GWHMUN 2024

DISEC
BACKGROUND GUIDE

Agenda: Dicussing Avenues to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Greetings, Delegates!

It is with immense pleasure that we, the Executive Board of DISEC, welcome you to Greenwood High Model United Nations 2024! The Disarmament and International Security Committee is a personal favourite of your chairs, partially due to its propensity for diplomatic chaos, but primarily because it perfectly encapsulates what an MUN conference should be: invigorating, informative, and unpredictable. DISEC is a highly competitive committee, which also makes it an ideal environment for first-timers and experienced delegates alike.

Our world as we know it is constantly changing. Armed conflicts are escalating, refugee crises are worsening and the environment is deteriorating. Yet, the most common national responses to external threats? Proliferating arms. Heightening military presence. Tightening borders. DISEC was established on the principles of opposing and preventing such unremunerative measures, and has been variably successful in doing so. However, with advancing technology and outer space presence, countries are seemingly unsatisfied with earth-bound militarisation. Many are intent upon increasing arms and apparatus in space. It is with this information in mind that you delegates must broaden your perception of the proliferation of arms and take into consideration the undesirable effects of an arms race in outer space.

What we expect from our delegates is not perfection but rather that each and every one of you strive for statesmanship, dialogue and excellence. We are fully aware of how disconcerting and perhaps intimidating speaking in front of large audiences may be; however, only when you make an attempt to venture out of your comfort zone will you truly become a better version of yourself. Each of your EB members have experienced the daunting sensation of sitting in a large auditorium during the Opening Ceremony of an MUN conference and feeling small amidst large minds. Still, we persisted— as do countless other delegates, and as will you. Award winning political author Brian Krans once said, “fear is the thief of dreams”. Our advice to you? Do not let your fear steal your aspirations, or hinder your potential. We believe each of you are tremendously capable of excelling in committee. You may feel your throat go dry, hear yourself stutter, or almost taste your anxiety. Acknowledge it, and move past it.

You will be attending this conference as delegates representing countries that consist of millions of individuals reliant upon your decisions. With this in mind, do not simply tirade on with your nation’s accomplishments, despite them being extensively valued and appreciated by your EB and the UN as a whole. Your words should be preparative and constructive. Try not to read from a pre-written speech, as they often lack vigour and authenticity. Come prepared with research, because the more knowledge you have regarding the agenda and your country, the more likely you are to succeed in the face of adversity.

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

To conclude, we would like to bring attention to the following: if the world focused solely on the past, we would still live within the confines of ancient societal norms. Nation-states are constantly increasing arms and increasing barriers. If militaries and weaponry advance, so must our counter-proliferation measures. The world has moved forward from small-scale conflicts and is now intent upon militarising outer space. In order to protect space from the destructive nature of humankind, we request you to come prepared with unique ideas, unending passion and a willingness to face difficulties as diplomats. We hope you look forward to the committee and are enthused about the infinite possibilities that await your infinite potential— as we certainly are.

In the words of Kris Carr, “adversity is a call to action, and your freedom lies in taking the first step”.

Warm regards,

Samhita Madakshira, Head Chairperson, (email: samhita128@gmail.com)
Arin Vineeth Jagtap, Vice Chairperson, (email: arinvjagtap@gmail.com)
Sunderjit Singh, Vice Chairperson, (email: Sunderjit.singh24@gmail.com)

INTRODUCTION TO DISEC

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), also known as the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, plays a pivotal role in maintaining global peace and security. Established in 1945 under the United Nations Charter, DISEC is mandated to address issues related to disarmament, global security, and the regulation of armaments. Its primary objective is to foster international cooperation to reduce the risk of armed conflict and enhance collective security.

Key Functions and Responsibilities

1. Disarmament and Arms Control: DISEC is responsible for formulating policies and strategies aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The committee also addresses conventional arms control, including small arms and light weapons.

2. International Security: The committee tackles a wide range of issues that threaten global security, such as terrorism, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space. DISEC seeks to develop comprehensive frameworks to mitigate these threats and promote stability.

3. Regional Security and Conflict Prevention: DISEC works to resolve regional conflicts and prevent the outbreak of new ones. This involves facilitating dialogue, promoting confidence-building measures, and supporting peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

4. Promoting Transparency and Confidence-Building: DISEC encourages transparency in military activities and promotes confidence-building measures among states to reduce the risk of misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to conflict.

5. Collaborating with Other UN Bodies: DISEC collaborates closely with other UN bodies, such as the Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Conference on Disarmament, to ensure a cohesive and coordinated approach to disarmament and international security.

INTRODUCTION TO DISEC

Historical Context and Achievements

Since its inception, DISEC has made significant contributions to global peace and security. Notable achievements include the adoption of landmark treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). These agreements have been instrumental in curbing the proliferation of dangerous weapons and fostering a safer world.

Despite these successes, DISEC continues to face numerous challenges. The evolving nature of global threats, the emergence of new technologies, and geopolitical tensions require the committee to remain adaptable and proactive. By fostering international cooperation and dialogue, DISEC strives to address these challenges and build a more secure and peaceful world.

Recent Resolutions and Ongoing Efforts

DISEC's work is constantly evolving to address new and emerging threats. Here are some of the recent resolutions and ongoing efforts of the committee:

1. A/RES/75/240: This resolution focused on advancing multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, emphasising the need for concrete steps toward a world free of nuclear weapons. It underscored the importance of transparency and trust among nuclear-armed states.

2. A/RES/75/55: Addressing the issue of small arms and light weapons, this resolution called for enhanced international cooperation to combat the illicit trade and accumulation of these weapons. It highlighted the need for effective stockpile management and the destruction of surplus weapons.

3. A/RES/75/36: This resolution dealt with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It advocated for measures to ensure the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of the deployment of weapons in space.

4. A/RES/74/27: Recognizing the growing threat of cyber warfare, this resolution aimed to promote norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. It called for international cooperation to prevent cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and to enhance cybersecurity measures globally.

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What Is PAROS?

PAROS stands for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It is a proposed treaty aimed at preventing the deployment of weapons in space and ensuring the peaceful use of outer space. The treaty seeks to address concerns about the potential militarization and weaponization of space, which could lead to an arms race and destabilise global security.

The concept of preventing an arms race in outer space originated in the 1950s and has been discussed within the United Nations. The Outer Space Treaty, which came into force in 1967, prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space and their stationing on celestial bodies. However, it does not explicitly ban other types of weapons in space.

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2020 on reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles of responsible behaviour. The United States has emphasised the importance of upholding existing international obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and has called on all UN Member States to ratify or accede to the treaty.

The PAROS treaty is seen as crucial to maintaining global security and preventing an escalation of tensions in outer space. If successful, it could help ensure the peaceful and sustainable use of space for the benefit of all humanity.

Actions taken In the Past to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space

1981 UN Resolution

The UN General Assembly adopted the "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" (PAROS) resolution in 1981, reaffirming the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and calling for further measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Ad Hoc PAROS Committee

In 1985, the Conference on Disarmament established the Ad Hoc PAROS Committee to examine issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including existing agreements and proposals. However, the committee's limited mandate meant it was not a proper negotiating forum, and it was eventually dissolved in 1994.

2009 UN General Assembly Resolution

In 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" with overwhelming support. This resolution reaffirmed the importance of the Outer Space Treaty and called for further practical measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

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2014 UN General Assembly Resolutions

In 2014, the UN General Assembly passed two additional resolutions on preventing an arms race in outer space. The first resolution called on states to contribute actively to the peaceful use of outer space and refrain from actions contrary to that objective. The second resolution emphasized the prevention of an arms race in space and stated that other measures could contribute to ensuring that weapons were not placed in outer space.

Proposals by China and Russia

Since 2005, China and Russia have put forward several proposals, including a draft treaty called the "Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects" (PPWT). This treaty aims to prohibit the placement of any kind of weapon in outer space.

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures

The international community has recognized the importance of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) to address issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. TCBMs can include information exchanges, notifications, consultations, and thematic workshops to enhance trust and prevent misunderstandings.

Timeline of Events

Early Militarization of Space (1950s-1960s)

The militarization of outer space began with the launch of the first military satellites by the United States and Soviet Union for communication, navigation, and reconnaissance purposes in the 1950s and 1960s.

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972)

The ABM Treaty between the US and USSR restricted ground-, sea-, air-, and space-based anti-ballistic missile systems, indicating the importance of space in strategic stability.

UN General Assembly Resolution 36/97C (1981)

The UN General Assembly passed Resolution 36/97C, which called for "the prevention of an arms race in outer space".

Soviet Proposal for Treaty to Prevent Weapons in Outer Space (1983)

The Soviet Union presented the first draft treaty to the UN Conference on Disarmament to "prevent the placement of weapons in outer space".

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Joint Russia-China Draft Treaty on Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) (2008)
Russia and China presented a joint draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) to the Conference on Disarmament in 2008, but it was rejected by the US.

UN Group of Governmental Experts (2018-2019)
A UN Group of Governmental Experts discussed possible elements of a treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space from 2018-2019, but failed to reach consensus.

UK Proposal for New Working Group (2023)
In 2023, the UK proposed establishing a new working group to continue efforts to develop norms, rules and principles for responsible behavior in space, but some states prefer a singular focus on negotiating a legally binding treaty.

Russia VETO (2024)
In March 2024, Russia vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution sponsored by the United States and Japan that aimed to reaffirm the obligations of countries under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

Ongoing Diplomatic Stalemate
Despite over 40 years of efforts at the UN, progress on preventing an arms race in outer space has been hindered by disagreements between major powers, particularly the US, over the appropriate approach - whether legally binding instruments or voluntary guidelines.
Threats of an Arms Race in Outer Space

The prospect of an arms race in outer space poses a grave threat to global security and stability. This threat has been exacerbated by the ongoing militarization and weaponization of the space domain. The deployment of weapons capable of destroying or disabling satellites, such as anti-satellite (ASAT) systems developed by nations like Russia and China, raises the risk of accidental or intentional damage to critical space-based infrastructure. The consequences of such actions could be catastrophic, disrupting vital communication, navigation, and military capabilities upon which the international community heavily relies.

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Efforts to establish effective arms control measures to prevent this scenario have been hindered by a lack of consensus among major powers. For over four decades, the United Nations has been the primary forum for diplomatic negotiations on this issue, yet progress has been stymied by disagreements, particularly with the United States rejecting proposals like the Russia-China draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT). The failure of the 2022-2023 UN Open-Ended Working Group to reach a consensus report due to opposition from a single member state underscores the persistent diplomatic deadlock.

The absence of clear norms, rules, and principles for responsible behaviour in space also heightens the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation of conflicts. The dual-use nature of certain technologies, such as missile defence systems that can target space assets, further exacerbates the potential for an arms race and the militarization of this critical domain. Given the growing reliance on space-based infrastructure for essential services and economic activities, the vulnerability of these assets to attack poses grave consequences for the global community.

Addressing the threat of an arms race in outer space requires urgent, coordinated, and multilateral action. Nations must prioritise the establishment of legally binding instruments, as well as transparency and confidence-building measures, to prevent the placement of weapons in orbit and the development of capabilities designed to target space-based assets. Failure to do so risks the escalation of tensions, the disruption of vital services, and the potential for catastrophic consequences that would reverberate across the international system. The time for decisive and collaborative diplomacy to safeguard the space domain is now.

Implications of an Arms race in Outer Space

Disruption of Critical Space-Based Infrastructure and Services

- The deployment of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and other space-based weapons raises the risk of accidental or intentional damage to satellites and other space assets.
- This could disrupt a wide range of critical services that rely on space-based infrastructure, including:
  - Global communication networks
  - Satellite-based navigation and positioning systems (e.g. GPS)
  - Weather forecasting and climate monitoring
  - Earth observation and remote sensing
  - Military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- The loss or degradation of these capabilities could have far-reaching impacts on national security, economic activities, and everyday life around the world.

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Escalation of Conflicts and Instability

- The lack of clear international norms, rules, and principles for responsible behaviour in space increases the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation of conflicts.
- The use of dual-use technologies that can target space assets, such as missile defence systems, further exacerbates the potential for an arms race and the militarization of this domain.
- Conflicts or accidents in space could quickly spill over into the terrestrial realm, with devastating consequences for global stability and security.

Undermining of International Law and Cooperation

- Diplomatic efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space have been hindered by disagreements between major powers, particularly the US rejecting proposals like the Russia-China draft PPWT treaty.
- The failure of the UN Open-Ended Working Group in 2022-2023 to reach consensus on a final report due to opposition from one member state (likely the US) demonstrates the persistent deadlock.
- This undermines the ability of the international community to establish effective arms control measures and norms to ensure the long-term security and sustainability of outer space activities.

Vulnerability of Critical Economic and Social Infrastructure

- The growing reliance on space-based assets for essential services and economic activities, such as communication, navigation, and remote sensing, makes these systems vulnerable to attack or disruption.
- The loss or degradation of these space-based capabilities could have severe global consequences, impacting critical infrastructure, supply chains, financial systems, and everyday life around the world.

Overall, the implications of an arms race in outer space are far-reaching and potentially catastrophic, ranging from the disruption of vital services and infrastructure to the escalation of conflicts and the undermining of international cooperation and law. Addressing these threats requires a concerted, multilateral effort to establish clear norms, rules, and principles for responsible behaviour in this critical domain.

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Possible Avenues

Strengthening the Legal Framework

- Reaffirm the importance of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and establishes the principle of using outer space for peaceful purposes.
- Negotiate a legally binding, multilaterally verifiable instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space, such as the draft treaty proposed by China and Russia in 2008.

Developing Norms and Confidence-Building Measures

- Develop norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour in outer space activities to complement any legally binding instrument.
- Implement transparency and confidence-building measures, such as information exchanges, notifications, consultations, and thematic workshops, to enhance trust and prevent an arms race.

Inclusive Participation and Cooperation

- Ensure equal access and participation in outer space activities for all countries, including emerging space powers, to promote the peaceful use of outer space.
- Enhance cooperation and coordination between relevant UN bodies, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the Outer Space Committee, and the Office for Outer Space Affairs, to address the challenges of preventing an arms race in outer space.

Addressing Specific Threats

- Condemn the testing of destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, which create dangerous space debris, and call for a halt to such activities.
- Address other specific threats, such as the proliferation of small satellites and the potential for space-based weapons.

KEY TERMINOLOGY

Outer Space Treaty
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty establishes the legal framework for space activities, prohibiting the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on celestial bodies. A PAROS treaty would build on this by preventing the placement of any type of weapon in space.

Confidence-Building Measures
Proposed confidence-building measures for PAROS include increased transparency, information exchanges, demonstrations, notifications, consultations, and thematic workshops. These aim to promote trust between nations and prevent an arms race in outer space.

Verification
Verification mechanisms are an important aspect of a potential PAROS treaty, as they would help ensure compliance. Proposals have included different types of verification measures such as on-site inspections, remote monitoring, and data exchanges.

Dual-Use Technology
The potential for dual-use space technology, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes, is a key challenge in negotiating PAROS. Distinguishing between peaceful and military uses of space technology is complex and complicates efforts to prevent an arms race.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
The principle of the peaceful uses of outer space, enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty, is a fundamental tenet that underpins PAROS efforts. Maintaining the peaceful nature of space activities is a key objective.

Arms Control
PAROS is part of broader efforts in arms control, aiming to prevent an arms race in outer space and maintain international security. This includes measures to prevent the deployment of weapons in space and to ensure that space activities are conducted peacefully.

Space Security
Space security is a critical aspect of PAROS, as it involves ensuring the security of space activities and preventing any hostile actions in space. This includes measures to protect satellites and other space assets from potential threats.

KEY TERMINOLOGY

Non-Appropriation
The principle of non-appropriation, which prohibits the appropriation of celestial bodies by any country, is another fundamental aspect of PAROS. This ensures that space remains accessible to all nations and is used for peaceful purposes.

Space Debris
The issue of space debris is also relevant to PAROS, as it can pose a threat to space activities and the security of space assets. Measures to mitigate and manage space debris are essential for maintaining space security.

Space Situational Awareness
Space situational awareness (SSA) is crucial for PAROS, as it involves monitoring and understanding the activities in space to prevent potential conflicts. SSA helps nations to detect and respond to any threats in space.

Space Traffic Management
Effective space traffic management is also important for PAROS, as it involves managing the increasing number of satellites and other space objects to prevent collisions and ensure the safety of space activities.

International Organizations
International organisations such as the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) play a key role in PAROS, providing a platform for countries to coordinate and collaborate on space-related issues.

Militarization of Space
The militarization of space is a key concern in PAROS, as it involves the development and deployment of military capabilities in space. Preventing the militarization of space is a crucial objective of PAROS efforts.

Space Weaponization
Space weaponization refers to the development and deployment of weapons in space, which is a key focus of PAROS. Preventing the weaponization of space is essential for maintaining the peaceful use of outer space.

Space Warfare
Space warfare involves the use of space-based assets for military purposes, such as the targeting of satellites or the use of space-based weapons. PAROS aims to prevent the emergence of space warfare and maintain the peaceful use of outer space.

CASE STUDIES

Russian Federation

In May of 2024, the Pentagon claimed that Russia had launched an anti-satellite nuclear weapon (ASAT), “presumably capable of attacking other satellites in low Earth orbit”. The militarisation of space can lead to a multitude of issues, such as the threat it poses to world peace, the potential destruction of satellites and the following disruption of communication and navigation systems. The alleged ASAT that was launched from Russia was the Cosmos 2576, initiated about 800 kilometres north of Moscow. Space analysts have said that the Cosmos 2576 is in the same space orbit as the USA 314 satellite– furthering American claims that its purpose is the destruction of satellite technology. The previous month, Russia vetoed a draft resolution proposed by the USA that called on countries to take measures to prevent an arms race in space. This led to exacerbated scepticism from Washington: if Russia had no plans to lead an arms race in space, then why the veto? Russia’s defence to these allegations were that they not only wanted a ban on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) but of all weapons in space. However, it is arguable that by vetoing and preventing the formation of any legislation regarding the prevention of an arms race in space, there is no progress with the same.
After vetoing the U.S.- Japan draft resolution on the banning of weapons in outer space, the Russian Federation proceeded to propose a highly similar draft that incorporated noticeably alike language on measures for PAROS. It is thereby not to be said that Russia is not in favour of anti-arms race measures, but outwardly adverse to collaboration with the U.S. and its allies. For this reason, the representative of the United Arab Emirates said in the seventy-eighth session, that “increasing divisions in the Council — especially among permanent members — undermine collective efforts to maintain international peace and security”. With Russia’s own GLONASS (navigation system) failing to update with technological advancements, they have become less reliant on their satellites, freeing the state to become more aggressive with their militarisation of outer-space.

United States of America

During the Cold War, American schoolchildren were being shown animated documentaries about what to do during a nuclear attack. Towards the late 1960s, both the USSR and the USA used reconnaissance satellites to identify and locate enemy bases from space. To prevent the other party from doing so, both in turn used anti-satellite weapons to either blind or destroy the other’s satellite systems.. In 1958, Project A119 was drafted by one of America’s leading nuclear physicists. The premise of this project was to detonate a hydrogen bomb on the moon, to deter Russian space advancements, and was supported by the U.S. Air Force. Despite its lack of execution, the very existence of such a plan highlights the USA’s willingness to take drastic measures in outer space, weaponizing it in a hypocritical manner, to achieve their political aims.

CASE STUDIES

Also in the 1960s, the United States conducted nuclear tests, a total of 11, to understand their effectiveness in outer space. In July 1962, the USA launched a test named Starfish Prime, later becoming the first successful nuclear test in space. It was launched approximately 250 miles above Earth, and the effects were seen near the Equator. The effect of the blast was the disablement of multiple satellites due to their contact with radioactive debris. After this test, however, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a pact in 1963 to discontinue further nuclear testing in space. It still raises the question as to why the U.S. so vehemently opposes recent Russian anti-satellite weapons when it too engaged in similar activities when it was a part of an international conflict.

People's Republic of China

The PRC has always emphasised on how important the 'space dream' is for the nation-state and its people. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense prepared a report suggesting China's advanced space capabilities, including SATNAV, SATCOM and ISR technologies. In May 2005, China conducted its first anti-satellite weapon test; shortly after in 2007, a weather satellite was destroyed by another ASAT test by China, leaving behind 3,000 pieces of harmful debris in space. In the early 2010s, China conducted multiple other missile tests, many noticeably close to where the USA's satellites are located in the geosynchronous orbit area. The furthering of dual-use technologies is no longer limited to Earth– there have been allegations stating that China's Aolong-1 spacecraft is meant to be a dual-use anti-satellite weapon.

Republic of India

In August of 2022, India launched a successful anti-satellite missile test, making it the fourth country with the potential to destroy enemy satellites. The test's name was *Mission Shakti*, which had the result of striking and destroying a low-level orbit Indian satellite. Johnson-Freese, a professor at an American naval war institute, said, "India's recent testing of its ASAT capability likely represents a feeling by other countries, specifically India in this case, that the weaponization of space is forthcoming, and India doesn't want to be left out of the 'have' category if arms-control agreements are eventually reached". While some appreciated Modi's decision and support of the test, others viewed it from a political lens intended to help voting polls. There has also been concern that any shrapnel as a result of the test that affects other nation's satellite systems could put India under legal fire in the international community.

UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND LEGALITIES

1. United Nations 1967 Outer Space Treaty

The purpose of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty adopted by the General Assembly is to detail legally binding rules regarding peaceful space exploration, to ban the presence of weapons in space, and to prohibit military activities in outer-space regions. Article IV of this treaty states, "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner."

It also emphasises how the moon should only be explored peacefully, without the presence or intention of militarisation. The treaty further highlights how if a state-party launches technology into outer space that then negatively impacts any other space-party's equipment, they are to be held legally and internationally accountable for their actions.

2. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space

The purpose of Resolution 2345 of the United Nations General Assembly is to establish a legal foundation for the rescue and safety of human-led space exploration. It stresses upon the fundamental idea that if a state-party were to find out about a misdirected or lost astronaut in space, they are to immediately inform the launch-team. The treaty also says that if an astronaut were to be found in a nation's naval territories, they are to be immediately returned to the home-country.

3. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects

With a similar but more nuanced purpose of the Outer Space Treaty, UN resolution 2777 insists that state-parties must immediately and efficiently pay reparations if they destroy or damage another nation-state's outer space equipment.

4. Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space

This convention starts by defining what a "launching state" is to avoid future legal disputes and discrepancies regarding the same. It says a "launching state" is "A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched;". It thereby provides a basis upon which to officially register objects and devices sent into outer space by state-parties.

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMA)

1. United Nations 1967 Outer Space Treaty

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QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION MUST ANSWER (QARMA)

1. What are the current threats and challenges to preventing an arms race in outer space?
2. How can the international community strengthen existing legal frameworks and develop new norms to prevent the weaponization of space?
3. What confidence-building measures and transparency mechanisms can be implemented to promote stability and prevent miscalculation in outer space activities?
4. How can the peaceful uses of outer space be promoted and protected, especially for developing countries?
5. What are the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders, including states, international organisations, and the private sector, in ensuring the peaceful use of outer space?
6. How can the issue of dual-use technologies be addressed to prevent their misuse for military purposes in outer space?
7. What are the potential economic, scientific, and technological benefits of international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space?
8. How can the principle of non-appropriation of outer space be upheld and what are the implications for national space activities?
9. What are the linkages between PAROS and other disarmament and arms control efforts? (Eg. - nuclear disarmament and conventional arms control)
10. What are the potential consequences of an arms race in outer space for global peace, security, and sustainable development?

EXPECTATION FOR DELEGATES

1. Thorough Preparation

Delegates are expected to arrive well-prepared, having thoroughly researched their assigned country's stance on the agenda topics. This includes understanding the historical context, current policies, and international treaties relevant to the issues at hand. Preparation should also include familiarity with the rules of procedure and the structure of the committee.

2. Active Participation

Active and respectful participation in all committee sessions is crucial. Delegates should be prepared to present their country's position clearly and persuasively, engage in debates, ask insightful questions, and respond thoughtfully to the points raised by others. Effective participation involves listening attentively and contributing constructively to discussions.

3. Diplomatic Conduct

Delegates must maintain a high standard of diplomacy, showing respect for all participants regardless of differing viewpoints. This includes adhering to formal language, avoiding personal attacks, and working collaboratively towards common goals. Professionalism and courtesy are essential in fostering a positive and productive committee environment.

4. Collaboration and Coalition-Building

Collaboration with other delegates is key to achieving meaningful outcomes. Delegates are expected to engage in coalition-building, forming alliances based on shared interests and working together to draft resolutions. Effective collaboration involves negotiation, compromise, and the ability to find common ground.

5. Resolution Drafting

Delegates will contribute to the drafting of comprehensive and well-structured resolutions. This process requires clarity, precision, and an understanding of the technical aspects of resolution writing. Resolutions should propose feasible and innovative solutions to the committee's agenda topics, reflecting a balance of national interests and global considerations.

6. Strategic Negotiation

Negotiation skills are critical in DISEC. Delegates should be prepared to negotiate with other countries, balancing assertiveness with the willingness to compromise. The goal is to achieve resolutions that are acceptable to a broad range of countries while still advancing the interests and security goals of their own nation.

EXPECTATION FOR DELEGATES

7. Problem-Solving and Innovation

Delegates are encouraged to think creatively and propose innovative solutions to complex security issues. This involves going beyond traditional approaches and considering new technologies, strategies, and policies that could enhance global peace and security. Problem-solving skills and forward-thinking are highly valued.

8. Adherence to Protocol

Delegates must adhere to the established rules of procedure throughout the conference. This includes following the correct format for speeches, motions, and voting procedures. Familiarity with parliamentary procedure and the ability to navigate it effectively will ensure smooth and efficient committee operations.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

Every Model UN conference follows a set of procedures to ensure the orderly and smooth flow of the committee. The flow of the committee is decided by the delegates, who can exercise their influence through points and motions. These can be raised when the chair intimates the same.

1. POINTS

Points are related to actions that involve the delegate who raises the point. In other words, it hands the floor to the delegate who raised it.

- POINT OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE: This point is used when a delegate experiences personal discomfort that hinders their ability to participate in the committee.

E.g., When the room is too cold and you want the fans to be turned off.

- Note: If a delegate is speaking too fast or is inaudible, a Point of Personal Privilege can be raised WHILE the speech is in progress. This is the only point that can be used when another delegate is speaking or 'out of turn'.

- POINT OF PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY: This is used when a delegate has a question about something that is not clearly understood in the committee with respect to the rules of procedure or committee procedures. This cannot interrupt a speaker.

- E.g., You want to know which speaker is next in line.

- POINT OF ORDER: This is used to highlight factual inaccuracies or, in cases permitted by the Executive Board (EB), logical inconsistencies in a delegate's speech. Points of order are thus of two types: factual inaccuracies and logical fallacies. When raised, the delegate must be extremely specific and must quote verbatim from the other delegate against whom the point is being raised. The format for doing so requires the exact statement to be presented between QUOTE and UNQUOTE, placed before and after the phrase. In addition, this point cannot interrupt another delegate.

- The format for a logical fallacy is: "The delegate of X stated that, QUOTE Chocolate is bad for your health. UNQUOTE, and then went on to state that, QUOTE Chocolate is also good for your health. UNQUOTE. This is a contradiction and defies logic."

- Note: Points of order cannot be raised on a delegate’s opinion or belief. For example, "Star Trek is better than Star Wars." However untrue, points of order cannot be raised.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

- POINT OF INFORMATION: This is used to question another delegate on their speech at the end of it in a General Speakers List (GSL) only as per UNA-USA procedure. However, they can also be sent via chits or raised after a Moderated Caucus speech at the Executive Board's discretion. They must begin with "what, who, how, where, when" or phrasing that alludes to the key question words. Questions that warrant 'yes' or 'no' answers tend to yield unsatisfying answers and are thus discouraged. Unlike points of order, points of information can be raised based on a delegate's opinion.
 - E.g., "Why does the delegate believe that Africa is poor?"
 - Note: If the received answer is unsatisfying, a plea to follow up can be raised where the delegate questioning can ask a follow-up question when granted by the EB.

2. MOTIONS
Motions are related to actions that involve the entire committee. They impact the flow of the committee as a whole and are a tool for representatives to discuss issues with multiple persons getting a chance to speak.
- ***MOTION TO BEGIN SESSION***: Used to start committee proceedings.

- ***MOTION TO BEGIN ROLL CALL***: Begins roll call in committee. If quorum (minimum strength) is met, the committee proceeds.

- ***MOTION TO OPEN A GSL***: This is a motion used to enter the General Speakers' List. No extra details are required. The GSL will be explained later in the Background Guide.

- ***MOTION TO BEGIN A MODERATED CAUCUS***: This is used to enter a formal discussion about a very specific sub-topic in line with the agenda. This will be explained later in the Background Guide.
 - The format for doing so is: "With the prior permission of the Executive Board, the delegate of X would like to suspend formal debate and move into a Moderated Caucus on the topic 'abc' for a total time period of ___ minutes, allotting ___ minutes/seconds per speaker."

- ***MOTION TO BEGIN AN UNMODERATED CAUCUS***: This is used to enter an informal session where the delegates are free to move around and are not guided by the Executive Board. Mentioning a topic with a speaker's time is not necessary and an unmoderated caucus only requires a total time period. This will be explained further in the Background Guide.
 - The format for doing so is: "With the prior permission of the Executive Board, the delegate of X would like to suspend formal debate and move into an Unmoderated Caucus for a total time period of ___ minutes."

RULES OF PROCEDURE

- ***MOTION TO EXTEND MODERATED/UNMODERATED CAUCUS***: In order to maintain the flow of important discussions, an extension can be granted if permitted by the EB. This motion is used to extend the total time period of a Moderated/Unmoderated Caucus, keeping in mind that the duration cannot extend more than half the original time period.
- The format for doing so is: "The delegate would like to extend the Moderated/Unmoderated Caucus by ___ minutes."

- ***MOTION TO REVERT BACK TO A GSL***: This is used to return to the General Speakers List from the Moderated and Unmoderated Caucuses.

- ***MOTION TO ADJOURN SESSION***: When this motion is passed, the committee session ends.

3. **FLOW OF COMMITTEE**
- Motion to Begin Session
- Motion to Begin Roll Call
- Motion to Open GSL
- Motion to Enter Moderated Caucus
- Have more moderated caucuses / Move into unmoderated caucus
- Continue informal discussion / Revert to GSL
- Keep repeating the cycle
- Introduce and discuss a 'resolution' (explained later) towards the end of the committee

To raise a motion, the verbatim goes as: "THE DELEGATE OF XYZ WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE A MOTION TO SUSPEND FORMAL DEBATE AND MOVE INTO A MODERATED CAUCUS ON THE TOPIC ABC FOR [TIME PER SPEAKER] [NUMBER OF SPEAKERS]."
Example: "The delegate of Burkina Faso would like to propose a motion to suspend formal debate and move into a moderated caucus on 'How can economic policies mitigate the economic costs of conflicts and large refugee flows?' for 15 minutes, with each speaker allotted 1 minute."

GENERAL SPEAKERS' LIST
The General Speakers List is a formal discussion where representatives can express their stance, opinions, or calls to action on the given agenda. However, the delegates are also free to use this time to present any other relevant information. The GSL typically has an individual speaker's time of 1 minute 30 seconds. This may vary depending on time constraints. The Executive Board will call for a raise of placards and will recognize countries who raise their placards.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

MODERATED CAUCUS

A Moderated Caucus is used to discuss the intricacies of the agenda through specific subtopics. Generally, most of the debate and presentation of solutions happen in the Moderated Caucuses, thereby giving direction to the committee. Total speaker time and individual speaker's time are decided by the delegate raising the motion.

Note:

- Total speaker's time must be exactly divisible by individual speaker's time.
- For example, 10 minutes is exactly divisible by 1 minute.
- Most motions raised are for a maximum of 20 minutes with 1 minute for each speaker.

UNMODERATED CAUCUS

Unmoderated Caucuses are free discussions in which the Executive Board does not interfere. During this period, delegates can make their own groups for discussion, form blocs, lobby for their interests, and once ready, frame a resolution. There is no individual speaker's time or specific topic of discussion. The Unmoderated Caucus is to be utilized by the delegates upon their own free will, and it is up to them on how to use it.

IMPORTANT TERMS

This is a list of terms that may be of relevance in the committee:

- BLOCS: A group of people with similar ideologies that band together for framing documents like working papers and draft resolutions.

- SPONSOR: A delegate that played a major role in creating the policies and solutions that give shape to the resolution. A delegate can only be the sponsor of a single resolution/working paper. The number of sponsors will usually be about 3-5.

- SIGNATORY: A signatory to a resolution is a country that would like to see the resolution presented and discussed in the committee. Unlike sponsorship, a delegate can be a signatory of multiple bloc documents.

Note: For documents like resolutions and working papers, there is usually a minimum number of signatories required before it is even discussed. A delegate can be a signatory for many resolutions. Being a signatory means the delegate is willing to place the resolution on the table for discussion. The delegate can agree and disagree with the points in the resolution.

- WORKING PAPER: This is a document that will eventually become the base for your draft resolution. The format can vary, but it is usually fairly liberal, and can be framed freely. It contains a detailed draft of your solutions to the agenda at hand, which can then be carried over to the draft resolution.

RULES OF PROCEDURE

DRAFT RESOLUTION

This is the resolution of your bloc when it has not been passed yet. It must be written in resolution format and is the final document you will need to present.

Formatting Guidelines:

1. There must not be a single full stop in the resolution, other than at the end of the final clause.
2. There are two types of clauses: Preambulatory Clauses and Operative Clauses.

Preambulatory Clauses:

1. These clauses highlight the reasons for writing the resolution.
2. They begin with the usable verbs in their continuous form.
3. Each clause ends with a comma.

Operative Clauses:

1. These clauses highlight the solutions to the problems.
2. They come after the Preambulatory Clauses.
3. They must be numbered and begin with the usable verbs in their simple present form.
4. Each clause ends with a semicolon, unless:
5. There are sub clauses to the operative clause.
6. It is the last clause of the resolution.

Subclauses:

1. Subclauses can be included under Operative Clauses and are used after putting a colon at the end of the main Operative Clause.
2. These must be alphabetized (points must be alphabetical).
3. A subclause that is followed by another sub clause must end with a comma, and the last sub clause must end with a semicolon.
4. The first word/phrase of every clause must be bolded and italicised.

FURTHER READING LINKS

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