



Side-Channel Attacks


ISSISP 2017 – Gif-sur-Yvette

2017-07-21





Damien Couroussé, CEA – LIST / LIALP; Grenoble Université Alpes
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CEA: French Atomic & Alternative Energies Commission

- » 15 700 employees
- » 10 research centers
- » Budget of 3.9 billion €
- » 580 patents/year
- » 4000 publications/year
- » 120 startup created since 1984




SIEGE SOCIAL
FONTENAY AUX ROSES
SACLAY
SIEGE ADMINISTRATIF
CEA / DAM
Île de France





leti Grenoble



list Saclay


DACLE Architectures, IC Design & Embedded Software Division

300 members
160 permanent
researchers


60 PhD students &
postdocs

> 150 scientific
papers per year


45 patents
per year



Digital design



Programming



Analog & MEMs



Signal processing



Imaging



Test

PhD and post-doc offers:

<http://www-instr.cea.fr/formations/formation-par-la-recherche/docte...>

<http://www-instr.cea.fr/formations/formation-par-la-recherche/post-doctorat/liste-des-propositions-de-post-doctorat.html>

CEA DACLE / LIALP LABORATORY

One team on code generation for performance & cybersecurity

■ Runtime code generation

- deGoal – Code specialisation with runtime code generation
- Code polymorphism for security in embedded components

■ Compilation of countermeasures with LLVM

- Static and dynamic protections against physical attacks

	Server	Embedded	Sensor & Network (middleware)
Feedback Control		✓	✓
Code generation Tools	✓	✓	✓
SW approaches for parsimonious systems	✓	✓	✓
Demonstrators	✓	✓	✓

One team on **code generation for performance & cybersecurity**

- Runtime code generation
 - deGoal – Code specialisation with runtime code generation
 - Code polymorphism for security in embedded components
- Compilation of countermeasures with LLVM
 - Static and dynamic protections against physical attacks

Thanks to many people at CEA

Charles Aracil, Thiero Barry, Nicolas Belleville, Henri-Pierre Charles, Fernando Endo, Abderrahmane Seriai, Pierre-Alain Moellic, Hassan Noura, Caroline Quéva, Bruno Robisson...
... and at other places

Side-Channel Attacks

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
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

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
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AES, TIME AFTER TIME (BUT SO USEFUL...)





Fig

**Figure B.7.** MixColumns operates on the columns of the state.

S. Mangard, E. Oswald, and T. Popp, Power analysis attacks: Revealing the secrets of smart cards, vol. 31. Springer, 2007.

BESTIARY OF EMBEDDED SYSTEMS

... IN NEED FOR SECURITY CAPABILITES




Smart Card



Secure Element inside...



... And many other things



PHYSICAL ATTACKS: WHY ALL THE FUSS?

Cryptography is used to secure communications


- **Encrypted data** can be safely sent over an untrusted communication channel
- Cannot recover the encrypted information without the **key**

Cryptanalysis studies the mathematical properties of cryptographic algorithms, and provides a “practical” confidence in security bounds.

- Security bounds are expressed in terms of **attack complexity**

Physical attacks are the only (effective) way to break cryptography nowadays.

- Sometimes considered as part of cryptanalysis
- But quite different research communities



Courtesy of Sylvain Guilley 2015, Télécom ParisTech - Secure-IC

An attacker proceeds in two steps:

- 1. Global analysis of the target, looking for potential weaknesses or known vulnerabilities – this step is not considered in the littérature.**
- 2. Focused attack on a target**

- **Cryptanalysis**

Out of the scope of this talk

- **Reverse engineering**

Hardware inspection: decapsulation, physical abrasion, chemical etching, visual inspection, etc.

Software inspection: debug, memory dumps, code analysis, etc. [see lectures past in the week]

- **Passive attacks: side-channel attacks**

Observations: electromagnetic, electrical / power, acoustic, execution time, etc. [you are here]

- **Active attacks: fault attacks**

Laser or other lights illumination, under/over-voltage, clock glitches, electromagnetic perturbations, etc. [next lecture]

- **Logical attacks**


[see past lectures this weeks]

Sometimes considered as a « solved » issue in High Security products.

« PHYSICAL ATTACKS IS SCI-FI »

Physical attacks are considered (by software hackers) as not practical

- Require dedicated HW attack benches, can be quite expensive, especially for fault injection (laser benches)
- We also find low cost ones
 - E.g. *The ChipWhisperer*, starting at ~ 300€
- Require human expertise, but more than other attacks



<https://newae.com/tools/chipwhisperer>

« PHYSICAL ATTACKS IS SCI-FI » #2

IoT Goes Nuclear: Creating a ZigBee Chain Reaction

“Adjacent IoT devices will infect each other with a worm that will rapidly spread over large areas”

- Philips Hue Smart lamp
 - ZigBee protocol
- Uploading malicious firmware with OTA update
 - Discovered the hex command code for OTA update
 - Firmware is protected with a single global key! Using symmetric crypto (AES-CCM).
- Attack path
 - Get access to the key → **side-channel attack with power analysis**
 - Sign a malicious firmware
 - Take over bulbs by: plugging a bulb, war-driving around in a car, war-flying with a drone
 - Request OTA update
 - The malicious firmware can request OTA update to its neighbours to spread.

IoT Goes Nuclear: Creating a ZigBee Chain Reaction

Eyal Ronen()*, Colin O'Flynn†, Adi Shamir* and Achi-Or Weingarten*

PRELIMINARY DRAFT, VERSION 0.91

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†Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada

coflynn@dal.ca

Other interesting read: N. Timmers and A. Spruyt, “Bypassing Secure Boot using Fault Injection,” presented at the Black Hat Europe 2016, 04-Nov-2016.

SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS FOR REVERSE ENGINEERING

- Reverse-engineering from side-channel analysis
 - Even simpler on interpreters
- SCARE attacks: recovering looking tables with side-channel analysis
- FIRE attacks: using fault attacks

T. Eisenbarth, C. Paar, and B. Weghenkel, “Building a Side Channel Based Disassembler,” in Transactions on Computational Science X, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 78–99.

M. S. Pedro, M. Soos, and S. Guilley, “FIRE: Fault Injection for Reverse Engineering,” in Information Security Theory and Practice. Security and Privacy of Mobile Devices in Wireless Communication, 2011, pp. 280–293.


C. Clavier, “An Improved SCARE Cryptanalysis Against a Secret A3/A8 GSM Algorithm,” in Information Systems Security, 2007, pp. 143–155.

THE “DPA” BOOK

The most comprehensive book about side-channel attacks

- Excellent introduction to side-channel attacks
- Published in 2007: does not cover recent attacks and countermeasures


S. Mangard, E. Oswald, and T. Popp, Power analysis attacks: Revealing the secrets of smart cards, vol. 31. Springer, 2007.



SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS (SPA)

Direct interpretation of power consumption measurements

Extraction of information by inspection of single side-channel traces



- Nature of the algorithm
- Structure of the algorithm
 - Number of executions
 - Number of iterations
 - Number of sub-functions
 - nature of instructions executed (memory accesses...)
- Etc.

Illustration of SPA in the wild: C. O’Flynn, “A Lightbulb Worm? A teardown of the Philips Hue.” presented at the Black Hat, 2016. cf. slides ~60 to 70

P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, “Differential Power Analysis,” in Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO’ 99, vol. 1666, M. Wiener, Ed. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999, pp. 388–397.

P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, and P. Rohatgi, “Introduction to differential power analysis,” Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 5–27, 2011.


SPA on RSA [Kocher, 2011]

```
-- Computing c = b ^ e mod m
-- Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modular\_exponentiation

function modular_pow(base, exponent, m)
    if modulus = 1 then return 0
    Assert :: (m - 1) * (m - 1) does not overflow base
    result := 1
    base := base mod m
    while exponent > 0
        if (exponent mod 2 == 1):
            result := (result * base) mod m
        exponent := exponent >> 1
        base := (base * base) mod m
    return result
```

Direct access to key contents:

- bit 0 = square
- bit 1 = square, multiply



Finding a needle in a haystack...

- Relationship between the different components of power consumption:

$$P_{\text{total}} = P_{\text{operations}} + P_{\text{data}} + P_{\text{noise}}$$




$$P_{\text{total}} = P_{\text{exploitable}} + P_{\text{switching.noise}} + P_{\text{electronic.noise}} + P_{\text{const}}$$

needle

haystack


- Power signal: a static and a dynamic component.
 - Static component: power consumption of the gate states → $a * \text{HW(state)}$
 - Dynamic component: power consumption of transitions in gate states
 $\rightarrow b * \text{HD(state}[i], state[i-1])$
- Other needles & stacks
 - Electromagnetic emissions
 - Execution time
 - Chip temperature
 - Etc.


- Target: STM32 – ARM Cortex-M3 @ 24MHz, 128KB flash, 8KB RAM
- The AES key is fixed
- A GPIO trigger is used to facilitate the trace measurements
- The attacker either knows the plaintext or the ciphertext (public data)
- Text chosen attack:
 - Generate D random plaintexts
 - Ask the cipher text to the target
 - Record the EM trace during encryption
- Do the computation analysis!



m: plaintext -> controlled by the attacker or observable

k: cipher key -> unknown to the attacker





ESTIMATING THE SUCCESS OF AN ATTACK

Success rate: success probability of a successful attack

$$SR = \Pr[A(E_{k_0}, L) = k_0]$$


A side-channel attack

k_0 correct key

E_{k_0} encryption with correct key

L leakage

n-order success rate?




F.-X. Standaert, T. Malkin, and M. Yung, “A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks,” in Eurocrypt, 2009, vol. 5479, pp. 443–461.

- CPA / DPA ... attacks do not constitute a security evaluation.
- Playing the role of the attacker is great, but the attacker
 - is focused on a potential vulnerability
 - Follows a specific attack path
- Starting from the previous attack, we could change
 - The hypothetical intermediate values: output of 1st SubBytes, output of 1st AddRoundKey, input of the 10th SubBytes...
 - The power model: Hamming Weight, Hamming Distance, no power model...
 - The distinguisher: Pearson Correlation, Mutual Information...
 - There are many other attacks!
- Our evaluation target is very “leaky” (less than 1000 traces is enough)
 - Unprotected components executed on more complex targets (i.e. ARM Cortex A9) will require 100.000 to 10^6 traces.
 - What about attacking a counter-measure in this case?
- As a security designer, you need to cover all the possible attack passes

TLVA: Test Leakage Vector Assessment

- Exploit Welch's t-test to assess the amount of information leakage
- Extract two populations of side-channel observations (traces)
- Test the null hypothesis: the two populations are not statistically distinguishable → no information leakage

$$t = \frac{\mu_0 - \mu_1}{\sqrt{\frac{s_0^2}{n_0} + \frac{s_1^2}{n_1}}}, \quad t > 4.5 \rightarrow \text{confidence of 99.999\% that the null hypothesis is rejected}$$



G. Goodwill, B. Jun, J. Jaffe, and P. Rohatgi, "A testing methodology for side-channel resistance validation," in NIST non-invasive attack testing workshop, 2011.


D. B. Roy, S. Bhattacharjee, S. Guilley, A. Heuser, S. Patranabis, and D. Mukhopadhyay, "Leak Me If You Can: Does TVLA Reveal Success Rate?," 1152, 2016.

T. Schneider and A. Moradi, "Leakage Assessment Methodology - a clear roadmap for side-channel evaluations," 207, 2015.

TLVA: Test Leakage Vector Assessment

- Exploit
- Extract
- Test the distinguishing hypothesis

$$t = \frac{\mu}{\sqrt{\frac{s}{n}}} \text{ T-TEST}$$




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
$$\mathcal{Q}_0 = \{T_i \mid \text{target bit}(D_i) = 0\}, \quad \mathcal{Q}_1 = \{T_i \mid \text{target bit}(D_i) = 1\}.$$

$$\mathcal{Q}_0 = \{T_i \mid \text{target byte}(D_i) = x\}, \quad \mathcal{Q}_1 = \{T_i \mid \text{target byte}(D_i) \neq x\}.$$

Number of
measurements for a
security evaluation?



*Q0: fixed input plaintext
Q1: random input plaintext*



COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS

MASKING & MASKING

In a masked implementation, **each intermediate value v is concealed** by a random value m that is called mask:

$V_m = v * m$. The mask m is generated internally, i.e. inside the cryptographic device, and varies from execution to execution. Hence, it is not known by the attacker.

[DPA book]



- **Boolean masking:** operator * is xor
- **Arithmetic masking:** operator * is the modular addition or the modular multiplication

Objective: **each masked variable is statistically independent of the secret v.**
A (first-order) CPA attack can recover a (first-order) masked variable, but this knowledge is not sufficient to recover the secret value.


Masking countermeasures are applied at the **algorithmic level**.

HIGHER-ORDER MASKING

Our following discussions will be based on the parallel implementation of a masking scheme such as described in [2]. More precisely, we will consider the simplest example where all the shares are in $\text{GF}(2)$ (generalizations to other fields follow naturally). In this setting, we have a sensitive variable x that is split into m shares such that $x = x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus \dots \oplus x_m$, with \oplus the bitwise XOR. The first $m - 1$ shares are picked up uniformly at random: $(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{m-1}) \xleftarrow{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^m$, and the last one is computed as $x_m = x \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus \dots \oplus x_{m-1}$.

Denoting the vector of shares (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m) as \bar{x} , we will consider an adversary who observes a single leakage sample corresponding to the parallel manipulation of these shares. A simple model for this setting is to assume this sample to be a linear combination of the shares, namely:

$$\mathsf{L}_1(\bar{x}) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^m \alpha_i \cdot x_i \right) + N,$$



F.-X. Standaert, “How (not) to Use Welch’s T-test in Side-Channel Security Evaluations,” 138, 2017.

The goal of hiding countermeasures is to make the **power consumption** of cryptographic devices **independent of the intermediate values** and **independent of the operations** that are performed. There are essentially two approaches to achieve this independence.

1. the **power consumption is random**.
2. **consume an equal amount of power** for all operations and for all data values.

[DPA book]



Hiding countermeasures aim at **breaking the observable relation** between **the algorithm** (operations and intermediate variables) and **observations**.

Information leakage: information related to secret data and secret operations “sneaks” outside of the secured component (via a side channel)

Hiding: “reducing the SNR”, where


- Signal -> information leakage
 - Noise -> everything else
-
- Temporal dispersion: spread leakage at different computation times
 - Shuffle independent operations
 - Insert «dummy» operations to randomly delay the secret computation
 - Spatial dispersion:
 - Move the leaky computation at different places in the circuit
 - E.g. use different registers
 - Modify the “appearance” of information leakage
 - E.g. use different operations

In practice, a secured product combines masking and hiding countermeasures.

STANDARD COMPILERS AND SECURITY

COMPILER DUTIES & OBJECTIVES

- **Duties: assurance of functional equivalence between source code and machine code**
 - “functional” / “functionality” is usually not precisely defined
 - Side effects?
 - Determinism of time behaviour? (real time execution)
 - Lazy evaluation?
 - No formal assurance
 - Except few works, such as CompCert
 - Correctness by construction?
 - The source code written by the developer is not always valid
- **Objectives: optimise one or several performance criteria**
 - Execution time
 - Resources: e.g. memory consumption
 - Energy consumption, power consumption
 - There is no complete criterion for optimality, and no convergence
 - Nature of the algorithm used
 - Relation to architecture / micro-architecture
 - Data...



- **Rights**
 - Reorganise contents of the target program, as long as program semantics is preserved
 - Machine instructions, basic blocs
 - Select the best translation for a source code operation / instruction
 - Remove parts of the program, as long as the program functionality is considered to be preserved (i.e. the computation does not participate in producing the program results)
- **Some classical optimisation passes:**
 - *dead code elimination*
 - *global value numbering*
 - common-subexpression elimination
 - *strength reduction*
 - *loop strength reduction, loop simplification, loop-invariant code motion*
- **LLVM's Analysis and Transform Passes, the 2016/06/30**
 - 40 analysis passes
 - 56 transformation/optimisation passes
 - 10 utility passes
 - ... backends, etc.

will break your security mechanisms

USE OF A STANDARD COMPILER, IMPACT ON SECURITY

INSERTION OF DUMMY INSTRUCTIONS

- Inserting a static procedure for desynchronisation

```
/* subBytes
 * Table Lookup
 */
void subBytes_f(void)
{
    int i;

    for(i = 0; i<16; i+=4)
    {
        CORON();
        state[i+0] = sbox[ state[i+0] ];
        state[i+1] = sbox[ state[i+1] ];
        state[i+2] = sbox[ state[i+2] ];
        state[i+3] = sbox[ state[i+3] ];
    }
}
```

```
void noiseCoron(void)
{
    size_t i;
    if(nbIt_Coron == N) {
        genNoiseCoron();
    }

    /* random delay */
    i = 0;
    while(i < table_d[nbIt_Coron]) {
        i++;
    }

    nbIt_Coron++;
}
```

- Also possible (even better) with a timer and an interrupt handler

Coron, J. S., & Kizhvatov, I. An efficient method for random delay generation in embedded software. In Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2009 (pp. 156-170). Springer (2009).

Coron, J.S., Kizhvatov, I. Analysis and improvement of the random delay countermeasure of CHES 2009. In: CHES. pp. 95–109. Springer (2010).



INSERTION OF DUMMY INSTRUCTIONS

Compiled with -Os:

```
void noiseCoron(void)
{
    size_t i;
    if(nbIt_Coron == N) {
        genNoiseCoron();
    }

    /* random delay */
    i = 0;
    while(i < table_d[nbIt_Coron]) {
        i++;
    }

    nbIt_Coron++;
}
```

Dump of assembler code for function noiseCoron:

0x0000859c <+0>:	push	{r4, lr}
0x000085a0 <+4>:	ldr	r4, [pc, #28] ; <noiseCoron+40>
0x000085a4 <+8>:	ldr	r3, [r4] ; r3 ← nbIt_coron
0x000085a8 <+12>:	cmp	r3, #160 ; nbIt_coron ?= N
0x000085ac <+16>:	bne	0x85b4 <noiseCoron+24>
0x000085b0 <+20>:	bl	0x8524 <genNoiseCoron>
0x000085b4 <+24>:	ldr	r3, [r4]
0x000085b8 <+28>:	add	r3, r3, #1 ; nbIt_coron++
0x000085bc <+32>:	str	r3, [r4]
0x000085c0 <+36>:	pop	{r4, pc}
0x000085c4 <+40>:	andeq	r0, r1, r0, lsr r8

End of assembler dump.

???



INSERTION OF DUMMY INSTRUCTIONS

```

void noiseCoron(void)
{
    size_t i;
    if(nbIt_Coron == N) {
        genNoiseCoron();
    }

    /* random delay */
    i = 0;
    while(i < table_d[nbIt_Coron]) {
        i++;
        asm("nop;");
    }

    nbIt_Coron++;
}

```

Compiled with -Os:

Dump of assembler code for function noiseCoron:

0x00000859c <+0>:	push	{r4, lr}
0x0000085a0 <+4>:	ldr	r4, [pc, #60] ; <noiseCoron+72>
0x0000085a4 <+8>:	ldr	r3, [r4]
0x0000085a8 <+12>:	cmp	r3, #160 ; nbIt_coron ?= N
0x0000085ac <+16>:	bne	0x85b4 <noiseCoron+24>
0x0000085b0 <+20>:	bl	0x8524 <genNoiseCoron>
0x0000085b4 <+24>:	ldr	r3, [pc, #44] ; <noiseCoron+76>
0x0000085b8 <+28>:	ldr	r2, [r4]
0x0000085bc <+32>:	ldr	r1, [r3, r2, lsl #2]
0x0000085c0 <+36>:	mov	r3, #0 ; i ← 0
0x0000085c4 <+40>:	cmp	r3, r1 ; i ?= nbIt_Coron
0x0000085c8 <+44>:	beq	0x85d8 <noiseCoron+60>
0x0000085cc <+48>:	add	r3, r3, #1 ; i ← i+1
0x0000085d0 <+52>:	nop	
0x0000085d4 <+56>:	b	0x85c4 <noiseCoron+40>
0x0000085d8 <+60>:	add	r2, r2, #1 ; nbIt_Coron++
0x0000085dc <+64>:	str	r2, [r4]
0x0000085e0 <+68>:	pop	{r4, pc}
0x0000085e4 <+72>:	andeq	r0, r1, r4, asr r8
0x0000085e8 <+76>:	andeq	r0, r1, r12, asr r8

End of assembler dump.



INSERTION OF DUMMY INSTRUCTIONS

```
void noiseCoron(void)
{
    size_t i;
    if(nbIt_Coron == N) {
        genNoiseCoron();
    }

    /* random delay */
    i = 0;
    while(i < table_d[nbIt_Coron]) {
        i++;
        asm("");
    }

    nbIt_Coron++;
}
```

Compiled with -Os:

Dump of assembler code for function noiseCoron:

0x00000859c <+0>:	push	{r4, lr}
0x0000085a0 <+4>:	ldr	r4, [pc, #56] ; <noiseCoron+68>
0x0000085a4 <+8>:	ldr	r3, [r4]
0x0000085a8 <+12>:	cmp	r3, #160 ; 0xa0
0x0000085ac <+16>:	bne	0x85b4 <noiseCoron+24>
0x0000085b0 <+20>:	bl	0x8524 <genNoiseCoron>
0x0000085b4 <+24>:	ldr	r3, [pc, #40] ; <noiseCoron+72>
0x0000085b8 <+28>:	ldr	r2, [r4]
0x0000085bc <+32>:	ldr	r1, [r3, r2, lsl #2]
0x0000085c0 <+36>:	mov	r3, #0
0x0000085c4 <+40>:	cmp	r3, r1
0x0000085c8 <+44>:	beq	0x85d4 <noiseCoron+56>
0x0000085cc <+48>:	add	r3, r3, #1
0x0000085d0 <+52>:	b	0x85c4 <noiseCoron+40>
0x0000085d4 <+56>:	add	r2, r2, #1
0x0000085d8 <+60>:	str	r2, [r4]
0x0000085dc <+64>:	pop	{r4, pc}
0x0000085e0 <+68>:	andeq	r0, r1, r0, asr r8
0x0000085e4 <+72>:	andeq	r0, r1, r8, asr r8

End of assembler dump.



RANDOM PRECHARGING

- Protection against power analysis using a Hamming Distance model
- Example: Leakage on value v is charged in memory or in a register:

#1 insn k
mem $\leftarrow v$

Leakage: HD (v, k)

#2 insn k
reg $\leftarrow v$

- Random precharging: the variable assignment is preceded by an assignment using a mask m , unknown to the attacker:

insn k
#1 mem $\leftarrow m$
mem $\leftarrow v$

Leakage:
HD (v, m) = HW ($v \oplus m$)

#2 insn k
reg $\leftarrow m$
reg $\leftarrow v$

```
#define SBOX_SIZE 256
uint8_t sbox[SBOX_SIZE];

#define STATE_SIZE 16
uint8_t state[STATE_SIZE];

/* subBytes, table Lookup */
void subBytes(void)
{
    size_t i;
    for(i = 0; i < SBOX_SIZE; i++) {
        state[i] = sbox[state[i]];
    }
}
```

Compiled with -Os:

```
0x0000 <+0>: mov r3, #0
0x0004 <+4>: ldr r2, [pc, #28] ; 0x28 <subBytes+40>
0x0008 <+8>: ldr r0, [pc, #28] ; 0x2c <subBytes+44>
0x000c <+12>: ldrb r1, [r3, r2]
0x0010 <+16>: ldrb r1, [r0, r1]
0x0014 <+20>: strb r1, [r3, r2] ; leaky instruction
0x0018 <+24>: add r3, r3, #1
0x001c <+28>: cmp r3, #16
0x0020 <+32>: bne 0xc <subBytes+12>
0x0024 <+36>: bx lr
0x0028 <+40>: andeq r0, r0, r0
0x002c <+44>: andeq r0, r0, r0
```

RANDOM PRECHARGING

```
#define SBOX_SIZE 256
uint8_t sbox[SBOX_SIZE];

#define STATE_SIZE 16
uint8_t state[STATE_SIZE];

/* subBytes, table Lookup */
void subBytes(void)
{
    size_t i;
    uint8_t mask, tmp_state;

    for(i = 0; i<SBOX_SIZE; i++) {
        tmp_state = state[i];
        mask = rand() & 0xFF;

        state[i] = mask;
        state[i] = sbox[tmp_state];
    }
}
```

Compiled with -Os:

```
0x0000 <+0>: push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, lr}
0x0004 <+4>: mov r4, #0
0x0008 <+8>: ldr r5, [pc, #36] ; <subBytes+52>
0x000c <+12>: ldr r7, [pc, #36] ; <subBytes+56>
0x0010 <+16>: ldrb r6, [r4, r5]
??? 0x0014 <+20>: bl 0x14 <subBytes+20>
0x0018 <+24>: ldrb r3, [r7, r6]
0x001c <+28>: strb r3, [r4, r5]
0x0020 <+32>: add r4, r4, #1
0x0024 <+36>: cmp r4, #16
0x0028 <+40>: bne 0x10 <subBytes+16>
0x002c <+44>: pop {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, lr}
0x0030 <+48>: bx lr
0x0034 <+52>: andeq r0, r0, r0
0x0038 <+56>: andeq r0, r0, r0
```



RANDOM PRECHARGING

```

#define SBOX_SIZE 256
uint8_t sbox[SBOX_SIZE];

#define STATE_SIZE 16
uint8_t volatile state[STATE_SIZE];

/* subBytes, table Lookup */
void subBytes(void)
{
    size_t i;
    uint8_t mask, tmp_state;

    for(i = 0; i<SBOX_SIZE; i++) {
        tmp_state = state[i];
        mask = rand() & 0xFF;

        state[i] = mask;
        state[i] = sbox[tmp_state];
    }
}

```

Compiled with -Os:

```

0x0000 <+0>: push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, lr}
0x0004 <+4>: mov r4, #0
0x0008 <+8>: ldr r5, [pc, #48] ; <subBytes+64>
0x000c <+12>: ldr r7, [pc, #48] ; <subBytes+68>
0x0010 <+16>: ldrb r6, [r5, r4]
0x0014 <+20>: bl 0x14 <subBytes+20>
0x0018 <+24>: and r6, r6, #255 ; 0xff
0x001c <+28>: ldrb r3, [r7, r6]
0x0020 <+32>: and r0, r0, #15
0x0024 <+36>: strb r0, [r5, r4]
0x0028 <+40>: strb r3, [r5, r4]
0x002c <+44>: add r4, r4, #1
0x0030 <+48>: cmp r4, #16
0x0034 <+52>: bne 0x10 <subBytes+16>
0x0038 <+56>: pop {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, lr}
0x003c <+60>: bx lr
0x0040 <+64>: andeq r0, r0, r0
0x0044 <+68>: andeq r0, r0, r0

```



RANDOM PRECHARGING

```

#define SBOX_SIZE 256
uint8_t sbox[SBOX_SIZE];

#define STATE_SIZE 16
uint8_t volatile state[STATE_SIZE];

void subBytes(void)
{
    size_t i;
    uint8_t mask, tmp_state;

    for(i = 0; i<SBOX_SIZE; i++) {
        tmp_state = state[i];
        mask = rand() & 0x000F;

        state[i] = mask;
        state[i] = sbox[tmp_state];
    }
}

```

Compiled with **-O1**:

```

0x0000 <+0>: push {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, lr}
0x0004 <+4>: mov r4, #0
0x0008 <+8>: ldr r6, [pc, #48] ; <subBytes+64>
0x000c <+12>: ldr r7, [pc, #48] ; <subBytes+68>
0x0010 <+16>: ldrb r5, [r6, r4]
0x0014 <+20>: and r5, r5, #255 ; 0xff
0x0018 <+24>: bl 0x18 <subBytes+24>
0x001c <+28>: and r0, r0, #15
0x0020 <+32>: strb r0, [r6, r4]
0x0024 <+36>: ldrb r3, [r7, r5]
0x0028 <+40>: strb r3, [r6, r4]
0x002c <+44>: add r4, r4, #1
0x0030 <+48>: cmp r4, #16
0x0034 <+52>: bne 0x10 <subBytes+16>
0x0038 <+56>: pop {r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, lr}
0x003c <+60>: bx lr
0x0040 <+64>: andeq r0, r0, r0
0x0044 <+68>: andeq r0, r0, r0

```



Huh??

So...

Let's avoid compiler
optimisations!

COMPILING WITH -O0

- All program variables are moved onto the stack before anything else
- Register spilling (> -O0): the register value is moved to the stack
⇒ **Information leakage!**
- Bigger code size -> larger attack surface
⇒ **More potential vulnerabilities**

Dump of assembler code for function subBytes:

```

0x84e4 <+0>: push {r11}          ; (str r11, [sp, #-4]
0x84e8 <+4>: add   r11, sp, #0
0x84ec <+8>: sub   sp, sp, #12
0x84f0 <+12>: mov   r3, #0
0x84f4 <+16>: str   r3, [r11, #-8]
0x84f8 <+20>: b    0x8530 <subBytes+76>
0x84fc <+24>: ldr   r2, [pc, #68] ; <subBytes+100>
0x8500 <+28>: ldr   r3, [r11, #-8]
0x8504 <+32>: add   r3, r2, r3
0x8508 <+36>: ldrb  r3, [r3]
0x850c <+40>: ldr   r2, [pc, #56] ; <subBytes+104>
0x8510 <+44>: ldrb  r2, [r2, r3]
0x8514 <+48>: ldr   r1, [pc, #44] ; <subBytes+100>
0x8518 <+52>: ldr   r3, [r11, #-8]
0x851c <+56>: add   r3, r1, r3
0x8520 <+60>: strb  r2, [r3]
0x8524 <+64>: ldr   r3, [r11, #-8]
0x8528 <+68>: add   r3, r3, #1
0x852c <+72>: str   r3, [r11, #-8]
0x8530 <+76>: ldr   r3, [r11, #-8]
0x8534 <+80>: cmp   r3, #15
0x8538 <+84>: bls   0x84fc <subBytes+24>
0x853c <+88>: sub   sp, r11, #0
0x8540 <+92>: pop   {r11} ; (ldr r11, [sp], #4)
0x8544 <+96>: bx    lr
0x8548 <+100>: andeq r0, r1, r4, lsl #15
0x854c <+104>: muleq r1, r4, r7

```

Side-Channel Attacks

ISSISP 2017 – Gif-sur-Yvette
2017-07-21

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Side-Channel Attacks

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
Damien Couroussé, CEA – LIST / LIALP; Grenoble Université Alpes
damien.courousse@cea.fr

COMPILATION OF COUNTER-MEASURES

CODE POLYMORPHISM

Automated application of software countermeasures against physical attacks

=> A toolchain for the compilation of secured programs




- Countermeasures supported:
 - **Fault tolerance**, including multiple fault injections
 - **Fault detection**
 - **Control-Flow Integrity**
 - Combined with integrity of execution pathes at the granularity of a single machine instruction
 - **Polymorphism**
- **LLVM**: an industry-grade, state-of-the art compiler (competitive with GCC)

CODE POLYMORPHISM

Code polymorphism: regularly changing the behavior of a (secured) component, at runtime, while maintaining unchanged its functional properties, with runtime code generation


- Protection against physical attacks: side channel & fault attacks
 - polymorphism changes the spatial and temporal properties of the secured code
 - Can be combined with other state-of-the-Art HW & SW Countermeasures

(patented techno.)




Runtime code generation for embedded systems

Reference version:



Polymorphic version, with COGITO:



- Random register allocation
- Semantic variants
- Instruction shuffling
- Noise instructions
- Execution of loops in random order

RANDOM REGISTER ALLOCATION

- Greedy algorithm: each register is allocated among one of the free registers remaining
- Has an impact on:
 - The management of the context (ABI)
 - Instruction selection

- Replace an instruction by a semantically equivalent sequence of one or several instructions
- Select the sequence in a list of equivalences
- Examples:

```
c := a xor b <=> c := ((a xor r) xor b) xor r
c := a xor b <=> c := (a or b) xor (a and b)
c := a - b    <=> k := 1 ; c:= (a + k) + (not b)
c := a - b    <=> c := ((a + r) - b) - r
```

INSTRUCTION SHUFFLING


- Randomly reorder instructions
- ... but do not break the semantics of the code!
 - Defs – read registers
 - Uses – modified registers
 - *Do not* take into account result latency and issue latency
 - Special treatments for... special instructions. E.g. branch instructions

INSERTION OF NOISE INSTRUCTIONS



- Noise instructions have no effect on the result of the program
- Parametrable model of the inserted delay \sim program execution time
 - Goal:
 - Maximize standard deviation σ
 - Minimize mean E
- Can insert any instruction:
 - nop
 - Arithmetic (add, xor...)
 - *Memory accesses* (lw, lb, ...)
 - Power hungry instructions
(mul, mac...)
 - Etc.

N: number of insertions
 $(E, \sigma) = f(N)$
f depends on

- the noise model
- the generated code





IMPACT OF POLYMORPHISM ON 1st ORDER CPA



Reference version:
unprotected AES-8

IMPACT OF POLYMORPHISM ON CPA




IMPACT OF POLYMORPHISM ON CPA


Effect of the code generation interval

Reference implementation

Polymorphic version,
code generation intervall: 500




Distinguish threshold = 39 traces



Distinguish threshold = 89 traces


IMPACT OF POLYMORPHISM ON CPA

Polymorphic version
code generation interval: 20



Distinguish threshold > 10000 traces

Polymorphic version,
code generation interval: 500



Distinguish threshold = 89 traces

AUTOMATED APPLICATION OF POLYMORPHISM


Automated application using LLVM

- Declaration of polymorphism with a source code annotation

```
/* unsecured */  
void AES_encrypt(...)  
{ /* ... */}  
/* secured */  
#pragma polymorphic (...)  
void AES_encrypt(...)  
{ /* ... */}
```

- Configurable levels of polymorphic transformations => security/performance tradeoff

- Nature of the code transformations: random allocation of registers, semantic variants, instruction shuffling, insertion of noise instructions.
- Degree of polymorphic variability inserted



AUTOMATED APPLICATION OF POLYMORPHISM

Automated application using LLVM

■ Declaration of polymorphism with a source code annotation

```
/* unsecured */
```



```
void AES_encrypt(...)  
{ /* ... */}
```

```
/* secured */  
#pragma polymorphic (...)  
void AES_encrypt(...)  
{ /* ... */}
```


■ Configurable levels of polymorphic transformations => security/performance tradeoff

- Nature of the code transformations: random allocation of registers, semantic variants, instruction shuffling, insertion of noise instructions.
- Degree of polymorphic variability inserted

Components evaluated: ciphers, hash functions, simple authentication, random generated codes



- Polymorphism is a hiding countermeasure against side-channel attacks
 - Does not remove information leakage; *reduces SNR only*
- However, information leakage is sufficiently blurred such that it is *not found* in observation traces, with a confidence level of 99.999%
- Configurable level of polymorphism for security-performance trade-offs



Attack complexity increasing



TAKE HOME MESSAGES

TAKE HOME MESSAGES

- **Physical attacks are currently the most effective way to break cryptography**
 - Also applicable to other classes of applications
- **Side-channel attacks**
 - Secured products involve a combination of hiding and masking protections
 - Advanced attacks use a combination of side-channel and fault injection attacks
- **Do not trust the compiler, unless it is specifically designed for security purposes**
 - You can workaround compiler optimisations,
 - but this is tricky, and **fragile**
- **Even if the compiler is specifically designed for security purposes, do not trust the compiler**
 - A security compiler is not enough if used alone

Side-Channel Attacks

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