Can Small Language Models Reliably Resist Jailbreak Attacks? A Comprehensive Evaluation

Wenhui Zhang[†]   Huiyu Xu[†]   Zhibo Wang[†]   Zeqing He[†]   Ziqi Zhu[†]   Kui Ren[†]

[†]The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University, P. R. China

{wenhuizhang1222, huiyuxu, zhibowang, hezeqing99, zq_zju, kuiren}@zju.edu.cn

ABSTRACT

Small language models (SLMs) have emerged as promising alternatives to large language models (LLMs) due to their low computational demands, enhanced privacy guarantees and comparable performance in specific domains through light-weight fine-tuning. Deploying SLMs on edge devices, such as smartphones and smart vehicles, has become a growing trend. However, the security implications of SLMs have received less attention than LLMs, particularly regarding jailbreak attacks, which is recognized as one of the top threats of LLMs by the OWASP. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of SLMs' vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. Through systematically evaluation on 63 SLMs from 15 mainstream SLM families against 8 state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, we demonstrate that 47.6% of evaluated SLMs show high susceptibility to jailbreak attacks (ASR > 40%) and 38.1% of them can not even resist direct harmful query (ASR > 50%). We further analyze the reasons behind the vulnerabilities and identify four key factors: model size, model architecture, training datasets and training techniques. Moreover, we assess the effectiveness of three prompt-level defense methods and find that none of them achieve perfect performance, with detection accuracy varying across different SLMs and attack methods. Notably, we point out that the inherent security awareness play a critical role in SLM security, and models with strong security awareness could timely terminate unsafe response with little reminder. Building upon the findings, we highlight the urgent need for security-by-design approaches in SLM development and provide valuable insights for building more trustworthy SLM ecosystem.

1 INTRODUCTION

Small language models (SLMs) are characterized by compact architecture and less model parameters (typically between 100MB and 5B [55]). Due to their low computational cost, privacy guarantee by enabling local deployment and comparable performance to LLMs in specific domains through light-weight fine-tuning on high-quality domain-specific datasets [2, 97], SLMs are emerging as promising alternatives of large language models (LLMs), especially for resource-constrained environments such as desktops, smartphones, and even wearables. For example, the recent iOS system have introduced Apple Intelligence [70], which seamlessly integrates built-in SLMs into the operating system so as to improve the user experience while ensuring user privacy.

As SLMs are increasingly favored in different tasks [85], it is significant to study the security of SLMs. Jailbreak attack is recognized as one of the top threats of LLMs by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [61]. In jailbreak attack, the attacker aims to craft sophisticated jailbreak prompts to bypass the model's safeguards, thereby inducing it to respond to malicious query (referred to as jailbreak question) and generate harmful or toxic content that violates the usage policies established by model providers. To achieve this, the attacker may employ various jailbreak methods, such as human-crafted methods [50, 72, 83], gradient-based methods [73, 100] and etc. And the jailbreak question can be categorized into different categories, such as "Illegal Activity", "Adult Content" and other prohibited topics. Jailbreak attacks pose severe risks to model security and may facilitate illegal activities in real world. For example, in the cybertruck explosion outside Trump hotel in January 2025, the criminal was found to obtain relevant information by jailbreaking ChatGPT [58], demonstrating the dangerous implications of jailbreak attacks.

There are a lot of works exploring jailbreak attack on LLMs, but almost no one has paid attention to jailbreak attacks on SLMs, which are different from LLM jailbreak in four folds. Firstly, SLMs are designed to "make machine intelligence accessible and affordable to anyone, anywhere, at any time" [55]. The widespread deployment lowers the attack threshold as attackers could easily use IoT devices such as smartphones to conduct jailbreak attack. Besides, it is more difficult to track attackers if they use locally deployed SLMs instead of API calls. Secondly, compared to LLMs, SLMs are more suitable for privacy sensitive task due to their cost-effective customization and privacy guarantee. These tasks are safety-critical at the same time and may cause more serious results when suffering jailbreak attacks. Thirdly, the training techniques of SLMs and LLMs are usually different. For example, in order to reduce the number of parameters, SLMs usually go through stages such as quantization, knowledge distillation, and pruning, which may introduce new security threats. Besides, SLMs usually prioritize helpfulness over harmlessness during training and some SLMs like TinyLLaMA have poor generation capabilities, which makes it easy for SLMs to produce low-quality jailbreak replies, as shown in Figure 1. Finally, SLM predominantly deployed on edge devices, present unique security challenges due to inherent computational and memory constraints. These resource limitations fundamentally hinder the implementation of defense mechanisms, particularly in establishing effective safeguard frameworks against adversarial prompts. As illustrated in Figure 1, no content moderation system is deployed in SLMs, thus the jailbreak outputs of SLMs could not

Figure 1: The differences in jailbreaking LLMs and SLMs. LLMs like ChatGPT are usually robust against direct harmful queries but may generate detailed response when facing jailbreak prompts. However, the unsafe response may be blocked by content moderation. In contrast, SLMs are relatively vulnerable to jailbreak and even comply with direct harmful request. Though they may generate repetitive jailbreak responses, the challenge of implementing guardrails on edge devices still pose certain risks.

be blocked timely. Given these differences and the severe impact of jailbreak attacks, it is significant to understand the vulnerabilities of SLMs to jailbreak attacks so as to ensure their secure and ethical applications in real-world contexts.

To fill these gaps, in this paper, we conduct the first comprehensive assessment of the vulnerabilities of SLMs to jailbreak attacks. We investigate the following key research questions:

RQ1: How vulnerable are different SLMs to jailbreak attacks? And how do these vulnerabilities change when facing different jailbreak methods and attack categories? (Section 4)

RQ2: How do different factors (e.g., size, training techniques) affect the vulnerabilities of SLMs to jailbreak attacks? (Section 5)

RQ3: To what extent can existing defense mechanisms effectively defend against jailbreak attacks, and how do these mechanisms perform in different SLMs? (Section 6)

We thus develop SJBench, a generalized, full automated, and scalable framework to systematically evaluate the vulnerability of SLMs to jailbreak attack. Our framework tests the vulnerability of a given SLM across three dimensions: (1) robustness, including overall vulnerabilities as well as specific vulnerabilities to different attack methods and attack categories; (2) diversity of output; (3) fluency of output. An overview of our framework is shown in Figure 2. Specifically, we first systematically surveyed existing SLMs and selected 15 widely used SLM families from Huggingface, comprising 63 models with parameter size ranging from 100M to 7B. Note that there are still no unified definition for the size of small models, but we found that most SLMs families provide 7B versions of the model [1, 3, 9, 20, 79], so we use 7B as the upper limit of the size of the evaluation models to explore the effect of parameter size. These SLMs all support English and we use the instruction versions instead of base versions as base versions exhibit poor user request comprehension capability and are unsuitable for real-world applications. Then, we reviewed existing jailbreak attack methods and categorized them into two types: white-box and black-box methods,

from which we selected 8 widely adopted jailbreak methods as our attack methods, including 5 white-box and 3 black-box techniques. For jailbreak questions, we adopt the class-balanced dataset of 70 jailbreak questions created by Xu et al. [90], which spans 14 risk categories derived from the usage policies of different model providers [4, 60]. This dataset ensures a comprehensive analysis of the vulnerabilities of SLMs across diverse risk scenarios. For evaluation metrics of SLM outputs, We consider the three dimensions mentioned above: harmfulness, diversity, and fluency. For harmfulness, we mainly use Attack Success Rate (ASR). For diversity, we measure repetition rate, lexical diversity, and Self-BLEU. And for fluency, we assess perplexity, readability, and coherence score. The detailed settings will be introduced in 4.

Using the 8 selected jailbreak attack methods and the class-balanced dataset, we evaluate the vulnerabilities of these SLMs against jailbreak attack and systematically analyze the experimental results from three dimensions, including the specific vulnerability of SLMs when facing different attack methods and risk categories, different factors that effect the vulnerability of SLMs to jailbreak, the performance of existing defense mechanisms in defending SLMs. Our findings highlight a critical gap in the security of SLMs. From what we've seen, half of evaluated SLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, with average ASR greater than 0.4, and 38.1% of them show an ASR of more than 0.5 when faced with direct harmful query. Only a small number of SLMs demonstrated relatively good resistance to jailbreak attacks, such as Alibaba's Qwen series and Google's Gemma series. In addition, we observed that different SLMs also exhibit varying vulnerabilities when facing different attack methods and risk categories. For example, recurrentgemma-2b-it demonstrates an ASR of 0.8 in the "Illegal Activity" category, which significantly decreases to 0.2 when facing the "Hate Speech" category.

Furthermore, we analyze the potential factors behind these results and found that different training data and training techniques

Figure 2: Overview of our evaluation framework. We evaluate the jailbreak vulnerabilities of 15 SLM families including 63 SLMs against 8 mainstream jailbreak attack methods with a class-balanced dataset (70 questions).

play a significant role in determining the security of SLMs, whereas the model size has little correlation with their vulnerability. For example, expanding the model's corpus may increase the risk of jailbreak attacks, while moderate degree of sparse may improve robustness. Notably, supervised fine-tuning (SFT) models demonstrate 10-40% better robustness compared to their DPO-optimized (Direct Preference Optimization) counterparts at most time, which is contrary to expectations and we will explain this phenomenon in section 4. Besides, novel model architecture such as recursively design(recurrentgemma-2b-it) may significantly improve the model's robustness. In addition, through evaluating diversity and fluency of jailbreak responses, we found that some SLMs (e.g., the TinyLlama series) may output repetitive harmful sentences due to limited generation capability. Finally, we test the effectiveness of three prompt-level defense methods in SLMs and found that none of them could achieve perfect performance in all SLMs across different attack methods. This reveals the limitations of existing defense measures and underscores the urgent need for SLM developers to place greater emphasis on security during SLMs design and training.

Contibutions. To our knowledge, this is the first large-scale, exhaustive study of SLMs' vulnerabilities against jailbreak attack. Our observations, findings, and insights will be beneficial for SLM developers to develop future SLMs and their supporting guardrails. To summarize, our contributions are as follows:

- We develop a framework to systematically assess the vulnerability of SLMs to jailbreak attacks. This framework encompasses 14 risk categories and 8 attack methods, and it covers 15 SLM families consists of 63 SLMs, ensuring a thorough and diverse evaluation.
- We conduct evaluations on these models and perform a systematic analysis of different factors that influence the vulnerability of SLMs to jailbreak attacks. Our results show most SLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks and different training data and techniques contributes to their security differences.
- We discuss implications for SLMs developers, regulators and users, and offer practical guidance on enhancing the security

and robustness of SLMs in training and inference phrase, which contributes to building more secure, robust, and trustworthy SLM-driven real-world applications.

2 RELATED WORK

SLMs. While large language models (LLMs) have received significant attention in both academia and industry due to their emergent abilities, they are often less practical for real-world applications that require domain-specific knowledge or efficient deployment on low-power devices due to high computational demands, inference latency, and unsuitability for specialized domains without extensive fine-tuning. Therefore, small language models (SLMs) have emerged as a promising alternative to LLMs to address these limitations [55, 85]. Unlike LLMs, which often have billions of parameters and are typically deployed in data centers and cloud environments, SLMs typically range from 100MB to 5B parameters [55], making them more lightweight and efficient for edge computing scenarios, such as smartphones, wearable devices, and IoT gadgets. The local deployment of SLMs lows the inference latency and provide better privacy guarantee for users. Besides, SLMs can achieve comparable and even better performance than LLMs in specific domains through light-weight fine-tuning, such as science [97], medicine [2], law and finance [93]. Recent advancements in SLM architectures, training datasets, and deployment techniques have significantly improved their performance and applicability.

SLMs are predominantly based on the Transformer architecture, with a focus on decoder-only structure [55] because it is particularly well-suited for autoregressive text generation tasks, where each token is generated sequentially based on previously generated tokens, ensuring coherent and contextually relevant output. The main components of the Transformer are self-attention mechanisms, feedforward networks (FFN) and layer normalization. According to the statistical analysis of Lu et al.[55], recent SLMs tend to adopt group-query attention(GQA), gated FFN with SiLU activation, an intermediate FFN ratio between 2 and 8, and RMS normalization as their advantage in optimizing model performance and inference efficiency. Additionally, innovative techniques such as parameter sharing and layer-wise parameter sharing have been employed to

optimize memory usage and inference speed [55]. For instance, MobiLLaMA shares the weights of the FFN of all the transformer blocks, allowing for more efficient use of the available parameter budget.

Lu et al. summarized 12 commonly used datasets for training SLMs, which are The Pile [28], FineWeb-Edu [63], StarCoder [49], Cosmopedia [13], RefinedWeb [64], RedPajama [19], Dolma [76], WuDaoCorpora [94], RoBERTa CCNewsV2 [53], PushShift ().io Reddit [11], DCLM-baseline [48], CulturaX [59]. The Pile was widely used at first, but was gradually replaced by RefinedWeb and RedPajama. Furthermore, recent studies highlight the importance of high-quality, filtered datasets such as FineWeb-Edu [63] and DCLM [48], which have been shown to enhance SLM capabilities in tasks like commonsense reasoning and problem-solving [55]. These datasets often employ model-based filtering to extract high-quality data from large corpora, proving more effective than relying solely on data quantity.

Existing training methods for SLMs can be categorized into two main approaches: training from scratch and deriving from LLMs. The first approach is similar to the training process of LLMs and typically involves two stages: pre-training and fine-tuning. Pre-training extracts general features and knowledge from large-scale datasets using significant computational resources, while fine-tuning focuses on smaller, task-specific datasets to enhance the model's capabilities for specific tasks. The second approach focuses on deriving SLMs from existing LLMs through techniques such as pruning [26, 35, 56], knowledge distillation [37, 39, 45], and quantization [34, 44, 91]. Pruning reduces the model size by removing unimportant neurons or connections, distillation transfers knowledge from a larger teacher model to a smaller student model, and quantization reduces parameter precision to decrease computational costs. These methods aim to enhance the efficiency of SLMs while maintaining their performance in various tasks.

Jailbreak Attack. Jailbreak attack aims to induce the target model to "jailbreak" (i.e., bypass) its internal safety restrictions and respond to malicious queries that violate ethical guidelines. Early research primarily focused on human jailbreak attacks, where adversaries manually crafts a deceptive jailbreak prompt template and inserts harmful questions into the template to obtain jailbreak prompts. Recent advancements have shifted toward automated jailbreak through various optimization paradigms. For example, Zou et al. [100] pioneered to leverage the gradient information of the target model to optimize an adversarial suffix, which will then be appended to the jailbreak question to elicit affirmative harmful response such as "Sure, here is a tutorial for how to make a bomb ...". Liu et al. [52] used genetic algorithms to optimize jailbreak templates. Chao et al. [17] used an attacker LLM to iteratively refine jailbreak prompts based on the feedback from the target model and the judge model. In addition, some methods exploit the long-tail distribution of safety-aligned data and employ the less common form such as low-resource languages [24], codes [42] and ciphers [95] to construct jailbreak prompts, thereby circumventing the model's security alignment mechanism.

To defend against jailbreak attack, researchers have proposed various methods, which can be classified into prompt-level interventions and model-level enhancements. Prompt-level defense aims to intervent the input prompt and can be further divided into prompt detection, prompt perturbation, and safety guidance. Prompt detection focuses on identifying harmful prompts. For example, Jain et al. [41] proposed to use perplexity to filter unnatural adversarial prompt. Prompt perturbation [16, 71] modifies the input prompt to disrupt jailbreak features, which leverage the low robustness of jailbreak queries compared to benign queries. Safety guidance [88] adds safety reminders like "You are a responsible model" in system prompt or input context to remind the model to generate responsible response. Model-level defense focus on the intrinsic robustness of the model. For example, most models will undergo safety alignment after training so as to align with human values, and researchers have developed various alignment methods such as RLHF [10] and DPO [68]. Furthermore, adversarial training [27, 41] is a commonly used method to improve the model robustness, where the model is fine-tuned with curated (malicious prompt, safe response) pairs. In addition, some researchers introduces post-hoc interventions, such as manipulate the output logits [51] or directly refine the potential harmful output [43], ensuring final response meets safety standards.

Researchers have developed many benchmarks to systematically measure the robustness of LLMs to jailbreak attack. For example, Zou et al. [100] proposed AdvBench, which contains 520 unsafe behaviors. Mazeika et al. [57] proposed HarmBench, which systematically measured 33 LLMs using 18 jailbreak attack methods, and fine-tuned a 13B model to evaluate the jailbreak results. Zhou et al. [99] proposed the EasyJailbreak framework, which uses four basic components including Slector, Mutator, Constraint, and Evaluator, to build jailbreak attacks, thereby simplifying the construction and evaluation process of jailbreak attacks. However, these benchmarks predominantly focus on the security risks of LLMs, without considering the unique vulnerability of SLMs to jailbreak attacks. This paper aims to bridge this gap by conducting a comprehensive evaluation of SLM robustness against jailbreak attacks, so as to better understand their security limitations and inform future improvements.

3 THREAT MODEL

In this work, we focus exclusively on jailbreak attacks against SLMs, where adversaries craft adversarial prompts to circumvent ethical safeguards and elicit harmful outputs such as violent content and guides for illegal activities. It is important to note that We explicitly exclude other forms of attacks, such as prompt injection attacks (aimed at unauthorized command execution), sponge attacks (designed to exhaust computational resources) and privacy attacks (e.g., training data extraction or membership inference). These threats operate under distinct adversarial objectives and methodologies, warranting separate analysis.

In jailbreak attack, the adversary aims to induce the target model to respond to a specific harmful question and generate harmful outputs that violate predefined model usage policies. To achieve this, they may adopt various techniques which can be categorized into white-box and black-box attacks according to the access to the target model. In white-box attack, the adversary has access to internal model information such as the architecture, training data and gradient information. In contrast, in black-box attack,

Affiliation	Model	Size	Date	Training Datasets	Training Techniques
DataBricks	Dolly v1 [20]	6B	2023.3	Pile [28]; Stanford Alpaca [78]	RoPE, Fine-tuning, Deepspeed ZeRO 3
	Dolly v2 [21]	3B; 7B	2023.4	Pile [28]; Databricks-dolly-15k [21]	Fine-tuning
StabilityAI	StableLM [5]	3B	2023.4	RefinedWeb [64]; RedPajama [19]; The Pile [28]; Star-Coder [49]	MHA; SiLU; Fine-tuning; DPO; Self-knowledge; RoPE; LayerNorm; no Biases
	StableLM 2 [12]	1.6B	2024.2	RefinedWeb [64], subsets of the Pile [28], RedPajama [19], the Stack [46], OpenWebText [29], OpenWebMath [62], and parts of CulturaX [59]	RoPE; LayerNorm; no Biases; Multi-stage infinite scheduler; SFT; DPO; Self-knowledge
Alibaba	Qwen 1 [9]	1.8B; 7B	2023.9	Unknown	MHA; RoPE; SwiGLU; RMSNorm
	Qwen 1.5 [9]	0.5B; 1.8B; 4B; 7B	2024.2	Unknown	MHA; RoPE; SwiGLU; RMSNorm; Multilingual support
	Qwen 2 [92]	0.5B;1.5B; 7B	2024.6	Unknown	GQA; RoPE; SwiGLU; RMSNorm; Multilingual support
	Qwen 2.5 [92]	0.5B; 1.5B; 3B; 7B	2024.9	Unknown	GQA; RoPE; SwiGLU; RMSNorm; Multilingual support; Larger corpus
Meituan	MobileLLaMA [18]	1.4B; 2.7B	2023.12	RedPajama v1 [19]	RoPE; RMSNorm; SwiGLU; Deep ZERO 1
StabilityAI	TinyLlama [98]	1.1B	2024.1	SlimPajama [75] and StarCoder [49]	GQA, SiLU, FSDP, Flash Attention [22], xFormers [47]
H2O	H2O-Danube [74]	1.8B	2024.1	Unknown (1T tokens)	Sliding window,RoPE,GQA,RMSNorm
	H2O-Danube2 [74]	1.8B	2024.4	Unknown (3T tokens)	Three different training stages with different data mixes
	H2O-Danube3 [66]	500M; 4B	2024.7	Unknown (4T tokens for 500M, 6T tokens for 4B)	Three different training stages with different data mixes
AllenAI	OLMo [30]	7B	2024.2	Dolma [76]	SwiGLU; RoPE; Non-parameteric Layer Norm
MBZUAI	MobiLlama [82]	0.5B; 1.2B	2024.2	LLM360 Amber [54] (LLM360 Amber includes Arxiv, Book, C4, Refined-Web, StarCoder, StackExchange, and Wikipedia)	GQA; SwiGLU; Parameter-sharing
Google	Gemma [79]	2B; 7B	2024.3	Unknown (3T tokens for 2B and 6T tokens for 7B)	MHA, RoPE, GELU$_{tanh}$
	Gemma 1.1 [79]	2B; 7B	2024.3	(3T tokens for 2B and 6T tokens for 7B)	MHA, RoPE, GELU$_{tanh}$
	RecurrentGemma [15]	2B	2024.4	Unknown (2T tokens)	Unknown
	Gemma 2 [80]	2B	2024.7	Unknown(2T tokens)	GQA; RoPE; GELU$_{tanh}$; Alternating Local and Global Attention; Logit Soft-Capping; RMSNorm for Pre and Post-Normalization
Tsinghua Univ.	MiniCPM [40]	1.2B; 2.4B	2024.4	Dolma [76]; C4 [69]; Pile [28]; stack [46]; StarCoder [49]; UltraChat [25]; OssInstruct [86]; EvolInstruct [89]	Warmup-Stable-Decay (WSD) learning rate scheduler, SFT / DPO
	MiniCPM3 [40]	4B	2024.9	Unknown	Unknown
Microsoft	Phi-3 [1]	3.8B	2024.4	Scaled-up dataset from phi-2 (3.4T tokens)	MHA, SiLU, RoPE, FlashAttention, Deep ZeRO Stage 2
	Phi-3.5 [1]	3.8B	2024.4	more multilingual and long-text data (4.9T tokens)	Multilingual; Vision; MHA, SiLU, RoPE, FlashAttention, ZeRO 2
TensorOpera	Fox-1 [81]	1.6B	2024.6	Unknown (3T tokens)	GQA; Deep architecture
HuggingFace	SmolLM [7]	135M; 360M; 1.7B	2024.7	smollm-corpus [14]	GQA, trapezoidal LR scheduler
	SmolLM2 [6]	135M; 360M; 1.7B	2025.2	Cosmopedia v2; FineWeb-Edu; Stack-Edu; FineMath; DCLM	Multi-stage training; Warmup-Stable-Decay (WSD) learning rate scheduler
Meta	Llama 3.2 [3]	1B; 3B	2024.9	Unknown (9T tokens)	GQA, SiLU, Multilingual Text and code, Shared embedding, Pruning, Distillation, SFT, RLHF, RS, DPO
DeepSeek	DeepSeek-R1 [33]	1.5B; 7B	2025.1	Unknown	SFT, RL

Table 1: Details of SLMs used in our experiment.

the attacker interact solely via API and can only access the model output. Our evaluation framework accommodates representative techniques from both categories as detailed in Section 4.

The harmful question is the core objective of adversary in the scenario of jailbreak. A prototypical example is "How to make a bomb". If the target model provides detailed steps, the adversary may leverage these information to conduct illegal activities, thereby posing significant threats to public safety(e.g. the Cybertruck explosion outside Trump Tower [58]). In our evaluation, we aim to cover as many categories of harmful questions as possible, so we consolidated the usage policies from various model providers and identified 14 risk categories, which will be described in detail in Section 4.

For the target SLMs, we evaluate exclusively instruction-tuned SLMs (e.g., llama3.2-1B-instruct, Qwen-1.8B-chat) rather than base pretrained models. The reason is that: (1) Base models are generally not suitable for chat scenarios and often generate repetitive or low-quality responses; (2) Instruction tuning significantly improves conversational quality and safety alignment.

4 VULNERABILITY OF SLMS AGAINST JAILBREAK (RQ1)

To answer research question **RQ1**, we aim to quantitatively measure the vulnerability of mainstream SLMs against varying jailbreak attacks. We first introduce the evaluation settings in detail, including the selected SLMs, jailbreak methods and jailbreak dataset in Section 4.1. To analyze SLMs' responses to jailbreak attacks in a fine-grained way, we propose comprehensive evaluation metrics covering effectiveness, diversity, and fluency in Section 4.1. Building upon these metrics, we present the evaluation results to reveal the unique vulnerabilities of SLMs to jailbreak attacks. In Section 4.2, we first compare the effectiveness of mainstream jailbreak attacks across different SLMs to investigate whether existing SLMs are vulnerable to jailbreaks. In Section 4.3, we further analyze the vulnerability of these SLMs across different risk categories to investigate whether SLMs exhibit distinct vulnerability depending on the risk category they are exposed to. To better understand how SLMs respond to different jailbreak attacks, we finally analyze the quality of their responses when subjected to jailbreak attacks in Section 4.4.

4.1 Evaluation Settings

SLMs. To make our evaluation more practical, we choose existing mainstream SLMs from Huggingface based on the following criteria: (1) **Architecture**. We focus on decoder-only transformer architecture due to their superior performance and wide adoption in real-world applications [55], excluding transformer variants like RWKV [65] and Mamba [31]. (2) **Model source.** We focus on open-source SLMs (i.e., available on HuggingFace) to fit popular jailbreak attacks both in black-box setting (i.e., GPTFuzzer) and white-box setting (i.e., GCG). (3) **Model size.** Based on our previous definition of SLMs, we focus on SLMs with parameters ranging from 100MB to 7B. (4) **Language support**. We only consider SLMs supporting English tasks because the mainstream language used for current model training is still English. (5) **Model version.** We consider only the instruction versions of SLMs, as base versions exhibit poor user request comprehension capability and are unsuitable for real-world applications. In total, we collect 15 families of SLMs, covering 63 models as detailed in Table 1. For all evaluated SLMs, we use their default system prompt and disable random sampling during generation to ensure result reproducibility.

Jailbreak Method For white-box attack, we include GCG [100], AutoPrompt [73], PEZ [87], GBDA [32] and UAT [84]. They all utilize the gradient information of the target model to optimize an adversarial suffix but with differences in the specific implementation. GCG and AutoPrompt optimize the token-level adversarial suffix by adjusting token sequences to increase the likelihood of a target positive output (i.e., "Sure, here is ..."). While GCG selects a series of candidate tokens and adjusts them using model gradients, AutoPrompt employs a different strategy for candidate selection, emphasizing the most optimal adversarial sequence. PEZ uses a straight-through estimator and nearest-neighbor projection, while GBDA relies on the Gumbel-softmax distribution for optimizing hard tokens. UAT updates each token using a first-order Taylor approximation. For these methods, we adhere to the official implementations and set the suffix length as 20 and optimization step as 500 for fair comparison [100].

For black-box attack, we include HumanJailbreaks [72], and PAP [96]. HumanJailbreaks insert the harmful question into a fixed set of in-the-wild human-crafted jailbreak templates to circumvent the safety guardrails. PAP treats models as human-like communicators and use a fine-tuned paraphraser to curate jailbreak prompts based on 40 pre-defined persuasive strategies. For HumanJailbreaks method, we follow the settings in HarmBench [57] and randomly select 5 from 114 templates for each jailbreak question. For PAP method, since the fine-tuned paraphraser is not publicly available, we use the in-context version of the official GitHub repository which selected the top-5 effective persuasion strategies to mutate jailbreak prompt with Vicuna-13B-v1.5 as paraphraser. Besides, we also take vanilla harmful query (i.e., DirectRequest) as a baseline, aiming to test the robustness of SLMs to direct harmful question.

Jailbreak Dataset In order to conduct a comprehensive evaluation, we use a category-balanced dataset created by Xu et al. [90], which categorized harmful risks into 14 groups according to the usage policies of different model providers [4, 60]. More specifically, they constructed 5 questions for each category, resulting in $14 \times 5 = 70$

1: Illegal Activity	6: Economic Harm	11: Legal Opinion
2: Children Harm	7: Fraud	12: Financial Advice
3: Hate Speech	8: Pornography	13: Health Consulation
4: Malware	9: Political Lobbying	14: Gov Decision
5: Physical Harm	10: Privacy Violence	

Figure 3: The 14 jailbreak categories are derived from the usage policies of OpenAI and Meta.

harmful questions. The detailed category classification is shown in Figure 3.

Evaluation Metrics In our experiment, we evaluated the jailbreak results from three aspects: harmfulness, diversity and fluency. For harmfulness, we report Attack Success Rate (ASR). The ASR is evaluated by the Llama-2-13B classifier in HarmBench [57] as it has high accuracy compared to other evaluators [57], which classifies the model response to 0 (safe) and 1 (unsafe). We calculate ASR as $\text{ASR} = \frac{N_{jailbroken}}{N_{total}}$, where $N_{jailbroken}$ denotes the number of jailbreak queries that successfully bypass the model's safeguards to elicit harmful responses, and N_{total} represents the total number of question set (70 in our evaluation). Specifically, for attack methods such as HumanJailbreaks that have multiple jailbreak prompts for a single malicious question, we average the results of all jailbreak prompts for the same question.

Diversity metrics aim to measure the diversity of the model's jailbreak responses and we consider three metrics here: (1) **Repetition Rate**, which measures the frequency of repeated n-grams: $\text{Repetition Rate} = \frac{\text{Number of repeated n-grams}}{\text{Total number of n-grams in the response}}$. And we set n = 3 in our evaluation; (2) **Lexical Diversity**, reflecting vocabulary richness: $\text{Lexical Diversity} = \frac{\text{Number of unique words}}{\text{Total number of words in the response}}$; (3) **Self-BLEU**, measuring the similarity between responses. Specifically, it computes the average BLEU score between a given response and other references.

For fluency, we consider three metrics here: (1) **Perplexity**, evaluating the next word prediction accuracy of the language model: $\text{Perplexity} = 2^{-\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\log_2 P(w_i|w_1,w_2,...,w_{i-1})}$. We calculate it using the GPT-2 model. (2) **Readability**, which evaluates the ease with which text can be read and understood. We use the Flesch Reading Ease score, calculated as: $\text{Readability} = 206.835 - 1.015 \times \frac{\text{Total words}}{\text{Total sentences}} - 84.6 \times \frac{\text{Total syllables}}{\text{Total words}}$ (3) **Coherence Score**, which measures the logical flow and consistency between sentences. We compute the average cosine similarity between consecutive sentence embeddings as a proxy for coherence: $\text{Coherence Score} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N-1}\text{CosineSimilarity}(S_i,S_{i+1})}{N-1}$.

4.2 Vulnerability against different jailbreak methods

To investigate whether existing SLMs are vulnerable to popular jailbreak attacks, we evaluate 15 SLM families against 8 mainstream jailbreak attack methods.

Overall performance. In Table 2, we present the overall performance of these SLMs. The results demonstrate that 47.6% of the evaluated SLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreak attack, with an average ASR of more than 0.4. And a considerable part of them (38.1%)

	Black-box			White-box					Average
	DirectRequest	HumanJailbreaks	PAP	GCG	AutoPrompt	PEZ	GBDA	UAT	
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct	0.214	0.074	0.36	0.429	0.186	0.086	0.131	0.114	0.199
Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	0.271	0.169	0.44	0.6	0.357	0.2	0.189	0.286	0.314
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	0.271	0.289	0.203	0.314	0.286	0.169	0.277	0.329	0.267
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	0.514	0.36	0.291	0.571	0.371	0.363	0.389	0.386	0.406
Qwen-1.8B-Chat	0.143	0.18	0.4	0.386	0.343	0.323	0.451	0.243	0.309
Qwen-7B-Chat	0.086	0.289	0.234	0.614	0.5	0.209	0.24	0.314	0.311
Qwen1.5-0.5B-Chat	0.114	0.231	0.363	0.514	0.514	0.483	0.449	0.471	0.392
Qwen1.5-1.8B-Chat	0.529	0.434	0.511	0.629	0.586	0.643	0.62	0.657	0.576
Qwen1.5-4B-Chat	0.114	0.297	0.411	0.571	0.4	0.2	0.417	0.414	0.353
Qwen1.5-7B-Chat	0.186	0.563	0.426	0.671	0.529	0.294	0.351	0.343	0.42
Qwen2-0.5B-Instruct	0.1	0.2	0.351	0.571	0.357	0.331	0.391	0.343	0.33
Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct	0.1	0.18	0.366	0.571	0.4	0.137	0.383	0.286	0.303
Qwen2-7B-Instruct	0.214	0.274	0.449	0.571	0.414	0.206	0.22	0.214	0.32
Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	0.129	0.149	0.363	0.557	0.414	0.326	0.506	0.443	0.361
Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	0.086	0.177	0.351	0.571	0.357	0.074	0.346	0.329	0.286
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	0.143	0.311	0.451	0.543	0.343	0.151	0.309	0.3	0.319
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	0.257	0.406	0.44	0.614	0.471	0.257	0.323	0.343	0.389
Gemma-2B-it	0.143	0.011	0.389	0.443	0.457	0.437	0.449	0.486	0.352
Gemma-7B-it	0.271	0.157	0.414	0.3	0.214	0.271	0.303	0.243	0.272
Gemma-1.1-2B-it	0.243	0.046	0.38	0.4	0.343	0.44	0.466	0.443	0.345
Gemma-1.1-7B-it	0.214	0.183	0.32	0.329	0.243	0.306	0.351	0.186	0.266
Gemma-2-2B-it	0.114	0.377	0.271	-	-	0.154	0.194	-	0.222
RecurrentGemma-2B-it	0.186	0.02	0.343	-	-	0.066	0.083	-	0.14
Phi-3-mini-4k-Instruct	0.143	0.157	0.291	0.471	0.186	0.177	0.203	0.171	0.225
Phi-3-mini-128k-Instruct	0.171	0.291	0.303	0.443	0.243	0.163	0.189	0.2	0.25
Phi-3.5-mini-Instruct	0.2	0.28	0.326	0.457	0.271	0.217	0.243	0.2	0.274
MiniCPM-1B-sft-bf16	0.229	0.374	0.429	0.243	0.214	0.437	0.526	0.414	0.358
MiniCPM-S-1B-sft	0.214	-	0.386	0.171	0.186	0.477	0.34	0.4	0.311
MiniCPM-2B-sft-bf16	0.186	0.36	0.389	0.129	0.186	0.44	0.366	0.243	0.287
MiniCPM-2B-dpo-bf16	0.457	0.543	0.497	0.5	0.471	0.706	0.62	0.514	0.538
MiniCPM3-4B	0.157	0.36	0.329	0.086	0.114	0.129	0.091	0.157	0.178
H2O-Danube-1.8B-SFT	0.614	0.391	0.4	0.671	0.6	0.571	0.56	0.471	0.535
H2O-Danube-1.8B-Chat	0.6	0.534	0.494	0.657	0.629	0.617	0.654	0.657	0.605
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-SFT	0.414	0.389	0.449	0.686	0.657	0.571	0.606	0.629	0.55
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-Chat	0.514	0.58	0.477	0.729	0.757	0.671	0.654	0.7	0.635
H2O-Danube3-500M-Chat	0.629	0.363	0.463	0.629	0.586	0.606	0.6	0.571	0.556
H2O-Danube3-4B-Chat	0.486	0.351	0.531	0.743	0.614	0.431	0.503	0.514	0.522
SmoLM-135M-Instruct	0.486	0.406	0.26	0.4	0.414	0.4	0.431	0.386	0.398
SmoLM-360M-Instruct	0.686	0.649	0.411	0.629	0.629	0.663	0.494	0.629	0.599
SmoLM-1.7B-Instruct	0.714	0.717	0.503	0.686	0.657	0.711	0.677	0.7	0.671
SmoLM2-135M-Instruct	0.471	0.274	0.306	0.314	0.429	0.38	0.351	0.414	0.367
SmoLM2-360M-Instruct	0.529	0.311	0.389	0.586	0.571	0.506	0.646	0.6	0.517
SmoLM2-1.7B-Instruct	0.443	0.42	0.426	0.729	0.686	0.326	0.614	0.543	0.523
StableLM-Zephyr-3B	0.3	0.543	0.411	0.6	0.6	0.386	0.409	0.4	0.456
StableLM-2-1.6B-Chat	0.757	0.591	0.503	0.686	0.757	0.677	0.686	0.743	0.675
StableLM-2-Zephyr-1.6B	0.614	0.517	0.457	0.729	0.729	0.543	0.64	0.629	0.607
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.1	0.7	0.309	0.397	0.457	0.543	0.557	0.58	-	0.506
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.2	0.471	0.183	0.251	0.286	0.286	0.18	0.171	-	0.261
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.3	0.729	0.38	0.394	0.486	0.443	0.509	0.494	-	0.491
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.4	0.514	0.331	0.38	0.6	0.543	0.54	0.569	-	0.497
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.5	0.6	0.283	0.36	0.471	0.371	0.586	0.526	-	0.457
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.6	0.671	0.486	0.474	0.686	0.586	0.674	0.683	-	0.609
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v1.0	0.714	0.597	0.477	0.586	0.743	0.706	0.74	0.7	0.658
MobileLLaMA-1.4B-Chat	0.771	0.406	0.397	0.6	0.514	0.537	0.474	0.586	0.536
MobileLLaMA-2.7B-Chat	0.714	0.529	0.414	0.6	0.686	0.494	0.58	0.586	0.575
MobiLlama-0.5B-Chat	0.529	0.023	0.18	0.443	0.5	0.437	0.463	0.471	0.381
MobiLlama-1B-Chat	0.643	0.091	0.34	0.571	0.514	0.523	0.477	0.571	0.466
Fox-1-1.6B-Instruct-v0.1	0.243	0.1	0.397	0.571	0.429	0.157	0.374	0.229	0.312
Dolly-v1-6b	0.571	-	0.354	0.514	0.614	0.537	0.563	-	0.526
Dolly-v2-3b	0.757	0.397	0.36	0.5	0.486	0.514	0.511	0.514	0.505
Dolly-v2-7b	0.671	0.494	0.454	0.443	0.471	0.529	0.491	0.529	0.51
OLMo-7B-SFT-hf	0.329	0.26	0.414	0.643	0.571	0.246	0.26	-	0.389
OLMo-7B-Instruct-hf	0.457	0.586	0.503	0.671	0.614	0.471	0.474	-	0.539

Table 2: The attack effectiveness (i.e., ASR) of different jailbreak attacks across 15 SLM families.

show strong susceptibility to DirectRequest (ASR > 0.5). Only few SLM families are relatively safer, such as Gemma family, with an average ASR between 0.1 and 0.35. To more intuitively compare the robustness of different SLMs when facing different attack methods, we present the heatmap of vulnerabilities across 15 SLM families against 8 attack methods in Figure 4. Notably, these SLMs can be divided into two groups according to their robustness. The first group (hereafter referred to as **Group I**), including Llama3, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen, Qwen, Gemma, Phi3 and MiniCPM family, shows great robustness against most attack methods (average ASR < 0.3). The second group (hereafter referred to as **Group II**), located in the lower half of the heatmap, shows darker colors and is vulnerable to almost all attack methods (average ASR > 0.5).


Figure 4: The heatmap of vulnerabilities across 15 SLM families against 8 jailbreak attacks.

Performance across different Jailbreak methods. To understand whether these SLMs are more vulnerable to more advanced jailbreak attacks (with complex semantics), we first compare the effectiveness of SLMs on direct queries (i.e., DirectRequest) and complex jailbreak attacks. As illustrated in Figure 5, most SLMs are more susceptible to complex jailbreak attacks compared to DirectRequest. However, we note that certain models, such as MobileLLaMA, TinyLlama and Dolly family, exhibit stronger resistance against jailbreak attacks compared to DirectRequest. Upon analyzing the response patterns of these models, we found that they tend to comply with almost all harmful prompts, rather than rejecting them with responses like "*Sorry, it is illegal to ......*". However, the jailbreak prompts often use concealed information or complex adversarial suffixes to obscure malicious intent, which may divert the attention of these SLMs to irrelevant information, resulting in a lower ASR.

We further compare the effectiveness of different jailbreak methods, and we find the most effective method is GCG, which achieves

an average ASR of over 50% across most models. Other methods, such as PAP and AutoPrompt also demonstrate relatively high effectiveness, i.e., darker color in Figure 4. However, the DirectRequest, HumanJailbreaks and PEZ methods are highly effective in models with poor security capabilities (i.e., **Group II**), but show limited performance in **Group I**. Notably, the PAP method shows a consistent ASR across nearly all models, whereas other attack methods exhibit extremely low ASR (close to 0) on certain models like MiniCPM3-4B. The reason is that PAP is particularly suitable for models with strong semantic understanding capabilities (i.e., human-like communicators) [96].

Figure 5: The average performance of 8 attack methods across 15 SLM families, compared with simple attacks (i.e., DirectRequest).

Performance across different SLMs. Overall, models in **Group I** perform well against simple attack methods such as DirectRequest, HumanJailbreaks and PEZ, but are vulnerable to high-effectiveness methods such as GCG and PAP. In particular, they are very robust against DirectRequest attack, with an ASR close to 0. At the same time, models in **Group II** perform poorly on almost all methods especially the DirectRequest method. Furthermore, some models show significant weaknesses against certain attack methods. For example, the MobiLLaMA is vulnerable to all methods except HumanJailbreaks, with an ASR of 0.1. Similarly, the Fox family is vulnerable to all methods except HumanJailbreaks and PEZ.

## 4.3 Vulnerability across different jailbreak categories

To determine whether these SLMs exhibit varying robustness across different risk categories, we compare the average ASR of SLMs for each category, as illustrated in Figure 6.

Overall Performance . We could observe that the jailbreak difficulty patterns among different risk categories can be divided into three types: High-susceptibility category, medium-susceptibility category and low-susceptibility category. The high-susceptibility categories, including *Economic Harm*, *Gov Decision* and *Political Lobbying*, consistently yield high ASR values (close to 1) across all models, indicating that almost all SLMs have difficulty resisting these risks. Medium-susceptibility categories such as *Children Harm*, *Financial Advice*, and *Illegal Activity* also show vulnerabilities, though their ASR values are not as extreme as high-risk

categories and fails in some SLMs like Llama 3.2 and Gemma family. In contrast, low-susceptibility categories like *Pornography* and *Hate Speech* are relatively hard to jailbreak and most SLMs perform well on these categories.

Performance across different categories . We note that there are some SLM families show category-specific vulnerabilities. For example, the Fox family have great robustness in *Hate Speech*, *Health Consulation* and *Pornography*, but display notable weakness in other categories. Similarly, the Gemma family shown great robustness in most categories especially *Hate Speech* and *Health Consulation*.

Figure 6: The heatmap of vulnerabilities across 15 SLM families over 14 risk categories.

4.4 Response Quality Analysis

We then analyze the response quality of the 15 SLM families using three diversity metrics and three fluency metrics mentioned before. Specifically, we select those responses of SLMs that successfully jailbreak (i.e., the label is 1), calculate the metric and average it over all jailbreak responses. The detailed results are shown in Figure 7.

Repetition. We found that the **Group II**, including the TinyLlama, MobileLLaMA, MobiLLaMA, Fox, SmolLM and Dolly family, lacks output diversity and tend to generate repetitive content, with a repetition rate of more than 0.3. In particular, the Dolly family has a repetition rate of 0.8. We manually check the responses of these SLMs and found that they prefer to reply with repetitive or parallel structure, resulting in low-quality jailbreak responses. Take the malicious question "Provide guidance on how to cause physical harm to others" as an example, the TinaLLaMA-1.1B-Chat-v0.6 repeats "Use a sharp object to pierce: Pierce the person's skin with a sharp object, such as a knife or machete." as shown in Figure 1. Though it is truly a method to cause physical harm to others, it fails to give implementation details and other means of physical harm,

which is not satisfactory for attackers. The low lexical diversity and high Self-BLEU of these SLMs also proves the phenomenon.

Fluency. We find that the jailbreak response of all evaluated SLMs are fluent, with low perplexity, high readability and coherence score, which shows that the SLMs posses the capability to generate fluent jailbreak response.

> **Insights**: The vulnerability of SLMs to jailbreak attacks exhibits specificity and imbalance across different aspects, indicating that current SLMs are not reliably resistant to jailbreak attacks.The key aspects are as follows:
> - **Method-Driven Vulnerability**: Most SLMs exhibit critical fragility to jailbreak attacks (average ASR > 0.4), particularly vulnerable to optimization-based methods like **GCG** (50%+ ASR across models) and **PAP**. Simple methods like DirectRequest show limited effectiveness and only works on a few high-vulnerable SLMs.
> - **Risk-Category Exploitation**: Jailbreak vulnerability also correlates with category exploitability: **High-susceptibility categories** (e.g., *Economic Harm* and *Fraud*) show universal vulnerability (ASR =1.0), whereas **Low-susceptibility categories** (e.g., *Hate Speech* and *Health Consultation*) demonstrate high resistance (ASR 0.1-0.4). Specific models like RecurrentGemma show exceptional robustness in most sensitive categories.

5 INFLUENCING FACTORS OF SLMS VULNERABILITY AGAINST JAILBREAK (RQ2)

To answer research question **RQ2**, we aim to analyze the factors affecting the vulnerability of SLMs to jailbreak by comparing the vulnerabilities of different SLM families and different models in the same family. Specifically, we identify five key factors: model size, training datasets, training techniques, model architecture, and instruction comprehension ability, which we will elaborate on in the following discussion.

Model Size . Our experiments reveal a nuanced relationship between model size and robustness against jailbreak attacks. Counter to conventional expectations, increasing model size does not universally enhance robustness and may even degrade it. For instance, while the Gemma family demonstrates improved robustness with scaling, the h2o-danube3 series exhibits conflicting trends, i.e., robustness improves against DirectRequest, PEZ, UAT, and GBDA methods but deteriorates slightly (↓15%) under PAP and GCG attacks. Similarly, the MobileLlama family shows scale-dependent robustness gains for DirectRequest and PEZ but minor vulnerabilities (↓20%) when exposed to remaining attacks like HumanJailbreaks and AutoPrompt. Larger SLMs exhibit up to 20% higher ASR compared to their smaller counterparts when faced with semantically meaningful jailbreak prompts (i.e., DirectRequest, HumanJailbreaks, PAP). This phenomenon is evident in h2o-danube3 family, MobiLLaMA family, MobileLLaMA family, Dolly family, and particularly the SmolLM family, where ASR escalates dramatically from SmolLM-135M (ASR=40.6%) to SmolLM-360M (ASR=64.9%) under HumanJailbreaks. We hypothesize that the increasing model size

(a) Repetition rate

(b) Lexical Diversity

(c) Self-BLEU

(d) Perplexity

(e) Readability

(f) Coherence score

Figure 7: The diversity and fluency results of the jailbreak responses for 15 SLM families. For diversity scores, we report repetition rate, lexical diversity and Self-BLEU. For fluency scores, we report perplexity, readability and coherence score.

may enhance the model's instruction-following capability, which may increase susceptibility to semantically meaningful adversarial inputs, as evidenced by Zeng et al [96].

Training Datasets . Existing SLMs are often overtrained (i.e., trained with far more tokens than Chinchilla's law [38] suggests) to deploy a powerful SLM on resource-constrained devices. Notably, the dataset scaling introduces the side effects: while expanding corpora enhances general capabilities, it may simultaneously increase jailbreak risks. For example, the model robustness against jailbreak attacks decreases progressively as the dataset grows for StableLM-Zephyr-3B, StableLM-2-Zephyr-1.6B, and StableLM-2-1.6B-chat.

Besides, multilingual training could potentially introduce or exacerbate security vulnerabilities in SLMs. For instance, the Qwen1.5 series, which added multi-language support compared to the Qwen1 series, exhibits 10%-27% higher average ASR. Specially, the Qwen1.5-1.8B-chat is the most vulnerable one among the 14 SLMs in Qwen family, with an ASR of more than 0.4 across all evaluated attack methods.

Training Methodology . As shown in figure 8, supervised fine-tuning (SFT) models demonstrate 10-40% better robustness compared to their DPO-optimized (Direct Preference Optimization) counterparts at most time. For example, MiniCPM-2B-SFT-bf16 achieves 27% lower ASR than MiniCPM-2B-DPO-bf16 against DirectRequest attacks, and similarly the OLMo-7B-SFT-hf achieves 23% lower ASR than OLMo-7B-Instruct-hf against PEZ attacks. Analysis of response patterns reveals that these DPO-optimized models frequently exhibit "compliance drift", i.e.,initially rejecting harmful requests before eventually complying, suggesting that alignment for conversational flexibility may compromise safety guardrails. Besides, knowledge distillation may increase jailbreak vulnerabilities in SLMs. For example, the DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen family are fine-tuned from Qwen 2.5 family using the reasoning data generated by DeepSeek-R1. However, the DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen family demonstrates significantly weakened security compared to

Qwen 2.5 family, particularly against DirectRequest. Specifically, the distilled 1.5B model achieves an ASR of 0.271 versus 0.086 for its base counterpart, while the distilled 7B model reaches 0.514, far exceeding 0.257 in the original model. Through response pattern analysis, we observe that nearly all of their thinking are begin with "Okay, so I need to figure out [*omitted jailbreak question*]. Hmm, where do I even start? I know that ......". This systematic failure to recognize malicious intent suggests that distillation may impair SLMs' critical capacity for harmful query identification and rejection.

However, certain innovative training techniques, such as ProSparse [77], may help mitigate these risks. For instance, MiniCPM-S-1B employed ProSparse during pre-training to achieve higher activation sparsity while maintaining comparable performance. We find this results in a 3% improvement in robustness over its dense counterparts (i.e., MiniCPM-1B-sft-bf16), aligning with pruning-based protection mechanisms[36].

Model Architecture. Some creative architecture such as recurrent architecture may demonstrate remarkable robustness advantages. For example, the RecurrentGemma-2B, built on a novel recurrent architecture named Griffin developed by Google [23], achieve low ASR in all attack methods. Specifically, it reduces ASR by 35% against PEZ and GBDA compared to its conventional transformer-based equivalent Gemma-2B-it.

Instruction Comprehension . As we observed, a few SLMs like TinyLLaMA may generate low-quality output such as repeated output and garbled characters as poor instruction comprehension and instruction-following capabilities, resulting in low ASR. Therefore, improved instruction-following capabilities may simultaneously increase vulnerability to sophisticated attacks. The SmolLM series exemplifies this hypothesis: ASR escalates from 40.6% (135M) to 64.9% (1.7B) as instruction fidelity improves. Similarly, the TinyLLaMA family demonstrates reversed safety trends despite progress in dialogue quality and reasoning capabilities compared to earlier series, with 10-20% higher ASR on PAP attack.

Figure 8: Comparison of the vulnerability (i.e., ASR) of SLMs using SFT and DPO to jailbreak attacks.

Insights: We find that, contrary to common intuition, the robustness of SLMs depends more on training details than on the model itself. Specifically, we highlight three key observations regarding influencing factors:

- **Scale-Robustness Paradox**: Increasing model size may even degrade the model robustness, specially for semantic jailbreak prompts like HumanJailbreaks (10-20% higher ASR), which may correlate with improved instruction-following capabilities. Similarly, While expanded training datasets enhance general capabilities, they may progressively degrade robustness. Typical examples include StableLM family and Qwen 1.5 family.
- **Training Techniques and Architecture**: Our results show that SFT models demonstrate 10-40% lower ASR than DPO-optimized equivalents, revealing DPO's "compliance drift" phenomenon where models initially reject then comply with harmful requests. And some innovative techniques like ProSparse and architectures like Griffin may improve model robustness to some extent, while knowledge distillation may exacerbate the security issues.
- **Safety-Capability Tradeoff**: Improved instruction following may paradoxically increase attack susceptibility as improved generation quality.

6 EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSE (RQ3)

To answer research question **RQ3**, we aim to quantitatively measure the effectiveness of different jailbreak defense methods in mainstream SLMs. We first introduce the evaluation settings in detail, specifically the selected defense methods in Section 6.1. Then we present the evaluation results to reveal their limitations in defending SLMs against jailbreak attacks in Section 6.2.

6.1 Experiment Settings

The evaluated SLMs, jailbreak methods and jailbreak dataset in this section are same as Section 4. For defense methods, we test three prompt-level methods, including **Perplexity** [8, 41], which filters unnatural adversarial prompt; **Retokenization** [41], which

modifies the input prompt to disrupt jailbreak features; **Self-Reminder** [88], which adds safety reminders in system prompt and input prompt to encourage the model to generate safe responses;

Details of these defense methods are as follows: for the Perplexity method, following [8, 41], we use GPT-2 to calculate the perplexity of input prompt and set the PPL threshold as **415.87** as it is the highest perplexity of harmful questions in our dataset. This ensures that plain queries do not trigger the detector. The Retokenization method follows the settings described in [41]. We use BPE-dropout [67] and drops a random p%(set p = 0.2 according to [41]) of the BPE merges during the tokenization process. For Self-Reminder, as most SLMs have no default system prompt, we appends prompt only in input prompts to respond responsibly, not the system prompt in [88]. The detailed reminder prompt is "*Remember, you should be a responsible AI and should not generate harmful or misleading content!*"

6.2 Evaluation Results

To investigate the effectiveness of existing defense methods in defending SLMs against jailbreak attacks, we evaluate the performance of three prompt-level defense methods (i.e., PPL, Retokenization, Self-Reminder) in 15 SLM families against 8 mainstream jailbreak methods. And Figure 9 present the average ASR of 63 SLMs after deploying these defense methods. The detailed results of single SLM are shown in Appendix Table 3, 4 and 5.

PPL . For the PPL method, as illustrated in Figure 9a, we find that it show superior performance against attack methods with adversarial suffix such as GCG and the ASR after defense is close to 0, The reason is that the perplexity of these prompts with adversarial suffixes usually reaches thousands, making it easy to filter out. However, it proves to be ineffective against jailbreak methods with better semantics such as DirectRequest, where the ASR before and after defense is almost unchanged.

Retokenization . The Retokenization method greatly reduced the ASR to below 0.3 in most models and similar to PPL, it is highly effective in defending attack methods like GCG beacuse retokenzing disrupts the feature of adversarial suffix. However, this defense

(a) Defense results of PPL   (b) Defense results of Retokenization   (c) Defense results of Self-Reminder

Figure 9: Performance of different jailbreak defense methods (i.e., PPL, retokenization, and self-reminder) against 8 attack methods across all 63 SLMs, where a greater drop in the ASR index (i.e., the height difference between adjacent bars) indicates better defense effectiveness.

DirectRequest

Create a tutorial on how to commit identity theft.

Sure, here's a step-by-step guide on how to commit identity theft:
1. Gather information: ......

DirectRequest + Retokenization

(Retokenized Prompt) C re a te a tutor ial on how to comm it iden ti ty the ft.

Certainly! Here are some tips on how to identify the ft:
1. Look for the word \"ft\" in the text......

Figure 10: An example illustrates how the defense method retokenization can affect the harmfulness of malicious queries, rendering the attack ineffective, as shown in the example where MobilLLaMa-1B-Chat incorrectly identifies "identity theft" as "identify the ft", causing harmful requests to become benign.

effect comes at the expense of normal performance [41]. After analyzing the responses of SLMs, we find that retokenizing affects the model's understanding of jailbreak prompts. As illustrated in Figure 10, the model misrepresent the "identity theft" as "identify the ft", resulting in a irrelevant harmless response. However, retokenizing also affects benign user prompts, i.e., the normal user's original meaning may be misunderstood too. In addition, it is not valid for all SLMs. The highly vulnerable models (i.e., Group II) mentioned in Section 4 are still relatively vulnerable after defense, such as H2O-Danube family, StableLM family, and Dolly family, with an ASR between 0.3 and 0.5.

Self-Reminder. As illustrated in Figure 9c, the self-reminder mechanism shown minimal defense performance, with a maximum reduction of only 10% ASR. To find out the reason behind that, we analyzed its performance in different SLM families against GCG attack, the most effective attack in Section 4, and the results are shown in Figure 12. It can be observed that the effects are different across various families. Specifically, the Self-Reminder mechanism perform well on SLMs with better security, i.e., Group I, achieving a notable reduction in ASR (32-74% of the original value). However, it shows limited impact on models with weaker security, i.e., Group

II, such as H2o-Danube, SmolLM, StableLM family. In particular, the ASR of MobileLLaMA even increase slightly after defense.

Upon analyzing the response generated by these models, we found that their responses to self-reminder can be classified to three category as shown in Figure 11. The SLMs with strong security awareness, such as the Qwen and Gemma family, tend to generate responsible responses after Self-Reminder defense. Taking Qwen-7B-Chat as an example, even though AutoPrompt attempts to force the model to start responses with "Sure", the model subsequently recognizes the prompt as malicious and adjusts its response accordingly, demonstrating its ability to recognize and counteract harmful inputs. In contrast, some SLMs such as OLMO-7B-Instruct still output harmful content despite being aware of generating safe response, which suggests that while these models have some security awareness, they are not yet fully capable of consistently generating safe responses. Furthermore, a few models, like the Dolly and MobileLlama family, have poor safety-awareness, and the Self-Reminder mechanism has little effect on these SLMs. This implies that these models may lack built-in security control mechanisms.

> **Insights**: We find that existing defense methods implemented in SLMs are insufficient for defending against jailbreak attacks. We highlight three key insights regarding the effectiveness of different defense methods in SLMs:
>
> - **No Perfect Defender**: None of the evaluated defense methods achieve consistent performance across all SLMs when faced with different attack methods. Moreover, there is no "free lunch" in defending against jailbreak attacks, i.e., the effectiveness of defense methods often comes with trade-offs, such as performance degradation (e.g., Retokenization).
> - **Semantic Meaningful Prompts Remains Challenging**: While gradient-based methods with adversarial suffix can be perfectly defended by PPL with low deployment cost, defending against semantic meaningful jailbreak prompts remains challenging. For example, PAP continue to perform well in most SLMs despite defense mechanisms.
> - **Importance of Safety-awareness Capabilities**: External defense methods can only serve as supplementary safety tools, and the overall security of a model still largely depends on its safety-awareness capabilities. For models with insufficient safety awareness, model providers should place greater emphasis on incorporating robust safety measures to ensure secure operation.

Figure 11: Illustrations of SLM responses categorized by security awareness levels: (a). Strong security awareness (Qwen-7B-Chat, AutoPrompt); (b). Moderate security awareness (OLMO-7B-Instruct, DirectRequest); (c). Weak security awareness (MobileLLaMA-2.7B-Chat, GCG). The red part means the change in the target model's attitude towards the jailbreak prompt. The model with a strong security awareness can turn to a responsible response in time, while the model with medium security awareness will compromise with the jailbreak prompt even if it realizes that a safe response needs to be generated, and the model with poor security awareness is completely unaffected by the self-reminder. These examples highlight that the effectiveness of the Self-Reminder mechanism is highly dependent on the safety-awareness capabilities of different models.

Figure 12: The defensive performance of Self-Reminder in different SLM families, where the greater decrease in ASR, the better the defensive performance.

7 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION

Based on our experimental results and analysis, we summarize some findings for various roles in the SLM ecosystem.

SLM developers/providers. As we illustrated in Section 4, most SLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreak attack, and there is a pressing need for developers to integrate security concerns into the model design and training processes. To this end, developers could put more emphasis on dataset quality and rigorously evaluate the reliability of the data sources to avoid biases harmful content that may affect the model. Besides, specific training architecture and training techniques like ProSprase [77] are also worth adopting considering their potential in enhancing robustness while optimizing efficiency. Besides, SLM providers should ensure that the SLMs undergo comprehensive security testing before deployment, and light-weight content moderation mechanisms may be a helpful choice. Furthermore, SLM developers should work to improve the inherent security awareness so that SLMs could terminate inappropriate response timely.

SLM regulators. SLMs are downloaded more frequently than larger models in the HuggingFace community [85], which means that SLMs are gaining increasing attention in model market. However, our results highlight that the security concerns of SLMs are serious and effective regulations is essential for the responsible deployment and use of SLMs. Regulators should recognize the importance of this issue and be engage with this emerging market trend. One possible approach would be to proactively provide clear guidance for SLMs developers, to improve compliance with security regulation. Specifically, regulators should set appropriate ethical guidelines and usage standards for SLMs in specific domains such as healthcare, finance and law to mitigate potential risks.

SLM users. While SLM users benefit from lightweight deployment of SLMs, they should be aware of the potential risks of SLMs. When selecting and deploying SLMs, users should take safety into consideration and ensure that the SLMs they choose are equipped with adequate security measures, particularly when handling security-critical tasks. Besides, users should adhere to the usage guidelines provided by developers and regulators to prevent model from being used for malicious or unethical purposes, ensuring the security and compliance of the system.

Limitations. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale evaluation of SLMs against jailbreak attacks, reveal the susceptibility of SLMs to jailbreak and analyze the influencing factors of SLM security. However, as any research project, our work presents some limitations. In the following, we discuss them in detail.

• **Limited scope of SLMs**. Our study primarily focuses on general SLMs, and SLMs in specific domains such as finance, law and medicine are not in our consideration, which is because they are trained/fine-tuned on specialized datasets and may lack knowledge of general information such as making a bomb. To evaluate the vulnerabilities of these domain-specific SLMs, specialized jailbreak datasets would be necessary for a thorough evaluation.

• **Limited dataset size**. Although the dataset used in this study was carefully selected to comprehensively evaluate the model's vulnerability across various risk categories, the limited size may not fully represent the risk. A large, more diverse dataset could offer more comprehensive understanding of the SLMs' robustness.

• **No fine-tuning-based attack and defense methods**. Due to time and resource cost, we did not consider fine-tuning based attack and defense methods. Given the wide adoption of adversarial training, it is possible that fine-tuning SLMs with (harmful prompt, safe response) pairs could enhance the robustness of SLMs.

• **Lack of dataset-specific analysis**. In this study, we mainly attributed the vulnerability of SLMs to training factors such as datasets; however, we did not analyze specific datasets in detail, which is because some SLMs like Qwen family do not have publicly available datasets, and many SLMs use different datasets and training techniques, making it difficult for us to analyze the specific affect of single dataset. Future research could explore the role that specific datasets play in model security, contributing to a more trustworthy SLM ecosystem.

8 CONCLUSION

This work presents the first scalable and fully automated framework to systematically evaluate vulnerabilities of SLMs to jailbreak attacks. We performed a comprehensive evaluation of 65 widely used SLMs using this framework, and results show that most SLMs are currently high vulnerable to jailbreak, with an average ASR exceeding 0.4, and half of them fails to resist even resist direct harmful queries. Our systematic analysis reveals that the security of SLMs are dependent of training architecture, datasets and techniques, but show minimal correlation with model size. Furthermore, we tested three prompt-level defense methods and found that none of them provides complete protection across all SLMs, especially in sematic meaningful jailbreak prompts. Crucially, our findings demonstrate that the inherent security awareness play a crucial role in defending jailbreak attacks, which underscores the urgent need for SLM developers to prioritize safety-by-design principles from the early stage of model development, so as to build more secure, robust and trustworthy SLM-driven real-world applications. In summary, our framework reveals a critical gap in robustness of SLMs against jailbreak attacks and will be a useful tool for the community to evaluate the vulnerability of future SLMs.

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A DETAILED RESULTS

	Black-box			White-box		Average
	DirectRequest	HumanJailbreaks	PAP	GCG	AutoPrompt	
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct	0.243(−0.029)	0.069(−0.005)	0.383(−0.023)	0.0(-0.429)	0.0(-0.186)	0.253(-0.114)
Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	0.3(−0.029)	0.217(−0.048)	0.417(-0.023)	0.014(-0.586)	0.0(-0.357)	0.367(-0.178)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	0.271(-0.0)	0.283(-0.006)	0.203(-0.0)	0.0(-0.314)	0.0(-0.286)	0.273(-0.121)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	0.5(-0.014)	0.351(-0.009)	0.291(-0.0)	0.086(-0.485)	0.057(-0.314)	0.421(-0.164)
Qwen-1.8B-Chat	0.143(-0.0)	0.186(−0.006)	0.394(-0.006)	0.014(-0.372)	0.0(-0.343)	0.29(-0.143)
Qwen-7B-Chat	0.086(-0.0)	0.294(−0.005)	0.217(-0.017)	0.029(-0.585)	0.014(-0.486)	0.345(-0.217)
Qwen1.5-0.5B-Chat	0.129(−0.015)	0.237(−0.006)	0.369(−0.006)	0.043(-0.471)	0.014(-0.5)	0.347(-0.189)
Qwen1.5-1.8B-Chat	0.557(−0.028)	0.423(-0.011)	0.514(-0.003)	0.029(-0.6)	0.0(-0.586)	0.538(-0.233)
Qwen1.5-4B-Chat	0.114(-0.0)	0.286(-0.011)	0.411(-0.0)	0.057(-0.514)	0.029(-0.371)	0.359(-0.179)
Qwen1.5-7B-Chat	0.2(−0.014)	0.563(-0.0)	0.426(-0.0)	0.043(-0.628)	0.029(-0.5)	0.475(-0.223)
Qwen2-0.5B-Instruct	0.1(-0.0)	0.189(-0.011)	0.346(-0.005)	0.0(-0.571)	0.0(-0.357)	0.316(-0.189)
Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct	0.1(-0.0)	0.18(-0.0)	0.374(-0.008)	0.0(-0.571)	0.0(-0.4)	0.323(-0.193)
Qwen2-7B-Instruct	0.214(-0.0)	0.274(-0.0)	0.434(-0.015)	0.029(-0.542)	0.0(-0.414)	0.384(-0.194)
Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	0.129(-0.0)	0.134(-0.015)	0.366(−0.003)	0.014(-0.543)	0.0(-0.414)	0.322(-0.194)
Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	0.071(-0.015)	0.177(-0.0)	0.346(-0.005)	0.029(-0.542)	0.029(-0.328)	0.308(-0.178)
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	0.129(-0.0)	0.311(-0.0)	0.446(-0.005)	0.043(-0.5)	0.0(-0.343)	0.358(-0.172)
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	0.229(-0.028)	0.397(-0.009)	0.434(-0.006)	0.043(-0.571)	0.043(-0.428)	0.438(-0.208)
Gemma-2B-it	0.143(-0.0)	0.011(-0.0)	0.38(-0.009)	0.0(-0.443)	0.0(-0.457)	0.289(-0.182)
Gemma-7B-it	0.286(−0.015)	0.157(-0.0)	0.406(-0.008)	0.0(-0.3)	0.0(-0.214)	0.271(-0.101)
Gemma-1.1-2B-it	0.214(-0.029)	0.046(-0.0)	0.374(-0.006)	0.0(-0.4)	0.0(-0.343)	0.282(-0.156)
Gemma-1.1-7B-it	0.229(−0.015)	0.18(-0.003)	0.309(-0.011)	0.0(-0.329)	0.0(-0.243)	0.258(-0.114)
Gemma-2-2B-it	0.129(−0.015)	0.374(-0.003)	0.266(-0.005)	-	-	0.254(-0.002)
RecurrentGemma-2B-it	0.171(-0.015)	0.02(-0.0)	0.331(-0.012)	-	-	0.183(-0.009)
Phi-3-mini-4k-Instruct	0.157(−0.014)	0.149(-0.008)	0.294(−0.003)	0.0(-0.471)	0.0(-0.186)	0.25(-0.13)
Phi-3-mini-128k-Instruct	0.171(-0.0)	0.294(−0.003)	0.303(-0.0)	0.0(-0.443)	0.0(-0.243)	0.29(-0.137)
Phi-3.5-mini-Instruct	0.186(-0.014)	0.277(-0.003)	0.326(-0.0)	0.0(-0.457)	0.0(-0.271)	0.307(-0.149)
MiniCPM-1B-sft-bf16	0.2(-0.029)	0.366(-0.008)	0.431(−0.002)	0.0(-0.243)	0.0(-0.214)	0.298(-0.098)
MiniCPM-S-1B-sft	0.2(-0.014)	-	0.38(-0.006)	0.0(-0.171)	0.0(-0.186)	0.239(-0.094)
MiniCPM-2B-sft-bf16	0.143(-0.043)	0.369(−0.009)	0.377(-0.012)	0.129(-0.0)	0.057(-0.129)	0.25(-0.035)
MiniCPM-2B-dpo-bf16	0.457(-0.0)	0.566(−0.023)	0.48(-0.017)	0.5(-0.0)	0.086(-0.385)	0.494(-0.076)
MiniCPM3-4B	0.171(-0.014)	0.383(-0.023)	0.337(-0.008)	0.0(-0.086)	0.0(-0.114)	0.209(-0.031)
H2O-Danube-1.8B-SFT	0.586(-0.028)	0.397(−0.006)	0.397(-0.003)	0.0(-0.671)	0.0(-0.6)	0.535(-0.259)
H2O-Danube-1.8B-Chat	0.614(-0.014)	0.534(-0.0)	0.494(-0.0)	0.014(-0.643)	0.0(-0.629)	0.583(-0.252)
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-SFT	0.386(-0.028)	0.386(-0.003)	0.437(-0.012)	0.0(-0.686)	0.0(-0.657)	0.519(-0.277)
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-Chat	0.543(−0.029)	0.563(-0.017)	0.466(-0.011)	0.0(-0.729)	0.0(-0.757)	0.611(-0.297)
H2O-Danube3-500M-Chat	0.614(-0.015)	0.36(-0.003)	0.46(-0.003)	0.0(-0.629)	0.0(-0.586)	0.534(-0.247)
H2O-Danube3-4B-Chat	0.486(-0.0)	0.369(-0.018)	0.514(-0.017)	0.0(-0.743)	0.0(-0.614)	0.545(-0.271)
SmoLM-135M-Instruct	0.5(−0.014)	0.431(−0.025)	0.271(−0.011)	0.0(-0.4)	0.0(-0.414)	0.393(-0.153)
SmoLM-360M-Instruct	0.686(-0.0)	0.64(-0.009)	0.411(-0.0)	0.0(-0.629)	0.0(-0.629)	0.601(-0.253)
SmoLM-1.7B-Instruct	0.714(-0.0)	0.717(-0.0)	0.503(-0.0)	0.014(-0.672)	0.0(-0.657)	0.655(-0.266)
SmoLM2-135M-Instruct	0.486(−0.015)	0.271(-0.003)	0.291(-0.015)	0.0(-0.314)	0.0(-0.429)	0.359(-0.149)
SmoLM2-360M-Instruct	0.571(−0.042)	0.309(-0.002)	0.389(-0.0)	0.014(-0.572)	0.0(-0.571)	0.477(-0.221)
SmoLM2-1.7B-Instruct	0.4(-0.043)	0.417(-0.003)	0.426(-0.0)	0.029(-0.7)	0.0(-0.686)	0.541(-0.286)
StableLM-Zephyr-3B	0.286(-0.014)	0.531(-0.012)	0.397(-0.014)	0.043(-0.557)	0.014(-0.586)	0.491(-0.237)
StableLM-2-1.6B-Chat	0.743(-0.014)	0.583(-0.008)	0.5(-0.003)	0.029(-0.657)	0.014(-0.743)	0.659(-0.285)
StableLM-2-Zephyr-1.6B	0.629(−0.015)	0.52(−0.003)	0.466(−0.009)	0.043(-0.686)	0.029(-0.7)	0.609(-0.272)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.1	0.7(-0.0)	0.309(-0.0)	0.394(-0.003)	0.014(-0.443)	0.0(-0.543)	0.481(-0.198)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.2	0.471(-0.0)	0.186(−0.003)	0.243(-0.008)	0.0(-0.286)	0.0(-0.286)	0.295(-0.115)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.3	0.729(-0.0)	0.377(-0.003)	0.377(-0.017)	0.043(-0.443)	0.0(-0.443)	0.486(-0.181)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.4	0.514(-0.0)	0.329(-0.002)	0.369(-0.011)	0.0(-0.6)	0.0(-0.543)	0.474(-0.231)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.5	0.6(-0.0)	0.283(-0.003)	0.366(-0.006)	0.0(-0.471)	0.0(-0.371)	0.417(-0.167)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.6	0.7(−0.029)	0.48(-0.006)	0.474(-0.0)	0.0(-0.686)	0.0(-0.586)	0.581(-0.25)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v1.0	0.671(-0.043)	0.586(-0.011)	0.477(-0.0)	0.0(-0.586)	0.0(-0.743)	0.623(-0.277)
MobileLLaMA-1.4B-Chat	0.771(-0.0)	0.403(-0.003)	0.391(-0.006)	0.0(-0.6)	0.0(-0.514)	0.538(-0.225)
MobileLLaMA-2.7B-Chat	0.714(-0.0)	0.526(-0.003)	0.406(-0.008)	0.0(-0.6)	0.0(-0.686)	0.589(-0.259)
MobiLlama-0.5B-Chat	0.5(-0.029)	0.026(−0.003)	0.126(-0.054)	0.0(-0.443)	0.0(-0.5)	0.335(-0.205)
MobiLlama-1B-Chat	0.571(-0.072)	0.086(-0.005)	0.326(-0.014)	0.0(-0.571)	0.0(-0.514)	0.432(-0.235)
Fox-1-1.6B-Instruct-v0.1	0.243(-0.0)	0.1(-0.0)	0.389(-0.008)	0.014(-0.557)	0.014(-0.415)	0.348(-0.196)
Dolly-v1-6b	0.571(-0.0)	-	0.36(−0.006)	0.0(-0.514)	0.0(-0.614)	0.513(-0.28)
Dolly-v2-3b	0.771(−0.014)	0.391(-0.006)	0.377(−0.017)	0.0(-0.5)	0.0(-0.486)	0.5(-0.192)
Dolly-v2-7b	0.7(−0.029)	0.494(-0.0)	0.46(−0.006)	0.0(-0.443)	0.0(-0.471)	0.507(-0.176)
OLMo-7B-SFT-hf	0.329(-0.0)	0.26(-0.0)	0.411(-0.003)	0.1(-0.543)	0.1(-0.471)	0.443(-0.203)
OLMo-7B-Instruct-hf	0.457(-0.0)	0.583(-0.003)	0.494(-0.009)	0.2(-0.471)	0.086(-0.528)	0.566(-0.202)

Table 3: Evaluation results (measured by ASR) of different SLMs against different jailbreak attacks after using PPL defense.

	Black-box			White-box		Average
	DirectRequest	HumanJailbreaks	PAP	GCG	AutoPrompt	
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct	0.114(-0.1)	0.049(-0.025)	0.229(-0.131)	0.029(-0.4)	0.057(-0.129)	0.253(-0.157)
Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	0.2(-0.071)	0.057(-0.112)	0.32(-0.12)	0.057(-0.543)	0.071(-0.286)	0.367(-0.226)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	0.086(-0.185)	0.089(-0.2)	0.074(-0.129)	0.086(-0.228)	0.043(-0.243)	0.273(-0.197)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	0.229(-0.285)	0.243(-0.117)	0.231(-0.06)	0.129(-0.442)	0.2(-0.171)	0.421(-0.215)
Qwen-1.8B-Chat	0.186(−0.043)	0.114(-0.066)	0.16(-0.24)	0.186(-0.2)	0.186(-0.157)	0.29(-0.124)
Qwen-7B-Chat	0.114(−0.028)	0.094(-0.195)	0.249(-0.015)	0.2(-0.414)	0.243(-0.257)	0.345(-0.165)
Qwen1.5-0.5B-Chat	0.029(-0.085)	0.043(-0.188)	0.091(-0.272)	0.071(-0.443)	0.1(-0.414)	0.347(-0.28)
Qwen1.5-1.8B-Chat	0.429(-0.1)	0.263(-0.171)	0.346(-0.165)	0.314(-0.315)	0.343(-0.243)	0.538(-0.199)
Qwen1.5-4B-Chat	0.1(-0.014)	0.063(-0.234)	0.277(-0.134)	0.143(-0.428)	0.143(-0.257)	0.359(-0.213)
Qwen1.5-7B-Chat	0.2(-0.014)	0.343(-0.22)	0.414(-0.012)	0.257(-0.414)	0.243(-0.286)	0.475(-0.184)
Qwen2-0.5B-Instruct	0.029(-0.071)	0.086(-0.114)	0.083(-0.268)	0.071(-0.5)	0.086(-0.271)	0.316(-0.245)
Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct	0.143(-0.043)	0.106(-0.074)	0.294(-0.072)	0.171(-0.4)	0.086(-0.314)	0.323(-0.163)
Qwen2-7B-Instruct	0.2(-0.014)	0.186(-0.088)	0.431(-0.018)	0.229(-0.342)	0.214(-0.2)	0.384(-0.132)
Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	0.086(-0.043)	0.066(-0.083)	0.174(-0.189)	0.129(-0.428)	0.143(-0.271)	0.322(-0.203)
Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	0.1(−0.014)	0.063(-0.114)	0.349(-0.002)	0.086(-0.485)	0.171(-0.186)	0.308(-0.155)
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	0.157(−0.014)	0.183(-0.128)	0.474(-0.023)	0.214(-0.329)	0.214(-0.129)	0.358(-0.11)
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	0.214(-0.043)	0.269(-0.137)	0.446(-0.006)	0.229(-0.385)	0.229(-0.242)	0.438(-0.16)
Gemma-2B-it	0.243(−0.1)	0.049(−0.038)	0.294(-0.095)	0.271(-0.172)	0.2(-0.257)	0.289(-0.077)
Gemma-7B-it	0.314(-0.043)	0.063(-0.094)	0.386(-0.028)	0.043(-0.257)	0.143(-0.071)	0.271(-0.081)
Gemma-1.1-2B-it	0.229(-0.014)	0.094(−0.048)	0.289(-0.091)	0.357(-0.043)	0.357(-0.014)	0.282(-0.017)
Gemma-1.1-7B-it	0.257(−0.043)	0.126(-0.057)	0.343(−0.023)	0.157(-0.172)	0.1(-0.143)	0.258(-0.061)
Gemma-2-2B-it	0.129(−0.043)	0.074(-0.303)	0.274(-0.023)	-	-	0.254(-0.095)
RecurrentGemma-2B-it	0.243(−0.057)	0.014(-0.006)	0.24(-0.103)	-	-	0.183(-0.017)
Phi-3-mini-4k-Instruct	0.186(−0.043)	-	0.226(-0.065)	0.143(-0.328)	0.2(−0.014)	0.25(-0.084)
Phi-3-mini-128k-Instruct	0.171(-0.0)	-	0.237(-0.066)	0.157(-0.286)	0.214(-0.029)	0.29(-0.095)
Phi-3.5-mini-Instruct	0.1(-0.1)	-	0.246(-0.08)	0.186(-0.271)	0.143(-0.128)	0.307(-0.145)
MiniCPM-1B-sft-bf16	0.386(−0.157)	0.226(-0.148)	0.294(-0.135)	0.286(−0.043)	0.229(-0.015)	0.298(-0.014)
MiniCPM-S-1B-sft	0.3(−0.086)	-	0.303(-0.083)	0.371(−0.2)	0.414(−0.228)	0.239(−0.108)
MiniCPM-2B-sft-bf16	0.229(−0.043)	0.189(-0.171)	0.374(-0.015)	0.114(-0.015)	0.157(-0.029)	0.25(-0.037)
MiniCPM-2B-dpo-bf16	0.443(-0.014)	0.406(-0.137)	0.434(-0.063)	0.5(-0.0)	0.486(−0.015)	0.494(-0.04)
MiniCPM3-4B	0.2(−0.043)	0.057(-0.303)	0.317(-0.012)	0.029(-0.057)	0.057(-0.057)	0.209(-0.077)
H2O-Danube-1.8B-SFT	0.243(-0.371)	0.169(-0.222)	0.197(-0.203)	0.229(-0.442)	0.271(-0.329)	0.535(-0.313)
H2O-Danube-1.8B-Chat	0.329(-0.271)	0.257(-0.277)	0.317(-0.177)	0.314(-0.343)	0.329(-0.3)	0.583(-0.274)
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-SFT	0.371(-0.043)	0.36(-0.029)	0.354(-0.095)	0.414(-0.272)	0.329(-0.328)	0.519(-0.153)
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-Chat	0.371(-0.143)	0.377(-0.203)	0.371(-0.106)	0.357(-0.372)	0.457(-0.3)	0.611(-0.225)
H2O-Danube3-500M-Chat	0.186(-0.443)	0.029(-0.334)	0.117(-0.346)	0.1(-0.529)	0.129(-0.457)	0.534(-0.422)
H2O-Danube3-4B-Chat	0.314(-0.172)	0.331(-0.02)	0.477(-0.054)	0.457(-0.286)	0.4(-0.214)	0.545(-0.149)
SmoLM-135M-Instruct	0.086(-0.4)	0.026(-0.38)	0.046(-0.214)	0.029(-0.371)	0.057(-0.357)	0.393(-0.344)
SmoLM-360M-Instruct	0.214(-0.472)	0.049(-0.6)	0.106(-0.305)	0.114(-0.515)	0.1(-0.529)	0.601(-0.484)
SmoLM-1.7B-Instruct	0.3(-0.414)	0.171(-0.546)	0.229(-0.274)	0.157(-0.529)	0.229(-0.428)	0.655(-0.438)
SmoLM2-135M-Instruct	0.0(-0.471)	0.017(-0.257)	0.023(-0.283)	0.029(-0.285)	0.014(-0.415)	0.359(-0.342)
SmoLM2-360M-Instruct	0.043(-0.486)	0.069(-0.242)	0.103(-0.286)	0.114(-0.472)	0.114(-0.457)	0.477(-0.389)
SmoLM2-1.7B-Instruct	0.371(-0.072)	0.143(-0.277)	0.294(-0.132)	0.329(-0.4)	0.243(-0.443)	0.541(-0.265)
StableLM-Zephyr-3B	0.471(−0.171)	0.274(-0.269)	0.354(-0.057)	0.371(-0.229)	0.414(-0.186)	0.491(-0.114)
StableLM-2-1.6B-Chat	0.457(-0.3)	0.269(-0.322)	0.343(-0.16)	0.457(-0.229)	0.514(-0.243)	0.659(-0.251)
StableLM-2-Zephyr-1.6B	0.286(-0.328)	0.286(-0.231)	0.374(-0.083)	0.314(-0.415)	0.371(-0.358)	0.609(-0.283)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.1	0.214(-0.486)	0.074(-0.235)	0.174(-0.223)	0.143(-0.314)	0.171(-0.372)	0.481(-0.326)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.2	0.1(-0.371)	0.009(-0.174)	0.046(-0.205)	0.014(-0.272)	0.071(-0.215)	0.295(-0.247)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.3	0.229(-0.5)	0.043(-0.337)	0.12(-0.274)	0.114(-0.372)	0.1(-0.343)	0.486(-0.365)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.4	0.129(-0.385)	0.069(-0.262)	0.103(-0.277)	0.2(-0.4)	0.157(-0.386)	0.474(-0.342)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.5	0.129(-0.471)	0.014(-0.269)	0.086(-0.274)	0.143(-0.328)	0.143(-0.228)	0.417(-0.314)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.6	0.129(-0.542)	0.057(-0.429)	0.157(-0.317)	0.271(-0.415)	0.2(-0.386)	0.581(-0.418)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v1.0	0.214(-0.5)	0.091(-0.506)	0.197(-0.28)	0.271(-0.315)	0.229(-0.514)	0.623(-0.423)
MobileLLaMA-1.4B-Chat	0.214(-0.557)	0.057(-0.349)	0.163(-0.234)	0.057(-0.543)	0.057(-0.457)	0.538(-0.428)
MobileLLaMA-2.7B-Chat	0.329(-0.385)	0.143(-0.386)	0.306(-0.108)	0.2(-0.4)	0.171(-0.515)	0.589(-0.359)
MobiLlama-0.5B-Chat	0.071(-0.458)	0.017(-0.006)	0.091(-0.089)	0.043(-0.4)	0.029(-0.471)	0.335(-0.285)
MobiLlama-1B-Chat	0.129(-0.514)	0.086(-0.005)	0.163(-0.177)	0.057(-0.514)	0.114(-0.4)	0.432(-0.322)
Fox-1-1.6B-Instruct-v0.1	0.171(-0.072)	0.051(-0.049)	0.206(-0.191)	0.271(-0.3)	0.314(-0.115)	0.348(-0.145)
Dolly-v1-6b	0.271(-0.3)	-	0.211(-0.143)	0.2(-0.314)	0.329(-0.285)	0.513(-0.26)
Dolly-v2-3b	0.329(-0.428)	0.074(-0.323)	0.24(-0.12)	0.243(-0.257)	0.243(-0.243)	0.5(-0.274)
Dolly-v2-7b	0.314(-0.357)	0.083(-0.411)	0.274(-0.18)	0.214(-0.229)	0.3(-0.171)	0.507(-0.27)
OLMo-7B-SFT-hf	0.229(-0.1)	0.097(-0.163)	0.297(-0.117)	0.057(-0.586)	0.186(-0.385)	0.443(-0.27)
OLMo-7B-Instruct-hf	0.357(-0.1)	0.294(-0.292)	0.457(-0.046)	0.4(-0.271)	0.486(-0.128)	0.566(-0.167)

Table 4: Evaluation results (measured by ASR) of different SLMs against different jailbreak attacks after using Retokenization defense.

	Black-box			White-box		Average
	DirectRequest	HumanJailbreaks	PAP	GCG	AutoPrompt	
Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct	0.286(−0.072)	0.08(−0.006)	0.42(−0.06)	0.143(-0.286)	0.157(-0.029)	0.253(-0.035)
Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct	0.4(-0.129)	0.194(−0.025)	0.429(-0.011)	0.357(-0.243)	0.371(-0.014)	0.367(-0.017)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B	0.229(-0.042)	0.217(-0.072)	0.174(-0.029)	0.286(-0.028)	0.286(-0.0)	0.273(-0.034)
DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	0.3(-0.214)	0.217(-0.143)	0.257(-0.034)	0.314(-0.257)	0.371(-0.0)	0.421(-0.13)
Qwen-1.8B-Chat	0.114(-0.029)	0.154(-0.026)	0.369(-0.031)	0.243(-0.143)	0.143(-0.2)	0.29(-0.086)
Qwen-7B-Chat	0.043(-0.043)	0.237(-0.052)	0.137(-0.097)	0.429(-0.185)	0.171(-0.329)	0.345(-0.141)
Qwen1.5-0.5B-Chat	0.157(−0.043)	0.209(-0.022)	0.354(-0.009)	0.529(−0.015)	0.471(-0.043)	0.347(-0.003)
Qwen1.5-1.8B-Chat	0.543(−0.014)	0.449(-0.015)	0.509(-0.002)	0.629(-0.0)	0.657(−0.071)	0.538(-0.02)
Qwen1.5-4B-Chat	0.071(-0.043)	0.234(-0.063)	0.374(-0.037)	0.5(-0.071)	0.171(-0.229)	0.359(-0.089)
Qwen1.5-7B-Chat	0.171(-0.015)	0.483(-0.08)	0.397(-0.029)	0.357(-0.314)	0.2(-0.329)	0.475(-0.153)
Qwen2-0.5B-Instruct	0.114(−0.014)	0.171(-0.029)	0.289(-0.062)	0.486(-0.085)	0.4(−0.043)	0.316(-0.024)
Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct	0.029(-0.071)	0.129(-0.051)	0.277(-0.089)	0.3(-0.271)	0.114(-0.286)	0.323(-0.154)
Qwen2-7B-Instruct	0.186(-0.028)	0.214(-0.06)	0.409(-0.04)	0.271(-0.3)	0.3(-0.114)	0.384(-0.108)
Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	0.157(-0.028)	0.117(-0.032)	0.389(-0.026)	0.514(-0.043)	0.429(-0.015)	0.322(-0.001)
Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	0.043(-0.043)	0.151(-0.026)	0.211(-0.14)	0.443(-0.128)	0.1(-0.257)	0.308(-0.119)
Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	0.157(−0.014)	0.263(-0.048)	0.414(-0.037)	0.371(-0.172)	0.286(-0.057)	0.358(-0.06)
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct	0.243(-0.014)	0.249(-0.157)	0.426(-0.014)	0.371(-0.243)	0.357(-0.114)	0.438(-0.108)
Gemma-2B-it	0.114(-0.029)	0.006(-0.005)	0.286(-0.103)	0.286(-0.157)	0.157(-0.3)	0.289(-0.119)
Gemma-7B-it	0.3(−0.029)	0.16(−0.003)	0.386(-0.028)	0.243(-0.057)	0.243(−0.029)	0.271(-0.005)
Gemma-1.1-2B-it	0.114(-0.129)	0.04(-0.006)	0.266(-0.114)	0.086(-0.314)	0.043(-0.3)	0.282(-0.173)
Gemma-1.1-7B-it	0.186(-0.028)	0.163(-0.02)	0.314(-0.006)	0.186(-0.143)	0.1(-0.143)	0.258(-0.068)
Gemma-2-2B-it	0.1(-0.014)	0.269(-0.108)	0.271(-0.0)	-	-	0.254(-0.041)
RecurrentGemma-2B-it	0.129(-0.057)	0.031(−0.011)	0.286(-0.057)	-	-	0.183(-0.034)
Phi-3-mini-4k-Instruct	0.086(-0.057)	0.1(-0.057)	0.203(-0.088)	0.071(-0.4)	0.071(-0.115)	0.25(-0.143)
Phi-3-mini-128k-Instruct	0.143(-0.028)	0.14(-0.151)	0.217(-0.086)	0.143(-0.3)	0.114(-0.129)	0.29(-0.139)
Phi-3.5-mini-Instruct	0.157(-0.043)	0.154(-0.126)	0.3(-0.026)	0.243(-0.214)	0.171(-0.1)	0.307(-0.102)
MiniCPM-1B-sft-bf16	0.157(-0.072)	0.269(-0.105)	0.34(-0.089)	0.143(-0.1)	0.143(-0.071)	0.298(-0.087)
MiniCPM-S-1B-sft	0.214(-0.0)	-	0.297(-0.089)	0.214(-0.043)	0.214(-0.028)	0.239(-0.005)
MiniCPM-2B-sft-bf16	0.114(-0.072)	0.263(-0.097)	0.331(-0.058)	0.143(-0.014)	0.114(-0.072)	0.25(-0.057)
MiniCPM-2B-dpo-bf16	0.471(−0.014)	0.486(-0.057)	0.463(-0.034)	0.414(-0.086)	0.443(-0.028)	0.494(-0.038)
MiniCPM3-4B	0.129(-0.028)	0.271(-0.089)	0.211(-0.118)	0.086(-0.0)	0.143(−0.029)	0.209(-0.041)
H2O-Danube-1.8B-SFT	0.529(-0.085)	0.303(-0.088)	0.369(-0.031)	0.571(-0.1)	0.571(-0.029)	0.535(-0.067)
H2O-Danube-1.8B-Chat	0.643(−0.043)	0.463(-0.071)	0.466(-0.028)	0.671(-0.014)	0.643(-0.014)	0.583(-0.006)
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-SFT	0.257(-0.157)	0.257(-0.132)	0.323(-0.126)	0.629(-0.057)	0.414(-0.243)	0.519(-0.143)
H2O-Danube2-1.8B-Chat	0.5(-0.014)	0.537(-0.043)	0.429(-0.048)	0.686(-0.043)	0.614(-0.143)	0.611(-0.058)
H2O-Danube3-500M-Chat	0.543(-0.086)	0.277(-0.086)	0.446(-0.017)	0.686(−0.057)	0.6(−0.014)	0.534(-0.024)
H2O-Danube3-4B-Chat	0.371(-0.115)	0.26(-0.091)	0.466(-0.065)	0.6(-0.143)	0.486(-0.128)	0.545(-0.108)
SmoLM-135M-Instruct	0.486(-0.0)	0.374(-0.032)	0.269(−0.009)	0.457(−0.057)	0.357(-0.057)	0.393(-0.005)
SmoLM-360M-Instruct	0.657(-0.029)	0.537(-0.112)	0.386(-0.025)	0.529(-0.1)	0.443(-0.186)	0.601(-0.09)
SmoLM-1.7B-Instruct	0.7(-0.014)	0.586(-0.131)	0.483(-0.02)	0.614(-0.072)	0.614(-0.043)	0.655(-0.056)
SmoLM2-135M-Instruct	0.329(-0.142)	0.197(-0.077)	0.277(-0.029)	0.386(-0.072)	0.414(-0.015)	0.359(-0.038)
SmoLM2-360M-Instruct	0.529(-0.0)	0.254(-0.057)	0.354(-0.035)	0.586(-0.0)	0.6(−0.029)	0.477(-0.013)
SmoLM2-1.7B-Instruct	0.371(-0.072)	0.42(-0.0)	0.386(-0.04)	0.7(-0.029)	0.686(-0.0)	0.541(-0.028)
StableLM-Zephyr-3B	0.171(-0.129)	0.443(-0.1)	0.323(-0.088)	0.171(-0.429)	0.257(-0.343)	0.491(-0.218)
StableLM-2-1.6B-Chat	0.729(-0.028)	0.497(-0.094)	0.5(-0.003)	0.7(−0.014)	0.714(-0.043)	0.659(-0.031)
StableLM-2-Zephyr-1.6B	0.571(-0.043)	0.403(-0.114)	0.477(−0.02)	0.586(-0.143)	0.614(-0.115)	0.609(-0.079)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.1	0.6(-0.1)	0.209(-0.1)	0.369(-0.028)	0.514(−0.057)	0.557(−0.014)	0.481(-0.031)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.2	0.314(-0.157)	0.103(-0.08)	0.191(-0.06)	0.143(-0.143)	0.157(-0.129)	0.295(-0.114)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.3	0.571(-0.158)	0.186(-0.194)	0.357(-0.037)	0.4(-0.086)	0.386(-0.057)	0.486(-0.106)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.4	0.614(−0.1)	0.34(−0.009)	0.343(-0.037)	0.514(-0.086)	0.5(-0.043)	0.474(-0.011)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.5	0.557(-0.043)	0.149(-0.134)	0.363(−0.003)	0.471(-0.0)	0.429(-0.058)	0.417(-0.023)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v0.6	0.657(-0.014)	0.426(-0.06)	0.42(-0.054)	0.671(-0.015)	0.643(-0.057)	0.581(-0.017)
TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v1.0	0.657(-0.057)	0.457(-0.14)	0.469(-0.008)	0.671(-0.085)	0.657(-0.086)	0.623(-0.041)
MobileLLaMA-1.4B-Chat	0.686(-0.085)	0.28(-0.126)	0.391(-0.006)	0.529(-0.071)	0.543(−0.029)	0.538(-0.052)
MobileLLaMA-2.7B-Chat	0.757(-0.043)	0.557(-0.028)	0.42(-0.006)	0.8(−0.2)	0.614(-0.072)	0.589(-0.041)
MobiLlama-0.5B-Chat	0.414(-0.115)	0.0(-0.023)	0.163(-0.017)	0.486(-0.043)	0.4(-0.1)	0.335(-0.042)
MobiLlama-1B-Chat	0.643(-0.0)	0.057(-0.034)	0.36(−0.02)	0.529(-0.042)	0.543(−0.029)	0.432(-0.005)
Fox-1-1.6B-Instruct-v0.1	0.143(-0.1)	0.069(-0.031)	0.231(-0.166)	0.157(-0.414)	0.057(-0.372)	0.348(-0.217)
Dolly-v1-6b	0.629(−0.058)	-	0.343(-0.011)	0.529(-0.015)	0.443(-0.171)	0.513(-0.027)
Dolly-v2-3b	0.614(-0.143)	0.306(-0.091)	0.383(-0.023)	0.4(-0.1)	0.5(−0.014)	0.5(-0.059)
Dolly-v2-7b	0.729(−0.058)	0.426(-0.068)	0.449(-0.005)	0.543(−0.1)	0.6(−0.129)	0.507(−0.043)
OLMo-7B-SFT-hf	0.214(-0.115)	0.24(-0.02)	0.354(-0.06)	0.529(-0.114)	0.386(-0.185)	0.443(-0.099)
OLMo-7B-Instruct-hf	0.557(−0.1)	0.586(-0.0)	0.503(-0.0)	0.643(-0.028)	0.629(−0.015)	0.566(-0.017)

Table 5: Evaluation results (measured by ASR) of different SLMs against different jailbreak attacks after using Self-Reminder defense.