## **Continuous Variables System**

#### **Daniel Pereira**

(danielfpereira@ua.pt)

Department of Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics, University of Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal Instituto de Telecomunicações, Aveiro, Portugal

INSTITUIÇÕES ASSOCIADAS:











Inovação



©2017, it - instituto de telecomunicações

instituto de telecomunicações

creating and sharing knowledge for telecommunications

## Introduction - Objectives

- Study Continuous Variables Quantum Key Distribution (CV-QKD) with 4 state discrete modulation.
- Both simulation and experimental results where obtained.
- Results where linked to theoretical expected values, not each other (missing detector information to compare simulation to experimental values).



## Introduction - Content in this presentation

- Simulation results:
  - Noise characterization.
  - Secret key generation rate in function of transmission for two levels of excess noise.
- Experimental results:
  - Phase drift compensation.
  - Noise characterization experiment.
  - Key distribution experiment with secret key generation rate estimation.



## Theoretical notes - Security of CV-QKD

In CV-QKD, the key for a One Time Pad (OTP) protocol is shared through a quantum channel. The security of this key is evaluated in terms of secret key generation rate (bits/symbol):

$$K = \beta I(A:B) - S(B:E). \tag{1}$$

The rate is positive if Alice and Bob manage to share more information, I(A:B), than the information obtained by Eve on Bob's results, S(B:E).  $\beta$  represents the efficiency of the employed error correction.



## Theoretical notes - Estimating information rates

The mutual classical information is estimated as:

$$I(A:B) = \log_2\left(1 + \frac{T\langle n\rangle}{1 + \frac{T}{2}\varepsilon}\right).$$
 (2)

This definition of I(A:B) assumes a Gaussian modulated signal, while we use discrete modulation. The effect of this inaccuracy on the mutual information is included in the error correction efficiency  $\beta$ .



## Theoretical notes - Estimating information rates

The quantum information Eve possesses, S(B:E), is upper bounded by the quantum information between Alice and Bob, S(B:A), which can be estimated by knowledge of the covariance matrices.

$$\gamma_{AB} = \begin{bmatrix} (1+2\langle n \rangle)\mathbb{I}_2 & \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}}Z\sigma_Z \\ \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}}Z\sigma_Z & (T\langle n \rangle + 1 + \frac{T}{2}\varepsilon)\mathbb{I}_2 \end{bmatrix}$$
(3)

The effect of the measurement on Alice's mode for the case of double-homodyne detection can be expressed as follows.

$$\gamma_{AB|B} = \left[ (1 + 2\langle n \rangle) - \frac{\frac{T}{2}Z^2}{T\langle n \rangle + 2 + \frac{T}{2}\varepsilon} \right] \mathbb{I}_2$$
 (4)



## Theoretical notes - Estimating information rates

The quantum information can then be calculated from the symplectic eigenvalues of the two previous covariance matrices through:

$$S(B:E) = \sum_{k=1}^{2} \left[ (\bar{n}_{k}^{AB} + 1) \log_{2}(\bar{n}_{k}^{AB} + 1) - \bar{n}_{k}^{AB} \log_{2}\bar{n}_{k}^{AB} \right] - (\bar{n}^{AB|B} + 1) \log_{2}(\bar{n}^{AB|B} + 1) - \bar{n}^{AB|B} \log_{2}\bar{n}^{AB|B},$$
(5)

where  $\bar{n} = (\mu - 1)/2$ , with  $\mu$  representing the symplectic eigenvalues.



## Theoretical notes - Security of practical CV-QKD

Taking into account the need to estimate the channel parameters, the covariance matrices are altered to:

$$\gamma_{\varepsilon} = \begin{bmatrix} (1+2\langle n \rangle) \mathbb{I}_{2} & t_{\min} Z \sigma_{z} \\ t_{\min} Z \sigma_{z} & (2t_{\min}^{2} \langle n \rangle + \sigma_{\max}^{2}) \mathbb{I}_{2} \end{bmatrix}, \tag{6}$$


and:


$$\gamma_{AB|B_{\varepsilon}} = \left(1 + 2\langle n \rangle - \frac{t_{\min}^2 Z^2}{2t_{\min}^2 \langle n \rangle + 1 + \sigma_{\max}^2}\right) \mathbb{I}_2. \tag{7}$$

 $t_{\min}$  is the minimum value of  $t=\sqrt{\frac{T}{2}}$  except with a probability of  $\Delta/2$ .  $\sigma_{\max}^2$  is the maximum value of  $\sigma^2=1+\frac{T}{2}\varepsilon$  except with a probability of  $\Delta/2$ .



## Simulation - Block diagram






Two independent noise sources are considered:

- Thermal noise.
- Shot noise.



### Simulation - Detector noise characterization

The first results presented here pertain to a noise variance characterization of the simulated homodyne receiver:




The simulation results closely follow the theoretical expectation values for all the studied power levels. The linear stage of the detector is seen to start at a Local Oscillator optical input power of -15 dBm.





### Simulation - Secret key generation rate

Following the noise characterization, the secret key generation rate of the simulation was evaluated and compared to the theoretical expectation values:




The simulation results closely follow the theoretical curve just until when the curve starts to quickly tend to 0, at which point they diverge.





## **Experimental results - Experimental system**










## **Experimental results - Output data processing**

The following digital signal processing was employed:





- The IQ imbalances are removed by applying a Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process.
- The phase drift is compensated by measuring the relative phase between the two lasers and removing that value from the decoded results.
- The secret key rate is estimated through the finite size analysis method presented above.



# **Experimental** results - Phase drift compensation

The phase drift compensation scheme was tested.










## Experimental results - Detector noise characterization

A shot noise characterization of the detector was performed




- The linear was stage was found to be below  $\langle n \rangle \sim 4 \times 10^6$ .
- Our detector has a very short linear stage, not ideal for this application.
- Shot Noise Units (SNU) conversion factor was obtained.





The system's performance was evaluated for 4 different setups, utilizing a single/double laser setup coupled with either a direct connection or a 10 km transmission channel. The secret key rate was estimated through the finite size analysis presented before.




$\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$	0.074	
	Theoretical	Experimental
$\overline{T}$	Efficiency	0.9519
$\overline{K}$	0.0288	0.0213

Single laser, BTB recovered constellation





The system's performance was evaluated for 4 different setups, utilizing a single/double laser setup coupled with either a direct connection or a 10 km transmission channel. The secret key rate was estimated through the finite size analysis presented before.




$\varepsilon$	0.0156	
	Theoretical	Experimental
$\overline{T}$	0.4547	0.4317
$\overline{K}$	0.0132	0.0094

Single laser, 10 km recovered constellation





The system's performance was evaluated for 4 different setups, utilizing a single/double laser setup coupled with either a direct connection or a 10 km transmission channel. The secret key rate was estimated through the finite size analysis presented before.




$\varepsilon$	2.9915	
	Theoretical	Experimental
$\overline{T}$	$\sim$ 0.95	0.9557
$\overline{K}$	Negative	-0.8011

Double laser, BTB recovered constellation





The system's performance was evaluated for 4 different setups, utilizing a single/double laser setup coupled with either a direct connection or a 10 km transmission channel. The secret key rate was estimated through the finite size analysis presented before.



$\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$	2.8196	
	Theoretical	Experimental
$\overline{T}$	0.4547	0.4282
K	Negative	-0.4769

double laser, 10 km recovered constellation



