

Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor Onion Service Sessions with **Sliding Subset Sum**



Daniela Lopes, Jin-Dong Dong, Pedro Medeiros, Daniel Castro, Diogo Barradas, Bernardo Portela, João Vinagre, Bernardo Ferreira, Nicolas Christin, Nuno Santos

February, 27th, NDSS '24

People need Tor!

People need Tor!

- Internet users face surveillance and censorship.

People need Tor!

- Internet users face **surveillance** and **censorship**.
- Journalists and **whistleblowers** need to share information.



People need Tor!

- Internet users face **surveillance** and **censorship**.
- Journalists and **whistleblowers** need to share information.
- Countries can try to find who they're communicating with.



People need Tor!


- Internet users face surveillance and censorship.
- Journalists and whistleblowers need to share information.
- Countries can try to find who they're communicating with.
- Tor is a network composed of voluntary relays to provide anonymity.



Preserving **anonymity** with Tor


Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:



Preserving anonymity with Tor


Circuits to the Internet:




Client-side anonymity

Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:




Circuits to onion services:




Client-side anonymity

Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:




Circuits to onion services:




Client-side anonymity

Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:




Circuits to onion services:




Client-side anonymity

Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:




Circuits to onion services:




Client-side anonymity

Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:




Circuits to onion services:



Client-side anonymity


Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:



Client-side anonymity


Circuits to onion services:



Client and server-side anonymity


Preserving anonymity with Tor

Circuits to the Internet:



Client-side anonymity

Circuits to onion services:




Client and server-side anonymity

Can one deanonymize Tor?


Can one **deanonymize** Tor?

Website fingerprinting:



Can one deanonymize Tor?


Website fingerprinting:



Can't find the service's IP!


Can one deanonymize Tor?

Website fingerprinting:




Can't find the service's IP!

Traffic correlation:




Can one deanonymize Tor?

Website fingerprinting:



Traffic correlation:




Can't find the service's IP!


Do existing attacks also work on onion services?

Threat Model


Threat Model




Threat Model




Threat Model




Threat Model




Threat Model




The SUMO Pipeline




The SUMo Pipeline




The SUMo Pipeline




Distinguishing flows




Distinguishing flows by their source




Distinguishing flows by their destination




The SUMo Pipeline




Match clients with onion services




Get possible pair combinations




Count packets per time unit



Get similarity scores per window



Group scores to find correlated pairs



Experimental testbed and datasets

Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:

Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.

Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.

Experimental testbed and datasets


- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.
 - Client-side browsing behaviour.

Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.
 - Client-side browsing behaviour.
 - Host diverse real-world websites.


Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.
 - Client-side browsing behaviour.
 - Host diverse real-world websites.
- Client **sessions** to onion services:



Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.
 - Client-side browsing behaviour.
 - Host diverse real-world websites.
- Client **sessions** to onion services:




Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.
 - Client-side browsing behaviour.
 - Host diverse real-world websites.
- Client **sessions** to onion services:




Experimental testbed and datasets

- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.
 - Client-side browsing behaviour.
 - Host diverse real-world websites.
- Client **sessions** to onion services:



Experimental testbed and datasets


- Framework to generate datasets:
 - Geographical distribution.
 - Request Concurrency.
 - Client-side browsing behaviour.
 - Host diverse real-world websites.
- Client **sessions** to onion services:



Filtering Phase


Filtering Phase

Source separation



Filtering Phase


Source separation




Distinguishes client- from server-side flows!

Filtering Phase

Source separation




Target separation



Distinguishes client- from server-side flows!


Filtering Phase

Source separation




Distinguishes client- from server-side flows!

Target separation




Distinguishes between flows to the Internet and to onion services!

Session Matching




Session Matching

- Over **99.6% precision and recall** for any duration.




Session Matching

- Over **99.6% precision and recall** for any duration.
- ★ **100% precision** for sessions longer than 6 minutes.




Session Matching

- Over **99.6% precision and recall** for any duration.
- ★ **100% precision** for sessions longer than 6 minutes.
- **Imperfect filtering achieves 99.5% precision!**




SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair



SUMo is fast!


Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair



SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair


Fast to re-train!



SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair


Fast to re-train!



SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair


Fast to re-train!



SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair

Deep learning correlation attack of Tor traffic to the clearweb




Fast to re-train!

SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair

Deep learning correlation attack of Tor traffic to the clearweb




Fast to re-train!

SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair

Deep learning correlation attack of Tor traffic to the clearweb




Fast to re-train!

SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair

Fast to re-train!

Deep learning correlation attack of Tor traffic to the clearweb




GPU-optimized correlation attack of Tor traffic to onion services

SUMo is fast!

Phase	Stage	Training time	Inference Time
Filtering	Source Separation	< 6 seconds total	< 4 μ s/flow
	Target Separation		
Matching	Session Correlation	-	< 6 μ s/pair

Deep learning correlation attack of Tor traffic to the clearweb





Fast to re-train!

SUMo is 100x faster than the state-of-the-art!



GPU-optimized correlation attack of Tor traffic to onion services

Correlation is a real threat!



Correlation is a real threat!





Correlation is a real threat!





Correlation is a real threat!



Correlation is a real threat!



Correlation is a real threat!



Guard node attribution is dangerously skewed!

Conclusion



Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.

Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.
- **Existing entities** can realistically deploy SUMo.

Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.
- **Existing entities** can realistically deploy SUMo.
- **Countermeasures:**

Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.
- **Existing entities** can realistically deploy SUMo.
- **Countermeasures:**
 - Pluggable transports (e.g. obfs4).

Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.
- **Existing entities** can realistically deploy SUMo.
- **Countermeasures:**
 - Pluggable transports (e.g. obfs4).
 - Concurrent multitab requests.

Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.
- **Existing entities** can realistically deploy SUMo.
- **Countermeasures:**
 - Pluggable transports (e.g. obfs4).
 - Concurrent multitab requests.
 - Guard geographical diversity.

Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.
- **Existing entities** can realistically deploy SUMo.
- **Countermeasures:**
 - Pluggable transports (e.g. obfs4).
 - Concurrent multitab requests.
 - Guard geographical diversity.



Scan for source code

Conclusion

- SUMo is effective at **deanonymizing** onion services.
- **Existing entities** can realistically deploy SUMo.
- **Countermeasures:**
 - Pluggable transports (e.g. obfs4).
 - Concurrent multitab requests.
 - Guard geographical diversity.

Get in touch!



daniela.lopes@tecnico.ulisboa.pt



Scan for source code