# Long-term Portfolio Choice with the Presence of a Liquidity Friction

Summer School Market Microstructure 2021

UvA, Macro and International Economics



Introduction
Motivation

Pension funds, endowment funds, etc. investing in asset classes that are illiquid even over large investment horizons...

- Hedge Fund lock-up periods;
- Private Equity, Infrastructure Funds exited usually once they mature;

- Examine portfolio allocation in a dynamic setting when part of the asset mix is illiquid;
- Examine how significant should illiqidity concerns be for long term investors;
- Quantify the cost of illiquidity in certainty equivalent terms;

## Model

Model based on Ang, Papanikolaou, Westerfield (2014) as an extension to Merton (1971, 1973)

- Continuous time;
- Liquidity is exogenous and random: an illiquid asset cannot be traded for periods of random length;
- Quantify illiquidity through the average time one needs to wait between transactions: a Poisson Process governs tradability;
- The investor can consume out of liquid wealth only

- Investment choice:
  - Liquid Wealth  $W_t$ , consisting of a risk-free asset  $(1 \theta_t)$  and a liquid risky asset  $(\theta_t)$
  - ullet Illiquid wealth  $X_t$  consisting of a risky asset
  - Rebalancing between liquid and illiquid wealth through cash withdrawals  $dl_t$
- Agent optimizes lifetime utility of consumption

$$V(W_t, X_t) = \sup_{\theta_s, dI_s, c_s} E_t \int_t^{\infty} e^{-\beta(s-t)} u(C_s) ds$$

Subject to the wealth constraints

$$dW_{t}/W_{t} = (r + (\mu_{1} - r)\theta_{t} - c_{t})dt + \theta_{t}\sigma_{1}dZ_{1t} - dI_{t}/W_{t}$$
$$dX_{t}/X_{t} = \mu_{2}dt + \sigma_{2}\rho dZ_{1t} + \sigma_{2}\sqrt{1 - \rho^{2}}dZ_{2t} + dI_{t}/X_{t}$$

Using CRRA Utility  $u(C_s) = \frac{C_s^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$  we can write


$$V(W_t, X_t) = (X_t + W_t)^{1-\gamma} H(\xi_t)$$

where  $\xi_t = \frac{X_t}{X_t + W_t}$  and whenever liquidity is available, the investor reshuffles the portfolio such that


$$\xi^* = \arg\max_{\xi} H(\xi)$$

#### Solution Approach

- Discretize and solve numerically through Dynamic Programming techniques.
- $\xi_t$  is both a stochastic state variable and a decision variable whenever liquidity is available.





Continuous trading (dashed lines) vs. one-year (solid curve) vs. ten-year friction (dotted curve)



#### ─ Model Implications

#### Holdings and Cost Sensitivity







### Model Implications

Asset Classes

Asset Class	$1/\eta$	р	$\mu_2$	$\sigma_2$	$\frac{\mu_2-r}{\sigma_2}$	ρ
Public Equity	-		5.5	14.0	39.1	1.00
LT Gov. Bonds	-		2.5	12.8	4.0	(0.35)
Municipal Bonds	0.50	63.2%	3.5	5.1	67.9	(0.01)
HF - Multi-strategy	0.90	42.6%	4.3	7.5	56.4	0.08
HF - ED	1.01	39.0%	4.8	9.0	52.6	0.66
HF - Long Bias	0.90	42.6%	4.8	10.5	45.0	0.80
HF - Relative Value	0.68	52.1%	4.5	7.0	64.0	0.86
HF - Global Macro	0.59	57.1%	3.8	7.0	53.3	0.68
Private Equity	4.00	11.8%	7.3	21.0	34.4	0.82
Direct Real Estate	9.00	5.4%	5.3	10.8	48.7	0.30
Infrastructure	55.00	0.9%	6.3	11.8	53.0	0.30

	$CEC(\xi^*)$	$\pi_1; \ \theta^*(1-\xi^*)$	$\pi_2;\xi^*$	$E[\theta(1-\xi)]$	<i>Ε</i> [ξ]
Public Equity	2.5	29.8	-		
LT Gov. Bonds	2.7	35.8	18.9		
Municipal Bonds	3.2	29.7	72.3	29.4	73.2
HF - Multi-strategy	2.6	13.5	26.7	12.9	27.7
HF - ED	2.8	10.4	44.8	9.7	46.6
HF - Long Bias	2.6	13.5	26.7	12.9	27.7
HF - Relative Value	3.1	-	80.9	-	82.6
HF - Global Macro	2.6	17.6	34.9	17.4	35.5
Private Equity	2.6	15.5	9.6	15.5	12.2
Direct Real Estate	2.8	25.3	18.0	20.4	33.8
Infrastructure	2.6	28.3	4.7	13.3	55.3