and reducing access to remittance services, particularly in small markets and remote regions. De-risking has had a significant impact on remittance services in Somalia, prompting a partnership between the British Government and the World Bank, known as the Safer Corridor Initiative, to improve flows in the United Kingdom-Somalia remittance corridor, increase transparency, and support the development of a sound financial system in Somalia.[111]

Figure 52. Average remittance transfer cost by corridor in the Arab region, 2016

No. of corridors (share of total)

Saudi Arabia – Myanmar (11.1); Saudi Arabia – Egypt (9.3); Saudi Arabia – South Sudan (7.8); Qatar – Sudan (7.3); Bahrain – Egypt (7.1); United Arab Emirates – South Sudan (7.1); Jordan – West Bank and Gaza (7.0); Kuwait – Jordan (6.9); Saudi Arabia – Syrian Arab Republic (6.7); Saudi Arabia – Afghanistan (6.5); Qatar – Bangladesh (6.0); United Arab Emirates – Indonesia (5.9); Qatar – Egypt (5.8); Qatar – Philippines (5.3); Saudi Arabia – Ethiopia (5.2); United Arab Emirates – Jordan (5.1)	18 (32%)

5%

Qatar – Sri Lanka (5.0); Qatar – Jordan (5.0); Oman – Jordan (5.0); Saudi Arabia – Jordan (4.9); Qatar – Nepal (4.8); Saudi Arabia – Lebanon (4.7); Qatar – India (4.4); average Arab region (4.4); United Arab Emirates – Yemen (4.3); Qatar – Pakistan (4.2); United Arab Emirates – Egypt (4.1); Saudi Arabia – Philippines (4.0); Saudi Arabia – Bangladesh (3.9); Saudi Arabia – India (3.9); United Arab Emirates – Nepal (3.8); Oman – Sri Lanka (3.8); Oman – Nepal (3.7); Saudi Arabia – Indonesia (3.7); United Arab Emirates – Philippines (3.7); Jordan – Syrian Arab Republic (3.7); Saudi Arabia – Sri Lanka (3.5); United Arab Emirates – Bangladesh (3.4); Saudi Arabia – Pakistan (3.4); Oman – India (3.3); Oman – Bangladesh (3.2); Saudi Arabia – Nepal (3.1); Jordan – Egypt (3.0); Oman – Pakistan (3.0); United Arab Emirates – Sri Lanka (3.0)	24 (43%)

3%

United Arab Emirates – India (2.9); Kuwait – Egypt (2.8); Kuwait – Bangladesh (2.7); Kuwait – Philippines (2.7); United Arab Emirates – Pakistan (2.6); Bahrain – India (2.5); Kuwait – India (2.5); Saudi Arabia – Yemen (2.4); Bahrain – Pakistan (2.3); Kuwait – Pakistan (2.2); Saudi Arabia – Sudan (1.7); United Arab Emirates – Sudan (1.4)	14 (25%)

DECREASING

Source: ESCWA and IOM calculations, based on World Bank, Remittance Prices Worldwide.
Note: Following the World Bank's methodology on the global average total cost of sending remittances, the data reflect the simple average of the total cost for sending $200 charged by each remittance service provider in 2016 included in the Remittance Prices Worldwide database.

(d) Recommendations for reducing remittance transfer costs

The transfer costs of migrants' remittances can be reduced effectively through a mix of regulatory, information, financial inclusion and technology interventions. However, such measures must consider the specific needs, potentials and preferences of different groups of women and men sending and receiving remittances, by undertaking the following.

i. *Collect highly disaggregated data on remittance transfer costs*

Effectively monitoring different financial mechanisms is the basis for reducing costs. The World Bank's database on the price of transferring money in bilateral remittance channels is a first step. However, all data

and analysis must be gender-disaggregated: women and men earn and remit different amounts of money, use different methods, and spend their remittances in different ways. Moreover, further analysis is needed on sending money from and to rural areas, and in specifically challenging contexts such as post-conflict and crisis situations. Data collection should highlight which groups pay higher fees and are excluded from technological advances aimed at reducing transfer costs.

ii. *Provide migrants with more information*

In addition to obtaining accurate and up-to-date information, remitters should be informed of the safest and least expensive way to transfer monies. The recently launched SmaRT indicator of the World Bank

estimates the costs that a consumer with adequate information could incur in each corridor. It is calculated as the simple average of the three least expensive services for sending $200 in each corridor, expressed as a percentage of the total amount sent. Certain criteria are included in the SmaRT indicator calculation, such as transaction speed, physical accessibility to the transaction location, and access to technology required for completing the transaction. The global average cost using this methodology is 5.54 per cent as at the fourth quarter of 2016, considerably lower than the global average of 7.40 per cent. A total of 54 of the 365 remittance corridors in the Remittance Prices Worldwide database possess fewer than three services that meet all the criteria for inclusion in the SmaRT indicator index, and nine corridors have no services that qualify. This highlights the importance of financial inclusion initiatives in reducing remittance costs.[112] Apart from enabling consumers to choose the most cost-efficient transfer method, having access to sufficient and reliable information empowers them to launch redress procedures if problems arise with a remittance transfer.

iii. *Increase competition between remittance service providers*

Increasing the number of remittance service providers entails measures such as lowering capital requirements and loosening regulations. However, measures must be taken to ensure that partnerships between remittance service providers and postal and telecommunications service providers (for mobile transfers) are non-exclusive and allow new entrants.

iv. *Harness the power of technology and make advanced services accessible*

Remittance costs have been reduced in many countries owing to the use of digital money transfer platforms, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which is the leading region in this field. It eliminates the need for physical access to locations to send and receive money, making payments faster and more secure, and enabling access to remittances in remote locations. However, stringent regulations on cross-border transactions and the de-risking behaviour of major financial institutions hinder the wider adoption of digital methods in remittance transfers.[113] There are several regulatory, security and legislative issues regarding international remittances that must be overcome in the policy domain. For instance, effective services require harmonization of banking and telecommunications regulations between States.[114] Currently, most mobile money transfers operate only domestically.[115] Given its large remittance market, banks in Saudi Arabia are establishing remittance departments, some of which work in partnership with postal services; some department services include electronic fund transfers.[116] Related strategies should focus on how different groups of migrants and their households at home can benefit from such technologies, and on how to overcome challenges related to Internet infrastructure and technical education.

v. *Promote financial inclusion for migrants and receiving households*

Remittance recipients and senders are often insufficiently included in financial systems: they may not have a bank account or know about different methods of sending money. For this reason, they often resort to more costly and sometimes risky mechanisms, especially migrant women who more commonly do not have access to bank accounts. Efforts to promote financial inclusion, especially in rural areas, and collaboration with financial institutions should include propagating information on the least expensive and most reliable ways to send and receive remittances. The Special Representative of the Secretary-

> **Box 19.** Technology can decrease transfer costs
>
> A range of technological services have been developed to reduce remittance transfer costs. Services such as WorldRemit, a mobile money transfer company, decrease transaction costs and increase access to remittance services in remote areas. Money transfers are sent online using a payment card through computers or mobile apps, and the user has the option to send them directly into accounts, cash pick-up points or mobile wallets. Other mobile phone-based money transfer systems include BitPesa and MPesa that offer international money transfer services through mobile payment systems. Small amounts can be transferred between mobile money accounts, and larger amounts can be directly sent to bank accounts. BitPesa offers its services at a 3 per cent transfer fee, and payments are received in the home country 30 minutes later.[a] In addition to improving remittance flows and offering a low-cost alternative to money transfer operators and banks, services like MPesa increase financial literacy as the platform features basic banking services.[b] The provider has recently expanded its operations to India, providing a viable option for Indian migrant workers in the Arab region to send money home. Although poor and rural populations often do not have access to a formal bank account, mobile phone coverage exceeds 90 per cent. Therefore, sending remittances to mobile wallets offers a real alternative for those groups.[c]
>
> **Source:** Compiled by ESCWA and IOM.
> [a] Walecik, 2016.
> [b] IFAD and the World Bank Group, 2015, p. 31.
> [c] IFAD, n.d.

General for Migration stresses that remittances play a critical role in achieving SDG 1 on ending poverty and improving poor people's resilience to shocks, if they can be used as an entry point for financial inclusion.[117] Financial literacy and access to banking and other financial institutions, such as microfinance institutions and credit unions, increase access to various types of remittance services.[118] Remittance senders and receivers frequently interact with financial systems, which can be leveraged to create long-term relationships with financial institutions. It is therefore paramount to acknowledge that remittance-sending patterns are influenced by social norms, which are established by transnational households and their communities.[119] Studies show that low-income remittance-receiving households are more likely to save than other households, which increases their need for financial services and could simultaneously offer an increase in credit worthiness by using their remittance history as proof. Lastly, migrant workers need more financial services than just remittance services,

including to support long-term goals such as financing their return home.

vi. Ensure remittance services in crisis situations

While most activities related to remittances and diaspora investments take place outside of crisis scenarios, there is growing evidence that remittances to and from refugees can support the development of refugees and/ or communities of origin.[120] Countries and other stakeholders can support those flows and exchanges, and ensure that they reach households and communities in distress, which are often cut off from formal banking and remittance channels.

vii. Prevent undue restrictions of legitimate remittance transfers

Under this approach, the Financial Action Task Force recommends that financial institutions use a risk-based approach to more discretely identify clients that might conduct illegal financial transactions, such as money laundering or financing terrorism. Institutions are able to use

simplified processes for low-risk and low-value transfers (below $1,000), which could prevent unduly restricting legitimate transfers to certain regions, especially those with already fragile economies dependent on remittances from abroad.[121]

viii. Refrain from establishing taxes on remittances

Faced with the need to supplement falling oil revenues, nearly all GCC countries have discussed remittance taxes, although no formal policies have been passed to date. Many concerns emerge from such a policy, including possible adverse effects on the labour market (for example, the region might become less attractive to migrant workers on whom it is highly dependent), and regressive effects on low-income workers who already struggle to send sufficient remittances. A tax could lead to changes in migrants' remitting behaviour, who might switch to informal channels to avoid the additional cost. This in turn raises security and policy concerns, and would impede efforts to collect reliable information on remittance behaviour.[122] A reduction in remittance flows could also increase remittance costs, which would significantly impact several countries, such as Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, that receive the largest absolute amounts of remittances from GCC countries relative to GDP.[123]

C. Conclusion: Holistic migration governance can help achieve the SDGs

Countries have acknowledged the important and complex relationship between international migration and development and the need to deal with the challenges and opportunities that migration presents for countries of origin, transit and destination, and for migrants and their families.[124] Sustainable development and human mobility are interlinked in four ways: the level of development influences migration and displacement dynamics; migration, especially migration based on rights and migrants' skills, leads to immediate development gains for migrants; migrants, including refugees, are contributors to sustainable development in their host, transit and origin communities; and migrants, refugees and displaced persons are often vulnerable populations whose specific needs have to be considered to 'leave no one behind'.[125] Governance schemes at various levels can play an important role in facilitating migration, strengthening inherent capacities, and addressing risks and challenges.

The 2030 Agenda and its SDGs provide a meaningful platform to consider migration and its direct and indirect links to development. Several SDG targets explicitly refer to migration, while other targets are relevant to human mobility even if they do not mention migration.

SDG target 10.7 anchors a broad notion of migration governance in the 2030 Agenda. It urges all governments and stakeholders to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies. This target therefore acknowledges that it is possible to increase the quality and scale of migration's positive impact on the development of migrants, and of communities of origin, transit and destination. Well-managed migration policies can empower migrant women and men, protect their rights, ensure decent working conditions, and provide choices and liberties. For example, country policies on movements across borders and of foreign nationals have a direct impact on asylum seeker and refugee access to protection. Well-managed migration policies also focus on saving lives by search and rescue, both at sea and on land; and ensure the existence of protection-sensitive entry systems that provide humane and adequate reception centres, screening mechanisms, differentiated processing and referral, data collection, access to fair and efficient asylum procedures, and return and reintegration for persons found not in need of international protection.

With discussions underway on a United Nations global compact on safe, regular and orderly migration, and a global compact on refugees and its comprehensive refugee response framework, the international community must embrace the opportunity to promote international cooperation to harness the development potential of human mobility. The following key elements should be considered as a basis for establishing holistic migration governance regimes.

Key elements of migration governance

a. Enabling migrants must be the core goal of governance: Enhancing the freedoms and capabilities of migrant men and women should be at the core of all migration governance schemes, reflecting the international obligation to consider migrant men and women as rights-bearers first. In addition, fostering the rights, skills and well-being of all migrants is a necessary condition for successful policy initiatives, which in turn promotes sustainable development for and by migrants.

b. Interconnected SDGs require a holistic approach: The present chapter elaborates on individual indicators and policy options required to achieve migration-specific SDG targets. The discussion also demonstrates that indicators are highly interconnected and that the broader issues behind them should be considered. For this reason, it is important to adopt a holistic approach to policymaking and programming, instead of focusing on individual indicators.

c. Migration governance extends beyond migration policies: Migration governance goes beyond migration policies. All existing frameworks and General Assembly resolutions recognize that development policies and related interventions must include gender-sensitive and migrant-specific elements. Sound migration policies in the narrow sense – understood as interventions that regulate how to leave the country and how to enter it, including

bilateral and multilateral agreements on migration – should consider key development concerns and empower migrants. However, it is important to recognize that migration-related policies and programmes go beyond migration policy options, and that policies and strategies on health, education, employment, investment, housing, urbanization, agriculture and rural development, gender, conflict and the environment must take into account migration, transit migration, internal displacement and refugees. Endeavours to mainstream migration in national and subnational public policies and development strategies are needed to fully account for the transversal character of migration and displacement.

d. Collaboration between institutions is key for holistic migration governance: Meaningful collaboration within and between institutions is vital for moving towards more holistic migration governance. Such institutions, including working groups, councils and commissions, promote institutional and policy coherence, and address the challenges that a fragmented institutional set-up and legal framework pose to coherent policy approaches, as highlighted in the outcome document of the 2013 United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.[126] Such institutions require the involvement of critical stakeholders, including migrant, refugee and diaspora organizations.

e. Group and gender-specific needs and capacities must be considered: Well-managed migration policies must consider the specific challenges faced by different segments of the population. For example, female migrant workers might require other basic health-care services, often related to sexual and reproductive rights, than those needed by male migrant workers who more often suffer occupational injuries in high-risk working environments. Policies that do not take into account different groups of migrants run the risk of further marginalizing those who are especially vulnerable, including irregular migrants.

Understanding those different dimensions allows for more effective and targeted policies. Wholly disaggregated data are therefore needed to understand such differences and prevent unforeseen negative policy outcomes.

f. Evidence-based governance schemes require well-founded information: The discussion on SDG indicators in the present chapter highlights the considerable gaps in data on migrant populations. Implementing SDG target 17.18 on building capacities to produce high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by age, gender, race, ethnicity and migratory status is critical to understanding migrant-specific vulnerabilities and potentials with regard to general SDG targets.

g. Migration governance extends beyond migrants: Migration does not happen in a vacuum. In addition to having an effect on migrant men and women, migrant movements also involve communities of origin, transit and destination. For this reason, migration governance should consider where migration-specific interventions are needed and when interventions should target broader communities, including populations that are not on the move.

h. Migration governance is about outcomes and impact: The discussion on measurement frameworks for well-managed migration policies favours indicators at the input and output levels rather than at the outcome level: it is easier to assess whether a country has a certain policy or institution, than to assess their impact. Beyond the methodological challenges of designing measurements for such policies, it is paramount for policymakers to remember that good migration governance is first and foremost about outcomes and impacts.

i. Multi-level governance is required: Effective migration governance includes various levels of government, including local, national, regional, bilateral and global. Subnational entities, such as municipalities, often play a

critical role in catering to the needs of mobile populations or in engaging diasporas. At the regional level, the Arab Forum for Sustainable Development holds discussions on international migration, and considers regional sectoral reports on international migration. The roadmap developed by the Doha Declaration on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted at the twenty-ninth ESCWA session, meaningfully considers how issues related to migration can be linked to implementing the SDGs and promoting sustainable development throughout the Arab region. Although managing the effects of large-scale displacement within and between countries in the region is a key priority for fostering sustainable development, activities should also focus on the migration-related SDG targets, in particular on protecting migrant workers' labour rights; promoting safe and secure working environments, in particular for women migrants; facilitating orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration; and reducing the transaction costs of migrant remittances.

The 2016 Human Development Report highlights that although a large majority of the world's countries have joined forces to promote world trade and investment protection, fewer than 50 countries are committed to protecting migrants' rights as human beings and their economic rights as workers.[127] The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants said that better global migration governance would be advantageous for all States, because such a global phenomenon could not be dealt with unilaterally, bilaterally or even regionally.[128]

For this reason, countries and stakeholders should actively engage in discussions on the global compact on safe, regular and orderly migration, so as to facilitate migration and improve the working conditions and human rights of all migrants. Migration can accelerate sustainable development in all parts of the globe – everyone benefits from making human mobility easier, less expensive and safer.Ugia

Annexes

© Ahmed Rady/IOM - Large group of migrants, Egypt.

Annex I
Glossary of terms

Amnesty	A general pardon, "regularization" or "legalization" that is extended to people who can show residence in a country for which the amnesty is granted, despite the fact that such residence was unauthorized.
Asylum	A form of protection given by a State on its territory based on the principle of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognized refugee rights. It is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in his or her country of nationality and/or residence in particular for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Asylum seeker	A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. In case of a negative decision, the person must leave the country and may be expelled, as may any non-national in an irregular or unlawful situation, unless permission to stay is provided on humanitarian or other related grounds.
Bonded labour	Service rendered by a worker under condition of bondage arising from economic considerations, notably indebtedness through a loan or an advance. Where debt is the root cause of bondage, the implication is that the worker (or dependents or heirs) is tied to a particular creditor for a specified or unspecified period until the loan is repaid.
Child	An individual being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier (Article 1, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989).
Debt bondage	The status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his or her personal service or those of a person under his or her control as security for a debt, if the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied toward the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined (Article 1(a), Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Abolition of Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956).
Deportation	The act of a State in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing a non-national from its territory to his or her country of origin or third State after refusal of admission or termination of permission to remain.
Detention	Restriction on freedom of movement through confinement that is ordered by an administrative or judicial authority. There are two types of detention: criminal detention, having as a purpose punishment for the committed crime; and administrative detention, guaranteeing that another administrative measure (such as deportation or expulsion) can be implemented. In the majority of countries,

	irregular migrants are subject to administrative detention, as they have violated immigration laws and regulations that are not considered to be crimes. In many States, a non-national may also be administratively detained pending a decision on refugee status or on admission to or removal from the State.
Diasporas	Diasporas are broadly defined as individuals and members or networks, associations and communities, who have left their country of origin, but maintain links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates with the nationality of the host country, dual nationals, and second-/third-generation migrants.
Displaced persons	Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, either across an international border or within a State, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. **Source:** Adapted from United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998.
Displacement	The movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters. **Source:** Adapted from Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United Nations, 1998.
Facilitated migration	Fostering or encouraging of regular migration by making travel easier and more convenient. This may take the form of a streamlined visa application process, or efficient and well-staffed passenger inspection procedures.
Family migration	A general concept covering family reunification and the migration of a family unit as a whole.
Family reunification/reunion	Process whereby family members separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin.
Forced/compulsory labour	All work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself/herself voluntarily. **Source:** Adapted from Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United Nations, 1998.
Forced return	The compulsory return of an individual to the country of origin, transit or third country, on the basis of an administrative or judicial act.
Governance of migration	System of institutions, legal frameworks, mechanisms and practices aimed at regulating migration and protecting migrants. Used almost synonymously with the term "migration management", although migration management is also sometimes used to refer to the narrow act of regulating cross-border movement at the State level.
Highly skilled/qualified migrant	While there is no internationally agreed definition, two overlapping meanings are often intended. In very general terms, a highly skilled migrant is considered to be a person with tertiary education, typically an adult who has completed at least two years of postsecondary education. In a more specific sense, a highly skilled migrant is a person who has earned, either by tertiary level education or

	occupational experience, the level of qualifications typically needed to practice a profession.
Integration	While the term is used and understood differently in different countries and contexts, "integration" can be defined as the process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. It generally refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies, while the particular requirements for acceptance by a host society vary from country to country. Integration does not necessarily imply permanent settlement. It does, however, imply consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose. Local integration is one of the three durable solutions to address the plight of refugees. It may also be applied to victims of trafficking and unaccompanied children.
Internal migration	A movement of people from one area of a country to another area of the same country for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration).
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. **Source:** Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.
International migration	Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed.
International migration law	International norms and principles relating to migration deriving from State sovereignty – such as the right to admit, detain and expel migrants, to combat trafficking and smuggling, to protect borders, to confer nationality – and from human rights instruments. These two elements constitute the main pillars of international migration law. Instruments of international migration law are spread across various branches of law, such as human rights law, humanitarian law, labour law, refugee law, consular law, trade law and maritime law.
Irregular migrant	A person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The definition covers inter alia those persons who have entered a transit or host country lawfully but have stayed for a longer period than authorized or subsequently taken up unauthorized employment (also called clandestine/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation). The term "irregular" is preferable to "illegal" because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' humanity.
Irregular migration	Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of countries of destination, it is entry,

	stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term "illegal migration" to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.
Labour migration	Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws. In addition, some States take an active role in regulating outward labour migration and seeking opportunities for their nationals abroad.
Less/low skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker	There is no internationally agreed definition of a less or low-skilled and semi-skilled migrant worker. In broad terms, a semi-skilled worker is considered to be a person who requires a degree of training or familiarization with the job before being able to operate at maximum/optimal efficiency, although this training is not of the length or intensity required for designation as a skilled (or craft) worker, being measured in weeks or days rather than years, nor is it normally at the tertiary level. Many so-called "manual workers" (e.g. production, construction workers) should therefore be classified as semi-skilled. A less or low-skilled worker, however, is considered to be a person who has received less training than a semi-skilled worker or, having not received any training, has still acquired his or her competence on the job.
Migrant	Any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.
Migrant flow	The number of migrants counted as moving or being authorized to move, to or from a given location in a defined period of time.
Migrant stock	The number of migrants residing in a country at a particular point in time.
Migrant worker	A person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national. **Source:** Article 2(1), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990.
Migration	The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.
Migration management	A term used to encompass numerous governmental functions within a national system for the orderly and humane management for cross-border migration, particularly managing the entry and presence of foreigners within the borders of the State and the protection of refugees and others in need of protection. It refers to a planned approach to the development of policy, legislative and administrative responses to key migration issues.

Mixed movements (mixed migration or mixed flows)	A movement in which a number of people are travelling together, generally in an irregular manner, using the same routes and means of transport, but for different reasons. People travelling as part of mixed movements have varying needs and profiles and may include asylum seekers, refugees, trafficked persons, unaccompanied/separated children, and migrants in an irregular situation. **Source:** UNHCR, 10 Point Action plan on Mixed Migration, 2012, p. 291.
Naturalization	Granting by a State of its nationality to a non-national through a formal act on the application of the individual concerned. International law does not provide detailed rules for naturalization, but it recognizes the competence of every State to naturalize those who are not its nationals and who apply to become its nationals.
Non-refoulement	The principle of non-refoulement prohibits States from extraditing, deporting, expelling or otherwise returning a person to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would risk being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance, or of suffering another irreparable harm.
Push-pull factors	Migration is often analysed in terms of the "push-pull model", which looks at the push factors, which drive people to leave their country (such as economic, social, or political problems) and the pull factors attracting them to the country of destination.
Readmission	Act by a State accepting the re-entry of an individual (own national, third-country national or stateless person).
Refugee	A person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. **Source:** Article 1A(2), Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1A(2), 1951 as modified by the 1967 Protocol. In addition to the refugee definition in the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 1(2), 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention defines a refugee as any person compelled to leave his or her country "owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality". Similarly, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country "because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, gross violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order".
Refugee status determination	A process (conducted by States and/or UNHCR) to determine whether an individual should be recognized as a refugee in accordance with applicable national and international law.
Regular migration	Migration that occurs through recognized, authorized channels.
Regularization	Any process or programme by which the authorities in a State allow non-nationals in an irregular or undocumented situation to stay lawfully in the country. Typical

	practices include the granting of an amnesty (also known as 'legalization') to non-nationals who have resided in the country in an irregular situation for a given length of time and are not otherwise found inadmissible.
Reintegration	Reinclusion or reincorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence.
Remittances	Multi-directional, voluntary, and private international monetary transfers that migrants make, individually or collectively, to people with whom they maintain close links.
Repatriation	The personal right of a refugee, prisoner of war or a civil detainee to return to his or her country of nationality under specific conditions laid down in various international instruments (Geneva Conventions, 1949 and Protocols, 1977, the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, human rights instruments as well as customary international law). The option of repatriation is bestowed upon the individual personally and not upon the detaining power. In the law of international armed conflict, repatriation also entails the obligation of the detaining power to release eligible persons (soldiers and civilians) and the duty of the country of origin to receive its own nationals at the end of hostilities. Even if treaty law does not contain a general rule on this point, it is today readily accepted that the repatriation of prisoners of war and civil detainees has been consented to implicitly by the interested parties. Repatriation as a term also applies to diplomatic envoys and international officials in time of international crisis as well as expatriates and migrants.
Resettlement	The relocation and integration of people (refugees, internally displaced persons, etc.) into another geographical area and environment, usually in a third country. In the refugee context, the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them. The refugees will usually be granted asylum or some other form of long-term resident rights and, in many cases, will have the opportunity to become naturalized.
Return migration	The movement of a person returning to his or her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation.
Seasonal migrant worker/ migration	A migrant worker whose work, or migration for employment, is by its character dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during part of the year. **Source:** Article 2(2)(b), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990.
Skilled migrant	A migrant worker who, because of his or her skills or acquired professional experience, is usually granted preferential treatment regarding admission to a host country (and is therefore subject to fewer restrictions regarding length of stay, change of employment and family reunification).
Smuggling	The procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident. **Source:** Article 3(a), Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.

	Smuggling, contrary to trafficking, does not require an element of exploitation, coercion, or violation of human rights.
Statelessness	The condition of an individual who is not considered as a national by any State under its domestic law. Statelessness may result from a number of causes including conflict of laws, the transfer of territory, marriage laws, administrative practices, discrimination, lack of birth registration, denationalization (when a State rescinds an individual's nationality) and renunciation (when an individual refuses the protection of the State).
Temporary (labour) migration	Migration of workers who enter a foreign country for a specified limited period of time before returning to the country of origin.
Temporary migrant workers	Skilled, semi-skilled or untrained workers who remain in the country of destination for definite periods as determined in a work contract with an individual worker or a service contract concluded with an enterprise. Also called contract migrant workers.
Trafficking in persons	The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. **Source:** Article 3(a), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000. Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character.
Transit	A stopover of passage of varying length while travelling between two or more countries.
Undocumented migrant workers/migrant workers in an irregular situation	Migrant workers or members of their families who are not authorized to enter stay or engage in employment in a State.
Victim of human trafficking	Any natural person who is subject to trafficking in human beings.
Voluntary return	The assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or another third country based on the free will of the returnee.
Vulnerable group	Depending on the context, any group or sector of society (such as children, the elderly, persons with disabilities, ethnic or religious minorities, migrants, particularly those who are in an irregular situation, or persons of diverse sex, sexual orientation and gender identity (SSOGI)) that is at higher risk of being subjected to discriminatory practices, violence, social disadvantage, or economic hardship than other groups within the State. These groups are also at higher risk in periods of conflict, crisis or disasters.

Source: International Organization for Migration, IOM, *Glossary on Migration*, 3rd ed. (forthcoming).
Note: Data are based on different surveys.

Annex II
Country data

A. Migration to the Arab region

Table AII.1 Migration to GCC countries, 1990-2015

Year	International migrant stock at mid-year			
	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of origin, both sexes
Bahrain				
1990	173,212	34.9	29.1	India (60,505), Egypt (21,908), Pakistan (20,949), Bangladesh (20,442), Philippines (7,934)
2000	239,361	35.9	30.9	India (88,904), Pakistan (29,683), Bangladesh (28,889), Egypt (25,417), Philippines (12,508)
2010	657,856	52.2	27.7	India (259,915), Bangladesh (81,920), Pakistan (74,535), Egypt (67,374), Philippines (42,281)
2015	704,137	51.1	27.7	India (302,635), Egypt (80,889), Bangladesh (78,396), Pakistan (74,710), Philippines (48,059)
Kuwait				
1990	1,074,391	52.2	39.0	India (375,183), Egypt (135,880), Pakistan (129,928), Bangladesh (126,783), Philippines (49,207)
2000	1,127,640	58.4	32.5	India (418,664), Pakistan (139,783), Bangladesh (136,047), Egypt (119,693), Philippines (58,906)
2010	1,871,537	61.2	30.0	India (674,184), Bangladesh (257,626), Pakistan (225,431), Egypt (168,272), Philippines (112,782)
2015	2,866,136	73.6	34.1	India (1,061,758), Egypt (387,993), Bangladesh (350,229), Pakistan (312,434), Philippines (181,462)
Oman				
1990	304,000	16.8	20.2	India (152,554), Bangladesh (50,041), Pakistan (35,675), Egypt (18,811), Sri Lanka (13,996)
2000	623,608	27.8	21.7	India (333,881), Bangladesh (92,034), Pakistan (66,498), Egypt (28,536), Indonesia (17,274)
2010	816,221	27.7	19.3	India (473,206), Bangladesh (108,861), Pakistan (86,029), Egypt (30,361), Indonesia (25,701)
2015	1,844,978	41.1	18.9	India (777,632), Bangladesh (346,068), Pakistan (284,460), Philippines (85,949), Egypt (78,630)
Qatar				
1990	309,753	65.0	27.1	India (129,147), Indonesia (108,178), United Arab Emirates (39,178), Philippines (37,462), Bangladesh (36,556)

Year	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of origin, both sexes
2000	359,697	60.6	23.8	Indonesia (133,562), Philippines (44,593), Bangladesh (43,402), United Arab Emirates (38,184), Saudi Arabia (18,792)
2010	1,456,413	82.5	17.2	India (540,914), Bangladesh (169,370), Pakistan (145,204), Egypt (136,060), Philippines (107,963)
2015	1,687,640	75.5	16.1	India (645,577), Egypt (163,569), Bangladesh (160,183), Philippines (148,496), Nepal (151,314)
Saudi Arabia				
1990	4,998,445	30.6	33.5	India (906,468), Indonesia (635,007), Pakistan (556,715), Bangladesh (479,380), Egypt (357,540)
2000	5,263,387	24.6	33.2	India (978,992), Indonesia (668,666), Pakistan (586,225), Bangladesh (504,790), Egypt (376,493)
2010	8,429,956	30.0	29.6	India (1,579,235), Indonesia (1,070,951), Pakistan (938,913), Bangladesh (808,485), Egypt (603,000)
2015	10,185,945	32.3	31.9	India (1,894,380), Indonesia (1,294,035), Pakistan (1,123,260), Bangladesh (967,223), Egypt (728,608)
United Arab Emirates				
1990	1,306,574	72.1	28.7	India (458,294), Egypt (165,980), Pakistan (158,710), Bangladesh (154,869), Philippines (60,107)
2000	2,446,675	80.2	28.2	India (915,848), Pakistan (305,782), Bangladesh (297,610), Egypt (261,834), Philippines (128,860)
2010	7,316,611	87.8	25.3	India (2,913,802), Bangladesh (919,365), Pakistan (836,310), Egypt (755,158), Philippines (474,063)
2015	8,095,126	88.4	25.3	India (3,499,337), Egypt (935,308), Bangladesh (906,483), Pakistan (863,858), Philippines (555,704)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table AII.2 Migration to the Maghreb, 1990-2015

Year	International migrant stock at mid-year			
	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of origin, both sexes
Algeria				
1990	273,954	1.1	45.2	Western Sahara (167,905), Palestine (36,004), Sudan (9,127), Germany (6,544), Russian Federation (6,287)
2000	250,110	0.8	45.2	Western Sahara (165,911), Palestine (31, 667), Somalia (11,570), Iraq (7,579), Saudi Arabia (3,926)
2010	244,964	0.7	45.2	Western Sahara (91,905), Palestine (57,565), Somalia (21,031), Iraq (13,777), Saudi Arabia (7,137)
2015	242,391	0.6	45.2	Western Sahara (90,939), Palestine (56,961), Somalia (20,810), Iraq (13,632), Saudi Arabia (7,062)

	Libya			
1990	457,075	10.4	46.9	Palestine (152,266), Sudan (38,599), Germany (27,674), Russia (26,586), United States (19,067)
2000	567,436	10.6	35.0	Palestine (210,540), Somalia (76,918), Iraq (50,384), Saudi Arabia (26,101), Syrian Arab Republic (20,428)
2010	683,998	10.9	28.4	Palestine (253,786), Somalia (92,720), Iraq (60,735), Saudi Arabia (31,464), Syrian Arab Republic (24,624)
2015	771,146	12.3	28.8	Palestine (286,136), Somalia (104,539), Iraq (68,477), Saudi Arabia (35,474), Syrian Arab Republic (27,762)
	Morocco			
1990	54,895	0.2	47.1	France (15,056), Algeria (9,188), Spain (2,802), Tunisia (1,763), Syrian Arab Republic (1,399)
2000	53,034	0.2	48.6	France (14,547), Algeria (8,877), Spain (2,708), Tunisia (1,704), Syrian Arab Republic (1,353)
2010	70,909	0.2	49.6	France (26,733), Algeria (10,190), Spain (3,108), Tunisia (1,956), Syrian Arab Republic (1,553)
2015	88,511	0.3	49.8	France (29,271), Algeria (13,664), Spain (4,167), Tunisia (2,622), Syrian Arab Republic (2,082)
	Tunisia			
1990	37,984	0.5	50.2	Algeria (13,757), Morocco (7,275), France (3,870), Italy (1,622), Libya (1,224)
2000	36,446	0.4	49.2	Algeria (9,967), Morocco (6,558), France (4,754), Libya (1,791), Italy (1,608)
2010	43,172	0.4	48.5	Algeria (8,068), Libya (7,062), France (6,669), Morocco (4,480), Italy (1,705)
2015	56,701	0.5	48.2	Algeria (10,443), Libya (9,147), France (8,638), Morocco (5,803), Italy (2,209)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table AII.3 Migration to the Mashreq, 1990-2015

	International migrant stock at mid-year			
Year	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of origin, both sexes
	Egypt			
1990	173,708	0.3	47.1	Palestine (53,328), Sudan (15,184), Germany (9,692), Russian Federation (9,311), United States (6,679)
2000	173,452	0.3	46.8	Palestine (56,745), Somalia (11,540), Sudan (9,388), Iraq (7,793), Saudi Arabia (5,987)

2010	295,714	0.4	43.8	Palestine (126,871), Sudan (26,632), Somalia (19,145), Iraq (10,013), Saudi Arabia (7,693)
2015	491,643	0.5	46.1	Palestine (150,486), Syrian Arab Republic (146,837), Sudan (31,589), Somalia (22,709), Iraq (11,877)

Iraq				
1990	83,638	0.5	33.3	Iran (14,976), Palestine (14,347), Egypt (11,075), Jordan (7,970), Syrian Arab Republic (4,778)
2000	210,525	0.9	42.8	Palestine (94,124), Iran (42,602), Turkey (13,885), Egypt (12,375), Jordan (8,905)
2010	117,389	0.4	37.8	Iran (17,568), Turkey (17,502), Egypt (14,326), Palestine (12,956), Jordan (10,309)
2015	353,881	1.0	41.5	Syrian Arab Republic (246,556), Turkey (17,515), Iran (14,406), Egypt (14,364), Palestine (12,051)
Jordan				
1990	1,146,349	34.1	48.8	Palestine (851,880), Egypt (171,413), Syrian Arab Republic (51,557), Iraq (25,773), Sri Lanka (11,062)
2000	1,927,845	40.4	49.0	Palestine (1,428,251), Egypt (287,377), Syrian Arab Republic (57,624), Iraq (55,884), Sri Lanka (15,147)
2010	2,722,983	41.8	49.2	Palestine (1,760,396), Iraq (475,782), Syrian Arab Republic (149,685), Egypt (135,994), Sri Lanka (28,134)
2015	3,112,026	41.0	49.6	Palestine (2,142,755), Syrian Arab Republic (700,266), Egypt (138,939), Iraq (35,875), Sri Lanka (13,175)
Lebanon				
1990	523,693	19.4	48.8	Palestine (389,171), Egypt (78,308), Syrian Arab Republic (23,553), Iraq (11,774), Sri Lanka (5,054)
2000	692,913	21.4	49.0	Palestine (467,005), Egypt (130,459), Syrian Arab Republic (26,159), Iraq (25,369), Sri Lanka (6,876)
2010	820,655	18.9	47.9	Palestine (530,550), Iraq (143,391), Egypt (99,001), Syrian Arab Republic (20,679), Sri Lanka (3,887)
2015	1,997,776	34.1	51.9	Syrian Arab Republic (1,255,494), Palestine (515,550), Iraq (120,668), Egypt (83,312), Sri Lanka (3,271)
Palestine				
1990	288,332	13.7	54.2	Israel (98,290), Jordan (55,317), Saudi Arabia (21,258), Egypt (17,920), Kuwait (16,702)
2000	275,202	8.5	54.7	Israel (93,814), Jordan (52,798), Saudi Arabia (20,289), Egypt (17,104), Kuwait (15,942)
2010	258,032	6.3	55.6	Israel (63,515), Jordan (56,259), Saudi Arabia (21,993), Egypt (18,633), Kuwait (17,280)
2015	255,507	5.5	55.7	Israel (62,895), Jordan (55,709), Saudi Arabia (21,778), Egypt (18,451), Kuwait (17,111)

Syrian Arab Republic				
1990	714,140	5.7	49.0	Palestine (244,707), Iraq (3,825), Somalia (200)
2000	832,273	5.1	48.7	Palestine (294,205), Iraq (1,829), Somalia (443), Afghanistan (172), Sudan (91)
2010	1,661,922	8.0	48.9	Iraq (1,012,300), Palestine (254,356), Somalia (2,762), Afghanistan (1,611), Sudan (539)
2015	875,189	4.7	48.9	Iraq (253,609), Palestine (238,809), Somalia (2,538), Afghanistan (1,791), Sudan (562)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table AII.4 Migration to the Arab LDCs, 1990-2015

	International migrant stock at mid-year			
Year	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of origin, both sexes
Comoros				
1990	14,079	3.4	52.3	Madagascar (10,810), Réunion (957), France (543), United Republic of Tanzania (163), Kenya (87)
2000	13,799	2.5	52.8	Madagascar (10,595), Réunion (938), France (532), United Republic of Tanzania (160), Kenya (85)
2010	12,618	1.8	52.0	Madagascar (9,689), Réunion (857), France (486), United Republic of Tanzania (146), Kenya (77)
2015	12,555	1.6	51.6	Madagascar (9,651), Réunion (850), France (482), United Arab Emirates (145), Kenya (76)
Djibouti				
1990	122,221	20.8	47.4	Somalia (101,216), Ethiopia (13,405), Yemen (289)
2000	100,507	13.9	47.3	Somalia (83,230), Ethiopia (11,023), Yemen (238)
2010	101,575	12.2	47.5	Somalia (84,118), Ethiopia (11,141), Yemen (240)
2015	112,351	12.7	47.4	Somalia (93,042), Ethiopia (12,323), Yemen (265)
Mauritania				
1990	111,650	5.5	48.4	Senegal (94,138), Mali (6,776), Guinea (2,748), Algeria (1,450), Guinea-Bissau (1,067)
2000	57,366	2.1	45.7	Senegal (37,730), Mali (7,483), Guinea (3,042), Algeria (1,601), Guinea-Bissau (1,178)
2010	84,679	2.4	42.6	Senegal (38,381), Mali (7,612), Guinea (3,100), Algeria (1,627), Guinea-Bissau (1,198)
2015	138,162	3.4	41.9	Mali (56,557), Senegal (38,574), Guinea (3,105), Algeria (1,634), Guinea-Bissau (1,203)
Somalia				
1990	478,294	7.6	48.9	Ethiopia (460,000)
2000	20,087	0.3	47.1	Ethiopia (555)
2010	23,995	0.3	46.2	Ethiopia (1,882), Eritrea (37)

2015	25,291	0.2	45.6	Ethiopia (2,079), Eritrea (34)
Sudan				
1990	1,402,896	7.0	50.4	Ethiopia (942,295), Chad (196,164), Uganda (74,433), Eritrea (64,790), Nigeria (23,208)
2000	801,883	2.9	49.7	Eritrea (435,158), Ethiopia (123,478), Chad (72,615), Uganda (44,409), Nigeria (24,143)
2010	578,363	1.6	49.0	South Sudan (202,948), Eritrea (132,187), Chad (71,202), Ethiopia (70,677), Democratic Republic of the Congo (20,549)
2015	503,477	1.3	49.4	Eritrea (159,748), South Sudan (135,558), Chad (74,514), Ethiopia (60,734), Nigeria (14,828)
Yemen				
1990	118,863	1.0	43.6	Somalia (36,771), Sudan (18,648), Ethiopia (15,804), Egypt (8,579), Iraq (4,943)
2000	143,495	0.8	44.5	Somalia (69,012), Sudan (20,102), Egypt (9,206), Iraq (5,389), Palestine (2,794)
2010	285,837	1.2	45.9	Somalia (194,393), Sudan (23,170), Egypt (10,621), Iraq (10,441), Ethiopia (4,181)
2015	344,131	1.3	47.6	Somalia (245,683), Sudan (27,082), Egypt (11,096), Iraq (9,801), Ethiopia (5,740)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

B. Migration from the Arab region

Table AII.5 Migration from GCC countries, 1990-2015

	International migrant stock at mid-year			
Year	**International migrant stock, both sexes**	**Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population**	**Percentage of female migrant stock**	**Top countries of destination, both sexes**
Bahrain				
1990	12,274	2.4	52.3	Palestine (8,351), Libya (1,091), United Kingdom (583), Australia (493), Egypt (382)
2000	47,711	7.1	34.5	Bangladesh (20,661), Philippines (8,381), Palestine (7,791), United Kingdom (4,047), Canada (1,327)
2010	53,941	4.2	29.9	Bangladesh (28,523), Palestine (8,640), United Kingdom (5,573), Canada (2,137), United Arab Emirates (1,679)
2015	55,964	4.0	29.8	Bangladesh (30,160), Palestine (8,555), United Kingdom (6,261), Canada (2,388), Australia (1,656)
Kuwait				
1990	80,563	3.9	44.5	India (16,860), Palestine (16,702), United Arab Emirates (13,095), United States (8,889), Qatar (6,155)
2000	112,788	5.8	41.4	United Arab Emirates (21,687), United States (20,367), Palestine (15,942), Canada (9,513), Libya (7,947)

2010	173,992	5.6	38.2	United Arab Emirates (56,684), United States (22,739), Palestine (17,280), Canada (13,110), United Kingdom (12,511)
2015	187,871	4.8	38.5	United Arab Emirates (62,546), United States (25,434), Palestine (17,111), Canada (14, 651), United Kingdom (14,054)
Oman				
1990	12,489	0.6	48.5	Palestine (9,110), Libya (1,246), Jordan (540), Egypt (436), United Kingdom (281)
2000	15,606	0.6	47.2	Palestine (8,695), United Kingdom (1,954), Libya (1,247), Jordan (772), Canada (555)
2010	20,784	0.7	46.4	Palestine (9,426), United Kingdom (3,055), Canada (1,569), Libya (1,502), Jordan (1,435)
2015	21,333	0.4	46.9	Palestine (9,334), United Kingdom (3,432), Canada (1,753), Libya (1,693), Australia (1,540)
Qatar				
1990	12,107	2.5	50.6	Palestine (9,870), Libya (819), Egypt (287), Canada (259), France (151)
2000	14,716	2.4	49.0	Palestine (9,420), Canada (1,089), Libya (1,040), United Kingdom (1,026), Egypt (292)
2010	22,307	1.2	47.9	Palestine (10,211), United Kingdom (2,409), United Arab Emirates (2,244), Canada (1,715), Libya (1,255)
2015	25,681	1.1	49.7	Palestine (10,111), United Arab Emirates (3,996), United Kingdom (2,706), Canada (1,917), Libya (1,414)
Saudi Arabia				
1990	106,451	0.6	46.0	Palestine (21,258), Qatar (14,187), Libya (12,976), United States (12,632), India (6,058)
2000	153,365	0.7	41.4	Libya (26,101), United States (21,083), Palestine (20,289), Qatar (18,792), Canada (9,840)
2010	227,479	0.8	41.0	United States (33,019), United Kingdom (32,177), Libya (31,464), Canada (22,494), Palestine (21,993)
2015	270,029	0.8	43.4	United States (62,496), United Kingdom (36,148), Libya (35,474), Canada (25,139), Palestine (21,778)
United Arab Emirates				
1990	78,979	4.3	43.7	Qatar (39,178), Palestine (10,629), India (9,940), Kuwait (4,778), Turkey (3,344)
2000	110,945	3.6	40.3	Qatar (38,184), India (14,662), Palestine (10,145), Oman (10,139), Kuwait (9,199)
2010	121,530	1.4	45.5	Kuwait (21,472), Canada (14,912), Qatar (12,533), India (12,432), Palestine (10,996)
2015	136,557	1.4	47.2	Kuwait (24,662), Canada (16,665), Oman (14,756), United Kingdom (12,314), India (11,986)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table AII.6 Migration from the Maghreb, 1990-2015

Year	International migrant stock at mid-year			
	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of destination, both sexes
Algeria				
1990	905,365	3.4	43.4	France (788,914), Israel (19,544), Tunisia (13,757), Spain (11,518), Belgium (10,413)
2000	1,024,745	3.2	44.0	France (839,920), Israel (30,065), Canada (20,571), Spain (19,360), Germany (16,238)
2010	1,633,040	4.5	44.6	France (1,322,603), Spain (60,245), Canada (51,025), Israel (44,292), United Kingdom (23,879)
2015	1,763,771	4.4	45.2	France (1,430,656), Canada (57,024), Spain (55,306), Israel (45,680), United Kingdom (26,826)
Libya				
1990	74,803	1.7	47.4	Israel (19,180), Indonesia (13,860), United Kingdom (6,468), Italy (5,450), Côte d'Ivoire (5,379)
2000	78,675	1.4	46.7	Israel (19,432), United Kingdom (8,836), United States (5,364), Côte d'Ivoire (4,526), Indonesia (4,480)
2010	130,833	2.0	47.3	Italy (36,216), Israel (16,748), United Kingdom (15,742), Tunisia (7,062), United States (6,857)
2015	141,623	2.2	47.8	Italy (36,222), United Kingdom (17,684), Israel (17,273), Tunisia (9,147), United States (8,724)
Morocco				
1990	1,587,234	6.3	43.1	France (713,987), Italy (169,285), Israel (157,029), Belgium (135,422), Spain (133,341)
2000	1,947,544	6.7	45.2	France (760,148), Italy (285,569), Spain (266,706), Israel (166,953), Netherlands (151,473)
2010	2,779,496	8.6	44.8	France (856,493), Spain (763,765), Italy (425,165), Netherlands (167,858), Israel (158,158)
2015	2,834,641	8.2	46.4	France (926,466), Spain (699,800), Italy (425,238), Netherlands (172,291), Israel (163,113)
Tunisia				
1990	453,522	5.5	39.6	France (276,216), Italy (70,813), Israel (40,293), Germany (27,234), Belgium (6,112)
2000	480,116	4.9	42.1	France (294,250), Italy (75,563), Israel (36,146), Germany (23,332), Switzerland (7,454)
2010	606,017	5.6	41.4	France (359,248), Italy (107,653), Germany (39,955), Israel (22,828), Canada (11,721)
2015	651,044	5.7	41.6	France (388,598), Italy (107,671), Germany (41,332), Israel (23,543), Canada (13,099)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table AII.7 Migration from the Mashreq, 1990-2015

Year	International migrant stock at mid-year			
	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of destination, both sexes
Egypt				
1990	1,320,273	2.3	37.7	Saudi Arabia (357,540), Jordan (171,413), United Arab Emirates (165,980), Kuwait (135,880), Lebanon (78,308)
2000	1,704,547	2.4	35.2	Qatar (376,493), Jordan (287,377), United Arab Emirates (261,834), Lebanon (130,459), Kuwait (119,693)
2010	2,607,915	3.1	32.3	United Arab Emirates (755,158), Saudi Arabia (603,000), Kuwait (168,272), Qatar (136,060), Jordan (135,994)
2015	3,268,970	3.5	34.6	United Arab Emirates (935,308), Saudi Arabia (728,608), Kuwait (387,993), Qatar (163,569), United States (159,562)
Iraq				
1990	1,501,477	8.5	43.2	Iran (1,153,969), Israel (74,502), United States (44,916), Saudi Arabia (42,857), Sweden (38,795)
2000	1,161,698	4.9	42.5	Iran (540,400), United States (89,892), Israel (75,702), Germany (58,884), Jordan (55,884)
2010	2,561,482	8.2	46.6	Syrian Arab Republic (1,012,300), Jordan (475,782), Lebanon (143,391), Sweden (121,761), United States (116,459)
2015	1,479,966	4.0	45.6	Syrian Arab Republic (253,609), United States (175,566), Sweden (133,118), Lebanon (120,668), Germany (115,041)
Jordan				
1990	311,562	9.2	40.2	Saudi Arabia (90,278), Palestine (55,317), United States (44,916), United Arab Emirates (26,078), Kuwait (21,348)
2000	367,275	7.7	38.6	Saudi Arabia (95,064), Palestine (52,798), United Arab Emirates (47,494), United States (46,794), Kuwait (21,710)
2010	599,034	9.1	35.6	Saudi Arabia (152,257), United Arab Emirates (141,838), United States (61,477), Palestine (56,259), Kuwait (33,444)
2015	699,719	9.2	36.3	Saudi Arabia (182,152), United Arab Emirates (167,585), United States (64,868), Palestine (55,709), Kuwait (50,399)
Lebanon				
1990	505,729	18.7	42.5	United States (86,369), Australia (81,858), Saudi Arabia (57,203), Canada (52,394), Germany (45,648)

Year	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of destination, both sexes
2000	557,494	17.2	43.5	United States (105,910), Australia (79,050), Canada (67,856), Saudi Arabia (60,237), Germany (49,663)
2010	713,494	16.4	41.0	United States (118,708), Saudi Arabia (96,479), Australia (89,680), Canada (80,995), Germany (76,884)
2015	798,140	13.6	41.1	United States (123,337), Saudi Arabia (116,577), Australia (96,306), Canada (90,517), Germany (79,534)
Palestine				
1990	1,810,315	86.1	51.0	Jordan (851,880), Lebanon (389,171), Syrian Arab Republic (244,707), Libya (152,266), Egypt (53,328)
2000	2,666,403	82.7	49.5	Jordan (1,428,251), Lebanon (467,005), Syrian Arab Republic (294,205), Libya (210,540), Iraq (94,124)
2010	3,128,484	76.8	48.6	Jordan (1,760,396), Lebanon (530,550), Syrian Arab Republic (254,356), Libya (253,786), Egypt (126,871)
2015	3,551,185	76.0	47.6	Jordan (2,142,755), Lebanon (515,550), Libya (286,136), Syrian Arab Republic (238,809), Egypt (150,486)
Syrian Arab Republic				
1990	615,517	4.9	42.7	Saudi Arabia (305,838), Jordan (51,557), United States (36,728), Lebanon (23,553), Germany (15,330)
2000	705,114	4.3	42.4	Saudi Arabia (322,050), Jordan (57,624), United States (54,561), Lebanon (26,159), Germany (25,116)
2010	1,094,693	5.2	38.9	Saudi Arabia (515,803), Jordan (149,685), United States (57,987), Germany (51,330), United Arab Emirates (44,418)
2015	5,011,509	27.0	46.3	Turkey (1,568,494), Lebanon (1,255,494), Jordan (700,266), Saudi Arabia (623,247), Iraq (246,556)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Table AII.8 Migration from the Arab LDCs, 1990-2015

Year	International migrant stock at mid-year			
	International migrant stock, both sexes	Migrant stock as a percentage of the total population	Percentage of female migrant stock	Top countries of destination, both sexes
Comoros				
1990	40,076	9.6	44.9	France (18,859), Mayotte (10,288), Madagascar (8,179), Libya (1,230), Réunion (411)
2000	70,493	12.8	47.5	Mayotte (36,203), France (20,078), Madagascar (8,050), Libya (3,162), Réunion (1,509)

2010	108,553	15.5	50.2	Mayotte (56,520), France (33,867), Madagascar (9,876), Libya (3,810), Réunion (2,143)
2015	116,516	14.7	51.3	Mayotte (59,811), France (36,634), Madagascar (10,953), Libya (1,425), Belgium (783)
Djibouti				
1990	5,247	0.8	45.4	France (3,050), Ethiopia (904), Libya (694), Egypt (234), Canada (111)
2000	9,039	1.2	42.6	Ethiopia (3,258), France (3,247), Libya (1,047), Canada (496), Egypt (271)
2010	13,658	1.6	48.0	France (6,075), Ethiopia (3,025), Canada (1,447), Libya (1,264), Belgium (439)
2015	15,927	1.7	48.7	France (6,573), Ethiopia (3,705), Canada (1,617), Libya (1,425), Belgium (783)
Mauritania				
1990	134,113	6.6	44.1	Senegal (89,862), Mali (14,942), France (11,287), Côte d'Ivoire (9,873), Gambia (3,100)
2000	105,587	3.8	39.2	Senegal (59,956), Mali (12,423), France (12,017), Côte d'Ivoire (9,058), Gambia (2,474)
2010	113,398	3.1	37.3	Senegal (50,090), France (16,426), Mali (14,446), Spain (11,138), Côte d'Ivoire (7,702)
2015	119,334	2.9	38.1	Senegal (51,490), France (17,768), Mali (17,189), Spain (8,606), Côte d'Ivoire (7,997)
Somalia				
1990	846,606	13.3	47.0	Ethiopia (616,940), Djibouti (101,216), Yemen (19,517), Canada (19,517), Italy (11,363)
2000	1,003,535	13.5	48.5	Ethiopia (389,419), Kenya (159,197), Djibouti (83,230), Libya (76,918), Yemen (69,012)
2010	1,595,533	16.6	46.9	Kenya (398,753), Ethiopia (361,609), Yemen (194,393), United States (114,613), United Kingdom (98,604)
2015	1,998,764	18.5	47.7	Kenya (488,470), Ethiopia (442,910), Yemen (245,683), United States (145,579), United Kingdom (110,775)
Sudan				
1990	585,849	2.9	42.6	Saudi Arabia (178,769), Uganda (126,304), Ethiopia (53,857), Libya (38,599), United Arab Emirates (32,088)
2000	859,202	3.0	43.0	Uganda (360,660), Saudi Arabia (188,246), United Arab Emirates (54,597), Central African Republic (29,587), Chad (28,613)
2010	1,196,493	3.3	42.4	Saudi Arabia (301,500), Chad (293,127), Uganda (166,124), United Arab Emirates (111,835), Kuwait (41,140)
2015	1,890,861	4.6	45.7	South Sudan (552,391), Saudi Arabia (364,304), Chad (363,465), Uganda (164,136), United Arab Emirates (86,981)

Yemen				
1990	455,221	3.8	36.2	Saudi Arabia (286,032), United Arab Emirates (44,514), Kuwait (36,441), Israel (36,222), Libya (10,956)
2000	528,854	2.9	35.0	Saudi Arabia (301,194), United Arab Emirates (72,861), Israel (36,041), Kuwait (33,307), United States (19,210)
2010	880,927	3.7	32.6	Saudi Arabia (482,400), United Arab Emirates (172,602), Kuwait (47,616), United States (33,981), Qatar (33,584)
2015	1,012,889	3.7	34.6	Saudi Arabia (582,886), United Arab Emirates (173,480), Kuwait (65,129), United States (40,861), Qatar (34,877)

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Annex III
Youth migration

Country	Total youth migrants (age 15-24)	Percentage of total migrant population	Total number of male youth migrants	Males as a percentage of youth migrants	Total number of female youth migrants	Females as a percentage of youth migrants
Algeria	26,943	11.1	15,628	58.0	11,315	42.0
Bahrain	48,429	6.9	30,651	63.3	17,778	36.7
Comoros	2,042	16.3	936	45.8	1,106	54.2
Djibouti	21,533	19.2	9,952	46.2	11,581	53.8
Egypt	124,267	25.3	70,084	56.4	54,183	43.6
Iraq	68,521	19.4	40,870	59.6	27,651	40.4
Jordan	510,877	16.4	253,476	49.6	257,401	50.4
Kuwait	306,274	10.7	201,512	65.8	104,762	34.2
Lebanon	307,455	15.4	146,681	47.7	160,774	52.3
Libya	124,598	16.2	75,687	60.7	48,911	39.3
Mauritania	21,345	15.4	11,814	55.3	9,531	44.7
Morocco	11,290	12.8	5,878	52.1	5,412	47.9
Oman	255,120	13.8	208,746	81.8	46,374	18.2
Palestine	65,832	25.8	32,304	49.1	33,528	50.9
Qatar	213,175	12.6	177,150	83.1	36,025	16.9
Saudi Arabia	1,023,247	10.0	567,500	55.5	455,747	44.5
Somalia	3,654	14.4	1,758	48.1	1,896	51.9
Sudan	89,242	17.7	45,013	50.4	44,229	49.6
Syrian Arab Republic	105,991	12.1	52,412	49.4	53,579	50.6
Tunisia	8,340	14.7	4,477	53.7	3,863	46.3
United Arab Emirates	858,316	10.6	589,469	68.7	268,847	31.3
Yemen	77,255	22.4	40,351	52.2	36,904	47.8
GCC countries	2,704,561	10.7	1,775,028	65.6	929,533	34.4
Mashreq	1,182,943	16.7	595,827	50.4	587,116	49.6
Maghreb	171,171	14.8	101,670	59.4	69,501	40.6
Arab LDCs	215,071	18.9	109,824	51.1	105,247	48.9
Total for Arab region	4,273,746	12.3	2,582,349	60.4	1,691,397	39.6

Source: DESA, 2015b.

Annex IV
Remittances

Table AIV.1 Remittance inflows to Arab countries, 2006-2016e

Country	Remittance inflows (millions of dollars)					
	2006	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016e**
GCC countries						
Bahrain	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kuwait	..	..	5	3	4	35
Oman	39	39	39	39	39	39
Qatar	..	..	..	803	499	441
Saudi Arabia	106	216	236	246	273	297
United Arab Emirates	..	..	..	..	..	..
Mashreq						
Egypt	5,330	8,694	12,453	19,236	19,570	16,584
Iraq	389	71	177	271	729	837
Jordan	2,794	3,510	3,623	3,848	6,370	5,131
Lebanon	5,202	7,181	6,914	6,671	7,191	7,309
Palestine	464	741	927	1,737	1,805	1,723
Syrian Arab Republic	795	1,325	1,623	1,623	1,623	1,623
Maghreb						
Algeria	1,610	2,202	2,044	1,942	2,000	2,046
Libya	16	..	..	..	..	..
Morocco	5,451	6,894	6,423	6,508	7,736	7,010
Tunisia	1,510	1,977	2,063	2,266	2,347	1,794
Arab LDCs						
Comoros	63	101	87	110	126	132
Djibouti	28	30	33	33	36	66
Mauritania	..	..	..	..	..	..
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..
Sudan	801	1,591	1,456	596	507	160
Yemen	1,283	1,411	1,526	3,351	3,351	3,351

Source: World Bank, 2017a.
Note: (..) indicates that data are not available. '2016e' indicates that the data refers to estimates for that year.

Table AIV.2 Remittance outflows from Arab countries, 2006-2015

Country	Remittance outflows (millions of dollars)				
	2006	2008	2010	2012	2015
GCC countries					
Bahrain	1,531	1,774	1,642	2,074	2,364*
Kuwait	3,183	10,323	11,864	15,459	15,203
Oman	2,788	5,181	5,704	8,086	10,991
Qatar	3,690	5,380	8,141	10,413	12,192
Saudi Arabia	15,964	21,696	27,069	29,493	38,787
United Arab Emirates	6,072	9,995	10,566	14,398	19,280*
Mashreq					
Egypt	135	241	305	293	623
Iraq	781	31	48	548	539
Jordan	402	472	605	685	597
Lebanon	3,445	4,366	4,390	4,698	3,675
Palestine	7	8	18	48	42
Syrian Arab Republic	235	210	530	..	..
Maghreb					
Algeria	35	27	28	44	75
Libya	945	964	1,609	1,971	..
Morocco	38	54	62	64	75
Tunisia	16	16	13	18	26
Arab LDCs					
Comoros	0.4	1	1	1	..
Djibouti	5	5	12	12	12
Mauritania	..	..	..	240	172
Somalia	..	..	..	..	..
Sudan	2	2	1	8	68
Yemen	120	337	338	338	333

Source: World Bank, 2017a.
Note: (..) indicates that data are not available. * indicates 2014 figures.

Annex V

Arab States' ratification status of international legal instruments related to international migration as at May 2017

	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990)	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime	Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime
Algeria	2005 (a)*	1963 (d)	1967 (a)	2001 (s); 2004 (r)*	2001 (s); 2004 (r)*
Bahrain	-	-	-	2004 (a)*	2004 (a)*
Comoros	2000 (s)	-	-	-	-
Djibouti	-	1977 (d)	1977 (d)	2005 (a)	2005 (a)
Egypt	1993 (a)*	1981 (a)*	1981 (a)	2002 (s); 2004 (r)	2005 (a)
Iraq	-	-	-	2009 (a)	2009 (a)
Jordan	-	-	-	2009 (a)	-
Kuwait	-	-	-	2006 (a)	2006 (a)
Lebanon	-	-	-	2002 (s); 2005 (r)	2002 (s); 2005 (r)
Libya	2004 (a)	-	-	2001 (s); 2004 (r)	2001 (s); 2004 (r)
Mauritania	2007 (a)	1987 (a)	1987 (a)	2005 (a)	2005 (a)
Morocco	1991 (s); 1993 (r)*	1956 (d)	1971 (a)	2011 (a)	-
Oman	-	-	-	2005 (a)	2005 (a)
Palestine	-	-	-	-	-
Qatar	-	-	-	2009 (a)*	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	2002 (s); 2007(r)*	2002 (s); 2007(r)
Somalia	-	1978 (a)	1978 (a)	-	-
Sudan	-	1974 (a)*	1974 (a)	2014 (a)	-
Syrian Arab Republic	2005 (a)	-	-	2000 (s); 2009 (r)*	2000 (s); 2009 (r)*
Tunisia	-	1957 (d)	1968 (a)	2000 (s); 2003 (r)*	2000 (s); 2003 (r)*
United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	2009 (a)*	-
Yemen	-	1980 (a)	1980 (a)	-	-

Sources: United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status of Treaties. Available from https://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx?clang=_en (accessed 17 April 2017); International Labour Organization, Ratification by Convention. Available from www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12001:0::NO::: (accessed 9 May 2017).
Note: * with reservations; (s) signature; (a) accession; (d) succession; (r) ratification.

	Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954)	Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)	ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour (1930)	ILO Protocol 29 to the Forced Labour Convention (2014)	ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment (1949)	ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957)	ILO Convention 143 on Migrant Workers (1975)	ILO Convention 181 on Private Employment Agencies (1997)	ILO Convention 189 on Domestic Workers (2011)
	1964 (a)	-	1962	-	1962*	1969	-	2006	-
	-	-	1981	-	-	1998	-	-	-
	-	-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-
	-	-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-
	-	-	1955	-	-	1958	-	-	-
	-	-	1962	-	-	1959	-	-	-
	-	-	1966	-	-	1958	-	-	-
	-	-	1968	-	-	1961	-	-	-
	-	-	1977	-	-	1977	-	-	-
	1989 (a)	1989 (a)	1961	-	-	1961	-	-	-
	-	-	1961	2016	-	1997	-	-	-
	-	-	1957	-	-	1966	-	1999	-
	-	-	1998	-	-	2005	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	-	-	1998	-	-	2007	-	-	-
	-	-	1978	-	-	1978	-	-	-
	-	-	1960	-	-	1961	-	-	-
	-	-	1957	-	-	1970	-	-	-
	-	-	1960	-	-	1958	-	-	-
	1969 (a)	2000 (a)*	1962	-	-	1959	-	-	-
	-	-	1982	-	-	1997	-	-	-
	-	-	1969	-	-	1969	-	-	-

Endnotes

Chapter 1

1. The four major subregions in the present report are: (a) Member States of the GCC: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates; (b) Maghreb countries: Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; (c) Mashreq countries: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and the Syrian Arab Republic; (d) Arab least developed countries: the Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen.
2. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), 2016b.
3. International Labour Organization (ILO), 2015b.
4. Ibid.
5. DESA, 2015b.
6. These figures are based on DESA data compiled in 2015 largely from national census data. While they comprise refugee data shared by UNHCR for countries in which refugees are not included in census data, they do not capture the most recent official refugee data from 2016. Data on Palestinian refugees from UNRWA are included in the DESA data, except in the case of Palestinian refugees in Palestine.
7. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
8. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
9. Authors' calculation, based on DESA data.
10. ILO, 2015b.
11. Throughout this report, data on refugees include people referred to by UNHCR as "refugees and people in refugee-like situations". Data on Palestinian refugees under the mandate of UNRWA are not included in UNHCR data.
12. Note that some refugees have subsequently been internally displaced, for example in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, and hence would be counted both within refugee data and IDP data.
13. UNHCR, 2016e.
14. ESCWA calculation based on UNHCR, 2016e and DESA, 2015b.
15. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), n.d.
16. DESA, 2015b.
17. Ibid.
18. DESA, 2015b.
19. This figure does not include all Palestinians registered as refugees with UNRWA.
20. DESA, 2015b.
21. Eurostat, n.d.
22. Migration Policy Institute (MPI), n.d.
23. Dubai Statistics Center, 2015.
24. ILO, 2015b.
25. UNHCR, 2016e.
26. Persons from Western Sahara are counted separately in the source used for this table. The designation of Western Sahara as a territory and its presentation separately in this table reflect this fact and do not imply expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations or the International Organization for Migration concerning the status of this territory, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
27. IOM, 2017d.
28. IOM, 2016d.
29. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, Libya. Available from www.globaldtm.info/libya/ (accessed 14 May 2017).
30. UNHCR, 2017b.
31. IOM, 2017c, p. 3.
32. DESA, 2015b.
33. UNHCR, 2016e.
34. DESA, 2015b.
35. Ghazal, 2016.
36. UNHCR, 2016e.
37. UNRWA, n.d.
38. This figure excludes Palestinians who possess Jordanian national identification numbers.
39. Ghazal, 2016.
40. Refers only to those without national identification numbers.
41. Ghazal, 2016.
42. Syria Regional Refugee Response, 2017.
43. Ibid.
44. Farid and El-Batrawy, 2015.
45. DESA, 2015b.
46. UNHCR, 2017b.
47. DESA, 2015b.
48. World Bank, 2017a.
49. World Bank, 2017a.
50. DESA, 2015b.
51. World Bank, 2017a.
52. UNHCR, 2016d.
53. DESA, 2015b.
54. UNHCR, 2016d.
55. World Bank, 2017a.
56. DESA, 2015b.
57. UNHCR, 2016d.
58. World Bank, 2017a.
59. DESA, 2015b.

Chapter 2

1. For developments from the previous biennial, see United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and International Organization for Migration, 2015.
2. Since official sources were not always available, the present chapter focuses on reports from international organizations and on news reports where necessary.
3. BBC News, 2013.
4. Libya, 2016.
5. Algeria, 2016.
6. لبنان، رئاسة مجلس الوزراء، 2015أ.
7. Collective for Research and Training on Development – Action (CRTDA), 2015.
8. www.lebanity.gov.lb.
9. البحرين، 2015.
10. Izzak, 2016b.
11. Dorsey, n.d.
12. Migrant-Rights, 2016d.
13. International Labour Organization (ILO), 2017a.
14. Saudi Arabia has also rolled out a WPS system in 2013.
15. قطر، 2015أ.
16. Qatar, 2015.
17. ILO, 2015c.
18. The Jordan Times, 2017.
19. United Arab Emirates, 2015a.
20. United Arab Emirates, 2015b.
21. United Arab Emirates, 2015c.
22. Brophy, 2016.
23. Toumi, 2016a.
24. Arabian Business, 2016a.
25. DT News, 2016a.
26. مصر، 2016ج.
27. La Vie Eco, 2015.
28. حمد العازمي، 2015.
29. سعد العنزّي، 2016.
30. داوود، 2016.
31. مصر، 2015.
32. وفاء الصعيدي، 2016.
33. البيان، 2015.
34. United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Interior Citizenship & Residence & Outlets, 2015.

35. United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation, 2017.
36. لبنان، وزارة العمل، 2015.
37. Gulf News, 2016b.
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89. See annex V for information on Arab States' ratification of international instruments related to migration.
90. Djibouti, Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, 2016c.
91. Lefébure, 2016.
92. العرب اليوم، 2016.
93. Libya, 2016.
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120. Libya, 2016.
121. United Nations Human Rights Council, 2015a, p. 16.
122. قطر، 2015ب.
123. Saudi Gazette, 2016b.
124. Toumi, 2016c.
125. IOM, 2016b.
126. European Council, 2015b.
127. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue is an interregional ministerial consultation on overseas employment and contractual labour for countries of origin and destination in Asia, bringing together GCC countries and Asian countries of origin of migrant labour.
128. Abu Dhabi Dialogue, 2016.

129. Abu Dhabi Dialogue, 2017.
130. League of Arab States, 2016.
131. Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 2016.
132. Memorandum of understanding on higher education, research, and vocational education and vocational training between the Government of Australia and the Government of the State of Qatar, 2016.
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134. Memorandum of understanding between India and Bahrain on cooperation for prevention of human trafficking especially trafficking in women and children, 2016.
135. Memorandum of understanding between India and United Arab Emirates on cooperation in preventing and combating of human trafficking, 2016.
136. European Union External Action, 2016.
137. Gadugah, 2016.
138. Baike, 2016.
139. قطر، 2015ج.
140. Gulf News, 2016a.
141. United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation, 2016.
142. UNHCR, 2016b.

Chapter 3

1. United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 2016a, para. 47. The Forum is a regional platform for Arab States to consider the means, frameworks and mechanisms for follow-up and review of the sustainable development agenda that builds on existing regional initiatives and structures.
2. Global Commission on International Migration, 2005.
3. Certain types of distress migration and displacement might not necessarily lead to an improvement in development outcomes for the individuals involved.
4. However, where temporary schemes do not correspond to specific temporary production bottlenecks and where they replace more long-term migration opportunities, they are often detrimental to sustainable human development. This is particularly the case where programmes that are conceptually temporary keep migrant workers for long periods on a series of short-term visas.
5. Naujoks, 2013.
6. Betts and others, 2016; Koinova, 2016.
7. For an assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees on host communities, see International Rescue Committee, (IRC), n.d.; and Betts and others, 2016.
8. For Egypt's diaspora and emigrant policies, see Tsourapas, 2015; for Morocco, see Iskander, 2010; and for India, see Naujoks, 2013. For an overview of how to compare

and theorize State-diaspora relations, see Délano and Gamlen, 2015.

9. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), 2016, para. 11.

10. A/RES/71/1, para. 16.

11. Ibid., paras. 37, 38, 85 and 86.

12. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2015.

13. Bakewell, 2015. There is a trend to securitize migration and refugee issues: some States establish deterrence policies and non-arrival measures that hinder international mobility, and prioritize the 'fight' against irregular migration over other aspects of migration policies.

14. A/71/728, para. 4. The Special Representative also highlights that States should avoid the criminalization of victims, and the reliance on border and law enforcement alone (para. 37).

15. Hollifield, 2004.

16. UNHCR, 2016c. UNHCR has identified eight such pathways including resettlement, family unity, humanitarian admission, private sponsorships, labour mobility schemes, medical or emergency evacuation and academic scholarships.

17. A/69/302, para. 26.

18. Comparing the impact of diaspora direct investments and non-diaspora foreign direct investment on key economic indicators in Tunisia, a firm-level survey showed that while companies that received diaspora investment created fewer jobs and paid lower salaries than firms receiving non-diaspora foreign direct investment, diaspora investors brought critical capital to less developed regions and sectors (UNDP, 2016a).

19. UNDP, 2016b.

20. OHCHR, 2016.

21. de Haas, 2007a; Clemens, 2014.

22. Global Commission on International Migration, 2005; ILO, 2014.

23. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016.

24. Knowledge partners are researchers at the United Nations University, Columbia University and Maastricht University.

25. A/71/296, para. 32.

26. UNHCR, 2016c, paras. 46 and 57; A/RES/70/147, para. 4.

27. A/71/385.

28. Martin, 2017.

29. Ibid.

30. A/68/190, pp. 20-22.

31. ILO, 2016d.

32. Martin, 2017.

33. IOM, 2016f, p. 7.

34. Martin, 2017.

35. Rahman, 2011.

36. Open Working Group on Labour Migration & Recruitment, 2017a.

37. Abella and Martin, 2014; Martin, 2017.

38. Abella and Martin, 2014, p. 3.

39. Ibid.

40. United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 2016b; DESA, Statistics Division, 2017d, pp. 89-91.

41. DESA, Statistics Division, 2017d, pp. 89-91.

42. Leighton, 2017.

43. Martin, 2017.

44. Leighton, 2017.

45. Martin, 2017.

46. Jureidini, 2016.

47. Martin, 2017.

48. A/HRC/29/36.

49. The Wall Street Journal, 2015.

50. IOM, 2016f, p. 86.

51. Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), 2014.

52. Martin, 2017.

53. Ibid.

54. Martin, 2013, p. 4.

55. Jones, 2015.

56. IOM, 2016f; Abu Dhabi Dialogue, 2017.

57. UN Women and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), 2016.

58. Martin, 2017.

59. Ibid.

60. Altschuller, 2015.

61. ILO, 2015a, p. 35.

62. A/71/728, p. 19.

63. Open Working Group on Labour Migration & Recruitment, 2017a, p. 4.

64. Martin, 2017.

65. ILO, 2017e.

66. A/71/385, para. 11.

67. ILO, 2013c.

68. ILO, 1998.

69. ILO, 2017f.

70. DESA, Statistics Division, 2017b.

71. ILO, 2017c.

72. Grivna, Eid and Abu-Zidan, 2015.

73. ILO, 2013a; ILO, 2017e, pp. 170-178.

74. Joubert, Thomsen and Harrison, 2011.

75. Grivna, Eid and Abu-Zidan, 2015.

76. ILO, 2010.

77. ESCWA and IOM, 2015, p. 87.

78. Algeria's national social insurance scheme receives all available data on occupational accidents, shares the information with the labour inspection department, and publishes an annual report including statistical data analysis (ILO, 2017e, p. 56).

79. A/RES/70/1. Objective 3.1.

80. Grivna, Eid and Abu-Zidan, 2015.

81. ILO, 2017e.

82. For a comprehensive description of the methodology, see Kucera and Sari, 2016; and DESA, Statistics Division, 2016a.

83. ITUC, 2016, p. 7.

84. Human Rights Watch, 2017a.

85. McGeehan, 2015.

86. Khawaja, 2016.

87. Pande, 2012.

88. For more details on each country, see http://survey.ituc-csi.org/?lang=en.

89. ILO, 2016e, p. 5.

90. ITUC, 2014.

91. ILO, 2016e.

92. Human Rights Watch, 2016d, 2016e, 2017a.

93. Wilcke, 2011; Begum, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2017b.

94. Human Rights Watch, 2016c.

95. ILO, 2012.

96. Human Rights Watch, 2016d.

97. ILO, 2016c.

98. ILO, 2016a, 2016f.

99. ECOSOC, 2016b.

100. Memorandum of Understanding between Bangladesh and Jordan in the field of manpower, 2012, Article 3, as quoted in ILO, 2015a, p. 25.

101. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016.

102. A/71/728.

103. Freunda and Spatafora, 2008.

104. World Bank, 2014.

105. World Bank and Bank for International Settlements, 2007, p. 1.

106. DESA, Statistics Division, 2016b.

107. World Bank, 2016b.

108. Union of Arab Banks, 2016.

109. World Bank, 2015a, p. 14.

110. Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2014.

111. World Bank, 2015b.

112. World Bank, 2016a, pp. 3-4.

113. World Bank, 2015a, p. 10.

114. World Bank 2016c, p. 116.

115. IFAD, n.d.

116. Oxford Business Group, 2015.

117. A/71/728, para. 66.

118. Ratha, 2012.

119. Carling, 2014.

120. Vargas-Silva, 2016.

121. Ibid., p. 11.

122. Malit and Naufal, 2016.

123. World Bank, 2016b, p. 26.

124. A/RES/71/237.

125. Naujoks, 2016.

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128. A/71/285, para. 42.

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Migration remains a prominent feature of the Arab region. The Arab region hosts nearly 35 million migrants and 19 million displaced persons. Over 26 million persons from Arab countries are living outside their country of origin. This report offers a new and emergent understanding of the critical nexus between migration and sustainable development. Exploring the trends and patterns of migration in the region and documenting progress in migration governance among Arab countries, this report presents recommendations for how the region can continue to improve in achieving both good migration governance and the sustainable development goals.

In line with the 2030 Agenda concept of "leaving no one behind," this report provides a roadmap for progress. This report also comes at a key moment in time where the migration trends in regions across the world are being considered in the negotiations for the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.