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**POLSCI.733**  
**Maximum likelihood estimation**  
**Term paper**  
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## 1. Introduction

Contemporary research holds that co-optation and political repression represent two mainstays of authoritarian regimes (Gerschewski, 2013, 21f.). Usually co-optation is defined as “the intentional extension of benefits to potential challengers to the regime in exchange for their loyalty” (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014, p. 333). Legislatures and political parties are said to simplify those exchanges. Since the end of the Cold War those nominally democratic institutions have taken root in almost every authoritarian regime. In fact, by the end of the observation period of the replication study (2004) only Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar sustained neither political parties nor a publicly elected parliament. At the same time authoritarian regimes did not forget about political repression. Restrictions on core political liberties and violations of physical integrity rights limit public criticism of the government and undermine coordinated campaigns against it. Yet, little is known about how co-optation affects political repression.



Figure 1: Parties and legislatures in authoritarian regimes, 2004

This is the point of departure for Erica Frantz’ and Andrea Kendall-Taylor’s (2014) ‘A dictators toolkit: Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies’. Based on extensive quantitative analyses they argue that co-optation fundamentally changes the use of repression (*ibid.*, p. 332). More precisely, they find that increasing levels of co-optation lead dictators to reduce restrictions on empowerment rights, but at the same time they increase physical integrity violations. The authors explain their key finding with the trade-offs involved in political repression. Restrictions on empowerment such as the freedoms of speech and assembly aim at the general public and characterize a diffuse approach to social control. Physical integrity violations such as torture and extrajudicial killings in contrast target specific individuals and are more attractive when the opposition is known. Nominally democratic institutions offer fora where regime opponents can raise demands and thus they increase the available information on the political opposition. Under the bottom line, the institutions of co-optation generate knowledge on threats to the regime and lead dictators to prefer physical integrity violations over empowerment rights restrictions (*ibid.*, p. 337).

This paper replicates the work of Frantz and Kendall-Taylor. It presents evidence on the violation of key statistical assumptions in the original publication and raises concerns with regard to predictive accuracy. Moreover, it casts doubt on a widespread estimation strategy that depends on lagged dependent variables to control for serial autocorrelation in pooled time-series cross-sectional designs. My own extension considers the possibility that increases in physical integrity violations undermine the credibility of nominally

democratic political institutions and attenuate the emancipating effect they might have on empowerment rights restrictions. The following section describes design and data and design of the original publication, and section three presents the replication results. Section four discusses my modified model, and section five concludes.

## 2. Design & data

Based on Geddes et al.'s (2014) "Autocratic regimes" data Frantz and Kendall-Taylor analyze 154 dictatorships over the period from 1981 to 2004. The authors follow the example of J. R. Vreeland (2008) and run ordered logistic regressions (c.f. Fox, 2008; Fox and Weisberg, 2011) to account for the ordinal nature of their dependent variables. Consequently, their research design probes the effect of co-optation on either type of political repression, empowerment rights restrictions and physical integrity violations, based on pooled time-series cross-section data. Furthermore, as institutional changes might take years to impact government policies, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor use contemporaneous levels of co-optation ( $t_0$ ) to predict future levels of political repression ( $t_0 + 1$  to  $t_0 + 5$ ). All models include a lagged dependent variable ( $t_0$ ) to account for serial autocorrelation and standard errors are clustered at the country level as a remedy to heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995). Finally, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor used multiple imputation to avoid inefficiency and biased estimates or inference (Honaker and King, 2010; Honaker, King, and Blackwell, 2011; King et al., 2001).

Information on political repression is drawn from two different sources. To assess the level of empowerment rights restrictions the authors rely on Freedom House's civil liberties scale. It captures the extent to which citizens enjoy the "freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy from the state" (Freedom House, 2010). In contrast to alternative measurements, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor argue, the Freedom House data is not endogenous to the existence of political parties and legislatures, i.e. their measurement of co-optation. The scale runs from 1 to 7, and higher values denote more restrictions on empowerment rights. Physical integrity violations are measured using the physical integrity index from the CIRI human rights dataset which provides "standards-based measures of government human rights practices" (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010, p. 402). It assesses the extent of torture, political imprisonment, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances on a scale from 0 to 8 whereby higher values denote more government respect for the sanctity of person. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor recode the index such that higher values denote more political repression.

The typology of political repression draws out meaningful differences between authoritarian regimes. This can be seen from Figure 2 which explores their relationship in the unimputed data. The full range of physical integrity violations is observed, but empowerment rights restrictions do not take their lowest possible value 1. Hence, all




Figure 2: Political repression in authoritarian regimes between 1981 and 2004 with LOESS smoother and .95 per cent confidence envelope added.

authoritarian regimes restrict civil and political liberties, but they do not always disrespect the sanctity of the individual at the same time. Moreover, Pearson's  $r$  between both repression types is only 0.31, and the LOESS smoother indicates that this already weak relationship disappears in certain regions of the data. More precisely, the smoother stays flat across the most densely populated interval of empowerment rights restrictions (4 to 6) and no inferences whatsoever may be drawn from changes in one type of political repression on the other. Consequently, although authoritarian regimes use both types of political repression there is empirical reason to believe that they differ to "the extent to which they rely on one type more than the other" (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014, p. 336).

Frantz and Kendall-Taylor assume that co-optation tips the scales of political repression. They measure this key explanatory variable by the existence of political parties and legislatures. Information on either institution is drawn from the 'Democracy & Dictatorship' data (Cheibub, Gandhi, and J. Vreeland, 2010) that map their de facto existence. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor create an index that takes the value of 3 if there is a multi-party legislature, 2 if there is a single-party legislature, 1 if there is no legislature but at least one political party or, equivalently, if there is a non-partisan legislature, and 0 if neither exists. The authors presume that their index behaves linearly, and they justify their coding scheme with an interest in the "interactive effect" of legislatures and political parties (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014, p. 338). Figure 3 explores the em-

111 empirical picture in the unimputed data. The majority of 2,221 non-missing country-year  
 112 observations falls into the highest category. Accordingly, more than half of all authori-  
 113 tarian regimes in the data sponsored multi-party legislatures. Single-party regimes come  
 114 in second, and only a minority of observations ranks lower than 2 on the index. In sum,  
 115 the crucial empirical distinction is whether authoritarian regimes co-opt via single party  
 116 or multiple parties.




Figure 3: Co-optation in authoritarian regimes between 1981 2004, absolute frequencies.

117 To account for alternative explanations of political repression Frantz and Kendall-Taylor  
 118 include a large set of controls. Among these are counts of ongoing civil and interstate  
 119 war as well as domestic political dissent in the form of riots, general strikes, and anti-  
 120 government demonstrations. Moreover, the authors include counts of past leadership  
 121 turnovers and attempted coups under the assumption that authoritarian regimes with a  
 122 history of leadership instability are more willing to repress. Another set of controls maps  
 123 socio-economic conditions and historical context of the regime. For instance, assuming  
 124 that oil-revenues offer alternative ways of co-optation Frantz and Kendall-Taylor control  
 125 for oil rents per capita. Moreover, since size and growth of the population have been  
 126 discussed as potential causes for state repression in the past the authors control for  
 127 those as well. Moreover, they add indicators on trade and economic well-being as well as  
 128 regime type. Moreover, to account for its considerable geopolitical repercussions a Cold  
 129 War dummy is added to the model. Finally, following the advice of Carter and Signorino  
 130 (2010) cubic splines of leadership duration are added. Summary statistics of all controls  
 131 variables are given in appendix A (c.f. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014, 338f.).

### 3. Replication results

On first sight the key findings discussed by Frantz and Kendall-Taylor hold. However, critical evaluation of key statistical assumptions, predictive accuracy and model parsimony give reason to doubt their statistical adequacy and substantial significance. Following a brief recapitulation of the key results each point is briefly discussed in the remainder of this section.




Figure 4: How co-optation affects political repression. Confidence intervals at the .95 level, positive coefficients black, negative estimates grey, statistically insignificant results faded. Cubic polynomials and cut points not shown.

Figure 4 summarizes all ordered logistic regressions presented in the original publication. Differences between the published and the replicated analyses are often negligible. With few exceptions coefficients and cluster robust standard errors agree up to two decimal places.<sup>1</sup> As can be seen from the top row in Figure 4 higher levels of co-optation concur with lower levels of empowerment rights restrictions, but they tend to go hand in hand with increases in physical integrity violations. Moreover, in line with the idea of inert government practices the attenuating impact of co-optation on empowerment rights restrictions increases in absolute size when moving from  $t + 1$  to  $t + 5$ . The same time-dependent dynamic is not observable for physical integrity violations. Finally, all models speak to the staying power of political repression because all lagged responses are positively signed and statistically significant.<sup>2</sup> In short, all key findings can be reproduced and a more detailed discussion of the original publication is possible.

Table 1: Parallel-regressions assumption:  $\chi^2$ -comparisons

		$t + 1$	$t + 2$	$t + 3$	$t + 4$	$t + 5$
Empowerment rights	Unadj. P-value	1.000	0.499	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Bonf. adj. P-value	1.000	0.833	0.000	0.000	0.000
Physical integrity	Unadj. P-value	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000
	Bonf. adj. P-value	0.077	0.052	0.001	0.000	0.000

Note: P-values were averaged over all imputed models.

Ordered logistic regression models rest on the parallel-regressions assumption. They constrain differences between the cumulative distribution functions of any two categories to a constant (Fox, 2008, p. 476). In other words, the slope of those curves must not change and hence all regression coefficients are constrained to equality between any two categories. One way to test this assumption is a  $\chi^2$ -comparison between the constrained coefficients and their unconstrained alternatives from a multinomial regression. As shown in Table 1 only the four models predicting political repression at  $t + 1$  and  $t + 2$  withstand this test and reject the alternative hypothesis of non-constant coefficients and thus support the choice of statistical model. However, since the null hypothesis is saved only by very conservative Bonferroni adjusted P-values a closer look at the four supported models seems justified. To that end  $j - 1$  separate




Figure 5: Separate logistic regression results. Confidence intervals at the .95 level added.

<sup>1</sup> A fundamental difference concerns the polynomials on tenure duration. The original models would not converge in  $R$  unless multicollinearity was reduced by using orthogonal polynomials.

<sup>2</sup> Why Erica Frantz and Andrea Kendall-Taylor regard all lagged responses as continuous and treat all leads as ordinal variables is not clear from the paper.

168 logistic regressions are fit to the set of binary responses  $\mathbb{1}_y(y_i \geq j)$ .<sup>3</sup> If the parallel-  
169 regressions assumption holds the coefficients should differ little as  $j$  increases. Figure 5  
170 shows the results for the key regressor co-optation. While the right-hand panel raises  
171 little reason for concern, coefficients in the left-hand panel exhibit a clear trend. As the  
172 level of empowerment rights restrictions increases co-optation develops more of a punch.  
173 In sum, the majority of models fails the parallel-regressions assumption and even if it is  
174 not rejected outright the published analyses give reason for concern.

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<sup>3</sup> As the marginal categories of all response variables are sparsely populated (c.f. Figure 2) perfect separation occurred on several instances. The affected response levels were dropped from Figure 5.



**A. Summary statistics**

Table 2: Summary statistics of control variables

Statistic	Min	Mean	Max	St. Dev.	N
Civil war	0	0.240	5	0.601	2,386
Interstate war	0	0.063	2	0.250	2,386
log(population)	4.215	8.777	14.074	1.712	2,352
log(GDP per capita)	5.139	7.913	10.807	1.058	2,352
Personal regime	0	0.292	1	0.455	1,857
Monarchy	0	0.097	1	0.297	1,857
Dominant party regime	0	0.489	1	0.500	1,857
Trade (Cold War	-50.046	1.003	90.470	7.694	2,049
Growth (Leadership duration	0	4.379	43	6.471	2,386
Past leadership fails	0	2.264	22	3.004	2,386
Past coups	-11.513	-3.867	10.811	8.328	2,250
Oil rents	0	0.090	5	0.442	1,857
Election year	0	0.358	23	1.378	1,857
Strikes	0	0.634	26	2.034	1,857

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