

CV
Daniel Elbro
danielbro.github.io

Areas of Specialisation

Philosophy of Mind and Action, Normative Ethics, Metaethics

Areas of Competence

Applied Ethics, Metaphysics, Epistemology

Employment

2019–22 Graduate Teaching Assistant – King’s College London

2017–18 Teaching Assistant – The Petchey Academy

Education

2018– MPhil/PhD Philosophy – King’s College London

Thesis: ‘Agency as the Grounds for Moral Standing’

Supervisors: Maria Alvarez (primary), Joachim Aufderheide,
John Callanan, David Owens

Examiners (provisional): Hallvard Lillehammer (Birkbeck)

Alison Hills (St John’s College, Oxford)

2016–17 MA Philosophy, Distinction – King’s College London

Dissertation: ‘Three worries about freedom and an agent-causal response’

Supervisor: Christopher Hughes

2013–16 BA(Hons) Philosophy, Politics and Economics, First – University of Sussex

Presentations

Refereed & Invited Talks

2022 ‘Indirect Accounts of Moral Standing.’ 17th London-Berkeley Philosophy Conference (May)

2022 ‘Indirect Accounts of Moral Standing.’ 5th London Graduate Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy (April)

2021 ‘Agency as the grounds for moral standing.’ Cumberland Lodge Philosophy Conference, King’s College London (October)

2021 ‘Agency as the grounds for moral standing.’ Start of Year Philosophy Conference, King’s College London (September)

2020 ‘Harmlessly wronging other animals.’ London Graduate Philosophy Conference, Institute of Philosophy (December)

Comments

2019 On Sophie Kikkert’s ‘Analysing Abilities.’ London-Warwick Mind Forum (November)

Teaching

As Graduate Teaching Assistant – King’s College London

2022 Modern Philosophy

2022	Introduction to Philosophy II, Epistemology element
2022	Introduction to Philosophy II, Metaphysics element
2021	Ethics I
2020	Introduction to Philosophy I, Ethics element
2020	Metaphysics I
2019	Ethics I

Professional Service

2022	Co-organiser, workshop on ‘Non-Human Agency and the Standard Story of Action’ (September)
2022	Co-organiser, workshop on accounts of moral status, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford (TBC, Summer)
2021	Co-organiser, KCL Graduate Conference in Politics, Philosophy and Law (December)
2020–22	GTA Representative, Philosophy Department, King’s College London
2019–22	Co-convenor, Philosophy of Action Reading Group, King’s College London
2019	Co-convenor, <i>Fellow Creatures</i> Reading Group, King’s College London
2014–16	Treasurer, Marx Reading Group, University of Sussex
2013–14	Co-founder & Academic Events Organiser, PPE Society, University of Sussex

Research

Under Review

“Indirect Accounts of Moral Standing”

If we can have obligations to non-human animals, they have ‘moral standing’. According to a range of influential accounts, animals have moral standing because they have a property, for example sentience or the capacity for intentional agency, which guarantees the presence of interests that matter intrinsically. Because animals have such interests, they conclude, we have obligations to them not to frustrate their interests. I argue that the concept of an interest that matters intrinsically is problematic, and so these accounts cannot meet their explanatory burdens without begging the question. Instead, we should pursue ‘direct’ accounts of moral standing: accounts which start by explaining why individuals of certain kinds matter, and which explain why we should not frustrate their interests as a consequence of that fact.

In Progress

“Refraining and Deciding to Refrain”

I argue against a prevailing view on which refraining from doing something requires deciding to refrain from doing so, on the grounds that this view fails to account for many ordinary instances of refraining. I defend an alternative account, according to which refraining is not-doing something that one has the ability to do, and show that my account is preferable to the ‘decision’ view because, unlike it, it can accommodate those ordinary cases of refraining.

“On the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests”

Shelly Kagan (‘What’s Wrong with Speciesism?’ *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 2016; *How to Count Animals, More or Less*, OUP 2019) has recently defended the

view that our obligations to persons are stronger than our obligations to non-persons. Peter Singer ('Why Speciesism Is Wrong: A Response to Kagan', *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 2016) rejects Kagan's view on the basis that the interests of any two individuals should be given equal consideration, regardless of e.g. gender, race, or personhood status. However, it seems that Singer's view does not have room for the thought that our obligations to, say, friends seems stronger than our obligations to strangers. I ask whether there is any salient difference between personhood status on the one hand, and relationships on the other, that explains why preferential treatment is impermissible in the former case but permissible in the latter. I argue that there is a difference: like one's race and gender, but unlike one's relationships, one's personhood status is intrinsic to one.

"Can other animals be 'harmlessly wronged'?"

It seems that we can wrong a person without harming them. For example, if we treat someone disrespectfully behind their back, then it is plausible that we wrong them but it is unclear that we cause them any harm. Cheryl Abbate ('Valuing Animals As They Are: Whether They Feel It Or Not', *European Journal of Philosophy* 2020) has recently argued that we can 'harmlessly wrong' animals too. However, the wrongness of being treated disrespectfully, even behind one's back, seemingly depends on one's capacity to understand that treatment *as* disrespectful, and animals cannot understand that. I examine whether there is any other basis for the claim that animals deserve respectful treatment that could underpin Abbate's claim.

Awards & Funding

- 2022 Group Event Grant for workshop on 'Non-Human Agency and the Standard Story of Action' (£2900) – King's College London Faculty of Arts & Humanities
- 2019 Travel grant (£330) – London Arts & Humanities Partnership Research Support Fund
- 2018–21 AHRC Research Studentship (fees and stipend) – London Arts & Humanities Partnership
- 2015 Highest marks in cohort for Philosophy (second year) – University of Sussex

Public Engagement

- 2021 'Review: Cécile Fabre, "Snatching Something from Death": Value, Justice, and Humankind's Common Heritage' (KCL Annual Peace Lecture 2021)' – KCL Philosophy Blog