



Managing the UK economy

Fiscal and monetary policy since 1945


Week 8 – 1997-07: Central Bank independence,
New Labour & Great Moderation

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1997-2007: Overview




Great moderation:

- Sustained and stable GDP growth.
- Low inflation.
- Decreasing unemployment.
- Limited fluctuations
- Common to other OECD countries (but better in UK).


1997-2007: Overview

- Unemployment goes down and stabilizes around 5.5%
- Inflation low & close to 2% target, slightly increases in 2006/7




1997-2007: Overview

- Remarkably stable GDP growth rate (*great moderation*).
- Growth now driven by services, not industry




1997-2007: Overview

- A persistent trade deficit opens up.
- Financed by net financial inflows, not loss of reserves.




1997-2007: Overview

- Increase in public spending & taxation as a % of GDP after 2001



1997-2007: Overview

- Budget surpluses during Labour's first term in office.
- Turn to deficit (around 3% of GDP) since 2001.



- 1998-2000 surpluses due to both fiscal tightening & higher than expected tax revenues.
- Post-2001 deficits due to both more expansionary policy & lower than expected revenues.

1997-2007: Overview

- New Labour in power since 1997
 - Blair PM, Brown Chancellor until 2007
- Maintains the post-1979 settlement
 - Pro-market stance
 - No nationalizations or interventionist industrial policy (unlike old Labour)
 - Primacy of monetary policy & inflation control
- But with some discontinuity
 - Reverse decline in revenues & spending as % of GDP
 - Social policy & investment in public services
- Reforms both monetary & fiscal policy
 - BoE independence
 - New fiscal policy rules
 - Both in continuity with post-1979 policy trajectory



Bank of England independence

- 1992-1997: inflation-targeting regime
 - Inflation target (2.5% since 1995) and monthly interest rate meeting (Ken & Eddie show)
 - Probably increased BoE influence, but Chancellor still had the last word
- May 1997: Bank of England independence
 - MPC within BoE conducts monetary policy
 - Independent of government but accountable to Parliament
 - Government sets inflation target (unlike USA/Eurozone)
- *Mandate: ‘to maintain price stability and, subject to that objective, to support the government’s economic policy, including its objectives for growth and employment’*
- Banking supervision & public debt management transferred away from BoE (FSA and DMO)



Gordon Brown's new fiscal rules

1. **Golden rule:**

on average over the economic cycle the government will only borrow to invest and not to fund current expenditure.

2. **Sustainable investment rule:**


public debt as a proportion of national income will be held over the economic cycle at a stable & prudent level.

- Also committed to stick to the spending plans of previous Conservative government over 1997-99.




The logic of fiscal rules

- Why fiscal rules, if they are self-imposed?
 - *Couldn't Brown just do what he thought was optimal, without having to impose a 'rule' on himself first?*
- Government ties its hands to avoid a future temptation of opportunistic behaviour
- Gain credibility with citizens, firms, investors
 - Lower inflation expectations
 - Strengthen £
 - Lower medium-long term interest rates on gilts
 - New Labour zealous to gain credibility with markets
- Can make it harder for future governments to use the budget opportunistically




‘Golden rule’ and its logic

- Investment paid upfront but will produce benefits in future years, so makes sense to pay gradually.
- If investment has a (social) return higher than interest rate, it is sound to borrow to finance it.
- Current spending must be renewed every year, so makes sense to cover it with *current* revenues.
- Corrects a possible bias against investment
 - Governments trying to contain the deficit usually find it politically easier to cut investment than current spending
 - Over time, this leads to severe underinvestment
 - Might have happened during the 1980s deficit reduction
- Differed from Euro fiscal rules.




'Sustainable investment' rule and its logic

- Golden rule alone might still allow government to over-invest leading to increasing debt.
- Sustainable investment rule prevents this by committing to stable debt-GDP ratio.
- Note that with $r < g$ deficits are still allowed.
- Both rules apply 'over the economic cycle' to allow for higher deficits during downturns, compensated by lower deficits during upturns.
- Brown's rules were maintained & broadly respected over 1997-07 but broke down and were suspended in the 2008-09 crisis.



The Code of Conduct

- Brown also issued a 'Code of conduct' for fiscal policy (part of the 1998 budget).
- Pre-Budget Report (PBR) to outline the government plans towards the subsequent budget.
- Publication of a 50-years forecast for public finances, to show how current policy affects long-term fiscal sustainability.
 - National Audit Office (NAO) assesses forecast assumptions to make sure no cheating.
- Publication of cyclically adjusted budget deficit figure.



Fiscal policy in 1997-07 [1/2]

- **Stability:** no huge fiscal or monetary actions
 - Reflected (maybe also contributed to) Great Moderation.
- **1997-1998: Fiscal tightening**
 - Tax increases (end of mortgage interest relief)
 - Followed spending plans of previous Conservative government.
 - Combined with higher than expected revenues to generate substantial surplus over 1998-2000
- **“Prudence for a purpose”**
 - Fiscal discipline not as an end in itself, but as a way to create conditions for sustainable increases in public services and public investment.
 - Establish a reputation for prudent fiscal management
 - Create fiscal space for a subsequent increase in spending.




Fiscal policy in 1997-07 [2/2]

- 1999-2001: Fiscal expansion
 - Increased spending on NHS and education
 - Modest tax cuts
 - Further positive revenue surprises, keeping the deficit small
- 2002-2005: neutral budgets
 - Previous expansion + lower than expected revenues produce increase in deficit (3.9% of GDP in 2004).
 - Government mistakenly assumed that the 1998-2001 increase in revenues given tax rates was structural rather than a temporary random event.
- 2006-08: mild fiscal tightening
 - Reduces deficit to ~3% of GDP.
- Fiscal rules were met over the economic cycle, with previous surpluses compensating subsequent deficits



Fiscal & monetary policy in 1996-07 in one graph



UK & the Euro

- 1992: Major negotiates opt-out from EMU
- 1997: Should UK join Euro 1st (1999) wave?
- New Labour's agnostic position: joining if passing 5 economic tests + a referendum.
- In contrast, countries like Italy saw joining the Euro as a political imperative.
- Oct 1997: Based on Treasury assessment, Brown announces not joining 1st wave.
- June 2003: Second Treasury assessment, again negative conclusions.



Balls & Brown's five economic tests

1. **Convergence test:**

Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?

2. **Flexibility test:**

If problems emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?

3. **Investment test:**

Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in Britain?

4. **Financial sector test:**

What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK's financial services industry, particularly the City's wholesale markets?

5. **Summative test:**

In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?



The Treasury 1997 & 2003 assessments

- Government was likely not going to join anyway (no political consensus within Labour).
- But Treasury produced a massive assessment, of unprecedented quality & breadth of analysis.
- Conclusion: no “clear and unambiguous” case for entry.
- Convergence & flexibility tests not met
 - Economic cycles not fully synchronized
 - Specificities of the UK housing market
 - UK economy not flexible enough to withstand UK-specific shocks without appropriate policy response
- Investment & summative test could not be met if convergence & flexibility were not.
- Only financial sector test fully met



Concluding thoughts on 1997-07

- Macroeconomic context so benign, it makes it hard to assess policy (until 2008).
- New Labour achieved its goals of acquiring credibility with markets and create fiscal space for investment in public services.
- Debate on whether 2003-07 deficits reduced fiscal space to respond to 2008-09 Great Recession.
- Should the Great Moderation have been used to accumulate larger surpluses?
- But nobody knew 2008 was coming.





Thank you for your attention