Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning:

Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace


Daina Chiba * Erik Gartzke †

*Essex †UCSD


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
Asian Online Political Science Seminar Series

The democratic peace: consensus about the correlation




Pairs of democracy rarely, if ever, fight wars with each other.





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- norms (Maoz & Russet 1993)
- institutions (BdM et al. 1999)
- information (Fearon 1994, Schultz 1998)




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
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3. Spurious correlation

- Alliance (Farber & Gowa 1997)
- National interests (Gartzke 1998,2000)
- Capitalist economy (Gartzke 2007)
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So many theories; not as many <u>credible</u> empirical tests.

Looking for causality

Previous attempts

- ▶ Observational studies
 - Too few controls (omitted variable bias)
 - Too many controls (post-treatment bias)
 - Unobservable confounder (endogeneity)
- Experimental studies
 - RCT on war and peace not possible
 - Effect of regime type on something else (e.g., public support for war)

Our contributions

- ► Quasi-experimental design (IV)
- ► Result: Democracy increases conflict

Identification strategy: fertility rate as an instrument

A country's average **fertility rate** (# of childbirths per woman)

We will show:

- ► Relevance: low fertility rate ⇒ democracy
 - Female empowerment → democracy
 - Quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence
- Exclusion restriction: fertility rate is unrelated to international conflict
 - Falsification tests


Instrument relevance: fertility rate decline ⇒ **democracy**

Countries that transitioned

- Initially, high fertility & non-democratic
- ► Then, a sizable decline in fertility
- ► Then, democratization


Overall

Strong relationship when analyzing all countries and controlling for other determinants




Main findings

- When ignoring endogeneity, democracy has a negative effect on conflict.
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- When correcting for endogeneity, the effect is zero.
- Dem. challenger vs non-dem target particularly dangerous



Critical assumption

Exclusion restriction


Fertility influences peace exclusively through democracy

Fertility → Democracy → Peace

Critical assumption


Exclusion restriction

Fertility influences peace exclusively through democracy



Fertility must not influence peace directly.

Falsification tests



Three tests to assess the plausibility:

- 1. Fertility and female leader
- 2. Reduced-form analyses
- 3. Model of fertility

Some studies find: fertility rate \Rightarrow conflict

- ► Caprioli (2000): positive
- ► Regan & Paskeviciute (2003): negative

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The theoretical argument:

- ► (a) Women have more peaceful preference than men
 - ► Mechanism

 Lower fertility rate

 ↓ (b)

 female empowerment

 ↓ (c)

 peace

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
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 female empowerment


 ↓ (c)

 peace


We agree with (a) and (b). Can (c) happen in the absence of democracy?



▶ If $\delta_1 \neq 0$ AND $\delta_2 \neq 0$ ⇒ exclusion restriction is **violated**




- ▶ If $\delta_1 \neq 0$ AND $\delta_2 \neq 0$ ⇒ exclusion restriction is **violated**
- ▶ However, if $\delta_1 = 0$ (maybe $\delta_3 \neq 0$) OR $\delta_2 = 0$, exclusion restriction still holds.



Causal mediation analyses to estimate

- \blacktriangleright δ_1 = direct effect (ADE)
- δ_3 = causal mediation effect (ACME)

Falsification test 1: leader gender



ADE $(\delta_1) = 0 \Rightarrow$ support exclusion restriction

Falsification tests 2 & 3

2. reduced-form analysis

- ► Reduced-form model
- Assuming no defiers, non-dem with low fertility (e.g., China) = "never takers", dem with high fertility = "always-takers"
- ► Null findings for "never-takers" and "always-takers"

3. Models of fertility

of conflict does not affect fertility

Conclusions

- ▶ Joint democracy does not have a pacifying effect.
 - ► If anything, democracy **increases** the risk of conflict initiation.
 - ▶ Need to revisit the debate about causal mechanisms (norm / institution / audience costs)
- ► Caveat: this is LATE (local average treatment effect) ≠ ATE
 - ► Fertility-induced causal effect of joint democracy
 - ► That said, better LATE than nothing!