Pre-electoral Coalitions Revisited

What about pre-electoral coalitions boosts turnout?

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## Abstract

Prior research suggests that voters have less incentive to turn out as the number of competing political parties increases. Multipartyism renders coalition cabinets more likely, and their composition usually turns on inter-party bargaining rather than voter preferences. Consequently, more parties reduce voters' incentive to turn out. Supporting this argument, a recent study by Tillman concludes that pre-electoral coalitions provide voters with additional information on post-electoral coalition options and thereby mitigate the adverse effect of multipartyism. This result, however, is less robust than previously thought. Using simple detrending techniques, this paper first demonstrates the need for alternative models of the relationship between turnout and pre-electoral coalitions. In a second step of the analysis, new data on pre-electoral coalitions are used to explore alternative specifications of the argument. More precisely, this paper explores how the impact which pre-electoral coalitions have on turnout varies with their properties such as type, programmatic integration, and incumbency status.

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