## Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning:


Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace

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
23 October, 2020


Online Peace Science Colloquium

### The democratic peace: consensus about the correlation




Pairs of democracy rarely, if ever, fight wars with each other.





### 1. "Democratic Peace theory"

- norms (Maoz & Russet 1993)
- institutions (BdM et al. 1999)
- information (Fearon 1994, Schultz 1998)




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### 2. Reverse causality

James, Solberg & Wolfson (1999), Mitchell, Gates, & Hegre (1999)

### 3. Spurious correlation

- Alliance (Farber & Gowa 1997)
- National interests (Gartzke 1998,2000)
- Capitalist economy (Gartzke 2007)
- Stable border (Gibler 2007)

So many theories; not as many <u>credible</u> empirical tests.

## Looking for causality

### **Previous attempts**

- ▶ Observational studies
  - Too few controls (omitted variable bias)
  - Too many controls (post-treatment bias)
  - Unobservable confounder (endogeneity)
- Experimental studies
  - RCT on war and peace not possible
  - Effect of regime type on something else (e.g., public support for war)

#### **Our contributions**

- ► Quasi-experimental design (IV)
- ► Result: Democracy increases conflict

## Identification strategy: fertility rate as an instrument

#### Our instrument:

A country's average fertility rate (# of childbirths per woman)

#### Relevance

### fertility rate $\Rightarrow$ democracy

- ► Low fertility rate ~> female empowerment ~> democracy
- Studies show quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence

#### **Exclusion restriction**

fertility rate is not directly related to international conflict

► Falsification tests

## **Instrument relevance: fertility rate decline** ⇒ **democracy**


### For many countries

- ► Low fertility & democracy
- High fertility & non-democracy

throughout 1960-2010.

#### Countries that transitioned

- Initially, high fertility & non-democratic
- ► Then, a sizable decline in fertility
- ► Then, democratization




# **Instrument relevance: first-stage estimates**

### Table: Lower fertility rate $\Rightarrow$ democracy

Democracy equation (probit)	
Fertility	-0.133***
	(0.042)
Per capita GDP	0.299***
	(0.065)
Infant mortality	-0.471***
	(0.105)
Urban population share	-0.010***
	(0.003)
Decades fixed-effects	$\checkmark$
Region fixed-effects	✓

# Main findings


- When ignoring endogeneity, democracy has a negative effect on conflict.
- When correcting for endogeneity, the effect is positive for challenger.



## **Critical assumption**

#### **Exclusion restriction**


Fertility influences peace exclusively through democracy



Fertility **must not** influence peace directly.

- ► Cannot be **verified** empirically, even if it's true
- ► Can be **falsified**, if it's false

### **Falsification tests**



Three falsification tests to assess the plausibility:

- 1. Fertility, female empowerment, and female leader
- 2. Reduced-form analyses
- 3. Model of fertility

Some studies find: fertility rate  $\Rightarrow$  conflict

- ► Caprioli (2000): positive effect
- ► Regan & Paskeviciute (2003): negative effect


#### Our claim:

Fertility rate may affect conflict only via inducing democratization first.

The theoretical argument of previous studies:

- (a) Women have more peaceful preference than men.
- (b) Lower fertility rate ⇒ female empowerment
- (c) Female empowerment  $\Rightarrow$  women's preference reflected in politics  $\Rightarrow$  peace/conflict
- ► We agree with (a) and (b).
- ► We argue that (c) necessarily involves democratization.
  - 1. Female empowerment  $\Rightarrow$  democratization
  - 2. For women's preference to be reflected in foreign policy, there has to be some mechanism (e.g., democracy)
- ► Any other ways that brings about women's preferences ⇒ foreign policy?

Having a female leader may open up a backdoor path.



- ▶ If  $\delta_1 \neq 0$  AND  $\delta_2 \neq 0$  ⇒ exclusion restriction is **violated**
- ▶ However, if  $\delta_1 = 0$  (maybe  $\delta_3 \neq 0$ ) OR  $\delta_2 = 0$ , exclusion restriction still holds.

Table: Fertility rate has no effect on female leaders

	DV = female leader or not		
Fertility rate $(\delta_1)$	-0.042 (0.153)		-0.095 (0.175)
Democracy $(\delta_3)$		1.166*** (0.325)	1.186*** (0.318)
Per capita GDP	-0.443* (0.238)	-0.427* (0.237)	-0.392 (0.252)
Infant mortality	-0.615** (0.271)	-0.638** (0.280)	-0.542* (0.325)
Urbanization	0.010 (0.010)	0.006 (0.011)	0.005 (0.011)
Decade fixed-effects Region fixed-effects Years since last female leader	<b>* * * *</b>	<b>√ √ √</b>	<b>√ √ √</b>
N	6,595	6,595	6,595

### **Conclusions**

- ▶ Joint democracy does not have a pacifying effect.
  - ► If anything, democracy **increases** the risk of conflict initiation.
  - ▶ Need to revisit the debate about causal mechanisms (norm / institution / audience costs)
- ► Caveat: this is LATE (local average treatment effect) ≠ ATE
  - ► Fertility-induced causal effect of joint democracy
  - ► That said, better LATE than nothing!