

# Assisting the Deployment of Security-Sensitive Workflows by Finding Execution Scenarios

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## SECENTIS

A European Industrial Doctorate on Security and Trust

# Outline


- 1 Introduction
- 2 Scenario Finding Problems
- 3 Solving SFPs
- 4 Validation
- 5 Conclusions

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# Context

- A **workflow** specifies a collection of **tasks** and the causal relationships between them
- Authorization **policies** specify which users can execute which tasks
- Additional **constraints**, such as Separation/Binding of Duty, further restrict the execution of tasks by users
  - Important to avoid errors and fraud, limiting the opportunities for abuse
- We call those workflows **security-sensitive**



task	roles
t1	r3
t2	r2
t3	r2
t4	r1
t5	r2

roles	users
r1	a
r2	a, b, c
r3	a, b

# Workflow Satisfiability Problem

## WSP


Is there an **assignment** of users to tasks such that a workflow **terminates** while satisfying all authorization constraints?

## Run-time WSP

Answering sequences of user **requests** at execution time **ensuring termination** with the satisfaction of authorization constraints

WSP is NP-hard already in the presence of one SoD constraint

# Problem




task	roles
t1	r3
t2	r2
t3	r2
t4	r1
t5	r2

roles	users
r1	a
r2	a, b, c
r3	a, b

Scenario = t1(a), t2(b), t3(c), X

# WSP solution



task	roles
t1	r3
t2	r2
t3	r2
t4	r1
t5	r2

roles	users
r1	a
r2	a, b, c
r3	a, b

Scenario = t1(b), t2(a), t3(c), t4(a), t5(b)




# Solving the WSP - previous work

- Technique for the synthesis of **run-time monitors** for the WSP
  - C. Bertolissi, D. R. dos Santos, and S. Ranise. “Automated synthesis of run-time monitors to enforce authorization policies in business processes” in ASIACCS 2015
- It takes as input the specification of a security-sensitive workflow and an authorization policy and consists of two steps (**off-line and on-line**)
- Authorization policy is only considered in the on-line phase, the result of the off-line phase is based on a set of **symbolic users** and an unconstrained policy

# Off-line

- A **symbolic transition system**  $S$  is derived from the execution constraints and the authorization constraints
- $S$  is used to compute a **symbolic reachability graph**  $RG$ 
  - Edges labeled by task-user pairs in which users are symbolically represented by variables
  - Nodes labeled by a symbolic representation of the set of states from which it is possible to reach a state in which the workflow successfully terminates
- Any path from a leaf node to the root corresponds to a **symbolic eligible scenario**


## Off-line - Symbolic Reachability Graph



# On-line

- A Datalog program is derived from  $RG$  by building clauses from the formulae **labeling the nodes**
- Each clause invokes predicates  $auth$ , which is an interface to the authorization policy, and  $h$ , which keeps track of which user has executed which task
- If the monitor **grants a request** (clause is satisfied), then the user can execute the task and the workflow can terminate while satisfying the authorization policy and the authorization constraints

# Run-time WSP solution



task	roles
t1	r3
t2	r2
t3	r2
t4	r1
t5	r2

roles	users
r1	a
r2	a, b, c
r3	a, b


#	History	Query	Answer
0	$\emptyset$	$can\_do(a, t1)$	deny
1	-	$can\_do(b, t1)$	grant
2	$h(t1, b)$	$can\_do(c, t3)$	grant
3	$h(t3, c)$	$can\_do(a, t4)$	grant
4	$h(t4, a)$	$can\_do(b, t2)$	deny
5	-	$can\_do(a, t2)$	grant
6	$h(t2, a)$	$can\_do(b, t5)$	grant
7	$h(t5, b)$	-	-

# New problem


- Customers **re-use** business process models with authorization constraints from a **repository**
  - Usually, BPMN and constraints are available at **design-time**
  - Authorization policy is decided during **deployment**
- They must know, at deployment time, whether a process can be successfully **instantiated** with their authorization policy

# Business Process Repositories

## Business Process Repository - SAP Solution Manager



SAP BPR



Signavio Process Library

# Business Process Repositories

- Many solutions to the WSP are less interesting in this scenario because they **do not exploit re-use**
- Design-time/run-time separation and re-use allow us to **pre-compute** and store part of the solution
- Later, we find concrete **execution scenarios** showing termination



# Contributions

- Statements of two [Scenario Finding Problems](#) (SFPs) and discussion of their relationships with the WSP
- [Solution](#) based on a technique for the synthesis of run-time monitors for the WSP
- [Validation](#) of the solution on real-world examples from a repository of re-usable business process models

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# Scenario Finding Problems (SFP)

- An execution scenario is a sequence of user-task pairs
  - A scenario is **eligible** if all the constraints are satisfied
  - A scenario is **authorized** if every user is authorized to perform the assigned task
- It is possible to compute—**once and for all**—the set of eligible scenarios associated to a workflow in a repository
- The problem is then to **look for** those scenarios with some **properties** when an authorization policy becomes available

# Scenario Finding Problems

## Basic (B-SFP)

Given the set of eligible scenarios according to a set of authorization constraints, return a scenario which is authorized according to a given authorization relation


## Minimal User Base SFP (MUB-SFP)

Given the set of eligible scenarios according to a set of authorization constraints, return a scenario which is authorized according to a given authorization relation and such that the set of users occurring in it is a minimal user base

# SFP vs. WSP

- WSP:
  - Input: Workflow with constraints and authorization policy
  - Output: Eligible and authorized scenario
- B-SFP:
  - Input: Workflow with constraints and authorization policy +  
Pre-computed set of eligible scenarios
  - Output: Eligible and authorized scenario
- MUB-SFP:
  - Input: Workflow with constraints and authorization policy +  
Pre-computed set of eligible scenarios
  - Output: Eligible and authorized minimal scenario


## Example - eligible scenarios



$$U = \{Alice, Bob, Charlie, Dave, Erin, Frank\}$$

- $\eta_1 = t_1(Alice), t_2(Bob), t_3(Charlie), t_4(Dave), t_5(Erin)$
- $\eta_2 = t_1(Bob), t_2(Alice), t_3(Charlie), t_4(Alice), t_5(Bob)$
- $\eta_3 = t_1(Bob), t_4(Charlie), t_2(Alice), t_3(Dave), t_5(Bob)$
- ... (total = 19,080 scenarios)


# Example - authorized scenarios



$$TA = \{(Alice, t_1), (Bob, t_1), (Alice, t_2), (Bob, t_2), (Charlie, t_3), (Alice, t_4), (Dave, t_4), (Bob, t_5), (Erin, t_5)\}$$

- $\eta_1 = t_1(Alice), t_2(Bob), t_3(Charlie), t_4(Dave), t_5(Erin)$
- $\eta_2 = t_1(Bob), t_2(Alice), t_3(Charlie), t_4(Alice), t_5(Bob)$
- $\eta_3 = t_1(Bob), t_4(Charlie), t_2(Alice), t_3(Dave), t_5(Bob)$
- ...

# Example - minimal scenarios



$$TA = \{(Alice, t_1), (Bob, t_1), (Alice, t_2), (Bob, t_2), (Charlie, t_3), (Alice, t_4), (Dave, t_4), (Bob, t_5), (Erin, t_5)\}$$

- $\eta_1 = t_1(Alice), t_2(Bob), t_3(Charlie), t_4(Dave), t_5(Erin)$
- $\eta_2 = t_1(Bob), t_2(Alice), t_3(Charlie), t_4(Alice), t_5(Bob)$
- $\eta_3 = t_1(Bob), t_4(Charlie), t_2(Alice), t_3(Dave), t_5(Bob)$
- ...



# Sketch of solution - B-SFP

- A scenario solving the B-SFP is **also a solution of the WSP** and vice versa, so we could re-use an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  returning answers to the WSP to solve the B-SFP
- We would have to invoke  $\mathcal{A}$  for **every task-user pair** in a scenario, because it does not exploit the fact that the scenarios in  $E$  are eligible
- A **better approach** is to consider each eligible scenario and check if all task-user pairs are authorized

# Sketch of solution - MUB-SFP

- Maintain a variable storing an eligible and authorized scenario which is a **candidate minimal user base**
- When all eligible scenarios have been considered, we find a minimal user base

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# Solving the SFPs

- We reuse the **monitor synthesis** technique from ASIACCS2015
- It provides us with a **compact data structure** to represent the set of all eligible scenarios in a workflow
  - Reachability graph with symbolic users

# Solving the SFPs

- Algorithm based on **DFS** to explore all paths in  $RG$  and check that the scenario is authorized by using the run-time monitor
- Instead of enumerating all users, we **exploit a Datalog engine** to find the right user
- Basic solution is **extended** with a set of facts which drives the search for a scenario with particular characteristics (conditionals, user-task pairs, etc.)


```
1: for all  $v \in \text{Nodes}(RG)$  do  $\text{visited}[v] \leftarrow \text{false}$ ;  
2: end for  
3:  $\eta \leftarrow \epsilon$ ;  $NI \leftarrow \text{NoIncoming}(RG)$ ;  
4: while ( $v \in NI$  and  $\eta = \epsilon$ ) do  
5:    $\eta \leftarrow \text{DFS}(v, \epsilon, \Gamma)$ ;  $NI \leftarrow NI \setminus \{v\}$ ;  
6: end while  
7: return  $\eta$   
8: function  $\text{DFS}(v, \eta, H)$   
9:    $\text{visited}[v] \leftarrow \text{true}$ ;  $OE \leftarrow \text{OutGoing}(v)$ ;  
10:  if  $OE = \emptyset$  then return  $\eta$   
11:  else  
12:    for all  $v \xrightarrow{t(v)} w \in OE$  do  
13:      if (not  $\text{visited}[w]$  and  $M, P, H \vdash^{v \mapsto u} \text{can\_do}(t, v)$ )  
14:        then  
15:          return  $\text{DFS}(w, \text{append}(\eta, t(u)), H \cup \{h(t, u)\})$   
16:        end if  
17:      end for  
18:    end if  
19:  return  $\epsilon$   
20: end function
```

# Outline


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# Workflows

## ITIL



## ISO 9000





# Experimental setting

- Policies **with and without possible scenarios**
- Facts about user assignments and **choice of branches**
- Algorithm implemented in Python and pyDatalog and experiments run on a MacBook Air 2014

# Experiments - B-SFP

#	Instance	Facts	Solution Scenario	Time (s)
0	TRW+ $P_0$	$\emptyset$	$t1(b), t2(a), t4(a), t3(c), t5(b)$	0.288
1	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{c1, c2\}$	$t1(u3), t3(u9), t4(u8), t6(u9), t7(u9)$	4.267
2	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{c1, \text{not } c2\}$	$t1(u3), t3(u3), t4(u7), t5(u8), t6(u3), t7(u7)$	4.454
3	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{\text{not } c1, c2\}$	$t1(u3), t2(u1), t3(u9), t4(u8), t6(u9), t7(u9)$	4.374
4	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{\text{not } c1, \text{not } c2\}$	$t1(u3), t2(u1), t3(u3), t4(u7),$ $t5(u8), t6(u3), t7(u7)$	4.561
5	ISO+ $P_4$	$\{appr\}$	$t1(u3), t4(u7), t5(u8), t2(u3), t3(u7),$ $t6(u9), t7(u7), t9(u8)$	6.581
6	ISO+ $P_4$	$\{\text{not } appr\}$	$t1(u3), t4(u7), t5(u8), t2(u3), t3(u7),$ $t6(u7), t7(u8), t8(u6)$	6.637
7	TRW+ $P_1$	$\emptyset$	$\epsilon$	0.407
8	TRW+ $P_0$	$\{t2(b)\}$	$\epsilon$	1.554
9	ITIL+ $P_3$	$\emptyset$	$\epsilon$	9.562
10	ISO+ $P_5$	$\emptyset$	$\epsilon$	44.076

# Experiments - MUB-SFP

#	Instance	Facts	Solution Scenario	Time (s)
11	TRW+ $P_0$	$\emptyset$	$t1(b), t2(c), t3(b), t4(a), t5(a)$	2.385
12	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{c1, c2\}$	$t1(u1), t3(u1), t4(u7), t6(u1), t7(u1)$	108.819
13	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{c1, \text{not } c2\}$	$t1(u3), t3(u3), t4(u7), t5(u7), t6(u3), t7(u3)$	116.525
14	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{\text{not } c1, c2\}$	$t1(u1), t2(u1), t3(u1), t4(u7), t6(u1), t7(u1)$	108.827
15	ITIL+ $P_2$	$\{\text{not } c1, \text{not } c2\}$	$t1(u3), t2(u3), t3(u3), t4(u7),$ $t5(u7), t6(u3), t7(u3)$	116.533
16	ISO+ $P_4$	$\{appr\}$	$t1(u5), t3(u5), t2(u5), t4(u5), t5(u5),$ $t6(u3), t7(u7), t9(u7)$	166.632
17	ISO+ $P_4$	$\{\text{not } appr\}$	$t1(u5), t3(u5), t2(u5), t4(u5), t5(u5),$ $t6(u9), t7(u6), t8(u9)$	166.644

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# Conclusions

- We have introduced two **SFPs** and **algorithms** to solve them
- The approach exploits the fact that the eligible scenarios can be **computed once and re-used** with every authorization policy
- **Experimental** evaluation shows that it can be used at deployment time since it performs the computationally heaviest part when the workflow is added to a repository
- We intend to study
  - resiliency in SFPs
  - automatically suggest changes to authorization policies so that solutions of an SFP are optimal with respect to some criteria, e.g., least privilege.

# Thank you!

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