

CV

Daniel Elbro

Areas of Specialisation

Philosophy of Action, Normative Ethics, Metaethics

Areas of Competence

Metaphysics, Applied Ethics, Epistemology

Employment

2019–22 Graduate Teaching Assistant – King’s College London

2017–18 Teaching Assistant – The Petchey Academy

Education

2018– MPhil/PhD Philosophy – King’s College London

THESIS: ‘Agency as the Grounds for Moral Standing’

SUPERVISORS: Maria Alvarez (primary), Joachim Aufderheide,
John Callanan, David Owens

EXAMINERS (provisional): Hallvard Lillehammer (Birkbeck)

Alison Hills (St John’s College, Oxford)

2016–17 MA Philosophy, Distinction – King’s College London

DISSERTATION: ‘Three worries about freedom and an agent-causal response’

SUPERVISOR: Christopher Hughes

2013–16 BA(Hons) Philosophy, Politics and Economics, First – University of Sussex

Presentations

REFEREED & INVITED TALKS

2022 ‘Indirect Accounts of Moral Standing.’ 17th London-Berkeley Philosophy Conference (May)

2022 ‘Indirect Accounts of Moral Standing.’ 5th London Graduate Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy (April)

2021 ‘Agency as the grounds for moral standing.’ Cumberland Lodge Philosophy Conference, King’s College London (October)

2021 ‘Agency as the grounds for moral standing.’ Start of Year Philosophy Conference, King’s College London (September)

2020 ‘Harmlessly wronging other animals.’ London Graduate Philosophy Conference, Institute of Philosophy (December)

COMMENTS

2019 On Sophie Kikkert’s ‘Analysing Abilities.’ London-Warwick Mind Forum (November)

Teaching

AT KING’S COLLEGE LONDON

2022 Modern Philosophy

2022 Introduction to Philosophy II, Epistemology element

2022	Introduction to Philosophy II, Metaphysics element
2021	Ethics I
2020	Introduction to Philosophy I, Ethics element
2020	Metaphysics I
2019	Ethics I

Professional Service

2022	Co-organiser, workshop on ‘Non-Human Agency and the Standard Story of Action’ (September)
2022	Co-organiser, workshop on accounts of moral status, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford (TBC, Summer)
2021	Co-organiser, KCL Graduate Conference in Politics, Philosophy and Law (December)
2020–22	GTA Representative, Philosophy Department, King’s College London
2019–22	Co-convenor, Philosophy of Action Reading Group, King’s College London
2019	Co-convenor, <i>Fellow Creatures</i> Reading Group, King’s College London
2014–16	Treasurer, Marx Reading Group, University of Sussex
2013–14	Co-founder & Academic Events Organiser, PPE Society, University of Sussex

Research In Progress

‘Indirect Accounts of Moral Standing’

If we can have obligations to non-human animals, they have ‘moral standing’. According to a range of influential accounts of animal moral standing, animals have moral standing because they have a property, for example sentience or the capacity for intentional agency, which guarantees the presence of interests which matter intrinsically. Because animals have interests that matter intrinsically, they conclude, we have obligations to them not to frustrate their interests. I argue that the concept of an interest that matters intrinsically is untenable, and so these accounts cannot meet their explanatory burdens without begging the question.

‘Refraining and Deciding to Refrain’

I argue against the prevailing view of the nature of refraining that it is possible to refrain without deciding to do so. I argue that the prevailing ‘decision’ view fails to account for many ordinary not-doings. I defend an account of the nature of refraining according to which refraining is not doing something one has the ability to do, and argue that my account solves the problem with the ‘decision’ view.

A paper on the principle of equal consideration of interests.

Shelly Kagan has recently defended the view that our obligations to persons are stronger than our obligations to non-human animals. However, philosophers like Peter Singer reject Kagan’s view on the basis that the interests of any two individuals should be given equal consideration, regardless of e.g. gender, race, or species. But our obligations to, say, friends seems stronger than our obligations to strangers. I ask whether there is a salient difference between one’s species membership on the one hand, and one’s relationships on the other, that explains why preferential treatment is impermissible in the former

case but permissible in the latter. I argue that there is a difference: like one's race and gender, but unlike one's relationships, one's species membership is intrinsic to one.

A paper on 'harmless wronging'.

It seems that we can wrong a person without harming them. For example, if we treat someone disrespectfully behind their back, then it is plausible that we wrong them but it is unclear where the harm to them would be. Cheryl Abbate has recently argued that we can likewise 'harmlessly wrong' animals. But the wrongness of being treated disrespectfully, even behind one's back, seemingly depends on understanding that treatment *as* disrespectful, and animals cannot understand that. How could such treatment wrong them? Is there any other basis for the claim that animals deserve respectful treatment?

Awards & Funding

- 2019 Travel grant, London Arts & Humanities Partnership Research Support Fund
- 2018–21 AHRC Research Studentship, London Arts & Humanities Partnership
- 2015 Highest marks in cohort for Philosophy, University of Sussex

Public Engagement

- 2021 'Review: Cécile Fabre, "Snatching Something from Death': Value, Justice, and Humankind's Common Heritage" (KCL Annual Peace Lecture 2021)' on KCL Philosophy Blog