years in the United Kingdom and three years in Sweden. Thus, any cabinet in power prior to a regularly scheduled election is forced to 'fail,' even though some of them might have continued for years if new elections had not been mandated. Ever since King et al. (1990, 853–55), analysts have addressed this complicating feature of the data by treating all failures in the 12 months prior to the end of the CIEP as censored. I followed this practice here as well.

With the exception of the *Pre-Electoral Coalition* variable, I employ two different sources of data to test the Government Survival Hypothesis. The first is Warwick (1994). These data cover Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France (Fourth), Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom from 1946 to 1988.[24] Warwick's data are the most widely employed data in the government survival literature. The second data source is the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Müller & Strøm 2000; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman 2003).[25] These data are brand new and cover the same set of countries (except France Fifth instead of France Fourth) from 1946 to 1998. The Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (PDDA) does not contain information on the ideological characteristics of governments. Instead, I obtained the required ideological data from the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2001).

Although the dependent variable (*Government Duration*) is measured in days, these two sources of data actually calculate government duration differently. Both sources of data treat government termination in the same way. They measure the end of a government as being when (i) parliamentary elections are held, (ii) the head of government changes, (iii) the party composition of the government changes, or (iv) the government tenders its resignation. However, they differ on when a new government starts. On the one hand, Warwick follows King et al. (1990) in measuring the start of a government as the time at which it is announced by the head of state. A consequence of this practice is that government duration may start prior to any investiture vote and, hence, prior to the government formally taking office. On the other hand, the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive measures the start of a government as the time at which the cabinet is installed or inaugurated. In other words, it does not measure government duration prior to an investiture vote. As I have already suggested, this difference in how the dependent variable is calculated is likely to show itself in different estimated effects of investiture requirements across the two data sets.

7.4.2 Results and Interpretation

The results from my analysis are shown in table 7.5. Because of my interest in pre-electoral coalitions, I consider only governments that form after an election. As

Table 7.5

Determinants of Government Survival

Dependent Variable: Duration of Government Survival in Days for Governments Forming after Elections (Cox Model)

	Pooled		Dissolution		Replacement	
Independent Variables	Warwick	PDDA	Warwick	PDDA	Warwick	PDDA
Government Attributes:						
Pre-Electoral Coalition	0.38	0.44	1.00**	1.06*	-0.16	0.29
	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.43)	(0.62)	(0.45)	(0.38)
Majority Government	-0.94***	-0.90***	-0.87**	-1.54***	-0.59	-0.71***
	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.36)	(0.52)	(0.48)	(0.24)
Single Party Government	0.06	0.11	1.75***	0.68	-0.001	0.10
	(0.54)	(0.33)	(0.65)	(0.67)	(0.44)	(0.38)
Ideological Range	0.20	0.001	0.57	-0.001	0.10	0.01
	(0.16)	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.01)	(0.24)	(0.01)
Caretaker Government	1.90***	2.53***	—	—	2.27***	2.33***
	(0.56)	(0.52)			(0.65)	(0.65)
Formation Attempts	0.22***	0.09	0.26***	0.10	0.16**	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Legislature Attributes:						
Legislative Fragmentation	0.12	0.14	0.28**	0.15	0.06	0.19*
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Country Attributes:						
Investiture	0.75***	0.16	0.80**	0.15	0.63*	0.04
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.30)
Log Likelihood	-347.94	-629.62	-189.83	-217.75	-290.89	-599.66
Observations	138	208	138	208	138	208

Notes: Results are Cox proportional hazards estimates where the Efron method was employed for handling ties; robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. A test using Schoenfeld residuals indicates that the proportional hazards assumption is not violated. **Dissolution:** The government ended in dissolution and new elections. **Replacement:** The government ended in a replacement government without new elections. **Pooled:** The government ended in dissolution or replacement. **Warwick:** Data come from Warwick (1994) and cover 16 countries from 1946 to 1988. **PDDA:** Data come from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Müller & Strøm 2000a, Strøm, Müller & Bergman 2003) and the Manifesto Research Group (Budge et al. 2001) and cover 16 countries from 1946 to 1998.

*$p < 0.10$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

before, the coefficients in table 7.5 are expressed as proportional hazard estimates. As a result, a positive coefficient indicates that the covariate in question increases the hazard rate for governments or reduces government duration. Conversely, a negative coefficient implies that the covariate reduces the hazard rate or increases government survival. Once again, I employ robust standard errors clustered by country to take account of the fact that the observations in each country may not be independent.

Note that government failure can lead to either the dissolution of the legislature and new elections, or simply to a replacement government. Recent research suggests that it is important to distinguish between these different termination modes,

because the processes leading to dissolution and replacement are different (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999). It is possible to distinguish between these modes of termination using a competing risks version of the Cox model.[26] The first two columns (Pooled) in table 7.5 indicate how the covariates affect government duration without distinguishing between whether one observes dissolution or replacement for the two sources of data. The next two columns (Dissolution) indicate how the covariates affect the duration of governments that end in dissolution. Finally, the last two columns (Replacement) indicate the effect of the covariates on government survival for those governments that terminate with replacement.

Remember that the principal hypothesis of interest relates to the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on government duration. My expectation is that governments based on electoral pacts should last longer than other governments and, hence, that the coefficient on *Pre-Electoral Coalition* will be negative. The results from the pooled and replacement models indicate that pre-electoral coalitions never have any significant effect on government survival. In fact, it is only in the replacement model, with data from Warwick, that the coefficient on *Pre-Electoral Coalition* is ever negative (though insignificant). The results from the dissolution model indicate that far from improving government survival, pre-electoral coalitions actually significantly increase the risk of dissolution.

To be precise, a government based on an electoral agreement is 2.7 [1.2, 6.4] times more likely to fail in dissolution than an identical government that is not based on a pre-electoral coalition, according to the Warwick data, and 2.9 [1, 7.9] times more likely to end in dissolution, according to the PDDA data. Confidence intervals (95% and 90%, respectively) are shown in brackets. Note, though, that the cases for which pre-electoral agreements significantly shorten the lives of governments end in dissolution; in other words, the electorate does get to have its say in the formation of the new government. In sum, and contrary to my expectations, electoral coalitions never increase government survival.[27] They either have no effect on governments that end in replacement, or they actually shorten the lives of governments that end in dissolution.

What about the effect of other government attributes on government duration? First, there is strong evidence to support the standard claim that majority governments survive longer than minority governments—the coefficient on *Majority Government* is always negative and is highly significant in five of the six models. Another common claim in the coalition literature that receives support in this analysis is that caretaker governments collapse more quickly than other governments—the coefficient on *Caretaker Government* is always positive and significant.[28]

However, the results regarding the role of government attributes in table 7.5 do not confirm other findings in the government duration literature. For example, there is little evidence that single-party governments improve the stability of governments, as previous studies have found (Warwick 1994). In fact, there is some evidence that single-party governments actually increase the risk of dissolution when I employ the Warwick data. Similarly, there is no evidence that the ideological diversity of a government makes the government more unstable, as some scholars have reported (Warwick 1994; Diermeier & Stevenson 1999; Druckman & Thies 2002). Substituting other measures of ideological diversity, such as *Ideological Spread* and whether the government coalition is ideologically connected for *Ideological Range*, does not alter this conclusion. There is simply no compelling evidence that ideological compatibility ever affects the survival of governments that form after elections. Finally, evidence is mixed, at best, for the claim that the number of foiled attempts at government formation reduces government survival. The Warwick data consistently provide support for this claim, whereas the PDDA data consistently do not.[29] The inconsistent results in table 7.5 are just one illustration of my earlier point that the findings in the government duration literature are not particularly robust to different data sources or slight variations in how variables are measured.

Having examined the attributes of the government, what about the attributes of the legislature? The results in table 7.5 provide little consistent evidence that legislative fragmentation, as measured by the effective number of legislative parties, ever reduces the duration of governments that form after elections. As predicted, the coefficient on *Legislative Fragmentation* is positive and significant in the dissolution model, but only for the Warwick data and not the PDDA data. The coefficient is also positive and significant in the replacement model, but now only for the PDDA data and not the Warwick data. Again, one can see that the results are not robust across the different sources of data.

As for country attributes, the results are mixed. Table 7.5 indicates that investiture requirements significantly reduce government duration, but only with the Warwick data. As I suggested earlier, this inconsistency is potentially a result of how the two data sources measure government duration. By including announced (but not formal) governments that collapse very quickly because they fail to pass an investiture vote, the Warwick data is likely to overestimate any negative effect of investiture requirements on government duration. In contrast, the PDDA data only measure the duration of formal governments that have taken office. The result that investiture votes do not significantly affect government survival using the PDDA data contradicts virtually all of the claims in the coalition literature regarding the effect of investiture votes on government survival.

I should remind the reader that the analyses conducted here focus only on those governments that form after an election. In contrast, the previous literature on government survival examines governments that form in inter-election periods as

well. By including these additional governments, coalition scholars have implicitly assumed that the factors affecting the survival of post-election governments are the same as those affecting inter-election period governments. I examined whether this assumption is valid by estimating the same models as shown in table 7.5 on a sample including inter-election period governments. Although most of my inferences are unaffected, there are a couple of substantive changes. First, there is now strong evidence that legislative fragmentation reduces the duration of governments. Second, it appears that the ideological diversity of the government does significantly reduce government survival based on the Warwick data (though ideology still has no significant effect with the PDDA data). Along with the findings from previous sections, these different results provide further evidence that analysts should begin to distinguish between governments that form after elections and those that form in inter-election periods.

To conclude, pre-electoral coalitions do not increase government survival. In fact, pre-electoral coalitions reduce the duration of governments that collapse in dissolution. The one positive point here, from a normative perspective, is that in those cases where pre-electoral coalitions significantly reduce government stability, the electorate is typically consulted about the identity of the next government. Thus, in some sense, electoral agreements could be said to have a 'bad' effect on government survival, but at least they end in a 'good' way.

7.5 Conclusion

In previous chapters, I have shown that pre-electoral coalitions are not rare and that their formation can be explained in terms of the office- and policy-seeking preferences of political actors. As my bargaining model in chapter four recognizes, the decision to form a pre-electoral coalition is largely determined by whether such a pact is going to increase the probability of entering government. In this chapter, I provide strong evidence that pre-electoral coalitions do indeed make it more likely that member parties will enter government. Although Martin & Stevenson (2001) have reported such a result before, their analysis is based on a small subsample of the electoral coalitions that actually form prior to elections. As I indicate, there are reasons to think that their analysis overestimates and underestimates the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on the identity of the government—I show that this is indeed the case. Overall, though, the evidence clearly indicates that pre-electoral coalitions help parties enter government. Moreover, the effect is quite substantial—a potential government is 123 times more likely to enter government if it is based on a pre-electoral agreement than if it is not. For critics of proportional representation and multiparty parliamentary systems, this ought to be an

encouraging result, because it implies that voters may often have a more direct say in the identity of the future government than is typically supposed (Pinto-Duschinsky 1999).

The analyses in this chapter also indicate that government coalitions based on pre-electoral agreements are more ideologically compatible than governments that are not constrained by electoral pacts. This result was consistently obtained using several different measures of ideological compatibility. Coalition governments are typically thought to face more difficulties than single-party governments because of the potential for inter-party disagreements over policy. These difficulties are likely to be exacerbated when the coalition partners have disparate policy goals. Being able to agree on and enact policy is an important requisite for a successful government, and ideological compatibility should make this capability more likely to occur. Pre-electoral coalitions help achieve this goal. This result suggests that party leaders are more worried about being punished for forming an ideologically incompatible coalition if the coalition must face the electorate before taking office than if the coalition is negotiated after the election.

After an election has been held, there is wide variation in the amount of time that it takes to form a government. Some governments form immediately after the votes have been counted and the distribution of seats in the legislature has been determined. Others can take several weeks or months to form, with power left in the hands of some sort of caretaker cabinet with no real mandate to make policy in the interim. In these latter cases, this situation means that important, and possibly urgent, legislation is delayed. Moreover, the uncertainty that surrounds the government formation process is likely to have negative economic consequences, with market actors unsure how to make their investments. Anything that can shorten the length of time that it takes to form a government should be welcomed by all political actors. In this chapter, I showed that governments based on pre-electoral coalitions suffer fewer delays in taking office and that this is particularly the case when there are many parties in the cabinet. For example, pre-electoral agreements can reduce the time that it takes to form a three-party government by roughly three weeks. This reduction is quite significant, given that the average time that it takes to form a government in my sample of 16 Western European countries from 1946 to 1998 is 32 days.

Although one might expect pre-electoral coalitions to enhance government stability and increase government duration, I find no evidence for this case. In fact, governments that end in dissolution are likely to be *more* unstable if they are based on pre-electoral coalitions than if they are not. The one saving grace about this situation is that whenever pre-electoral agreements increase the risk of government collapse, the end result is a new election and a chance for the electorate to again influence the government formation process. My analysis indicates that

pre-electoral coalitions have no effect on the risk of collapse for governments that end in replacement.

Aside from the normatively pleasing aspects of pre-electoral coalitions (such as giving voters a chance to express their preferences over government alternatives, endowing the government with a stronger mandate, and generally creating a stronger connection between the electorate and the government that eventually forms following an election), the analysis in this chapter shows that pre-electoral coalitions have concrete effects on various aspects of government coalitions as well. They affect who gets into government, how long it takes to form a government, and how ideologically compatible the government is. While pre-electoral agreements do have a negative effect on government survival in some circumstances, they at least result in elections rather than in replacement. Thus, electoral coalitions have a real impact on how coalition governments work in parliamentary democracies—their impact does not end when the votes have been counted and the seats have been allocated.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Coalitions are a fundamental part of democratic politics because democracies generally rely on legislative majorities to determine policy. Since single parties do not form such a majority in most countries, those parties who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced to form some kind of coalition. In effect, political parties have two choices. They can either form a coalition prior to elections, or they can compete independently at election time and try to form a government coalition afterwards. Most scholars have ignored the possibility of pre-electoral coalitions. Instead, they employ a simple dichotomy between single-party governments that appear in the ideal 'Westminster' or 'majoritarian' democracies and coalition governments that appear in the ideal 'proportional representation' or 'consensus' democracies (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). The unstated assumption that these analysts make is that electoral coordination among political actors occurs *prior* to elections and *within* parties in majoritarian systems, but *after* elections and *between* parties in proportional representation systems (Bawn & Rosenbluth 2003).[1] Although it captures certain aspects of political reality, it should be obvious to the reader by now that this simple dichotomy is limited in its usefulness, because it overlooks the fact that political parties can, and often do, form multi-party coalitions prior to elections in both majoritarian and proportional representation democracies. For example, I presented evidence in chapter two illustrating that multi-party electoral coalitions routinely form in a wide variety of democracies such as France, Germany, Australia, and Israel. In fact, I found evidence of 240 pre-electoral coalitions competing in the 364 legislative elections held between 1946 and 2002 in the 23 advanced industrialized countries studied in this book; only in Canada and Malta did I fail to find any evidence of national-level electoral coalitions.

Much has been written comparing the relative advantages and disadvantages of the majoritarian and proportional representation visions of democracy. In contrast to the single-party governments typically found in majoritarian democracies,

it is common for coalition governments in proportional representation democracies to be criticized for producing a disconnect between the electorate and the government. The basic criticism is that voters in these democracies are largely unaware as to how their votes are ultimately translated into an actual government. The end result is a low level of government accountability and identifiability, as well as an absence of government mandates. Government accountability is low because voters cannot use their votes to reward or punish the government for its policy choices, since they do not know how (or, in some cases, even if) their votes will influence the government formation process. Government identifiability is low because voters have difficulty in identifying the probable government alternatives when casting their ballots. As a consequence, it is not always clear whether government coalitions actually have the support of the electorate in any meaningful sense. As a result of this last point, it is, therefore, difficult for governments to legitimately claim a popular mandate for their policies in proportional representation democracies.

Although these criticisms are often made of coalition governments and the proportional representation vision of democracy more broadly, it should be noted that their strength rests largely on the mistaken belief that coalition governments only form *after* elections have taken place. As I have illustrated in this book, this is far from the case. The presence of pre-electoral coalitions in many countries means that voters in proportional representation democracies are often able to identify the different government alternatives at election time and express their support for one of them. By providing a direct link between the voters and the government that proposes and implements policy, electoral pacts undermine the common criticism that coalition governments lack a convincing mandate from the voters and that the quality of representative democracy is thereby diminished (Pinto-Duschinsky 1999). In fact, one could argue that pre-electoral coalitions provide a unique opportunity to combine the best elements of the majoritarian vision of democracy (increased accountability, government identifiability, strong mandates) with the best elements of the proportional representation vision of democracy (wide choice, more accurate reflection of voter preferences in the legislature). Given these potential normative benefits, electoral coalitions are perhaps something that should be encouraged. This book indicates some of the ways that policy makers might achieve this goal. For example, policy makers could encourage pre-electoral coalition formation by manipulating the electoral rules. Of course, as the analyses conducted in chapters three and six indicate, the actual effect of this manipulation will ultimately depend on the size of the party system and the ideological nature of political competition in each country.

Not only do the pre-electoral strategies of political elites have significant normative consequences, but they also routinely affect the identity of the government

that forms in many countries across the world. Fully one-fifth of all the governments that formed after the 364 legislative elections studied in this book were based on pre-electoral pacts. It is worth pointing out that this percentage would be even higher if I restricted my sample to purely coalition governments and if I also counted those governments that contained parties in addition to those participating in an electoral coalition. As the qualitative analysis of electoral coalition history in France and South Korea illustrated, the presence or absence of pre-electoral coalitions can have a quite dramatic effect on election outcomes. For example, it was the failure on the part of left-wing elites to coordinate their electoral strategies that enabled the leader of the extreme-right National Front to progress against all odds to the second round of the French presidential elections in 2002, and it was a similar coordination failure on the part of pro-democracy candidates that gifted electoral victory to the official candidate of the military regime in the first democratic presidential elections in South Korea in 1987. Other examples illustrating the profound effects that pre-electoral agreements can have on election outcomes can be found in numerous other countries. For instance, I briefly described in chapter three how pre-electoral agreements were instrumental in defeating once-dominant parties in Sweden, Ireland, and India.

Given the relative frequency with which electoral coalitions form, the significant normative benefits that they offer, and the tremendous effect that they can have on election outcomes, it is somewhat surprising that so little attention has been paid to them in the existing coalition literature. Although some scholars with knowledge of countries such as Germany or Ireland do mention electoral agreements with some regularity when explaining why certain government coalitions form, this book represents the first systematic cross-national study of pre-electoral coalition formation. I hope that at some point in the future scholars will go further and develop a fully integrated model of coalition formation that incorporates both pre-electoral and government coalitions within a unified framework. Just as existing models of government coalitions ignore the possibility of pre-electoral agreements, the bargaining model that I presented in chapter four does not explicitly take account of any post-election bargaining phase that might occur. Given the state of the coalition literature and the fact that we do not yet have a very satisfying model of government coalition formation, a fully integrated model is probably some way off in the future. As a result, I have undertaken a slightly narrower project in this book by analyzing just the determinants of pre-electoral coalition formation. While such a partial equilibrium approach offers the possibility of important insights into this stage of the coalition formation process, it also holds out the possibility that it could be combined with a model of government coalition formation at a later date. The approach that I take explicitly recognizes that the accumulation of knowledge in the scientific process typically occurs in small steps (Kuhn 1962).

The central question that I address in this book is why some parties choose to coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition, whereas others choose to compete independently at election time. For the purposes of this book, an electoral coalition was defined as a publicly stated coordination of electoral strategies by party leaders at the national level. Rather than address the variety of different forms that electoral agreements can take (nomination agreements, joint lists, dual ballot and vote transfer instructions, public commitments to govern together), I focused simply on whether parties publicly coordinated their electoral strategies in some way at the national level or not. While the dearth of studies on pre-electoral coalitions indicates that this simple dichotomy is a useful starting point, future researchers might well want to disaggregate the different types of electoral agreements. The new data set on pre-electoral coalitions accompanying this book should provide a good foundation on which scholars interested in such an endeavor can build.

Before presenting my theoretical model of pre-electoral coalition formation, I tested two implicit hypotheses regarding electoral coalitions that can be found in the existing government coalition literature. The first hypothesis was that electoral coalitions are more likely to form in countries with disproportional electoral systems because such systems benefit larger parties. The problem with this hypothesis as it stands is that it ignores the fact that the incentives to form electoral coalitions in disproportional systems really exist only when there are a sufficiently large number of parties. For example, one would not expect a pre-electoral coalition to form if there were only two parties. As a result, I tested the Disproportionality Hypothesis that electoral coalitions were more likely to form and be successful in disproportional systems so long as the party system was sufficiently large.

The second hypothesis was that party leaders form pre-electoral coalitions in order to signal the identity of future governments to the electorate. There are several reasons why party elites might want to send such a signal. First, they might want to signal that member parties can form an effective government and thereby convince voters that they would not be wasting their votes by supporting the coalition parties. Second, they might want to signal the identity of a potential future government as clearly as possible out of a desire to give voters a more direct role in choosing the government. Third, they might simply want to signal the identity of the government clearly so as to increase the efficiency of the post-election government coalition bargaining process. I tested the Signaling Hypothesis that electoral coalitions are more likely to form and be successful when government identifiability is low (or when the effective number of parties is high).

While the statistical analyses conducted in chapter three provided considerable support for the Disproportionality Hypothesis, there was no such support for the Signaling Hypothesis—at least, there was no evidence that increasing the effective number of parties makes it more likely that electoral coalitions will form and be successful. As I noted when I discussed these results earlier, one should be wary of rejecting the Signaling Hypothesis outright on the basis of this single analysis for two reasons. First, the effective number of parties is not a particularly good proxy for the identifiability of government alternatives. Second, we do observe pre-electoral coalitions forming in countries, such as Israel and the Netherlands, with highly proportional electoral systems. These two points suggest that the Signaling Hypothesis should be exposed to further scrutiny before it is completely rejected.

The implicit claim in much of the coalition literature is that pre-electoral coalition formation is a simple function of electoral rules. While the analyses conducted in chapter three do indeed confirm that electoral institutions play an important role, this cannot be the full story, because it ignores the fact that pre-electoral agreements can involve significant distributional and ideological costs. Before party leaders can benefit from any increased probability of winning office that might result from forming a coalition, they have to reach an agreement on a coalition policy and a distribution of expected office benefits. It may well be the case that party leaders fail to reach an agreement on these divisive issues even if the potential electoral coalition offers significant electoral benefits. In chapter four, I presented a bargaining model in which party leaders who care about office and policy must weigh the electoral benefits of forming an electoral coalition against the associated distributional and ideological costs.

The implications of the model are quite straightforward. For example, increasing the expected office benefits from running as a coalition makes it more likely that party leaders will reach a pre-electoral agreement. If the likely opposition party is ideologically extreme, then party leaders will be more likely to form a pre-electoral coalition *so long as* the coalition is electorally beneficial. In other words, party leaders want to keep extreme opposition parties or coalitions from coming to power. If this goal is best achieved by forming a coalition, this is what they do. If not, they prefer to run separately. Parties that are ideologically close are more likely to form an electoral coalition than parties with incompatible policy platforms. Finally, party leaders are less likely to form a coalition as the probability of winning office after running separately increases.

The plausibility of the model's assumptions and implications are explored in chapter five using in-depth analyses of electoral coalition history in Fifth Republic France and post-1987 South Korea. These histories are particularly interesting because they highlight that the underlying logic of pre-electoral coalition formation that I present is quite general and not country- or region-specific. Despite significant differences in terms of geography, culture, democratic history, institutions, and ideological divisions, the history of electoral coalitions in both countries provides significant support for my model. In two very different settings, we see that

having a disproportional electoral system, in which forming an electoral coalition could reasonably be expected to provide electoral advantages, is not sufficient for pre-electoral agreements to be reached.[2] This situation is perhaps most clearly seen in the first presidential elections after the transition to democracy in South Korea. Both leaders of the democratic opposition preferred to compete separately (and lose) rather than form a pre-electoral agreement, even though opinion polls convincingly indicated that a single democratic candidate would defeat the military incumbent.

The history of pre-electoral coalitions in France indicates that potential coalition partners must be sufficiently ideologically compatible for coalitions to form. For example, the Socialists and the Communists were willing to consider electoral coalitions only after their ideological positions drew sufficiently close to each other in the 1970s. There is also compelling evidence from the French case that coalition formation is facilitated if the policies proposed by the likely opposition are extreme. For instance, right-wing parties and voters were able to coordinate much more effectively when the Communist Party was considered the dominant party on the left. In addition to policy and electoral incentives, both countries also indicated that the divisibility of office benefits matters for the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation. The bargaining model presented in chapter four suggested that it is easier to form electoral coalitions when the benefits of office can be divided in a manner that makes both parties better off. Evidence in support of this idea comes from the fact that electoral agreements have been much more common in French legislative elections, where there are nearly 600 offices to share out among coalition partners, than in French presidential elections, where there is only one office at stake. While the Korean analysis illustrates that presidential electoral coalitions can form in certain circumstances, I argued that they are made possible, or more likely, by the use of term limits. The existence of term limits in South Korea is important, because they provide for the temporal divisibility of the presidential office, and because they make it easier for party leaders to compromise by weakening the power of the presidential office. Finally, the evidence from both countries suggests that personal animosity and myopia on the part of party leaders, which receive so much attention in the description of campaigns and party politics in particular countries, play no systematic role in pre-electoral coalition formation. This finding is especially striking in South Korea.

The qualitative analysis of electoral coalitions in France and South Korea suggested that the assumptions and implications of my bargaining model are plausible and informative in these two countries. However, I claimed throughout this book that the logic of pre-electoral coalition formation that I set out in chapter four is more general and applies in multiple settings. To examine whether this is the case, in chapter six I subjected my model's hypotheses to a series of statistical

tests using data from 20 advanced industrialized countries. The results strongly supported all of my model's predictions. For example, two parties are more likely to form an electoral coalition when they share similar ideological preferences. They are also more likely to form a coalition if the party system is ideologically polarized and the coalition offers an electoral bonus. Coalitions are also more likely to form when the potential coalition size is large, but not too large. In other words, party leaders prefer to join a coalition if it increases their chances of winning office. On the whole, it is reasonable to think that a coalition's chance of winning office will increase with its size. However, if the coalition becomes too large, such that one of the parties starts to think that it can win office on its own, then the likelihood of coalition formation begins to decline. The more asymmetric the strength of the two parties in the potential coalition, the more quickly this cut-point will be reached. This last point indicates that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between parties of similar size. The cross-national statistical analyses conducted in this chapter clearly support the model of pre-electoral coalition formation that is the centerpiece of this book.

To a large extent, party leaders who decide to form a pre-electoral coalition are ultimately interested in government coalition formation. As I indicated in chapter two, this is particularly the case regarding the national-level electoral pacts that are the focus of the empirical analyses in this book. Therefore, I investigated how pre-electoral agreements affect various aspects of the government formation process in chapter seven. Throughout the book, I had suggested that the primary benefit from forming a pre-electoral coalition is that it improves the probability that member parties will enter government. The statistical analyses conducted in chapter seven confirm this claim—a potential government is 123 times more likely to enter government if it is based on a pre-electoral agreement than if it is not.

The statistical analyses also indicate that governments based on pre-electoral agreements are more ideologically compatible than governments that are not based on such pacts. We already know that both pre-electoral and government coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties than incompatible ones. What the results in chapter seven indicate in addition to this fact is that the ideological compatibility constraint facing party leaders thinking about forming a coalition may well be stronger prior to an election than afterwards. One reason is that any proposed pre-electoral coalition, unlike a proposed government coalition, must be immediately put before the voters. It is worth noting that the increased ideological compatibility of governments based on pre-electoral agreements is quite appealing, because it means a greater ideological congruence between the electorate of the government and the policy position of that government.

Finally, the empirical analyses conducted in chapter seven indicate that governments based on pre-electoral coalitions take office more quickly than equivalent governments that are not based on electoral pacts. This is particularly the case when the government consists of many parties. This result suggests that pre-electoral agreements help to resolve some of the bargaining difficulties that arise with large government coalitions prior to the election rather than leaving them to be resolved after the election. By shortening the time that it takes a government to take office, pre-electoral coalitions have the beneficial consequence of reducing the amount of time a country must live under a caretaker government that has no real mandate to make policy. By reducing the period of uncertainty that characterizes the government formation process, electoral coalitions are also likely to have a positive effect on economic actors who would otherwise be uncertain as to how to make their investment decisions. This idea is particularly important given the growing empirical evidence that political uncertainty can have a significant negative impact on a country's economy.

This book represents just a first step toward understanding pre-electoral coalitions, and my hope is that it will generate a wider scholarly debate about their causes and consequences. I believe that the study of electoral coalitions provides a fertile terrain for the opportunistic researcher. Let me briefly describe one avenue of future research that would be worth examining. In chapter two, I argued that one could think of electoral coordination as a continuum, with completely separate and independent parties competing in elections at one end of the spectrum, and party mergers at the other end. Pre-electoral coalitions represent some intermediary position on this continuum of electoral coordination—indeed, the various types of electoral pacts described in chapter two represent different intermediary positions on this continuum. Although I only considered snapshots of party systems prior to elections in this book and asked whether or not a pre-electoral coalition is likely to form, it is worth thinking about what types of electoral coalitions are 'stable' and what types are just a step on the way to a full party merger.

Duverger (1963 [1954], 224) pointed out a long time ago that electoral alliances are frequently "the prelude to the extreme form, total fusion, which is the normal term of the development and is often attended by schism. . . ." For example, the three Christian Democratic parties in the Netherlands originally ran as separate parties prior to competing in elections as a pre-electoral coalition before eventually merging into a single party. By describing "total fusion" as the "normal term of development," Duverger implies that electoral coalitions are somehow ephemeral, simple intermediary steps on the way to party fusion, or failed experiments that ultimately collapse back to complete party independence. I think that this implication is somewhat mistaken and that there are circumstances in which

party leaders will prefer to permanently retain their separate identities yet coordinate their electoral campaigns with other parties. What these circumstances are has never really been examined and is beyond the scope of this book.

Nevertheless, I can offer one or two speculations. For example, if two parties have separate electoral bases of support, then they might be less likely to merge. If the electorates are geographically separate, as is the case with the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in Germany, or the National Party and the Liberal Party in Australia, then the parties in question can easily form an electoral coalition instead of giving up their separate identities by merging into a single party. It is striking that these two cases—the only two in my sample that can be considered 'permanent' pre-electoral coalitions—have unusually separate geographic bases of support.

Certain electoral institutions should also encourage pre-electoral coalitions as a permanent feature of electoral politics. Consider the situation where a country employs different electoral formulas in national and sub-national elections. In such a country, it is often the case that sub-national elections employing proportional representation give parties and voters incentives to maintain a higher number of parties than would otherwise be the case. For example, France uses a majoritarian formula in single-member districts for its legislative elections, but a proportional representation formula in multi-member districts for its regional (and some local) elections. Small parties in France that might otherwise have disappeared can benefit from the proportional representation elections to win regional and local offices, thereby making them more viable coalition partners on the national political scene. Electoral rules that allow voters to indicate coalition preferences are also likely to make electoral alliances a permanent feature of the political landscape, because they make reaching a pre-electoral agreement so costless that party leaders are simply unwilling to give up their independence by merging into a larger party. For example, the alternative vote in Australia, the single transferable vote in Ireland, and the two-vote system in Germany all allow voters to show their support for more than one party in a given election. As a result, party elites do not need to broker politically costly nomination agreements that force some of their own candidates to withdraw from competition. These are obviously just a few speculations, and further research is required to better evaluate the 'stability' or 'permanence' of pre-electoral coalitions.

Like all good comparative political scientists, I end with an appeal for more (and better) data concerning pre-electoral coalitions. The country-specific material used to build the data set employed in this book varied widely in the amount of useful information that it provided concerning electoral coalitions. It is my opinion that there is a vast amount still to be discovered. With more detailed case studies of electoral coalition formation in various countries, it would be possible

to disaggregate the different types of pre-electoral coalitions in terms of the nature of the electoral coordination chosen, or in terms of their purpose—that is, was the coalition formed to get parties over an electoral threshold in order to win legislative seats or in order to enter government? Such distinctions will prove invaluable as scholars develop more precise theories of pre-electoral coalition formation than that presented here.

APPENDIX

In this appendix, I provide detailed information by country on the 240 national-level electoral coalitions that formed prior to the 364 legislative elections held between 1946 and 2002 in the 23 advanced industrialized countries studied in this book. I do not provide tables containing information on Canada (17 elections from 1949–2000) or Malta (8 elections from 1966–98) because I found no national-level electoral coalitions in these countries. Those interested in the coding rules for identifying national-level electoral pacts should examine chapter two. Given that there is sometimes conflicting information regarding the presence or absence of electoral coalitions, I cite all sources consulted in detail so that the interested reader can evaluate my coding decisions. The tables that follow contain the following data:

- **Election Year:** This is the year in which the legislative election was held. Note that if the election was held near the end of the year, it is possible that the government that eventually forms does not enter office until the next year.
- **% Vote for Coalition:** This is the percentage of votes cast for the parties in the electoral coalition. These percentages are taken mainly from Mackie & Rose (1991), the *European Journal of Political Research* (various years), Caramani (2000), or the website www.electionworld.org.
- **PEC:** This is a list of the parties in the pre-electoral coalition. The abbreviations of the party names are explained below each table.
- **In Govt?:** This indicates whether or not the pre-electoral coalition entered government following the election. Unless otherwise indicated, the parties in the pre-electoral coalition form the government without additional parties.
- **MRG:** This indicates whether the electoral coalition members are included as separate parties in the Comparative Manifesto Research Group (MRG) data set (Budge et al. 2001). This data set provides information on the ideological position of the parties from 1946 to 1998. Certain parties or coalitions listed in the appendix are not included in the empirical analyses conducted in chapters six and seven, because the MRG data set does not include all of the parties or because it includes an electoral coalition as a single party.

Table A.1

Electoral Coalitions in Australia, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946	43.9	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1949	50.3	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1951	50.3	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1954	47	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1955	47.6	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1958	46.5	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
	9.4	DLP+QLP	No	No
1961	42.1	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
	8.7	DLP+QLP	No	No
1963	46.0	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1966	49.9	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1969	43.4	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1972	41.4	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1974	44.9	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1975	53.1	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1977	48.1	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1980	46.3	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1983	43.6	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1984	45.0	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1987	45.9	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1990	43.2	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1993	44.27	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1996	47.2	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1998	39.18	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
2001	42.7	Lib+Nat	Yes	No

PARTIES: Lib: Liberal Party of Australia, **Nat:** National Party (formerly Country Party); **DLP:** Democratic Labor Party; **QLP:** Queensland Labor Party. The DLP and QLP merged into a single party in 1962.

COMMENTS: All elections: For Lib+Nat coalition, see Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge (1994, 81), Butler (1999), Powell (2000, 71–72), and McAllister (2003, 381). **1958, 1961:** For the DLP+QLP electoral coalition, see Mackie & Rose, Table 1.1 (1991).

Table A.2

Electoral Coalitions in Austria, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1949	82.74	ÖVP+SPÖ	Yes	Yes
1953	83.37	ÖVP+SPÖ	Yes	Yes
1956	89.01	ÖVP+SPÖ	Yes	Yes
1959	88.98	ÖVP+SPÖ	Yes	Yes
1962	89.43	ÖVP+SPÖ	Yes	Yes
1966	90.91	ÖVP+SPÖ	ÖVP only	Yes
1970		No		
1971		No		
1975		No		
1979		No		
1983		No		
1986	(84.41)	ÖVP+SPÖ*	Yes	Yes
	4.82	Green Alternative	No	No
1990	74.84	ÖVP+SPÖ	Yes	Yes
1994	62.59	ÖVP+SPÖ	Yes	Yes
1995	(66.35)	ÖVP+SPÖ*	Yes	Yes
	10.32	Greens+LF	No	Yes
1999		No		
2002		No		

*SPÖ announced intention to govern with ÖVP but ÖVP did not reciprocate.

COALITIONS: Green Alternative: Alternative List of Austria and United Greens of Austria.

PARTIES: SPÖ: Socialist Party. **ÖVP:** People's Party. **LF:** Liberal Forum.

COMMENTS: 1949–62: See Müller (2000, 91–92). **1966:** See Müller (2000, 91–92) and Dreijmanis (1982, 256). **1986:** SPÖ announced an intention to govern with ÖVP. Although the ÖVP did not reciprocate, it did not repudiate the offer (Müller 2000, 92). The Alternative List of Austria and the United Greens (VGÖ) ran joint lists—see Müller (1996, 62) and the Library of Congress Country Studies (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/attoc.htm). **1990:** SPÖ announced it would not govern with FPÖ but would govern with ÖVP (Müller 2000, 92). Powell refers to a pre-election coalition victory (2000, 141) but later says that the grand coalition was "only vaguely identified as a pre-electoral coalition" (2000, 213). **1994:** Continuation of grand coalition (Müller 2000, 92). **1995:** SPÖ announced an intention to govern with ÖVP. Although the ÖVP did not reciprocate, it did not repudiate the offer (Lauber 1996, 256–57).

Table A.3

Electoral Coalitions in Belgium, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No		
1949		No		
1950		No		
1954		No		
1958		No		
1961		No		
1965		No		
1968	5.90	FDF+RW	No	Yes
1971	11.23	FDF+RW	No	Yes
1974	10.94	FDF+PLDP+RW	No	Yes
1977	4.7	FDF+RW	No	Yes
1978	7.04	FDF+RW	No	Yes
	1.40	VVP+VNP	No	No
1981	4.21	FDF+RW	No	Yes
	4.92	Eco+Agalev	No	Yes
1985	50.20	CVP+PSC+VLD+PRL	Yes	Yes
1987	17.40	PSC+PRL	Yes*	Yes
1991	1.5	FDF+PPW	No	No
1995	10.30	PRL+FDF	No	Yes
1999	10.14	PRL+FDF	Yes*	No
	5.6	VU+ID21	No	No

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

PARTIES: FDF: Democratic Front of French Speakers. **PLDP:** French-speaking Liberal Party. **CVP:** Christian People's Party (Flemish). **PSC:** Christian People's Party (Walloon). **VLD:** Liberals (Flemish). **PRL:** Liberals (Walloon). **RW:** Walloon Rally. **VVP:** Flemish People's Party. **VNP:** Flemish National Party (merged 1979). **Eco:** Ecologist Confederation for the Organization of New Struggles. **Agalev:** Live Differently, Greens. **PPW:** Parti pour la Wallonie. **VU:** People's Union. **ID21:** Social-Liberal Party.

COMMENTS: 1968, 1971: See Caramani (2000). **1974:** See Caramani (2000) and Dewachter (1987, 295). Note that Mackie & Rose (1991) only mention FDF+PLDP as being in the electoral coalition. **1977:** See Caramani (2000). **1978:** For the FDF+RW coalition, see Caramani (2000). For the VVP+VNP coalition, see Mackie & Rose (1991). **1981:** See Caramani (2000, 158, 185) and Mackie & Rose (1991). Note that with the exception of Louvain, the two Green parties competed in different districts. **1985:** See Powell (2000, 73). **1987:** See Downs (1998, 190). **1991:** See the 1992 *European Journal of Political Research* (22) election report. **1995:** See De Winter, Timmermans, and Dumont (2000, 303), the 1996 *European Journal of Political Research* (30) election report, and http://elections.fgov.be/Resultats/electionshtml/710.html. **1999:** See http://elections.fgov.be/Resultats/electionshtml/5130.html, http://electionworld.org/belgium.htm, and http://polling2003.belgium.be/electionshome/uk/result/chamber/table_top.html.

Table A.4

Electoral Coalitions in Denmark, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1947		No		
1950		No		
1953 (April)		No		
1953 (Sept.)		No		
1957		No		
1960		No		
1964		No		
1966		No		
1968	53.89	RL+Con+Lib	Yes	Yes
1971		No		
1973	7.80	CD+SLE	No	No
1975	2.20	CD+SLE	No	No
1977	6.40	CD+SLE	No	No
1979		No		
1981		No		
1984		No		
1987		No		
1988		No		
1990	1.67	CP+LSP	No	No
1994	3.15	CP+LSP	No	No
1998	2.70	CP+LSP	No	No
2001	2.40	CP+LSP	No	No

PARTIES: **Lib:** Liberals. **Con:** Conservatives. **SD:** Social Democrats. **RL:** Radical Liberals. **CP:** Communist Party. **LSP:** Left Socialist Party. **CD:** Center Democrats (1973 splinter of Social Democrats). **SLE:** Schleswig Party (German-speaking minority).

COMMENTS: **1968:** See Pesonen & Thomas (1983, 71–72), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Schou & Hearl (1992, 155), Arter (1999, 210), and Damgaard (2000, 245). **1973, 1975, 1977:** See Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 5.1. See also Elklit (2002, 63). **1979–84:** Powell (2000, 76) implies that a pre-electoral non-bourgeois coalition formed prior to these elections. However, he does not specify the parties that are involved, and other literature on Denmark makes no reference to these electoral coalitions. **1990–2001:** See Esaiasson & Heider (2000, 445–46, Elklit (2002, 64), updates to Mackie & Rose (1991) in the *European Journal of Political Research*, the Danish election update in *Electoral Studies* (1994), and http://electionworld.org.

Table A.5

Electoral Coalitions in Finland, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948		No		
1951		No		
1954		No		
1958		No		
1962		No		
1966		No		
1970	18.22	CE+CHR	No	Yes
1972		No		
1975		No		
1979		No		
1983	17.63	Lib+CE	Yes*	Yes
1987		No		
1991		No		
1995		No		
1999	67.2	Purple Coalition	Yes	No

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

COALITION: Purple Coalition: Conservative Party, Left-Wing League, Swedish People's Party, Social Democratic Party, and Greens.

PARTIES: Lib: Liberals. **CE:** Center Party (formerly Agrarians). **CHR:** Christian League of Finland.

COMMENTS: 1970: The CHR, with only 1.1% of the vote, broke into parliament and, profiting from an electoral alliance with the CE, had 1 MP (Arter 1999, 110). **1983:** According to Appendix 2 in Esaiasson & Heidar (2000, 447–48), the Liberals ran with the Center Party from 1982–86. See also Sundberg (2002, 98) and Caramani (2000, 286). **1999:** Personal communication with Mark Hallerberg: the 'Purple coalition,' which had formed a government coalition following the 1995 election, campaigned asking to be re-elected to form the government again.

Table A.6

Electoral Coalitions in France, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition *	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No		
1951		No		
1956		No		
1958		No		
1962	34.39	UNR+UDT+RI (2)	Yes	UNR+UDT = 1 Party
	39.25	PCF+SFIO+PRG (2)	No	Yes
1967	45.7	UNR+UDT+RI (1)	Yes	UNR+UDT = 1 Party
	56.18	UNR+UDT+RI+CD (2)	Yes	UNR+UDT = 1 Party
	16.54	FGDS:SFIO+PRG+CIR (1)	No	SFIO+PRG only
	40.45	FGDS+PCF+PSU (2)	No	SFIO+PRG+PCF only
1968	36.87	UNR+RI (1)	Yes	Yes
	50.96	UNR+RI+PDM (2)	Yes	No PDM
	41.41	FGDS+PCF (2)	No	Yes
1973	34.07	UDR+RI+UC (1)	Yes	Yes
	47.32	UDR+RI+UC+REF (2)	Yes	Yes
	19.10	UGDS:PS+PRG (1)	No	PS only
	42.46	UGDS+PCF+PSU (2)	No	PS+PCF only
1978	20.21	UDF:CDS+PR+RI (1)	Yes	UDF = 1 Party
	42.75	UDF+RPR (2)	Yes	Yes
	24.95	PS+PRG (1)	No	PS only
	45.56	PS+PRG+PCF (2)	No	PS+PCF only
1981	41.16	RPR+UDF (1)	No	Yes
	37.53	PS+PRG (1)	Yes	PS only
	53.66	PS+PRG+PCF (2)	Yes	PS+PCF only
1986 (PR)	42.1	RPR+UDF†	Yes	Yes
	23.8	PS+PRG	No	PS only
1988	37.67	RPR+UDF (1)	No	Yes
	35.90	PS+PRG (1)	Yes*	PS only
	47.22	PS+PRG+PCF (2)	No	Yes
1993	39.47	RPR+UDF (1)	Yes	Yes
	18.49	PS+PRG (1)	No	PS only
	27.67	PS+PRG+PCF (2)	No	PS+PCF only
	7.64	Greens+GE (1)	No	Greens+GE = 1 Party
1997	31.5	RPR+UDF (1)	Yes	Yes
	29.1	PS+PRG+Greens (1)	No	Yes
	39.0	PS+PRG+Greens+PCF (2)	No	Yes
2002	33.7	UMP:RPR+UDF+DL (1)	Yes	No
	30.1	PS+PRG+Greens (1)	No	No
	34.9	PS+PRG+Greens+ PCF (2)	No	No

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

(1) and (2) indicate the round of the two-ballot system in which the pre-electoral coalition formed.

*The vote percentages are taken from Portelli (1994) for 1958–93. Figures for 1997 are from the election results report in the 1998 *European Journal of Political Research* (34), and the figures for 2002 are from www.electionworld.org.

†The UDF and RPR ran joint lists in 61 districts and separate ones in 35 districts. The joint list won 21.0%, while the separate lists won an additional 9.6% and 11.5% of the vote respectively.

COALITIONS: FGDS: Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left, SFIO+PRG+CIR (1967, 1968). **UGDS:** Democratic and Socialist Union, PS+PRG (1973). **UDF:** Union for French Democracy, CDS+PR+RI (1978). **UMP:** Union for a Presidential (Popular) Majority, RPR+UDF+DL (2002).

PARTIES: UNR: Gaullist Party (1958–62). **UDT:** Left Gaullists (merged with the UNR after 1962 elections and became the UNR-UDT 1962–67 and then the UDVe 1967–68). **UDR:** Gaullist Party

(cont.)

(1968–76, continuation of UDVe). **RPR:** Gaullist Party (1976–2002, continuation of UDR). **UMP:** Gaullist Party (2002–, continuation of RPR). **UDF:** Union for French Democracy. **SFIO:** Socialist Party (1905–69). **PS:** Socialist Party (1969–, continuation of SFIO). **PCF:** Communist Party. **PRG:** Left Radical Party (PRG 1998–, PRS 1996–98, MRG 1973–96, MGRS 1972–73, Radicals 1901–72). **REF:** Reformateurs (split from Radicals in 1972). **PSU:** Unified Socialist Party. **Greens:** Green Party. **GE:** Generation Ecology. **RI:** Independent Republicans. **PR:** Republicans. **UC:** Center Union. **CD:** Democratic Center. **PDM:** Progress and Modern Democracy.

COMMENTS: 1962: See Bell & Criddle (1984, 26) and Cole & Campbell (1989, 97). **1967:** See Bell & Criddle (1984, 47, 76), Cole & Campbell (1989, 100), and Alexandre (1977, 146). **1968:** See Bell & Criddle (1984, 49) and Cole & Campbell (1989, 104). **1973:** See Bell & Criddle (1984, 75), Martin (1993, 53), Lavau & Mossuz-Lavau (1980, 110), and Portelli (1994, 225). **1978:** See Charlot (1980, 82, 108), Martin (1993, 53), Jaffré (1980, 46, 72), Portelli (1994, 236–37), and Bell & Criddle (1984, 101). **1981:** See Ysmal (1989, 129), Martin (1993, 53), Portelli (1994, 304), and Schlesinger & Schlesinger (2000, 136). **1986:** See Bréchon (1995), Martin (1993, 53), Portelli (1994,, 366–37, 371), and Ysmal (1989, 146). **1988:** See Martin (1993, 53), Portelli (1994, 402), and Schlesinger & Schlesinger (2000, 136–38). **1993:** See Charlot (1994, 37), Ysmal (1993), Backman & Birenbaum (1993), Martin (1993, 53), Portelli (1994, 445–47), Thiébault (2000, 502), and http://www.les-verts.org/histoire.html. **1997:** See Schlesinger & Schlesinger (2000, 136–38, 149), Thiébault (2000, 501, 511–12), and http://www.les-verts.org/histoire.html. **2002:** Le Monde, various.

Table A.7

Electoral Coalitions in Germany, 1949–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG†
1949		No		
1953	48.38	CDU+CSU+DP	Yes*	CD
1957	53.55	CDU+CSU+DP	Yes	CD
1961	45.31	CDU+CSU	Yes*	CD
1965	47.59	CDU+CSU	Yes*	CD
1969	46.09	CDU+CSU	No	CD
1972	44.86	CDU+CSU	No	CD
	54.21	SPD+FDP	Yes	Yes
1976	48.64	CDU+CSU	No	CD
	50.48	SPD+FDP	Yes	Yes
1980	44.54	CDU+CSU	No	CD
	53.48	SPD+FDP	Yes	Yes
1983	55.73	CDU+CSU+FDP	Yes	CD
1987	53.35	CDU+CSU+FDP	Yes	CD
1990	54.85	CDU+CSU+FDP	Yes	CD
	1.20	B'90+Greens	No	No
1994	41.44	CDU+CSU	Yes*	CD
1998	39.58	CDU+CSU	No	CD
2002	38.5	CDU+CSU	No	No
	47.1	SPD+Greens	Yes	No

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

†CDU/CSU treated as a single party—the Christian Democrats (CD).

PARTIES: CSU: Christian Socialist Union. **CDU:** Christian Democratic Union. **FDP:** Free Democrats. **SPD:** Social Democrats. **DP:** German Party. **B'90:** Alliance '90. **Greens:** Green Party.

COMMENTS: 1953: See Saalfeld (2000, 39). **1957:** See Saalfeld (2000, 39), Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 8.1. **1965:** See Pulzer (1983, 102). **1969:** See Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 8.1. **1972:** See Pulzer (1983, 102), Powell (2000, 141), Schoen (1999, 488), and Conradt (1978, 34). **1976:** See Pulzer (1983, 102), Powell (2000, 72), and Conradt (1978, 45). **1980:** See Pulzer (1983, 102), Powell (2000, 72), and Gunlicks (1990, 3). **1983:** See Powell (2000, 72), Conradt (1990, 45) and Martin & Stevenson (2001). **1987:** See Powell (2000, 72) and Martin & Stevenson (2001). **1990:** See Powell (2000, 72, 210) and Martin & Stevenson (2001). **2002:** *New York Times* (various).

Table A.8

Electoral Coalitions in Greece, 1946–66, 1974–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946	55.1	UCNM	Yes	No
	19.3	NPU	No	No
	2.9	UNM	No	No
1950	2.6	FWR+NAPP	No	No
	16.4	EPEK	Yes	No
	9.7	DC	No	No
	8.2	PIC	No	No
	5.3	NRF	No	No
1951		No		
1952	34.2	UP	No	No
1956	48.2	DU	No	No
1958	2.9	UPP	No	No
	10.6	PADU	No	No
1961	33.7	CU+PP	No	No
	14.6	UDL+NAPP	No	No
1963		No		
1964	35.3	NRU+PP	No	No
1974	9.5	UL	No	No
	20.4	CU+NF	No	No
1977	2.7	PLWF	No	No
1981	48.1	UDL+PASOK	Yes	No
	1.4	RCPG+CPG-ML	No	No
1985	45.8	UDL+PASOK	Yes	No
	40.8	PDS+ND	No	No
1989 (June)	13.1	PLWF	No	No
1989 (Nov.)	11.0	PLWF	No	No
1990	10.3	PLWF	No	No
1993		No		
1996		No		
2000		No		

COALITIONS: UCNM: United Camp of the Nationally Minded: People's Party, Reformist Party, National Liberal Party, Royalist Party, Panhellenic National Party, Patriotic Union Party, Political Group Forward, Party of Reconstruction, Social Radical Union. **NPU:** National Political Union: National Unity Party, Democratic Socialists, Venizelist Liberals. **UNM:** Union of the Nationally Minded: Party of the Nationally Minded, People's Agrarian Party. **DC** Democratic Camp: Union of Democratic Leftists, Socialist Party—Union of Popular Democracy, Party of Leftist Liberals. **PIC:** Politically Independent Camp: Greek Renaissance Party, Party of the Nationally Minded. **NRF:** National Reconstruction Front: National Unity Party, People's Progressive Party, Panhellenic Party. **EPEK:** National Progressive Center Union: Progressive Liberal Center Party, Democratic Progressive Party. **UP:** Union of the Parties: National Progressive Center Union, Liberal Party, Socialist Party – Union of Popular Democracy. **DU:** Democratic Union: United Democratic Left, Liberal Party I, National Progressives Center Union, Farmers' and Workers' Rally, Democratic Party, Liberal Democrats, People's Party. **UPP:** Union of the People's Parties: People's Party, People's Social Party. **PADU:** Progressive Agrarian Democratic Union: National Progressives Center Union, Farmers' and Workers' Rally, Democratic Party, Progressives Party. **UL:** United Left: Communist Party, Communist Party-Interior, United Democratic Left Party. **PLWF:** Alliance of Progress and Left-Wing Forces: Christian Democrats, Communist Party-Interior, Socialist Initiative, Socialist March, U.D. Left.

PARTIES: FWR: Farmers' and Workers' Rally. **NAPP:** National Agrarian Progressive Party. **UDL:** United Democratic Left. **PASOK:** Socialists. **PSP:** Popular Social Party. **NRU:** National Radical Union. **PP:** Progressive Party. **NF:** New Forces. **CU:** Center Union. **RCPG:** Revolutionary Communist Party of Greece. **CPG-ML:** Communist Party of Greece—Marxist Leninist. **PDS:** Party for Democratic Socialists. **ND:** New Democracy.

COMMENTS: 1946–85 See mainly Clogg (1987) but also Mackie & Rose (1991), Kohler (1982, 105–33) for 1961, 1974–77, and Papayannakis (1981, 141–53) for 1956 and 1977. **1989–90:** Various issues of the *European Journal of Political Research*—reports on national elections in western nations.

Table A.9

Electoral Coalitions in Iceland, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No		
1949		No		
1953		No		
1956	19.2	People's Alliance I	Yes*	Yes
1959 (June)	15.2	People's Alliance I	No	Yes
1959 (Oct.)	16.0	People's Alliance I	No	Yes
1963	16.0	People's Alliance II	No	No NPP
1967	13.9	People's Alliance I	No	Yes
1971		No		
1974	4.60	ULL+PP	No	Yes
1978		No		
1979		No		
1983		No		
1987		No		
1991	1.8	NP+HP	No	No
1995		No		
1999	26.8	PA+WP+SDP+PM	No	No

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

COALITIONS: People's Alliance I: United Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party (1956, 1959, 1967). **People's Alliance II:** United Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party, National Preservation Party (1963).

PARTIES: IP: Independence Party. **PP:** Progressive Party. **ULL:** Union of Liberals and Leftists. **NPP:** National Preservation Party. **SP:** United Socialist Party. **PA:** People's Alliance. **WP:** Woman's Party. **SDP:** Social Democratic Party. **PM:** People's Movement. **NP:** National Party. **HP:** Humanist Party.

COMMENTS: 1956–67: This electoral coalition included the left wing of the SPD only. The coalition eventually merged into a single party (PA) in 1968. See Grimsson (1982, 146), Kristjánsson (1998, 175), Arter (1999, 84–85), Esaiasson & Heidar (2000, 448, 450), Hardarson (2002, 109, 144), Kristjánsson (2002, 126), and Indriðason (2004). **1974:** Includes only a splinter of the PP and not the entire party (Grimsson 1982, 148). **1991:** See the *European Journal of Political Research* 1992 (22)—reports on national elections in western nations. **1999:** See Hardarson (2002, 107).

Table A.10

Electoral Coalitions in Ireland, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948		No		
1951	53.11	FG+L+CnT+CnP	No	Yes
1954	44.28	FG+L+CnT	Yes	Yes
1957		No		
1961		No		
1965		No		
1969		No		
1973	48.75	FG+L	Yes	Yes
1977	42.12	FG+L	No	Yes
1981	46.40	FG+L	Yes	Yes
1982 (Feb.)	46.42	FG+L	No	Yes
1982 (Nov.)	48.6	FG+L	Yes	Yes
1987		No		
1989		No		
1992		No		
1997	40.8	FG+L+DL	No	Yes
	44.0	FF+PD	Yes	Yes
2002		No		

PARTIES: CnP: Clann na Poblachta (Party of the Republic). **CnT:** Clann na Talmhan (Party of the Land). **DL:** Democratic Left. **FF:** Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Ireland). **FG:** Fine Gael (Irish Race). **L:** Labour. **PD:** Progressive Democrats.

COMMENTS: 1951: See Farrell (1987, 138). **1954:** See Farrell (1987, 138). **1973:** See Sinnott (1987, 93), Mair (1987, 114), Farrell (1987, 138), and Gallagher (1982, 118,190–96). **1977:** See Gallagher (1982, 216–32). **1981:** See Laver (1992). **1982** (February and November): See Gallagher (1982, 249) and Sinnott (1987, 93). **1997:** See Murphy (2003, 4), Collins (2003, 25), and Gallagher (2003, 93).

Table A.11

Electoral Coalitions in Israel, 1948–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG†
1949	12.2	URF	Yes*	No
1951		No		
1955	4.7	Torah Front	No	No
1959	4.7	Torah Front	No	No
1961		No		
1965	21.3	Gahal	No	No
1969	21.7	Gahal	Yes*	No
	46.2	Maarakh	Yes*	No
1973	30.2	Likud Bloc	No	No
	39.6	Maarakh	Yes*	No
	1.4	Moked	No	No
	3.8	Torah Front	No	No
1977	33.4	Likud Bloc	Yes*	No
	24.6	Maarakh	No	No
	11.6	DMC	No	No
1981	37.1	Likud Bloc	Yes*	No
	36.6	Maarakh	No	No
1984	31.9	Likud Bloc	Yes*	No
	34.9	Maarakh	Yes*	No
	4.0	HaTehiya+Tsomet	Yes*	No
1988	31.1	Likud Bloc	Yes*	No
1992	24.9	Likud Bloc	No	No
	9.6	Meretz	Yes*	No
1996•	25.8	LGT	Yes*	No
1999•	14.1	Likud Bloc	No	No
	20.2	One Israel	Yes*	No
	3.0	National Union	No	No
	3.7	Yahadut HaTorah	No	No

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

†The MRG data set includes these coalitions as single parties.

•The Prime Minister was directly elected by the voters in 1996 and 1999.

COALITIONS: URF (United Religious Front): Mizrahi, HaPoel HaMizrahi, Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel. **Torah Religious Front:** Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel. **Gahal:** Liberal Party and Herut. **Likud Bloc:** Liberal Party, Herut, Free Center, Laam, Movement for a Greater Israel, State List. **Maarakh** (Alignment): Labor Party and Mapam. **Moked:** Maki and Rakah – The Communist Party of Israel was founded in 1949, and in 1965 broke into two factions, Maki and Rakah. They formed an electoral list together in 1973. **DMC** (Democratic Movement for Change): Shinui and Free Center. **Meretz:** Shinui, Mapam and Ratz. **One Israel:** Labor, Gesher and Meimad. **LGT:** Likud Bloc, Gesher and Tsomet. **Yahadut HaTorah:** Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah. **National Union:** Moledet, Herut and Tekuma.

COMMENTS: See official Knesset website, www.knesset.gov.il. See also the Library of Congress (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/israel/il_appnb.html), Laver & Schofield (1998, 230), Penniman (ed.) (1979), Aronoff (1978).

Table A.12

Electoral Coalitions in Italy, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948	31.0	PCI+PSI	No	Yes
1953	35.3	PCI+PSI	No	Yes
1958		No		
1963		No		
1968		No		
1972		No		
1976		No		
1979		No		
1983		No		
1987		No		
1992		No		
1994	34.3	Progressive Allia nce	Yes*	(1)
	15.7	Pact for Italy	Yes*	Yes
	46.4	Pole of Good Government	No	(2)
1996	43.4	Olive Tree I + RC	Yes†	(3)
	42.1	Freedom Pole	No	(4)
2001	35.0	Olive Tree II	No	No
	45.4	House of Freedom	Yes	No

* Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

† Although the RC was a member of the electoral alliance, it did not enter government. The RC did support the Olive Tree I government in the legislature, though.

(1) MRG data set does not include the Socialist Party, Social Christians, or Socialist Renewal; (2) MRG data set does not include the Christian Democratic Center, Democratic Union of the Left, Liberal Democratic Pole; (3) MRG data set does not include the Prodi Group or the Sardinian Action Party; 4) MRG data set treats the Christian Democrats as a single party.

COALITIONS: Progressive Alliance: Party of the Democratic Left, Communist Refoundation, Greens, Network, Democratic Alliance, Socialist Party, Social Christians, Socialist Renewal. **Pact for Italy:** Popular Party, Segui Pact. **Pole of Good Government:** Forza Italia, National Alliance, Northern League, Panella List-Reformers, Christian Democratic Center, Democratic Union of the Left, Liberal Democratic Pole. **Freedom Pole:** Forza Italia, National Alliance, Christian Democratic Center, United Christian Democrats. **Olive Tree I:** Party of the Democratic Left, Prodi Group, Dini List-Renewed Italy, Green Federation. **House of Freedom:** Forza Italia, National Alliance, Northern League, Union of Christian and Center Democrats (formerly the Christian Democratic Center and the United Christian Democrats), New Italian Socialist Party. **Olive Tree II:** Party of Democratic Left, Italian People's Party, Democrats, Dini-List-Renewed Italy, Democratic Union for Europe, Green Federation, Italian Democratic Socialist Party, Party of Italian Communists.

PARTIES: RC: Communist Refoundation. **PCI:** Communist Party. **PSI:** Socialist Party.

COMMENTS: 1948: See Mackie & Rose (1991), Marradi (1982, 39), and Mastropaolo & Slater (1992, 313). **1953:** See Mastropaolo & Slater (1992, 313). **1994:** See Newell (2000, 32), Mershon (2002), Rhodes (1995, 128–29), Daniels (1999, 82–84), and Verzichelli & Cotta (2000). **1996:** See Mershon (2002), Newell (2000, 38–39), Daniels (1999, 85–89), and Verzichelli & Cotta (2000). **2001:** See Mershon (2002) and www.electionworld.org.

Table A.13

Electoral Coalitions in Japan, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1947		No		
1949		No		
1952		No		
1953		No		
1955		No		
1958		No		
1960		No		
1963		No		
1967		No		
1969		No		
1972		No		
1976		No		
1979		No		
1980		No		
1983		No		
1986		No		
1990		No		
1993	37.18	JRP+JSP+CGP+DSP+SDF	Yes*	No SDF
	10.69	NP+JNP	Yes*	Yes
1996		No		
2000		No		

*The government was formed from the two pre-electoral coalitions in 1993.

PARTIES: CGP: Clean Government Party. **DSP:** Democratic Socialist Party. **JNP:** Japan New Party. **JRP:** Japan Renewal Party (Shinsei-to). **JSP:** Japan Socialist Party. **NP:** New Party (Sakigake). **SDF:** Socialist Democratic Federation.

COMMENTS: 1993: See Kohno (1997, 139–41, 149).

Table A.14

Electoral Coalitions in Luxembourg, 1946–2002

Election Year†	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1954		No		
1959		No		
1964		No		
1968	68.45	LSAP+CSV	No*▲	Yes
1974		No		
1979	6.64	EF+SI	No	No
1984		No		
1989		No		
1994	9.91	GAP+GLEI	No	1 Party
1999		No		

†The elections of 1949 and 1951 were partial legislative elections and were, thus, not included.
*After the election, the LSAP was prevented from entering the government coalition by its trade union—the CSV did want to form the government coalition based on the electoral pact (Dumont & De Winter 2000, 405).
PARTIES: CSV: Christian Democrats. **LSAP:** Socialists. **GAP:** Alternative Green Party. **GLEI:** Green Left Ecological Initiative. **EF:** Forcibly Enrolled. **SI:** Independent Socialists.
COMMENTS: 1968: See Dumont & De Winter (2000, 405). **1979:** See Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 15.1. **1994:** See Dumont & De Winter (2000, 403).

Table A.15

Electoral Coalitions in the Netherlands, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No		
1948		No		
1952		No		
1956		No		
1959		No		
1963		No		
1967		No		
1971	33.70	PvdA+D66+PPR	No	Yes
1972	36.29	PvdA+D66+PPR	Yes*	Yes
1977	31.89	ARP+CHU+KVP	Yes*	1 Party
	35.90	PvdA+PPR	No	Yes
1981		No		
1982		No		
1986	52.00	CDA+VVD	Yes	Yes
1989	67.19	PvdA+CDA	Yes	Yes
	4.10	CPN+PPR+EVP	No	No
1994		No		
1998	62.7	D66+PvdA+VVD	Yes	Yes
2002		No		

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.
PARTIES: PvdA: Social Democrats. **D66:** Liberal Democrats. **PPR:** Radical Party. **CHU:** Christian Historical Union. **ARP:** Anti-Revolutionary Party. **KVP:** Catholic People's Party – ARP, CHU and KVP merged to form the Christian Democrat Appeal (**CDA**) in 1979. **VVD:** Liberals. **CPN:** Communist Party. **EVP:** Evangelical People's Party.
COMMENTS: 1971: See Timmermans & Andeweg (2000, 367), Tops & Dittrich (1992, 279), and Daalder (1987, 254). **1972:** See Timmermans & Andeweg (2000, 367), Tops & Dittrich (1992, 279), Daalder (1987, 254), and De Swaan (1982, 223, 230). **1977:** See Koole (1994, 280), Daalder (1987, 217), de Jong & Pijnenburg (1986, 148), De Swaan (1982, 223, 230), and Keesing's. **1986:** See Powell (2000, 141) and Napel (1999, 177). **1989:** See Powell (2000, 55). **1998:** See Irwin (1999).

Table A.16

Electoral Coalitions in New Zealand, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No		
1949		No		
1951		No		
1954		No		
1957		No		
1960		No		
1963		No		
1966		No		
1969		No		
1972		No		
1975		No		
1978		No		
1981		No		
1984		No		
1987		No		
1990	5.2	MM+NLP	No	No
1993		No		
1996		No		
1999	46.4	AL+LAB	Yes	No
2002		No		

PARTIES: MM: Mana Motuhake. **NLP:** New Labor Party. **AL:** Alliance Party. **LAB:** New Zealand Labour Party.

COMMENTS: 1990: See Alliance website, http://www.alliance.org.nz. The NLP stood in the general seats, and Mana Motuhake stood in the Maori seats. In 1991, the two parties merged into the Alliance. **1999:** See Vowles (2002) and Alliance website http://www.alliance.org.nz.

Table A.17

Electoral Coalitions in Norway, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1949		No		
1953		No		
1957		No		
1961		No		
1965	49.47	SP+H+V+KRF	Yes	Yes
1969	48.88	SP+H+V+KRF	Yes	Yes
1973	11.20	CP+SPP+WIC	No	1 Party
1977	45.78	H+KRF+SP	No	Yes
1981	47.77	H+KRF+SP	No	Yes
1985	45.28	H+KRF+SP	Yes	Yes
1989	37.19	H+KRF+SP	Yes	Yes
1993		No		
1997	26.04	KRF+SP+V	Yes	Yes
2001	22.00	KRF+SP+V	No	No

PARTIES: SP: Center Party. **H:** Conservative Party. **V:** Liberal Party. **KRF:** Christian People's Party. **CP:** Communist Party. **SPP:** Socialist People's Party. **WIC:** Worker's Information Committee.

COMMENTS: 1965: See Groennings (1970, 73–74), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Rommetvedt (1992, 59), Hancock (1998, 245), Arter (1999, 210), and Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). **1969:** See Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Strøm & Leipart (1992, 69), and Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). **1973:** See Valen & Martinussen (1977, 40–43), Esaiasson & Heidar (2000, 452), and Keesing's. In March 1975 the electoral coalition was transformed into the Socialist Left Party. **1977:** See Rommetvedt (1992, 61, 75) and Arter (1999, 210). **1981:** See Narud & Strøm (2000, 177), Shaffer (1998, 122) and Rommetvedt (1992, 60, 75). **1985:** See Strøm & Leipart (1992, 69) and Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). **1989:** See Rommetvedt (1992, 61) and Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). **1997:** See Narud & Strøm (2000, 175). **2001:** See Valen (2003).

Table A.18

Electoral Coalitions in Portugal, 1976–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1976		No		
1979	46.30	SD+CDS+PMP	Yes	Yes
	19.51	PCP+MDP	No	Yes
1980	27.80	PS+UEDS+ASDI	No	Yes
	17.32	PCP+MDP	No	Yes
	48.30	SD+CDS+PMP+Ref	Yes	Not Ref
1983	18.69	PCP+MDP+Greens	No	Yes
1985	15.97	PCP+MDP+Greens	No	Yes
1987	12.46	CDU	No	Yes
1991	8.80	CDU	No	1 Party
1995	8.60	CDU	No	1Party
1999	9.02	CDU	No	No
	2.46	UBL	No	No
2002	7.00	CDU	No	No
	2.80	UBL	No	No

COALITIONS: CDU (Unitarian Democratic Coalition): Communist Party and Greens. **UBL** (United Block of the Left): Worker's Revolutionary Party, Democratic People's Union, and Extreme Left (Politica XXI).

PARTIES: PCP: Communist Party. **MDP:** Portuguese Democratic Movement. **CDS:** Center Social Democrats. **SD:** Social Democrats. **DI:** Democratic Intervention. **Ref:** Reformists. **PS:** Socialist Party. **UEDS:** Left Social Democratic Union. **ASDI:** Independent Social Democrats. **PRD:** Party of Democratic Renovation. **PMP:** Popular Monarchist Party.

COMMENTS: 1979: See Cunha (1997, 36), Frain (1997, 100–102), Kohler (1982, 196, 209), Bruneau & Macleod (1986, 28–29), Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 20.3a, Magone (2000), and Laver & Schofield (1998, 237). **1980:** See Cunha (1997, 37), Frain (1997, 100–102), Bruneau & Macleod (1986, 28–29), Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 20.3a, Magone (2000), and Laver & Schofield (1998, 237). **1983–87:** See Cunha (1997, 39–41), Mackie & Rose (1991), Table 20.3a, Magone (2000), and Laver & Schofield (1998, 237). **1991–95:** See Cunha (1997, 45–47), Magone (2000, 533). **1999:** See Lloyd-Jones (2002) and Keesing's. **2002:** See electionworld.org.

Table A.19

Electoral Coalitions in Spain, 1977–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1977	34.52	UCD	Yes	1 Party
	9.35	PCE+CS	No	Yes
	4.47	PSP+FSP	No	No
1979	5.97	AP+PDP+PL	No	1 Party
	10.82	PCE+CS	No	Yes
1982	23.64	AP+PDP	No	Yes
1986	26.12	AP+PDP+PL	No	Yes
	4.63	PCE+left	No	No
1989	9.13	IU	No	No
1993	9.63	IU	No	No
1996		No		
2000	39.6	PSOE+IU	No	No

COALITIONS: IU (United Left Coalition): Spanish Communist Party, Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain, Catalan Unified Socialist Party, Progressive Federation, Party of Socialist Action, Unitarian Candidature of Workers, Berdak-Les Verds and Republican Left. This was an electoral coalition until 1994, when it became a federation where its members could belong either to the IU itself or to its member parties (Newton 1997, 193, 215). **UCD:** Union of the Democratic Center: an electoral coalition of fourteen center and right-wing parties that merged into a single party in 1978. **AP:** Popular Alliance: an electoral alliance with around seven conservative constituent parties. By 1978, the coalition had split, losing some conservative members and gaining some moderate ones.

PARTIES: PDP: Christian Democrats. **PL:** Liberals. **PCE:** Communists. **CS:** Catalan Unified Socialist Party. **PSOE:** Socialists. **PSP:** Popular Socialist Party. **FSP:** remnant of Federation of Socialist Parties.

COMMENTS: 1977: See Kohler (1982, 17–35), López-Pintor (1985a, 189), Esteban & López Guerra (1985), Mackie & Rose (1991), Heywood (1995, 175), Caramani (2000), and Hopkin (1999, 213). **1979:** See Kohler (1982, 27–28), López-Pintor (1985a, 189), and Esteban & López Guerra (1985). **1982:** See López-Pintor (1985b), Mackie & Rose (1991), and Laver & Schofield (1998, 239–40). **1986:** See Laver & Schofield (1998, 239–40) and Gillespie (1995, 59). **1989:** See Keesings and Newton (1997, 193, 210–11). **1993:** See Keesings, Newton (1997, 193, 210–11), and Budge et al. (2001). **1996:** See Newton (1997, 210–11). **2000:** See Colomer (2001) and www.electionworld.org.

Table A.20

Electoral Coalitions in Sweden, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948	47.48	CE+LIB+CON	No	Yes
1952	56.79	SD+CE	Yes	Yes
1956		No		
1958		No		
1960		No		
1964		No		
1968		No		
1970		No		
1973	48.81	CE+LIB+CON	No	Yes
	9.4	SLP+left	No	Yes (SKP)
1976	50.73	CE+LIB+CON	Yes	Yes
1979	49.0	CE+LIB+CON	No	Yes
1982		No		
1985	12.42	CE+CD	No	Yes
1988		No		
1991	31.05	LIB+CON	Yes*	Yes
1994		No		
1998		No		
2002		No		

*Pre-electoral coalition did not enter government alone.

PARTIES: **SD**: Social Democrats. **SKP**: Left Party. **CE**: Center Party. **LIB**: Liberal Party. **CON**: Conservative Party. **CD**: Christian Democratic Party. **ND**: New Democracy Party.

COMMENTS: **1948**: See Särlvik (2002, 243–45, 247). **1952**: See Bergman (2000, 208). **1973**: See Bergman (1995, 74, 84), Särlvik (1977, 75–76), Hadenius (1990, 132–33), Strøm & Bergman (1992, 115) and Powell (2000, 76). **1973**: Keesing's reported an alliance on the left but mentioned only one party by name (SKP). **1976**: See Särlvik (1983, 126), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Hadenius (1990, 144), Strøm & Bergman (1992, 115), and Powell (2000, 72, 76, 261). **1979**: See Särlvik (1983, 131), Fitzmaurice (1986, 266), Strøm & Bergman (1992), and Powell (2000, 76, 261). **1985**: See Hadenius (1990, 177), Sannerstedt & Sjölin (1992, 104), Strøm & Bergman (1992, 117), Arter (1999, 111), and Särlvik (2002, 229, 257–58). **1991**: See Bergman (2000, 209).

Table A.21

Electoral Coalitions in the United Kingdom, 1946–2002

Election Year	% Vote for Coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1950		No		
1951		No		
1955		No		
1959		No		
1964		No		
1966		No		
1970		No		
1974 (Feb.)		No		
1974 (Oct.)		No		
1979		No		
1983	25.37	Lib+SocDem	No	Yes
1987	22.57	Lib+SocDem	No	Yes
1992		No		
1997		No		
2001		No		

PARTIES: **Lib**: Liberals. **SocDem**: Social Democratic Party.

COMMENTS: **1983**: See Boothroyd (2001, 5–8), Kitschelt (1994, 180), Norton (1984, 126–30), and Peele (1995, 202–3). **1987**: See Peele (1995, 202–3) and Boothroyd (2001, 5–8).

NOTES

Notes to Chapter 1

1. I use the terms 'electoral' or 'pre-electoral' interchangeably to characterize coalitions that form prior to elections.

2. Electoral coalitions can also play a role in determining the identity of the government in countries with more proportional electoral rules. For example, the presence of an electoral coalition can affect the choice of government formateur or allow a small party that is a potential government member to surpass an electoral threshold. By affecting the identity of the government, electoral coalitions ultimately influence the types of policy that get implemented. This is the case whether the electoral system is disproportional, as in the stylized example above, or not.

3. Some of these studies do take account of the pre-election environment by incorporating voter choice and candidate entry (Shepsle 1991). For instance, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) analyze the strategic behavior of voters in their model of government coalition formation. Other more recent work combines voter behavior with post-election elite bargaining (Glasgow & Alvarez 2005; Quinn & Martin 2002). However, none of these analyses ever explicitly allows for pre-electoral coalition formation.

4. I know of only one major cross-national statistical analysis that takes account of pre-electoral coalitions (Martin & Stevenson 2001). However, just as in the rest of the literature, the goal of this study is to better understand government coalitions, not electoral coalitions. Extremely recently, several papers have appeared examining electoral coalitions between particular parties in France (Blais and Indriðason 2004; Spoon 2004; Fauvelle-Aymar & Lewis-Beck 2005).

5. Kaminski (2001) uses a cooperative game-theoretic model to examine pre-electoral coalitions and party mergers in Poland in the 1990s. However, his analysis has not been extended to other cases and does not take account of bargaining or policy issues.

6. I do not claim that pre-electoral coalitions will automatically be electorally advantageous. After all, it may be the case that a coalition is composed of parties that are so ideologically incompatible that their respective electorates refuse to vote for the coalition.

7. Note that this does not have to be the case for a coalition to be advantageous. A coalition that attracts more votes than either party could win on its own, but fewer than the total number of votes they would win running independently, may still be useful if it increases the probability that this coalition enters government or becomes the formateur.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. Powell (2000) has collected data on government majorities that were identifiable

prior to elections. Although he includes some pre-electoral coalitions in his analysis, they are certainly not the main focus of his book. Martin and Stevenson (2001) include a pre-electoral coalition variable in their analysis of government coalitions. However, as I note in chapter seven, they significantly underestimate the presence of electoral coalitions in their sample.

2. Convergencia i Unió is an electoral coalition between the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia and the Democratic Union of Catalonia. Unidade Galega, known as the Socialist Galega Block in 1982 and the Socialist Galega-Left Galega in 1986, is composed of several small Galician parties. The Galician National Popular Block is another Galician electoral coalition in which the Marxist Unión do Pobo Galego is the dominant party. The Basque Left is an electoral coalition of left-wing Basque parties, while Herri Batasuna is an electoral coalition of more extreme left-wing parties in the Basque region.

3. These two electoral coalitions formed in the 1993 legislative elections (Kohno 1997, 139–41, 149). One electoral coalition comprised the Clean Government Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, the Socialist Democratic Federation, the Japan Renewal Party (Shinsei-to) and the Japan Socialist Party. The other comprised the New Party (Sakigake) and the Japan New Party. Both electoral coalitions entered government in 1993.

4. There was a coalition between the Center Party and the Christian League of Finland in 1970 (Arter 1999, 110), a coalition between the Liberals and the Center Party in 1983 (Esaiasson & Heidar 2000, 447–48), and the Purple Coalition in 1999 (personal correspondence with Mark Hallerberg). For more on electoral coalitions in Finland, see Sundberg (2002) and Kuitunen (2002).

5. I do not include Switzerland in this book because my statistical analyses focus on parliamentary, rather than presidential, systems. Were I to do so, though, it would present other ambiguous cases. Parties in Switzerland often form electoral coalitions in particular cantons; however, they are not nation-wide coalitions. The 'magic formula' used after 1959 to determine coalition government composition means that everyone knows in advance which parties will end up in government (Kerr 1987) and that "elections do not have a direct impact on the government composition" (Caramani 1996). I do not consider this agreement over government composition to constitute a pre-electoral coalition, since the parties in question do not coordinate their electoral strategies. Moreover, members of the executive council are elected individually by the parliament and are not "constrained by interparty policy deals" (Church 2004, 20, 117–18). Thus, although Switzerland has pre-electoral coalitions at the local level and the 'magic formula' at the national level, I would code Switzerland as having no national-level pre-electoral coalitions.

6. Prior to the 1960s, the Liberal Party also formed several local electoral coalitions with the Conservative Party. These coalitions took the form of nomination agreements, in which the Liberals agreed "not to contest a particular seat if the Conservatives refrained from offering a candidate in another seat" (Rasmussen 1991, 167).

7. Identifying electoral coalitions in Israel is further complicated by the fact that some parties that form an electoral alliance for certain elections later merge into a single party, where the original constituent parties exist as separate factions. This was the case with Mapai and its electoral alliance partners when they merged to form the Labor Party in 1968. Fortunately the act of officially forming a party does tend to be mentioned in the literature on elections and parties in Israel.

8. For a more detailed discussion of electoral coordination in mixed and multi-tier electoral systems with dual ballots, see Ferrara & Herron (2005).

9. Because the National and Liberal parties have such a long-standing electoral agreement, most of their pre-electoral bargaining is not actually over the flow of preferences, but rather over the number of districts in which both should compete and the extent to which their policy platforms differ (Sharman, Sayers, & Miragliotta 2002).

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Note that this is equivalent to saying that an increase in the number of parties will only raise the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional.

2. However, some commentators analyzing Dutch politics have suggested that electoral coalitions have not been very effective in giving Dutch voters more say over the composition of their governments. For example, De Jong and Pijnenburg (1986, 148) state that "the making of a [government] coalition remains the crucial moment despite the efforts . . . towards more 'political clarity' and pre-electoral agreements . . . Dutch voters will never decide on the composition of their government."

3. A slightly different scenario took place in Italy in 1996, when a number of center-Left parties running under the heading of Olive Tree agreed to go into government together if they were successful at the polls. While the Communist Refoundation (RC) was not part of this coalition and had no intention of going into government with the Olive Tree, it did reach nomination agreements with the member parties of the Olive Tree to avoid splitting the left-wing vote in a number of constituencies (Daniels 1999, 85–86). Following the election, the Olive Tree coalition entered government, and the RC simply supported it from the legislature (Newell 2000, 38). In this case, I do consider that the government was based on an electoral coalition.

4. For another analysis of how electoral system disproportionality and party system size affect the probability of electoral coalition formation, see S. Golder (2005).

5. The effective threshold is the mean of the thresholds of representation and exclusion. It is calculated as

$$\frac{50\%}{M+1}+\frac{50\%}{2M}$$

where M is the district magnitude. If there are legal thresholds and/or upper-tier seats, the calculation is slightly more complicated (Lijphart 1994, 25–30). For more information on electoral thresholds, see Taagepera (1998*a*, 1998*b*).

Notes to Chapter 4

1. However, it is important to recognize that actual election results may rule out certain combinations, so that a party may reconsider its alliance strategy afterwards. It may

also be the case that voters do not clearly show their support for a particular electoral coalition. In these circumstances, party leaders can more easily justify not honoring the terms of the electoral coalition. After all, agreements over the division of government spoils do not necessarily specify appropriate behavior if the coalition loses. It is, perhaps, interesting to note that some pre-electoral agreements are sufficiently detailed that they take these possibilities into account and prescribe particular actions. This is an indication that party leaders are clearly aware of the commitment problems associated with electoral coalitions.

2. If the main issue for voters in a particular election was incumbent corruption, then parties at opposing extremes could potentially form an anti-incumbent, anti-corruption electoral coalition that could generate a significant amount of voter support. In fact, this is the story often told of the defeat of the Congress Party in India in 1989 (Andersen 1990).

3. Note that the fact that a coalition may be sub-additive does not necessarily mean that it offers no significant electoral gains. It is possible for a coalition to be sub-additive and yet still be sufficiently large to represent the largest 'party,' thereby winning itself the role of government formateur.

4. This does not rule out the possibility that politicians will overestimate the support they would receive from running separately or from forming an electoral coalition. Estimates of party or coalition support are likely to be uncertain in volatile or new party systems. Although the extent to which these estimates are inaccurate can obviously affect the range in which coalition bargains are feasible, I have not explicitly modeled this source of uncertainty.

5. The core of any bargaining game is that two players are bargaining over a 'pie.' The size of this pie is typically normalized to 1. An agreement is a pair (x_1, x_2), in which x_1 is Player A's share of the pie and x_2 Player B's share. The set of possible agreements is: $X = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \Re^2: x_1 + x_2 = 1 \text{ and } x_i \geq 0 \text{ for } i = 1, 2\}$.

6. As long as party leaders have single-peaked preferences over the policy space, then the use of a quadratic loss function does not affect any of the model's implications.

7. It is not difficult to see that this feature of presidential elections would make it rather difficult to find a coalition bargain acceptable to both sides. The problems caused by non-divisible presidential offices will be illustrated in the next chapter.

8. Although there are three possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, there is always a unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for any given set of values for the model's parameters.

9. However, this assumption is not entirely innocuous, since it does affect the number of possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria. It turns out that if I allow the players to remain indifferent between making and not making an offer, there would be an additional equilibrium in which Party A makes an offer, B rejects this offer, and B makes no counter-offer. The outcome would be that no electoral coalition forms.

10. If this assumption is not made and the players are allowed to remain indifferent, then there is a fourth sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The outcome is that Player A makes an initial offer, which is rejected. The game enters a second period, but Player B does not make a counter offer. The end result is that no electoral coalition forms.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. Le Pen received 16.86% of the vote in the 2002 presidential election compared to 15% in 1995. A rival far-right candidate, Bruno Mégret, won another 2.34% of the vote in 2002. These figures come from the *Election Politique* website at http://www.election-politique.com.

2. The electoral system used for the 1986 elections was different. In an attempt to prevent an expected right-wing legislative majority, President Mitterrand introduced a proportional representation system similar to that used in the Fourth Republic. He hoped that this system would encourage voters to support the extremist National Front and siphon off votes from the moderate right-wing parties. Although a large number of voters did support the National Front, the leader of the moderate right, Jacques Chirac, still managed to become prime minister, albeit with a legislative majority of just two. Chirac immediately restored the traditional two-round electoral system.

3. The early 5% threshold was based on the actual number of votes cast. When the threshold was raised to 10% in 1966, the percentage of votes a party now needed to advance to the second round was 10% of the *registered* voters. This method remained in place when the threshold was raised to 12.5% (Duhamel 1999, 138–39). Given turnout levels, a party often needs around 17% of the actual vote to qualify for the second round.

4. A small number of moderate right-wing deputies regularly call for an electoral coalition with the National Front in certain districts. However, they tend to be isolated very quickly by the party elites (Hecht & Mandonnet 1998). For example, when several mainstream right politicians were elected with the help of the National Front in the cantonal and regional elections of 1998, President Chirac immediately went on national television to denounce all alliances between the moderate and the extreme right. The politicians were then kicked out of their parties (Martin 1999).

5. Cohabitation refers to a time when the presidential and prime ministerial positions are held by people from opposing parties.

6. The origins of this federation can be found in a series of discussions that took place around the presidential candidate of a mysterious 'Monsieur X.' It was only once the idea of a candidate of the center-Left had been 'tested' in the weekly magazine, *L'Express*, that Gaston Deferre came out and announced that he was actually Monsieur X (Chagnollaud & Quermonne 1996).

7. The PCF were opposed to the alliance, because they did not want to be sidelined as they had been in the Fourth Republic. Since the Gaullists opposed the alliance and wanted the centrist voters for themselves, they constantly raised the religious issue to drive a wedge between the Socialists and the MRP.

8. Parties of the right during the Third and Fourth Republics had always suffered from elite fragmentation and the poor organization of their mass electoral following. However, the Gaullists were able to gain control of the local 'notables' and achieve a high degree of parliamentary discipline, centralization, and nationalization (Schain 1991).

9. The other three cases include one with multiple left-wing candidates, and two with multiple right-wing candidates. In the fourth district in the Maine-et-Loire department, the left-wing candidate managed to win with only 36.57% of the vote, because two mainstream-Right candidates split the right-wing vote between them.

10. In the proportional representation elections of 1986, the UDF and the Gaullists ran joint lists in 61 of the 96 electoral districts. They ran separate lists in the remaining 35.

11. Along with a small band of followers, the UDF leader François Bayrou was one of the few who refused to join the new 'Union for a Presidential Majority.' He was worried that the Gaullists would dominate the new coalition and control the bulk of the campaign funding from the government.

12. Socialist voters were much less likely to vote for a Communist candidate in the second round than Communist voters were to support a Socialist candidate. The vast majority of centrist voters simply refused to vote for an electoral union of the Left led by the PCF (Hanley 2002; Bell & Criddle 1984; Johnson 1981; Alexandre 1977).

13. Rivalry among the various leaders of the moderate Left was intense; anecdotes of the personal nature of this rivalry are rife in the descriptive literature (Du Roy & Schneider 1982; Alexandre 1977). It is important to note that this rivalry did not prevent the merger. As a result, one should be wary of the 'personal animosity' story as an explanation for coordination failure.

14. It is important to remember that the 1986 election was held under a proportional representation system. It is worth stating, though, that there is some doubt as to how many of the French voters actually realized this prior to the election. The simulation would certainly be more useful had the poll been taken during an election held under the usual two-round system.

15. Analysts of French politics often refer to the parties on the right using a typology developed by René Rémond (1982), according to which the Right has been divided since Napoleon into Orleanist, Bonapartist, and Monarchist wings. In recent years, references to this typology have diminished. For a further discussion, see Golder (2000).

16. There were seven candidates representing the Right. See http://www.election-politique.com for a complete listing of candidates and results.

17. So far, the National Front has not managed to win seats in the legislature, with the exception of 35 seats in the 1986 proportional representation elections.

18. As one might expect, these electoral agreements are often a source of conflict between the party elites and the local candidates.

19. Both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were confident of at least receiving the votes from their own native region (Im 2000; Nam 1989, 196; Dong 1988, 181–82).

20. Although the Korean system is often treated as presidential (Przeworski et al. 2000), it does have a prime minister subject to the approval of parliament. The president is not responsible to parliament and does not have the ability to dissolve it. The government of the prime minister can be brought down, though, by a vote of no confidence. In many ways, this system is similar to that used in France. The main difference is that the South Korean president does not have the power to dissolve the parliament, as the French president does.

21. In the absence of ideological conflict, regional distinctions have become central to much of Korean politics. Regional antagonisms were encouraged during Park Chung Hee's reign (Nam 1989, 279, 316–17). This applies particularly to the split between the Cholla region and the rest of the country. Morriss (1996) argues that regional voting did not develop before the 1970s but has grown rapidly since then. He emphasizes that this pattern is a political construct, since there are no intrinsic regional differences, and that in "the absence of other socio-economic cleavages, regional attachments provide a way for leaders to differentiate themselves, and a basis on which to appeal to their supporters."

22. Kim Dae Jung also promised to change the institutional setup and create more of a parliamentary regime in which the president would have no more than a ceremonial role (Diamond & Shin 2000; Kim 2000*b*). Since parliament was controlled by Kim Young Sam's party at the time, it would obviously be difficult to get such a measure passed. As a result, this second promise was never entirely credible.

23. Kim Young Sam's long-term rival, Kim Dae Jung, came second with 33.8% of the vote, while Chung Ju Yung came third with 16.3%.

24. Shortly before the election, though, Chung abruptly ended his alliance with Roh. Despite this change, Roh still won the election.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. Kaminski (2001) has used a similar survey approach to the one suggested here to analyze coalition stability in Poland.

2. Dyadic data is also the format of choice in the international relations literature addressing coalition or alliance behavior.

3. 'Government potential' refers to a party that is a former, actual, or (realistically) possible member of government. 'Blackmail potential' refers to a party that is able to affect the tactics of party competition among government-oriented parties (Budge et al. 2001, 216). The Budge et al. criteria are themselves drawn from Sartori (1976).

4. Random effects are similar to fixed effects in that they are both used to model unobserved heterogeneity. However, they measure unobserved heterogeneity in different ways. The fixed effects model introduces dummy variables, essentially modeling unobserved heterogeneity as an intercept shift. In contrast, a random effects estimation models unobserved heterogeneity with an additional disturbance term that is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero. There are at least two reasons why random effects are preferable here. Theoretically, a random-effects specification is more appropriate when inferences are being made about a population on the basis of a sample as is the case here (Greene 2003; Hsiao 2003). More practically, running a fixed-effects model by election would mean that all elections in which no pre-electoral coalition formed would be dropped. Doing so would leave me with only 37% of the observations and potentially introduces selection bias.

5. The log-likelihood from the model with random effects is −625.79, while the log-likelihood from the model without them is −681.29. This gives a χ^2 statistic of 111.0, i.e., $2(-625.79 + 681.29) = 111.0$. The *p*-value of obtaining a χ^2 statistic of this magnitude or larger if the random effects are not required is less than .0001, with one degree of freedom. This result strongly suggests that random effects should be retained.

6. Confidence intervals are based on simulations using 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix.

7. One might also wonder about the predictive power of my analysis. As with all rare event data, the predicted probability of a pre-electoral coalition forming is quite low (King & Zeng 2001). However, the results from my analysis show that the mean predicted prob-

ability of an electoral coalition forming for those dyads that actually did form an electoral coalition (.10) is twice as large as the mean predicted probability for those dyads that did not form a coalition (.05). The fact that simulations show that we can be highly confident (greater than 99%) that these mean predicted probabilities are different provides support for the predictive power of my analysis.

8. I show the effect of a change in *Polarization* by one standard deviation from its mean both when *Effective Threshold* is at its minimum value and when it is at its maximum value. This result shows the effect of a reasonable change in *Polarization* over the whole range of values of *Effective Threshold* in the sample. I do this for the other interacted variables as well.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. See Martin & Stevenson (2001, 38) for a discussion of the reasons why more traditional regression methods are unsuitable for analyzing which parties enter government.

2. Martin & Stevenson do, in fact, code some potential government coalitions as being based on pre-electoral agreements during inter-election periods. They do not discuss the justification for coding these observations in this way.

3. The test essentially involves comparing the estimated parameters produced by a fully specified model (all potential choices are included) with the estimated parameters from a model where the set of choices is restricted (some choices have been dropped). If IIA holds and the dropped choices are irrelevant, then the estimates of the model parameters will be the same. While Martin & Stevenson conducted their test by randomly dropping 20% of the potential government coalitions, I employed a more stringent test and randomly dropped 50% of the potential governments. I then repeated this procedure 50 times to make sure that the randomization procedure did not produce an unusual answer. If the *p*-value from the test is less than .05, then the null hypothesis of IIA is rejected. The average *p*-values from the 50 tests for the four models that I estimated in table 7.1 range from .69 to .89. I also conducted more stringent tests, where I dropped more than 50% of the potential government coalitions; I was still unable to reject the IIA assumption.

4. By the same logic, one might also worry about the omission of *Investiture* from the model, since this variable is interacted with *Minority* status. However, *Investiture* does not vary across the choices for a given formation opportunity, and including it along with its interaction with *Minority* status would lead to perfect multi-collinearity. Thus, omitting the constitutive term *Investiture* is appropriate and necessary in this particular case (Brambor, Clark, & Golder 2006).

5. Martin & Stevenson draw this same inference, but in slightly different terms. They state that "[v]ery strong parties do tend to get into government and, even more, to rule alone" (2001, 46).

6. The inclusion of the constitutive term *Single Party* also affects some of the other coefficients. For example, it increases the size of the coefficient on *Minimal Winning Coalitions* by 43% and reduces the size of the coefficient on *Ideological Divisions* by 26%. This is just further evidence of the bias arising from the omission of *Single Party* in Model 1.

7. These two claims cannot be verified by simply looking at the results in Model 3 and comparing them to those in Model 2. However, the results from a model in which I interact all of the variables in table 7.1 with a *Post-Election* dummy variable do support these claims—the coefficients on the interaction terms *Minimal Winning Coalition* × *Post-Election* and *Pre-Electoral Pact* × *Post-Election* are both positive and significant in this model. These results are not shown.

8. The odds that a potential coalition becomes the government if it is based on a pre-electoral coalition compared to the exact same potential coalition that is not based on an electoral pact is calculated as $e^{\beta_{PEC}}$ where β_{PEC} is the coefficient on the *Pre-Electoral Coalition* variable in table 7.1 (Long 1997, 168–70).

9. In addition, non-political factors such as holidays affect the length of time between the election and the date the new government takes office. For instance, forming the German government at the end of the year in 1990 took extra time because of the Christmas holidays (Saalfeld 2000, 48).

10. The data in table 7.2 refer only to governments that formed after an election. Governments also form in inter-election periods after a cabinet falls. The mean length of time that it takes to form a government in an inter-election period is only 13.5 days. A difference in means test indicates that we can be well over 99% confident that governments that form after an election take a much longer time to take office than those that form in an inter-election period.

11. The hazard rate has two components. The first is a set of covariates that are hypothesized to systematically affect the timing of an event. The second is the baseline hazard function that indicates the rate of event occurrence when all the covariates are zero, i.e., the baseline hazard reflects how the rate of event occurrence changes with time only (Martin & Vanberg 2003).

12. The results from a generalized gamma model, as well as an examination of the Cox-Snell residuals, indicate that the Weibull model is appropriate for examining the duration of government formation (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, 41–43, 124–25, 137–39). The fact that the results from a Cox proportional hazards model are qualitatively similar to those that I obtain from the Weibull model indicates that I can be particularly confident that my results are not dependent on my choice of the Weibull distribution to parameterize the baseline hazard function. This is because the Cox model does not have to specify a particular distribution of the hazard rate. The results from estimating the Cox model also indicate that the proportional hazards assumption underlying both the Weibull and Cox models is not violated—the *p*-value from the global test of the Schoenfeld residuals is .21 (Grambsch & Therneau 1994; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004; Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez 2004, 178–80).

13. See http://www.pol.umu.se/ccpd/.

14. Figure 7.1 illustrates the change in expected duration as the *Pre-Electoral Coalition* variable goes from 0 to 1 across the range of observed values for *Government Parties*. The change in expected duration in the Weibull model for a given number of *Government Parties* is calculated as:

$$E(T_{PEC=0}|\text{Parties}) - E(T_{PEC=1}|\text{Parties}) = \left[\left(\frac{1}{\lambda}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\Gamma\left(1+\frac{1}{\rho}\right)\right]_{PEC=0|Parties} - \left[\left(\frac{1}{\lambda}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}\Gamma\left(1+\frac{1}{\rho}\right)\right]_{PEC=1|Parties} \quad (7.2)$$

where $\lambda = e^{X\beta}$ is a scale parameter, ρ is a shape parameter, and Γ is the gamma function. Confidence intervals around this change in expected duration are based on simulations using 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix. Change in expected duration and confidence intervals are then calculated for all of the observed values of *Government Parties*, and these values are then plotted in figure 7.1.

15. In addition to using the *Ideological Range* variable, I also examined whether the *Ideological Spread* and *Ideological Connectedness* of the incoming government affected the duration of the government formation process. I found no evidence that they did. These additional variables are described in some detail in the next section.

16. I should note, though, that the 1977 Spanish government was actually based on a 14-party pre-electoral coalition. The problem is that the ideological data from the Manifesto Research Group have this government coded as a single party even though the parties did not merge until 1978.

17. As Laver (2003, 30) notes in a recent review article on government duration and termination, scholars have "tended to assemble a portfolio of independent variables gleaned from previous published work and the author's own ideas, each given a brief ad hoc 'theoretical' justification in its own terms. But the set of independent variables taken as a whole does not amount to the empirical elaboration of a coherent model of government termination."

18. In some cases, both sets of scholars will find a model and sample that support their 'contradictory' theoretical claims. For example, Strøm (1985) argues and finds that the number of days of 'crisis' before a government forms increases cabinet duration, while King et al. (1990) argue and find that the same variable actually decreases cabinet duration.

19. For example, much of the debate over questions of government duration has centered on the advantages of survival analysis as compared to ordinary least squares regression (King et al. 1990), whether the hazard rate is rising or falling and how it should be interpreted (Alt & King 1994; Warwick 1992, 1994; Beck 1998), and whether analysts should be employing a competing risks model or not (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999).

20. While Warwick (1994, 42) seems aware of some these problems, this does not change the fact that this type of procedure is problematic in the presence of multi-collinearity and leads to confidence intervals that are too small and *p*-values that cannot be interpreted in the usual way (Altman & Andersen 1989). Another problem is that this elimination procedure cannot distinguish between predictors of direct substantive interest and those whose effects one wants to control for (Singer & Willett 2003). Moreover, the end result is a model that tends to be sample specific. This last point may help to explain why the results from government duration models are not always robust across different samples.

21. Warwick does provide measures for different definitions of the government; he just prefers the more inclusive definition stated above.

22. The principal reason for employing the Weibull model earlier was that it made it easier to evaluate the conditional effect of pre-electoral coalitions on government bargaining delays in figure 7.1.

23. Censoring issues occur when the analyst does not observe the end of a duration period (right-censoring), while truncation issues occur when the analyst does not observe the duration of an observation that occurs prior to the start point of the data (left-truncation).

24. Although Warwick's data actually start in 1945, I only have data on pre-electoral coalitions from 1946.

25. Another source of data commonly used in the government duration literature is King et al. (1990). These data measure government duration in months, whereas the two data sources that I employed measure it in days. Since the data provided by King et al. are less accurate, I did not use them in my analysis.

26. Competing risks (or multiple destination) models take account of the fact that observations can terminate in different ways (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004). I employ a latent survivor time approach to the competing risks problem where there are two specific destination states (dissolution or replacement), each of which has a latent failure time associated with it for each observation (Diermeier & Stevenson 1999).

27. I have already shown in previous sections that pre-electoral coalitions increase the ideological compatibility of governments and shorten the length of time that it takes to form a government. As a result, one might reasonably wonder if the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on government survival is being muted by the fact that I include *Ideological Range* and *Formation Attempts* as independent variables in table 7.5. However, analyses where I drop *Ideological Range* and *Formation Attempts* do not change my inferences.

28. The '——' symbol for the risk of dissolution indicates that the coefficient on *Caretaker Government* tends toward infinity, because there are no cases (Warwick data) or only one case (PDDA data) of a caretaker government that forms after an election ending in dissolution (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004, 171). The one case of a caretaker government ending in dissolution in the PDDA data occurs in Iceland in 1959. Since the categorization of this particular government is open to interpretation, I should note that my results do not change if this government is not classified as a caretaker government (Indriðason 2004).

29. A cursory glance at the data reveals that Warwick and PDDA often measure the number of foiled formation attempts for the same governments differently. In fact, the correlation between the Warwick and PDDA variables is only 0.54.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. There are a few exceptions, of course. For example, Powell (2000) makes a point of considering both single parties and pre-electoral coalitions in 'majoritarian' democracies. He does so because he is interested in the identifiability of government alternatives. However, a more typical example is Laver and Schofield (1998, 1). Although they include a nice discussion of pre-electoral coalitions in their book on multi-party government, they still state that the "[t]he special forms of bargaining and negotiation that characterize the politics of coalition can be found *after* nearly every election that does not produce an unassailable 'winner' in the shape of a single party that controls a majority of the seats in the legislature." Emphasis added.

2. This suggests that a cooperative game-theoretic approach where coalitions automatically form whenever they are expected to be super-additive in seats or votes (Kaminski 2001) is less appropriate for modeling electoral coalition formation than the non-cooperative approach that I employ in this book.

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