An exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems with compensation and the power market uplift problem

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Mathematical cheat sheet, October 7, 2017

This document summarizes the mathematical formulation for easier reference of the GAMS implementation provided at http://danielhuppmann.github.io/binary_equilibrium/. All equation numbers are identical to those in the published version of the manuscript.

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Theoretical formulation (Section 3.4)

$$\min_{\substack{x_i, y_i, \widetilde{y}_i^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_i)}, \widetilde{\lambda}_i^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_i)} \\ \kappa_i^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_i)}, \zeta^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_i)}}} F\left(\left(x_i, y_i\right)_{i \in I}\right) + G\left(\left(\zeta_i^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_i)}\right)_{i \in I}\right) \tag{14a}$$

s.t.
$$\nabla_{y_i} f_i \left(\mathbf{1}, \widetilde{y}_i^{(\mathbf{1})}, y_{-i} \right) + \left(\widetilde{\lambda}_i^{(\mathbf{1})} \right)^T \nabla_{y_i} g_i \left(\mathbf{1}, \widetilde{y}_i^{(\mathbf{1})} \right) = 0$$
 (14b)

$$0 \le -g_i \left(\mathbf{1}, \widetilde{y}_i^{(1)} \right) \perp \widetilde{\lambda}_i^{(1)} \ge 0 \tag{14c}$$

$$\nabla_{y_i} f_i \left(\mathbf{0}, \widetilde{y}_i^{(\mathbf{0})}, y_{-i} \right) + \left(\widetilde{\lambda}_i^{(\mathbf{0})} \right)^T \nabla_{y_i} g_i \left(\mathbf{0}, \widetilde{y}_i^{(\mathbf{0})} \right) = 0$$
 (14d)

$$0 \le -g_i(\mathbf{0}, \widetilde{y}_i^{(\mathbf{0})}) \perp \widetilde{\lambda}_i^{(\mathbf{0})} \ge 0 \tag{14e}$$

$$f_i(\mathbf{1}, y_i^{(1)}, y_{-i}) + \kappa_i^{(1)} - \zeta_i^{(1)} - \kappa_i^{(0)} + \zeta_i^{(0)} = f_i(\mathbf{0}, y_i^{(0)}, y_{-i})$$
 (14f)

$$\kappa_i^{(1)} + \zeta_i^{(1)} \le x_i \, \widetilde{K} \tag{14g}$$

$$\kappa_i^{(\mathbf{0})} + \zeta_i^{(\mathbf{0})} \le (1 - x_i) \, \widetilde{K} \tag{14h}$$

$$\widetilde{y}_i^{(\mathbf{0})} - x_i \, \widetilde{K} \le y_i \le \widetilde{y}_i^{(\mathbf{0})} + x_i \, \widetilde{K}$$
 (14i)

$$\widetilde{y}_{i}^{(1)} - (1 - x_{i}) \widetilde{K} \leq y_{i} \leq \widetilde{y}_{i}^{(1)} + (1 - x_{i}) \widetilde{K} \quad (14j)$$

$$x_{i} \in \{0, 1\}, (y_{i}, \widetilde{y}_{i}^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_{i})}) \in \mathbb{R}^{3m}, (\lambda_{i}^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_{i})}, \kappa_{i}^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_{i})}, \zeta_{i}^{(\overline{\mathbf{x}}_{i})}) \in \mathbb{R}^{2k+4}$$

The power market application (Section 4)

The generator's optimization problem

Each generator $i \in I$ seeks to maximize her profits from generating and selling electricity over the time horizon $t \in T$:

$$\min_{x_{ti}, y_{ti}, z_{ti}^{\text{on}}, z_{ti}^{\text{off}}} - p_{tn(i)} y_{ti} + c_i^G y_{ti} + c_i^{\text{on}} z_{ti}^{\text{on}} + c_i^{\text{off}} z_{ti}^{\text{off}}$$
(16a)

s.t.
$$x_{ti}g_i^{min} \le y_{ti} \le x_{ti}g_i^{max} \quad (\alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}}, \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}})$$
 (16b)
 $x_{ti} - x_{(t-1)i} = z_{ti}^{\text{on}} - z_{ti}^{\text{off}}$ (16c)

$$x_{ti} - x_{(t-1)i} = z_{ti}^{\text{on}} - z_{ti}^{\text{off}}$$
 (16c)

$$x_{ti} \in \{0, 1\}, \quad y_{ti}, z_{ti}^{\text{on}}, z_{ti}^{\text{off}} \in \mathbb{R}_+$$

Demand for electricity and network constraints

The other side of the market is a player seeking to maximize the welfare (utility) of consumers while guaranteeing feasibility of the transmission system, given locational marginal prices p_{tn} . A set of units $j \in J$ consume electricity (load d_{tj}), each located at a specific node n(j). The sets I_n and J_n are the generators and load units located at node n, respectively. There are a set of power lines $l \in L$ connecting the nodes; the direct-current load flow (DCLF) characteristics are captured using the susceptance matrix B_{nm} (node-to-node) and network transfer matrix H_{nl} (node-to-line mapping). This approach is equivalent to a power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) matrix.

$$\min_{d_{tj},\delta_{tn}} \sum_{j \in J} p_{tn(j)} \left(d_{tj} + \sum_{m \in N} B_{nm} \delta_{tm} \right) - u_{tj}^D d_{tj}$$
(18a)

s.t.
$$d_{tj}^{max} - d_{tj} \ge 0 \quad (\nu_{tj})$$
 (18b)

$$f_l^{max} - \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{tl}^+)$$
 (18c)

$$f_l^{max} - \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{tl}^+)$$
 (18c)
 $f_l^{max} + \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{tl}^-)$ (18d)
 $\pi - \delta_{tn} \ge 0 \quad (\xi_{tn}^+)$ (18e)

$$\pi - \delta_{tn} \ge 0 \quad (\xi_{tn}^+) \tag{18e}$$

$$\pi + \delta_{tn} \ge 0 \quad (\xi_{tn}^-) \tag{18f}$$

$$\delta_{t\hat{n}} = 0 \quad (\gamma_t) \tag{18g}$$

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Sets & Mappings
    n, m \in N
                      ... nodes
    t \in T
                      ... time step, hours
    i \in I
                      ... generators, power plant units
    j \in J
                      ... load, demand units
    l \in L
                      ... power lines
    i \in I_n, j \in J_n ... generator/load unit mapping to node n
                      ... node mapping to generator i/load unit j
    n(i), n(j)
    \phi\in\Phi
                      ... set of dispatch options (schedules) for each generator
    t \in T_{\phi}
                      ... hours in which a generator is active in dispatch option \phi
Primal variables
                      \dots on/off decision for generator i in hour t
    x_{ti}
    z_{ti}^{\,\mathrm{on}},z_{ti}^{\,\mathrm{off}}
                      ... inter-temporal start-up/shut-down decision
                      \dots actual generation by generator i in hour t
    y_{ti}
    y_{ti}^{\,\mathrm{on}}
                      ... generation if binary variable is fixed at \overline{\mathbf{x}}_{\mathbf{i}}
    d_{tj}
                      \dots demand by unit j in hour t
    \delta_{tn}
                      ... voltage angle
Dual variables
    \alpha_{ti}^{\,\mathrm{on}}, \beta_{ti}^{\,\mathrm{on}}
                      ... dual to minimum activity/maximum generation capacity
                      ... dual to maximum load constraint
    \nu_{tj}
                      ... dual to voltage angle band constraints
    \mu_{tl}^+, \mu_{tl}^-
    \xi_{tn}^+, \xi_{tn}^-
                      ... dual to thermal line capacity constraints
                      ... dual to slack bus constraints
Switch and compensation variables
                      \dots locational marginal price
    p_{tn}
    \kappa_{ti}^{\,\mathrm{on}},\kappa_{ti}^{\,\mathrm{off}}
                      ... switch value (defined per time step)
    \zeta_i
                      ... compensation payment (defined over entire time horizon)
Parameters
    c_i^G
                      ... linear generation costs
    c_i^{\text{on}}, c_i^{\text{off}}
c_\phi^D
g_i^{min}
                      ... start-up/shut-down costs
                      ... commitment costs in dispatch option \phi (start-up, shut-down)
                      ... minimum activity level if power plant is online
    g_i^{max}
g_i^{init}
x_i^{init}
u_{tj}^D
d_{tj}^{max}
f_l^{max}
                      ... maximum generation capacity
                      ... power plant status at start of model horizon (t = 0)
                      \dots utility of demand unit j for using electricity
                      \dots maximum load of unit j
                      \dots thermal capacity of power line l
     B_{nk}, H_{lk}
                      ... line/node susceptance/network transfer matrices
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Table 2: Notation for the nodal power market problem

The bi-level multi-objective program

$$\min \sum_{t \in T} \left[\sum_{i \in I} c_i^G y_{ti} + c_i^{\text{on}} z_{ti}^{\text{on}} + c_i^{\text{off}} z_{ti}^{\text{off}} - \sum_{j \in J} u_{tj}^D d_{tj} \right] + \sum_{i \in I} \zeta_i$$
 (20a)

s.t.
$$\sum_{j \in J_n} d_{tj} - \sum_{i \in I_n} y_{ti} + \sum_{m \in N} B_{nm} \delta_{tm} = 0$$
 (20b)

$$0 \le -u_{tj}^D + p_{tn(j)} + \nu_{tj} \quad \perp \quad d_{tj} \ge 0$$
 (19a)

$$0 = \sum_{m \in N} B_{mn} p_{tm} + \sum_{l \in L} H_{ln} \left(\mu_{tl}^{+} - \mu_{tl}^{-} \right)$$

$$+\xi_{tn}^{+} - \xi_{tn}^{-} - \begin{cases} \gamma_t & \text{if } n = \hat{n} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases} , \quad \delta_{tn} \text{ (free)}$$

$$0 \le d_{tj}^{max} - d_{tj} \perp \nu_{tj} \ge 0$$

$$(19b)$$

$$0 \le d_{tj}^{max} - d_{tj} \quad \perp \quad \nu_{tj} \ge 0 \tag{19c}$$

$$0 \le f_l^{max} - \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \quad \perp \quad \mu_{tl}^+ \ge 0 \tag{19d}$$

$$0 \le f_l^{max} + \sum_{n \in N} H_{ln} \delta_{tn} \quad \perp \quad \mu_{tl}^- \ge 0 \tag{19e}$$

$$0 \le \pi - \delta_{tn} \quad \bot \quad \xi_{tn}^+ \ge 0 \tag{19f}$$

$$0 \le \pi + \delta_{tn} \quad \bot \quad \xi_{tn}^- \ge 0 \tag{19g}$$

$$0 = \delta_{t\hat{n}}$$
 , γ_t (free) (19h)

$$0 = c_i^G - p_{tn(i)} + \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} - \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}} \quad , \quad y_{ti}^{\text{on}} \text{ (free)}$$
 (17a)

$$0 \leq -g_{ti}^{min} + y_{ti}^{\text{on}} \quad \perp \quad \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}} \geq 0$$

$$0 \leq g_{ti}^{max} - y_{ti}^{\text{on}} \quad \perp \quad \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} \geq 0$$

$$(17b)$$

$$0 \le g_{ti}^{max} - y_{ti}^{\text{on}} \quad \perp \quad \beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} \ge 0 \tag{17c}$$

$$x_{(t-1)i} + z_{ti}^{\text{on}} - z_{ti}^{\text{off}} = x_{ti}$$
 (21a)

$$\beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{max} - \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{min} - \kappa_{ti}^{\text{on}} + \kappa_{ti}^{\text{off}} = 0$$
(21b)

$$|\kappa_{ti}^{\,\text{on}}| \le x_{ti}\,\widetilde{K} \tag{21c}$$

$$|\kappa_{ti}^{\text{off}}| \le (1 - x_{ti})\,\widetilde{K} \tag{21d}$$

$$\sum_{t \in T} \left[\kappa_{ti}^{\text{on}} - c_i^{\text{on}} z_{ti}^{\text{on}} - c_i^{\text{off}} z_{ti}^{\text{off}} \right] + \zeta_i \ge$$

$$\sum_{t \in T_{t}} \left[\beta_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{max} - \alpha_{ti}^{\text{on}} g_{ti}^{min} \right] - c_{\phi i}^{D} \quad \forall \ \phi \in \Phi$$
 (21e)

$$0 \le y_{ti} \le x_{ti} g_{ti}^{max} \tag{21f}$$

$$y_{ti}^{\text{on}} - (1 - x_{ti}) g_{ti}^{max} \le y_{ti} \le y_{ti}^{\text{on}} + (1 - x_{ti}) g_{ti}^{max}$$
 (21g)