Prisoner's Dilemma

This is code for me to explore strategies for iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas. I was motivated by prase on LessWrong, inspired by Axelrod's famous tournaments.

Interesting reading: http://lesswrong.com/lw/7f2/prisoners_dilemma_tournament_results/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution_of_cooperation

On the LW post, JamesAndrix suggested a rock-paper-scissors dynamic between defecting tit-for-tat variants. wedrifid points out that a TFT(n+1)D will always thrive against a TFT(n)D. My first agenda item is investigating how those populations interact under different evolutionary settings.

	Failed to load latest commit information.
	test
	README.md
	anti_social.rb
	defecting_tit_for_tat.rb
	match.rb
	round_robin.rb
	strategy.rb
	tit_for_tat.rb

danielharan/prisoners_dilemma

README.md

Prisoner's Dilemma